

# AJS

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
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
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## **IN THIS ISSUE**

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4. With more than one reference to an author in the same year, distinguish them by use of letters (*a*, *b*) attached to the year of publication: (1965*a*).
5. Enclose a series of references with a single pair of parentheses, separated by semicolons: (Duncan 1959; Gouldner 1963; Lipset 1964, pp. 61-65).
6. Format for references to machine-readable data files is:

Davis, James Allan. 1978. GSS (General Social Survey). NORC ed. Chicago: NORC. Distributed by Roper Public Opinion Research Center, New Haven, Conn.

**Format of References:** List all items, including machine-readable data files (MRDF), alphabetically by author (providing the full list of multiple authors) and, within author(s), by year of publication, in an appendix titled "REFERENCES." For examples, see text of articles in this issue.

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# **Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s<sup>1</sup>**

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Changes in corporate governance practices can be analyzed by linking the adaptations of individual firms to the structures of the networks in which firms' decision makers are embedded. Network structures determine the speed of adaptation and ultimate patterns of prevalence of governance practices by exposing a firm to particular role models and standards of appropriateness. The authors compare the spreads of two governance innovations adopted in response to the 1980s takeover wave: poison pills (which spread rapidly through a board-to-board diffusion process) and golden parachutes (which spread slowly through geographic proximity). The study closes with a discussion of networks as links between individual adaptation and collective structures.

Researchers examining organizational adaptation to changing institutional environments have documented the spread and persistence of discrete practices and structures across organizational fields, including the multidivisional form (Fligstein 1985), corporate diversification (Fligstein 1990), accounting standards (Mezias 1990), and corporate affirmative action offices (Edelman 1992), among others. In many accounts, these practices are not adopted by organizations as social atoms but rather through a process of social construction by networks of managers groping to respond to changes in the legal and political environment (Dobbin et al. 1993). While networks are often part of the explanation, however, they are rarely examined explicitly as the link between the actions of particular organizations and the collective structure that results.

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This article explores an approach to linking individual adaptation and collective structure through structural embeddedness in networks (Granovetter 1985). We consider the corporation as a governance structure—a set of contracts—and examine how two forms of social proximity (based in interlocking boards of directors and geographic proximity) influenced the evolution of the terms of those contracts during the takeover wave of the 1980s, a point when the governance regime for large American corporations was being renegotiated (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Useem 1996). Using the literatures on neoinstitutionalism and diffusion through networks as points of departure, we argue that both structural embeddedness—the configuration of the networks in which firms are embedded—and cultural embeddedness—in particular the repertoire of accounts available to the firms' decision makers to justify actions—shape individual actions and the process of aggregation. At the micro level, decision makers in firms are discriminating in whom they look to when determining the appropriateness of a given practice; whom they look to varies with the content of the practice. In other words, not all referents count the same, and some referents are more appropriate for deciding about some practices than about others. At the macro level, the configuration of the networks shapes the process by which individual choices aggregate into the overall structure of the field.

We develop our account by examining the spread of two particular governance practices, the golden parachute and the poison pill, among the several hundred largest industrial corporations in the United States during the 1980s. Both pills and parachutes were adopted by the boards of a majority of large U.S. corporations during this time in response to the wave of hostile takeovers. Golden parachutes are contracts that award generous severance packages (typically three years' salary) to top executives whose employment ends following a takeover. Poison pills are securities that prohibitively raise the cost of hostile takeovers (those made without gaining the approval of the target's board of directors) by giving target shareholders the right to buy shares at a 50% discount if an acquirer passes a certain ownership threshold. At the time it appeared, the pill was considered the strongest available defense against hostile takeover. Several studies have documented that the individual profiles of firms adopting both tend to be similar—in short, firms that were most susceptible to takeover and where executives stood to lose the most if the firms were acquired were likely to have each (e.g., Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat 1990; Davis 1991). But the dynamics of adoption were quite different (see fig. 1). The pill spread extremely quickly: in under three years, adoption of the strategy grew from 5% to 50% of firms. In contrast, it took seven years for the use of parachutes to grow from 5% to 50% of firms.




FIG. 1.—Diffusion of poison pills and golden parachutes among 1986 Fortune 500 firms, 1980–89.

Comparing the divergent processes by which pills and parachutes spread is particularly informative because, absent a controlled experiment, these practices are as similar on important dimensions as one is likely to encounter in the real world. Both pills and parachutes were initially controversial practices that were eventually adopted by most (50% or more) major corporations. Moreover, both were adopted at the sole discretion of boards of directors. Thus, the experiences of corporate directors, either through the direct exposure of serving on other boards that had contemplated these innovations or by observing what other corporations had done from a distance, were immediately relevant to their adoption decisions, and prior evidence suggests that boards were influenced by network contacts in considering the poison pill (Davis 1991). But though the decision makers were the same and the practices very similar, pills and parachutes differ in intriguing ways that make their comparison particularly valuable. The earliest evidence on pills indicated that they were harmful to shareholders (SEC 1986). The reason is straightforward: shareholders typically get windfalls of upward of 50% when the firm they own is taken over, and pills could in principle be used by managers of a corporation to deprive shareholders of this windfall, thereby giving themselves the corporate equivalent of tenure. In contrast, the evidence on parachutes suggested that they increased share price (Lambert and

Larcker 1985), the rationale being that parachutes allowed managers to negotiate the best deal for shareholders without having to worry about their own financial well-being after the takeover. In light of this, one would have expected directors concerned with shareholder welfare to rush to implement parachutes but to be extremely wary of pills; yet quite the opposite happened. As this article demonstrates, structural embeddedness provides an explanation for this puzzle.

This article makes four contributions. First, it contributes to the recent literature on changes in governance regimes by examining how large corporations changed practices in response to the takeover wave of the 1980s. This period has been characterized as a shift from "managerial capitalism" to "investor capitalism" (Useem 1996). Further, by unpacking some of the microstructural changes made by managers of individual corporations, we hope to contribute to an understanding of the macrochanges that took place. Second, Hedström (1994, p. 1177) notes that "much more analytical work is needed on the role of multiplex networks, particularly on how multiple, overlapping networks of varying density and reach are likely to influence the diffusion of information." This article takes one step toward that goal by simultaneously analyzing the effects of the board interlock network and the geographical proximity of firms.<sup>2</sup> Third, we do so by using unusually comprehensive time-series data on a large network of corporations over several years. This stands in contrast to most diffusion data, which is plagued by incomplete network data or imprecise information on the timing of adoption (e.g., the canonical data on physician adoption of Tetracycline, originally reported in Coleman, Katz, and Menzel [1966] and reanalyzed by Burt [1987], Marsden and Podolny [1990], and Strang and Tuma [1993]). Fourth, although Rogers notes that there have been approximately 4,000 papers on diffusion—which warrants extreme caution in undertaking another one—"There have been relatively few studies of how the social or communication structure affects the diffusion or adoption of innovations in a system. It is a rather tricky business to untangle the effects of a system's structure on diffusion, independent from the effects of the characteristics of individuals that make up the system" (Rogers 1995, p. 25). Marsden and Friedkin (1993) review several recent studies of network influences, noting some of the methodological problems raised by these studies and suggesting alternative designs (e.g., using longitudinal data sets). Recent statistical innovations have dealt with several of the problems with prior studies quite effectively (Strang and Tuma 1993; Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995) and allow researchers to distinguish

<sup>2</sup> Prior studies have looked at multiple network measures (Burt 1987; Strang and Tuma 1993) or multiple origins of influence (Greve 1995, 1996), but still with only one network transmitting the influence.

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the individual characteristics that affect adoption from network effects on adoption, as well as discerning who decision makers look to in order to judge the appropriateness of a practice (cf. Burt 1987).

The article is organized as follows: We first discuss recent neoinstitutional work on changes in governance practices and link it to the broader literature on diffusion of innovations. We then describe how takeovers prompted a reordering of the governance practices of large corporations in the 1980s and describe the practices we study and the networks through which they spread. We present analyses of the diffusion of these practices, finding that different alters mattered differently for the two practices and speculating on how their normative statuses conditioned how they spread. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the microstructural bases for changes in governance regimes in the United States.

### CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

How organizational fields come to have particular governance regimes is an underdeveloped topic in organizational sociology. Governance regimes are “combinations of specific organizational forms, including markets, corporate hierarchies, associations, and networks . . . that coordinate economic activity among organizations in an industry or economic sector” (Campbell and Lindberg 1990, p. 636). In the United States, governance regimes are largely constructed from the ground up, by individual organizations adopting discrete practices and structures. This is because American corporate law is enabling rather than mandatory (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991): the state (or, more accurately, states; see Abzug and Mezias 1993) rarely requires specific forms, but issues broad directives to be interpreted by the managers of organizations, individually or collectively (Edelman 1992).

If U.S. corporate law is a blank slate, and if managers of organizations can in principle assemble highly customized structures ideally suited to their situation, then why—to paraphrase DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148)—are there so few types of organizations? Recent work on the effect of legal changes on organizational structures has provided useful guidance by examining how organizations respond when old practices are proscribed or when new types of practices are required to meet demands in the legal environment. Fligstein (1990) examined how large businesses responded to changes in antitrust law, as horizontal and then vertical integration were limited as legal means to achieve corporate growth, finding that new approaches (e.g., diversification) were typically initiated by deviant innovators and then spread to become essentially conventional wisdom. Edelman (1992) examined the spread of employment practices in

the wake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, arguing that the meaning of compliance was sufficiently vague that organizations were called on to define it themselves. Forms of compliance that were sufficient to meet legal demands but encroached least on managerial power and interests (e.g., adopting formal rules against employment discrimination) were most likely to spread widely. Dobbin et al. (1993) studied the diffusion of internal labor market practices, finding them to be spread through personnel professionals in response to equal employment opportunity laws. And Abzug and Mezias (1993) looked at the failure of comparable worth protections ("equal pay for comparable work") to spread widely, arguing that the failure of comparable worth legal reforms at the federal level left reformers to focus on local levels with varying success, resulting in fairly minimal organizational change.

The collective implication of these studies is that changes in the legal environment create problems for organizations, either by creating new demands or limiting their repertoire for action. In response, fields of organizations experiment with new solutions that, once they meet a minimum standard of acceptability in the eyes of the courts or other relevant constituencies, diffuse widely. Yet the process of aggregation is not well defined. How, exactly, do organizations engage in this collective enterprise? Who are the relevant decision makers, and what leads them to decide what practices will meet the minimum standard of appropriateness? If the major motivation is the "quest for legitimacy" (Edelman 1990, p. 1403) employing organizational structures as symbols to "demonstrate appropriateness and rationality" (Sutton et al. 1994, p. 948), then who constitutes the audience for these acts? Moreover, what is the source for models of legitimate practices?

Some order is brought to this jumble of questions by Scott's (1995, chap. 3) typology distinguishing three "pillars" of institutions and their related bases of legitimacy. Scott defines institutions as "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures that provide stability and meaning to social behavior" (p. 33). The cognitive approach focuses on the actors' shared frameworks of interpretation, which allow them to acquire a common definition of the situation. Thus, legitimacy comes from adopting a common frame of reference consistent with the one that prevails in a social system. The normative conception is more evaluative in nature, and legitimacy takes on a moral tone—doing what others expect as "appropriate" for one's role. The regulative view looks to formal and informal rules as constraining and regularizing behavior, and legitimacy consists in conforming to those rules. Evidence for the legitimacy of an organizational practice (and thus what those seeking it would look for) differ according to which aspect of institutions is featured: conformity to laws and other rules for the regulative pillar, moral endorsement or certification that one meets the obliga-

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tions of one's role for the normative pillar, and following the prevalent practices in one's field for the cognitive pillar.

Legitimacy can be thought of as a perception or assumption that a practice meets some minimum constraint (Suchman 1995). But practices and structures do not spread simply because they are legitimate, but because organizational decision makers regard them as acceptable solutions to the particular problems they face (Scott 1995, p. 143). Matching problems with solutions is problematic because solutions are too abundant: managers are deluged with plausible-sounding but often contradictory "best practices," each with convincing evidence in the form of vivid case studies—culture, quality, reengineering, financial restructuring, downsizing, and so on. Recognizing genuinely best practices amid this inadvertent welter is an imposing task, particularly given that it is almost always easier to find out whether a practice was adopted than whether it subsequently worked as advertised (Greve 1996). Under these conditions, as the vast literature on the diffusion of innovation attests, managers will look to the experiences of others—alters—to determine what is appropriate (see Rogers's [1995] comprehensive review). Alters that are closest in social distance—those in direct contact or those who occupy a similar role—provide the most vivid models (Burt 1987), although the process by which organizations determine the relevant reference set is somewhat underspecified (Scott 1995, p. 123). Alters that are most similar to the focal organization are the most likely to be influential, particularly when their status is high (e.g., because of their prior success or centrality). Moreover, the relevant alters will vary with the type of practice, depending on what type of logic is driving the action and who the relevant audience is.

If adjustments are strongly influenced by what local alters do, then what explains their tendencies to flow in the same direction, militating in favor of "isomorphism" across fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983)? First, network structures—the density of ties among individual actors and the aggregate structure created by those ties—determine the route and speed with which practices will spread. Practices will spread more rapidly in dense networks than in thin ones, just as viruses spread faster in urban areas than in rural ones. And, as is well known (e.g., Burt 1982), practices that start at the center will spread faster and farther than those that start at the periphery. Thus, knowing the structure of the network is necessary to map the spread of practices and their ultimate prevalence.

Second, cultural embeddedness enables some practices by giving ready accounts to justify them and constrains others by providing a limited menu of rationales. Accounts explaining how practices help actors rationally pursue some valued goal are an important condition for diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1994), but which kinds of accounts are acceptable depends on the culture of the social system and the content of the practice.

The network is a “community of practice” with its own more-or-less shared understandings (ideologies, assumptions, scripts, norms) that form a background for constructing economic strategies and goals and that determine what will count as appropriate or deviant (Hirsch 1986; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). Normatively appropriate practices that fit with the cultural backdrop of a network spread faster and farther than deviant ones—which may in fact be more efficient—in part because they are taken up early on by central actors or opinion leaders, whose actions weigh more heavily in individual judgments (Burt 1982, pp. 199–201).

This brief account summarizes how the literatures on diffusion and embeddedness can help link individual action and collective outcomes, an association that has not been addressed in prior research on governance practices. In the wake of changes in the legal environment, decision makers in organizations look to what those that are proximate to them—socially or spatially—are doing, as well as what the most central or visible actors in the system are doing. Practices that have a ready rationale and are sufficiently convincing to outside constituencies are adopted by organizations that are central in the relevant network and spread quickly through direct contact. Practices that lack a legitimating account spread either slowly among peripheral organizations or not at all. The structure of the diffusion network will condition whether and when practices spread widely. We next turn to a discussion of the corporate environment of the 1980s, a period of considerable ferment in governance practices.

#### TAKEOVERS AND GOVERNANCE CHANGES IN THE 1980s

Times of turbulent change are particularly useful for studying the construction and spread of new practices, and the 1980s was a decade of turbulent change for American corporations. The relations between those who own and control large U.S. corporations—shareholders, managers, and boards of directors—underwent what was arguably an epochal transition in the 1980s and early 1990s, from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one of “investor capitalism” (Useem 1996). The traditional American system of corporate governance was marked by the separation of ownership and control made famous by Berle and Means in 1932, with dispersed (and powerless) shareholders having essentially no voice in running the firm while concentrated (and powerful) managers exercised great discretion. According to the traditional account, managers faced little constraint from the directors charged with overseeing them in the shareholders’ interest, as directors were typically selected by the managers themselves. This traditional system of managerial capitalism was challenged first by the wave of hostile takeovers, in which nearly one-third of the largest public corporations were subject to outside takeovers, and second by the

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rise of shareholder activism, in which investors (primarily pension funds) demanded a greater voice in issues of corporate governance (Useem 1996). The result has been a widespread fixation on the creation of shareholder value to the virtual exclusion of other, potentially competing, corporate goals.

Takeovers were the most dramatic force for bringing about changes in the governance practices of corporations in the 1980s. Takeovers are usually accomplished by outside raiders making a “tender offer”: shareholders of the target firm are approached with an offer to buy their shares at a significant premium—typically upward of 50% over the market price. Tender offers made without gaining the approval of the board of directors are considered hostile. The standard theory holds that corporations are prone to being taken over when their share price is low due to poor management (Manne 1965). Tender offers allow outsiders to unilaterally buy control of the firm and oust the directors and the managers who were presumably responsible for the firm’s poor performance. The interests of the different constituencies in a takeover are straightforward: shareholders benefit from takeovers because they get a premium for tendering their shares; raiders benefit by “rehabilitating” the business; and managers typically lose their jobs (Gilson and Black 1995). During the 1980s, conglomerate firms operating businesses in several industries were the most frequent takeover targets because the sum of the value of the parts, typically sold to buyers in the same industries, was worth more than the stock market price of the whole. This “bust-up value” allowed raiders to make money simply by buying conglomerates and selling off the component businesses (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994).

Changes in the legal environment were crucial in bringing about the takeover wave. First, the vast majority of firms were at least partially protected from hostile takeovers prior to 1982 by state corporate laws. These laws were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Edgar vs. MITE*. Second, the Justice Department issued revised merger guidelines in 1982 that significantly lowered the regulatory barriers to within-industry mergers. This made it much easier for raiders to find interested buyers for the parts of conglomerates they intended to bust up, as it was now possible for firms to buy competitors that were off-limits during the previous decades.<sup>1</sup>

Corporate managers and directors were the critical decision makers in

<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the governance innovations previously discussed (e.g., Edelman 1992; Dobbin et al. 1993), the legal environment for poison pills and golden parachutes was relatively homogeneous, and proximity to the state (e.g., through dependence on government contracts) was of relatively little importance in explaining the spread of these practices.

determining how corporations responded to the takeover wave. State governments had little leeway until late in the decade to craft a legislative response to takeovers, although local businesses strongly lobbied for such protection (Roe 1993). At the federal level, Reagan's appointees at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Justice Department steadfastly refused to intervene in the so-called market for corporate control on the theory that takeovers were an essential tool for enforcing economic efficiency. Congress, facing the virtual certainty of a presidential veto for any significant legislation seeking to limit takeovers, passed none, in spite of lobbying by the Business Roundtable and other business constituencies (Roe 1993).

Given no legal template to work with, the managers and directors of firms had to construct organization-level governance practices in response to takeovers (cf. Edelman [1992] on corporate responses to civil rights legislation). Ultimately, the response to takeovers was a substantial shift in how firms were run, emphasizing industrial "focus" rather than diversification (Davis et al. 1994) and measuring success in terms of share price appreciation (Useem 1996). But the more immediate problem facing corporate directors in the early 1980s was what to do about takeovers.

One type of response was to protect those who were perceived as standing to lose the most by providing severance benefits for top executives unemployed after a takeover. These agreements were labeled "golden parachutes" almost immediately and received highly visible coverage in the business press (e.g., Morrison 1982). A typical parachute provided three years' salary and benefits to the CEO and occasionally a handful of other executives in the event of a takeover that would leave them unemployed, voluntarily or otherwise. Parachutes, like other forms of compensation (contingent or otherwise), are set by the board of directors, and their adoption would traditionally be protected from shareholder legal challenges by the "business judgment rule." The SEC began to require disclosure of parachute agreements in 1980, and while one large firm (Hammermill Paper) implemented a parachute in 1976, no others did until 1980; the diffusion of parachutes did not begin in earnest until 1982 (see fig. 1 above).

A second type of response was to make hostile takeovers as difficult as possible by implementing takeover defenses. The Shareholder Rights Plan, known universally as the "poison pill," was created by attorney Martin Lipton to make tender offers not vetted by the board of directors prohibitively costly. Like the parachute, the pill is adopted at the discretion of the board of directors. The typical pill is issued as a dividend giving shareholders the right to buy shares at a two-for-one rate if a raider buys or seeks to buy a significant stake in the firm (commonly 20%), thereby

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“poisoning” the target with this onerous obligation. The rights usually exclude the acquiring entity and transfer to the acquirer in the event that the takeover is completed—in other words, the acquirer could be compelled to honor the two-for-one obligation with its own shares. Pills usually have a grace period during which the board can—at its discretion—redeem the rights for a nominal fee, thus allowing a takeover without triggering the pill. The first major corporation to implement a pill was Crown Zellerbach in July 1984. Questions regarding its legality caused the pill to spread fairly slowly. But the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in *Moran vs. Household International* legalized it for Delaware corporations, which includes the majority of large firms, in November 1985.

Several studies have uncovered the characteristics of boards adopting parachutes and pills, finding that many of the same factors predict the use of both. Given our portrayal of the winners and losers in takeovers—shareholders and raiders win, boards and managers lose—the picture of what types of organizations are likely to adopt is straightforward. Boards are expected to adopt each to the extent that their firms are susceptible to being taken over (due to small size, poor stock market performance, and being owned largely by institutional investors who are perceived as favorably disposed toward takeover); managers and directors own little stock (and thus will lose more than they gain if a takeover is successful); and boards are powerful relative to shareholders (because there are no large shareholders with the incentives and power to influence the board). Empirically, firms with parachutes tended to be susceptible to takeover due to poor performance, to have boards with proportionally fewer executives on them, to be smaller, to have less concentrated ownership, and to be owned proportionately less by their executives than those firms without parachutes (Wade et al. 1990). Similarly, compared to those without, firms with pills tended to be owned less by their executives and directors, to have less concentrated ownership, to be owned by institutional investors, to be smaller, and to have fewer executives on the board (Davis 1991).

Yet while the individual characteristics of firms are not irrelevant to whether or not they adopted pills or parachutes, neither can the spread of governance practices be reduced to atomistic decision making detached from social context. As anticipated by our previous discussion, although firm adaptation was primarily local in character, it was also embedded in larger social structures and culture. Where would directors turn in evaluating parachutes and pills? In deciding whether a practice is appropriate, decision makers in firms look to what decision makers in other firms have done, either through direct contact or observation—in other words, they look to corporate elite networks.

## CORPORATE ELITE NETWORKS: INTERLOCKS AND REGION

Boards of directors are embedded in two prominent types of social networks, based on interlocks and geographic location. The interlock network is composed of the ties formed through shared board members. Interlocks are pervasive: during the time period of this study the median firm shared directors with seven other large corporations, and some shared directors with over 40 others. Relatively few large firms have no interlocks—only about 7% of the largest corporations in 1982 were “isolates.” The interlock network is perhaps the most-studied social structure in organization theory, as dozens of studies in the past 20 years attest (Mizruchi 1996). It is well established at this point that interlocks have a substantial influence on governance: research has shown shared board members to be linked to compensation levels (O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal 1988), to changes in corporate structure (Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993), to susceptibility to takeover (in the 1960s, not the 1980s; cf. Palmer et al. 1995; Davis and Stout 1992), to the propensity to acquire (Haunschild 1993), and, most germane to this topic, to the likelihood of adopting a poison pill (Davis 1991). The question is not whether interlocks matter for corporate governance, but how.

Our answer is that the effects of interlocks are “mundane but consequential,” providing conduits for the flow of information and norms of corporate governance (see Useem 1984). For instance, as interviews with directors attest, when evaluating whether it is appropriate to adopt an innovation such as a poison pill, it only makes sense that directors who have experience with such decisions will bring their experience to bear on the decision. To believe otherwise would be to imagine that directors sit silent while decisions with which they have direct experience are made. It is in the process of aggregation, and in distinguishing between appropriate and deviant practices, that the structure of the network becomes significant by determining how quickly and in what direction the field will evolve.

The accounts given by experienced directors can help legitimate practices more directly than the sort of broadcast information available from mere outside observation of corporate action. For instance, both AT&T and IBM completed highly visible hostile takeovers in the 1990s (AT&T bought NCR in 1991, and IBM acquired Lotus in 1995). Whatever their business merit, these acquisitions indicated to the press and other commentators that hostile takeovers had achieved a status as fully legitimate tactics for growth, even for blue-chip firms (e.g., “Suddenly, the hostile takeover is a benevolent act,” *New York Times*, June 7, 1995). Perhaps more important than press coverage, however, is the fact that members of AT&T’s board of directors at the time of the NCR acquisition sat on

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the boards of upward of 40 other corporations, while members of IBM's board of directors sat on more than 20 other boards. The other directors of these interlocked companies could hear directly of the rationales behind AT&T's and IBM's actions from those in the best position to transmit "important data concerning costs, problems, political risks, likelihood of opposition from interest groups, efficacy of the innovation when initiated, and so forth—a kind of information only available from peers who have already adopted" a practice (Becker 1970, p. 269). In light of this information, these decision makers are more likely to see takeovers in a more positive light, potentially increasing the prevalence of takeovers generally (see Haunschild 1993). This is how individual actions aggregate into structural consequences, in this case helping legitimate initially controversial practices.

A second corporate elite network is based on geographic proximity. While there is a national corporate elite, perhaps consisting of the top executives of the largest firms who belong to the Business Roundtable, there are also geographically clustered segments of the elite. This is partially reflected in the interlock network: for corporations other than banks, 32% of the outside directors who were executives of other large corporations (received ties) came from firms headquartered in the same telephone area code, and 39% came from the same state in 1982. Executives from the same area need not be represented on the same boards to be in contact with each other, so it is likely that the local interlock ties capture only part of the contact within the local corporate elite: "Directors who maintain intraclass bonds with one another by virtue of their common residence in elite neighborhoods and membership in social clubs and public policy-making groups need not sit on one another's boards in order to facilitate coordination between the firms they command" (Palmer, Friedland, and Singh 1986, p. 794). Directors who are not corporate executives are often not members of the local elite, so the total interlock network is largely nonlocal: when all interlock ties are considered, 23% of the average firm's contacts (sent, received, and neutral ties) were with companies headquartered in the same area code, and 29% were in the same state. Local corporate elite networks, then, are somewhat different from the interlock network.

It is easy to understand why interlocks would influence governance—directors bring the experiences gained on one board to bear on the decisions made at another. But local elite members who are not on the board will not be present when decisions are made, so why should mere physical proximity play a role in governance? The country club cliché—that much business gossip is traded over golf games—is in fact surprisingly accurate, according to discussions with directors. There are localized patterns of corporate political donations (Mizruchi 1989) and legislative lobbying

(Roe 1993) that suggest coordinated action by local elites, and a range of formal and informal institutions facilitating interaction among elites, from local charitable organizations to chambers of commerce.

Local alters may also be more influential in prompting de facto coordination simply because their actions are easily observed, whether or not the gossip was literally shared over golf games. For instance, executives in St. Louis are likely to be particularly attuned to the practices of Anheuser Busch, a highly prominent local business, even if they do not share drinks with the latest scion of the Busch family to run the company. Regional corporate elites, although less studied than the national corporate elite network tied through interlocks, are thus potentially important bases for the spread of practices. While regional effects often have alternative interpretations (Marsden and Friedkin 1993), they nonetheless provide a basis for direct forms of influence (see, e.g., Hedström [1994] on the spatially based spread of unions in Sweden).

#### WHOSE OPINION COUNTS?

Until recently, methodological limitations have prevented empirical work from specifying the processes by which firms (or individuals) choose referents in any detail. When network data on direct contacts among members of a population are absent, for instance, researchers modeling the influence of role models on rates of adoption commonly use indirect indicators such as the proportion of prior adopters in the organization's industry (e.g., Fligstein 1985) or region (e.g., Burns and Wholey 1993). Those with network data typically assume that the degree of influence is directly proportional to the contact among corporations, or at most is mediated by some form of structural similarity in the intercorporate network (e.g., Mizruchi 1989; Davis 1991; Haunschild 1993). In either case, the assumption that each contact is as influential as the other may be a convenient approximation when the goal is only to show that the influence occurs, but it is likely to hide substantial variation. Not all referents carry the same weight in evaluating a course of action: AT&T will have a greater legitimating effect on hostile takeovers than Mesa Petroleum, while a commercial bank's governance practices may have little apparent relevance to a software firm. On a practical level, this suggests that the authority granted a director in board decision-making processes is in part a function of the social characteristics of the other firms on whose boards he or she sits; for instance, a company director who also sits on the board of IBM is likely to be particularly influential in discussions about launching hostile takeovers.

On what basis are firms likely to choose referents in evaluating the desirability of a practice? The adoption of a new practice is a salient organizational act, and to satisfy the institutional environment and make sense

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to the decision makers, it needs to have a legitimating account (Strang and Meyer 1994). These accounts include cognitive elements such as definitions of relevance that describe what kind of innovation is done by what kind of actor and normative elements that prescribe why certain acts are good and desirable (see Scott 1995). The question of legitimacy highlights the fact that governance practices must be evaluated in relation to the cultural accounts that may support or undermine them. A large part of the costs and benefits of a solution is determined by how well the solution can be explained and justified to the various referees that examine what corporations do. Thus, decision makers will be attentive to the legitimacy of a practice.

Evidence for the “cognitive” legitimacy of a practice comes from its prevalence among those occupying similar positions. Prevalence indicates that the practice is taken for granted among those in such a role. Criteria for deciding who is “similar” are problematic, but we expect that managers and directors will rely on easily evaluated characteristics that reflect a firms’ type of business or status in the network of firms. A characteristic with obvious relevance to judgments of similarity is the industry, since industry groupings describe firms doing roughly similar kinds of business. Thus, Fligstein (1985) found that firms adopted the M-form to the extent that others in their industry had done so. Size and centrality may also be the basis of similarity judgments, since they reflect status groupings among firms. For example, large savings and loan (S&L) associations were more likely to follow the lead of other large S&Ls into new markets (Haveman 1993).

The normative view focuses on the moral and obligational bases of legitimacy. Evidence of legitimacy on this dimension comes not simply from sheer numbers but from the status of prior adopters. The actions of high-status actors take on a halo of approval quite apart from their actual merit. Some organizational fields have well-defined status orders that lend themselves well to measurement, such as the “brackets” in investment banking (Podolny 1993), and measuring such a status order would certainly be helpful in determining the how a firm’s status can legitimate its actions within its organizational field. Evaluating a firm’s potential to legitimate a practice across organizational fields is much more difficult, and it is unlikely that any single measure will be completely acceptable. Among very large business firms, large size, superior economic performance, and great prominence may confer status on a firm. Firm size can be seen as a measure of importance, power, and success, and so large firms may strongly legitimate the practices they adopt (Burns and Wholey 1993; Haveman 1993). Current economic performance gives the firm attention and admiration in the business press and may help legitimate its actions (Haveman 1993). Network position has been argued to reflect status

groupings (Burt 1987, 1992) and may shape how strongly a firm influences others (Burt 1987; Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991; Podolny and Stuart 1995). An important aspect of network ties is that firms are selective about establishing visible ties (Podolny 1993), so network position directly shows how other firms evaluate the focal firm. Position in a network of boards of directors also shows, of course, how well positioned the firm is to explain its actions directly to other firms.

While our discussion has focused on decisions at the level of individual firms, prior research also suggests an aggregate diffusion pattern. Practices consistent with the prevailing norms of the social system will be adopted early by high-status actors, which will quickly legitimate those practices and accelerate their diffusion (Burt 1982, p. 199). Early adoptions are extremely important for the ensuing contagion pattern. Even if the contagion pattern were to follow the same point-to-point influence pattern, diffusion from noncentral actors will be slower (see Becker [1970] for a comparison of diffusions of "high adoption potential" and "low adoption potential" innovations within the same social system). In short, the content of a practice—the extent to which it can be accounted for within the relevant social system—will influence the network location of early adopters and thereby the speed of diffusion.

## METHOD

### Sample

The initial sample included all firms in the 1980 and 1986 Fortune 500 largest U.S. industrials. Firms that were not publicly traded, and thus immune to adoption, were eliminated from the sample, leaving an effective sample size of 442 in 1980. In addition to this full data sample, we had network data for most publicly traded members of the 50 largest commercial banks, 25 diversified financials, 25 retailers, and 25 transportation firms in 1986. While organizations with missing data were not included in the analysis, their adoption times were recorded where available, and they were used to update the variables describing contagious influences.

### Data

*Dependent measures.*—Information on the dates that U.S. firms initially adopted a poison pill or golden parachute (if ever) came from the Investor Responsibility Research Center, a not-for-profit institution that tracks issues of interest to the investor community, and from proxy statements. Because pills are issued to shareholders as a dividend, the timing of their adoption is known with great precision—namely, the date that

the announcement was sent to shareholders—a substantial advantage in diffusion studies.

We define a “golden parachute” to be a formal obligation to pay cash compensation to one or more top executives that is specifically contingent on a “change in control” in the corporation. Severance agreements that do not explicitly include a change in control clause, and change in control provisions that do not involve cash compensation (e.g., continued medical coverage or accelerated vesting of options) were not considered golden parachutes. Such agreements are considered to be “adopted” at the time the contingent contract is put in place, not at the time they are paid out (if ever). Since 1980, firms have been required to report golden parachutes in proxy statements or 10K statements (Cochran and Wartick 1984). We coded dates of adoption by locating the first proxy statement for every adopting firm in which compensation contingent on a change in control was mentioned. If the date of adoption was specifically listed in the proxy statements, we recorded it; otherwise the date was interpolated (e.g., if the parachute was mentioned as having been adopted “last November,” we used November 1; if it was listed as having been adopted “within the past year,” we used the date six months prior to the date of the proxy statement). The time period covered by the poison pill data begins with the first adoption by a Fortune 500 firm (Crown Zellerbach, July 1984) to August 1989, at which point roughly 57% of the surviving firms in the sample had adopted the pill. The first adoption of a golden parachute by a Fortune 500 firm for which we could find documentation was in July 1976 (Hammermill Paper), but it attracted little notice at the time. We include this adoption as influential, but let the rest of the population become at risk of adoption from January 1, 1980, until the end of 1989. By this point, the takeover wave had largely run its course, as the spread of state antitakeover laws and the collapse of the junk bond market largely eliminated firms’ propensity to seek further protection from takeover.

*Network measures.*—Interlock network data and board composition data were constructed using lists of board members from proxy statements, as reported in Standard and Poor’s *Directory of Corporations, Executives and Directors* for 1982. The expanded network included all firms in the 1980 or 1986 Fortune 500 largest industrials as well as firms among the 50 largest commercial banks, 25 diversified financials, 25 retailers, or 25 transportation firms in 1986 for which valid board data were available, giving a total of 648 corporations. In principle, firms could share one or more directors with any of these other firms for which such a tie was not legally prohibited. We used the most straightforward measure of centrality: *degree*, that is, the total number of contacts (interlocks) a firm has with others in the sample. (Alternative measures of centrality, such as the Bonacich [1972] measure or Freeman’s [1979] betweenness measure, are

very highly correlated with degree and did not improve on the models estimated using this simpler measure.)

Geographic proximity was measured using the headquarters location of the prior adopters and the focal firm. We operationalized this using telephone area codes in 1982. For most urban areas, this included suburbs as well as central cities, while for rural areas it encompassed a broader area.

*Independent measures.*—Data on the proportion of shares owned by insiders (executives and directors), financial institutions, and the five largest ownership blocks collectively came from the *Spectrum* 3, 5, and 6 guides for 1980 and from the *CDE Stock Ownership Directory*. Insider ownership and institutional ownership data were updated from Compact Disclosure for the first quarter of 1986. The CDE data on ownership concentration were not readily replicable for subsequent years using a comparable methodology, so these figures were not updated.

Data on the market value of the firm's common equity (the stock market price for all the firm's shares outstanding, an indicator of size), the market-to-book ratio (the ratio of the market value of the firm's equity to its book or accounting value, an indicator of performance), the number of employees, total sales, and the firm's primary standard industrial classification (SIC) code came from Standard and Poor's Compustat.

## Model

Our discussion hypothesizes a diffusion process characterized by spatial heterogeneity (Strang and Tuma 1993). An adoption by one actor may affect other actors differently depending on their social similarity, and an adoption by one actor may affect all other actors differently depending on variables that describe how influential it is. Heterogeneous diffusion models can measure such effects by specifying a hazard rate of adoption that depends on the actors' propensity to adopt (i.e., their own intrinsic rate of adoption independent of social influences), susceptibility to influence from other adopters, infectiousness of previous adopters, and social proximity to previous adopters (see Strang and Tuma [1993], where the model is spelled out in considerable detail). The model specified by Strang and Tuma and a modified model introduced by Greve, Strang, and Tuma (1995) are used. Following their notation, we let  $X_i$  be a vector of variables affecting propensity to change,  $V_i$  be susceptibility variables,  $W_i$  be infectiousness variables, and  $Z_{it}$  be social proximity variables. The original model specified the following hazard rate:

$$\tau_i(t) = \exp(\alpha' X_i) + \exp(\beta' V_i) \sum_{j \neq i} \exp(\gamma' W_j + \delta' Z_{ij}). \quad (1)$$

Although the model appears complex, its interpretation is fairly intuitive. First, an individual actor (firm) has an intrinsic propensity to adopt a particular type of innovation flowing from its own characteristics. Firms that are prone to be taken over are more likely to adopt a takeover defense than those unlikely to be a target regardless of what other organizations in the environment are doing. Second, when other actors in the environment adopt an innovation, the extent to which it influences the adoption behavior of the focal actor depends on several factors. The focal actor may be more or less susceptible to outside influence, just as individuals vary in their immunity to a virus. This susceptibility can either reduce or magnify the influence of prior adoption by other organizations in the environment. Prior adopters can be more or less influential according to their individual characteristics (their "infectiousness") and their similarity to (or "social distance" from) the focal organization. The influence of each prior adoption on the focal organization is a multiplicative combination of these things; that is, for a firm that is highly susceptible, adoptions by infectious alters that are maximally similar will be particularly influential. Conversely, some firms may be virtually immune to outside influence, and prior adoptions will have a minimal impact. For example, firms that are likely takeover targets and that have no countervailing influences (e.g., from strong owners) may be particularly susceptible to influence by other firms seeking to avoid hostile takeover. Similarly, each time a central or similar alter with whom a firm interlocks adopts a poison pill, the likelihood of adoption increases on the part of the interlocking firm. Conversely, firms unlikely to be taken over (due to their size or ownership structure) may be effectively immune to outside influence, no matter how many of their contacts adopt these strategies.

A modification of the basic model was suggested by Greve et al. (1995) for situations where socially proximate actors are much more influential than nonproximate actors, so that the influence from nonproximate actors is negligible. This model specifies that only proximate actors have any influence, which simplifies the estimation because the maximum-likelihood routine does not attempt to find out exactly how close to zero the effect of nonproximate adopters is. If we let  $Z_{**} = 1$  denote the existence of a direct tie, and  $Z_{**}^*$  denote the social proximity variables remaining after deleting the direct tie variable, the new model becomes:

$$r_s(t) = \exp(\alpha' X_s) + \exp(\beta' V_s) \sum_{i \in S(t) \cap G_s - 1} \exp(\gamma' W_i + \delta' Z_{**}^*). \quad (2)$$

Preliminary tests showed that the adoption of the pill was overwhelmingly guided by whether a direct tie existed between a prior and a potential adopter, so in the case of poison pills the simplified model was used (though we also ran the usual model to verify that the results were not

sensitive to model choice). For parachutes, the models allow all prior adopters to be influential. The models were estimated using a modified version of RATE (Tuma 1994).

The ownership, market value, and market-to-book variables were entered into the propensity vector, along with an indicator variable for the pre-Household International period (for pills). For our purposes, these are control variables to allow a better specification of the contagion process. A selection of variables found to affect susceptibility was entered in the susceptibility vector. In this model, a variable can have an effect in multiple vectors (Strang and Tuma 1993), so final model specification should be preceded by exploratory analysis that includes variables in both propensity and susceptibility vectors (Greve et al. 1995). We followed this procedure, finding that inside and concentrated ownership and market value should be included as susceptibility variables in the golden parachute model. To facilitate comparison, we specified the same set of control variables for both outcomes, so these variables were also included in the susceptibility vector of the poison pill models.

Measures of similarity were constructed from the size (log employees) and centrality (number of interlocks) variables.<sup>4</sup> The measures had the following functional form. Given a previous adopter  $s$  and a focal organizations  $n$ , the social difference of these based on variable  $u$  is  $s_{ns} = |u_s - u_n|$ . In other words, the social distance is the absolute value of the difference in variable value for the two corporations. A negative sign for these variables indicates decreasing influence as the difference increases.<sup>5</sup>

We defined a social distance variable to be "0" if the corporations were in the same one-digit SIC group, and "1" if they were in different SIC groups. Most likely social difference judgments based on industry do not have such a discrete structure; rather a decision maker is likely to see gradations of differences among industries. This means that this discrete measure will be imperfect. If it is based on the commonly used two-digit definition of industries, then there is likely to be substantial unmodeled influence from neighboring industries. If it is based on a coarser one-digit definition of industrial groups, there are likely to be industries modeled as influential that have little influence on the focal organization. Modeling less influential industries as influential may weaken the results, but it is unlikely to miss substantial influences, so the one-digit measure was chosen to measure the social differences of industries.

<sup>4</sup> Substituting a log sales measure of similarity for log employees yielded similar but weaker results. Because using sales as a measure of size gives disproportionately high weight to oil companies (with very high sales per employee), we report the results for employees as our size measure.

<sup>5</sup> Using the square root of the absolute difference yielded the same results; we use the linear measure of difference for parsimony.

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We also defined social distance by geography. Firms were coded "0" if they were headquartered within the same telephone area code in 1982 and "1" otherwise, so a negative coefficient is expected.

### RESULTS

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the "at risk" population. Because of potential problems of collinearity between measures of size and network centrality revealed by this table, we avoided entering variables built on these measures in the same vector.

#### Poison Pills

Table 2 shows the results of the poison pill analysis. The models have four different types of effects—propensity, susceptibility, infectiousness, and social similarity—so for easy reference the estimates are shown in this order and labeled with effect name and coefficient symbol. The contagion effects were overwhelmingly mediated by whether the prior adopter was connected through a shared director. In other words, we found that adoption by other firms only mattered to the extent that those other firms shared a director with the potential adopter. Thus, the analyses in table 2 follow equation 2 (i.e., nonconnected adopters are not influential). The interpretation of the contagion effects is articulated in this question: Among the firms with which a focal firm shared directors, what made their prior adoption more or less influential? The table concludes with log-likelihood ratios for the models and chi-square tests of the models against a baseline model (constant rate, no covariates) and of model 2 against model 1 and model 4 against model 3.

The results for propensity affirmed what prior analyses have uncovered (Davis 1991): boards were quicker to adopt poison pills to the extent that the firm was owned proportionally less by insiders and more by institutions, ownership was dispersed rather than concentrated, the firm was relatively small in terms of its market capitalization, and the board was composed of proportionally fewer "inside" directors (i.e., executives of the firm). In other words, the prototypical adopter was a managerialist firm owned by dispersed institutional investors rather than its own managers and directors. These features, along with smaller market capitalization, also made a firm more susceptible to unwanted takeover, and thus its board was more prone to finding takeover protection attractive. Finally, firms were much more likely to adopt a pill after it was legally sanctioned by the Delaware courts in the Household International decision.

In contrast to the propensity vector, only one effect in the susceptibility vector approached significance: ownership concentration. This effect im-

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TABLE I  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 1982

VARIABLE	MEAN	SD	CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS							
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Golden parachute	.57	.49								
2. Poison pill	.58	.49	.38							
3. Inside ownership	9.61	13.32	-.15	-.25						
4. Institutional ownership	40.26	18.31	-.12	.15	-.28					
5. Concentrated ownership	28.68	18.02	-.20	-.25	.36	-.06				
6. Market value*	213.73	585.72	-.19	-.12	-.16	.12	-.15			
7. Market-to-book ratio	1.54	1.03	-.19	-.08	-.02	.27	.00	.17		
8. Inside directors	30.06	14.02	-.18	-.18	.12	-.02	.11	-.01	.08	
9. No. of interlocks	8.64	7.45	.00	.17	-.35	.23	-.22	.43	.03	-.27

Note.—N = 422. This includes all firms that were in the risk set for adopting both a golden parachute and a poison pill.

\* This figure is given in terms of millions of U.S. dollars.

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plies that boards of firms with more dispersed ownership were more susceptible to influence by prior adopters, while conversely those with large ownership blocks were largely immune to outside influences.

Model 1 in table 2 includes no infectiousness variables, while model 2 enters the market-to-book ratio (as a measure of performance) and network centrality. (Size and centrality measures were highly collinear, and inclusion of both in the infectiousness vector led to deterioration of the estimates.) A positive effect for centrality would imply that adoption by more central interlock partners had a greater influence than adoption by more peripheral contacts. We were surprised to find no statistically significant effect on infectiousness.<sup>6</sup> We did, however, uncover significant effects for social distance, namely, that adoption by an interlock partner was more influential to the extent that the partner was in a similar broad industry sector (e.g., manufacturing rather than agriculture or retail) or was similar in terms of centrality (measured by number of interlocks).<sup>7</sup> Finally, we found no effect for geographic proximity—the coefficient estimate in model 2 was positive, contrary to prediction, and much smaller than its standard error. The high standard error suggests that the inclusion of “headquarters city” made the model difficult to estimate, so to check the results this variable was omitted and the models reestimated (models 3 and 4). The results on the other variables did not change, as comparison of the models shows.

To see the effect of variables on the hazard rate of adoption, recall that the heterogeneous diffusion model defined in equation (2) is the sum of two terms: the firm’s intrinsic propensity to adopt and the contagion term. Within the contagion sum, each adoption by an interlocked firm adds to the hazard rate, and all variables in the susceptibility, infectiousness, and social proximity vectors have a multiplicative effect on each other in determining the effect of each adoption. The easiest way to interpret the results in the contagion term is then to consider how changes in covariates would multiply the effect of prior adoptions. Concentrated ownership had a standard deviation of 18.02 and a coefficient of -0.065 in model 3, which means that a one-standard-deviation increase would reduce the effect of all adoptions to  $\exp(18.02 \times [-0.065]) = 0.31$ , or to less than one-third. Although the variable is borderline significant, it has a large effect in “immunizing” firms to the influence of their interlock partners. We found no

<sup>6</sup> Omitting the market-to-book ratio from the infectiousness vector did not change these results or the results of the analysis of golden parachutes.

<sup>7</sup> When the measure based on one-digit SIC codes was replaced with a measure based on two-digit SIC codes, this result was not obtained, indicating either that specifying a two-digit SIC code as the range of influence is too narrow or that the corporations have limited opportunity to interlock within the two-digit SIC code.

TABLE 2  
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF POISON PILL ADOPTION

	Model			
	1	2	3	4
Propensity ( $\alpha$ ):				
Intercept .....	-6.603 (.328)	-6.688 (.325)	-6.623 (.333)	-6.653 (.341)
Pre-Household International decision .....	-2.275*** (.260)	-2.299*** (.261)	-2.267*** (.262)	-2.264*** (.265)
Inside ownership .....	-0.317*** (.010)	-0.345*** (.010)	-0.366*** (.010)	-0.355*** (.011)
Institutional ownership .....	.018*** (.005)	.018*** (.005)	.017*** (.005)	.018*** (.005)
Concentrated ownership .....	-0.015*** (.004)	-0.017*** (.004)	-0.015*** (.004)	-0.015*** (.004)
Market value .....	-0.0016*** (.0004)	-0.0011*** (.0003)	-0.0016*** (.0004)	-0.0016*** (.0005)
Market-to-book ratio .....	-1.101 (.072)	-1.124* (.071)	-1.103 (.073)	-1.106 (.074)
Inside directors .....	-0.017*** (.005)	-0.015*** (.005)	-0.017*** (.005)	-0.017*** (.005)
Susceptibility ( $\beta$ ):				
Intercept .....	-5.146 (.580)	-15.11 (488.2)	-5.346 (.568)	-5.249 (1.147)
Inside ownership .....	-1.139 (.145)	-3.03 (.185)	-1.30 (.120)	-1.27 (.101)

Concentrated ownership .....	-.071 <sup>+</sup> (.039)	-.057 <sup>*</sup> (.025)	-.065 <sup>+</sup> (.036)	-.060 <sup>+</sup> (.031)
Market value .....	-.0014 (.0010)	-.0017 <sup>*</sup> (.0007)	-.0016 (.0011)	-.0017 (.0012)
Infectionous (%)				
Market-to-book ratio .....		.376 (.479)		1.35 (.294)
No. of interlocks .....		-.166 (.104)		-.032 (.058)
Social distance (θ):				
Industry group .....	-2.019 <sup>*</sup> (.979)	-1.363 <sup>+</sup> (.699)	-1.870 <sup>+</sup> (1.020)	-1.756 <sup>+</sup> (.923)
Log employees .....	.241 (-.306)	-.752 (.637)	.198 (.336)	.235 (.350)
No. of interlocks .....	-1.139 <sup>*</sup> (.503)	-.779 <sup>*</sup> (.317)	-1.029 <sup>*</sup> (.449)	-.878 <sup>*</sup> (.431)
City of headquarters .....	-.527 (.671)	14.64 (48.2)		
Log Likelihood .....	-2,100.07 309.51 <sup>****</sup>	-2,099.23 311.20 <sup>****</sup>	-2,100.39 308.86 <sup>****</sup>	-2,100.10 309.45 <sup>****</sup>
$\chi^2$ (against baseline) .....	17	19	16	18
$\chi^2$ (against previous model) .....	...	1.69	...	.59

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs. There are two degrees of freedom between models 1 and 2 and between models 3 and 4.

+ P < .10, two-tailed test.

\* P < .05.

\*\* P < .01.

\*\*\*\* P < .001.




FIG. 2.—The effect of ownership concentration and interlock similarity on poison pill adoption.

significant effect for the centrality or performance of prior adopters, while their similarity to the potential adopter firm (in terms of industry and centrality) does modify their influence. If two firms are in the same broad type of industry, then the effect of one's adoption on the other's hazard rate is multiplied by  $\exp(1.87) = 6.49$ . The number of interlocks is also an important modifier, as a difference of three interlocks will reduce the effect of an adoption to  $\exp(3 \times -1.029)$  or about one-twentieth.<sup>8</sup> These effects are depicted in figure 2, which shows how a firm's ownership concentration and similarity in status to prior adopters (as measured by number of board interlocks) interacted to modify the influence of prior adoptions by interlocked firms. Clearly, a firm with highly dispersed ownership was susceptible to influence, particularly when connected to a firm of similar status that had already adopted the strategy.

#### Golden Parachutes

Table 3 shows the results of the golden parachute analysis. For this table, the model in equation (1) was used (noninterlocked adoptions were al-

<sup>8</sup> Since this model specifies only interlocked adoptions as influential, these effects modify the influence of adoptions by interlocked firms. Noninterlocked firms have an influence of zero regardless of covariate values.

TABLE 3  
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF GOLDEN PARACHUTE ADOPTION

	MODEL	
	1	2
<b>Propensity (<math>\alpha</math>):</b>		
Intercept .....	-7.364 (.634)	-7.383 (.678)
Inside ownership .....	-.032 (.026)	-.025 (.021)
Institutional ownership .....	-.013 (.013)	-.012 (.015)
Concentrated ownership .....	-.017 (.013)	-.018 (.014)
Market value .....	-.0024 (.0029)	-.0016 (.0013)
Market-to-book ratio .....	-.233 (.260)	-.155 (.258)
Inside directors .....	-.026 (.017)	-.016 (.018)
<b>Susceptibility (<math>\beta</math>):</b>		
Intercept .....	-10.540 (.428)	-17.570 (2.050)
Inside ownership .....	-.022* (.009)	-.021* (.008)
Concentrated ownership .....	-.014** (.006)	-.014** (.005)
Market value .....	-.0017*** (.0005)	-.0019*** (.0004)
<b>Infectiousness (<math>\gamma</math>):</b>		
Market-to-book ratio .....		112 (.387)
No of interlocks .....		.377*** (.077)
<b>Social distance (<math>\delta</math>):</b>		
Log employees .....	-.230 (.290)	-.331* (.158)
No of interlocks .....	.015 (.032)	.014 (.014)
City of headquarters .....	-2.217*** (.353)	-1.146* (.455)
<b>Social ties (<math>\delta</math>):</b>		
Board interlock .....	.563 (2.688)	-.755 (1.813)
Log likelihood .....	-2,626.17	-2,616.67
$\chi^2$ (against baseline) .....	176.90***	195.92***
$df$ .....	15	17
$\chi^2$ (against model 1) .....		19.02***
$df$ between models .....		2

NOTE—Nos in parentheses are SEs.

\*  $P < .10$ .

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .

lowed to be influential), as previous adopters that were not interlocked with the focal firm had substantial effects.

The findings are quite different from those in the previous analysis. First, we found that effects previously interpreted as propensity effects (e.g., Wade et al. 1990) are revealed by this model to be susceptibility effects. In other words, ownership by insiders and by large blockholders and firm size had their effects not by directly influencing adoption but by making the firm more susceptible to social influence. Second, prior adoptions by central firms (indicated by number of ties) increased rates of adoption. That is, boards were more likely to adopt parachutes in the wake of adoptions by central firms than by peripheral firms. The social distance effects indicate that adoptions by firms of similar size (as indicated by number of employees) were more influential. Moreover, prior adoptions by firms in the same headquarters city were particularly influential. In contrast, we found no direct effect of interlocks with prior adopters. In other words, being tied to a prior adopter through a shared board member had no more discernible effect than adoptions by unconnected firms.<sup>9</sup>

For golden parachutes, inside ownership and concentrated ownership have moderate effects, as a one-standard-deviation increase in each variable reduces the susceptibility by one-fourth or less ( $\exp[13.32 \times -0.022] = 0.75$ ;  $\exp[18.02 \times -0.014] = 0.78$ ). The largest susceptibility effect is market value, where an increase of one standard deviation decreases the contagious effects of prior adoptions by not quite two-thirds ( $\exp[585.72 \times -0.0017] = 0.37$ ). The largest social proximity effect on golden parachute adoption is headquarters location, where an adoption by a firm headquartered in the same telephone area code is nine times ( $\exp[2.217] = 9.18$ ) more influential than one outside. In model 2, centrality (number of interlocks) shows a strong effect on contagiousness, as a one-standard-

<sup>9</sup> Estimated models including measures of centrality in the propensity vector as well as the infectiousness vector uncovered null results for poison pills. For parachutes, we found a borderline significant negative coefficient for the Bonacich measure of centrality in the propensity vector in some specifications, indicating that more central firms may have been less likely to adopt. We also estimated models with industry social structures for golden parachutes, but we found no effect and some deterioration in estimates for other social structures (SEs were inflated, probably because of the inclusion of too many variables with no effect). Models with the same infectiousness and social structure variables but only those propensity and susceptibility variables that were significant or nearly significant were also estimated, yielding the same results as those shown. We also estimated models with log employees in the infectiousness vector and found a positive effect for poison pills and an unexpected negative effect for golden parachutes. The social structure coefficient of log employees became positive and significant for poison pills and nearly significant for golden parachutes, while other social structure results were unchanged. We suspect that entering this variable as an infectiousness effect and a basis for social comparison creates estimation problems, making these results questionable.

deviation difference increases the influence on all potential adopters by a factor of 16.59 ( $\exp[7.45 \times 0.377]$ ). The effects are multiplicative, so an out-of-town adopter that was one standard deviation higher in its centrality was 1.8 times (16.59/9.18) more influential than an in-town, less interlocked adopter. Since this model specifies all adoptions as influential, these effects modify the influence of adoptions by all firms, not just interlocked ones.

## DISCUSSION

The results on the diffusion processes for pills and parachutes can be summarized as follows: pills spread rapidly through a board-to-board (cohesive) diffusion process in which firms adopted to the extent that their contacts had done so. Contacts varied in their influence such that those in similar industry sectors, and those with similar levels of centrality, were particularly influential. This indicates that, during boardroom discussions, directors who sat on the boards of other manufacturing firms were more influential than directors that sat on the boards of, say, financial firms.

In contrast, parachutes spread slowly, and there was little evidence of board-to-board diffusion. Rather, the medium for diffusion was geographic proximity: firms adopted to the extent that other firms in the same metropolitan area had done so. Prior adoptions by central firms were also more influential than adoptions by less central firms.

Figure 1 shows the cumulative adoptions of poison pills and golden parachutes. The vertical axis shows the proportion adopters in the population, and the horizontal axis shows historical time. The difference in diffusion speed is quite dramatic. Poison pills went from 5% to 50% adoption in three years, from late 1985 to late 1988, and thus we found the classic S-curve predicted when innovations diffuse through a network-based contagion process. For golden parachutes it took seven years, from late 1981 to early 1989, to achieve a prevalence of 50%. In marked contrast to the adoption curve for the pill, the adoption curve for the parachute was essentially flat.

What accounts for these highly divergent diffusion processes? It is important to keep two things in mind in comparing the spreads of these two practices. First, the same actors—boards of directors—were responsible for deciding whether or not to adopt both practices. Second, by the end of the decade each had been adopted by a majority of firms. In other words, eventually most boards would decide to adopt a parachute, and most boards would decide to adopt a pill. But the question remains: Why one would be readily adopted and spread from board to board, whereas one would spread slowly through observation rather than direct contact?

The diffusion literature suggests several possibilities (Rogers 1995).

First, complex innovations spread slower than simple ones. But in this case, parachutes are fairly simple and require no special expertise to adopt, whereas pills are designed to be complicated, in part to increase the uncertainty facing potential acquirers, and thus require sophisticated legal counsel to draft. On this count, parachutes should have spread faster.

Second, practices that are observable spread faster than those that are not. Pills are readily observable by a firms' shareholders—they are typically notified by mail that the board has adopted a pill—while parachutes are observed only when they are reported on the proxy statement. To nonshareholders, however, which would include most directors of other firms, it is not clear which is more observable, and observation of the effects probably privileged parachutes. There is little doubt that parachutes work as advertised because they are legal contracts adopted through a process fully within the purview of the board of directors. Knowing whether pills work at preventing takeovers, on the other hand, is more problematic. Some firms with pills were in fact taken over, so pills do not render their adopters impervious to hostile takeover. At best, they might be compared to the automotive antitheft devices that attach to steering wheels and are particularly popular in the United States. These devices are quite easy for a determined car thief with a hacksaw to bypass—steering wheels are easy to cut through and replace—yet one would be anxious to own the only car parked on the street without one. In short, pill adoption was undoubtedly driven in part by anxiety around being one of the last to adopt, regardless of any direct evidence for its efficacy (cf. Burt 1987).

Finally, innovations that are compatible with the norms of a social system spread faster than those that are not (Rogers 1995). That is, legitimate innovations should spread faster than illegitimate ones. Again, at first blush this would appear to favor parachutes. Adoption of a parachute is associated with increases in share prices (Lambert and Larcker 1985) and, from the perspective of shareholders, a few years' severance pay is a trivial amount to pay if it means that a takeover that would otherwise be resisted is allowed to go through. Academics could construct a ready account for why parachutes were appropriate as a Coasean solution to the conflicts of interest created by takeovers—in essence, the winners (shareholders) would pay off the losers (managers), who may well have devoted their careers to building the corporation and thus merited protection (Coffee 1988). A relatively low-cost solution that benefits shareholders and allows (by the received wisdom) a more efficient allocation of resources should hardly be illegitimate. If the problem were simply one of constructing a public account to justify parachutes for consumption by shareholders, it should have been easy to accomplish, as the producers of these accounts are remarkably adept at framing justifications of identical practices in

different terms depending on the tenor of the times (Westphal and Zajac 1994).

In contrast, pills depressed share prices (SEC 1986), and, “when they first appeared, all the wise men (this author included) said that pills were patently illegal” (Lowenstein 1988, p. 167), an impression shared by the large number of shareholders who sought to have them removed very early on (Davis 1991). The potential consequences of pills were portrayed in dire terms by their opponents: “Protected by impenetrable takeover defenses, managers and boards are likely to behave in ways detrimental to shareholders. . . . The end result, if the process continues unchecked, is likely to be the destruction of the corporation as we know it” (Jensen 1988, p. 347). Thus, if the norms of the system were founded on the notion of protecting shareholder interests, then parachutes should have spread rapidly while pills should never have gotten off the ground. Yet as Katz (1961, pp. 71–72) noted long ago, “The innovation must be characterized with respect to the patterns of thought and action of the people to whom it is directed”; their decisions are based on the best evidence available to them at the time. Thus, the question is not how parachutes and pills looked to outsiders (whose impressions were presumably malleable), but how they looked to members of the corporate elite.

In hindsight, successful diffusions have an air of inevitability, and it is difficult to recapture the sense of contingency that initially accompanied them. While we cannot reconstruct the debates that occurred among directors, accounts published at the time suggest that, in contrast to their receptions by the stock market and by academics guided by market reaction, parachutes were considered highly suspect by many outside directors, whereas pills were considered to be entirely appropriate.

Parachutes appeared as naked self-interest on the part of management, and adoption was often apparently driven by management itself, not the board. Thus, when CEO William Agee portrayed the \$4 million parachute he received when Bendix was taken over as a kind gesture by the outside directors, one of them responded, “Bullshit. The golden parachutes were initiated by management” (Morrison 1982, p. 84). Prominent investment banker Felix Rohatyn, director of six firms at the time, found the rationale for parachutes unconvincing: “If an executive needs a multimillion-dollar contract to get his mind clear in a takeover situation, then maybe he should see a psychiatrist,” while the chairman of one firm stated, “I and my board hold the opinion that golden parachutes are an unconscionable rape of a shareholder’s assets” (Morrison 1982, pp. 83, 87). Not all opinion on them was negative, of course, or they would not have spread so widely, but it was ambivalent early on. As Andrew Sigler, CEO of Champion International and head of the Business Roundtable’s task force on governance, stated, “I think that you could make a pretty good case that the

person who has to deal with it deserves an employment contract just like anybody does. . . . I don't think that anybody is willing to stand up and say those are great things, because they are not great things. But I think that when you calm the system down, a lot of objections will fall away" (Sigler 1985, p. 20). The problem was not that parachutes were bad per se, but that they were difficult to provide a legitimating account for—no one was willing to stand up and say they were great things. To be sure, our results indicate that in some locales they were considered legitimate by local standards: most (seven of 13) corporations headquartered in Dallas had a parachute in place by the end of 1983. But this perception was not shared nationally; for instance, only one of the seven firms in the San Jose area had one as late as 1990. (The notion of strong local norms is consistent with Rogers's [1995] discussion of the wide variation among South Korean villages in the prevalence of different birth control techniques.)

The poison pill, in spite of representing a potentially far more radical shift in the relations among managers, boards, and shareholders, was easier for directors to justify as an effort to preserve the integrity of the firm against unscrupulous raiders and, ultimately, to protect the public interest. Protecting the integrity of the firm from the ravages of abusive takeover practices could be portrayed as looking out for the long-term interests of stakeholders, even if this comes at the short-term expense of shareholders. "Fending off outsiders" is perhaps a more readily understood rationale than a Coasean solution of "paying off the losers." Pills also had the advantage that they could be redeemed by the board of directors, allowing takeovers that the board deemed to be in the firm's best interests. In short, unlike parachutes, they had a legitimating account that was plausible to directors, if not to other constituencies.

This helps provide one interpretation of the pattern of results we observed. Pills spread through shared directors, who acted like Johnny Appleseeds to spread practices from board to board, because they could be readily rationalized by outside directors. The national reach of this network facilitated the rapid spread of this practice. Parachutes spread through regional elite networks, perhaps by an informal social comparison process among CEOs. In some cities diffusion was swift, whereas in others the process never took off. Because diffusion was based in local networks rather than national ones, the aggregate effect was a much slower rate of diffusion.

While the process underlying the spread of the pill is readily interpretable from the results, we can only speculate on what is responsible for the regional effect on parachutes, as region can proxy for many things (see Marsden and Friedkin 1993). One likely scenario meshes well with the finding that boards were more likely to adopt to the extent that they

were particularly beholden to the CEO (Wade et al. 1990). It is plausible to assume that awareness of the adoption of parachutes spread among local executives either through direct communication (the golf course effect) or observation. These executives could in turn have proposed adoption of parachutes to their boards, who adopted to the extent that they were weak vis-à-vis the CEO. Thus, the initiators in this case would typically be managers (because it is perceived as most directly in their interest), whereas for pills the initiators could have been any director (because it was perceived as in the interest of all directors collectively).<sup>10</sup>

The distinction between normative and cognitive bases of legitimacy provides additional depth to this discussion. Parachutes required substantial normative legitimization in the eyes of the directors adopting them. Questions of the propriety of parachutes could be settled by looking to what central actors had done and to what other firms located in the same area had done. In contrast, pills did not require a moral endorsement but merely evidence for their cognitive legitimacy—that those in the same role had adopted them. Thus, what mattered was contact with similar firms—those with similar levels of status and those in similar industry sectors. The two innovations relied on two bases of legitimacy for their spread—normative legitimacy for parachutes, verifying that they were morally appropriate, and cognitive legitimacy for pills, indicating that they were appropriate for a particular role.

### CONCLUSION

Understanding how a society arrives at the distinctive configuration of social institutions that orders its economic life is perhaps the central project of economic sociology and requires a mosaic of theories and types of research operating at the macro level of political economy and the meso level of social organization (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). In the United States, a “blank slate” approach to corporate law implies that governance regimes are built from the ground up by individual organizations adopting discrete practices and structures through a social construction process that involves networks of managers constrained by the broad dictates of the legal environment (Edelman 1992). Thus, the question of how organiza-

<sup>10</sup> If CEOs initiated discussions of parachutes, one might expect that interlocks created by CEOs would be another channel for diffusion—i.e., that when a firm’s CEO sat on outside boards that had adopted parachutes, this would prompt adoption by the focal firm. We tested this and found no effects. This null finding is perhaps due to the fact that the CEO interlock network is relatively sparse: 60% of the firms’ CEOs did not sit on any outside boards, while 21% sat on only one, giving little chance for diffusion.

tional fields come to be characterized by conformity in corporate practices and structures is a vital one (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet while organization theory should by rights play a central role in this project, its contributions have thus far been inchoate, focusing either on individual adaptation or aggregate change in fields, with little attempt to bridge the two levels. We have sought to provide such a bridge by combining the literatures on neoinstitutionalism and diffusion through networks with recent methodological innovations to characterize the spread of two innovations in corporate governance. The results have been fruitful.

In the 1980s, the actions of the state facilitated a wave of takeovers, and the culmination of the shift in ownership from individuals to institutions created new tensions in relations among owners, managers, and boards. Firms adapted in myriad ways, and among these, poison pills and golden parachutes draw special interest because the divergent paths by which they spread provide insights into the broader question of how individual firms adapt and how this aggregates, through social networks, into collective structures. Parachutes, initially regarded by boards as deviant and self-interested, spread slowly and inconsistently through regional corporate elite networks, and there was little evidence for contagion through boards of directors, although adoption by central corporations ultimately helped legitimate them. Pills, regarded by boards as legitimate early on, rapidly spread from firm to firm through shared directors, particularly when those directors represented similar corporations. Thus, both the social ties among firms—structural embeddedness—and the norms of directors—cultural embeddedness—conditioned how quickly and in what direction the field of large corporations adapted. Somewhat ironically, directors' notions of legitimate practices appeared to be precisely contrary to what the shareholders that elected them would want.

Contagion among actors embedded in multiple social structures is a useful way to contemplate the construction of governance regimes. Viewing contagion in this context goes beyond previous work on the spread of governance practices, and we believe our results provide a good first step in specifying more precisely the nature of contagion among large corporations. We have demonstrated a method and articulated a framework for linking individual actions and collective structures. Moreover, we have shown that individual firms do not simply imitate the practices of other firms blindly, but are quite discriminating in their choices of referent according to the type of legitimization required.

More broadly, research that looks at the spread of practices without linking that spread to the structure and culture of the social system in which firms are embedded will misapprehend the nature of the diffusion process. Network and geographical proximity effects were extremely powerful determinants of the diffusion of the governance practices we consid-

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ered, and it is unlikely that the same would not be true of other governance practices. It is extremely demanding to assemble complete network data and trace adoptions over time, but our results indicate that the effort is worthwhile.

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# The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960–1992<sup>1</sup>

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This study analyzes the relationship between religion and political behavior in recent presidential elections in the United States. The magnitude of the religious cleavage remains substantial but has declined during the past nine presidential elections. The single factor behind this decline is the reduction in support for Republican candidates among denominationally liberal Protestants, whose changing voting behavior is a function of their increasingly liberal views of social issues. The political alignments of Catholics and conservative Protestants have been very stable relative to the electorate-wide mean over this time period, and the authors find no evidence of increased political mobilization among conservative Protestants.

The social bases of political behavior—divisions arising out of racial, ethnic, class, religious, and/or gender differences—have been at the forefront of recent scholarly controversies over the causes and consequences of political change in postindustrial capitalist democracies (Inglehart 1990; Franklin et al. 1992; Brint and Kelley 1993; Miller and Wattenberg 1993; Brooks and Manza, *in press*). The most widely debated issues concern the (changing) role that class divisions have played in the evolution of party coalitions and political alignments (Franklin et al. 1992; Manza, Hout,

<sup>1</sup> Authors' names are listed in reverse alphabetical order; both contributed equally to the article. Our title acknowledges the pioneering work of Gerhard Lenski (1963). We thank Michael Hout, Richard Wood, and David Legee for advice and materials related to this project, Robert Robinson for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Roblyn Rawlins for research assistance. Data from the American National Election Studies were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. An earlier version of the article was presented at the 1996 meeting of the American Sociological Association. The usual disclaimers about responsibility for the data analysis apply. Direct all correspondence to Jeff Manza, Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802. E-mail: MANZA@pop.psu.edu

and Brooks 1995; Evans 1998). Yet numerous comparative analyses suggest that, in many polities, religious-based cleavages may have been a more important factor for understanding the social bases of voter alignments than the class cleavage (Rose and Unwin 1969; Converse 1974; Rose 1974; Lijphart 1979; Dahl 1982, chap. 4; Powell 1982; Mann 1995).

Interest in the relationship between religion and politics has been especially well developed in the United States, which has long appeared exceptional in the degree to which religion has influenced social and political life. Americans routinely claim higher levels of church membership and attendance at religious services and are more likely to believe in God and claim that religion is of considerable importance in their lives than citizens in other postindustrial capitalist democracies (Burnham 1981; Lopatto 1985; Gallup 1985, 1995; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988; Wald 1992, chap. 1; Tiryakian 1993; Lipset 1996). Although the common European pattern of a secular left coalition contesting for power against a conservative coalition rooted in religious groups made little headway in the United States, political historians have long emphasized the importance of ethnoreligious cleavages for 19th- and early-20th-century U.S. party coalitions (Kleppner 1970, 1979; Jensen 1971; McCormick 1986; Swierenga 1990; Skocpol 1992, chap. 1).

Despite expectations that the New Deal political realignment in the 1930s would lead to a pattern of electoral alignments dominated by class, the political significance of religious cleavages has proved to be resilient throughout the 20th century. While Catholics and Jews have long provided bedrock support for the Democratic Party, mainline Protestant sects generally remained solidly Republican in their preferences during and after the New Deal era (see, e.g., Fowler and Hertzke 1995, pp. 86–87). Perhaps because of this stability, the role of religious cleavages in structuring voting behavior received significantly less attention than might otherwise have been expected. Indeed, it has only been over the last 15 years or so that social scientists have begun to reexamine systematically the relationship between religious group membership and political behavior (Wald 1992, chap. 1; Leege 1993a). Much of this interest has been prompted in part by the emergence of politically active Christian Right groups, as well as considerable turmoil among the established denominational families.

This article contributes to the recent resurgence of interest in religion and politics.<sup>2</sup> Our analysis employs three significant innovations. First, we

<sup>2</sup> We have restricted our analyses to nonblack voters in view of the well-known and widely studied alignment of African-Americans (many of whom are members of doctrinally conservative black Protestant churches) with the Democratic Party since 1960. Black churches have played an undeniably important role in American politics, e.g., in the presidential campaigns of Jesse Jackson or in nonelectoral social movements,

employ a set of measures for assessing the overall magnitude of the religious cleavage in American politics based on a multicategory denominational scheme. Second, we develop a set of models for exploring the interrelationship between religion and political behavior that distinguish political trends affecting *all* religious groups from political trends affecting (only) *specific* religious groups. Although these techniques have been utilized in analyses of other types of political cleavages (e.g., Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Evans 1998), they have not yet been deployed in the study of religious politics. Finally, we use regression decomposition techniques to analyze the most important source of religious political change in the period since 1960: the movement of liberal Protestants from rock-ribbed support for the Republican Party to a more neutral posture in recent elections.

The article is in four parts. In part 1, we provide an overview of the recent debates, focusing on four theses about changes in the religious political cleavage and the political behavior of specific religious groups in the electorate. We then discuss the theoretical concepts of the (denominationally based) religious cleavage and group-specific voting trends used in the study. In part 3, we present the results of our analyses, first considering trends in presidential vote choice and turnout between 1960 and 1992 and then more detailed examinations of political change among Catholics, liberal Protestants, and conservative Protestants. We discuss the implications our findings have for understanding the magnitude and evolution of the religious cleavage in the concluding section.

#### DEBATES OVER RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

Scholarly analyses of religion and presidential politics in the United States since the 1950s suggest four main hypotheses, which can be summarized as follows.<sup>3</sup>

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most notably the Civil Rights movement (e.g., Morris 1984). But an analysis of these influences would take us beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, the research hypotheses we consider focus explicitly on the impact of religious differences among nonblack voters.

<sup>3</sup> Our focus in this study is on denominational membership as a source of political alignments. Other recent scholarship has investigated the effects of levels of religiosity, the contextual effects of individual churches on their members, and the role of religious salience and doctrinal beliefs as an alternative to denominational analyses (see, e.g., Kellstedt, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1991, pp. 142–43). However, because of the limitations of the available data sources, research on historical trends at the national level dating back before 1980 and incorporating a range of explanatory variables is primarily limited to questions about the association between denominational preference, church attendance, and political behavior. Since our concerns are with long-term historical trends, the focus of this article is on the political consequences of membership in

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*The overall impact of denominational cleavages on voter alignments in presidential elections has declined.*

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Denominationally conservative Protestants have moved away from the Democratic Party and realigned with the Republican Party, increasing their levels of participation in presidential elections in response to encouragement from the Christian Right.*

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Catholic voters have moved away from traditional support for the Democratic Party toward a more neutral posture. This shift is largely explained by the growing economic affluence of Catholics.*

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*Mainline or liberal Protestants have moved from strong support for the Republican Party toward a more neutral posture.*

We consider the research literatures that have generated each of these hypotheses below.

### The Declining Religious Cleavage Thesis

Two distinct trends have shaped debates about the overall magnitude of the religious cleavage in American politics. On the one hand, the growing public prominence of activist organizations associated with the Christian Right has led many analysts to hypothesize the rising importance of religion in U.S. politics (see below for the Christian Right thesis). The Christian Right is said to have politicized certain core social and religious values, with the effect of bringing religious conservatives into the political process or deepening the preferences of the highly devout for Republican candidates (e.g., Simpson 1985; Himmelstein 1990; Diamond 1995). In other versions of this argument, the most important emerging social cleavage for party coalitions “[includes], on one side, believers who organize their lives around religious commitments, while the other side would attract nonbelievers and those for whom religion is unimportant” (Kellstedt et al. 1994, p. 322; see also Green and Guth 1991; Hunter 1991).

Other scholarly accounts have rejected these arguments, suggesting instead that the political significance of religion, like many other social-structural attributes, is declining in its capacity to influence voters. One approach emphasizes the “declining significance of denominationalism” (Wuthnow 1988, chap. 5; 1993, pp. 156–57; Hunter 1991, pp. 86–87). This approach asserts that increased social differentiation within denominations, rising levels of religious mobility and intermarriage, and declining organizational conflicts have decreased the political relevance of denominational membership. A second argument emphasizes the growing secularization of citizens as a source of declining political influence of religion

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a religious denomination, although we also utilize a measure of religiosity (church attendance) as a control variable in our analyses.

(Inglehart 1990; but cf. Hout and Greeley 1987). The “secularization thesis” has been a staple of comparative analyses of religion and politics in recent years (see Dobbelaere [1984] for overview and references).

Some researchers have offered empirical support for these propositions. For example, in the most recent of their ongoing series on changes in the social bases of American political behavior, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1994, chap. 5) present evidence of declines in the political importance of region, union membership, class, and religious cleavages. Their measure of religious voting is based primarily on a dichotomous conceptualization: the percentage of Catholics who voted Democratic minus the percentage of Protestants who voted Democratic (see Abramson et al. 1994, p. 156). Using this measure, Abramson et al. find that religious political cleavages declined from a high in 1960 (.48) to a low in 1980 (.10), rising again somewhat through 1992 (.20) among white voters (cf. Wattenberg and Miller 1981, p. 359; Miller and Wattenberg 1984, pp. 301–2; Brint and Kelley 1993, p. 307). Using a related pair of contrasts between Republican voters versus Protestant or Jewish Democrats, Carmines and Stanley (1992, p. 224) find a similar picture of declining religious political cleavages in their analyses of the 1972–88 presidential elections. However, systematic evidence of change in the *overall* religious cleavage has not yet been established at the national level using a more differentiated conception of denominational identities than the crude Protestant versus Catholic dichotomy employed in these studies. Dichotomous approaches can potentially mislead, for growing divisions *among* Protestants (especially the growth of the Christian Right) go undetected by analysts using a single, undifferentiated Protestant category (see Kellstedt 1993, p. 276).

### The Christian Right Thesis

The second widely debated thesis about religion and politics in both the mass media and among political analysts concerns the possibility of a political realignment among conservative Protestant voters. The sudden emergence of the “Christian Right” in the late 1970s as a factor in U.S. politics and the visible role of some early Christian Right groups such as the Moral Majority in the 1980 elections seemed to herald a new type of political conflict in which religious values were becoming central to voters’ decisions. In the relatively brief period since 1980, however, the varying fortunes of the Christian Right have prompted cyclical dismissal and then rediscovery of religious conservatism as a political force (Green 1995, p. 1). Notwithstanding the outpouring of journalistic and media commentary during the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, the search for a mass base to the Christian Right in the 1980s unearthed surprisingly modest support for groups such as the Moral Majority (Buell and Sigelman 1985;

Perkins 1989). Indeed, by the late 1980s, many informed observers were emphasizing the sharp decline of the Christian Right, at least as a force in national politics (Bruce 1988, 1994; Jelen 1991; D'Antonio 1992; Fowler 1993; Wilcox 1994).

In the 1990s, the cycle of debates over the Christian Right appears to have come around again, with a number of analysts reporting evidence that evangelical Christian voters have become increasingly pro-Republican in recent elections (Himmelstein 1990; Green and Guth 1991, p. 217; Kellstedt and Green 1993, p. 56; Kellstedt et al. 1994, p. 308; Diamond 1995, chap. 10; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996, chap. 10). Given that many of the most important cases of Christian Right activism have occurred at the state or local level, notably the activism of the Christian Coalition (Rozell and Wilcox 1995), the Christian Right thesis has implications for political behavior at all levels of U.S. politics.

### The Catholic Dealignment Thesis

A third widely debated issue among analysts of religion and politics concerns the possibility that Catholic voters are shifting away from alignment with the Democratic Party toward a more neutral posture (Lopatto 1985; Petrocik 1981, 1987; Kenski and Lockwood 1991; Green and Guth 1991; Kellstedt 1989; Kellstedt and Noll 1990; Kellstedt and Green 1993). Abramson et al. (1994, p. 156) even characterize this shift as "precipitous." Writing in the early 1980s, Dionne (1981, p. 308) suggested that "loyalty to the Democratic Party has been something on the order of a theological commitment for a large share of America's Catholic community." Indeed, evidence from early Gallup polls suggests that as many as 80% of all Catholic voters backed Roosevelt in 1936, 73% in 1940 and 1944, and 66% supported Truman in 1948 (Gallup and Castelli 1987; Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 175). In more recent elections, however, significantly smaller proportions of Catholic voters have supported Democratic presidential candidates. From this, virtually all analysts of the Catholic vote have concluded that Catholics are now a "swing" constituency susceptible to election-specific economic conditions (e.g., Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 173; Kellstedt et al. 1994, pp. 323–24) or candidate-centered appeals (Fowler and Hertzke 1995, p. 96).<sup>4</sup>

The main explanation for this hypothesized shift among Catholics is that they have become progressively more affluent over time, matching

<sup>4</sup> Standing virtually alone against the scholarly consensus that Catholics have realigned is Greeley (1985, 1990), who has explicitly rejected such conclusions. Penning (1986) strikes a more equivocal note, reporting only a modest shift among Catholic voters.

or even surpassing Protestants on a number of measures of socioeconomic attainment (Green and Guth 1991, p. 214; Kellstedt 1989, p. 99; Kellstedt and Noll 1990, p. 359–61; Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 174). Indeed, the most systematic reviews of the evidence suggest that by the 1980s Catholics had reached parity with the “Protestant elite” in terms of average income and were closing the gap in terms of access to positions of power and influence (see esp. Greeley 1990, chap. 7; on access to elite positions, see Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes [1995]). In this study, we analyze the effect of changes in economic affluence among Catholics. However, before accepting the Catholic dealignment thesis, it is necessary to first determine whether Catholic voters have shifted relative to the electorate as a whole.<sup>5</sup>

### The Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis

The fourth thesis we consider concerns the historically most Republican bloc of religious voters, the “mainline” or “elite” Protestant denominations. The members of these denominational families, especially Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists (United Church of Christ), have long been overrepresented among the American political elite (Mills 1956; Baltzell 1964, 1991; Davidson et al. 1995) and in business, academe, and the military establishment (e.g., Karabel 1984; Domhoff 1967, 1983). Reflecting their social and cultural power in American society, the “Protestant establishment” has thus been viewed by many social scientists as a solidly Republican constituency.

In recent years, however, the political stability of the mainline and liberal Protestant denominations has been questioned. Several analysts have found evidence of a shift among the broader group of mainline Protestants away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats (Lopatto 1985; Kellstedt 1994 et al.; Kivisto 1994). These findings cannot be considered conclusive, however, as other scholars have denied there is any evidence of changing political alignments among mainline Protestants (Petrocik 1987; Kellstedt and Noll 1990). As with the Christian Right and Catholic analyses, we reexamine these issues through an analysis over

<sup>5</sup> To the extent that Catholics have become no more Republican since 1960 than other groups, the de-realignment thesis is not supported. As with the Christian Right thesis, we test such claims through an analysis of historical trends in voting since 1960 (using our multicategory scheme) and 1952 (using a simplified comparison necessitated by the more limited information about Protestant religious affiliations available in the 1952 and 1956 NES). By examining whether Catholics’ vote choices differ when controls for income and education are added to the model, we also analyze the effect of rising affluence among Catholics on their political alignment.

time that distinguishes electorate-wide shifts from changes in the political behavior of specific religious groups.

Unlike the other denominational debates, fewer scholars have attempted to theorize the sources of shifts among liberal Protestants. The receptivity of mainline Protestant religious leaders to politically liberal messages on "social issues," beginning in the 1960s with the Vietnam War and continuing more recently on issues such as racial and gender inequality, suggests one possible explanation for the relative shift away from the Republican Party (Quinley 1974a, 1974b; Neuhaus 1984; Hallum 1991; Guth et al. 1991). Conversely, Leege (1993b) emphasizes the political consequences of the sharp falloff in regular church attendance among liberal Protestants as a factor encouraging political change among this group, especially among younger people (see also Sweet 1989). Finally, the loss of economic and political power to non-Protestant groups—albeit only relative—suggests a third possible source for the movement of liberal Protestants away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats (Davidson et al. 1995). We evaluate these competing explanations of the source of political change among liberal Protestants.

#### CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELIGIOUS POLITICAL CLEAVAGE

Our first step in developing a systematic test of the four preceding theses is to provide a suitable conception of the religious political cleavage. This task is especially important in light of the continuing reliance by some analysts on simplified schemes that do not draw distinctions *among* Protestant voters. In this study, we thus adopt a multicategory scheme based on the denominational typology devised by Stark and Glock (1968) and Lopatto (1985; cf. Smith 1990). This scheme distinguishes between "liberal," "moderate," and "conservative" Protestants on the basis of doctrinal positions and beliefs of followers. Our scheme also distinguishes Catholics, Jews, those with no religious identification (including atheists), and people belonging to other religions. Full details of our denominational coding scheme are provided in appendix table A2.

Using these conceptual distinctions, we arrive at the following seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: liberal Protestants, moderate Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other religions, and no religion.

This denominational scheme enables us to develop estimates of change in the relationship between religion and political behavior. We call this relationship the "religious political cleavage," which we define as the existence of differences in presidential vote choice among these seven religious groups. So long as there are (significant) differences in the voting behavior of the groups in our analyses, we can speak of a "religious cleavage" in

presidential politics. Our primary main concern is with the degree of *change* over time in the magnitude of the religious cleavage, and the index we develop in this article yields scores that enable comparisons over time.

### Change in the Religious Cleavage versus Change among Specific Religious Groups

The preceding concept of the religious cleavage suggests two distinct ways in which religion can affect political behavior: at the level of specific religious groups and at the level of the religious cleavage as a whole. While changes at these two levels tend to co-vary, this need not always be the case. If, for instance, Catholics fall out of a Democratic alignment (thus becoming more like the rest of the electorate in their voting behavior) while conservative Protestants shift toward support for Republican candidates, these two group-specific changes may cancel one another out, leaving the overall religious cleavage largely unchanged. The four theses we analyze in this study refer to *changes* at both levels. While the declining religious cleavage thesis is about all seven religious groups, the claims about change among Catholics, liberal Protestants, and conservative Protestants are primarily about specific groups of religious voters.

## DATA AND MEASURES

### Dependent and Independent Variables

For the analyses presented in this article, we use data from the Center for Political Studies' pre- and postelection National Election Studies (NES) for presidential elections from 1960 through 1992 (Center for Political Studies 1995). By combining data from individual election surveys into a single file in which year is itself coded as a variable, we are able to directly measure political trends in the religious cleavage and also in the behavior of specific religious groups.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the historical period covered by these nine elections, we also supplement our analyses with data from the 1952 and 1956 NES surveys. While the 1952 and 1956 surveys do not contain sufficient information to distinguish among Protestant sects, they nevertheless allow us to broaden our time frame in order to assess the uniqueness of Catholics' strong support for Kennedy in 1960.

To provide a systematic evaluation of the four theses, we have selected three dependent variables: presidential vote choice (coded "1" for the Democratic candidate and "0" for the Republican candidate); voter turnout (coded "1" for voters and "0" for nonvoters); and party identification

<sup>6</sup> As discussed in n. 2, we restrict our analyses to nonblack voters.

(coded using the Michigan partisanship scale ranging from "1" for strong Republican to "7" for strong Democrat).<sup>7</sup> While much of our interest centers on presidential vote choice, the turnout variable is useful as a measure of religious-based mobilization, which has particular relevance to the Christian Right thesis. Party identification is likewise useful in examining whether the voting trend we uncover for liberal Protestants has been accompanied by a shift in partisanship (thereby suggesting a *partisan* realignment). We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the trends in party identification among the seven denominational groups and logistic regression models to analyze the two dichotomous dependent variables.<sup>8</sup>

As discussed earlier, we use a seven-category denominational scheme for identifying religious groups, treating "other religion" as the reference in the regressions. We have constructed the scheme to take into account some of the peculiarities of the early years of the NES series, most notably the failure of the pre-1972 NES to distinguish Southern Baptists from other Baptist sects.<sup>9</sup> Full coding details are presented in the appendix.

Our analyses of trends yield two sets of estimates of change in the religion-vote choice/turnout relationship. We derive the first of these estimates from modeling the effect of religion without any controls, the second from a model that incorporates controls. For this second set of estimates, we add age, education, region, household income, and church attendance to the model to determine whether change in these variables is related to change in the religious political cleavage (or in the behavior of specific groups). Education and income, in particular, are relevant as measures of the growth of affluence and status among religious voters (they thus have particular relevance to the Catholic dealignment thesis). Age (years), edu-

<sup>7</sup> More specifically, the seven categories are strong Republican, weak Republican, independent Republican, independent, independent Democrat, weak Democrat, and strong Democrat. For recent discussion of the logic of this scheme, see Miller and Shanks (1996, chap. 6).

<sup>8</sup> Recent scholarly interest in voting for independent or third party candidates underscores the possible relevance that third party vote choice may have for the religious cleavage. As a side note, we present in the appendix additional analyses of third party voting to determine whether religious group membership had a significant impact on support for George Wallace and Ross Perot in the 1968 and 1992 elections.

<sup>9</sup> We differ from Lopatto (1985) in placing all Baptists into the conservative Protestant category, both before and after 1972 to maintain internal consistency. (Before 1972, Lopatto places all Baptists in his moderate category but after 1972 places Southern Baptists in the conservative category.) However, we have also created a Southern Baptist dummy variable to test whether placing more moderate Baptist sects in the conservative Protestant category affects our estimates of political trends. We also note that most analysts employing a two-category scheme (e.g., Leege and Kellstedt 1993), place all Baptists in their "evangelical" category.

cation (years), and income (dollars) are measured as continuous variables, while region is a dummy variable ("1" for South, "0" other regions). To estimate the effect of household income for the entire 1960–92 period, we have scaled income to 1992 dollars for each election year in the analyses.

In addition to the preceding variables, we also add a variable for regular church attendance to the model (coded "1" for regular attendance and "0" otherwise).<sup>10</sup> Regular church attendance provides attendees with greater exposure to religious messages, and adding attendance in our model thus enables us to analyze whether changing voting patterns among specific religious groups are related to changing patterns of church attendance. In the course of evaluating statistical models, we also test for two-way interactions between regular attendance and religious group membership.

Our analyses are presented in four stages. In the first stage, we analyze presidential vote choice, voter turnout, and party identification using our seven-category scheme for the entire 1960–92 period. Our goal here is to weigh the evidence for political trends in the behavior of specific groups as well as in the overall religious cleavage. In the second stage of the analyses, we examine in further detail the surprising evidence of an *absence* of trends among Catholic voters—in spite of their growing economic affluence—found in our initial estimates. The third stage examines the causes of liberal Protestants' movement away from the Republican Party. The fourth stage uses a finer-grained measure distinguishing Southern from other Baptists to search for any additional evidence for political trends occurring *among* the category of conservative Protestants that might have been missed in the first round of analyses.

### Statistical Models

To analyze our two dichotomous dependent variables (presidential choice and turnout), we use a logistic regression framework. We compare a series of competing models to arrive at a preferred model of change in the relationship between these variables and religious group membership.<sup>11</sup> Our

<sup>10</sup> The NES introduced changes in the response categories of this item during and after the 1972 survey. To maintain consistency with the pre-1972 categories, we have dichotomized this item, coding "every week/almost every week" as what was previously "regular" reported attendance. The nearly identical rates of regular attendance using this measure (.436 in 1968 and .439 in 1972) lend support to this coding decision. For discussions of the importance of incorporating religiosity measures in models of religious politics, see esp. Leege (1993b; 1996).

<sup>11</sup> We choose our preferred models of religious voting using the  $-2 \log\text{-likelihood}$  statistic ( $-2LL$ ) and Raftery's (1986, 1995) Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which is calculated for logistic regression models as  $D - (df)\log(N)$ , where  $D$  is the residual

simplest model of change in the interrelationship between religion and presidential vote choice serves as a baseline for subsequent comparisons.<sup>12</sup> This model includes terms for the main effects of election year and religion; however, because it does not include any religion-by-election interactions, it assumes that shifts in presidential vote choice affect all religious groups equally. In this model, the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds of choosing the Democratic over the Republican presidential candidate, which we designate by  $\Phi_{ij}$  for vote choice  $j$  ( $j = 1$  for the Democratic and 0 for the Republican candidate) for person  $i$ :

$$\Phi_{ij} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k=1}^T \beta_{ik}^T C_{ik} + \sum_{l=1}^L \beta_{il}^R D_{il}. \quad (1)$$

In equation (1),  $C_{ik}$  are dummy variables for the  $k$  election years in the analyses ( $k = 1$  for 1960, 2 for 1964, . . . , 9 for 1992), and  $D_{il}$  are dummy variables for the seven religious categories ( $l = 1$  for no religion, 2 for liberal Protestant, 3 for moderate Protestant, 4 for conservative Protestant, 5 for Catholic, 6 for Jewish, and 7 for other religion).<sup>13</sup> The parameters to be estimated in this model are the constant,  $\alpha_i$ , for the "other religion" category's log-odds of voting Democratic in the 1960 election, the  $\beta_{ik}$  terms for the effect of each of the  $k$  elections on vote choice (the  $T$  superscript designates this as the election year variable), and the  $\beta_{il}$  for the effect of the  $l$  religious categories on vote choice (with the  $R$  superscript designating this as the religion variable).

Our preferred model of religious voting is summarized in equation (2). Despite the necessarily cumbersome notation, the model's implied hypotheses about voting trends are relatively simple. The three new  $\beta$  terms (superscripted by  $RT$  to indicate a religion by time interaction) represent hypotheses about voting trends for three specific religious groups: liberal Protestants ( $l = 2$ ), conservative Protestants ( $l = 4$ ), and Catholics ( $l = 5$ ). For liberal Protestants, the  $\beta_{il}$  term's election-year-by-liberal-Protestant interaction is constrained by  $Y_{it}$ , a fixed score for person  $i$ , which is coded "0" to "8" for the election years (i.e., 0 for 1960, 1 for 1964, . . . , 8 for 1992). Given this linear constraint, the inclusion of this new parameter in the model represents the hypothesis that liberal Protestants' likelihood of

deviance ( $-2 \log$  likelihood) for the model under consideration,  $df$  is its degrees of freedom,  $\log$  is the natural logarithm, and  $N$  is the sample size.

<sup>12</sup> Given that our models of religion and voter turnout are structurally similar to the models of partisan vote choice, we do not present them formally.

<sup>13</sup> To identify the model, we set the highest  $\beta_{il}$  (for "other religion") and the lowest  $\beta_{il}$  (for the 1960 election) equal to zero. There are thus six parameters for the religion variable and eight parameters for the election year variable to be estimated in this and in subsequent models.

choosing the Democratic candidate has increased at a constant rate (in logits) for each election since 1960.

$$\Phi_y = \alpha_j + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k^T C_{jk} + \sum_{l=1}^L \beta_l^T D_{lj} \\ + \beta_{ij}^{RT} D_{i2} Y_{j0} + \beta_{ij}^{RT} D_{i4} Z_{j0} + \beta_{sj}^{RT} D_{is} V_{j0}. \quad (2)$$

The  $\beta_i$  and  $\beta_s$  terms refer respectively to more limited patterns of change among conservative Protestants and Catholics. The fixed score  $Z_{j0}$  is coded "1" for the 1976 and 1980 elections (when born-again presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was running for office) and "0" otherwise, and it constrains the conservative-Protestant-by-year interaction to refer to their tendency to favor the Democratic candidate during these two elections. The  $V_{j0}$  term is coded "1" for the 1960 election and "0" otherwise, and it constrains the Catholic-by-year interaction to refer to Catholic voters' disproportionate support for John Kennedy.<sup>14</sup> The remaining models (including our final model, which adds age, education, income, region, and church attendance) are nested extensions of the two preceding models and are discussed in the results section of the article.<sup>15</sup>

### An Index of the Religious Political Cleavage

Using the coefficients of our preferred models of presidential vote choice and turnout for the 1960–92 period, we can construct an index of change in the religious political cleavage. By summarizing the information contained in the model's coefficients, this index provides us with a measure of the magnitude of the religious cleavage at a given election. Because it is measured in standard deviations, this measure enables us to directly compare the magnitude of the cleavage at various elections, thereby gauging the evidence for trends over time.

Our measure of the religious cleavage in presidential vote choice is calculated as the average deviation of a given religious category from the overall mean.<sup>16</sup> This index is summarized in equation (3), where the  $\beta$ s are the coefficients of the model, and the  $t$  subscript for the index indicates

<sup>14</sup> As discussed in the results section, the election-specific references of the two trend parameters for Catholics and conservative Protestants implies that their (category-specific) voting trends are considerably less enduring in comparison to liberal Protestants' voting trends, which encompasses the entire 1960–92 trend.

<sup>15</sup> Note that our preferred model of religion and presidential choice with controls simply adds additional terms for the main effects of the five additional variables.

<sup>16</sup> This index has been used by Hout, Brooks, and Manza (1995) to study changes over time in the relationship between class and voter choice/turnout.

that there is a single score for each of the election years:<sup>17</sup>

$$\text{religious cleavage index}_i = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^P (\beta_{ij}^R + \beta_{ij}^T + \beta_{ij}^{RT})^2}{P}} \quad (3)$$

Scores for this index measure the magnitude of the religious cleavage in deviations from the mean for a given election. When the voting behavior of religious groups differs, the standard deviation of the group-specific coefficients (i.e., the index) will increase; conversely, when the voting behavior of religious groups converges, the index score will approach zero. By examining whether these scores increase or decrease over time, we test whether a decline (or alternatively, an increase) has occurred in the religious political cleavage.

We use a series of graphical displays to present scores under our religious cleavage index. The first set of displays presents a pair of index scores, the first of which is the result of modeling *only* the effect of religion on vote choice, the second of which adds our controls to the model. The first set of scores thus are derived from the coefficients of our model incorporating no controls; the second set of scores are derived from the coefficients of the model once the controls have been added. Using the graphical displays, we can observe whether change in our five control variables has affected the magnitude of, and trends in, the religious political cleavage. Using household income as an example, this comparison tells us whether changes in economic affluence have had the effect of narrowing the denominational-based religious cleavage.

In addition to analyzing changes in the religious cleavage, we also consider the contribution of each of the specific religious groups in the analysis to this cleavage. In our second set of figures, we thus present our measures of religious *group-specific* voting behavior for each of the groups in the analyses. This measure is the (normalized) logit coefficient for the category in question, and because the coefficients sum to zero (for identification purposes), scores indicate a tendency for a particular religious group to vote Democratic (a positive sign) or Republican (a negative sign) in a given election. By graphing group-specific voting behavior by election year, we can thus determine whether the groups in the analyses have moved together from election to election or whether one or more groups have moved disproportionately toward support for one of the parties, thus showing evidence of a changing political alignment.

<sup>17</sup> To identify all  $\beta$  coefficients for a given year, we employ the familiar zero-sum constraint (i.e.,  $\sum \beta_j = 0$ ).

TABLE 1

FIT STATISTICS FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS  
AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE, 1960-92

MODEL	FIT STATISTICS	
	-2 log Likelihood	BIC
1. Election years, religious categories	10,944.09 (8,553)	-66,510
2. Kennedy effect for Catholics	10,894.14 (8,552)	-66,551
3. Liberal Protestants * election year	10,874.54 (8,551)	-66,562
4. Carter effect for conservative Protestants	10,861.50 (8,550)	-66,566
5. Religious categories $\times$ election year	10,803.42 (8,505)	-66,216
6. Model 4 + household income, <sup>a</sup> years of education, age, region, gender, church attendance, attendance $\times$ religious categories, and attendance $\times$ year	10,499.41 (8,536)	-66,801

NOTE.—<sup>a</sup>s are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including a constant only) is -65,829. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of the Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for the Republican presidential candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analysis). N = 8,568.

<sup>a</sup> Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

## RESULTS

## The Religious Political Cleavage and Group-Specific Trends since 1960

Our first set of analyses examines the evidence for change in the overall religious political cleavage and in the political behavior of the seven specific groups. In table 1, we present fit statistics for our competing models of presidential vote choice in the 1960-92 period. Model 2's Catholic-by-1960-election interaction results in an improvement in fit over model 1, which includes only the main effects of religion and election year.<sup>18</sup> Model 3 contains an additional term for a linear voting trend among liberal Protestants, and it results in an improvement over model 2's fit (the -11 BIC improvement of model 3 over model 2 represents strong evidence for this trend). Model 4 in turn provides a better fit to the data, adding a single parameter relating to conservative Protestants' voting behavior in the 1976 and 1980 elections (what we call in table 1 the "Carter effect").

<sup>18</sup> Adding an additional parameter to model 2 for a linear voting trend pertaining to Catholics fails to improve model fit according to  $-2LL$  ( $-2LL = 10890.80$ ) and results in a worse fit according to BIC (-66,545).

In model 5, we test whether model 4's three religious-group-by-year interactions are sufficient to capture all sources of change in the interrelationship of religion and voting behavior. Model 5 allows the religious categories to interact freely with election year, thereby consuming 45 more parameters than model 4. Both  $-2\text{LL}$  and BIC readily select model 4 over model 5, demonstrating that trends in the religious cleavage can be succinctly captured by our three (constrained) religion-by-year interactions. Model 6 adds covariates for church attendance, income, education, age, and gender and interaction effects for church attendance by religious group and also with the 1992 election.<sup>19</sup> While model 4 is thus our preferred model of religious voting *not* controlling for socioeconomic change, model 6 is our preferred model *with* controls (both  $-2\text{LL}$  and BIC show that the effects of these controls on vote choice are significant).

In table 2, we present the coefficients from our two preferred models of change in the religious cleavage. The three statistically significant coefficients for liberal Protestants by year, Catholics by 1960, and conservative Protestants by 1976/80 are of particular interest. For Catholics, the 1.20 coefficient indicates that the log odds of Catholics choosing the Democratic candidates was 1.20 greater in 1960 than all other elections in the series. This translates into a 3.3-fold increase in the odds that Catholics favored the Democrat (John Kennedy) in this election. Similarly, conservative Protestants were disproportionately likely to favor born-again Baptist Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980 relative to the much lower levels of support they gave to Democratic candidates in other presidential elections.

The three coefficients are virtually unchanged in the first versus second columns, indicating that the additional variables in the model including controls do not explain these religious-group-by-year changes. Given that they refer to a single or pair of elections, Catholics' and conservative Protestants' voting "trends" are, however, less consequential for long-term changes in the religious cleavage than liberal Protestants' shift, which spans the entire 1960–92 period. We interpret Catholics' and conservative Protestants' unusual support for Democratic candidates as a product of ethnoreligious considerations: as a form of "identity" politics, these two groups gave unusually high levels of support to a member of their religious group. By contrast, the trend among liberal Protestants is clearly not explained by factors of this sort. The cumulative effects of this trend are, moreover, substantial: the .11 coefficient for liberal Protestants indicates

<sup>19</sup> We note that adding additional terms for interactions between church attendance and (all) election years does not improve the fit of the model ( $-2\text{LL} = 10494.58$  at 7 df; BIC  $\approx -66,742$ ). Model 6's single attendance by year = 1992 interaction effect is thus sufficient to capture the interaction between church attendance and time.

TABLE 2

## LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS FOR INITIAL TREND AND PREFERRED MODELS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE, 1960-92

Independent Variable	Initial Trend Estimates	Preferred Estimates
Constant .....	-.33*	1.30*
	(.16)	(.26)
Election year (reference = 1960):		
1964 .....	.89*	.94*
	(.11)	(.11)
1968 .....	-.19	-.07
	(.12)	(.12)
1972 .....	-.64*	-.50*
	(.11)	(.11)
1976 .....	-.09	.09
	(.11)	(.12)
1980 .....	-.52*	-.34*
	(.13)	(.13)
1984 .....	-.49*	-.34*
	(.11)	(.12)
1988 .....	-.30*	.00
	(.13)	(.13)
1992 .....	.16*	.62*
	(.12)	(.14)
Religious category (reference = other religion):		
Liberal Protestants .....	-.51*	-.92*
	(.17)	(.22)
Moderate Protestants .....	-.19	-.42*
	(.14)	(.20)
Conservative Protestants .....	-.16	-.61*
	(.14)	(.20)
Catholics .....	.64*	.14
	(.14)	(.20)
Jews .....	1.80*	1.66*
	(.21)	(.26)
No religion .....	.94*	.41*
	(.16)	(.21)
Religion by time interaction:		
Liberal Protestants × year (linear) .....	.11*	.11*
	(.02)	(.02)
Catholics × year <sub>1960</sub> .....	1.20*	1.22*
	(.21)	(.22)
Conservative Protestants × year <sub>1960/1980</sub> .....	.49*	.46*
	(.14)	(.14)
Region (reference = northeast):		
South .....	...	.13
		(.07)
Midwest .....	...	.11
		(.07)
West .....	...	.20
		(.08)

TABLE 2 (*Continued*)

Independent Variable	Initial Trend Estimates	Preferred Estimates
Gender (reference = male)	..	.14* (.05)
Household income (continuous, in 1,000s)*	..	-.01* (<.01)
Years of education (continuous)	..	-.05* (.01)
Age (continuous)	..	-.01* (<.01)
Regular church attendance (reference = less than regularly)	..	-1.11* (.28)
Church attendance by religion, time interactions		
Regular attendance × liberal Protestants	..	1.01* (.30)
Regular attendance × moderate Protestants	..	.40 (.30)
Regular attendance × conservative Protestants	..	.70* (.30)
Regular attendance × Catholics	..	1.13* (.29)
Regular attendance × Jews	..	1.11 (.61)
Regular attendance × year <sub>1960</sub>	..	-.47* (.15)

NOTE.—SEs are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for Republican presidential candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses).  $N = 8,568$

\* Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

\*  $P = .05$ , two-tailed test.

that since 1960 their tendency to favor the Democratic over the Republican presidential candidate has increased by .11 logits per year, amounting to a .88 total increase since 1960 in the log odds of Democratic vote choice. Whereas liberal Protestants were once the most supportive of Republican candidates of *any* religious group, they now give the *least* support to Republican candidates among the three Protestant groups (this can be observed in fig. 2, discussed below).

How have these group specific changes in presidential vote choice affected the overall religious cleavage? More clearly than the raw coefficients, the charts displayed in figure 1 provide a graphical illustration. In figure 1's right-hand panel, we present our twin sets of estimates for trends in the religious cleavage in presidential voting. The solid line shows the trend according to model 4 (without controls), the dotted line shows the




FIG. 1.—Maximum-likelihood estimates of the religious political cleavage under models 1 (dashed), 4 (solid line), and 6 (dots), 1960–92.

trend according to model 6 (with controls). Model 6's trend line is slightly higher at each election since 1968, indicating that the combined effect of the five covariates has been to actually enhance the total effect of religion on vote choice during these elections. With regard to trends, the critical finding conveyed by figure 1's right-hand panel is that both sets of estimates show a *decline* in the religious political cleavage. This decline of the religious cleavage between 1960 and 1980 is substantial, and the fact that the trend estimates for models 4 and 6 are parallel during most of the series is especially important, for it reveals that change in the five covariates cannot explain the majority of the net decline in the voting difference among the seven religious groups.<sup>20</sup>

In figure 1's left-hand panel, we present, for purposes of comparison, estimates of trends in the religious cleavage according to model 1, the model that includes *no* religion-by-year interactions. While model 1's fit to data is, of course, much worse than either model 4 or model 6, its coefficients nevertheless contain useful information. These estimates show us what trends in religious voting would have looked like had liberal Protestants' long-term (and Catholics' and conservative Protestants' short-term) trends *not* occurred. Model 1's dashed trend line shows no net change from 1960 to 1992, revealing that the decline in the religious cleavage established in the preferred models is due entirely to the three category-specific trends.

In figure 2, we examine how the presidential voting behavior of the specific religious groups in the analyses has contributed to the decline in total religious voting. Figure 2's six panels display the group-specific trend estimates, and as before, the solid lines represent the trend according to model 4 and the dotted lines represent the trends according to model 6. (To conserve space, the "other religion" category is not shown here but is available upon request.) The three main groups of interest are liberal Protestants, Catholics, and conservative Protestants, given that the modeling results have already established the existence of year-by-category interactions for these groups.

The first panel shows that the voting trend among liberal Protestants has been steep relative to the (change in) the average presidential choice of all voters. Once the most Republican of all religious groups, liberal Protestants have moved to within close proximity to the x-axis (marking the point at which their fitted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate equals .5), suggesting a considerable movement away from their earlier political alignment. The nearly perfect congruence of the two trend

<sup>20</sup> If change in these covariates were sufficient to account for this trend, the dashed trend line representing model 6's coefficients would flatten, running parallel to the x-axis.




FIG. 2.—Maximum-likelihood estimates of religious group-specific presidential vote choice under preferred models 4 (solid line) and 6 (dots), 1960–92.

lines again reveals that liberal Protestants' voting trend is not explained by the socioeconomic covariates parameterized in model 6. (We address the question of what force accounts for this trend in the third stage of the analyses.)

The trend for Catholics is mostly captured in a single step from disproportionately high support for Kennedy in 1960 to much lower support for Democratic candidates in the remaining elections. Insofar as they remain above the figure's x-axis, however, Catholics continue to be in a (weak) Democratic political alignment (relative to the average religious voter), and the trend lines for the two preferred models are nearly congruent. Given that the current series goes back no further than the 1960 election, we utilize data from the 1952 and 1956 elections in the next stage of the analyses to measure more fully any evidence of a shift away from the Democratic Party among Catholics since the 1950s.

With the partial exception of two elections, conservative Protestants have consistently favored Republican candidates by a large margin. The trend estimates for models 4 and 6 are very similar, and these estimates are suggestive of a Republican voting trend *only* if one were to take the 1976 election as the baseline for assessing political change among this segment of the electorate.<sup>21</sup>

Jewish voters remain by far the most Democratic of religious groups, and our analyses show that their level of support has varied little (with the exception of the 1964 election) relative to the electorate-wide mean. Our results are consistent with the findings of other scholars who have found little evidence of any rightward shift among Jewish voters in spite of the Republican Party's repeated efforts in recent years to attract Jewish support (e.g., Lipset and Raab 1995, chap. 6; Sigelman 1991; Abramson et al. 1994, p. 156).

Seculars—understood broadly as those who either identify themselves as atheists, agnostics, or as having no religious affiliation—are consistently Democratic throughout the 1960–92 period, although at a lower rate than Jews. While this result is perhaps not surprising in recent elections, the Republican Party's open embrace of religious values during the past two decades cannot per se explain seculars' support for Democratic candidates over the entire period. Accordingly, we find no evidence to support claims that seculars are becoming *more* Democratic over time, as Fowler and Hertke (1995, pp. 104–5) have suggested. In fact, the high-

<sup>21</sup> Indeed, much of the outpouring of journalistic analyses of an ostensibly surging New Right came in the wake of the 1980 and 1984 elections, in which conservative Protestants were moving away from the higher levels of support they accorded Carter in 1976 and 1980. This shift, however, becomes illusory when viewed from the standpoint of the entire time series.

TABLE 3

FIT STATISTICS FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS  
AND VOTER TURNOUT, 1960-92

MODEL	FIT STATISTICS	
	-2 log likelihood	BIC
1 Election years, religious categories .....	12,611.92 (11,870)	-98,765
2 Carter effect for conservative Protestants .....	12,601.70 (11,869)	-98,766
3 Model 2 + conservative Protestants $\times$ year .....	12,597.70 (11,862)	-98,704
4. Model 2 + preferred model of partisan choice .....	12,596.31 (11,867)	-98,752
5. Model 2 + religious categories $\times$ election year .....	12,542.30 (11,822)	-98,384
6. Model 2 + household income,* years of education, age, region, gender, church attendance .....	11,143.84 (11,861)	-100,148

NOTE.—*d.f.* are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including constant only) is -98,519. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for voted and "0" for did not vote (African-American voters are excluded from the analysis). *N* = 11,885.

\* Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

water mark of seculars' support for the Democratic Party came in 1964, in reaction to the Goldwater candidacy.

The two residual categories in the analysis—moderate Protestants and “other” religions—are aligned with the Republican Party. Moderate Protestants are slightly more Republican in their voting behavior than conservative Protestants, and liberal Protestants’ defection from the GOP has left moderates as the most consistently Republican of the three Protestant sects since 1976.<sup>22</sup> The “other religion” category’s voting behavior (not shown) exhibits significant volatility from election to election. While they remain aligned with the Republican Party, their support for Republican candidates is considerably more variable than that of moderate and conservative Protestants.

## Trends in Turnout and Party Identification

We now analyze the evidence for group-specific trends in voter turnout and party identification. We present in table 3 fit statistics for evaluating

<sup>22</sup> Given that the moderate category is a diverse group including both unclassified and nondenominational Protestants, some caution should, however, be taken in interpreting these results.

competing models of trends in the relationship between religious group membership and voter turnout. Model 2's improvement in fit over model 1 provides positive evidence of an interaction between conservative Protestants and voter turnout in the years in which Democrat Carter was running for the presidency. Model 3 does not, however, improve the fit of model 2, providing evidence that group-specific change in turnout rates among conservative Protestants were limited to the 1976 and 1980 elections.<sup>23</sup> Model 5 includes terms for the unconstrained interaction between election year and religious group. Model 5 does not, however, improve the fit of model 2 according to either -2LL or BIC, establishing that there are no more significant turnout trends among specific religious groups. Given that the control variables in model 6 result in a significant improvement in fit over model 2, model 6 is our preferred model of religious and voter turnout.

The coefficients of our preferred model (see table 4) show that Jewish voters enjoy the highest rate of turnout among the seven groups. The next largest coefficient is for Catholics, with liberal and moderate Protestants following close behind. The small coefficients (.18 and .19) for conservative Protestants and seculars are not statistically significant, indicating that turnout rates among these two groups are not distinguishable from the "other religion" category. While conservative Protestants are thus less likely than any religious group to actually vote, the 1976 and 1980 elections are an exception. In these two elections, our model predicts their log odds of voting increased by .48. The same force eliciting unusually high levels of Democratic Party support among conservative Protestants—the candidacy of a "born-again" presidential candidate—also led to higher than average voting rates among this segment of the electorate.

In similar fashion to the earlier presentation of the presidential vote choice results, we summarize in figure 3's panels our findings for religious voter turnout.<sup>24</sup> Five of the seven trend lines are essentially flat, with the "other religion" (not shown) exhibiting a net increase in the likelihood of voting and conservative Protestants experiencing a temporary, but sharp, boost in turnout in 1976 and 1980. Most important for the Christian Right thesis, there is no evidence of increasing participation by conservative Protestants at the ballot box since 1980.

<sup>23</sup> Model 4's similar lack of improvement in fit over model 2 provides evidence that the two additional group-specific interactions with time we found for presidential vote choice (relating to Catholics and liberal Protestants) are irrelevant in the case of turnout.

<sup>24</sup> Note that because they are calculated relative to the overall mean, the group-specific estimates of turnout rates in fig. 3 do not reveal the *electorate-wide* decline in turnout since 1960. This decline can, however, be observed from the election year (main effect) coefficients presented in table 4.

TABLE 4

LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PREFERRED MODELS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS  
AND VOTER TURNOUT, 1960-92

Independent Variable	Preferred Estimates	SE
Constant	-2.55*	.22
Election year (reference = 1960):		
1964	-.55*	.13
1968	-.80*	.12
1972	-1.04*	.12
1976	-1.18*	.12
1980	-1.29*	.13
1984	-1.00*	.12
1988	-1.17*	.13
1992	-.98*	.12
Religious category (reference = other religion):		
Liberal Protestants	.50*	.14
Moderate Protestants	.59*	.14
Conservative Protestants	.19	.14
Catholics	.64*	.13
Jews	1.01*	.24
No religion	.18	.15
Religion by time interaction:		
Conservative Protestants × year <sub>1964/1992</sub>	.48*	.13
Region (reference = northeast)		
South	-.33*	.07
Midwest	.10	.07
West	.06	.08
Regular church attendance (reference = less than regularly)	.68*	.05
Gender (reference = male)	-.24*	.05
Household income (continuous, in 1,000s)*	.02*	<.01
Years of education (continuous)	.19*	.01
Age (continuous)	.03*	<.01

Note.—Dependent variable is coded "1" for voted and "0" for did not vote.

\* Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

\*  $P = .05$ , two-tailed test.

In table 5, we consider religious group-specific trends in party identification during the 1960-92 period. The OLS model whose coefficients we present includes our control variables, as well as an additional (linearly constrained) interaction for Southern residence and election year; the latter coefficient (-.14; SE = .02) represents the well-known breakup of the solid Democratic South. In addition to the main effects of religious group membership, we also estimate a series of interactions with time; all these are linear interactions with election year (coded "1" for 1960, "2" for 1964,




FIG. 3.—Maximum-likelihood estimates of group-specific religious voter turnout under preferred models 2 (solid line) and 6 (dots), 1960–92.

TABLE 5  
OLS COEFFICIENTS FOR ANALYZING TRENDS IN PARTISANSHIP  
AMONG RELIGIOUS VOTERS, 1960-92

Independent Variable	Preferred Estimates	SE
Constant .....	5.31*	.23
Election year (reference = 1960):		
1964 .....	.36*	.11
1968 .....	.09	.12
1972 .....	.01	.12
1976 .....	.02	.14
1980 .....	-.12	.16
1984 .....	-.08	.16
1988 .....	-.25	.18
1992 .....	.04	.19
Religious category (reference = other religion):		
Liberal Protestants .....	-.45*	.18
Moderate Protestants .....	-.14	.18
Conservative Protestants .....	.25	.18
Catholics .....	1.70*	.23
Jews .....	1.59*	.28
No religion .....	.53	.29
Religion by time interaction:		
Liberal Protestants $\times$ year (linear) .....	.10*	.03
Moderate Protestants $\times$ year (linear) .....	.02	.03
Conservative Protestants $\times$ year (linear) .....	.01	.03
Catholics $\times$ year .....	-.55*	.20
Jews $\times$ year (linear) .....	.08	.05
No religion $\times$ year (linear) .....	.05	.05
Region (reference = northeast):		
South .....	1.32*	.12
Midwest .....	.02	.06
West .....	.22*	.07
Region by time interactions:		
South $\times$ year .....	-.14*	.02
Household income (continuous, in 1,000s)* .....	-.01*	<.01
Gender (reference = male) .....	.10*	.04
Years of education (continuous) .....	-.08*	.01
Age (continuous) .....	-.01*	<.01
Regular church attendance (reference = less than regularly) .....	-.32*	.05

NOTE.—Dependent variable is a seven-point scale ranging between "1" (strong Republican) and "7" (strong Democrat).  $N = 8,568$ .

\* Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

\*  $P = .05$ , two-tailed test.

. . . , and "9" for 1992), with the exception of Catholics, whose category is constrained to interact solely with the 1960 election (during which their Democratic identification is predicted by the model as being unusually high).

The only two statistically significant religious-group-by-year coefficients are for Catholics and liberal Protestants. This implies that trends in party identification among the five remaining religious groups are fully captured by the changes expressed in the election year (or region by year) coefficients. The main finding of interest relates to the political trend for liberal Protestants. The statistically significant .10 coefficient translates into a sizable shift in party identification between 1960 and 1992—nearly a full point change (.80) on the seven-point scale in the direction of Democratic identification. This trend in party identification provides additional evidence that liberal Protestants' voting trend represents a *partisan* shift in political alignment, not merely a shift in voting patterns.

### Catholics' Voting Behavior since 1952

Before any firm conclusions about change in Catholics' political alignment can be drawn, it is necessary to examine the period prior to the 1960 election. To test the hypothesis that Catholics have moved over time from strong to weak Democratic Party support, we need to determine whether Catholics' support in the 1950s for Democratic candidates (relative to other voters) was similar to their support for Kennedy over Nixon in 1960. If the latter condition is met, it would imply that Catholics' 1964–92 voting behavior represents a trend toward declining support for the Democratic Party (rather than a single election spike *toward* the Democratic Party in 1960).

To test this hypothesis, we present in table 6 fit statistics for models of Catholic vote choice for the entire 1952–92 period. Limitations in the information available on Protestant denominations prior to 1960 make it impossible to distinguish among Protestant voters, so for these analyses we treat them as the (homogeneous) reference category in our regressions.<sup>25</sup> While this limitation would be problematic for obtaining estimates during the *post*-1960s period of the analyses (during which time liberal Protestants diverge substantially in their vote choice, thus leading to greater political heterogeneity *among* Protestants), it should not introduce any bias into our estimates of the *Catholic* vote in the 1950s. The reason for

<sup>25</sup> For the 1952–92 analyses, we have restricted our analyses of the NES data to Protestants and Catholics, given that it is sufficient to know whether Catholics were—relative to Protestant voters—as supportive of Democratic candidates in the 1950s as in 1960.

TABLE 6

FIT STATISTICS FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE  
AMONG CATHOLICS VERSUS PROTESTANTS, 1952-92

MODEL	FIT STATISTICS	
	-2 log Likelihood	BIC
1. Election + religion main effects*	13,768.36 (10,661)	-85,117
2. Kennedy effect for Catholics (Catholics $\times$ year <sub>1960</sub> )	13,710.82 (10,660)	-85,166
3. Catholics $\times$ year <sub>1952-56</sub>	13,708.98 (10,659)	-85,159
4. Catholics $\times$ year	13,692.72 (10,651)	-85,100

NOTE.—df are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including only a constant) is -84,531. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for Republican presidential candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses).

\* Religious categories in the 1952-92 analyses are (homogeneous) Protestants and Catholics.

this is that our earlier analyses of presidential voting showed that all three Protestant denominational groups were very similar in their high levels of Republican Party support in the 1960s and thus can be expected to show similar voting patterns in the 1950s.

Corroborating our earlier finding, model 2 (which adds a single interaction for Catholics in the 1960 election) improves over the fit of model 1 (which includes only terms for the main effects of religion and election year). In model 3, we add a second interaction term for Catholics' vote choice in 1952 and 1956 to test whether their voting patterns in the 1950s differed from the remainder of the series.<sup>26</sup> The clear lack of improvement in fit of model 3 over model 2 provides no support for this hypothesis.<sup>27</sup> Model 4's additional terms (which allow the dummy variable for Catholics to interact freely with the election year variable) also worsen model 2's fit. These results establish two critical facts: Not only was the support of Catholics for the Democratic candidate in 1960 unusually high, their tendency to favor Democratic candidates in *all* other elections (relative to

<sup>26</sup> This interaction is parameterized by multiplying the dummy variable for religion (Catholics = 1, homogeneous Protestants = 0) by a dummy variable for the 1950s (the 1952 and 1956 elections are coded "1," all remaining elections "0").

<sup>27</sup> We also tested an alternative parameterization of this hypothesis, modifying model 3 so that Catholics' vote choice in the 1956, 1956, and 1960 elections were constrained to be equal; this alternative model decisively worsened the fit of model 2.

the corresponding preference of Protestant voters) shows no distinctive net trend (either toward or away from the Democratic Party) during the entire 1952–92 period. Corroborating our earlier analyses, we thus find that with the exception of 1960, Catholics' vote choice has fluctuated without any clear trend away from (or toward) the Democratic Party since the 1950s. These results also establish that the post-1960 decline in the religious political cleavage is entirely a product of liberal Protestants' dealignment from the Republican Party.

#### Liberal Protestants' Voting Trend

Of the group-specific trends we have investigated, the trend for liberal Protestants is of greatest consequence for the religious cleavage. Whereas the "trend" among Catholics and conservative Protestants is a function (respectively) of one or two elections, liberal Protestants' changing voting behavior has moved them from being the most Republican of any religious group to being nearly as likely to be Democratic as Republican in their presidential preference.

Using the 1972–92 NES surveys, we explore the causes explaining liberal Protestants' voting trend.<sup>28</sup> The items we use for these analyses measure an array of potentially relevant causal factors that may account for the phenomenon at hand. We summarize these items in table 7, along with their sample means for the election years defining the endpoints of the trend: 1972 and 1992. Most of these item means show net changes for the 1972–92 period, but to determine whether these changes actually explain liberal Protestants' trend, we must first obtain their coefficients from a multivariate model. Once we have estimated these coefficients, we use a regression decomposition to derive estimates of the contribution of each of the items in the analyses to explaining liberal Protestants' trend.<sup>29</sup> These estimates are presented in table 8.

The estimates in the first column of this table are the change in presidential vote choice from 1972 to 1992 that is predicted using the regression coefficients and the change in the item's sample mean. The estimates in the second column are the proportion of the total (predicted) change in vote choice among liberal Protestants attributable to a row-specific fac-

<sup>28</sup> Because the items measuring potentially relevant causal factors are available only after the 1972 survey, we limit our explanatory analyses of liberal Protestants' trend to the 1972–92 period. Since the trend continues vigorously (and linearly) during the entire period, this limitation should be of little consequence, since the mechanisms explaining the shift after 1972 can be expected to also be operating prior to 1972.

<sup>29</sup> To conserve space, we have not presented the model's coefficients, but they are available upon request from the authors.

TABLE 7

## SAMPLE MEANS/PROPORTIONS FOR LIBERAL PROTESTANTS, 1972 VERSUS 1992

Independent Variable (Contrast)	1972	1992
Region (reference category = all other regions), South .....	.19	.25
Gender (reference category = male), female .....	.57	.49
Age (continuous) .....	45.98	50.39
Years of education (continuous) .....	13.37	14.02
Household income (continuous) .....	45,026	46,587
Church attendance (reference category = less than regularly), regularly .....	.36	.33
Economic satisfaction (reference category = better off than year ago):		
Same as year ago .....	.49	.28
Worse off than year ago .....	.15	.39
Welfare state (continuous: higher scores indicate support for welfare state) .....	2.49	2.34
Gender equality (continuous: higher scores indicate support for egalitarianism) .....	3.80	4.87
Abortion (reference category = all else) unconditional pro-choice position .....	.30	.59
Civil Rights movement (reference category = moving too fast)		
Moving about right .....	.47	.63
Moving too slow .....	.07	.15

TABLE 8

## LOGISTIC REGRESSION DECOMPOSITION FOR EXPLAINING TREND IN VOTE CHOICE AMONG LIBERAL PROTESTANTS, 1972-92

Independent Variable	Change in Log Odds of Democratic Vote Choice	Proportion of Total Logit Change
Region .....	.00	.00
Gender .....	-.01	-.03
Age .....	-.01	-.03
Years of education .....	-.04	-.11
Household income .....	-.02	-.06
Church attendance .....	.01	.03
Economic satisfaction .....	.11	.31
Welfare state attitudes .....	-.05	-.14
Gender attitudes .....	.07	.20
Abortion attitudes .....	.15	.43
Civil Rights attitudes .....	.14	.40
$\Sigma$ logit change in partisan vote choice, 1972-92 .....	.35	1.00

tor.<sup>10</sup> Using the results for gender as our example, the  $-.01$  estimate indicates that on the basis of a decrease in the proportion of female liberal Protestants since 1972, we predict a very slight shift toward support for Republican candidates among liberal Protestants as a whole. The accompanying  $-.03$  estimate in the second column shows that the explanatory power of gender as a causal factor is low. Note that the estimate is negatively signed insofar as the actual (as well as the predicted) overall change in liberal Protestants' vote choice is toward Democratic candidates (and thus is positively signed).

Taken together, the first six factors relating to sociodemographic and church attendance factors do not explain liberal Protestants' trend. They predict, in fact, *increased* support for Republican candidates during this period. Lower rates of economic satisfaction during Republican presidential administrations, by contrast, have a positive impact on Democratic vote choice, explaining just over 30% of the trend. The next estimate, relating to attitudes toward the welfare state, is negatively signed, indicating that declining liberal Protestant support for the welfare state would have by itself intensified their alignment with the Republican Party.

The main part of the causal story is summarized in the ninth through the eleventh rows of table 8. These results show that liberal Protestants' have become increasingly liberal in their views of social issues relating to gender, abortion, and race, with the result that attitudinal change on these issues explains an impressive 103% of the trend. The fact that the latter proportion exceeds 100% shows that by itself, the expansion of socially liberal attitudes would have resulted in a slightly larger than actual voting trend. Of these three factors, abortion attitudes explain the largest share (43%) of the (predicted) trend, but gender attitudes (20%) and views of the Civil Rights movement (40%) also have had a very substantial impact.

### Conservative Protestants and Southern Baptists

Our final analyses return to the case of conservative Protestants and the Christian Right thesis. Our results for the analyses of the 1960–92 period found no evidence of a mobilization or realignment among denominationally conservative Protestants. However, to maintain consistency over the entire time series, we placed all Baptists in the conservative Protestant category. It is, however, possible that Southern Baptists—the largest fundamentalist denomination in the United States—did in fact undergo a

<sup>10</sup> For additional discussion of the regression decomposition strategy utilized in these analyses, see Firebaugh (1997) and Teixeira (1987).

TABLE 9

FIT STATISTICS FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE  
AMONG CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANTS, 1972-92

MODEL	FIT STATISTICS	
	-2 log likelihood	BIC
1. Election year .....	1,764.20 (1,413)	-8,491
2. Southern Baptist main effect <sup>a</sup> .....	1,755.42 (1,412)	-8,492
3. Southern Baptist * year .....	1,755.10 (1,411)	-8,486
4. Southern Baptist × year .....	1,747.35 (1,407)	-8,464

NOTE.—<sup>a</sup> are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including only a constant) is -8,465. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are denoted by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for Republican candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses). N = 1,419.

\* Dummy variable coded "1" for Southern Baptists, "0" for other Baptists and other conservative Protestants.

shift to the right. This shift could be undetectable in our analysis of the conservative Protestant category if, for instance, Southern Baptists were moving further toward the Republican Party at the same time that other Baptists were moving away from the GOP. These divergent trends would thus cancel one another out leaving the "conservative Protestant" category trendless. To test this hypothesis, we use the NES's more detailed information on religious denomination (available for the 1972-92 surveys) to distinguish between Southern Baptists and other Baptists. Using a dummy variable coded "1" for Southern Baptists (and "0" for the remainder of the "conservative" Protestant category), we analyze the evidence for trends in presidential vote choice *within* the larger category of conservative Protestants.

The results summarized in table 9 provide no evidence for the hypothesis of a Southern Baptist shift. The -1 BIC improvement of model 2 (adding to model 1 a term for the main effect of the Baptist variable) provides positive evidence that Southern Baptists' vote choice differed from the rest of the conservative Protestant category during the 1972-92 period. The coefficient for Southern Baptists (.39; SE = .13) is, however, *positively* signed, indicating that Southern Baptists were in fact *more* likely than other conservative Protestants to favor Democratic candidates from 1972 through 1992. While this finding is suggestive of lingering Democratic support among Southern white, religious voters, the main point

to be appreciated is the *absence* of trends among Southern Baptists. Neither a linear trend parameter for Southern Baptists (model 3), nor a set of unconstrained interactions of (Southern) Baptist with election (model 4), improves over model 2's fit. Southern Baptists remain slightly less Republican than other Baptists and given the stability of this gap over time, there is no evidence of a "right turn" among Southern Baptists as predicted by the Christian Right thesis.

## DISCUSSION

The results of the current study support arguments (summarized in hypothesis 1) that the religious political cleavage has experienced a decline in magnitude. The explanation for this development is, however, not in keeping with either widely held modernization theories of religious development or the thesis of the declining political relevance of religious denominational membership. We find that reestimating change in the religious cleavage to take into account changes in educational and household-income levels yields a comparable picture of overall as well as group-specific changes for the 1960–92 period. This result suggests that growing "affluence" cannot account for political trends in the religious cleavage, as predicted by secularization arguments.

Scholars using dichotomous or trichotomous measures of the religious cleavage (e.g., Wattenberg and Miller 1981; Abramson et al. 1994; Brint and Kelley 1993) have also concluded that declines in the religious cleavage are due to the growing political similarity of Catholics and Protestants. But these formulations do not capture the full story, for our analyses using the seven-category scheme show that the religious cleavage has narrowed precisely because of the growing political *heterogeneity* of Protestant denominations. Instead of being a function of conservative Protestants' behavior (which shows no net trends) or the behavior of *all* Protestants, the decline in the religious cleavage is a function of a specific change in the voting behavior of liberal Protestants. Liberal Protestants have fallen out of the earlier, Republican political alignment they shared with moderate and conservative Protestants and moved toward a more neutral voting alignment.

With regard to the Christian Right thesis, this study finds no evidence of a political realignment or increased mobilization among denominationally conservative Protestants.<sup>21</sup> Ironically, the only trend we find for presiden-

<sup>21</sup> These findings compliment and amplify Davis and Robinson's (1996) study of religious orthodoxy and racial and economic attitudes revealing that the voting behavior of denominationally conservative Protestants shows no evidence of a realignment or net shift in political alignment as predicted by the "culture wars" thesis.

tial vote choice and turnout among conservative Protestants (relative to the mean) relates to their higher than expected levels of turnout and support for (Democrat) Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980. This does not mean that a “new” Christian Right cannot be identified but that its base cannot be located denominationally at the presidential level (cf. Wilcox 1986; Hunter 1982, pp. 363–64). Rates of voter turnout among this group are likewise notable, not because of any trend toward greater participation, but instead because of their unchanging and comparatively low level of mobilization. Given that conservative Protestants were in a Republican alignment prior to the rise of conservative evangelical activists, the challenge for these activists continues to be to one of leading conservative Protestants to the ballot box in the first place.

With regard to the third thesis under examination, our results imply that claims about the dealignment of Catholic voters have been significantly overstated. Like Greeley (1985, 1990), we conclude that with the exception of the unusual 1960 election Catholics have maintained slightly above-average support for the Democratic Party since 1952, once we control for change or decline in the popularity of Democratic presidential candidates among all religious groups. Our results for Catholics also show that taking 1960 as a baseline would yield biased estimates of political trends among this segment of the electorate. The religious political cleavage was especially high in 1960, not because it was also high in preceding elections of the 1950s, but instead because Catholics became momentarily more Democratic in their party identification and presidential voting preferences.

The single most important source of change in the relationship between religious group membership and political behavior discovered in this study relates to liberal Protestants’ eroding support for Republican candidates. Given the historical context covered by our analyses, our findings present a highly consistent portrait of the mechanisms explaining this voting trend. Since the 1960s, liberal Protestants have been under pressure from a clergy that has grown considerably more receptive to calls for a variety of social changes, first stemming from opposition to the Vietnam War and general concerns with civil liberties, to more recent struggles to bring women into the clergy and to allow the equal participation of gays and lesbians in the church. Likewise, since the pivotal Goldwater campaign of 1964—coinciding with the origins of the liberal Protestants’ voting trend—socially conservative activists have made considerable inroads into the Republican Party (Brennan 1995). Opposition to Civil Rights legislation coupled with strong Republican opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and the increasingly partisan struggle over abortion appear to have provided liberal Protestants with sufficient reason to move away from their traditional alignment with the Republican Party.

### The Relative Magnitude of the Religious Political Cleavage

While our study finds clear evidence of a net decline stemming from liberal Protestants' voting trend, it is nevertheless important not to *understate* the magnitude of the religious cleavage. Our index reveals a drop from about .85 in 1960 to a low of .6 in 1980, back up to nearly .7 in 1992. This means that despite remarkable shifts in the political environment as well as rising rates of denominational switching and religious intermarriage (e.g., Roof and McKinney 1987; Wuthnow 1988; Kalmijn 1991), the average (logit) difference between our seven religious groups and the overall mean at a given election remains well above .5. Presuming a mean of zero for a given election, this .5 logit value means that for a given pair of religious groups, the expected difference in the probability that they will choose the Democratic presidential candidate is a very substantial .12 (e.g., .50 vs. .62).

The results of the current study are informative when compared with results from our related analyses of the class cleavage (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995) and the race and gender cleavages (Brooks and Manza, in press). Using the same index of social cleavages (and data from the same historical period), Hout et al.'s (1995) results reveal that the class cleavage varied between .3 and .4 on the logit scale during the 1952–92 period. Far from approaching the point of insignificance predicted by the "declining cleavage" thesis, the religious cleavage appears to be nearly twice the magnitude of the more widely debated class cleavage. Our comparative analyses of social cleavages in the United States show further that the religious cleavage—while roughly half the magnitude of the race cleavage in the 1964–92 period—is about four times the magnitude of the gender cleavage (Brooks and Manza, in press).

The preceding comparison is especially telling when juxtaposed with our findings about the relative stability of six of the seven religious groups in our analyses. While the denominationally based religious cleavage has proven to be permeable to contextual effects relating to specific candidates (in particular those of Kennedy, McGovern, and Carter), it is nevertheless a rare event for a specific religious group to move decisively toward or away from support for a major party's presidential candidates. Not only is the magnitude of the religious cleavage considerable, the results of the current study thus suggest little reason to believe that it is likely to experience a major decline in future elections.

### APPENDIX

#### Supplementary Analyses of Third Party Voting

Some analysts of religion and political behavior have examined independent presidential candidates (e.g., Gilbert, Johnson, and Peterson 1995),

hypothesizing that third party candidacies activate latent aspects of religious politics that are not observable in the major party choice of the Democratic versus the Republican candidate. To complement our analyses of religious denominations and major party vote choice, we examine the evidence for a religious basis of support for the candidacies of George Wallace in 1968 and Ross Perot in 1992. While both these candidates received a nontrivial share of the popular vote (13.5% and 18.9% respectively), they represent quite different sources of potential relevance to religious voters. Wallace's potential religious appeal stemmed from his socially conservative views on race and his support for segregation early in his career, views that may have resonated with denominationally conservative Protestant voters. Perot, by contrast, may have indirectly appealed to denominationally liberal (and perhaps also moderate) Protestants. Perot's socially moderate and economically conservative views may have made him appear to be an attractive alternative to the Republican and Democratic candidates for these Protestants.

We examine the evidence for a religious group bases of support for Wallace and Perot in table A1. The dependent variable is coded "1" for third party candidate support and "0" for major party candidate choice. As before, we use a logistic regression model, whose coefficients are presented in the columns of the table.

None of the coefficients for the effect of religious group membership on third party vote choice is statistically significant in either 1968 or 1992 (regular church attendance likewise has no significant effect). Statistically significant coefficients reveal that Wallace enjoyed disproportionate support among young, Southern, male voters. Perot's support was mainly among younger men. Comparing our statistical model to a simplified model that does not estimate the effect of religion, we find that deleting the parameters for religious group membership does *not* result in a significant loss of fit for either 1968 ( $-2LL$  is reduced by 9.99 at 6  $df$ ) or 1992 ( $-2LL$  is reduced by 5.94 at 6  $df$ ). Taken as a whole, these results thus provide no evidence that the political relevance of religious group membership found an expression in the candidacies of George Wallace or Ross Perot.

TABLE A1

LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR ANALYZING THIRD PARTY VOTE CHOICE  
AMONG RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN 1968 AND 1992

Independent Variable	Wallace Vote Estimates	Perot Vote Estimates
Constant .....	-.29 (.92)	-1.47* (.61)
Religious category (reference = other religion):		
Liberal Protestants .....	-.72 (.71)	.20 (.39)
Moderate Protestants .....	-.51 (.70)	.02 (.38)
Conservative Protestants .....	.05 (.68)	-.35 (.39)
Catholics .....	-.52 (.70)	.09 (.37)
Jews .....	.20 (.93)	-.14 (.61)
No religion .....	-.90 (.91)	-.08 (.40)
Region (reference = northeast):		
South .....	1.43* (.36)	-.41 (.22)
Midwest .....	.62 (.36)	.29 (.20)
West .....	.13 (.45)	.16 (.21)
Gender (reference = male) .....	-.67* (.21)	-.45* (.14)
Household income (continuous, in 1,000s)* .....	<.01 (<.01)	<.01 (<.01)
Years of education (continuous) .....	-.11* (.04)	.02 (.03)
Age (continuous) .....	-.02* (.01)	-.01* (<.01)
Regular church attendance (reference = less than regularly) .....	-.12 (.23)	-.14 (.16)

NOTE.—SEs are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of Wallace in 1968 and Perot in 1992, and "0" for choice of a major party candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses).  $N = 1,170$  in 1968;  $N = 1,684$  in 1992.

\* Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.

\*  $P = .05$ , two-tailed test.

TABLE A2  
MAJOR DENOMINATIONAL CODING SCHEME

PROTESTANT						
	Moderate	Conservative	Catholic	Jewian	Other	
Congregational/United Church of Christ	Presbyterian	Baptist*	Roman Catholic	Orthodox	Christian Scientist	
Episcopal/Episcopalian/Anglican	Lutheran <sup>b</sup>	Pentecostals/Assemblies of God	Greek Rite Catholic	Conservative	Jehovah's Witnesses	
Methodist <sup>c</sup>	Evangelical and Reformed	Holiness/Church of God		Reformed	Mennonite Church	
Unitarian/Universalist	Reform, Dutch Reformed, or Christian Reformed	Plymouth Brethren		No preference	Mormon Church	
	African Methodist Episcopal Church	Seventh Day Adventist			Eastern Orthodox	
	Protestants n.e.c.	Missouri Synod			Non-Judeo-Christian <sup>d</sup>	
	"Christian" n.e.c.	Lutheran			Quaker	
		Fundamentalist, n.a.c.			Salvation Army	
		Church of the Nazarene				

NOTE.—The "None" category included agnostic, atheist, and no preference responses. The Southern Baptist dummy variable (1972-72) was coded Southern Baptist = 1, all other Baptists = 0.

\* Including Southern Baptist.

<sup>b</sup> Except Missouri Synod Lutheran.

<sup>c</sup> Except Nazarene/Free Methodist.

<sup>d</sup> Buddhist, Hindu, Mohammedan, etc.

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# The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto<sup>1</sup>

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This essay draws on long-term ethnographic data to analyze the shifting relations between street gangs and their broader community. The essay focuses on one particular moment in the evolution of a ghetto-based street gang, namely its attempt to "corporatize" by accumulating revenues in underground economies, in order to demonstrate that neither the structure nor the practices of the street gang can be understood apart from the social organizational context of the larger community it inhabits.

## INTRODUCTION

The urban poor ghetto, the "socially isolated" inner city, and the "underclass" neighborhood have all become powerful phrases in the popular discourse on race and urbanism. They are grounded firmly in American consciousness, and they carry strong, cathected understandings of citizenship, individual responsibility, normative social behavior, and so on. One of the strongest images produced by these catchphrases is that of the street gang lurking about in dimly lit streets, preying upon the local residential population, and destroying community social fabric. Out of the extraordinary attention of media and state institutions, street gang activity has become depicted as a signature attribute of ghetto life, along with other resonant behaviors such as teenage childbearing and welfare dependency. Conventional wisdom suggests that the contribution of a street gang to its surrounding communities is largely negative and its "positive functions" (Klein 1995) minimal. Often, however, the power of such images obscures a fuller portrait, in this case, of the range of activities of a street gang—delinquent, normative, and mundane—and the complex ways it participates in the social life of a community. To date, this estimation of

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the street gang as a primarily destructive community actor remains based more on the weight of popular imagery and emotion than on a foundation of research and evidence.

To redress this one-sided perspective, I analyze the relations of street gangs to their broader community (hereafter referred to as the "gang-community" relation). My focus on the gang-community relation addresses both an empirical and theoretical gap in the research on street gangs. Concerning the former, in their assessments of the state of the field, researchers repeatedly single out the lack of attention to the ways in which the street gang interacts with other groups and institutions in its neighborhood (Spergel 1995; Fagan 1996, p. 42). With some exceptions (Jankowski 1991; Horowitz 1987; Padilla 1992; Moore 1991), scholars generally do not examine the street gang's engagement with the local neighborhood and other surrounding spaces.<sup>1</sup> This includes the ways in which the street gang interacts with other social groups and institutions, how residents cope with some of the associated phenomena (e.g., patterns of symbolic expression, illicit economic activity, criminality), and, finally the patterns of change and continuity of gang and community over time.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, some scholars have criticized the conventional theoretical frameworks applied to the study of street gangs because they fail to incorporate a social contextual dimension (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Spergel 1995; Jankowski 1991).

To explore the relations of gang and community and the theoretical relevance therein, I focus on patterns of street gang activity in Blackstone, a midsize public housing development located in a poor ghetto of a large midwestern city.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, I examine a set of struggles that occurred during 1992 among tenants, street gangs, and community institutions. From May to December of that year, these actors debated with one another and engaged in political battles to control affairs that affected the

<sup>1</sup> Jankowski (1991) and Horowitz (1987) offer the most direct examinations of gang-community relations. Moore (1991) relies on interviews of gang members themselves: she asks them to recount their experiences with families, schools, etc. Padilla's (1992) account of the gang in the community is surface level—e.g., his community history narrative is broad and relies largely on secondary, quite general resources. This is only a partial criticism because his ostensible object of analysis is the entrepreneurial dimension of street gangs.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the final point, Fagan (1996, p. 42), in a review of literature, writes: "Changes in gangs have occurred simultaneously with rapid changes in the social and economic structure of cities and suburbs. . . . What has been poorly understood, however, are the links between changes in gangs and changes in neighborhoods and communities."

<sup>3</sup> Names of persons and locations have been changed to ensure anonymity, as have some minor geographic attributes that would enable ready identification of the field site. However, the lack of disclosure has been minimized in order not to influence the argument that is proffered.

social and material welfare of the housing development. Noteworthy in these interactions was the role of the street gang. Historically, despite their visibility, street gangs in Blackstone did not occupy a legitimate community presence. Their involvement in public forums, community events, and local decision making was minimal; moreover, resident interaction with street gangs was quite circumscribed, primarily in delinquent activities such as small-scale drug distribution or larceny. Both the role of the street gang and their relations with the broader population changed toward the end of the 1980s when the gangs began to "corporatize" (Taylor 1990)—that is, when they directed their energies toward systematic involvement in drug distribution—and began using their illicit revenues to fulfill a range of community needs. In 1992, after the street gangs' economic expansion was well underway, many of the long-standing relations between gangs, residents, and local institutions were disrupted and a historically novel social organization emerged. My main concern in this article is to analyze this process of corporatization and the ways in which it redefined the experience of street gang activity for residents of the housing development.

To begin, I review some of the theoretical and empirical trajectories in street gang research, pointing both to the insights that researchers have made as well as to their shortcomings. I introduce some theoretical concepts from recent scholarship in critical urban sociology that will be applied subsequently to the analysis of interactions among street gangs, residents, and institutions in the Blackstone community. The overall aim of the article is to contribute to the growing body of research on the interplay of space and social structure and to shed light on the nuances and complexities of the role of a street gang in community social life.

### Methods and Setting

The data in this article are based on my ethnographic fieldwork in Blackstone and surrounding communities. The Blackstone housing development was built in the late 1950s and is situated within a larger set of predominantly black ghettos that consolidated in the mid 20th century. In the post-1960 era, several profound social transformations deleteriously affected these ghetto spaces. The key components were the outmigration of industries and the ensuing loss of employment for blacks in blue-collar jobs; the subsequent segmentation of the labor market into a high-wage sector, out of reach for most displaced blacks, and a low-wage service sector where blacks competed with women and minorities for menial and part-time work opportunities; the "flight" of economically and politically powerful constituencies to suburban and nonghetto central city areas; and the evisceration of public institutions due to cutbacks in federal and state funding (Caraley 1992; Wacquant 1992) as well as the redirection of re-

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sources by municipal entities to other ethnic and higher-income neighborhoods.

Once the development was a mixture of working and unemployed households. Today welfare monies comprise the main source of reported legitimate income for Blackstone's approximately 8,000 residents: only 4% of households report receipt of income from legal employment. In place of mainstream markets, an alternate economic opportunity structure has become entrenched in Blackstone and the surrounding ghettos and is anchored in the availability of sporadic part-time work, the distribution of illicit goods and services, informal labor including car repair, gypsy cab service, domestic work, and the sale of homemade goods such as crafts, clothing, and food items. As welfare monies have become insufficient to meet even the basic needs of the urban poor (Edin 1991), this alternate economic structure has become integral for the daily sustenance of Blackstone's households.

Since the mid-1960s, there have been continuous struggle and contestation among residents and the state's two most prominent representatives in Blackstone—the public housing authority and law enforcement agencies (on the municipal and federal level)—over issues affecting the housing development. Initially, according to residents, street gang activity did not cause the greatest tensions. Instead, the most sustained disputes were anchored in issues related to the built environment. For example, in the 1960s, tenants protested the failure of housing authority management to maintain safe and working elevators, and in the 1970s, they demonstrated against the reluctance on the part of city police to patrol hallways, stairwells, and other semiprivate areas within buildings. Only in the 1980s, when the local street gangs experienced a social and economic resurgence, did the disputes expand to include street gang activity, but, in these matters as well, physical space was central as tenants fought the attempts of law enforcement agents to enter apartments without procuring search warrants.

Most recently, tenant groups and street gangs duel to "represent the community," including the struggle both to control local informal economic activity and to win the support of the broader residential population. As it is used in conversation, "community" retains both a functional and a symbolic designation. It references an objective entity, namely, the physical boundaries and structures that constitute the housing development. It also denotes a common subjectivity based on shared experiences, symbols, and sentiments. Each of these bases of affiliation afford legitimacy to the person who speaks in a representative capacity.

In the analysis below, I concentrate on four actors who spoke most forcefully on behalf of the Blackstone community during the May–December 1992 period: the *Council* is a body of tenant-elected officers

who act on behalf of the residential population; the *street gangs* most active during 1992 were the all-male factions; the *Grace Center* is a social service organization that provides social, recreational, and educational programs to Blackstone residents; and, the *state*, understood as an embodied social actor, is represented by the housing authority and the municipal police department, whose roles, though formally circumscribed, are immensely significant in their scope and symbolic effect.

For nearly four years, I conducted intensive participant observation in Blackstone. My ethnography began fortuitously in 1991 when I met several street gang members during a foray into an urban poor residential community. (At the time, I was administering a formal social science survey for a research project at a local university.) Having befriended these gang members, I moved into their world, accompanying them into Blackstone and other spaces where they were actively involved in illicit economic activities, member recruitment, and the general expansion of their street-based organization. My fieldwork quickly became anchored in "community" concerns; observing the gangs' attempts to establish themselves in different neighborhoods, I wished to understand in greater detail how the street gang is situated in broader social structures, both at the level of local social organization and in relation to systemic-level phenomena such as labor market structures, state law enforcement practices, and the like. To facilitate these interests, I focused more directly on social life in the Blackstone housing development since one could locate numerous social institutions—resident based and external—within this geographic space. Though explicating the minutiae of gang structure became less of an immediate research objective, I quickly learned that even the organizational development of the street gang itself was fundamentally a product of its relations with other actors in its "local and larger community" (Jankowski 1991). Thus, this article is motivated by this modest fieldwork epiphany.

#### STUDYING THE STREET GANG

The literature on *street gangs* is expansive and varied, but a cursory look at methodology and substantive areas of inquiry reveals particular patterns, tendencies, and gaps. Researchers employ diverse methods of data collection and analysis, including statistical analyses of rates of criminal activities among street gangs (Block and Block 1993), structured interviews of gang members in institutional settings (e.g., Curry and Spiegel 1992), and direct ethnographic observation (Hagedorn 1988; Taylor 1990; Moore 1978). The substantive areas of focus in street gang research vary but tend to address definitional and methodological issues (Klein and Maxson 1987; Horowitz 1990; Decker and Kempf-Leonard 1991), patterns

of gang involvement in illicit activities (Padilla 1992; Taylor 1990; Skolnick, Blumenthal, and Correl 1993), organizational structure (Jankowski 1991; Sheley et al. 1995), gender and sexual relations (Taylor 1993; Campbell 1984; Moore and Hagedorn 1996) and (sub)culture and identity (Vigil 1988; Conquergood 1992). Common to most of the scholarship on street gangs is the tendency to favor social structural and attitudinal data over practice and interaction. Actual behaviors are not frequently or systematically recorded (Spergel 1992, p. 124). Where lived experience *has* been documented, significant revision of extant theoretical and conceptual apparatuses ensues (cf. Moore 1991; Moore, Vigil, and Garcia 1983; Taylor 1990).

An area of relative paucity, both in terms of theory and empirical attention, is the social contextual status of the street gang, that is, its relationship to broader spaces and institutions (Spergel 1992, p. 124).<sup>5</sup> Jankowski (1991) clearly demonstrates the importance of the social contextual status of the street gang in his work, *Islands in the Street*. He argues that the researcher must have an appreciation for the larger sociospatial context within which the gang is embedded because part of the specificity of gang activity derives from an exigency of the “[gang] to be integrated into both the local and the larger community” (Jankowski 1991, p. 32).<sup>6</sup> In practice, this integrative process translates into a dynamism whereby the gang and other community actors (e.g., police, schools, families) engage in ongoing interaction. “Integration” becomes a contingent state that has to be continually reconstituted. And, through such engagement, social relations of power, friendship, solidarity, animosity, and so on that involve the street gang are reproduced. Thus, the street gang and those actors with whom it interacts mutually determine each other’s status and identity in local community social organization.

It is precisely such processes of integration and codetermination that are not well documented in street gang scholarship. Several factors, theoretical and methodological, have directed the study of street gangs away from such phenomena. I have already alluded to one, namely the collec-

<sup>5</sup> Some of the more noteworthy exceptions have focused on the relations of gangs to educational institutions (Monti 1994; Padilla 1992), law enforcement approaches to street gang activity (Klein 1995), and the role of the gang in its immediate neighborhood (Suttles 1968; Padilla 1992).

<sup>6</sup> In Jankowski’s (1991) framework, any analysis that fails to consider this continuous interaction in its full import risks numerous analytic pitfalls, only one of which seems to be the misinterpretation of street gang activity and structure. More fundamentally, without constructing a community context for the gang, one could mistake the gang for another similar social actor—e.g., one could fail to differentiate between a street gang and other social collectives that may exhibit one or another feature of “gang activity” but not all at once.

tion of primarily attitudinal data. Whether in the form of fixed-choice questionnaires or life-historical interviews, only a limited understanding of the status of the gang in community social organization has been derived through data on beliefs, values, and attitudes. A second factor is the disproportionate concern of researchers with the *origins* of gang activity, on both the individual and collective levels. Why did gangs come into being in a particular community and not another? Did nonurban street gang activity form independently or through contagion vis-à-vis the transmigration of metropolitan street gang "sets"?<sup>7</sup> In this context, the reproduction of *existing* gang activity over time garners less attention, as does the gang-community relationship, since the tenure of gang activity is highly contingent on the response by others locally (cf. Moore 1991). Third, a study of community relations would lead street gang research into nondelinquent areas of study, a move that to date has been blocked due to the dominance of a criminological paradigm for both academic and popular inquiries (Sumner 1994; see also Bursik and Grasmik 1993; Klein 1995).

A fourth factor, the one that I will address in greatest detail in this article, is the interplay of space and interaction that buttresses the scholarship on street gangs. This relation, theoretical in nature, has framed the possibilities both for conceptualizing the gang within a broader social and institutional context and for studying its patterns of interaction with other actors in that space. Specifically, since the mid 20th century, when Thrasher (1927) and Shaw and McKay (1931) set the tone for research on youth delinquency, researchers have acknowledged that street gangs must be understood in relation to their surrounding environment and that systemic factors can affect the character of street gang activity. To argue for this linkage between macrosocial context and locally situated behaviors, researchers typically correlate community characteristics such as demographic patterns or social structural attributes with other aggregate data such as crime rates. Thus, the link between street gang activity and systemic factors is often asserted but not well explicated either theoretically or in specific empirical areas. (An important exception to this mode of analysis is Sampson and Grove's [1989] research, which is more nuanced and incorporates community-level variables that mediate the impact of social structural forces. To date, however, their model has not been ade-

<sup>7</sup> A street gang family is composed of numerous, geographic-based subunits, called "sets." Each set possesses a leader, lower-ranking officers, and a rank and file. In Blackstone, there are four such sets, and along with other neighborhood sets throughout the city, they comprise the Saints street gang "family." To ensure anonymity, and because it is not imperative for this analysis, I offer only a limited description of the Saints' citywide organizational hierarchy.

quately incorporated by scholars of street gangs. This essay can be seen as an attempt to build on the spirit of their approach.)

A strand of ethnographic street gang research commonly referred to as the “underclass school” is noteworthy in this regard because it has successfully uncovered some of the spheres of social activity where street gang activity assumes its texture and force due to broader systemic transformations.<sup>8</sup> Scholars adhering to this perspective appropriate William Julius Wilson’s (1987) theory of the reproduction of the underclass. Wilson’s theory is not intended to explain street gang activity, nor is it ostensibly an analysis of deviant behavior; nevertheless, according to Spergel (1995, p. 150), “the underclass formulation, or variations of it, has been a useful basis for explaining gang development and its sustenance by gang researchers and scholars.”<sup>9</sup> These researchers argue that the contemporary street gang is a product of postwar systemic factors that have deleteriously affected the economic and institutional fabric of inner cities.<sup>10</sup> Specifically, the gang partially fills the void left by other community-based institutions. *Adaptation* is the central trope—a “cluster concept” (Sartori 1969)—for underclass researchers to explain a range of phenomena: for example, the gang can be a substitute for poorly functioning familial structures; its value orientation offers a moral chart for those youths excluded from mainstream cultural systems.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Since most street gang studies pay little or no attention to contextual and interactional dimensions of street gang activity and since others have conducted adequate literature reviews (e.g., Spergel 1995; Klein 1995), I anchor the ensuing theoretical discussion to strands of street gang research that *explicitly* consider social interaction and the larger contexts within which street gang activity takes place. The underclass school is best exemplified in the works of Padilla (1992), Moore (1978, 1991), Hagedorn (1988), Vigil (1988), and Taylor (1990) (and to a lesser degree Terry Williams [1989] and Phillip Bourgois [1989]).

<sup>9</sup> Since these authors published their seminal texts, many have modified their allegiance to the underclass perspective. Hagedorn (1991) and Moore (1991) have used the specificity of the Chicano experience and differences in lower- and working-class communities to suggest that the underclass perspective is not fully explanatory.

<sup>10</sup> Horowitz (1987) criticizes the underclass school, specifically Moore (1978) and Hagedorn (1988) for their economic determinism, i.e., their reduction of gang organization, behavior, and external relations to the effects of economic changes such as poverty, deindustrialization, etc. Instead, she calls for the need to incorporate “cultural” variables that foreground individual experiences and outlooks, i.e., that allow for the possibility that individuals may have different reactions to similar structural circumstances.

<sup>11</sup> The following are some common examples of explanations based on the adaptation trope: In the absence of legitimate economies, gangs provide income generation and cultural affirmation for young men and women (Hagedorn 1988). Midst pervasive disruption of household and familial arrangements, they provide quasi kin- or peer-based social ties by becoming a “partial substitute for family” (Vigil 1988, p. 12; Thrasher 1927, p. 340); in the absence of effective educational institutions, the gang (and the prison) has become a *de facto* socialization center where youths acquire the

Currently, the underclass perspective is the “most popular and influential” one used to “explain a whole range of socially disordered or deviant behaviors” (Spergel 1995, p. 149).<sup>12</sup> However, the use of adaptation to link a wide range of social activity to macrohistorical contexts has not enabled a more detailed analysis of both interaction and gang-community dynamics. Street gang members are portrayed as active agents struggling to lead meaningful lives in impoverished contexts, yet, other community actors are often not given a voice or mention in analysis. For example, if gangs are substitutes for families in underclass communities, what is the relation of gang members to parents and siblings? Similarly, do household members and communities broadly intervene in the gangs’ rising familial role? The complexity within, and differentiations among, the range of processes that are captured in the catch-all category of adaptation (and its analytic synonyms: adjustment, response, substitution, etc.) becomes erased as quickly as they are gathered together within this single analytic trope.

To build upon the contributions of the underclass school of street gang research, while providing a more fine-grained analysis of social interaction and the gang-community dynamism, I argue that space is not a “natural” entity to which individuals adapt but a social product, structured through the interactions of persons, groups, and institutions that are embedded in definite social relations. On the one hand, the formal qualities of a built environment exert a powerful effect on individuals by shaping the possibilities for their behaviors. On the other hand, individuals produce their space by investing their surroundings with qualitative attributes and specified meanings (de Certeau 1984, p. xxi). To see this linkage of human geographies and human practices, consider a community within which a territorially based street gang resides. On the one hand, the ways in which residents and gangs move about their neighborhood are conditioned by attributes of the built environment, including the density of buildings, the layout of streets and alleys, and the placement of parks and public spaces. However, by laying claim to certain “turf” (i.e., by symbolically appropriating spaces, policing areas, and monitoring the behaviors of strangers) and offering services such as protection for residents, the gang effectively

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knowledge and skills necessary to survive in their unstable environs (Padilla 1992; Moore 1978); and, where the values of the “middle class” are “no longer present,” street gangs have created “their own societies” to fill the normative void (Taylor 1990, p. 111).

<sup>12</sup> “Social disorganization” theory is founded on the notion that community controls (or the lack thereof) contribute to street gang activity. Numerous authors appropriate concepts of this theory, yet few have applied it *in toto* and in depth to the study of one particular community where gang activity persists. Instead, as in the case of the underclass school, one will find acknowledgement of ideas and principles that derive from a social disorganizational theoretic framework.

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imposes onto this formal space a symbolic map that residents of the neighborhood are aware of and use to guide their own travels. Residents' fear of crossing the symbolic boundaries that separate one gang's "territory" from another is an exemplary indication that this qualitative map can affect their everyday interaction as much as any physical obstacle. In this manner, the space in which individuals constitute their everyday lives—what I refer to in this article as "social space" following Lefebvre (1970)—is socially constructed, a product of the interplay of the formal built environment and a more personal, meaning-laden geography.

### RECONSTITUTING COMMUNITY IN BLACKSTONE

Summer 1992 proved to be a pivotal moment in Blackstone. Street gangs, tenant bodies such as the Council, and governmental agencies such as the housing authority began to act in ways that deviated from their past behavior. Stated summarily, the Council has been the dominant tenant-elected representative body in Blackstone since the early 1970s. So strong was their presence in the seventies and eighties that residents' everyday experience was determined by their relation to the particular Council representatives in their building: that is, a *"building-centered" social space* *reigned whereby different buildings had different histories, reputations, levels of service, maintenance and attention by administrative agencies, rates of criminal activity, and so on.* During the mid-1980s, tenants grew frustrated because the Council could no longer procure effective physical maintenance from the housing authority, nor could they lobby law enforcement with success as in the past. As important, Council representatives were unable to dole out benefits such as part-time employment and emergency loans to residents. The Council was partially strapped because the housing authority had rescinded its own commitment to upkeep and physical maintenance, in some instances diverting budgetary resources from "maintenance" to "security" needs—a practice that provoked the ire of Blackstone residents and caused numerous protests.

In the void created by both Council and housing authority inaction, the Saints, a local street gang, channeled illicitly obtained revenues from drug economies to the general residential population. This process was part of the street gang's overall "corporatization" (Taylor 1990) and had several effects on social relations within the community: (1) it enabled the Saints gang to vie for the sponsorship of resident constituencies that had previously granted their allegiance to the Council; (2) as such, the base of tenant allegiance the Councils had previously relied on was no longer self-evident, and their influence with government agencies that administered Blackstone slowly eroded because they could not unproblematically claim to be spokespersons.

To date, corporatization has been understood primarily as an *economic* process whereby the gang eschews its “territorial” or symbolic interests in favor of monetary gain.<sup>13</sup> To be sure, revenue generation based on the exchange of illicit goods certainly buttressed the rising social status of the Saints street gang in Blackstone. However, their rise to economic superiority was one constitutive part of a more comprehensive social advancement that involved interaction with a broader community of actors and not only other “outlaw capitalists” (Davis 1990). In effect, the Saints consciously tried to “integrate” (Jankowski 1991) themselves into the social fabric of Blackstone, using economic power as their foundation to build relations with residents and local organizations. *The result of their corporatization was the emergence of a novel social space in Blackstone, that is, a new orientation to local geography in which the symbolic distinctions of local street gangs challenged the building-centered distinctions that had previously underwritten the power of the Councils.*

The empirical explication of this multifaceted process of corporatization by the Saints street gang is organized in three sections below. I begin by examining public forums in Blackstone at which tenants discussed the Saints’ increasing involvement in community affairs. These discussions became prevalent after May 1992, when the gang war between the Saints and their enemy, the Roaches street gang, reached its apex and threatened the safety of daily commerce and intercourse within the housing development. I then analyze a central dilemma that residents faced as they tried to control the behavior of street gangs; namely, whereas residents labored to reduce the public violence and drug distribution of the street gangs, they also consciously employed street gang members to provide services for them, thus creating a set of conflicts that hampered their ability to adopt a consistent posture when combating street gang activity. Third, I

<sup>13</sup> Taylor’s (1990) study of Detroit street gangs is generally void of any larger sociological concerns, most notably shifting relations of the street gangs to their respective communities as a result of monetary pursuits. He does, however, include interviews of nongang affiliated actors. Kinnear’s (1996, p. 19) explanation for the increased involvement of older gang members in drug distribution is largely assertive and, apart from attributions of age-specific motivations for informal economic involvement, is not well grounded in sociological factors or community-related concerns. Government reports also reproduce this economic perspective by counterposing “neighborhood” gangs with “crack-selling” gangs (GAO 1989, p. 47). Padilla’s (1992, pp. 91–116) account assumes a less economicistic stance when describing how the “Diamonds [become] a business gang.” Yet, he too reproduces the internalist fallacy by emphasizing organizational exigencies such as the need “to develop and maintain a sound financial base” (1992, p. 113) and saying relatively little about the ways in which the gangs’ social organizational status affected its embourgeoisement.

look at the ensuing implications of these interactions for the organization of social and spatial relations in the housing development.

### The Impact of Corporatization

The May–December 1992 period brought to the surface many of the tensions that accompanied the Saints' historically unprecedented attempt to ground themselves in the social organization of Blackstone. According to tenant leaders such as "Ms. Willis," the most important issue brought "into the open for all to see" was the increasing acceptance of street gang resources by residents. With respect to the adaptation analytic framework, the motivations of residents to accept street gang dollars and in-kind support (e.g., nightly escorts to the grocery store) can be accounted for as a function of macrostructural constraints. Specifically, Blackstone's residents are generally quite poor and do not possess access to monetary, legal, social service, and other institutional resources; thus, it would not be altogether surprising that as a "survival strategy" (Stack 1974) residents would accept the offerings of the street gang. This explanation is not entirely inaccurate since it attempts to link macrosocial attributes of Blackstone with emergent social action on the part of individuals. However, it simplifies the agency exercised by residents because it cannot help explicate why some tenants preferred to reject street gang assistance, nor does it unravel why tenants' decisions to accept the gang's assistance occurred *at a particular historical juncture*. By contrast, a more in-depth understanding of residents' attitudes toward, and historically shifting relations with, local street gangs can better account for their decision-making process.

To elaborate, in the 1980s, the Saints family of street gangs took over the power to distribute drugs in Blackstone from the Roaches family. The Saints were led in these efforts by "JT" whose set is currently the most powerful of the four Saints sets in the housing development. In May, the Roaches gang initiated a series of violent attacks on Saints members in an effort to recapture drug distribution territories. Many of these attacks were poorly planned and did little to recapture lost markets. Typically, the younger members of the Roaches became drunk both with liquor and the zeal to fight the Saints; disobeying their elder leaders' commands, these "shorties" executed "drive-by" shootings in areas controlled by the Saints. On one of these drive-bys, the Roaches fatally shot a young girl and wounded her friend, both of whom were playing in front of a housing development building. This incident not only accelerated the gang war, but it prompted forthright community discussion of the deleterious effects of the increased involvement by the Saints gang in drug economies. In other words, what, on one level, signified street gangs grappling for control

over drug economies, referenced on another level a crisis in community social organization.

The unexpected consequence of the gang wars was an expanded public discussion of the new behaviors and statuses being exhibited by different community actors. These discussions began in June 1992 at “community control” meetings. Here, tenants and their elected Council representatives discussed the effects of street gang activity for the safety of public spaces and semipublic areas such as stairwells and lobby areas on the first floor of buildings. For much of the three-hour dialogue, the conversation was dry, centering primarily on the possibility of diverting the Council’s fiscal resources toward upgrading “tenant patrols”—these patrols are comprised of pairs of women who conduct systematic “walkabouts” within buildings in order to locate illegal or dangerous behavior. Toward the end of the meeting, tenant-police relations and resident collusion in gang-controlled drug economies were raised for discussion:

“Who’s running things ‘round here?” an unidentified voice from the back of the room yelled to the Council representatives sitting around the front table.

“You all don’t control nothing,” yelled another voice in support.

A Council member replied, “You don’t either, nigger, so don’t be getting all over me. We got to work together to take control of our community. If you don’t feel safe walking around the building, help us out with tenant patrols.”

“Tenant patrols!” an elderly man sitting in the front row said mockingly in reference to the residents’ practice of walking through their buildings each hour to identify trouble. “We need the police to kick these drugs out the building, tenant patrols ain’t doing shit!”

“Tell ‘em nigger!” yelled a voice from the back. “Police is the ones ought to be patrolling, not 50-year-old women too old to see shit.”

“Women wouldn’t have nothing to see if you all didn’t let them gangs run up in here doing whatever they pleased,” barked a Council officer in response.

“Shit, *you* the one getting they money. Don’t act like you ain’t. How you bought that big screen TV anyway?”

As is apparent, this exchange witnessed several accusations. Specifically, residents blamed one another for supporting street gang extortion, participating in gang-controlled drug distribution, and refusing to speak publicly against inadequate police protection.

The meeting ended when residents conceded support for a twofold intervention strategy: first, Council officers would negotiate with the street gangs to end the sale of drugs *within* buildings. As one man said, “Feeling unsafe when I go out is bad, but at least I want to feel like I ain’t gonna get shot pulling up a chair in front of my door and watching the world go by. Inside these buildings, that’s where we need to be safe, that’s where police gotta do something for us.”

Second, Council officers would pressure law enforcement agencies to provide more responsive and effective policing inside their buildings. At a “town hall” meeting one week later, when confronted with the tenants’ requests, city police officers responded by asking residents to “cooperate with law enforcement.” The officers openly criticized residents who, by withholding information and refusing to allow police to enter their apartments without search warrants, were effectively lending support to street gangs. After the town hall meeting ended, Clara Davis, a prominent tenant leader, explained to me that residents of Blackstone “stopped cooperating with police a long time ago, ‘cause [the police] harass us so much and they don’t do a damn thing anyway. At least the gangs is giving us something, so lot of us prefers to help them ‘cause we can *always* go to them and tell them to stop the shooting. Police don’t do anything for us and they can’t stop no shooting anyway. Call me what you want, but all I know is that [the Saints] is the ones providing security around here, not no police. And, my brother was a Saint when he was younger, so you know, it’s a community thing ‘cause we all niggers anyway when it come down to it.”

Davis’s comments above suggest that residents’ decisions to cooperate with city and housing authority police are not only a product of the perceived impotence of law enforcement agencies but are also affected by the regnant ties between residents and street gangs. For example, she points to historic relations between gangs and residents when she says, “my brother was a Saint [gang member] when he was younger.” Despite their admission that gang activity is the root cause of many community instabilities, residents embrace gang members as wayward kin rather than ostracizing them completely as social deviants who need the discipline of law. At other moments, residents who have lived in Blackstone since the 1960s and 1970s will compare the ambitions of contemporary street gang factions to their predecessors, for whom community service was quite prominent (yet participation in underground economies was relatively minimal). Finally, although gang affiliation is arguably the principal public identity for many of the individual members, much of the social interaction in Blackstone occurs in situations where gang membership is not marked and where gang members are known by other roles (e.g., son, niece, neighbor’s son, etc.). Thus, a great deal of everyday social life affirms common experiences for community members as opposed to differential experiences that result from gang affiliation. Witness, for example, the rebuke made by “Ms. Jackson,” an elderly tenant who moved into Blackstone in 1968, of a housing authority officer’s claim that gang members are the sole cause of community decline: “Keep our apartments clean. Make sure that [the] security [guards] leave the lobby and walk through the hallways and stairwells. Don’t let weapons come in the buildings when the metal

detector goes off! We ain't asking for much. These gang members is our kids. We'll take care of 'em. But, they need work, and we need to have [you] take care of our homes."

These strong symbolic ties between gangs and (non-gang-affiliated) residents are themselves grounded in material linkages that have formed between the two groups. In the 1980s, the Saints channeled revenues from drug economies to residents who lacked financial resources or who were simply willing to remain silent in police investigations. The most direct examples were loans and lines of credit to residents (which, depending on personal relations, could either be given interest free or offered at an exorbitant 100% rate of interest), periodic disbursements of groceries and clothing to households, and the purchase of bail bonds for jailed residents. The Saints gang also organized recreational leagues in the community at which residents would compete for trophies and bragging rights. Participants were given clothing and uniforms (embazoned with "Blackstone and Proud" on the back) as well as shoes and equipment.

To paraphrase Bourgois's analysis of individual decisions to enter crack-cocaine economies, the decision by Blackstone's tenants to accept street gang monies is "by no means strictly economic" (Bourgois 1989, p. 639) nor a simple response to a field of limited resources and opportunities. To say only that tenants "adapted" to social contextual constraints dismisses the symbolic forces outlined above that motivated their decision making (cf. Bourgois 1989, pp. 638-40). And, as I suggested, the functionalist resonances of "adaptation" cannot explain why the response occurred at a particular moment in time. Consider, for example, "Ms. Willis's" struggle to obtain monetary support for a Council-sponsored neighborhood party during a conversation I had with her. Her reluctant acceptance of street gang resources is replicated by other tenant leaders who are unable to locate funding for their activities:

"I asked the housing authority [for the money] first, you know them? They're the ones who's supposed to give us money for these kinda things— you know little parties, community things. But, we can't get a damn dollar out of these folks. They got their little group over there, and we ain't seen a penny of the 'community' money."

"So, you want me to give you some money. . . . Well, to tell you the truth, Ms. Willis, I really don't have all that much money myself," I said.

Disbelieving what I said, she shook her head and replied, "Well, now how you gonna tell me that when you drivin' round that little sports car o' yours . . . ?"

"So, you won't be able to throw the party, then?" I said, trying to remain calm.

"Guess, I'll go back to Ottie [a street gang leader] again. I just don't like takin' 'dirty money' if I can avoid it. You know? But whatcha gonna do?"

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As Ms. Willis made clear, accepting street gang assistance is not only a difficult decision for residents to make but, as important, *before the early 1990s, she says many Council officers (and other tenant leaders) did not accept such gang largesse.* Only after this date could one find systematic patterns of giving whereby the Saints' leaders funded the Council's activities.<sup>14</sup> Others affirm her assessment. For example, until the early 1990s, Council representatives with whom I spoke stated that they did not feel threatened by local street gangs. Ms. Jackson, mentioned above, who has been an activist in Blackstone for nearly three decades, recalls that street gangs were always present in large numbers, but their status was restricted to intergang activities, and they held minimal influence in community affairs. Council officers felt little need to "use [the gang's] money, hurting our image in the eyes of other tenants" (Ms. Jackson). When the street gangs became more influential and increased their own philanthropy, Council officers and other tenant leaders felt their own power threatened: lacking the connections to city agencies, foundations, and other potential sources of monetary support, the Council turned increasingly to the Saints in order to buy goods, to plan collective activities, and to get manpower at public events. In other words, though Council members acted on the basis of perceived circumstances, their response was not simply a product of macrolevel forces but was instead mediated by their perceptions, by specific historical factors, and by emergent political dynamics at the social organizational level.

In autumn 1992, a more profound and historically unprecedented relationship between gangs and residents formed: residents used current and ex-gang members to establish social order in Blackstone. *This gang-community dynamic, more than any other, brought to the surface the spectrum of resident opinions regarding "how much we've changed since the gangs took over the power."* As a result of the cooperative relationships forming between the Council and street gangs, some tenants publicly questioned whether the Council had compromised its own vision for the community's future. The most extreme statements were skeptical of the Council's ability to serve as a representative body.

### The New Law and Order

Gangs have long been a means by which "interstitial" urban communities fulfilled their need for protection, safety in intercourse, and defense

<sup>14</sup> The exact date at which these exchanges began is a matter of debate. Most residents argue that street gangs began giving money to resident organizations in the early 1980s but that this became systematized in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

against perceived threats (Stark 1981). "Vigilante peer groups" (Suttles 1968) provided white ethnic and minority urban communities with a range of regulative services that include enforcement, policing, escort (Jankowski 1991, p. 185), protection against social predators, and punishment. In Blackstone, self-policing existed in varying forms since the mid-1960s. The earliest documented cases are social networks composed predominantly of women that watched over children and monitored the behavior of strangers in and around their building. Subsequent examples include tenant patrols, community watches, and militias of men who were assembled by Council officers and influential residents to chase down thieves, burglars, and perpetrators of domestic abuse. While these practices were systematic and also developed in the context of ineffective mainstream law enforcement, they could not match in breadth or intent the system of "law" that select residents were attempting to institutionalize in autumn 1992 in order to regulate gang activity. An extended account of self-policing and "indigenous" law in Blackstone is beyond the scope of this essay; therefore, I will address aspects of this process that are most relevant for the gang-community dynamism and the corporatization of the Saints street gang.

In mid-summer 1992, Council officers felt that they could no longer obtain adequate police enforcement. They needed to locate alternate methods of resolving the "gang wars" between the Roaches and Saints street gangs. Led by Carol Collins, the Council officers approached Joe Jackson, the director of the Grace Center, a local social service agency. Jackson was sympathetic to their predicament. He had been working closely with JT—the highest ranking Saints leader in Blackstone—as well as citywide, higher-ranking gang leaders to forge a peace treaty among Roaches and Saints sets based in Blackstone. His reaction was positive, and he explained his willingness to assist the Council:

Two heads are always better than one, you know. See, what we had going for us was two things. JT wanted peace and he was, you know, he was alright. I don't mean he is a priest or nothing but, he always gave us what we needed to help families 'round here, so, and he didn't want to piss off the head honchos! You know, he had to keep the money flowing in, so I figured Ms. Collins and the rest of 'em, well, talking with the Saints could only help 'em, 'cause they wasn't getting along that great. (Joe Jackson, Grace Center Director)

As Jackson makes clear in the quote above, he realized that his efforts to offer social services to the gangs could marry well with the Council leaders' interests in violence reduction and conflict resolution. Under his initiative, the Grace Center sponsored several meetings to introduce Council officers to Peace Now, an organization specializing in gang peace treaties. Peace Now was directed by an ex-gang member who had influential ties

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to the senior, predominantly imprisoned, leaders of the Saints and Roaches street gang families. Peace Now offered to mediate the disputes among Roaches and Saints until the fighting had been eradicated and a treaty could be formed.

Council officers wanted more, explains Carol Collins: "Peace ain't shit, if they ain't respecting us every day, you know what I'm sayin. Stop beating up women, stop dealing drugs up inside the buildings, don't go shooting one another up and down Crabtree Lane—that's what we want." Peace Now agreed to add to disputes between warring gangs the many grievances issued by residents against street gangs. In doing so, their conflict resolution expanded to include mediation of gang-resident disputes. For example, residents could report incidents of domestic abuse or sexual harassment by street gang members; Peace Now officers would adjudicate these transgressions. Similarly, residents who were performing tasks for the street gangs (e.g., storing cash or drugs in their apartment) could report violations of verbal contracts; at these hearings, the party at fault would be determined, and fines and punishment would be meted out.

By November 1992, Peace Now staffers, Joe Jackson, Carol Collins, and ex-gang leaders were meeting actively with members of the Saints and Roaches to discuss complaints. At first, Blackstone's gang leaders refused to allow this delegation to intervene in incidents that involved gang-community interactions. Once Peace Now produced evidence that the higher-ranking, imprisoned street gang leaders approved of this forum, the local Saints and Roaches members had no choice but to acquiesce to the issued rulings and sentencing. The following summer, JT reflected on these initial interactions and acknowledged their merit:

"I don't know why I was against all that. It reminded me of, you know, court or something, and any time you get these niggers [referring to gang members] in the justice system, they gonna close up and not say shit. So, why we want to have something like that again?"

"But, you think it was good, in the long run?"

"Yeah, now, 'cause all the violence is Roaches shooting at us. We don't beat up nobody, all [our] 'shorties' [adolescent members] learning to treat people with respect, we take care of our community more now, you know."

JT's resistance to the self-enforcement mechanisms, based on his distrust of the judicial system, is similar to the other street gang leaders with whom I spoke. As another Saints leader stated, "It was like going up before the judge again, and [gang members] don't like that kinda shit, you know."

During that period, resistance to the self-enforcement mechanisms came not only from the street gangs themselves but also from residents. In one of the most impassioned speeches to the Council officers, James Marcus, a 40-year-old father whose son had been shot in summer 1992 by a stray bullet (allegedly from a gang member's weapon), stated: "You all can tell

[the gangs] that what goes down in that room: they gotta listen to it. But, this ain't gonna do nothing as far as getting us better police protection. You know what, the police is laughing at us: they sitting there watching us kill each other, and then, we making their jobs easier 'cause now, they don't even gotta clean up the mess we made. They laughing at you and me and all of us in this room. How you figure this is gonna help us live safer 'round here?"

Others voiced appreciation for the greater level of personal safety that they felt to be a result of the conflict resolution procedures, but like James Marcus, they also expressed concern over the use of gang members to control gang activity. The most active dissension occurred in private and in informal conversations, both of which spread in the form of rumor and hearsay. By contrast, in *public* venues such as town hall gatherings, Council-sponsored bimonthly building meetings, and Grace Center community focus groups, resident opinion was mixed. By December 1992, no consensus existed among residents regarding the adjudicative procedure that had been introduced into the community. This lack of unanimity did not provide strong grassroots support for its continuation nor did it provide Council officers with unmitigated appeals to abandon the procedure and delimit the scope of Peace Now governance solely to breaches of conduct between gangs.

Several factors produced this ambivalence on the part of residents. First, as Grace Center director Joe Jackson liked to say, "Since you and I don't live here everyday, you can't predict what people will do to get them some safety and peace of mind"—that is, the willingness of an appointed body to intervene and respond to gang-related concerns had an immediate impact on a tenant body that did not have another individual or organization to help resolve street gang disputes. The impact could be measured to some degree by the high proportion of votes that tenants subsequently cast in favor of a Peace Now officer running for political office in the congressional district that included Blackstone. Whereas I heard residents frequently complain to their Council officers that the quasi-court was "turning over the community to the gangs," I watched the very same persons stand in front of the delegation and voice their complaints. One resident, whom I confronted directly regarding this contradiction, replied, "Until something better comes along, well, fuck it. I'm gonna tell them to stop them niggers from selling drugs 'round my baby. If police want to stop them, OK. But, right now, they ain't doing nothing."

The underlying material generosity of the street gangs also helped dissuade residents from actively voicing their dissent, and in this case, their bought silence proved to be a vote in favor of the Peace Now-sponsored forum. During the autumn 1992 period, the Saints' gang leaders actively lobbied to garner residential support for the "indigenous policing" proce-

dures that were being implemented. The number of people whom JT and other Saints leaders contacted and offered money or favors “[wasn’t] that many, but it was enough to get ‘em to not say shit” (Ottie, another Saints gang leader). JT and Ottie also planned barbecues and basketball tournaments during the autumn 1992 months in order to demonstrate that they were interested in the affairs of the community. They replaced aging playground equipment and basketball rims, and they exercised greater discipline over the younger Saints gang members, forcing them to minimize their truant behavior. However, in general, their benevolence was directed at Council officers because they understood that most residents were inactive in community affairs. When I asked JT why he was directing much of his lobbying at Council officers and was not waging an outright populist campaign, he replied: “It’s only the Council really that we gotta worry about, ‘cause they the only ones who give a fuck, so we just take care of them.”

Similar to the analysis above, it would be inaccurate, or only partially helpful, to argue that residents of Blackstone “adapted” to the system of “law and order” that was being instituted in 1992. Residents’ grudging acceptance of street gang authority and their use of indigenous adjudicative schemes in protest suggest a degree of self-awareness, agency, and conscious assessment that belies the blind determinism of adaptation. Their conscious decision to patronize (or not) the services of Peace Now—much like their decisions to accept other gang resources—is contingent on their own social organizational status as well as their ideologies regarding the legitimacy of street gang authority and the responsibility of mainstream law enforcement agencies. Reflecting Hobsbawm (1959, p. 32), who analyzes 19th-century Sicilian residents’ preference for the Mafia’s law enforcement provisions to that of formal state mechanisms, in places “without effective public order” such as Blackstone, residents’ decisions to utilize one or another procedure for redress and enforcement is partially contingent on their own ideologies regarding “the authorities as wholly or partially hostile or as unappreciative of the things which really matter . . . or as a combination of both.”

The metaphor of adaptation also belies the complexity of the events described above because it pretends that the social context being adapted to was formed independently of those who performed the adaptations. By contrast, residents actively helped to develop a mechanism that could police their own community. More than simply “adopt[ing] a variety of tactics in order to survive” (Stack 1974, p. 29), “the poor” residents of Blackstone attempted to put into place procedures that would enable them to reproduce a lifestyle in accordance with their own visions of morality, right, justice, and social order. In other words, their practices helped create the larger contextual structures that (in turn) shaped their experiences.

Where they could, they expressed their criticism, although, as I indicated, for many the short-term need to resolve conflicts prevailed over their disdain for non-state-sponsored juridical forums. Though the quasi-court created by Peace Now officers was eventually discarded some months later—when law enforcement agencies accelerated their crackdown on Saints street gang members throughout the city—its success or failure should not erase residents' conscious struggle to realize their goals. Perhaps residents of Blackstone are best understood in terms of Kaplan and Kelly's (1994, p. 21) definition of the "responsible agent": namely, one who is neither fully compliant nor fully alienated but who is an agent "who challenge[s] existing and permeable structures of domination, with varying scope of intention and facing varying modes of danger and levels of risk."

### Space and Social Reproduction

I have so far described some of the unprecedented material exchanges that characterized the corporatization of the Saints street gang, the novelty of which is not simply the material disbursement from street gangs to non-gang-affiliated constituencies. This practice had existed in Blackstone long before the corporatization and correlative philanthropy of the Saints began. By contrast, these 1990s exchanges assumed their unique character due to the role of the street gang as a provider of goods and services on par (or, at the very least, in competition) with the state, the Council, and legitimate labor markets. Stated differently, by "taking [the gangs'] dirty money," as one tenant leader often says, there is an implicit admission by residents that mainstream sources (e.g., income maintenance programs, part-time jobs, philanthropy) are unable to meet the community's needs. James Marcus made this point in a conversation with the director of the Grace Center and me in summer 1993: "The day when the Council—and you can blame me too, cause I took their money—the day when they started taking the gangs' money and giving it out to everybody, that's when everything changed, you dig? No way we could turn back, no way we could say no to all that cash being thrown around, man we needed that, families needed that help." Others assessed the situation in much the same manner as Marcus, reflecting on the totality of the shifts that were occurring. During a 6:00 A.M. surprise police search of apartments, several tenants—sitting in the hallway and discussing with me their decisions to withhold information in police investigations—talked openly with me as police, other residents, and housing authority representatives walked past. They remarked on their resignation to the authority of the local street gangs:

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It used to be our community, we used to say what went on 'round here, but it's they community now.

We have to listen to [the Saints gang], 'cause when the police leave, [Saints gang members] are the ones who'll let you know if shootings gonna start up again, you know, they'll tell you if it's safe to go outside at night, or if you can go up north [to Roaches territory] or if you should just stay in the building.

Yeah, right, [Saints] make our lives miserable, but if we piss them off, police ain't gonna come 'round here and help us out. And, shit, I gotta tell you, that most of the time it's nice, 'cause they make sure I don't get robbed up in here, they walk through the buildings like . . . police never did that! It's when the wars start that I don't really feel safe, you know? Most of the time, it's OK.

In these observations, residents acknowledge the gang's control over the ebb and flow of daily movements and cycles.

There is by no means a uniform acknowledgment or acceptance of the benevolence of the Saints street gang. There is tremendous variation in residents' willingness to bestow upon the Saints a legitimate community status. Those with personal historic connections to street gangs may champion a vigorous identification, referring to their own gang affiliation in an earlier time. Yet, others may actively decry the subordination of tenant interests to those of local gangs, expressing disdain for the corporatization that has launched street gangs to positions of dominance in community social organization. Similarly, whereas the Council may reluctantly embrace the gang's services, other social groups will resist the Saints' advances and prefer "to live or die on our own, without [the Saints] meddling in our affairs." And, though some take advantage of a local street gang presence for protection and enforcement, others will patronize both the gangs as well as mainstream enforcement agencies, hoping that the latter will eventually improve. More important, irrespective of their appreciative inclinations, all of Blackstone's residents are affected to some degree by the rhythms of street gang activity because they must engage with an environment saturated with the symbolism of street gangs. This is perhaps the strongest indication of the street gang's impressive stature in community social organization, namely, regardless of an individual's opinion of and relation with local gangs, the latter serve as a primary reference point to which resident action and decision making are oriented.

This local omnipresence of the gang is best evidenced, not in the juridical and material offerings that I have described above, but instead in the more generic development whereby the social space formed through the territorial practices of the street gang have challenged earlier identifications of residents with their local environment. The gang's marking of "turf," its spatialization of ally and enemy relations, and its assignment

of areas for exchange and consumption are articulated with, and in some cases superseded by, previously formed cultural “enunciations” that enabled residents to negotiate or make do with their physical surroundings (de Certeau 1984). This is readily apparent in the reorientation of Blackstone’s non-gang-affiliated residents to the city. The manner by which they can move about in Blackstone and surrounding spaces—both *where* they can visit and *how* they get there—is effectively altered once they are forced to acknowledge and incorporate street gang inscriptions. For example, consider those residents who arrived in Blackstone before the 1980s and who often fondly recall the era when the “gangs was controlled by the community, not the other way around.” Until the mid-1980s, street gang attributes were secondary for their movements in Blackstone. Instead, the building in which a person lived, the reigning Council officers, and the relative proximity to local transportation networks were some of the important indexes of social space that affected their daily intercourse.<sup>15</sup> As the gang’s entrepreneurialism and largesse became entrenched and as their “law and order” services became more pronounced, their geographic markings exerted a greater symbolic force. Gang-based distinctions impressed upon a social space where gang symbolism previously held minimal sway. Corey Wilson, a 40-year-old resident in a Saints-controlled building, makes this point forcefully by arguing for the relative importance of “the gang who controls the building you live in,” as opposed to other symbolic attributions that determine safety, personal identity, and ease of local travel:

It’s like, now I think about myself living in Saints territory. That’s the most important thing, ‘cause they the ones who do stuff around here, they clean up, give money to people who need food, you know, they the ones who really, you know, affect how you live. So, I tell my friends I live ‘over there with the 33rd St. Saints’ where before I might say ‘yeah I live in this or that building, come and see me.’ Now people want to know what gang controls where you living, ‘cause that’s more important than how far away you are from them, or if you can take the bus there, you know?

The emergent gang-laden social space has forced Blackstone residents to reconstitute their “street wisdom” in line with the new dictates imposed

<sup>15</sup> These spatial markers were also determinative of personal identity, differentiating Blackstone’s residents from one another in meaningful ways: “Back [in the seventies], we used to paint our buildings with signs and drawings, ‘cause the building you lived in was important for who you was, and like I was telling you, they was all ugly so we needed to show our building was better”; “[The] 331 [building] is the most violent of all”; “330 has the most unity.” This mode of physical spatial demarcation was also important for quality of life: e.g., “our floor has always been able to work with gangs”; “we get the part-time jobs first, ‘cause our floor captain’s brother works for the city.”

by street gang geography. Like the inhabitants of Village-Northton in Elijah Anderson's (1990, p. 231) *Streetwise*, those in Blackstone also have "found some system for categorizing the denizens of the street and other public spaces. . . . The streetwise individual thus becomes interested in a host of signs, emblems, and symbols that others exhibit in everyday life." The general navigation of the "local and larger community" (Jankowski 1991) by Blackstone residents demonstrates their adherence to the contours of "gangland." For example, an individual visiting a friend living outside Blackstone may minimize travel through those areas controlled by gangs that are at war with the one in his or her own neighborhood. Within Blackstone, residents living in buildings controlled by the Saints gang will limit their visits to buildings controlled by the Roaches, calling upon friends and family only during daytime hours or when peace treaties are known to be in place between the two street gang families. "Cookie," a young adult who does not belong to a gang but who lives in a Saints-controlled building, continually expresses frustration at the constraints imposed by this "outlaw" social space. On one occasion, he was not allowed to enter a building in Blackstone by members of the Roaches who were standing guard at the building's entrance. I met him as he returned to his own apartment:

"What's wrong, Cookie, you upset at something?" I asked.

"Cookie can't go and see his old lady! Ain't that right, nigger," said Billy, a friend of Cookie's who was sharing a stoop with me.

"These niggers won't even let me see my girlfriend. Bitch gonna have a baby and the father can't even come in the apartment. Shit, these outlaws taking over this place . . . and I ain't even in the damn organization."

"No," interrupted Billy, "They done took over the place!"

Cookie's inability to visit his girlfriend has become a routine occurrence for residents of Blackstone. To visit his girlfriend, Cookie lobbied Ms. Jackson, the Council president in his building. She called the respective Council officer in Cookie's girlfriend's building, who in turn convinced the local Roaches gang leader that Cookie was a "neutron," that is, that he was not a gang member, had no allegiance to the Saints (or to the Roaches for that matter), and posed no threat. Cookie's successful use of weak ties to obtain visitation rights with his expectant girlfriend is exemplary of the streetwise efforts that are needed not only to move about freely but, in the case of youth, to sustain personal identities that are not dominated by street gang affiliations.

Similar to Cookie, other non-gang-affiliated young adults are forced to reconstitute their personal identities in reference to the gang-based social space that they inhabit. For these neutrons, gang identity has revalorized extant geographically based stigmatizations. For example,

many youths feel that an address in Blackstone limits their opportunities to succeed in social institutions such as school and the mainstream labor market.

When I go out and try to get a job, I tell 'em my address and they think you know, that I'm running with a gang. It's like I can't convince them that I ain't a part of all that, you know? And, if they believe me, then they ask about all that warring going down, so like, I'm fucked if I tell 'em anything I know, 'cause then they'll ask, "How is it you know if you ain't in a gang?"

It was bad enough, before, you know, 'cause I got outta high school and I had to tell folks that I was from Blackstone but I didn't want to stay on welfare my whole life. Now, they ask me if I'm in a gang! So, I gotta work on that and tell them that we ain't all alike, not all of us are into that.

As their lamentations make clear, the stigma of their address in a public housing development has become coupled with the popular conception of Blackstone as a breeder of street gangs, thus compounding their diminished social status.

The restrictions on general motility that arise from local street gang markings also affect the relations that Blackstone's residents can engender with other social actors in the community. Some residents do not patronize social service providers in nearby neighborhoods because these spaces are inhabited by rival street gangs. Similarly, they may not travel to a medical clinic or grocery store for fear of intimidation or physical harassment. Thus, they must forgo the use of certain resources and services. Conversely, organizations in Blackstone will keep residents who live in Saints' and Roaches' territories apart during events and programs in order to deter antagonistic interactions (or, in the case of the Grace Center, the staff may at times "sit them all together so that they can start talking to each other again" [Joe Jackson]). State agencies are also aware of the gang-laden social space and use it to their own advantage—although, they also seek to delegitimize street gangs' symbolic investitures of the municipality through "mob action" and "antiloitering" ordinances that allow them to remove gang members who occupy public spaces (Kainec 1993; Trosch 1993). Housing authority management, sensing increased cooperation among residents and street gangs in a particular building, will intervene by eliminating physical maintenance or by increasing enforcement of curfews and lease regulations in the building.<sup>16</sup> To offer another example, law enforcement officers routinely acquire cooperation from youths and older residents, regardless of their gang affiliation, by threatening to "drop them off" in territories controlled by gangs at war with those in Black-

<sup>16</sup> These examples were offered by tenant leaders in Blackstone but were substantiated by several housing authority managers to whom I spoke informally.

stone. An undercover officer working in the city's "gang crimes" unit made no attempt to hide law enforcement's attempt to co-opt the gang's local stature for their own objectives: "[Police officers in Blackstone] aren't stupid. Yeah, you put *that* in your book! We know that people are scared of gangs, and that they get things from them. We know they're working together. But, until we can stop that, we have to use what we know to our advantage, you see. We have crimes to stop and this is a tool like any other."

In sum, due to this comprehensive presence—spatial, material, ideological—I argue that the early 1990s signaled the arrival of the street gang as an important element in the social organization of the Blackstone community. This does not mean that, after the events in December 1992, residents were held hostage by street gangs, nor that the street gangs exerted an absolute dominance over social life in Blackstone. Instead, the street gangs' modus operandi and symbolism simply became incorporated into what Bourdieu (1992) calls the "rules of the game" that defined the possibilities of social interaction, identity, and experience for residents of Blackstone. In their daily intercourse and decision making, Blackstone residents took into account the street gang, whereas in the past the gang did not have such a determinative influence.

By embedding themselves in community social organization the street gangs imposed their own expressive patterns, boundaries and territories, and symbols and markers of identity onto those already in existence. The social space that had formed decades ago based on the Council system and building-centered differentiations was challenged and partially overridden in 1992 by the territoriality of the street gang. The gang, in this sense, became more than a delinquent actor and, to the degree that it committed socially transgressive acts, it was not simply a "social bandit" with no other ties to the community other than periodic outbursts of disruptive behavior (cf. Hobsbawm 1959, p. 6). It became a recognized, albeit internally contradictory, community institution, performing a range of "positive functions" (Klein 1995) while simultaneously engaging in behaviors that disrupted community social life.

## CONCLUSION

In this study, I have focused on a specific historical moment in the development of an urban street gang, namely, its turn toward systematic involvement in drug economies. In the scholarship on street gangs, this process of *corporatization* has been a primary variable by which researchers differentiate entrepreneurially oriented gangs from their counterparts that are more interested in defending turf or that are motivated by symbolic factors. However, I argued in this essay that corporatization is a

multifaceted social process that cannot be reduced to its economic dimensions. In the Blackstone community, developing relations with tenant leaders, building empathy from residents, and participating in nondelinquent social activities were as important in the Saints' maintenance of (informal) economic superiority as the direct control over drug distribution itself. The overly economicistic understanding of corporatization has missed the ways in which symbolic issues and gang-community dynamics can affect the accumulation of revenue by street gangs. Moreover, a street gang's interest in monetary gain is not always at the expense of other motivations, which is also implied in research on street gang entrepreneurship.

In Blackstone, the Saints street gang was not simply attempting to earn increased revenue, but in the words of its leader, "We wanted to be a part of the community, help our community, 'cause we're here to stay" (JT). That is, the Saints did not discard noneconomic motivations when they experienced greater success in drug economies. Instead, their economic gains prompted a reconsideration of their marginalized social status. Through monetary donations and the provision of law and order services, the gang tried to become a more legitimate social actor in the community. It is important to note that the redistribution of revenue by the Saints to the broader population was not their only means of winning the allegiance and support of residents. Though at its apex the Saints earned several thousand dollars per month (according to gang leaders), only a small percentage was funneled to tenant leaders, resident organizations, and other individuals who were paid off for their silence or cooperation. As important were the in-kind services that the gang provided—ranging from security escorts to recreational programming—as well as their willingness to assist households in times of need through grocery purchases, free transportation, and manpower. As I have argued, their capacity to do so was deeply linked to their successes in drug distribution. This is made clear by the demise of the Saints street gang family in the mid-1990s due to the imprisonment of their leaders from different parts of the city. As one might expect, their drug-based revenue declined precipitously at this point as did their largesse in Blackstone. To maintain a legitimate local presence, JT and other leaders used their own personal cash reserves to pay off community members, while attempting to reclaim their informal economic stature.

Little is known about such relations among gangs, community residents, and local organizations. Nor do we understand fully the ways in which patterns of association and interaction among these actors can shift over time in accordance with other social transformations. By paying attention to the varying ideological makeup and patterns of association among different actors in Blackstone, I tried to explicate the *range* of inter-

actions that occur between a street gang and the broader community. The focus on social organization in this article allowed me to describe the varying functions, positive and negative, that street gangs can fulfill and the ways in which residents can hold ambivalent attitudes toward this social actor. Specifically, in the context of economic destitution and the lack of mainstream services, Blackstone's street gangs have become a resource as well as a harbinger of insecurity and social instability for residents.

By paying direct attention to the actual interactions among different actors in Blackstone, I have sought to provide a more nuanced analysis of gang activity than typically offered in community and field studies. To bridge the chasm between macrosocial constraints and locally situated behaviors, I did not rely solely on the trope of "adaptation." Instead, I incorporated a dialectical perspective regarding space and social behavior, arguing that not only do social beings respond to ecological constraints but their actions also shape such contexts. Moreover, since their actions are mediated by conflict and contradiction, historical change and ideological forces, their responses to social constraints retain a measure of contingency and indeterminacy.

Much of the gang-community dynamics that I have addressed are specific to the contours of the Blackstone housing development, such as its demographic makeup and the particular history of its associations among residents, gangs, and administrative agencies. Other empirical studies have affirmed the increasing importance of underground economies and street gang-based resources for residents of economically impoverished communities (Sullivan 1989; Padilla 1992; Jankowski 1991). Further research is needed on the social organizational status of street gangs in order to determine whether these processes are in fact endemic to urban poor communities in which street gangs are socially prominent. Along with greater empirical data, this article has argued for a more concerted attempt to theorize the gang in the context of its relations with other actors in its local and larger community.

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# **Welfare and the Rise in Female-Headed Families<sup>1</sup>**

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The article provides a bridge between recent marriage market research and studies of welfare incentive effects on U.S. family formation. Estimates from state and county fixed-effects models indicate significant effects of changing state Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and Medicaid expenditure levels on county-level changes in families headed by unmarried mothers. However, neither changing welfare benefit levels nor declining economic and marital opportunities could account for recent increases in female headship. The results imply that large additional cuts in welfare payment levels would lead to only small reductions in the percentage of female-headed families with children.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The transformation of the family has continued apace in the United States. Between 1970 and 1993, the percentage of all families (with children) maintained by a single mother increased from 11.5% to 25.9%, while the number of children living with only their mother expanded from 7.5 to 15.6 million (Rawlings 1994; Saluter 1994). The economic and social costs have been large. A disproportionate share of children raised in

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female-headed families experience chronic poverty and various deleterious developmental and behavioral problems, including poor cognitive and emotional development, teenage pregnancy, and school dropout (Amato 1993; McLeod and Shanahan 1996; McLanahan and Sandefur 1995). Indeed, female-headed families have experienced exceptionally high rates of poverty—about 50%—over the past two decades (Casper, McLanahan, and Garfinkel 1994; Lichter 1997). They also have comprised the overwhelming share of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the cash assistance program that was the nation's largest prior to implementation of new welfare reform legislation in early 1997.<sup>1</sup>

From a public policy standpoint, it should come as no surprise that marriage is increasingly viewed as a panacea for poverty and other social problems (Blankenhorn 1995; Popenoe 1996; Waite 1995). The current retreat from marriage and the decline in the two-parent family have reinvigorated research on the etiology of family formation in the United States (e.g., Cherlin 1992; Qian and Preston 1993). Much of the interest has centered on the role played by demographic shortages of "marriageable men" and the rising employment and earnings of women (e.g., Wilson 1987; Wood 1995). At the same time, recent trends have raised new questions about whether past and current welfare policies and public assistance programs (e.g., AFDC participation and benefit levels) have undermined traditional patterns of family formation, while encouraging nonmarital fertility, divorce, and the growth in female-headed families with children (Moffitt 1994, 1995; Schultz 1994).

The main objective of our article is to provide a bridge between recent research on local marriage markets (South and Lloyd 1992; Lichter, Anderson, and Hayward 1995) and studies of welfare incentive effects on family formation (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Duncan and Hoffman 1990). Specifically, we estimate and compare the effects of *changing* state AFDC benefit levels, food stamp benefits, and Medicaid expenditures, as well as changing economic and marriage market opportunities, on recent area-level changes in female-headed families. Our goals are (1) to document the rise in female-headed families (for non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and Hispanics) during 1980–90 for all U.S. counties, (2) to evaluate, for the first time, competing explanations (e.g., welfare incentives to nonmarriage

<sup>1</sup> The new program is called Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. In the early 1990s, only about 8% of recipients received cash payments as married persons through the AFDC-Unemployed Parents program. This program provided married couples with assistance during spells of unemployment if they met certain eligibility requirements regarding previous work histories (i.e., the 100-hour rule). One purpose of this program was to reduce family stress during periods of economic hardship and prevent marital disruption and divorce.

versus mate unavailability) of increasing local-area female headship rates, and (3) to estimate various cross-state and cross-county fixed-effects models of family formation (Moffitt 1996). Research on the rise in female-headed families with children is propitious in light of current welfare debates centered on the possible implications—both good and bad—of the newly enacted welfare bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.

#### ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND FEMALE HEADSHIP

The retreat from marriage is inextricably linked to the growth in the number and percentages of female-headed families (Lichter 1995; Smith, Morgan, and Koropecskyj-Cox 1996). Nearly one-third of all babies today are born out of wedlock and roughly 30% of all nonmarital births are to divorced women (Ventura et al. 1995). Among blacks, increases in nonmarriage (rather than increases in nonmarital fertility rates) have accounted for the overwhelming share of the post-1960 rise in the nonmarital fertility ratio, that is, the ratio of nonmarital births to all births (Smith et al. 1996). Clearly, public policies—including welfare policies—that address the retreat from marriage may also slow or even reverse the rise in nonmarital fertility and female-headed families in the United States.

Current debates on changing patterns of family formation, especially among ethnic and racial minority groups, have centered largely on the comparative merits of theoretical perspectives that emphasize either men's or women's changing economic roles (Cherlin 1992; Oppenheimer 1997). Some argue, for example, that the rise in female headship is largely explicable in terms of growing demographic shortages of "marriageable" men. The deteriorating low-wage, low-skill labor market has reduced women's incentives to marry and has undercut the economic foundations of existing marriages. This is most apparent among black women residing in communities with large sex ratio imbalances and high male unemployment (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995; Wilson 1987). Other studies attribute changing patterns of family formation to the improving employment circumstances of American women (McLanahan and Casper 1995; Schultz 1994; Darity and Myers 1995). Employment and earnings presumably increase women's economic independence from men and reduce the incentives to marry. Improved economic status also allows women to leave unhappy marriages, unmarried mothers to live independently from other adult family members, and pregnant unmarried women to choose single motherhood over abortion, adoption, and marriage.

From a conceptual standpoint, the singular emphasis on *either* men's or women's economic roles is inappropriate. These are not mutually exclusive perspectives; men's and women's economic roles within the family

are interrelated in fundamental ways (Oppenheimer 1997). Indeed, a broader microeconomic perspective, one that emphasizes the rising economic and personal costs and the declining benefits of marriage in modern society, can subsume both (Becker 1981). The benefits from the specialization of household production along traditional gender roles—women in home production (i.e., childbearing and child rearing) and men in labor market activities—have declined with the changing economic roles of women. At the same time, the main benefit of marriage for women, traditionally one of economic support from men, has eroded as the economic position of men, especially young men with limited education or work skills, has declined relative to women's over the past two decades. The implication from Becker's rational choice model is that rising female headship results from the blurring of traditional gender and economic roles.

The problem with economic explanations that emphasize changing employment and earnings—of either men or women—is they are often inconsistent with the empirical record. For example, declining "male marriageability" implies that the economic gains from traditional marriage have declined for women. But most studies show that demographic shortages of economically attractive men do not account for the widening racial differences in family formation patterns, nor can they account for much of the recent change in marriage rates or female headship (McLanahan and Casper 1995; Lichter, LeClere, and McLaughlin 1991; Raley 1996; McLaughlin and Lichter 1997). The study by Mare and Winship (1991) is illustrative of this point. Among white men, roughly 20% of the decline in marriage rates during the 1940–85 period was due to their changing employment rates. For blacks, the role of declining "marriageable men" is even smaller. Using metropolitan-level census data, Wood (1995) showed that only about 4% of the 1970s decline in black marriage rates was due to the changing local pool of adequately employed black men.

Other research eschews the current preoccupation with the changing availability of male marriage partners but stresses instead the declining economic "costs" of remaining single and getting divorced for women. Specifically, the economic imperative for women to marry and stay married has diminished with rising female labor force participation and higher real wages. Delayed marriage and divorce impose fewer economic hardships than in the past on women. Moreover, employed single mothers can afford to live apart from their families of origin (Avery, Goldscheider, and Speare 1992). Such commonplace assertions, however, have received mixed empirical support. McLanahan and Casper (1995) reported that, among white women, changing employment and earnings accounted for 70% of the decline in marriage between 1970 and 1990. At the other extreme, Qian and Preston (1993) found that declines in marriage were most

pronounced during 1972–87 among the least educated women—a result inconsistent with arguments that emphasize the changing economic roles of women. They also suggested that change in the “force of attraction” (i.e., unobservable change in values regarding marriage) was most responsible for the retreat from marriage (see also Schoen and Kluegel 1988). Other studies show poor women are less likely to marry than nonpoor women (McLaughlin and Lichter 1997) and that employed women and high wage earners have an increased rather than decreased annual probability of marriage (Oppenheimer 1994; Lichter et al. 1992).

The mixed conclusions and apparent limitations of strictly economic explanations have revived previously discredited explanations of changing family life. This includes new research on whether the welfare state has created economic disincentives to marriage among low-income groups while setting into motion various adaptive or maladaptive cultural changes (including nonmarital fertility and divorce) felt throughout society (Moffitt 1996; Murray 1993). This resurgent interest in welfare incentives is coincident with the passage of new welfare reform legislation that includes time limits and work provisions aimed at promoting behaviors among the poor that resonate with the deeply held American values of hard work and “strong” families. During President Clinton’s first term, the Department of Health and Human Services loosened the waiver process for state experimentation with welfare programs. State experimentation with welfare and social service provisions has now been institutionalized through the mechanism of federal block grants to states.

An evaluation of the incentive effects of state welfare benefit levels is clearly needed at a time when state-to-state variation in welfare provision and generosity is expected to increase substantially over the next several years. The existing literature on welfare incentives on the family is complicated and difficult to summarize neatly. Welfare effects apparently also have changed unpredictably over time (Moffitt 1996), further complicating the conventional wisdom.<sup>3</sup> The theory, however, is straightforward: Public assistance, especially cash assistance programs like AFDC, putatively creates economic incentives to bear children without marriage, discourages marriage, and promotes independent living among unmarried mothers. It contributes to the retreat from marriage and the rise in female-

<sup>3</sup> Many sociologists appear to have a much different reading of the literature than do other social scientists. At the risk of some simplification, sociologists often downplay the role of welfare incentives (based largely on their reading of pre-1980 studies) or ignore welfare altogether in empirical studies because to do so would be tantamount to “blaming the victim.” On the other hand, the more nuanced analyses of economists regarding welfare incentive effects often come at the expense of ignoring or minimizing other competing explanations, including cultural or value changes, gender roles, and labor market discrimination.

headed families among low-income women by providing a "surrogate husband" in the form of a steady but modest source of income. The "antifamily" effects of welfare therefore are expected to increase over time in response to the deteriorating economic circumstances of young, less educated adults. Welfare incentive effects also should be most apparent among minority populations, a disproportionate share of whom are poor and eligible for welfare.

Others reject such arguments. First, the family has been transformed across all economic strata in America (Sweet and Bumpass 1987), a fact that militates against monocausal explanations that emphasize the role of welfare. Recent family trends suggest sweeping cultural shifts that have affected virtually all segments of American society. Second, female headship has increased over the past decade while real welfare benefit levels have become less rather than more generous (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986). If welfare benefits were the primary determinant of single headship, theory predicts that the decline in benefit levels would have led to a decrease in this outcome. Third, "blaming" the welfare system for the problems of the poor (e.g., Murray 1993) is misplaced; rather, factors such as inadequately funded schools and family-supporting social services, few employment opportunities, racial discrimination, and neighborhood segregation and isolation are seen as root causes of various adaptive behaviors, as well as correlates of both welfare generosity and dependence. The implication is that studies of welfare incentive effects must be evaluated within a comprehensive framework that considers a variety of alternative explanations. Such is the purpose of this article.

Moffitt's (1992, 1995, 1996) recent comprehensive reviews of welfare incentives draw several useful conclusions for the purpose of our study. First, most economic studies show that welfare has significant deleterious effects on various measures of family formation, including female headship. Second, these effects have generally increased in size over the past decade (Moffitt 1994). Third, any disincentive effect of public assistance on family formation is not spurious, that is, it is not an artifact of the fact that women bearing children outside of wedlock are more likely to receive public assistance and to delay or forgo marriage (Bennett, Bloom, and Miller 1995).<sup>4</sup> And, fourth, welfare incentives tend to be stronger among whites than among blacks, a finding inconsistent with public perceptions and also puzzling in light of the larger share of blacks "at risk" of welfare incentive effects (i.e., being eligible for welfare by virtue of low income). Other research, however, shows that the receipt of public assistance

<sup>4</sup> Bennett et al. (1995, p. 57) found that "welfare recipiency accounts for a small but nontrivial portion (about one-fifth) of the negative association between nonmarital childbearing and the subsequent likelihood of marriage."

among cohabiting couples lowers marital transition rates among blacks but not whites (Manning and Smock 1995). Black women on welfare are also more likely than white women to forgo marriage rather than marry relatively low-status men (Lichter et al. 1995).

The debate today should not focus exclusively on whether welfare effects exist. The emphasis should instead be on the absolute size of welfare incentives, on the size of welfare effects compared to those of other frequently ignored "causes" (such as employment and sex ratio imbalances), and on issues of statistical design for best discerning welfare incentive effects.

#### THE CURRENT STUDY

From a conceptual and analytic standpoint, our article builds most directly on the recent areal study by McLanahan and Casper (1995). They used data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples to construct marriage market indicators for the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. They estimated a pooled regression model that included women's characteristics (e.g., proportion employed full-time), men's characteristics (e.g., median earnings), the local sex ratio, and state welfare benefits. They found that AFDC-food stamp benefit levels were negatively associated with metropolitan proportions currently married, but that welfare effects were small from a substantive standpoint. Substituting the low and high levels of welfare in their regression equation resulted in a difference of only about 5–7 percentage points in predicted marriage rates. Welfare incentive effects also were small in comparison to the effects of men's and women's economic circumstances.

Our analysis incorporates several important strengths of the McLanahan-Casper study, and also of other recent cross-state, cross-sectional analyses of local marriage markets (e.g., Fossett and Kiecolt 1992; Lichter et al. 1991), while addressing the weaknesses of each. First, we examine the effects of *changes* in welfare benefit levels, skill levels, and economic opportunities for women and men, and the local pool of "economically attractive" spouses on family formation. This departs from much of the existing sociological research, which downplays or ignores the role of government assistance in marriage and family formation decisions.

Second, we examine longitudinal data aggregated over small geographic areas—counties. The use of county-level economic data confers conceptual and statistical advantages in comparison to previous studies that have used gross state-level measures without regard to intrastate differences in labor market conditions or marriage opportunities (Moffitt 1994). Most marriage markets are locally circumscribed rather than defined by state boundaries.

Third, unlike McLanahan and Casper (1995), who used metropolitan area data, we need not impute welfare benefits across multistate areas, and we can consider family formation behavior in nonmetropolitan areas. Our analysis is comprehensive from a geographic standpoint, covering all counties in the 48 contiguous states.

Finally, our analysis, which uses repeated measures of both the family formation outcome variable and the other explanatory variables, can incorporate county-specific fixed-effect controls for omitted variable bias. Decisions regarding marriage and family formation are clearly more complex than indicated by the simple models specified in most empirical studies. Moreover, previous research has shown that model estimates are highly sensitive (in some instances to the point of results being eliminated or reversed) to the inclusion of alternative controls for the processes and variables that researchers can or cannot observe.<sup>5</sup> Omitted variable bias is addressed here with estimates of welfare incentive effects from county-level panel models of female headship.

## METHODS

### Data

The primary data for this analysis consist of cross-sectional county records drawn from the Summary Tape Files (STF) of the 1980 and 1990 decennial censuses of the United States. We matched information for each county across years to form a short panel. We excluded all observations from Alaska and Hawaii because the costs of living and ethnic composition were unrepresentative of the rest of the country. Counties that had fewer than 50 families with children under 18 in either 1980 or 1990 also were eliminated from the analysis. The result is a pooled data set containing 6,106 observations (3,053 counties matched across 1980 and 1990).<sup>6</sup> Short descriptions as well as means and standard deviations of the variables for the total sample of counties in 1980 and 1990 are reported in table 1.

The STF data have several features that distinguish them from the data

<sup>5</sup> Relevant examples include Moffitt's (1994) analysis of female headship rates and Jackson and Klerman's (1994) and Kane and Staiger's (1996) analyses of young women's fertility rates.

<sup>6</sup> There were a small number of cases during the 1980s where new counties split off from existing counties. For consistency, our analysis defines counties in terms of their 1980 boundaries. In some states, STF data are recorded for independent cities as well as for counties. For small independent cities whose borders rested entirely within a county, data for the city and county have been combined; for large cities, the analysis includes the city-level records as if they were counties.

TABLE 1  
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SIMPLE STATISTICS

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION	MEAN	
		1980	1990
Female headship .....	Percentage of family households with children under 18 years old with single female heads	16.03 (6.30)	18.72 (6.76)
Sex ratio .....	Ratio ( $\times 100$ ) of males to females, 15-59 years old	97.56 (6.96)	98.90 (8.03)
Male employment .....	Percentage of male civilians employed	70.20 (6.71)	69.42 (6.75)
Male earnings .....	Median income for men working full-time, full-year (1989 dollars, in 1,000s)	29.94 (5.01)	29.05 (5.33)
Male education .....	Percentage of males, 25-44 years old, with a bachelor's degree or more	24.87 (9.09)	25.10 (10.00)
Female earnings .....	Median income for women working full-time, full-year (1989 dollars, in 1,000s)	17.34 (2.51)	19.18 (3.69)
Female education .....	Percentage of females, 25-44 years old, with a bachelor's degree or more	17.51 (6.70)	22.46 (8.78)
Percentage 65 and over .....	Percentage of the population 65 years old or older	11.04 (3.44)	12.41 (3.60)
Percentage black .....	Percentage of the population who are black	11.01 (12.09)	11.71 (12.67)
Percentage Hispanic .....	Percentage of the population who are Hispanic	6.81 (11.01)	8.74 (13.03)
Percentage rural .....	Percentage of the population who reside in a rural area	26.98 (27.84)	25.86 (27.80)
ln(population) .....	Natural logarithm of county population	12.44 (1.62)	12.55 (1.65)
Percentage Catholic .....	Percentage of the population who are adherents to the Catholic religion	20.11 (15.75)	21.14 (16.48)
Percentage LDS .....	Percentage of the population who are adherents to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints	1.35 (6.55)	1.51 (6.93)
Percentage conservative Protestant .....	Percentage of the population who are adherents to strongly antiabortion Protestant denominations	10.93 (11.52)	11.30 (12.27)

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION	MEAN	
		1980	1990
Maximum AFDC benefits for family of four .....	Maximum monthly AFDC benefits for a family of four with no other income (1989 dollars, in 100s)	5.65 (2.07)	4.60 (1.84)
Average Medicaid benefits for family of four .....	Average state monthly Medicaid payment for AFDC family of four (1989 dollars, in 100s)	2.90 (.95)	2.57 (.64)
Maximum combined welfare benefits .....	Sum of maximum AFDC and food stamps and average Medicaid benefits for a family of four (1989 dollars, in 100s)	9.14 (1.70)	7.48 (1.34)

NOTE.—Statistics based on 3,053 county-level observations in each year weighted by the no. of families in each county. SDs appear in parentheses.

used in previous research. First, because the data for each county are longitudinal, our study can track changes in and determinants of family formation, including welfare payment levels both across and within counties over time. This addresses a limitation of the McLanahan-Casper study and most previous work in this area (i.e., the failure to control for other unobserved community or local-area variables). Second, the data allow us to form community-based measures of marriage opportunities, gender-specific economic opportunities, and other population characteristics. Third, these data also provide race- and ethnicity-specific measures of family formation and several other key variables. Accordingly, we conduct separate analyses for non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and Hispanics. The race-specific data sets contain 5,800 observations (data for 2,900 counties) for non-Hispanic whites; 2,366 observations for blacks; and 1,542 observations for Hispanics. Means and standard deviations for the race- and ethnicity-specific measures are reported in table 2.

### Measurement

The dependent variable for our county-level regression analysis is the percentage of family households with children under 18 headed by unmarried women.<sup>7</sup> Using the STF data, we measure the demographic supply of men

<sup>7</sup> Other research has sometimes examined the percentage of all women who are heading families with children. Welfare effects are then interpreted as reduced-form effects that have many different pathways to female headship: marriage or not, childbearing

TABLE 2  
RACE- AND ETHNICITY-SPECIFIC VARIABLES

	WHITE		BLACK		HISPANIC	
	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990
Female headship .....	12.16 (3.26)	13.98 (3.21)	41.30 (8.81)	48.10 (9.14)	19.72 (9.97)	22.31 (10.39)
Sex ratio .....	98.64 (5.50)	99.45 (6.52)	88.74 (20.37)	89.24 (22.83)	100.53 (16.25)	110.91 (18.55)
Male employment .....	71.57 (6.72)	71.00 (6.58)	58.82 (7.69)	57.47 (8.49)	71.73 (7.22)	70.55 (7.67)
Male earnings .....	30.91 (5.04)	30.26 (5.79)	22.30 (5.09)	22.17 (4.49)	22.37 (3.88)	20.19 (3.31)
Male education .....	26.39 (9.82)	26.98 (10.99)	11.01 (5.27)	12.39 (5.73)	10.49 (6.18)	10.23 (5.45)
Female earnings .....	17.45 (2.51)	19.43 (3.92)	16.16 (3.24)	17.81 (3.90)	15.11 (1.89)	16.12 (2.41)
Female education .....	18.26 (7.30)	23.88 (9.77)	10.89 (4.70)	13.97 (5.50)	6.98 (4.24)	9.56 (5.14)
No. of counties .....	2,900		1,189		772	

NOTE.—Statistics in each year weighted by the no. of families of each racial/ethnic group in each county. SDs appear in parentheses.

relative to women and the "economic attractiveness" of potential male partners in the county. These are defined by the sex ratio, male employment rate, male earnings among full-time workers, and percentage of college-educated men in the county (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991; Lichter et al. 1991). The expectation is that an increasing supply of economically attractive men is negatively related to the rise in female-headed families. We construct similar measures of female economic independence, including the median earnings of full-time, full-year female workers and percentage of college-educated women. We examine the effects of both aggregate and race-specific measures of marriage market and gender-specific economic and skill-level variables on female headship. Dollar-denominated values are deflated by the Personal Consumption Deflator and expressed in constant 1989 terms.

A main objective of the analysis is to evaluate the absolute and relative

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or not, independent living or not, etc. Data limitations prevent us from exploring these alternative pathways. In any event, the denominator in this alternative measure is not the population at risk of receiving AFDC; it is families with children, a fact reflected in our measure. We nevertheless have fit models with alternative measures (table A1), and the results are discussed below.

relationship between welfare generosity and female headship. For this, we have matched the county-level STF records to longitudinal state-level information on the AFDC, food stamp, and Medicaid programs (U.S. House of Representatives 1990; U.S. Office of Family Assistance 1980; and unpublished data from the U.S. Food and Nutrition Service and U.S. Health Care Financing Administration). For our measures of AFDC and food stamp generosity, we use the maximum benefit levels for a family of four with no other income. Food stamp benefits are fixed at the national rather than state level; by definition, they will not be associated with state-to-state variation in changes in female headship. Food stamps may nevertheless be important because benefits under the program are reduced by the receipt of AFDC income and thus act to narrow state-to-state variation in the overall benefits package. We use the combined benefits package as our primary measure of welfare generosity. Following Moffitt (1992), this is the sum of the maximum AFDC benefit, the adjusted food stamp benefit, and .368 times the average Medicaid benefit.\*

Finally, the census STF data also provide other control variables. These include the age and racial/ethnic composition of each county, variables that have been highly associated with family formation in previous studies (Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Lichter et al. 1991). Moreover, unlike virtually all other studies, we include both proxy and direct measures of the cultural context of family formation. Proxy measures of urbanization (which has many cultural manifestations) include the logarithm of county population and the percentage of rural population, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Previous studies have shown that nonmetropolitan women marry earlier, on average, and are less likely than urban women to bear children outside of marriage (McLaughlin, Lichter, and Johnston 1993; Heaton, Lichter, and Amoateng 1989). These proxy measures of cultural context are supplemented with direct measures, that is, longitudinal county-level information on participation in religious organizations with strong "profamily" orientations. Specifically, the Glenmary Research Center (1980–92) provides county-level estimates of the number of adherents and communicants for various religious denominations. We use these data to form estimates of the percentages of the county population that are Roman Catholic, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the Mormon church), or members of Protestant denomina-

\*The adjusted food stamp amount is defined as maximum food stamp benefit –  $.3 \max(0, \text{maximum AFDC benefit} - \text{standard deduction})$ , while the 0.368 in the combined benefit formula represents the fraction of AFDC recipients who actually claim services under the Medicaid program. The AFDC and food stamp amounts are deflated by the Personal Consumption Deflator, and the Medicaid amount is deflated by the Consumer Price Index for medical services.

tions with strong antiabortion positions.<sup>9</sup> Winkler (1994) showed that the effects of welfare payments are sensitive to the inclusion of measures of "community conservatism."

### Model Specifications

The pooled regression analysis of McLanahan and Casper (1995) provides a point of departure for our analysis. We begin with estimates from 1980–90 pooled county-level cross-section regression models of the percentage of families with children that are headed by females. Let  $y_{ij}(t)$  denote the percentage of families with female heads in county  $i$  of state  $j$  in year  $t$ . Let  $x_{ij}(t)$  denote the set of observed county- and year-specific economic and marriage opportunity variables. Let  $s_i(t)$  denote the set of state- and year-specific welfare policy variables, and let  $d(t)$  be a dummy variable indicating whether the observation came from 1990. The year dummy,  $d(t)$ , is used to account for "global" effects that alter the national trend in family formation (this probably includes what Qian and Preston [1994] have called changes in the "force of attraction"). With this notation, a standard regression of the relationship between family formation outcomes and local economic, marriage opportunity, and policy conditions can be written as

$$y_{ij}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta'_1 x_{ij}(t) + \beta'_2 s_i(t) + \beta_3 d(t) + \epsilon_{ij}(t), \quad (1)$$

where  $\epsilon_{ij}(t)$  represents unobserved county- and year-specific determinants of family formation. In the results that follow, this specification is estimated by applying OLS to the pooled county-level samples where each observation is weighted by the number of families in the county.

Estimates of the coefficients in model (1) are biased if the error term,  $\epsilon_{ij}(t)$ , includes unobserved factors that are correlated with the variables in  $x_{ij}(t)$  or  $s_i(t)$ . For instance, states with higher welfare benefits may be more generous providers of education and social services generally. If this

<sup>9</sup> The specific denominations are the Assemblies of God, Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church, Christian Reformed Church, Church of God (Anderson, Indiana), Church of God (Cleveland, Tennessee), Church of the Nazarene, Evangelical Congregational Church, Free Methodist Church, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Mennonite Church, North American Baptist Conference, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Reformed Church in America, Southern Baptist Convention, and Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod. These denominations were identified by the National Right to Life Committee (personal communication) and Bosgra (1987) as having strong antiabortion positions. Several other denominations including the Free Will Baptists, International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, Old Order Amish, and Wealeians were also identified as having strong antiabortion positions; however, data were not consistently available for these groups on numbers of adherents.

additional service spending is at the same time negatively related to headship and omitted from model (1), estimates of the effect of welfare benefits will be biased downward. Conversely, liberal (conservative) political and social attitudes may account for both high (low) welfare spending and high (low) rates of headship. Omitting such attitudes from regression (1) leads to upwardly biased estimates of the effects of welfare.

To control for unobserved time-invariant factors, several recent studies have estimated models that incorporate state-specific fixed effects. Using the notation from specification (1), such a model can be expressed as

$$y_v(t) = \beta'_x x_v(t) + \beta'_s s_v(t) + \beta_D d(t) + \mu_v + \epsilon_v^*(t), \quad (2)$$

where  $\mu_v$  represents a state-specific effect (with  $\beta_0$  suppressed, a state-specific intercept). While the inclusion of state fixed effects likely mitigates biases associated with unobserved state spending and institutions, the specification does not control for unobserved variation in local determinants or for interactions between omitted state and local variables.<sup>10</sup>

The availability of repeated county-level data allows us to include a finer set of fixed-effects controls. Specifically, we estimate models of the form

$$y_v(t) = \beta'_x x_v(t) + \beta'_s s_v(t) + \beta_D d(t) + \mu_v + \tilde{\epsilon}_v(t), \quad (3)$$

which nest specification (2) as a special case. Because our primary interest rests with the coefficients  $\beta_x$ ,  $\beta_s$ , and  $\beta_D$ , we can obtain consistent estimates of the relevant parameters of equation (3) by applying OLS to data that have been differenced across 1980 and 1990.<sup>11</sup> For purposes of comparability, we estimate variants of specifications (1), (2), and (3). However, on the basis of specification tests for the inclusion of county-specific versus state-specific or no fixed effects, the general model (3) is our preferred specification in the subsequent empirical analysis.

## RESULTS

### Changes in Female Headship

The percentage of families headed by females continued its steady rise during the 1980s. The weighted county data in table 1 indicate that the

<sup>10</sup> The use of the word *likely* is purposeful here as the use of fixed effects may exacerbate biases associated with other statistical problems such as measurement error in the explanatory variables or omitted local-level variables.

<sup>11</sup> Even after differencing, there still may be spatial correlation in the errors because of the clustering of counties within states. To account for this, we report estimates from feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) models that incorporate controls for within-state correlation.

percentage of female-headed families increased from 16.03% to 18.72% between 1980 and 1990, an absolute increase of 2.69% and a relative increase of 16.7%.<sup>12</sup> On both an absolute and percentage basis, the increase was largest among black women, whose headship rates rose from 41.30% to 48.10% (table 2). The increase among Hispanics was more similar to that of whites than blacks.

Over the same period, average real AFDC benefit levels declined by \$105, or 19%. In terms of the combined benefits package, the decline in AFDC generosity was reinforced by a slight drop over the decade in average Medicaid benefits but partially mitigated by the income adjustment for food stamps. On net, the evidence is still one of substantial cutbacks in the real value of the welfare "safety net." The average combined monthly benefit dropped by \$166, or 18%, over the decade.

Averages reweighted to reflect the different residential distributions of racial and ethnic groups (not shown) further reveal that black families were more likely to live in states with lower-than-average welfare benefits in both 1980 and 1990. The paradox is that female headship increased, especially among blacks, during a period of decline in AFDC and of divergence in the welfare safety net that increasingly favored whites over blacks. This pattern of decline provides strong evidence against the argument that welfare was responsible for the rise over the decade in female-headed families.

#### Pooled Cross-Sectional Models of Female-Headed Families

Like the McLanahan-Casper study, our initial model (shown in the first column of table 3) provides estimates of welfare incentive effects from a 1980-90 pooled regression specified as in equation (1). Consistent with theory, this conventional analysis indicates that the association between welfare benefits and female headship is positive and statistically significant. At the same time, the effects are arguably small from a substantive standpoint: a \$100 change in welfare payments is associated with slightly less than a one percentage point change in female headship. To give a more extreme example, if monthly AFDC payments had been completely eliminated and not offset by any change in food stamps or Medicaid (i.e., if the average monthly combined benefits package had decreased by \$565 instead of \$166 over the decade), the results indicate that headship rates would have indeed fallen but only by about half a percentage point.

A criticism of previous cross-section research is that estimates of the

<sup>12</sup> Since the county data are weighted by the number of families in the county, these weighted averages are algebraically equivalent to the population estimates of the percentage of female-headed families for the United States.

TABLE 3

## DETERMINANTS OF FEMALE HEADSHIP REGRESSIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE AREA CONTROLS, 1980-90

Variable	No Area Effects	State Effects <sup>a</sup>	County Effects <sup>b</sup>
Maximum combined welfare benefits	.817*** (.036)	.392*** (.105)	.838*** (.214)
Sex ratio	-.178*** (.005)	-.171*** (.005)	-.076*** (.008)
Male earnings	-.421*** (.016)	-.403*** (.016)	-.092*** (.023)
Male education	-.007 (.018)	.048*** (.017)	.045** (.017)
Male employment	-.285*** (.008)	-.270*** (.009)	-.161*** (.014)
Female earnings	.317*** (.035)	.306*** (.034)	-.432*** (.040)
Female education	.014 (.020)	-.041*** (.020)	-.159*** (.018)
Percentage 65 and over	-.185*** (.014)	-.123*** (.015)	-.135*** (.034)
Percentage black	.271*** (.004)	.316*** (.005)	.257*** (.017)
Percentage Hispanic	-.001 (.004)	.027*** (.005)	-.147*** (.017)
Percentage rural	-.087*** (.003)	-.077*** (.003)	-.019** (.008)
ln(population)	.241*** (.047)	.383*** (.049)	-.2015*** (.336)
Percentage Catholic	-.038*** (.003)	-.060*** (.004)	-.025*** (.005)
Percentage LDS	-.039*** (.006)	-.063*** (.016)	.121** (.055)
Percentage conservative Protestant	-.042*** (.004)	-.011** (.005)	-.052*** (.016)
Dummy <sub>1990</sub>	3.029*** (.141)	2.465*** (.205)	6.053*** (.387)
R <sup>2</sup>	.834	862	...

NOTE.—Results based on 6,106 county-level observations from 1980 and 1990 weighted by the no. of families in each county. Dependent variable is percentage of families with children under 18 years old with single female heads. SEs appear in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> The 49 state effects are jointly significant at the .01 level.

<sup>b</sup> The 3,053 county effects are jointly significant at the .01 level.

\* P < .10.

\*\* P < .05

\*\*\* P < .01

effects of public assistance may be spurious, a result from excluding other state-level variables associated both with welfare generosity and female headship from the model. The model presented in the second column addresses this concern by including 48 state dummy variables as controls for unmeasured state-level effects (DiPrete and Forristal 1994).<sup>13</sup> Specification tests reveal that the state dummy variables are jointly significant at the .01 level. More important, their addition leads to a substantial (more than 50%) reduction in the estimated effect of welfare. Although the coefficient remains significantly positive, each additional \$100 change in welfare benefits is now estimated to lead to only a .392 percentage point change in female-headed family households. Estimates of the coefficients for several other variables including men's and women's education and the religious affiliation variables are also very sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects. On balance, the concerns expressed in the existing literature about potential biases from omitted variables, even in models such as ours that are augmented by a relatively rich and detailed set of observed control variables, appear to be well founded (cf. Moffitt 1994; McLanahan and Casper 1995).

#### Change Models of Female-Headed Families with County Fixed Effects

Our results so far indicate that welfare benefit levels significantly affect the percentage of female-headed families with children, even when other unobserved state effects are controlled. These models do not, however, take full advantage of the longitudinal county-level data. The possible effects of county-specific unobserved heterogeneity are addressed in the model presented in the final column of table 3, which differences each of the county-level observations over time.<sup>14</sup> This model provides an estimate of the effect of *changing* public assistance on *intradecade* changes in female headship at the county level, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between both states *and* counties (DiPrete and Forristal 1994) as well as for observed changes in local area sex ratio imbalances, local economic opportunities, and cultural factors.<sup>15</sup> As with the previous speci-

<sup>13</sup> In studies using data from a single point in time, the state dummies and welfare variables would be redundant and welfare effects could not be estimated. This is not the case using pooled data. Each state has two unique welfare variables (i.e., for 1980 and 1990), allowing us to estimate a state welfare effect independent of state effects.

<sup>14</sup> In this first-difference model, the dependent variable is the difference between the 1980 and 1990 percentages of families with children that were headed by women. The independent variables are similarly differenced. In terms of the coefficients for the variables of substantive interest, the specification is equivalent to having run a regression on the pooled sample with 3,052 county dummy variables.

<sup>15</sup> These models were estimated using the HML/2L computer program. This package does not include an estimate of  $R^2$  from the model.

fication, estimation reveals that the additional fixed effect controls are jointly significant and that their inclusion leads to substantive changes in several of the coefficients of interest.

The county fixed-effects model produces estimates of the association between welfare and female headship that are much closer to pooled regression estimates from column 1 in table 3 than the state fixed effects estimates from column 2. Specifically, each \$100 change in welfare benefits is associated with an .838 percentage point change in the county female headship rate. When we combine this point estimate with the actual decrease in welfare benefits over the decade, the change in welfare policy is calculated to have depressed headship rates by 1.4%. The finding of a significant positive association between welfare and headship is all the more striking because we have fit our model for female headship among all families with children, not simply for the low-income, potentially eligible population. Models estimated for such a targeted population would likely produce even stronger results than those reported here.<sup>16</sup>

Our difference model also is the first of its kind to examine the effects of *changing* local marriage market conditions on family formation for the 1980s. It builds directly on previous pooled cross-sectional analyses of 1980 and 1990 census data (Lichter et al, 1991; McLanahan and Casper 1995) and on Wood's (1995) study, which was restricted to the metropolitan black population using change data computed from the 1970 and 1980 censuses. Our results reveal significant effects of changing marriage market conditions on the 1980s rise in female-headed families.

Specifically, the estimates indicate that the sex ratio is negatively associated with female headship; areas with relatively fewer men to women have higher rates of female headship than do other areas. These effects, though, are small from a substantive standpoint with the coefficient implying that a decline of 13 men for every 100 women would be necessary to raise the female headship rate by a single percentage point. Men's employment and earnings are significantly negatively associated with female

\* Our analysis has focused primarily on the effects of welfare benefits overall, without regard to the "packaging" of benefits. In some additional analyses (available upon request), we fit difference models (with county effects) that included the maximum AFDC benefits for a family of four and the average Medicaid benefits received by AFDC recipients *separately*. Our evaluation assesses claims that the rise in female headship reflects the pernicious effects of Medicaid, which provides medical coverage that is typically unavailable in the low-wage jobs held by low-income women. The results provided a straightforward conclusion: Welfare incentive effects result from changes in AFDC rather than Medicaid payment levels. The effects of changes in average Medicaid payment levels were not associated with changes in female headship for the sample of all counties, nor in the race disaggregated samples of whites, blacks, and Hispanics. There is little evidence here that Medicaid payment levels promoted the rise in female-headed families over the past decade.

headship. The magnitudes of these estimated effects, however, are again comparatively small: a 10% change in the male employment rate (an absolute change of 7 percentage points) is associated with a 1.1 percentage point change in headship while a 10% swing in male earnings is associated with only a .3 percentage point change (by way of contrast, the change in female headship associated with a 10% change in welfare payments is .7 percentage points). The results while modest nevertheless imply that the supply of marriageable men influences women's decisions to bear or raise children outside of marriage.

One piece of evidence that potentially contradicts this hypothesis is the small but significantly positive coefficient on the percentage of men in the county who have completed at least a bachelor's degree. To the extent that this variable serves as a proxy for long-term wage opportunities, the positive coefficient runs counter to the marriage market explanation. However, to the extent that the variable reflects either a shortage of marriageable teenage and young adult men, liberal attitudes regarding sexual activity, or progressive attitudes about and a willingness to provide child support, the coefficient can be reconciled with our other results.

The results from the county fixed-effects model fail to support the female "independence hypothesis" but do support economic hypotheses regarding family formation processes. This represents strong support for Oppenheimer (1994), who claims that the recent emphasis on the deleterious effects of women's improved economic status on the family is overdrawn. Specifically, our estimates indicate that women's earnings and education are significantly negatively related to female headship. Previous cross-section research on the effects of women's changing economic roles on various family formation outcomes has been mixed with a large number of economic studies finding negative effects of female economic opportunities (see the review by Montgomery and Trussell [1986]) but with several sociological and some economic studies finding positive effects (see, e.g., McLanahan and Casper 1995; Lichter et al. 1991; Matthews, Ribar, and Wilhelm 1997). The estimated magnitudes of these associations are also much larger than those for the male earnings and education variables, in the case of the earnings variable nearly five times as large. The schooling results are consistent with higher levels of education increasing women's access to economically attractive marital partners, increasing their attractiveness to potential marital partners, and thus increasing the quality and stability of marriages generally (South 1991; Lichter et al. 1995).

As expected, high rates of female headship are significantly associated with urbanization (see also McLaughlin and Lichter 1997), high concentrations of blacks and young people, and local population declines. The percentages of Hispanics, Catholics, and antiabortion Protestants in the county, on the other hand, are negatively associated with the percentage

of families headed by women. A counterintuitive finding is that changes in the percentage of Mormons are positively associated with female headship. This last result notwithstanding, it is clear that changes in the demographic and cultural character of local areas affect the concentration of female headship, independent of changes in economic conditions.

Finally, the intercept from the differenced model can be interpreted analogously to the dummy variables in our previous specifications indicating whether the observation pertains to 1980 or 1990 (coded "1" if 1990). If the year effect is zero, the appropriate inference is that the 1980s rise in female-headed households with children was due entirely to changes in the state and county characteristics considered here. But, as shown in table 3, the net year effect of 6.053 is large and statistically significant in the model. In contrast, the percentage of family households (with children) headed by females increased by 2.68 percentage points, on average, between 1980 and 1990 (table 1). The significant time coefficient means that neither county compositional changes nor changing state welfare policy can explain the 1980s rise in female-headed families. In fact, current short-run demographic and economic trends have muted the upward rise. Other explanations clearly must be entertained, including cultural ones that emphasize changing family values or rising individualism.<sup>17</sup>

In some additional analyses (table A1), we evaluated the sensitivity of our results using three alternative measures of family structure. Previous research on welfare is often unclear about measurement issues (e.g., whether subfamilies are defined as families) or the unit of analysis (i.e., percentage of women heading families with children or percentage of families with children that are headed by women). Such differences may contribute to differences from study to study in reported welfare effects. Our sensitivity analysis focused on three alternative measures: (1) percentage of women heading family households with children, (2) percentage of families (including subfamilies) with children headed by women, and (3) percentage of women heading families (including subfamilies) with children. Regardless of measure used, estimates from county fixed-effect models (models specified along the lines of eq. [3]) revealed statistically significant and positive effects of changes in welfare benefit levels on the change in female headship. The welfare incentive effects are thus robust with respect to alternative measures of female headship. Our findings regarding

<sup>17</sup> The coefficient on the time trend is more properly interpreted as a residual that incorporates all of the trends that we have either omitted or improperly measured. So the trends in low-income wages, the availability and relative value of other forms of public assistance, child care and child support policies, the lifetime parity of married and single mothers, etc., are all potential contributors to this residual along with the cultural trends described in the text.

the negative effects of the sex ratio, men's employment, and women's economic opportunities were also robust to changes in the specification of the dependent variable, while our findings regarding men's earnings and education were somewhat more sensitive.

#### Female Headship among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics

The clear and consistent relationships between welfare and female headship for the total sample are not observed for each of the racial and ethnic groups considered here. The estimates from the 1980–90 difference or county-effects models reported in table 4 are based on counties with significant populations (more than 50 families) of whites, blacks, and Hispanics. The results, which have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity among counties, indicate significant positive effects of welfare benefit sums on female headship among blacks but not among whites and Hispanics. For blacks, the welfare effect (1.294) is over four times larger than the nonsignificant effect for whites (.302). This effect implies that each \$100 change in welfare benefits is associated with a 1.294 change in the percentage of family households with children headed by females. Alternatively, this means that counties with the largest welfare cuts experienced relatively slower increases in female headship over the decade. For blacks, the observed welfare effect implies that average black female headship would decline from the observed percentage of 48.10% to 43.01%, a 5.09 percentage point drop, if welfare payments were cut in half. Such results suggest that even large cuts in welfare benefits will produce relatively small declines in female headship for blacks. They will yield no change in female headship for whites or Hispanics.

The other results in table 4 reinforce previous research that emphasizes deteriorating marriage market conditions as a causative factor in the rise in female-headed families. For each racial/ethnic group, increases over 1980–90 in the ratio of men to women and increases in men's earnings, education, and employment were associated with slower increases (or even declines) in female headship. But the effects of shortages of economically attractive men were strongest among minority populations. For example, each percentage point increase in black men's and Hispanic men's employment during the 1980s was associated with a .252 and .287 percentage point decline, respectively, in female headship. This compares with a .099 percentage decline in white female headship for each percentage point increase in white men's employment. Similarly, the effect of men's earnings on female headship was over twice as large for blacks and Hispanics. Clearly, our results indicate that changes in local economic circumstances played an especially large role in the rise in minority female-

TABLE 4  
DETERMINANTS OF FEMALE HEADSHIP BY RACE/ETHNICITY

Variable	White	Black	Hispanic
Maximum combined welfare benefits ....	.302 (.198)	1.294*** (.611)	-.111 (.803)
Sex ratio .....	-.080*** (.008)	-.041*** (.009)	-.092*** (.010)
Male earnings .....	-.151*** (.020)	-.346*** (.066)	-.164** (.066)
Male education .....	.022 (.015)	-.058 (.045)	.101** (.047)
Male employment .....	-.099*** (.013)	-.252*** (.029)	-.287*** (.030)
Female earnings .....	-.397*** (.034)	-.265*** (.098)	.064 (.110)
Female education .....	-.132*** (.015)	-.095** (.045)	-.146*** (.050)
Percentage 65 and over .....	-.040 (.031)	.058 (.121)	.181 (.144)
Percentage black .....	.011 (.018)	-.259*** (.044)	.154* (.085)
Percentage Hispanic .....	-.076*** (.016)	-.163** (.060)	-.110** (.051)
Percentage rural .....	-.016** (.007)	.009 (.037)	-.074* (.039)
ln(population) .....	.582 (.301)	-5.104*** (1.357)	.657 (1.390)
Percentage Catholic .....	-.018*** (.005)	-.011 (.026)	-.010 (.013)
Percentage LDS .....	.107** (.049)	.463 (.428)	.754*** (.274)
Percentage conservative Protestant .....	-.021 (.014)	.085 (.064)	-.077 (.094)
Dummy....	3.820*** (.359)	9.819*** (1.075)	3.303** (1.558)
Observations .....	5,800	2,366	1,542

NOTE.—Dependent variable is percentage of families with children under 18 years old with single female heads. Regressions include controls for county-specific effects and are weighted by the no. of families in each racial/ethnic group. SEs appear in parentheses.

\*  $P < .10$ .

\*\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .01$ .

headed families in the 1980s, a result consistent with previous research (Mare and Winship 1991).

The observed effects of women's changing economic circumstances on family formation similarly reinforces the (too often ignored) theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of Oppenheimer (1994), that is, that women's improving earnings and education promoted marriage rather than created disincentive to marriage or female independence from men. Indeed, for both white and black women, improvements in earnings were negatively associated with 1980–90 increases in female-headed families. These estimated effects, however, were generally larger and more precise among white women than among blacks and Hispanics. This is not surprising in light of existing racial and ethnic differentials in female education and earnings; fewer benefits in the form of lower female headship are likely to be observed if the education and earnings distributions are truncated at the top among minority women.

In sum, our models (with county fixed effects) indicate that welfare benefit levels are positively associated with the rise in female headship under varying model specifications and in race specific models for blacks. At the same time, our results highlight the importance of local economic opportunities, especially among men, in promoting traditional patterns of family formation. Clearly, neither monocausal explanations that focus on welfare incentives nor explanations that emphasize jobs and earnings can fully account for recent increases in female headship. From a policy standpoint, this is perhaps discouraging because it implies that cultural changes—such as value shifts—may partly underlie recent trends (Popenoe 1996). Attitudes and values are difficult to reverse by public policy, even if consensus about the need for such change exists.

#### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, welfare reform is on the public policy and state legislative agenda. Our study revisits the subject of possible links between changing national and state welfare policy and the rise in female-headed families—a timely but contentious subject that has been given surprisingly little systematic empirical attention in the sociological literature over the past decade.<sup>18</sup> Our multilevel analysis of the multiple causes

<sup>18</sup> The voice of social science research has not often been heard in this debate. It has been drowned out by a much louder and more passionate public voice of concern about the "breakdown of the family" and the possible contributing role of welfare dependency. This is not surprising. Sociologists typically have shied away from sensitive or controversial public policy issues that might seem to "blame the victim," that might promote racial stereotypes, or that might generate empirical evidence supporting a conservative political agenda. For example, Massey's (1995) recent review essay

of the rise in female-headed families is especially appropriate at a time when state and federal welfare reform initiatives seek to restore "strong families," reduce nonmarital fertility, and promote economic independence among poor women.

Our analyses of changing female headship provided strong and consistent evidence that state welfare benefit levels were associated with changes in female headship over the 1980–90 period. Previous studies using state fixed-effects models of female headship have produced inconclusive results for the 1960s (Ellwood and Bane 1985) or have showed that state welfare benefit effects are nonsignificant (for 1968–89) when unobserved state-level variables are controlled (Moffitt 1994). Our fixed-effects analysis, which controlled for both unobserved state and county heterogeneity, indicated instead that areas with larger declines in welfare benefits had significantly slower increases in the percentage of families headed by unmarried mothers. Moreover, the welfare incentive effects observed here may in fact be underestimated if welfare has *lagged* effects on family decision-making processes (Murray 1993; Moffitt 1994). Family formation behaviors may respond slowly to changing welfare policy as perceptions of welfare benefit levels catch up with the reality of recent welfare cuts. They also may be underestimated for certain high-risk populations. For example, marriage rates were lowest in the 1980s for young, poor, and less educated women, a group that contributed disproportionately to recent increases in female-headed families and may have been influenced most by welfare availability (Qian and Preston 1993; McLaughlin and Lichter 1997).<sup>19</sup>

Our study perhaps built most directly on the cross-sectional study by McLanahan and Casper (1995) by further explicating the role of welfare incentives in the family formation process. First, ours is the first comprehensive study for the 1980s to pit explanations that emphasize state welfare incentives against those that stress the deteriorating economic attractiveness of male marriage partners and the rising economic independence of women. We show that the effects of *changing* welfare benefits existed under a variety of alternative and rigorous model specifications for *all* (rather than only metro) counties. The robustness of our results for the 1980s also reinforce recent speculation that welfare incentive effects may have increased since the 1970s (Moffitt 1996).

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of *The Bell Curve* argues that the attention received by this book can be traced directly to the policy vacuum left by sociologists.

<sup>19</sup> Some support for this argument was found in additional analyses (not reported) that revealed a significant negative interaction effect of welfare and education on female headship. The substantive interpretation is that welfare effects were largest in the counties with the least educated population, a result consistent with arguments suggesting larger welfare effects among the poor.

Second, welfare incentive effects during the 1980s were especially large for blacks (a result similarly shown but not discussed by McLanahan and Casper [1995]), while the effects for whites and Hispanics were insignificant. Such results for the 1980s contrast with previous research that typically showed that welfare effects were larger for whites than for blacks (see Moffitt 1995). The welfare incentive effects observed here for blacks are consistent with the larger share of poor and welfare-dependent persons in the black population. By virtue of their lower economic status alone, blacks should be more responsive to changing welfare benefit levels. The race-disaggregated results from our county fixed-effect models therefore help reconcile the theoretically anomalous results of previous studies.

Third, conventional economic arguments, including those that emphasize employment or welfare, cannot account for recent upswings in female-headed families with children. The "period" effects in our pooled regression models were invariably large and statistically significant. Female headship increased between 1980 and 1990, net of 1980–90 compositional changes in the sex ratio, the economic circumstances of men and women, or welfare. The fact that the size of the period effect exceeded the actual 1980–90 percentage point change in female headship indicates that recent demographic and economic changes may have contributed, on balance, to otherwise even larger increases in female headship over the past decade. In the end, welfare was not the primary or even a key factor responsible for the recent upswing in female headship. The estimated welfare incentive effects implied that even very large cuts in welfare payment levels would produce only a relatively small drop in the rate of female family headship. Little evidence exists to support the apparently widely held perception that welfare is largely responsible for the breakdown of the traditional married-couple family.

Clearly, other explanations for the rise in female-headed families are required and await additional study. For example, until recently, cultural explanations have had a bad reputation, one born of 1960s debates about a "culture of poverty" and the Moynihan report. Cultural arguments seemed to blame the poor themselves (e.g., "tangle of pathology") for their unfortunate economic circumstances (for cultural discussions, see Cherlin [1992] and Pagnini and Morgan [1996]). As in previous studies, our results also lend themselves to possible cultural interpretations.<sup>20</sup> Such explana-

<sup>20</sup> "Residual" evidence supporting the so-called minority-group hypothesis provides a similar example. Studies show that the higher fertility among minority women cannot be explained with standard social (e.g., education) and economic (e.g., income) variables. The usual inference is that this unexplained residual variation in fertility must then be due to unmeasured cultural differences between majority and minority groups. Such a residual interpretation also is used when differences in income between groups (e.g., blacks and whites, men and women) cannot be explained by objective human

tions are implied by increases in female headship even after adjusting for 1980–90 shifts in conventional social and economic variables (e.g., growing shortages of marriageable men). A cultural argument—one based on observed race differences—also is indicated by the disproportionate increase in female-headed families in counties with increasing black populations, holding marriage market and other local economic conditions constant. One interpretation, then, is that the effects of changing welfare and economic factors reported here represent only small deviations from an otherwise upward trend in female headship across many segments of American society.

Some observers have argued that the retreat from the traditional family is a result of the widespread rise in individualism at the expense of the collectivity, changing mores regarding sexuality and unmarried cohabitation, and the declining stigma associated with unmarried pregnancy and motherhood (Bumpass 1990; Thornton 1995; Popenoe 1996). Indeed, only about one-third of young people today agree that it is better to get married than to spend one's life being single, and three-fifths express moral acceptance of cohabitation before marriage (Thornton 1989). Moreover, black Americans—especially black men—are less likely than their white counterparts to indicate a desire to marry (South 1993). And, unlike white women, black women typically suffer little stigma from unmarried childbearing (Pagnini and Morgan 1996). Blacks also are less likely to marry than Mexican Americans, a group that shares the disadvantaged economic circumstances of blacks but not the same familial cultural traditions (Oropesa, Lichter, and Anderson 1994). Of course, any distinctive features of contemporary black family life may be cultural adaptations and a legacy of historical circumstances, including spatial and social isolation, chronic economic deprivation, peer group attachments, and gender role dissonance (Pagnini and Morgan 1996; Lloyd and South 1996; Schoen and Kluegel 1988). By their very nature, such sweeping cultural interpretations often defy empirical study.

Whatever its etiology, our focus on the growth of family households headed by unmarried women with children is clearly appropriate. Current welfare debates and nascent state welfare legislation remain targeted at needy unmarried women with children. Our estimates of welfare incentive effects must nevertheless be regarded as reduced-form effects; as in previous studies, we have ignored the multiple pathways through which welfare may have contributed to the rise in female-headed families with children (Ellwood and Bane 1985). Welfare incentive effects on female headship may operate indirectly through increased nonmarital childbear-

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capital or job-related characteristics. Here, the residual interpretation is usually one of unmeasured overt or subtle race or gender discrimination.

ing (Moffitt 1995), lower marriage or remarriage rates (McLanahan and Casper 1995), more independent living among unmarried women with children (Wilson 1987), a lower likelihood of resolving premarital pregnancies through abortion or marriage (Lundberg and Plotnick 1990), or more cohabitation at the expense of marriage (Manning and Smock 1995; Raley 1996). Different state welfare reform initiatives may have much different and perhaps offsetting effects on the various demographic pathways to female headship and poverty (Lichter and Gardner 1996-97). Our results should be regarded as a first step toward a fuller understanding of the etiology of family formation behaviors.

Finally, the current devolution of the federal welfare system to the states implies considerable potential for future increases in state-to-state variation in welfare policy and benefit levels. The United States currently may be undergoing a process of increased territorial differentiation—a balkanization across geographic space of cultural and economic groups (Frey 1995; Lichter 1992). The future may yield growing spatial heterogeneity in family formation processes, including the rise of female-headed families, that reinforce existing economic disparities over geographic space (Massey 1996). Indeed, the welfare incentive effects observed here may grow over time as state welfare policies further differentiate one state from another.

## APPENDIX

TABLE A1

## DETERMINANTS OF FEMALE HEADSHIP: ALTERNATIVE HEADSHIP MEASURES

Variable	Household Headship per Woman	Family Headship	Family Headship per Woman
Maximum combined welfare benefits .....	.378*** (.099)	1.021*** (.262)	.538*** (.117)
Sex ratio .....	-.026*** (.004)	-.084*** (.008)	-.034*** (.004)
Male earnings .....	-.010 (.011)	-.113*** (.024)	-.008 (.013)
Male education .....	-.008 (.008)	.080*** (.018)	.033*** (.010)
Male employment .....	-.086*** (.007)	-.167*** (.014)	-.106*** (.008)
Female earnings .....	-.248*** (.019)	-.314*** (.041)	-.225*** (.022)
Female education .....	-.078*** (.009)	-.199*** (.019)	-.133*** (.010)
Percentage 65 and over .....	-.044*** (.016)	-.142*** (.035)	-.123*** (.018)
Percentage black .....	.051*** (.008)	.324*** (.017)	.129*** (.009)
Percentage Hispanic .....	-.076*** (.008)	-.030* (.017)	-.005 (.009)
Percentage rural .....	-.008** (.004)	-.019** (.008)	-.010** (.004)
In(population) .....	-.244 (.161)	-.3,098*** (.350)	-.1,439*** (.186)
Percentage Catholic .....	-.014*** (.002)	-.015*** (.005)	-.009*** (.003)
Percentage LDS .....	.086*** (.028)	.082 (.058)	.062* (.033)
Percentage conservative Protestant .....	-.006 (.008)	-.067*** (.016)	-.023*** (.009)
Dummy <sub>1990</sub> .....	2.386*** (.179)	7.566*** (.472)	3.811*** (.213)
Mean of the dependent variable:			
1980 .....	6.919	18.049	8.018
1990 .....	7.614	22.216	9.668

NOTE.—The weight for the first and third columns is women 15–44 years old. The weight for the second column is families with children. Regressions include controls for county-specific effects. SEs appear in parentheses.

\* $P < .10$ .

\*\* $P < .05$

\*\*\* $P < .01$ .

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# World Society and the Nation-State<sup>1</sup>

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The authors analyze the nation-state as a worldwide institution constructed by worldwide cultural and associational processes, developing four main topics: (1) properties of nation-states that result from their exogenously driven construction, including isomorphism, decoupling, and expansive structuration; (2) processes by which rationalistic world culture affects national states; (3) characteristics of world society that enhance the impact of world culture on national states and societies, including conditions favoring the diffusion of world models, expansion of world-level associations, and rationalized scientific and professional authority; (4) dynamic features of world culture and society that generate expansion, conflict, and change, especially the statelessness of world society, legitimization of multiple levels of rationalized actors, and internal inconsistencies and contradictions.

This essay reviews arguments and evidence concerning the following proposition: *Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and*

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*associational processes.* These models and the purposes they reflect (e.g., equality, socioeconomic progress, human development) are highly rationalized, articulated, and often surprisingly consensual. Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all of the domains of rationalized social life—business, politics, education, medicine, science, even the family and religion. The institutionalization of world models helps explain many puzzling features of contemporary national societies, such as structural isomorphism in the face of enormous differences in resources and traditions, ritualized and rather loosely coupled organizational efforts, and elaborate structuration to serve purposes that are largely of exogenous origins. World models have long been in operation as shapers of states and societies, but they have become especially important in the postwar era as the cultural and organizational development of world society has intensified at an unprecedented rate.

The operation of world society through peculiarly cultural and associational processes depends heavily on its statelessness. The almost feudal character of parcelized legal-rational sovereignty in the world (Meyer 1980) has the seemingly paradoxical result of diminishing the causal importance of the organized hierarchies of power and interests celebrated in most “realist” social scientific theories. The statelessness of world society also explains, in good measure, the lack of attention of the social sciences to the coherence and impact of world society’s cultural and associational properties. Despite Tocqueville’s ([1836] 1966) well-known analysis of the importance of cultural and associational life in the nearly stateless American society of the 1830s, the social sciences are more than a little reluctant to acknowledge patterns of influence and conformity that cannot be explained solely as matters of power relations or functional rationality. This reluctance is most acute with respect to global development. Our effort here represents, we hope, a partial corrective for it.

We are trying to account for a world whose societies, organized as nation-states, are structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar ways. A hypothetical example may be useful to illustrate our arguments, and we shall carry the example throughout the essay. If an unknown society were “discovered” on a previously unknown island, it is clear that many changes would occur. A government would soon form, looking something like a modern state with many of the usual ministries and agencies. Official recognition by other states and admission to the United Nations would ensue. The society would be analyzed as an economy, with standard types of data, organizations, and policies for domestic and international transactions. Its people would be formally reorganized as citizens with many familiar rights, while certain categories of citizens—children, the elderly, the poor—would be granted

special protection. Standard forms of discrimination, especially ethnic and gender based, would be discovered and decried. The population would be counted and classified in ways specified by world census models. Modern educational, medical, scientific, and family law institutions would be developed. All this would happen more rapidly, and with greater penetration to the level of daily life, in the present day than at any earlier time because world models applicable to the island society are more highly codified and publicized than ever before. Moreover, world-society organizations devoted to educating and advising the islanders about the models' importance and utility are more numerous and active than ever.

What would be unlikely to happen is also clear. Theological disputes about whether the newly discovered *Indios* had souls or were part of the general human moral order would be rare. There would be little by way of an imperial rush to colonize the island. Few would argue that the natives needed only modest citizenship or human rights or that they would best be educated by but a few years of vocational training.

Thus, without knowing anything about the history, culture, practices, or traditions that obtained in this previously unknown society, we could forecast many changes that, upon "discovery," would descend on the island under the general rubric of "development." Our forecast would be imprecise because of the complexity of the interplay among various world models and local traditions, but the likely range of outcomes would be quite limited. We can identify the range of possibilities by using the institutionalist theoretical perspective underlying the analysis in this essay to interpret what has already happened to practically all of the societies of the world after their discovery and incorporation into world society.

Our institutionalist perspective makes predictions somewhat at variance with those of three more established theoretical approaches to world society and the nation-state (for reviews, see Powell and DiMaggio [1991], Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein [1996], and Finnemore [1996b]). In multivariate analyses of properties of nation-states, researchers would inevitably consider hypotheses from all four perspectives. But none of the prevailing theories would effectively predict many of the profound social and organizational changes that would occur on our hypothetical island, not least because they do not adequately consider the cultural processes involved.

Microrealist analyses, dominant in the field of international relations under the banner of neorealism, assume that the nation-state is a natural, purposive, and rational actor in an essentially anarchic world (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981). State action reflects inherent needs and interests; culture is largely irrelevant, though it may be invoked to explain particular, often historically rooted patterns of policy or behavior. In any case, culture is only local or national, not global. Much contemporary theory about glob-

alization has this microrealist character, stressing a conception of world society as involving nothing more than dense networks of transactions and interdependence (Jacobson 1979) among autonomous nation-state actors. Variants like neoliberalism (Keohane 1986) and regime theory (Krasner 1983) pay attention to institutional frameworks created by states that, once in place, act as constraints on state action, but they rely on microeconomic realist arguments to explain the emergence of institutions and their durability. Power and interests come first, leaving little room for culture.

Partly in reaction to microrealism, macrorealist arguments such as world-system theory (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1989) and state-competition theory (Tilly 1992; Skocpol 1979) see the nation-state as the creature of worldwide systems of economic or political power, exchange, and competition. The nation-state is less a bounded actor, more the occupant of a role defined by world economic and political/military competition. Culture, most often seen as self-serving hegemonic ideology or repressive false consciousness, is of only marginal interest; money and force, power and interests, are the engines of global change. World-system theory develops this line of thought most consistently: The dynamism of the world economy and state system depend greatly on the absence of centralized world authority (a world state or empire), and global culture is essentially a by-product of hegemony with no causal significance in its own right (Chase-Dunn 1989).

The third perspective, also developed partly in response to microrealism, adopts a microphenomenological approach that conceptualizes the nation-state as the product of national cultural and interpretive systems. The state is embedded in institutions whose cultural character matters, but these institutions reflect world processes only indirectly or not at all. Simple arguments (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963) are content to give a nod to local political culture as background material, while more complex versions (March and Olsen 1989; March 1988) see cultural interpretation and purposive action as simultaneously shaping one another. Application of this perspective to global cultural processes could be fruitful, but most discussions extending this line of thought to the world level (e.g., Sklair 1991; Mattelart 1983) treat culture superficially, as flows of relatively arbitrary, expressive Western tastes in media products, fashion, art, or fast foods (Ritzer 1996). They fail to appreciate sufficiently the substantive significance of culture and its organizational presence in world society.

Our own perspective, macrophenomenological in orientation, builds on contemporary sociological institutionalism (Thomas et al. 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). We see the nation-state as culturally constructed and embedded rather than as the unanalyzed rational actor depicted by realists (Meyer 1997). We find that the culture involved is substantially organized on a worldwide basis, not simply built up from local circum-

stances and history (Thomas et al. 1987; Meyer 1980). We see such trans-national forces at work throughout Western history, but we argue that particular features and processes characteristic of world society since World War II have greatly enhanced the impact of world-institutional development on nation-states.

Below, we further develop this theoretical background. Then we turn to our causal argument, which is organized in four sections: (1) distinctive properties of the nation-state as constructed in world culture; (2) processes operating at the world-society level that produce and shape nation-states; (3) features of world society that enhance the impact of world culture on national states and societies; and (4) dynamics of world society, especially global cultural processes that promote inconsistency and conflict in the production and modification of world-societal structures and characteristics.

#### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

For realist perspectives, the world is either anarchic (actors pursue interests without interference from an overarching authority structure) or networked (actors intentionally construct interdependent systems of economic and political competition from the ground up). Microphenomenological analysts take culture and interpretation more seriously but restrict them to action processes operating at local or national levels.

Our opening proposition suggests, in contrast, that the world level of social reality is culturally transcendent and causally important, in several different senses. First, contemporary constructed "actors," including nation-states, routinely organize and legitimate themselves in terms of universalistic (world) models like citizenship, socioeconomic development, and rationalized justice. Second, such models are quite pervasive at the world level, with a considerable amount of consensus on the nature and value of such matters as citizen and human rights, the natural world and its scientific investigation, socioeconomic development, and education. Third, the models rest on claims to universal world applicability; for example, economic models of development and fiscal policy and medical models of the human body and health care delivery are presumed to be applicable everywhere, not just in some locales or regions.

The authority of these general models, legally nonbinding though it may be, goes far in explaining why our hypothetical discovered island society would rapidly adopt "modern" structures and purposes upon incorporation into world society. Alternative models, including whatever traditional structures were in place, have little legitimacy. The correct modern forms are highly developed and articulated, with elaborate rationalized justifi-

cations. Particularistic or local models find it difficult to compete with these legitimations.

### Culture

Realist analyses view culture functionally, as expressive material that integrates collectivities or supports the domination of powerful actors. Microphenomenological analysts give greater heed to culture's meaning-generating properties and cognitive import (Berger and Luckmann 1967) but limit their scope to local situational knowledge and reality construction. These approaches miss the essential elements of the cultural dimension of world society—the cognitive and ontological models of reality that specify the nature, purposes, technology, sovereignty, control, and resources of nation-states and other actors (Meyer 1997). These models, organized in scientific, professional, and legal analyses of the proper functioning of states, societies, and individuals, are more cognitive and instrumental than expressive. The analyses involved are highly rationalized and universalistic, describing integrated, functioning, rational actors. They thus constitute functional theories serving as ideologies of actor-centric rationalization (Thomas et al. 1987).

To avoid misunderstanding on this point, we emphasize that the functionalism of world culture is inscribed in commonsense descriptions and social-scientific theories of "the way things work," but such theories may not mesh well with practical experience. For example, conventional legitimations for mass schooling insist that formal education is necessary and beneficial for economic growth, technical innovation, citizen loyalty, and democratic institutions, among other things. Such functional justifications of schooling are rarely questioned, even though careful studies of, for example, education's effects on economic growth suggest that this functional relationship is at best weak and highly conditional (Rubinson and Browne 1994).

Diffuse functional models of this sort, about actors, action, and presumed causal relations, are centrally constitutive of world culture. As they are implemented in the furthest corners of the globe, they operate as framing assumptions producing consequences that in no reasonable way can be seen as "functional" for the societies that implement them. For instance, the implementation of standard scripts for educational development in countries of all sorts, without regard to their particular circumstances, produces results that often seem quite bizarre, especially when viewed through the rationalized lenses of the functional theories that justify these scripts. Children who will become agricultural laborers study fractions; villagers in remote regions learn about chemical reactions; members of




FIG. 1.—The world as aggregated action

marginalized groups who will never see a ballot box study their national constitutions (Meyer, Nagel, and Snyder 1993). Deeming such practices rationally functional requires a breathtaking leap of faith.

In our island society, the implementation of world models embodying “functional” or “modernity” theories of development would be rampant. For example, any economist comes equipped with powerful models with which to interpret the island economy. These can be applied, with considerable authority, without even visiting the place. A few standardized data tables would be sufficient to empower policy proposals. Similarly, any sociologist comes equipped with the capability to propose measures, analyses, diagnoses, and policy prescriptions for the correction of gender inequalities on the island. On a broad range of economic and social indicators, the island would be categorized and compared with other nation-states, in the same way that every newly independent geopolitical entity has been processed in the past several decades. These data collection and comparison processes would greatly enhance the cultural standing and membership of the island society in the nation-state community (McNeely 1995), helping to transform it quickly into a “real” national entity.

### Explanatory Models

Most analyses see nation-states as collective actors—as products of their own histories and internal forces. Figure 1 depicts such conventional models. We emphasize instead models of the sort depicted in figure 2.

Figure 2 presents the view that nation-states are more or less exogenously constructed entities—the many individuals both inside and outside the state who engage in state formation and policy formulation are enactors of scripts rather more than they are self-directed actors. The social

## World Society




FIG. 2.—The world as enactment of culture

psychology at work here is that of Goffman (1969, 1974) or Snow (Snow and Benford 1992), emphasizing dramaturgical and symbolic processes in place of the hard-boiled calculation of interests assumed by rationalistic actor-centric approaches (see Thomas and Meyer 1984; or cf. Skocpol 1985, pp. 3–20, with pp. 20–28).

We have deliberately oversimplified figure 2 because the proposition we are examining focuses on the enactment dimension of world-societal development. Of course, states, organizations, and individuals also contribute to the content and structure of world culture, and much world-cultural change and elaboration occur within transnational organizations and associations independent of lower-level units. A more complete figure would depict recursive processes among the constituent parts of world society, but here we concentrate on enactment processes. We take up some issues of world-cultural change in the essay's last section, on the dynamics of world culture.

The exogenous cultural construction of the nation-state model makes it easy and “natural” for standard sociopolitical forms to arise in our island society. Models and measures of such national goals as economic progress and social justice are readily available and morally compelling. Also available are model social problems, defined as the failure to realize these goals, that make it easy to identify and decry such failures as inefficient production methods or violations of rights. Alongside these are prescriptions about standardized social actors and policies that are to be engaged in the effort to resolve these newly recognized problems. All this is widely known and ready for implementation.

### PROPERTIES OF THE CULTURALLY CONSTITUTED NATION-STATE

As we develop our argument, we want to keep in the forefront a number of empirical observations about contemporary nation-states. First, nation-

states exhibit a great deal of isomorphism in their structures and policies. Second, they make valiant efforts to live up to the model of rational actorhood. Third, and partly as a result of the second observation, they are marked by considerable, and sometimes extraordinary, decoupling between purposes and structure, intentions and results. Fourth, they undergo expansive structuration in largely standardized ways. The generality of these observations makes sense only if nation-states are understood as, in part, constructions of a common wider culture, rather than as self-directed actors responding rationally to internal and external contingencies.

### Isomorphism and Isomorphic Change

Given other perspectives' emphases on the heterogeneity of economic and political resources (realist theories) or on local cultural origins (microphenomenological theories), most lines of thought anticipate striking diversity in political units around the world and in these units' trajectories of change. Our argument accounts for the similarities researchers often are surprised to find. It explains why our island society, despite all the possible configurations of local economic forces, power relationships, and forms of traditional culture it might contain, would promptly take on standardized forms and soon appear to be similar to a hundred other nation-states around the world.

Take the example of women in higher education. Microrealist or functional actor-centric models, following Harbison and Myers (1964), suggest that female enrollments in universities would increase in developed economies much more than elsewhere. Macrorealist arguments imply that female enrollments would expand in the core much more than the periphery (Clark 1992; Ward 1984), while microphenomenological arguments point to rising female enrollments in Western but not Islamic countries. However, female enrollments have expanded rapidly everywhere, and in about the same time period (Ramirez 1987; Bradley and Ramirez 1996)—a period in which world societal discourse has emphasized female equality (Berkovitch 1997). This finding makes sense only if common world forces are at work.

Isomorphic developments leading to the same conclusion are reported in studies of many other nation-state features: constitutional forms emphasizing both state power and individual rights (Boli 1987), mass schooling systems organized around a fairly standard curriculum (Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), rationalized economic and demographic record keeping and data systems (McNeely 1995; Ventresca 1995), antinatalist population control policies intended to enhance national development (Barrett and Frank 1997), formally equal-

ized female status and rights (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan, *in press*; Ramirez and Weiss 1979; Berkovitch 1997; Charles 1992), expanded human rights in general (Ramirez and Meyer 1992), expansive environmental policies (Frank et al. 1997), development-oriented economic policy (Hall 1989; Finnemore 1996a), universalistic welfare systems (Abbott and Deviney 1992; Thomas and Lauderdale 1987; Strang and Chang 1993; Collier and Messick 1975), standard definitions of disease and health care (Thornton 1992), and even some basic demographic variables (Watkins 1987). Theories reasoning from the obviously large differences among national economies and cultural traditions have great difficulty accounting for these observed isomorphisms, but they are sensible outcomes if nation-states are enactments of the world cultural order.

### Rational Actorhood

As we discuss further below, in world culture the nation-state is defined as a fundamental and strongly legitimated unit of action. Because world culture is highly rationalized and universalistic, nation-states form as rationalized actors. Out of all the possible forms political entities might take, one—the model of the rational and responsible actor—is utterly dominant. This is how nation-states routinely present themselves, both internally (e.g., in their constitutions) and externally (e.g., in seeking admission to the United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies). They claim all the features of the rational state actor: territorial boundaries and a demarcated population; sovereign authority, self-determination, and responsibility; standardized purposes like collective development, social justice, and the protection of individual rights; authoritative, law-based control systems; clear possession of resources such as natural and mineral wealth and a labor force; and policy technologies for the rational means-ends accomplishment of goals.

Consider this last item—goals. Nation-states are remarkably uniform in defining their goals as the enhancement of collective progress (roughly, gross domestic product [GDP] per capita) and individual rights and development (roughly, citizen enhancement and equality). This occurs in constitutions, which typically emphasize goals of both national and equitable individual development (Boli 1987), in general statements on national education, which frequently follow suit (Fiala and Gordon-Lanford 1987), in depictions of the nation and the individual citizen in educational curricula (Wong 1991), and in vast amounts of formal economic policy (McNeely 1995). Goals outside the standard form (the nation in service to God, a dynasty, an ethnic or religious group, or imperial expansion), while still common enough, are usually suspect unless strongly linked to these basic goals of collective and individual progress.

Nations have traditions of piling up the skulls of their neighbors in war, but these are no longer announced as goals. War is no longer an acceptable “continuation of politics by other means”; war departments have been relabeled departments of defense (Eyre and Suchman 1996). Nation-states present themselves as not simply rational actors but rather nice ones at that.

Thus our island society would likely adopt a purposive nation-state structure almost immediately, with the appropriate goals of economic development, equality, and enhancement of individual opportunity. A purposive nation-state actor would be constructed to take formal responsibility for such matters, even under the most unlikely social and economic circumstances (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Meyer 1980).

### Decoupling

Both realist and microphenomenological arguments suggest, for different reasons, that nation-states should be tightly coupled structures—due to functional requirements, the control structures imposed by external powers, or their own domestic cultures and interpretive schemes. This is notoriously not the case. For example, commitments to egalitarian citizenship, which are ubiquitous in constitutions and public discourse, are frequently contradicted by policies that make formal distinctions between genders and among ethnic groups. At the same time, both the claims and the policies are frequently inconsistent with practice.

Decoupling is endemic because nation-states are modeled on an external culture that cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Riggs 1964). World culture contains a good many variants of the dominant models, which leads to the eclectic adoption of conflicting principles. Diffusion processes work at several levels and through a variety of linkages, yielding incoherence. Some external elements are easier to copy than others, and many external elements are inconsistent with local practices, requirements, and cost structures. Even more problematic, world cultural models are highly idealized and internally inconsistent, making them in principle impossible to actualize (Strang and Meyer 1993).

Having few rationalized resources, our imagined island society would find it much easier to adopt the latest structural forms than to make them work effectively. It is easier to create a cabinet ministry with appropriate policies for education or for the protection of women than to build schools and organize social services implementing these policies. It is easier to plan for economic development than to generate capital or technical and labor skills that can make development happen.

Hence, the logic of copying externally defined identities promotes pro-

found decoupling. Any rationalized "actor," whether an individual, organization, or nation-state, reveals much decoupling between formal models and observable practices (for organizations, see Meyer and Rowan [1977] and Weick [1976]; for individuals, see Cancian [1975], Jepperson [1992], Brim and Kagan [1980], and Goffman [1974]). Resource-rich "actors" facing exogenous pressures to assume a given posture may be able to do so convincingly: Core countries often have the resources and organizational capacity to adopt, for example, a curricular innovation in education (Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992), even if, like the United States, they lack a central educational authority structure. Weaker actors, faced with the same imperative, may emphasize formal structuration instead. Peripheral nation-states do a good deal of symbolic educational reform via national policies and control systems (Ramirez and Rubinson 1979), but they have more difficulty bringing change into the classroom.

If formal structuration and centralization are difficult, state managers may retreat simply to planning for future progress. National planning is especially common in the world's peripheries (Meyer, Boli-Bennett, and Chase-Dunn 1975). If even planning cannot be accomplished, policymakers and bureaucrats may settle for incorporating the required principle in general statements of values and identity. Peripheral countries' constitutions are especially likely to specify comprehensive principles of rationalized progress, including detailed assertions of state responsibility for both individual welfare and national economic growth (Boli 1987; Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978), that their states cannot live up to.

We can predict that our island society would likely adopt a rather advanced constitution and engage in formal social and economic planning. Repeated rounds of planning and policy-making would occur as it became clear that the idealized rational models were far from effective implementation. Cynicism would emerge, but its main concrete result would be still more planning and reform.

The decoupling of general values from practical action is, of course, quite different from the relationship predicted by realist and microphenomenological lines of argument (Parsons 1951). Realist theories see actor policy and structure as deliberate means of controlling action, not as conformity to exogenous models. Microphenomenological perspectives see policy and structure as constructed in hermeneutic consistency with action. Thus, the prevalence of decoupling has led to much befuddlement (Cancian 1975; for an extended discussion, see Jepperson [1992]): How can values and action be so habitually inconsistent? Such inconsistency is an obvious actor characteristic from an institutional point of view, particularly for actors like nation-states that have broad and diffuse goals (March 1988; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Brunsson 1989).

One should not be too cynical about decoupling, however. True, for

any set of constructed actors the correlations between policy and practice may be very low (e.g., the correlation between constitutional state authority and government revenue as a proportion of GNP is slightly negative [Boli 1987]). But systemically this relationship is strong: The same time periods and civilizations that foster expanded images of state authority also generate highly elaborated state organizations.

### Expansive Structuration

By structuration we mean the formation and spread of explicit, rationalized, differentiated organizational forms. Here we argue that the dependence of the modern nation-state on exogenous models, coupled with the fact that these models are organized as cultural principles and visions not strongly anchored in local circumstances, generates expansive structuration at the nation-state and organizational levels.

The structuration of the nation-state greatly exceeds any functional requirements of society, especially in peripheral countries. Impoverished countries routinely establish universities producing overqualified personnel, national planning agencies writing unrealistic five-year plans, national airlines that require heavy subsidization, and freeways leading nowhere—forms of “development” that are functionally quite irrational. This observation poses a problem for both realist and microphenomenological theories.

One common intellectual response to this decoupled structuration is neglect of its generality. Typically, political and organizational theorists try to explain the apparent irrationalities of specific structural changes as products of local constellations of power and interests—the delusions of a self-aggrandizing leader, perhaps, or the interests of dominant elites. But the process operates everywhere and in many different sectors of social life. Holding constant the functional pressures of size, resources, and complexity, in recent decades nation-states and other organizations have clearly expanded inordinately across many different social domains. This is precisely the period during which world society has been consolidated (Meyer et al. 1975; Strang 1990), making world models universally known and legitimated. Nation-states and organizations may have distinct and complex histories, but they all have expanded structurally in similar ways in the same historical period (Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Soysal 1994; Dobbin 1994; Guillen 1994).

Present-day universities and firms, for instance, have a multitude of offices that an organization of the same size and goals would not have had just a few decades ago: accounting, legal, personnel, safety, environment, and counseling offices, among others. After the fact, all of these seem functionally necessary, and the power coalitions that produced them

can certainly be identified, but this sort of explanation simply does not account for the worldwide simultaneity of the process. So also with nation-states, which undergo structuration to manage the expanding externally defined requirements of rational actorhood. Common evolving world-societal models, not a hundred different national trajectories, have led states to establish ministries and other agencies purporting to manage social and economic planning, education (Ramirez and Ventresca 1992), population control (Barrett and Frank 1997), the environment (Frank et al. 1997), science policy (Finnemore 1996a), health, gender equality (Berkovitch 1997), the welfare of the old and the young (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978), and much more. This worldwide process affects both core and peripheral countries, though with variable impact depending on local resources and organizational capacities.

The enormous expansion of nation-state structures, bureaucracies, agendas, revenues, and regulatory capacities since World War II indicates that something is very wrong with analyses asserting that globalization diminishes the "sovereignty" of the nation-state (Duchacek et al. 1988; Nordenstreng and Schiller 1979). Globalization certainly poses new problems for states, but it also strengthens the world-cultural principle that nation-states are the primary actors charged with identifying and managing those problems on behalf of their societies. Expansion of the authority and responsibilities of states creates unwieldy and fragmented structures, perhaps, but not weakness. The modern state may have less autonomy than earlier but it clearly has more to do than earlier as well, and most states are capable of doing more now than they ever have been before.

#### PROCESSES OF WORLD SOCIETY'S IMPACT ON NATION-STATES

So far we have argued that the observable isomorphism among nation-states supports our proposition that these entities derive from models embedded in an overarching world culture. What processes in world society construct and shape these "actors" to produce such isomorphism? The usual approach to answering this question would seek to identify mechanisms whereby actors rationally pursuing their interests make similar choices and decisions. This approach implicitly assumes that actor definitions and interests are largely fixed and independent of culture. We find it more useful and revealing to focus on processes that produce or reconstruct the actors themselves. We identify three processes by which world-societal elements authorize and fashion national states: the construction of identity and purpose, systemic maintenance of actor identity, and legitimization of the actorhood of such subnational units as individuals and organized interests.

Construction of Nation-State Identity and Purpose

World society contains much cultural material authoritatively defining the nation-state as the preferred form of sovereign, responsible actor. The external recognition and construction of sovereign statehood has been a crucial dimension of the Western system for centuries (Krasner 1995–96), with new claimants especially dependent on obtaining formal recognition from dominant powers. With the anticolonial and self-determination movements of the 20th century, all sorts of collectivities have learned to organize their claims around a nation-state identity, and the consolidation of the United Nations system has provided a central forum for identity recognition that diminishes the importance of major states. Entry into the system occurs, essentially, via application forms (to the United Nations and other world bodies) on which the applicant must demonstrate appropriately formulated assertions about sovereignty and control over population and territory, along with appropriate aims and purposes (McNeely 1995; Meyer 1980; Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

More than 130 new nation-state entities have formed since 1945. They consistently proclaim, both internally and externally, their conformity to worldwide models of national identity and state structure. So, too, would our island society. But older states, too, have learned to adapt to changes in these models. Thus, through both selection and adaptation, the system has expanded to something close to universality of the nation-state form. Realist theories, grounding their analyses in each country's particular resources and history, would predict a much wider variety of forms, including the retention of older statuses such as formal dependency or indirect incorporation of small or weak entities (Strang 1990).

World-cultural models of sovereign identity take concrete form in particular state structures, programs, and policies. As described above, worldwide models of the rationalized nation-state actor define appropriate constitutions, goals, data systems, organization charts, ministry structures (Kim and Jang 1996), and policies. Models also specify standard forms for the cultural depiction of national identity. Methods of constructing national culture through traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), museums (Anderson 1991), tourism (MacCannell 1976), and national intellectual culture (Gellner 1983) are highly stylized. Nation-states are theorized or imagined communities drawing on models that are lodged at the world level (Anderson 1991).

Often, copying world models or conventions amounts to simple mimesis (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that has more to do with knowing how to fill in forms than with managing substantive problems. For instance, to compile comparable educational enrollment data in the 1950s, UNESCO statisticians chose to report enrollments for a six-year primary level and

three-year junior and senior secondary levels. In ensuing decades, many countries structured their mass schooling systems around this six-year/three-year/three-year model, generally without investigating whether it would best meet any of the presumed purposes of schooling.

Strang (1990) shows the extraordinary impact of the legitimized identity system on the survival and stability of states. Throughout modern history, dependent territories have moved to sovereign statehood at a steadily increasing rate that accelerated rapidly in the postwar period. Once sovereign, countries almost never revert to dependence. Even the breakup of the Soviet Union produced not dependent territories but formally sovereign nation-states, unprepared as some of the former republics were for this status. Thus, it is highly unlikely that our island society would be incorporated as a dependent territory of an extant nation-state; this would be too great a violation of the legitimized right to self-determination. Moreover, establishing the island society's sovereign status in the international system would stabilize its new state, though it would not preclude, and might even increase, instability in the state's government (Thomas and Meyer 1980).

Orientation to the identity and purposes of the nation-state model increases the rate at which countries adopt other prescribed institutions of modernity. Having committed themselves to the identity of the rationalizing state, appropriate policies follow—policies for national development, individual citizenship and rights, environmental management, foreign relations. These policies are depicted as if they were autonomous decisions because nation-states are defined as sovereign, responsible, and essentially autonomous actors. Taking into account the larger culture in which states are embedded, however, the policies look more like enactments of conventionalized scripts. Even if a state proclaims its opposition to the dominant world identity models, it will nevertheless pursue many purposes within this model. It will develop bureaucratic authority and attempt to build many modern institutions, ranging from a central bank to an educational system. It will thereby find itself modifying its traditions in the direction of world-cultural forms.

#### Systemic Maintenance of Nation-State Actor Identity

If a specific nation-state is unable to put proper policies in place (because of costs, incompetence, or resistance), world-society structures will provide help. This process operates more through authoritative external support for the legitimate purposes of states than through authoritarian imposition by dominant powers or interests. For example, world organizations and professionalized ideologies actively encourage countries to adopt population control policies that are justified not as good for the world as a

whole but as necessary for national development (Barrett and Frank 1997). National science policies are also promulgated as crucial to national development; before this link was theorized, UNESCO efforts to encourage countries to promote science failed to diffuse (Finnemore 1996a). As this example illustrates, international organizations often posture as objective disinterested others who help nation-states pursue their exogenously derived goals.

Resistance to world models is difficult because nation-states are formally committed, as a matter of identity, to such self-evident goals as socioeconomic development, citizen rights, individual self-development, and civil international relations. If a particular regime rhetorically resists world models, local actors can rely on legitimacy myths (democracy, freedom, equality) and the ready support of activist external groups to oppose the regime. Nation-state "choices" are thus less likely to conflict with world-cultural prescriptions than realist or microphenomenological theories anticipate because both nation-state choices and world pressures derive from the same overarching institutions.

#### Legitimation of Subnational Actors and Practices

World-cultural principles license the nation-state not only as a managing central authority but also as an identity-supplying nation. Individual citizenship and the sovereignty of the people are basic tenets of nationhood. So too are the legitimacy and presumed functional necessity of much domestic organizational structure, ranging from financial market structures to organizations promoting individual and collective rights (of labor, ethnic groups, women, and so on). World-society ideology thus directly licenses a variety of organized interests and functions. Moreover, in pursuing their externally legitimated identities and purposes by creating agencies and programs, nation-states also promote the domestic actors involved. Programs and their associated accounting systems increase the number and density of types of actors, as groups come forward to claim newly reified identities and the resources allocated to them (Douglas 1986; Hacking 1986).

A good example is the rise of world discourse legitimating the human rights of gays and lesbians, which has produced both national policy changes and the mobilization of actors claiming these rights (Frank and McEneaney 1994). As nation-states adopt policies embodying the appropriate principles, they institutionalize the identity and political presence of these groups. Of course, all these "internally" generated changes are infused with world-cultural conceptions of the properly behaving nation-state.

Hence, if a nation-state neglects to adopt world-approved policies, domestic elements will try to carry out or enforce conformity. General world pressures favoring environmentalism, for example, have led many states to establish environmental protection agencies, which foster the growth of environmental engineering firms, activist groups, and planning agencies. Where the state has not adopted the appropriate policies, such local units and actors as cities, schools, scout troops, and religious groups are likely to practice environmentalism and call for national action. Thus, world culture influences nation-states not only at their centers, or only in symbolic ways, but also through direct connections between local actors and world culture. Such connections produce many axes of mobilization for the implementation of world-cultural principles and help account for similarities in mobilization agendas and strategies in highly disparate countries (McAdam and Rucht 1993).

Explicit rejection of world-cultural principles sometimes occurs, particularly by nationalist or religious movements whose purported opposition to modernity is seen as a threat to geopolitical stability. While the threat is real enough, the analysis is mistaken because it greatly underestimates the extent to which such movements conform to rationalized models of societal order and purpose. These movements mobilize around principles inscribed in world-cultural scripts, derive their organizing capacity from the legitimacy of these scripts, and edit their supposedly primordial claims to maximize this legitimacy. By and large, they seek an idealized modern community undergoing broad-based social development where citizens (of the right sort) can fully exercise their abstract rights. While they violate some central elements of world-cultural ideology, they nonetheless rely heavily on other elements. For example, religious "fundamentalists" may reject the extreme naturalism of modernity by making individuals accountable to an unchallengeable god, but they nevertheless exhort their people to embrace such key world-cultural elements as nation building, mass schooling, rationalized health care, and professionalization (on the striking case of postrevolutionary Iran, see Rajaee [1993] and Tehranian [1993]). They also are apt to reformulate their religious doctrine in accordance with typical modern conceptions of rational-moral discipline (Thomas 1996; Juergensmeyer 1993). In general, nationalist and religious movements intensify isomorphism more than they resist it (Anderson 1991).

Realist models envision chains of organizational control from major powers downward through national powers and into local arenas. They therefore miss the direct effects of world-cultural models on the creation and sustenance of domestic actors. Microphenomenological and conventional "cultural" models stress the tradition-based resistance of local life-

worlds to the exogenous pressures of modernization. They miss the extent to which, in the contemporary world, the local is itself cosmopolitan (Hannerz 1987).

#### ELEMENTS OF COLLECTIVE WORLD SOCIETY

The stateless character of world society has blinded many scholars to the enormous accumulation in recent decades of world social organization and cultural material. The culture involved clearly champions the principle that nation-states, organizations, and individuals are responsible, authorized actors. World-level entities, however, are not conceptualized in the same way. World society is mainly made up of what may, loosely following Mead (1934), be called "rationalized others" (Meyer 1994): social elements such as the sciences and professions (for which the term "actor" hardly seems appropriate) that give advice to nation-state and other actors about their true and responsible natures, purposes, technologies, and so on. Rationalized others are now everywhere, in massive arrays of international associations (Boli and Thomas 1997b) and epistemic communities (Haas 1992), generating veritable rivers of universalistic scientific and professional discourse.

In this section, we concentrate on the social structural frame that organizes, carries, and diffuses world cultural models, leaving the content of the models aside. The content is widely discussed in the literature under the heading of "modernization": well-known, highly abstract, and stylized theories of the "functional requirements" of the modern society, organization, and individual, and the linkages among them. In these theories, the legitimated goals of properly constructed actors center on collective socio-economic development and comprehensive individual self-development. Society and individuals are bound together by rationalized systems of (imperfectly) egalitarian justice and participatory representation, in the economy, polity, culture, and social interaction. These are global conceptions, not local, expressed as general principles to be applied everywhere (e.g., the World Congress of Comparative Education's [1996] sweeping affirmation of education's importance for justice and peace in all countries). Many other international professional associations, and nongovernmental organizations more generally, express similar goals (Chabbott 1997).

In world culture, almost every aspect of social life is discussed, rationalized, and organized, including rules of economic production and consumption, political structure, and education; science, technique, and medicine; family life, sexuality, and interpersonal relations; and religious doctrines and organization. In each arena, the range of legitimately defensible forms is fairly narrow. All the sectors are discussed as if they were functionally integrated and interdependent, and they are expected to conform to gen-

eral principles of progress and justice. The culture of world society serves as a "sacred canopy" for the contemporary world (Berger 1967), a universalized and secularized project developed from older and somewhat parochial religious models. This section shows how this material is structured and rendered authoritative in world society.

### Organizational Frame

The development and impact of global sociocultural structuration greatly intensified with the creation of a central world organizational frame at the end of World War II. In place of the League of Nations, which was a limited international security organization, the United Nations system and related bodies (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) established expanded agendas of concern for international society, including economic development, individual rights, and medical, scientific, and educational development (Jones 1992; Donnelly 1986). This framework of global organization and legitimization greatly facilitated the creation and assembly of expansive components of an active and influential world society, as we discuss below. A wide range of social domains became eligible for ideological discussion and global organization. The forces working to mobilize and standardize our island society thus gain strength through their linkage to and support by the United Nations system and the great panoply of nongovernmental organizations clustered around it.

### Diffusion among Nation-States

The organization of a Tocquevillian world, made up of formally equal nation-states having similar rationalized identities and purposes, has intensified diffusion processes among nation-states (Strang and Meyer 1993). In the West since at least the 17th century, nation-states have claimed legitimacy in terms of largely common models; this commonality led them to copy each other more freely than is usual in systems of interdependent societies. The institutionalization of common world models similarly stimulates copying among all nation-states, in sharp contrast to traditional segmental societies in which entities jealously guard their secrets of success and regard copying as cultural treason.

Realist models expect this sort of copying only as a result of direct interdependence, especially domination, or in response to functional requirements imposed by competitive systems. They therefore overlook the broad cultural thrust involved. Microphenomenological models, emphasizing local traditions and interpretive schema, overlook the extent to which the modern actor is a worldwide cultural construction whose identity and

interpretations derive directly from exogenous meanings, which makes the local arena less determinative of actor structuration.

The contemporary world is rife with modeling. Obviously, much of this reflects the main dimensions of world stratification—the poor and weak and peripheral copy the rich and strong and central. The Japanese, on entering the system in the 19th century, self-consciously copied successful Western forms (Westney 1987). Aspiring to core status in the same period, the Germans and Americans paid careful attention to each other's educational successes (Goldschmidt 1992). In the 20th century, there has been a pronounced tendency to copy such American forms as the corporation (Takata 1995) and the liberal educational system. More recently, attention has shifted to Japanese work organization (Cole 1989) and education (Rohlen 1983). The emerging elites of our island society would undoubtedly turn first to American, Japanese, or European models for much of their social restructuring.

The world stratification system, however, is multidimensional; different countries parade distinctive virtues. For planning welfare programs, Sweden is the paragon of virtue. For promoting social equality, such "radical" countries as Maoist China and Cuba have been major models. On the other hand, even economically successful countries, if deemed opprobrious due to their failure to conform to important world principles, are unlikely models for imitation. South Africa is the best example.

### Associations, Organizations, and Social Movements

As with any such polity, the decentralized world made up of actors claiming ultimate similarity in design and purpose is filled with associations. Both governmental and nongovernmental voluntary organizations have expanded greatly, particularly since 1945 (Boli and Thomas 1997a; Feld 1972). Hundreds of intergovernmental entities cover a broad range of rationalized activity, including science, education, the economy and economic development, human rights, and medicine. Thousands of nongovernmental organizations have even broader concerns, organizing almost every imaginable aspect of social life at the world level. They are concentrated, however, in science, medicine, technical fields, and economic activity—the main arenas of rationalized modernity and, thus, arenas where rationalized nation-states are seen as the principal responsible actors. Less often, they focus on more expressive solidarities, such as religion, ethnicity, one worldism, or regionalism (Boli and Thomas 1997a). World organizations are, thus, primarily instruments of shared modernity.

Many of the international nongovernmental organizations have a "social movement" character. Active champions of central elements of world culture, they promote models of human rights (Smith 1995), consumer

rights (Mei 1995), environmental regulation (Frank et al. 1997), social and economic development (Chabbott 1997), and human equality and justice (Berkovitch 1997). They often cast themselves as oppositional grassroots movements, decrying gaps or failures in the implementation of world-cultural principles in particular locales and demanding corrective action by states and other actors. Agents of social problems, they generate further structuration of rationalized systems.

Clearly, our island society would quickly come under the scrutiny of all these international organizations. Its state and people would be expected to join international bodies, and they would find it advantageous to do so, gaining access to leading-edge technologies and ideas and enhancing their legitimacy as participants in the great human endeavor. The organizations themselves would also directly "aid" our island society in "developing." They would provide models for data, organization, and policy; training programs to help the island's elites learn the correct high forms of principle, policy, and structuration; consultants to provide hands-on assistance; and evaluation schemes to analyze the results. International organizations would collect data to assess the island's population, health care, education, economic structure (labor force, production, investment), and political status, all in fully rationalized terms redefining the society as a clear candidate for modernity.

Thus, the whole panoply of external organizations would set in motion efforts to increase social value and development on the island. Eventually, the locals would know how to push the process relatively autonomously, establishing such movements as a green party, women's organizations, and consumer rights' bodies to protect the new identities being constructed in the reorganizing society.

### Sciences and Professions

Scientists and professionals have become central and prestigious participants in world society. Their authority derives not from their strength as actors—indeed, their legitimated postures are defined as disinterested rationalized others rather than actors—but from their authority to assimilate and develop the rationalized and universalistic knowledge that makes action and actorhood possible. This authority is exceptionally well organized in a plethora of international organizations, most of them nongovernmental. These organizations are usually devoted to specific bodies of knowledge and their dissemination, but their ultimate aims include the broad development of societies (Schofer 1997; Drori 1997).

Especially in the more rationalized and public arenas of social life, the sciences and professions are leading forces; the occupations involved are the most prestigious in stratification systems almost everywhere (Treiman

1977). Sustainable socioeconomic development calls for the knowledge of economists who can advise on production functions, natural scientists and engineers to create and manage technologies, and a variety of scientists to analyze environmental problems and costs. Individual development, rights, and equalities call for the expertise of social scientists, lawyers, psychologists, and medical professionals. These legitimated experts appeal to and further develop transnational accounts and models, yielding a self-reinforcing cycle in which rationalization further institutionalizes professional authority.

Scientific and professional authority is rooted in universal, rationalized ultimate principles of moral and natural law (on the rise of universities along these lines, see Riddle [1993]). Their rationalized knowledge structures constitute the religion of the modern world, replacing in good measure the older "religions" that have been spiritualized and reconstructed as more ordinary organizational actors, and they underlie the other mechanisms of world influence noted above. The models of national development or human rights carried by international associations have their roots in scientific and legal knowledge, such as theories and measures of national economic development or of individual social and economic equality. Similarly, diffusion among nation-states is heavily mediated by scientists and professionals who define virtuous instances, formulate models, and actively support their adoption. The current wave of Japanization in American economic and educational organization is defined and carried not directly by Japanese elites or American managers but by professors of business and education (Smith and O'Day 1990).

Organizations and consultants would flock around our island society, operating almost entirely in terms of scientific and professional (legal, medical, educational) models and methods. Very little would be presented to the island society as a matter of arbitrary cultural imposition; advice would be justified in terms of rational scientific authority. Scientists and professionals carry ultimate, rational, unified, universal truth, by and large shunning the image of self-interested power brokers. Science as authority is much more influential than scientists as an interest group (Meyer and Jepperson 1996).

### Summary

The rapidly intensifying structuration of a world society made up of rationalized cultural elements and associational organizations rather than a centralized bureaucratic state is insufficiently appreciated in social research (Robertson 1992; Thomas et al. 1987). To show the coherence of what has happened, Boli and Thomas (1997a) present correlations among longitudinal variables describing many dimensions of world-level devel-

opment. The period covered is the last 80–100 years; variables are world totals, by year, for economic production, energy consumption, foundings of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, educational enrollments, urban population, trade, treaties in force, and so on. The point is not to sort out causal relations among these variables but to show the consistency of the trends involved. Almost all correlations are extremely high (.90 or above). The current period of intensive international organization (more treaties, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental bodies, trade, and international scientific and professional discourse) is also a period of intensive national organization and development and individual rationalization and modernization. World society is rationalizing in an extraordinarily comprehensive way.

#### SOURCES OF DYNAMISM AND CHANGE IN WORLD CULTURE

Few lines of sociological theory entirely discount the existence or impact of world culture. Microrealists may imagine that the world is made up solely of interest-driven national and local actors, but macrorealist perspectives often invoke an influential collective cultural sphere. Usually, though, macrorealists describe the cultural sphere as a matter of hegemony, that is, a function of the resources amassed by dominant actors (capitalists, in world-system theory, or states, in state-competition theory). Expansion and change in stratified structures of interaction thus produce expansion and change in cultural rules, with advantages always accruing to the dominant. Such arguments seem quite reasonable in some respects, and one explanation for the current world-cultural preference for market systems and political democracy is surely a half century of dominance by the United States. Our island society would obviously evolve quite differently in a world with a hegemonic China.

Microphenomenological arguments can add some useful ideas here. Power and interests aside, the cultural styles or tastes of dominant actors might readily replicate themselves in global cultural models. Some dimensions of world culture may therefore be relatively gratuitous reflections of American culture as opposed to deeper underlying structures. For example, the more exotic aspects of American individualism, such as its peculiar interest in self-esteem and the inner child, may fade from world culture when the United States has lost its hegemonic position.

It is thus plausible to argue that dominant actors directly shape world culture. It is not plausible to argue, however, that institutionalization and change occur solely through the purposive action of constructed actors. This argument takes the cultural ideology of the modern world at face value, insisting on the exclusive power of humans as actors to give dynamism to the secular world. Much more is at work, however. Contempo-

rary world culture is not passive and inert but highly dynamic in its own right. World-cultural forces for expansion and change are incorporated in people and organizations as constructed and legitimated actors filling roles as agents of great collective goods, universal laws, and broad meaning systems, even though the actors themselves interpret their action as self-interested rationality. Cultural forces defining the nature of the rationalized universe and the agency of human actors operating under rationalized natural laws play a major causal role in social dynamics, interacting with systems of economic and political stratification and exchange to produce a highly expansionist culture (Meyer and Jepperson 1996).

These cultural dynamics appeared early on, in the distinctive culture of Western Christendom (Mann 1986; Hall 1986; McNeill 1963) that provides much of the foundation for modern world culture. In this cultural complex, a demystified, lawful, universalistic nature forms the common frame within which social life is embedded (Weber 1946), and unitary moral laws and spiritual purposes are clearly differentiated from nature (Eisenstadt 1986, 1987). Spiritual obligations and rights originally devolving from an active and interventionist god are now located in humans and their communities, making individuals the ultimate carriers of responsible purposive action. As legitimated actors having agency for themselves and others, individuals orient their action above all toward the pursuit of rationalized progress.

Contemporary world culture thus posits a system of action, in contrast to more ceremonial or status-oriented cultures (including the premodern West, at various periods) that locate actorhood in transcendent entities and depict humans as subject to fate or the gods. Action is initiated and carried out by "actors," who dominate the cultural stage in virtually all current cultural theories (including most social-scientific work). Individuals, organizations, and states are highly legitimated entities whose interests are defined in universalistic terms, and they are both expected and entitled to act as agents of their interests (Meyer and Jepperson 1996). Faithful and energetic enactment of this cultural framework yields collective authority: Proper actors reciprocally legitimate each other.

Intense dynamism inheres in social and cultural arrangements that make human actors the core carriers of universal purposes (Eisenstadt 1987). The distinctive structure of actorhood that characterizes world society pushes the limits in this regard, for several reasons. First, no universal actor (world state) has central control or the repressive capacity to limit lower-level action. Second, the universalistically legitimated actors of world society are defined as having similar goals, so competition for resources is enhanced. Third, legitimated actorhood operates at several levels (national, organizational or group, and individual) that partially compete with one another. Fourth, internal contradictions and inconsistencies

in world-cultural models make certain forms of struggle inevitable in world society. Taken together, these factors generate widespread conflict, mobilization, and change.

### The Stateless of World Society

A powerfully organized and authoritative worldwide actor would obviously lower the dynamism of world society. Wallerstein (1974) makes this point regarding the world economy, but it applies culturally as well. Agents of a world actor responsible for general human welfare would find the invention of new cultural goods and problems costly and disorderly. They would discourage rights-based claims by subunits and the self-righteousness of heteronomous intellectuals challenging central authority on moral grounds (Eisenstadt 1987). Perhaps the best historical example is the well-known pattern of Chinese imperial repression directed at innovative intellectuals (Collins 1986), scientists (Wuthnow 1980), and merchants (Hall 1986). The continuously expanding rationalization of natural and moral law, so characteristic of the sciences and professions, would seem wasteful and destabilizing, not value enhancing.

In present world society, intellectuals who discover new truths (about gender inequality, say, or science's contribution to economic growth, or the probability of asteroid collisions) gain much honor and preferment. They also create many costs by impelling collective action and structuration to deal with their discoveries. These costs are borne not by the cultural innovators themselves, who are pitched as rationalized others, but by responsible actors, especially states.

A centralized world actor might approach our island society like a medieval king, taking steps to protect his peasants from the joys and temptations of urban life by limiting their exposure to the high forms of cultural modernity. Such steps would be interpreted as paternalistic or repressive violations of basic human and social rights—a discriminatory denigration of the islanders as incapable of rational actorhood. Widespread internal and external opposition movements would ensue.

### The Structure of Multiple Actors in a Common Frame

Instead of a central actor, the culture of world society allocates responsible and authoritative actorhood to nation-states. They derive their rights and agency from the relatively unified culture of natural and moral law institutionalized by the sciences and professions. Many features of state action and interaction involve the application of general principles and the further elaboration or modification of these principles.

Given actors' common identity and ultimate similarity, competition is

not only the prevailing theory of interaction but a source of collective moral meaning. The successes and failures of particular actors engender extensive theorization, learning, and diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993). Global depression produced and popularized Keynesian economic models (Hall 1989); more recently, the dislocations and challenges theorized as due to globalization have popularized neoclassical economic models (Biersteker 1992). Similarly, relative ineffectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality promotes welfare-system expansion or reform (Strang and Chang 1993), while scientized measurement of hitherto unsuspected forms of pollution pushes the expansion of environmental ministries (Frank et al. 1997).

In this cultural context, practical problems reflect neither fate nor the gods but crises of action and technical systems, provoking further cultural theorization. The actors involved—for example, the economic clergy charged with advising states on means of dealing with economic downturn—may suffer a modest loss of face, but the proposed solutions do not include burning a few economists at the stake. Instead, more resources go to economics graduate programs and state regulatory agencies.

Study of our island society would reveal an array of social problems. Its traditions, interpreted as prerational culture, might well be stored in museums (as they are elsewhere), but they would also be reinterpreted as problems. World culture is a factory of social problems that are both products of theorization and occasions for further cultural growth. In addition, these problems foster diverse forms of moral entrepreneurship that collide with one another. Diverse responses to problems are guaranteed because of the legitimacy endowed on multiple actors and their interests; collisions are frequent because of the universalism of the definitions and rules of world culture. The greater the number of entities, whether individuals, organizations, or nation-states, that pursue similar interests requiring similar resources, the more the entities will come into conflict with each other and develop theories of one another as sources of social ills.

Local variations in a universalistic society become anomalies or deviations unless they are justified in terms of general cultural principles. Due to their dependence on the wider culture, local actors thus discover that their interests lie in defending local arrangements, not as locally legitimate but as instances of more universal rules. This process fills world society with dynamic ideological conflicts over matters that on the face of it seem inconsequential, including a considerable number of wars fueled partly by clashes over modest variations on shared cultural or religious models.

Thus, if our island society elite wishes to maintain distinctive local patterns of, say, gender differentiation, it would be well advised to invoke universalistic cultural principles of some sort and join with others in generalizing the issue to the world level. African intellectuals have shown the

way here, activating principles of self-determination and cultural autonomy to resist the application of Western feminist scholarship to their societies (Mohanty 1984).

The forces motivating local actors (including states) to incorporate, employ, and legitimate world theorists and theories thereby strengthen the authoritative worldwide network of sciences, professions, and consultants. They also reinforce and modify, in continuing contest, the elements of world culture that undergird them. Global discourse intensifies and becomes ever more complex as the world-societal arena of interaction is ever more routinely activated.

### Multiple Levels of Legitimated Actorhood

World society would be a good deal less dynamic if only one type of actor were legitimated, but actors at several levels enjoy appreciable legitimacy. Individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles of citizenship, while individuals and international organizations do the same via principles of human rights. Between individuals and nation-states lie any number of interest and functional groups that have standing as legitimated actors due to their connections with individuals and states. These include religious, ethnic, occupational, industrial, class, racial, and gender-based groups and organizations, all of which both depend on and conflict with actors at other levels. For example, individual actors are entitled to demand equality, while collective actors are entitled to promote functionally justified differentiation. Individual actors claim primordial ethnic and familial rights while collective actors impose homogenization. Such dualisms, once peculiarly Western (Eisenstadt 1987), are now common world-cultural features.

In virtually every contested arena, both sides can rely on the wider cultural canopy for a good deal of legitimization, especially if they imaginatively adapt the general frame to fit local circumstances. A major result of contestation is thus even more expanded cultural modeling and structuration. In our island society, economic, psychological, and biological analysts would discover a variety of purportedly functional inequalities and individual handicaps, while educational and sociological analysts would specify methods of correcting or managing these problems. International organizations would send experts to help mobilize grassroots movements to demand solutions to the problems. The solutions would require structuration and, in the long run, cultural or theoretical elaboration.

### Cultural Contradictions

Most social theories, scholarly or not, treat change as the product of actors rightly pursuing their interests. The cultures (if any) in which these actors

are embedded are assumed to be closed, internally consistent, and rather static. This is the dominant interpretation of the work of Parsons (1951), and its obvious inadequacy, given the openness, inconsistencies, and flux of the culture of modernity, readily leads critics to discount the importance of culture in the production of change.

What critics of cultural analysis overlook is the dynamism that is generated by the rampant inconsistencies and conflicts within world culture itself. Beyond conflicts of interests among individuals or among states, beyond the dualistic inconsistencies between individuals and organizations or groups and national collectivities, there are also contradictions inherent in widely valued cultural goods: equality versus liberty, progress versus justice, standardization versus diversity, efficiency versus individuality. Contestation thus often centers on such contradictory pairs as too much state regulation (inhibiting growth) or too little (permitting excessive inequality), too much individual expressiveness (producing profanity) or too little (infringing liberty), too much nationalism (yielding genocide) or too little (producing anomie).

These contradictory elements are integrated in different ways in different variants of world-cultural models—at the world level, within each national society, even locally (Friedland and Alford 1991). Adherents of competing models suspiciously regard others as violators of quasi-sacred definitions and boundaries; they thus are primed to perceive potential and at least partially legitimated dangers, sins, and impurities (Douglas 1966). Economists are primed to perceive legitimate efforts to reduce inequality as threatening equally legitimate economic growth; sociologists are primed to perceive rationalizing technique as a leviathan threatening face-to-face community; ecologists interpret economic and technical development as a threat to the natural base of the entire system. All of these priesthoods preach in terms of ultimate values and with considerable authority, reflecting and reproducing a remarkably dynamic culture.

In summary, analysis of the expanding and changing culture of world society must take into account dynamic properties of world culture as such, not just interaction and power relations among actors. The cultural construction of rational actorhood endows individuals and groups (to a lesser extent, organizations as well) with exalted spiritual properties that justify and motivate mobilization, innovation, and protest. Further, the decentralized and multilevel character of modern actorhood ensures that interests will conflict and meaning structures will develop contradictions, especially in the absence of a stabilizing central world actor.

Ironically, world-cultural structuration produces more mobilization and competition among the various types of similarly constructed actors than would occur in a genuinely segmental world. Increasing consensus on the meaning and value of individuals, organizations, and nation-states

yields more numerous and intense struggles to achieve independence, autonomy, progress, justice, and equality. Greater good becomes possible and likely but so too does greater evil, as good and evil become more derivative of world culture and therefore of greater scale than in earlier times.

## CONCLUSION

A considerable body of evidence supports our proposition that world-society models shape nation-state identities, structures, and behavior via worldwide cultural and associational processes. Carried by rationalized others whose scientific and professional authority often exceeds their power and resources, world culture celebrates, expands, and standardizes strong but culturally somewhat tamed national actors. The result is nation-states that are more isomorphic than most theories would predict and change more uniformly than is commonly recognized. As creatures of exogenous world culture, states are ritualized actors marked by extensive internal decoupling and a good deal more structuration than would occur if they were responsive only to local cultural, functional, or power processes.

As the Western world expanded in earlier centuries to dominate and incorporate societies in the larger world, the penetration of a universalized culture proceeded hesitantly. Westerners could imagine that the locals did not have souls, were members of a different species, and could reasonably be enslaved or exploited. Inhabiting a different moral and natural universe, non-Western societies were occasionally celebrated for their noble savagery but more often cast as inferior groups unsuited for true civilization. Westerners promoted religious conversion by somewhat parochial and inconsistent means, but broader incorporation was ruled out on all sorts of grounds. Education and literacy were sometimes prohibited, rarely encouraged, and never generally provided, for the natives were ineducable or prone to rebellion. Rationalized social, political, and economic development (e.g., the state, democracy, urban factory production, modern family law) was inappropriate, even unthinkable. Furthermore, the locals often strongly resisted incorporation by the West. Even Japan maintained strong boundaries against many aspects of modernity until the end of World War II, and Chinese policy continues a long pattern of resistance to external "aid."

The world, however, is greatly changed. Our island society would obviously become a candidate for full membership in the world community of nations and individuals. Human rights, state-protected citizen rights, and democratic forms would become natural entitlements. An economy would emerge, defined and measured in rationalized terms and oriented to

growth under state regulation. A formal national polity would be essential, including a constitution, citizenship laws, educational structures, and open forms of participation and communication. The whole apparatus of rationalized modernity would be mobilized as necessary and applicable; internal and external resistance would be stigmatized as reactionary unless it was couched in universalistic terms. Allowing the islanders to remain imprisoned in their society, under the authority of their old gods and chiefs and entrapped in primitive economic technologies, would be unfair and discriminatory, even though the passing of their traditional society would also occasion nostalgia and regret.

Prevailing social theories account poorly for these changes. Given a dynamic sociocultural system, realist models can account for a world of economic and political absorption, inequality, and domination. They do not well explain a world of formally equal, autonomous, and expansive nation-state actors. Microcultural or phenomenological lines of argument can account for diversity and resistance to homogenization, not a world in which national states, subject to only modest coercion or control, adopt standard identities and structural forms.

We argue for the utility of recognizing that rationalized modernity is a universalistic and inordinately successful form of the earlier Western religious and postreligious system. As a number of commentators have noted, in our time the religious elites of Western Christendom have given up on the belief that there is no salvation outside the church (Shils 1971; Illich 1970). That postulate has been replaced by the belief among almost all elites that salvation lies in rationalized structures grounded in scientific and technical knowledge—states, schools, firms, voluntary associations, and the like. The new religious elites are the professionals, researchers, scientists, and intellectuals who write secularized and unconditionally universalistic versions of the salvation story, along with the managers, legislators, and policymakers who believe the story fervently and pursue it relentlessly. This belief is worldwide and structures the organization of social life almost everywhere.

The colossal disaster of World War II may have been a key factor in the rise of global models of nationally organized progress and justice, and the Cold War may well have intensified the forces pushing human development to the global level. If the present configuration of lowered systemic (if not local) tensions persists, perhaps both the consensuality of the models and their impact on nation-states will decline. On the other hand, the models' rationalized definitions of progress and justice (across an ever broadening front) are rooted in universalistic scientific and professional definitions that have reached a level of deep global institutionalization. These definitions produce a great deal of conflict with regard to their content and application, but their authority is likely to prove quite durable.

Many observers anticipate a variety of failures of world society, citing instances of gross violations of world-cultural principles (e.g., in Bosnia), stagnant development (e.g., in Africa), and evasion of proper responsibility (in many places). In our view, the growing list of perceived "social problems" in the world indicates not the weakness of world-cultural institutions but their strength. Events like political torture, waste dumping, or corruption, which not so long ago were either overlooked entirely or considered routine, local, specific aberrations or tragedies, are now of world-societal significance. They violate strong expectations regarding global integration and propriety and can easily evoke world-societal reactions seeking to put things right. A world with so many widely discussed social problems is a world of Durkheimian and Simmelian integration, however much it may also seem driven by disintegrative tendencies.

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## Commentary and Debate

To conserve space for the publication of original contributions to scholarship, the comments in this section must be limited to brief critiques. They are expected to address specific errors or flaws in articles and reviews published in the *AJS*. Comments on articles are not to exceed 1,500 words, those on reviews 750 words. Longer or less narrowly focused critiques should be submitted as articles. Authors of articles and reviews are invited to reply to comments, keeping their replies to the length of the specific comment. The *AJS* does not publish commenters' rebuttals to authors' replies. We reserve the right to reject inappropriate or excessively minor comments.

### THE "NEW PARADIGM" IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION: COMMENT ON WARNER<sup>1</sup>

Raising the banner of a new paradigm in the sociology of religion, R. Stephen Warner ("Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States," *AJS* 98 [March 1993]: 1044–93) presents the recent work of a group of scholars as a challenge to a previously dominant, but presumably exhausted, old paradigm. "The presuppositional key to the new paradigm," he writes (p. 1045), is "the idea that religious institutions in the United States operate within an open market." This presuppositional shift has important implications. Offered as a paradigm, Warner's sketch of new directions aims to transform the sociological study of religion generally. In spite of the boldness of his claims, however, Warner's case for the aspiring paradigm has yet to receive the serious critical response it deserves. In order to show that there is no warrant for establishing a new paradigm along Warner's lines, I offer such a response here. The critique yields a positive conclusion: it indicates that there is considerable consensus within a long-standing tradition, which continues to be fruitful and is supported by Warner in practice.

<sup>1</sup>I thank John Boli, Terry Boswell, Mark Chaves, Nancy Eiesland, Alex Hicks, and Regina Werum for their helpful response to an earlier version of this comment.

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My specific reply consists of three main points. First, I argue that Warner mischaracterizes the so-called old paradigm and therefore misdiagnoses its faults. Contrary to Warner's claims, few, if any, of the scholars he associates with the old paradigm treated religion as a property of a whole society, took medieval Christendom as a yardstick, believed in the demise of religion, or overlooked the voluntaristic and pluralistic shape of American religion. Various scholars in fact took for granted the features of American religion Warner describes as in need of recognition. Second, Warner's own interpretation of prominent religious facts relies on conventional contextual arguments, most notably the core idea that religious practice and symbolism are rooted in the structure and experience of communities. This represents encouraging convergence within a tradition centered on that idea, but it calls into question the status of the "new paradigm." Third, beholden as he is to useful old-paradigm notions, Warner does not offer coherent new theoretical guidance of the kind required to establish a new paradigm. His theoretical commitment to versions of economic theorizing remains ambiguous at best. His reluctance to adopt rational choice theory is sociologically wise but undermines the case he tries to make. In fact, the weakness of Warner's case and the actual pattern in his interpretive practice reinvigorate the tradition rooted in a critique of predecessors of rational choice theory.<sup>1</sup>

### Warner's Target

New paradigms need old ones that are to be replaced. Not surprisingly, then, Warner offers his argument in favor of the new paradigm in polemical fashion. There is, he claims, an old paradigm that ran into anomalies, which now require a change in presuppositions. The conventional social science wisdom "is rooted in a paradigm that conceived religion . . . to be a property of the whole society" (p. 1046). Peter Berger argued for religion's marginalization, Talcott Parsons for its generalization (pp. 1046–47). Like those Warner considers their followers, they took the monopoly position of medieval Catholicism as their paradigmatic situation. They viewed religious history as linear secularization in which implausible beliefs are threatened by "degenerative" pluralism (table 1, p. 1052). They took their cues from Weber's *Protestant Ethic* and Durkheim's *Division of Labor* (p. 1052). Thus they could not grasp the special religious vitality of the

<sup>1</sup> To keep these comments brief, I challenge Warner on *his* terms, by taking his case for the new paradigm seriously as a paradigmatic intervention in the subdiscipline. However, in this compressed critique I sidestep the thorny issue of the usefulness of treating "paradigms" as models for understanding scientific progress, especially in social science.

United States. While focusing on the explanatory role of religion, they missed the solidarity function of freely chosen religion organized in voluntary associations (p. 1052).

Is there an “old” paradigm whose adherents think of religion as the “property of the whole society”? If one can speak of an old paradigm in the sociology of religion, its foundation must lie, as Warner notes, in the works of Weber and Durkheim. To the former, who famously declined to define religion, the concept referred both to shared “meaning complexes” and to the ideas promoted by elites and held by status groups, neither of which counts as “society” in Warner’s sense (Weber 1968, p. 399). If anything, religion has a civilizational reach for Weber. A theorist reluctant to think of society as a recognizable entity in the first place would not treat anything as “the property of society.” To Durkheim, religion referred to those sacred beliefs and practices that express the supreme worth and authority of “society.” But in his work, society encompassed any collectivity at any level. Even if one were to consider the *Elementary Forms* open to another reading, it would not be shared by Warner, since he includes the book among his new-paradigmatic texts.<sup>3</sup> In spite of the well-known differences between Weberian and Durkheimian views of religion, the now-classical presupposition shared by their successors was that religion could be considered the property of collectivities. Insofar as there is an “old” paradigm, it would treat the proposal Warner surprisingly presents as new, namely that religion can serve as the “vital expression” of groups (p. 1047), as simply one version of old ideas.

Does medieval Europe constitute the “best historical fit” for old-paradigm adherents, and do they view subsequent religious history as one of inexorable decline?<sup>4</sup> On these historical and empirical questions, there are

<sup>3</sup> To suggest that Parsons disparaged the *Elementary Forms* in favor of the *Division of Labor*, as Warner does, contradicts Parsons’s own view of the matter (he found his return to the *Forms* “one of the most fruitful” of his career [1978a, p. 169] and Parsons [1978c] presents a wholly positive examination of the *Forms*). Though Parsons did analyze the “generalization” of religion in America, he distinguished it from the “religion of the churches” (1978b, p. 203) and criticized Berger in the same way Warner attacks Parsons: “[In *The Sacred Canopy*] the all-important intermediate area of the *solidarity of societal groups* is simply squeezed out, and, therefore, anything like a Durkheimian interpretation of the relation of religion to the nature and problems of modern society is radically precluded” (Parsons 1978c, p. 229; emphasis added).

<sup>4</sup> The assumption that proponents of the old paradigm follow a monopolistic European model is based on a view of European religion as biased as any offered of the United States by European scholars. For what it is worth, my own experience is of growing up as a member of a religious minority in a religiously pluralistic society on the Continent. Apart from the comment in the text, I do not address the “secularization debate,” since I have addressed the merits of secularization theory (as distinguished from the infamous “secularization thesis”) and its opponents’ arguments elsewhere (Lechner 1991).

significant variations. One school of thought argues in Weberian fashion that modernization entails secularization, in the sense that the *social* significance of religion declines (Wilson 1982; Lechner 1991). Insofar as this argument simply traces historical change, it presupposes no one paradigmatic period, though its supporters would maintain that, by comparison with Catholic dominance in medieval Europe, organized religion is not as significant a force in Western societies today. The one exception to this rule Warner presents, namely the "vital expression" function of religion in the United States, does not refute the argument, since it represents a continuation of one, but only one, function religion had as well in earlier times. Another school, inspired by Durkheim, holds that, during modernization, religions change in form and content (Crippen 1990). Parsons held a version of this view. His argument about the "generalization" of traditionally Christian values and their institutionalization in American social structure was an effort to emphasize their continued social significance (Parsons 1978b). According to him, religion does not only become more "generalized," it also becomes more deeply embedded in the actual institutions of American society. Strictly speaking, he and other presumed adherents of the old paradigm did not think secularization in the sense of decline had taken place at all.

Does the "old" paradigm nevertheless remain blind to the vitality of American religion in its voluntary-associational form? The fact of disestablishment, emphasized by Warner, has not escaped the attention of scholars associated with the older tradition. Mainstream secularization theory (Martin 1978) *assumes* rather than challenges the disestablishment of religion and its pluralistic makeup in the United States. For Parsons it was one of the *defining* characteristics of the American religious system, which proceeded to develop along denominational lines (Parsons 1978b, p. 199). That the nation was both pluralistic and inclined toward free choice in religious matters was clear to him: "By the time of its establishment the new nation was religiously and politically pluralistic. . . . Religiously, it went very far toward basing itself on the principle of voluntary association" (Parsons 1978b, p. 202). Voluntarism in religion he regarded as an advance in religion, not least because it overcame ascriptive constraints on belonging.<sup>5</sup> Presenting religion as "empowering" is thus an elaboration of, not a departure from, the Parsonian view of religion in the United States. By the same token, Parsons did not treat American society

<sup>5</sup> Warner does not show that Parsons thought religious recruitment was "likely to be ascriptive" in America (p. 1047). Like Warner, he thought that "residence, socioeconomic status, occupation, and political attachment have become increasingly dissociated from religious affiliation and from the ethnic components which have historically been so closely associated with religion" (Parsons 1978b, p. 204).

as an aberration in need of explanation. Rather, he viewed it as having achieved the highest evolutionary stage, distinctive by virtue of its advances (Parsons 1971). It would have been most surprising if a theorist long accused of uncritical celebration of American distinctiveness had ignored the most obvious features of American religious organization.

Interpreting that distinctiveness is a separate issue. What accounts for America's special qualities? Apart from incorrectly criticizing secularization theorists, Warner identifies no shared theory that unified the old paradigm on this score. To him, the key issue is the new emphasis on the market as the institutional setting in which American religion could uniquely flourish. Older theories, focused on religion as meaning provider for a whole society, could not explain the success of religions faced with the challenge of providing solidarity to groups searching for satisfaction in an open market. Insofar as Warner offers an alternative theory, or at least a guide to interpreting widely recognized evidence, it is one that treats the internal mechanisms of a market as the determining force in religious life. The marketplace brings rational consumers and suppliers together in a way that satisfies religious needs most effectively, precisely because a genuine market removes obstacles to rational action. The problem here is threefold. As indicated, Warner does not attempt to sketch an actual old theory to be replaced. Without doing justice to an old paradigm, it is hard to assess the relative merits of the new. Further, Warner's own commitment to the theory on which his proposal relies remains tenuous. To the extent that he has a theory showing *why* the market holds the presuppositional key to the new paradigm, it is a version of rational choice theory. But in fact he says little to confirm that this theory serves best to account for the workings of America's religious "market." Finally, most old-school sociologists would agree that the operation of any market is itself to be explained contextually. They would *not* deny that actors can pursue their interests in a more or less rational fashion, even in religion, but would hold that the explanatory value of that point is limited. Since Warner seems to agree with this conventional position in his own practice, he leaves the theoretical justification for the new paradigm unclear.

Sketching disparate authors as belonging to an ill-identified "paradigm" hardly lends itself to unmasking "anomalies" that cannot be explained in conventional terms. Warner nevertheless offers the following as indicators of paradigm crisis: "proselytizers were busy"; one scholar "met lawyers and business executives . . . speaking in tongues"; an "energetic" new denomination ministering to gays and lesbians now counts many members; and the variety in American religion is "staggering" (pp. 1047-48). Warner does not show which of these data serve as *counterevidence*, or how and for whom they cause a crisis. From a conventional point of view, however, none of Warner's anomalies is bothersome. But here I rely on a conven-

tional wisdom slightly different from the one he fuzzily describes. As I suggested above, if there is a key idea shared by most sociologists of religion, it is that religion is the culture of community, to adapt and generalize a phrase of Bryan Wilson's.<sup>6</sup> From this idea follow several lines of argument about the way in which social context, place in social structure, and the nature of social relations affect religious expression and participation. With additional postulates about types of historical circumstances, elaboration of this idea also offers a way to explain religious change, as Martin (1978) shows. Again, given the conventional wisdom centering on contextual approaches to religion, no old-school sociologist would be surprised by the claim that religion in America is the "vital expression of groups."

### The Proposal

Warner proposes a move from the old social-structural accounts of religion as institution to ones that rely primarily on the internal structure of a religious system. But what justifies the move? His proposal relies on statements about the American religious experience, not on theoretical analysis of religion as such. In America, Warner writes, "the proportion of the population enrolled in churches grew hugely throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century" (p. 1048), which he considers "inconvenient" to secularization theory. The supposedly inconvenient fact is his starting point: healthy church membership, in spite of mainline and overall declines in recent decades, refutes that old theory. This "far higher level of religious mobilization than had existed before" was "the long-term result of disestablishment" (p. 1051). Disestablishment and the rise of an open market for religion are the "analytic key" to the new paradigm. Treating disestablishment as "the norm" (p. 1053) should not be confused, Warner adds, with relying on economic imagery. Having praised the new paradigm, Warner concludes modestly that "a paradigm is not yet a theory but a set of ideas that make some questions more obvious and urgent than others. Much remains to be specified" (p. 1055). Yet he reiterates that for new-paradigm market theorists (economic imagery is a defining feature after all) the "paradigmatic situation" is the "furious competition to evangelize North America in the 19th [century]" (p. 1058).

<sup>6</sup> Wilson (1982, pp. 159, 164) treats religion as "the ideology of community" in an analysis "overdrawing" the historical contrast between community and society. Since he says that religion "may be said to have its source in, and to draw its strength from, the community" (Wilson 1982, p. 154), the old-paradigm logic of his analysis suggests that where, and to the extent that, groups rebuild, or continue to function as, communities within societies, religion is likely to flourish in those contexts as well. Warner's main point about American religion thus appears as a logical inference from the work seemingly most at odds with his.

Warner thus offers a description of a particular historical circumstance as "normative" for the study of religion. If he only intends to urge scholars to respect the facts of American history in the study of American religion, that hardly would justify the paradigmatic significance he attaches to the claim. If one assumes that his claim has greater scope, it is hard to see what the sociology of religion will gain from the substitution of an American for a European focus, since Warner also suggests that the American experience is distinct among industrialized nations. The gains presumably will follow from exploring the nexus between disestablishment and mobilization via the operation of the open market. But beyond this we do not receive much guidance. Indeed, while stressing the need to study the workings of the "open market" by new-paradigm "market analysts," Warner also questions "economic imagery" and holds that a paradigm is "not yet" a theory (p. 1055). This would seem to violate the scientific norm that a new paradigm can only prevail if it accounts better for the anomalies left by an old theory. It can only do so if it proposes a more powerful alternative theory. Does Warner have one? The causal claim about disestablishment and mobilization indeed contains the core of such a theory, as the many references to the operation of the religious market make clear. A unique level of religious mobilization resulted in the United States from the way in which religious producers and consumers operated in an open market. Short of the economic reasoning implied by this line of argument, Warner provides no alternative theory. He acknowledges this implicitly by taking the "furious competition" of 19th-century America as his "paradigmatic situation." Sustaining the claims in favor of the new paradigm as paradigm requires adoption of some form of rational choice theory derived from "economic imagery." Certainly the point would be accepted by most, though not all, of the scholars Warner cites as new-paradigm protagonists.

Warner's own causal argument posits that disestablishment leads to pluralism and competition, which leads to increased mobilization. But does competition lead to increased mobilization? Here I can focus only on one analytical point about one anomaly Warner mentions but does not explore.<sup>7</sup> It concerns the yardstick he uses to assess religious mobilization, namely overall levels of church membership reflected in official data. He reports that, since the mid-1960s, individual membership has declined several percentage points (p. 1049), that many switchers switch to no religion (p. 1077), and that, since the 1950s, religious "nones" have increased threefold (p. 1077). My response is not that America has turned secular.

<sup>7</sup> See Lechner (1996) for more detailed arguments and relevant data.

It is that such individual-level data should count as creeping secularization by Warner's yardstick (though not by that of the standard secularization theory). Since he never claims that the essential structure of the market itself has changed, other factors, not captured by the paradigm, must be at work to produce the change. A significant change in official data pertaining to religious adherence presents a theoretical puzzle to the new paradigm. It faces an anomaly before its actual theory has been fully worked out.<sup>8</sup>

*How does pluralism work* to the advantage of religious vitality according to Warner? Not, on close inspection, by encouraging competition as such. What church one belongs to depends on one's region, social class, urban/rural residence, and race/ethnicity (p. 1058). For many subcultures, Warner adds, religion is "constitutive" in that it grounds their solidarity and identity. It especially promotes associations among mobile people (p. 1059). In a changing society that stifles minority representation, it "serves as a refuge of free association and autonomous identity" (p. 1060). For some groups, churches are the primary vehicle of empowerment, "*partly* a function of pluralistic social organization" (p. 1069; emphasis added). Overall, American religion is "(a) disestablished, (b) culturally pluralistic, (c) structurally adaptable, and (d) empowering" (p. 1074).

This interpretation of some major facts of American religion makes good sense. Theoretically, however, it is quite conventional. Note that Warner does not in fact argue that vitality stems from market competition in which some churches attract customers who otherwise would choose different or no churches. He also does not rely on the absence of government regulation, except as a background fact. The logic of his argument is precisely that of the old paradigm as I sketched it earlier. Warner offers a functional interpretation (religion serves group x in respect y) based on characteristics of the group and its internal relations (using conventional variables). This interpretation assumes that identity/solidarity is strongly linked to religious belief/practice (for group x, religion expresses identity and reinforces solidarity) and that religious expression has special value in American society (legitimacy and plausibility presupposed). Warner in effect sketches a special case of the axiom that religion is the culture of community. Given the diverse (proto-)communities in the United States and the absence of official coercion, pluralistic vitality follows. Adherents of the old paradigm would welcome both the interpretation and the logic of the argument.

<sup>8</sup> Whether pluralism has had the historical impact Warner claims remains open to debate. See Land, Deane, and Blau (1991) and Finke, Guest, and Stark (1996) for contrasting positions.

### A Puzzle

Warner concludes by examining a significant recent change in American religion, namely the rise of the “new voluntarism” identified previously by Roof and McKinney (1987)—a change for which his proposed paradigm cannot account in my view. The term refers to a behavioral and an attitudinal change among Americans: increased denominational switching (including some disaffiliation) as well as an increased attitudinal emphasis on “individual-expressive” religious involvement (which may take a neotraditional form).<sup>9</sup> Not surprisingly, he interprets the trend as further evidence in favor of the new paradigm. After all, “there is considerable evidence that religious switchers are morally serious” (p. 1076); switching includes people dropping out, but for those who shift to another faith community, it also means greater religious involvement (p. 1077); and while “traditional” religion is passé, “neotraditional religion is all the rage” (p. 1076). He infers that “religion is still a prime idiom by which Americans identify themselves” (p. 1077). In the process, Warner discounts any evidence of diminishing religious mobilization, such as the rise of religious nones acknowledged earlier. He also counts all evidence of religious involvement without at the same time examining countertrends toward disaffiliation.<sup>10</sup>

Apart from not dealing with evidentiary problems, Warner fails to sustain his paradigm theoretically. Here is the puzzle: the religious system has not changed in any respect considered theoretically significant by the new paradigm. Disestablishment and pluralistic competition continue as before; yet, by Warner’s own description, patterns of “religious mobilization” have changed. How is this possible? Warner introduces ad hoc variables, such as the “decoupling of culture and social structure,” the increasingly “random” connection between social and religious status (p. 1078). Leaving aside whether they supply a sound explanation, such variables neatly resemble the old functionalist category of differentiation. Religious mobility further stems from aggressive proselytizing, emphasis on loyalty

<sup>9</sup> Here I accept that there is good evidence for the changes the term “new voluntarism” captures. A strict rational choice theorist, which Warner is not, might question use of this term, which reflects the sociological common sense that religious and other choices can be more or less “voluntary.”

<sup>10</sup> A case in point is his repeated mention of the Metropolitan Community Church, with about 22,000 members (p. 1047). Assuming this must convey its significance in empowering the homosexual community, how does this count as the “vital expression” of this large group? Establishing this role would require examining the patterns of religious involvement among gays and lesbians. The same goes for neotraditionalism among educated Jewish women. I submit that further analysis would not confirm Warner’s picture of continuing mobilization vitally expressing these groups. I do not dispute his point that religion is still “a prime idiom” of identification in America.

to God over institutions, and so on (p. 1079), but here Warner fails to establish that these factors are indeed new factors logically suggested by new-paradigm arguments. I submit that the "new voluntarism" Warner correctly accepts as a descriptive account cannot be properly explained in new-paradigm terms. Warner's own explanatory sketch relies at least implicitly on old-paradigm structural categories.

The new voluntarism also has troubling implications for the paradigm. For Warner religion serves the "vital expression of groups" in America. If he and others are right about the new voluntarism, however, religion becomes less and less the "expression of groups," for the trend implies that fewer individuals choose to be religious, fewer groups seek identity and solidarity through religion, and fewer churches bind an actual group. This amounts to secularization, however modest, in two senses: individual involvement declines (Warner's original yardstick) and social significance declines (one old-paradigm yardstick). To be sure, the actual "supply-side" actions of churches themselves may help to account for the new types of expressive mobilization. But students of the new voluntarism have begun to look for its sources in larger, social-structural changes, following old-paradigm precedents for linking social to cultural change (see Roof 1996, p. 157).

### Conclusion

Warner's proposal for a new paradigm in the sociology of religion merits rejection: it relies on an inaccurate description and assessment of the putative old paradigm; it contains important old-paradigm residues; it only hints at an alternative theory required for a new paradigm; and it faces counterevidence and a puzzle that call into question some of his assertions. He shows by example that ideas derived from a presumably exhausted century-old tradition in fact remain fruitful for the analysis of American religion. In spite of his praise for the work of scholars identified with rational choice theory, he provides no adequate reason for sociologists of religion to abandon the tradition rooted in a critique of earlier versions of that theory. It is a tradition worth building on.

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A PARADIGM IS NOT A THEORY: REPLY TO LECHNER<sup>1</sup>

Although Lechner raises some worthwhile points, the basic issue between us is simple.<sup>2</sup> I announced a new *paradigm*, but Lechner insists on reading my article as a proposal for a new *theory*. He applies himself to refuting what he imagines the new theory to be (rational choice) and does me the favor, from his point of view, of absolving me from its advocacy. I trust I will not be thought churlish if I decline the favor and protest that he has misread me. I meant what I said about "paradigms."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thanks to Nancy Ammerman, Roger Finke, Laurence Iannaccone, Daniel Olson, Darren Sherkat, and Sidney Simpson for suggestions and to Frank Lechner for his civility and cooperation.

<sup>2</sup> As alike intellectual grandchildren of Talcott Parsons, Lechner and I could carry on for pages about our debts to and differences with his work, but space does not permit such indulgence.

<sup>3</sup> Some additional misreadings: Lechner (p. 186) imputes to me the notion of a "genuine" market, but I talk of no such thing. The "open market" of which I speak means that anybody can set up a religion. Barriers to entry are low. Potential niches are many. Awareness of alternatives is high. Choice is possible and fully compatible with commitment. He claims (p. 188) that I posit "that disestablishment leads to pluralism and competition," but I actually said (p. 1058) that "pluralism has tended in this society to take on a religious expression." He lectures me (in his n. 8) on the debate over the

True, the article is a compressed book. It has several subtexts, intending (1) to impart a great deal of sheer factual information about an institutional sphere too many sociologists neglect and (2) to showcase the work of a remarkable new cohort of scholars (p. 1048), many of them admittedly having no interest in paradigm disputes.

Yet the main text of the article concerns a paradigm shift in the making, and I intended the argument to be prefigured from the outset both by the title and abstract (with their explicit mention of “paradigms”) and by the epigram from Joseph Schumpeter that comes right afterward (“In every scientific venture, the thing that comes first is Vision”). The argument is that scholars of U.S. religion are converging on a new way of thinking about their subject, a new way that contrasts decisively with the old way (which is more often referred to as “secularization theory” than “the old paradigm”). The new way of thinking is not a refutation of the old and does not propose a simple reverse of secularization. Proposing that religion in the United States is disestablished, culturally pluralistic, structurally adaptable and often empowering, it is a fundamentally different idea.<sup>4</sup>

I meant what I said, but I confess that I did not say all that I meant. For example, I made no explicit reference to the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970), and I left the contrast between the two paradigms to a schematic table (p. 1052). I welcome the opportunity to elaborate the “paradigm” argument.

A paradigm is a “gestalt” (Kuhn 1970, pp. 112, 122, 204), a way of seeing the world, a representation, picture, or narrative of the fundamental properties of reality. For the purposes at hand, paradigms may be regarded as metanarratives, as illustrated below:

1. The earth can be seen as the stable center of the universe, about which the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars orbit, or it can be seen as one of several planets that revolve about the sun, the new (albeit astronomically temporary) center of the universe (see Kuhn 1957, pp. 229–31).
2. The earth may be imagined as a once-hot, slowly cooling ball, developing a fixed, thickening shell of continents and sea floors as it cools, the shell cracking and fissuring, the continents rising or falling, or

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effects of pluralism on religion, a matter to which I devoted a long paragraph (pp. 1055–56), citing the same scholars he does plus several more.

<sup>4</sup> Lechner calls these “conventional” claims, and I agree that they are conventional to U.S. religious historians, despite the largely negative reception of Finke and Stark’s (1992) new paradigm history among historians, who objected to being lectured about what they already knew (Marty 1995). But the claims are by no means conventional to the exemplar of the old paradigm I identified (Berger 1969).

the earth may be imagined to be still hot and churning inside, so that the thin shell is continually renewed and destroyed by convection, huge, oddly shaped plates floating on the surface until they collide and are consumed, edgewise, in its depths (see Stewart 1990, pp. 117–18, 153–60).

3. Evolution by adaptation may be conceived of as a matter of organisms struggling with their environment (in Lamarck's view) or struggling with each other for the best exploitation of their environment (as Darwin saw it) (see Himmelfarb 1967, p. 317).

The Copernican, geoscience, and Darwinian revolutions represent radical changes in point of view. So also does the new paradigm in the sociology of religion in the United States, as I indicated too cryptically in table 1 (p. 1052) and the paragraph summarizing Section II of the article (p. 1058). Here I will unpack the contrast.

The old paradigm metanarrative begins about 800 years ago in medieval Europe, when, by state sanction, a monopoly church commanded sacred authority over the whole society. As a protected monopoly, assent to it was assured by formal and informal sanction. (Some versions of this story stress that there were no ideological alternatives, and the church's viewpoint was unquestioningly taken for granted.) Thus people followed its rules and had to regard the local parish as the sole authority over what concerned them (from when to take holidays to what to name one's child to what happens after a relative's death) and to accept as the local representative of the sacred order the prebendary appointed by the central bureaucratic system and supported from its lands. This system constituted the religious order. Since the heyday of this system (roughly the 13th century), its hegemony has slowly eroded (the process of "secularization"), both because other powers rose to challenge it and because the sacred answers it provided became less plausible. The increasing implausibility of religious ideas was the result of ideological and cultural pluralism—Islam, the discovery of the New World, the success of the Protestants, the Enlightenment—which offered alternatives that had more plausibility or simply, as alternatives, invalidated the claims of the church. In other words, religious ideas are particularly vulnerable because their primary function is to provide meaning, a function on the provision of which they no longer command a monopoly. (That monopoly status was their "plausibility structure.") Some of these sources of erosion were exogenous (contact with other cultures) but others were endogenous, particularly modern science, which, as a differentiated offshoot of religion, shares with it the function of the provision of meaning but fills this need more efficiently than can religion. (This metanarrative stands behind Weber's *Protestant Ethic* and Durkheim's *Division of Labor*.) Religious institutions—the

remnant of the church—survive today in shadowy form by specializing in general values that legitimate the institutional order of the society.

Lechner denies that his and other old paradigm proponents' work presupposes the paradigmatic status of medieval Europe. It "simply traces historical change" from "earlier times" to "today," the master change being "secularization." New paradigm proponents ask the obvious questions, whose history? what earlier times? and secularization from what? The answers are Europe and its previously established religions (Casanova 1994, pp. 12–17).<sup>4</sup> Without such a baseline, "secularization" as a concept has no meaning.

The new paradigm metanarrative begins 200 years ago in the early republican United States. Most people were not involved in churches, and the dominant ideology, including that represented in social theory, was largely secular. At about that time, religion was disestablished, and a majoritarian political system was instituted. Thus religion no longer enjoyed the support of the state, but also the state made no room for the representation of minorities. Some religious bodies found disestablishment a challenge, but others had already been outsiders to the older establishment and quickly adapted to the new circumstances. Eventually no one body could successfully rule another claimant out of the system. People had to be persuaded to give assent, and religious entrepreneurs and operatives criss-crossed the country to save souls, anathematizing each other and offering a great variety of alternatives to their audiences. People made religious choices, joining up with congregations led by one or another of these competitors. The result within a generation was the creation of a huge, popular, quasi-public social space that women, and later racial minorities, could appropriate to their purposes. The society's encounter with other populations, through immigration, capture, and conquest (factors partly exogenous to the religious system) introduced more social diversity and eventually more competition. Groups gathered under religious banners, deriving much of their identity from these symbols. (This is where Durkheim's *Elementary Forms* comes in handy.) Eventually, religious profession became as much an identity marker in the United States as language, accent, and social class were in Europe, so people were located by the "denomination" to which they adhered. (This is where Weber's "Protestant Sects" is useful, inspired as it was by his visit to the United States in 1904.) When, because of cartelization, the identifications provided by these affiliations become less distinct and/or their demands prove too irksome, disaffiliation can occur, but, because potential rewards con-

<sup>4</sup> Readers can judge for themselves the Eurocentrism of Lechner's version of the secularization metanarrative (which he labels as "the conventional wisdom") (Lechner 1991, pp. 1103–4, 1107–8, 1116).

tinue to be high and barriers to entry low, religious entrepreneurs keep trying to recruit the unchurched. Thus cycles of mobilization and demobilization continue.

A paradigm is indeed not a theory (p. 1055), and a paradigm shift does not alone invalidate findings or render older theories and methods obsolete (Stewart 1990). Nor are old paradigms necessarily wrong. In the *very* long run, the entropic vision shared by the old paradigms in religion and geoscience is sure to triumph. So it should be no surprise that Lechner, committed to the old paradigm, can find many points of agreement with me, committed to the new. But he cannot successfully appeal to a "scientific norm" (p. 188) to adjudicate paradigm succession because in the nature of paradigm disputes there is "no neutral algorithm" to make such decisions (Kuhn 1970, p. 200). I have claimed (Warner 1991) that the old paradigm appeals to those with a European background and to those who have *individually* undergone the experience of religious erosion the old paradigm attributes to *the whole of society* (p. 1054).

The affinity between the new paradigm and rational choice theory is obvious. Religious producers and consumers act rationally, and, given the inefficiency of monopoly, religion flourishes the more choice is available. Unlike some sociologists of religion, I have no fear of the taint of rational choice and am happy to embrace such theorists when, as is the case here (especially Finke and Stark [1992] and Iannaccone [1995]), they produce brilliant insights.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, as I understand the new paradigm, rational choice theories contribute to it but do not define or constitute it. I pointed this out with the observation (p. 1053) that the key exemplar of the old paradigm, Peter Berger's *Sacred Canopy*, makes use of economic reasoning to understand what the author saw as the degeneracy of U.S. religion.

I also intended the new paradigm to incorporate the work of other scholars who recognize that American religion flourishes in situations of choice and who had abandoned (or never adopted) the old paradigm's privileging of established or "mainline" religions, whether or not they embraced rational choice. Mary Jo Neitz (1990) and Nancy Ammerman (1997) recommend symbolic interactionism for its capacity to articulate the role of agents, to disaggregate macrophenomena, and to encompass the "decentering" of contemporary organizational life. Without presuming their assent, I suggested that feminist and race/ethnic-studies scholars

<sup>6</sup> I have outlined some differences with rational choice thinkers (Warner 1996), particularly Finke and Stark (1992). One difference is that Finke and Stark speak of an "unregulated market," whereas I speak of an "open" market. I also think they overstate the role of "strictness" and underestimate that of "distinctiveness" in producing strong religious bodies. I differ with Stark (1996) in proceeding inductively by design.

## Commentary and Debate

should find the new paradigm more compatible than the old paradigm with the social worlds they investigate (e.g., Braude 1997; Yoo 1996). I am disappointed that Lechner neglects that very important aspect of my article.

I also regret that I did not make clear enough to Lechner and others that while the "new voluntarism" (pp. 1074–80) involves disaffiliation, it also promotes new and renewed solidarities (pp. 1076–78) and is not so new as to be discontinuous with earlier patterns in U.S. religious history (pp. 1079–80).

It would be silly to claim that the paradigm succession I discuss has anything like the significance of the Copernican or Darwinian revolutions, and I intended no such claim. Yet there was a crisis and there has been a succession. In the article, I cited (p. 1048) several established scholars who expressed public perplexity with the old paradigm. I did not cite the work of many younger scholars whose struggles with the old paradigm frustrated their ongoing research and muddied their reports to the point of making them unpublishable. One reason I set aside the book on which I was working in 1991 to write the article was to let such scholars know that there was an alternative to the old paradigm, an alternative that *expected* "traditional" religions to flourish in modern society, *expected* diversity to invigorate rather than demoralize religious communities, *expected* religious innovation and religious commitment to go hand in hand, and did not suppose that the decline of mainline Protestantism was the decline of religion. If the old paradigm were as open to the dynamic phenomena of American religious life as Lechner claims, fewer scholars would have wasted time and paper on the equivalent of Ptolemaic epicycles.<sup>7</sup> In the years since publication of my article, such scholars, whether or not they embrace rational choice, have become more aware of alternative perspectives. Work continues to be done and progress to be made.

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the "community" that Lechner (n. 6), following Wilson, sees as the base of religion has, according to Wilson (1982, pp. 159–60), suffered as much "collapse" as religion. Contrary to the new paradigm, Wilson believes neither communities nor their religions are robust.

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# Review Symposium: A Logic to Evil?

*The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925–1933.* By William Brustein. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+235. \$27.50.

## STUDYING THE NAZI PARTY: “CLEAN MODELS” VERSUS “DIRTY HANDS”

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### Introduction

*The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party* is destined to become an important contribution to the sociology of Nazism and other extreme political movements. In only some 180 pages, this slender, well-written volume takes on four challenging tasks (p. 22): first, in line with recent scholarship on this topic, it wants to confirm that the Nazi Party (NSDAP), prior to 1933, served as a catchall party for the dissatisfied; second, it wants to examine what kinds of classes and occupational groups among the dissatisfied made up the “pool” of likely joiners; and third, it sets out to investigate why these groups were more likely to join the party than were other segments of Germany’s social structure.

The fourth task remains somewhat implicit, and Brustein does not fully address it until the concluding chapter (pp. 180–84), although it reverberates in his brief discussion on the role of anti-Semitism in the Nazi Party (pp. 57–60). This task takes on the much broader question of the relationship between “good and evil” and “rationality and irrationality” in the context of Nazi membership and voting.

### Synopsis

In taking on these challenges, Brustein proposes, and then applies, an “interest-based account” of Nazi affiliation (pp. 22–29). This account serves as his primary tool first to classify the economic positions and interests of the various social classes and occupations in Weimar Germany and then to analyze which of these groups were more likely to join the Nazi Party than others and why. “My principal hypothesis is that individuals who joined the Nazi Party calculated that the benefits of joining

would exceed the costs" (p. 22). The decision to join a political party is a two-stage process: first, individuals identify the political party they perceive as most beneficial relative to their needs; second, given the compatibility of interests, they will decide to join if incentives and potential rewards outweigh disincentives and costs (pp. 23–24).

The interest-based account assumes that people's economic concerns constitute their basic yardstick when making political decisions. This is a consistent finding in modern voting studies, and Brustein is certainly correct in arguing that economic aspects have been ignored in the study of Nazism relative to the emphases on political and ideological factors (pp. 8–11, 180). Since economic and financial issues are typically and most prominently reflected in the economic platforms and programs of political parties, Brustein further assumes that potential members and voters examine, in some meaningful way, the "relative worth" of party positions.

Thus, against the background of various alternative platforms and programs from major German parties, Brustein systematically asks: Did this particular group (social class, occupational groups, or industry) have reasons to join the Nazi Party in greater numbers than others groups? If so, why? In other words, people across the social and occupational spectrum must have had reasons—typically economic ones—however varied for deciding to become Nazis. In addition, this decision entailed costs, sometimes substantial ones, such as loss of job or social status as well as fear of violence and discrimination. Specifically, he finds that the Nazi Party's strong emphasis on autarkic development, protectionism (i.e., constructing a protecting, caring state), mandatory imitable inheritance, tax relief, resettlement policies, job creation, and antitrust policies had great appeal to members of the old middle class (artisans, farmers, merchants).

By examining various key elements of German society in terms of occupation, market, and class positions, Brustein draws a differentiated picture of incentives and disincentives to join the Nazi Party. Generally, such incentives became stronger as the economic depression deepened, and disincentives weakened as the party grew in strength and the stigma of being a "brown shirt" became less threatening to potential members. What emerges is a complex but nonetheless tractable picture of different groups having different incentive and disincentive "packages." In the end, of course, for many groups incentives to join seemed to have surpassed the perceived disincentives, which then paved the way for the ultimate electoral victory of the Nazi Party after 1933 and the massive influx of new members once the party was in power.

The axiom of interest-based political affiliation is applied to what is certainly the most systematic and comprehensive database of Nazi membership files that exists today, a sample drawn from the vast holdings of the Berlin Document Center. In the past, quantitative research on the origin of Nazism was frequently hampered by available data sources that

were highly local, incomplete at best, and severely biased at worst. Thus, beyond the present concern of reviewing this particular book, I want to emphasize that the data system on which the study reports amounts to a highly useful and valuable service to the field.

The beauty of Brustein's approach is its parsimony. Simplicity has its virtue, particularly in a field as complex and as easily politicized as the study of Nazism. Of course, the world of the late 1920s and early 1930s was more complex than what a rational choice approach can ever account for, and Brustein (pp. 28–29) seems well aware of that. Any approach should be judged by its fruitfulness, that is, the extent to which it allows us to answer old questions and discover new ones. What, then, are the "fruits" of Brustein's application of rational choice thinking to the study of Nazi membership?

Brustein finds strong support for his thesis that the 1.4 million Germans who joined the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1932 did so in large measure because the party offered an "imaginative and proactive" economic package that resonated well with their own material self-interest. The dominant motivation to join the party was therefore *economic* (p. 177). In his empirical findings, Brustein shows that members of the old middle class, married male white-collar employees, workers in import-oriented industries, and skilled blue-collar workers formed the backbone of Nazi membership prior to 1933. Other groups, particularly civil servants, faced higher disincentives to join, even though the Nazi Party favorably addressed their economic concerns throughout. Once disincentives were lowered after mid-1932, however, the propensity of civil servants to join the Nazi Party increased dramatically.

Brustein also finds additional support for the catchall "party of protest" thesis, which in recent years has gained greater acceptance among researchers in the field (see Hamilton 1982; Mühlberger 1990; Falter 1991; Anheier and Neidhardt 1994; Fischer 1995). This thesis, which, as Brustein correctly remarks, begs an explanation, is set against "older" explanations such as the "irrationalist appeal," the middle-class thesis, and the political confessionalism hypothesis (pp. 2–8). The analysis shows what economic reasons were important to whom, why this was likely the case, and how this, in the aggregate, produced the observed "catchall" composition of Nazi membership.

#### Four Issues

The book offers a rich and systematic account of how various class, occupational, and status interests came to play in the formation of the Nazi constituency prior to 1933. There are nonetheless a number of issues that are important to spell out for two reasons: first, they help position the book's strength and limitations in the context of current scholarship; and second, they point out potential improvements and avenues for further

research. For convenience sake, I group these issues under four topics, which follow below.

*Methodology and Approach*

Several aspects concerning the interest-based accounts, membership, and measurement deserve particular consideration. I will discuss each in turn.

*Interest-based accounts.*—I have no fundamental disagreement with Brustein's use of a rational choice model to study why people joined the Nazi Party. Weimar Germany was a highly politicized country, and political issues were salient and "mattered." Routine political behavior was probably less prevalent than it would have been in more normal times. Moreover, in the absence of modern media coverage, individual participation in political events and party membership was frequent and assumed great importance in the political life of the country, particularly at local levels. All of these factors render more credence to the use of rational choice as a model to understand membership in any party at that time.

Nonetheless I take issue with the way Brustein applies the rational choice model, that is, his use of interest-based accounts. First, we learn very little about a number of crucial questions: How do we know that potential members and voters did indeed apply the two-stage decision-making process when making their choices? Did potential members really have a fair conception of the range of options available to them—and of the dilemmas these options entailed? Of course, we will never be able to reconstruct people's thinking and motivations in deciding whether to join or not; but we can use the wealth of qualitative historical evidence available in various national and local archives to make a case for the use of more parsimonious models in understanding their behaviors.

Second, this lack of a systematic qualitative underpinning of the model becomes most acute in Brustein's discussion of "scope conditions" (p. 28). He correctly states that no theory or model applies universally, and he lists four assumptions that underlie the rational choice model. In short, these are that actors (1) have alternative choices, (2) associate unique sets of outcomes with each choice, (3) assign utility to each outcome, and (4) assign a probability to the occurrence of each outcome. These are well-known assumptions; yet these assumptions are not "brought to life," or at least questioned within the context of Weimar Germany. For example, can we—and if so, why—assume that people had identifiable, alternative choices available to them if the NSDAP, particularly before 1930, shared political space with numerous other smaller nationalist parties and groups? Can we really assume a unique set of outcomes given the frequent use of coalition governments in Weimar Germany, or the significant overlap in memberships among nationalist, right-wing groups, including the Nazi Party? Particularly because we know the outcome, Brustein should have spent more time discussing counterfactuals: What

political behaviors would have constricted the expectations of the rational choice model? And what political behaviors are outside the scope of model-based explanations?

Third, Brustein does little to explore the relationship between long-term and short-term accounts of interest-based political affiliation. What groups were more inclined to think "long term," and what groups were more likely to emphasize more immediate concerns? And how would these calculations affect the results of his analysis?

**Membership.**—Largely because of the use of a highly specific primary source (the Nazi membership card catalogs at the Berlin Document Center), the data used for the analysis—as important and useful as they are—nevertheless contain two shortcomings not mentioned by Brustein. Due to these shortcomings the category "membership" is more ambiguous than is apparent in the book. How severe these shortcomings are cannot be assessed with the information at hand, but they certainly point to a need for further clarification and research.

The first shortcoming relates to membership in the SA, or storm troopers (*Sturmabteilung*). The SA membership was high and, at 60,000, close to 50% of party membership in 1930. For some time prior to 1934 the SA, always more of a "movement" for activists than a political party organization, was politically as important as the NSDAP itself, although with significant regional variations. Moreover, the SA provided social welfare services to members at a lower cost, since SA dues were lower than party membership fees. Relations between the party and the SA at the organizational level were complex (and became even more so with the growth of the *Schutzstaffel*, or SS, and other specialized party branches.) Much overlap existed among SA and party members, both among rank and file as well as among officeholders: SA members were frequently party members, but not necessarily so, and vice versa. It seems reasonable to assume that SA and party memberships may have appeared as alternatives for some potential members, as joint events for others, and as "fuzzy" options for others yet. The fundamental point is that we need to know more about how the explicit recognition of the complex membership structure between the SA, the party, and other right-wing organizations would influence the findings of the book generally, and its use of interest-based accounts more specifically.

The second membership issue relates to the problem of *Schwarzmitglieder* or members unregistered with, and unknown to, party headquarters (see Anheier and Ohlemacher 1996; Horn 1972). Typically, these were members who joined the local party chapters without knowledge and approval of the *Gau* (regional) administration or party headquarters in Munich. Obviously, the membership information available at party headquarters (and later, the Berlin Document Center) does not include such unregistered members unless they joined formally at some later date (usually after 1933). In such cases, their membership was rarely back-dated.

Why is the question of unregistered members important? For one, there

were many of them. In a 1935 speech, *Reichsschatsmeister* (chief NSDAP treasurer) Franz Xaver Schwarz mentions some 200,000 of such cases were still pending in 1933 at Munich headquarters alone. Second, the frequent presence of unregistered members may have implications for the results: given that the 200,000 quite likely represent only a portion of all unregistered members between 1925 and 1933, we can assume that significant segments of Nazi party participants may have escaped the sample.

Why did so many unregistered members exist? There are several reasons for this. Most important among them is the dues structure of the Nazi Party, which in effect provided incentives for local party chapters to underreport the number of members, particularly the unemployed. In addition, some members may have opted for "silent" or secret membership for fear of costs and retribution associated with public knowledge about their political convictions; moreover, the membership administration of the Nazi Party was not all well established until the 1930s (Horn 1972); plagued with inefficiencies and quests for regional autonomy, the centralized system of membership administration allowed for much opportunity to maintain, even encourage, unofficial membership pools at local levels—even without the knowledge of prospective members.

The key issue is that such "sample specifics" may well have an impact on the results. I believe it would have been useful to the overall thrust of the book had its empirical limitations been made more explicit in that regard.

*Measurement.*—Brustein does not reify social class. He is well aware of the pronounced differences, even cleavages, that existed within each major class position. An emphasis on occupation, market position (e.g., import-dependent vs. export-oriented industries), and class allows for a much more refined analysis of interest-based accounts than has been the case in the past. Yet the various class and occupational classifications used by Brustein nonetheless all rest on the entry *Stand* on the Nazi membership card. *Stand*, a term no longer used in modern administrative German, is a mixture of occupation, type of business, and civil status. As such, it is full of ambiguity and in any case a weak measure of social status.

While the membership cards contain no information on the two other components typically associated with measures of social status (i.e., education and income or net worth) other files contained at the Berlin Document Center do. In this respect, it would have been useful to learn more about the extent to which the author tried to cross-validate the social class variable and occupational coding using additional information. In other words: how valid and reliable is the coding based on *Stand*? Given the importance of *Kaufmann* (merchant), *Bauer* (farmer), or *Beamter* (civil servant) for Brustein's analysis, it is crucial to know more about the strengths and weaknesses of his measures. While appendix A in the book is useful, it does not tell the full story.

### *Organizational Development*

The history of any political party includes at least three parts: membership, political-ideological history, and organizational formation. In his analysis, Brustein puts emphasis on the first, brings in the second when it comes to economic policies, but says little about the third. The neglect of organizational and social movement aspects leads Brustein to overlook two distinct periods in the development of the Nazi Party: from February 1925 to September 1930, and from September 1930 to the March elections of 1933. There are several reasons to make this distinction.

First, prior to September 1930, the NSDAP represented an organization too complex and too large relative to its success at the ballot box. At the very least, it was a membership organization without any large voter support: with some 100,000 party members in some 1,400 chapters, the party achieved 2.6% or 1 million of the valid votes cast in the national elections of May 1928. The relationship between membership numbers and voter numbers changed with the September 1930 vote: while membership increased about one-third to 129,000, the party achieved a surprising 7.9 million (18.3%) of the valid votes cast. Consequently, the NSDAP, now the second largest party, changed suddenly from a membership organization to a people's party and was increasingly able to attract votes from population segments outside the more narrow reservoir of ethnic and nationalist voters.

What this suggests is that the Nazi Party prior to the end of 1930 was as much a part of the right-wing movement industry as it was of the more formal political process. It polished its image of *Überpartei*, a "nonparty"-party that stood above the "political theater" in Berlin.<sup>1</sup> Particularly in the early years, the party was carried by a cadre of organizers and activists with deep roots in the nationalist, right-wing camp and was frequently associated with the paramilitary grouping (*Freikorps*) of the post-World War I years. It seems likely that for these members "conviction" was more important than "economics"—a relationship that may well have reversed for later cohorts that are part of Brustein's analysis. For later cohorts, welfare services provided by the SA or the NSDAP may well have been important; the party's economic program may well have made the difference, but perhaps not for those members who joined the Nazi Party earlier.

Second, the Nazi Party itself seemed to have been quite aware of different membership cohorts and organizational periods in the party's history prior to 1933. The party statistics of 1935 differentiated distinct cohorts, as did administrative practices and the various party rewards, rolls, and

<sup>1</sup> A minor note: Brustein suggests (p. 147) that the magnitude of the left-right rivalry in the Nazi Party has been overstated. This shift was certainly very acute prior to 1928, with the formation of the Working Group of Northwest German Gauleiter that threatened party unity for much of the late 1920s and only came under more complete control in the summer of 1930 when the small but still influential group around Gregor Strasser split from the party to form the Black Front.

medals of honor. Moreover, popular party language referred to “old fighters” (joined before September of 1930), the “Septemberlings” or “September violets” (those joining in the aftermath of the electoral success in September 1930), and those “fallen in March” (*Märzgefallenen*), that is, those joining after March 1933. These categorizations were meant to separate the true believers from opportunists.

This implies that a cohort analysis of the major relationships is needed to see if the interest-based account applies to all members equally across the years in question, or if economic aspects assume greater weight over time. I assume the latter, as Brustein seems to do (p. 180), but a fuller exploration of differences over time in terms of membership groups, incentives, and disincentives would be necessary before accepting the general conclusion of his study.

### Party Program

Brustein argues that the Nazi Party was the “first mass political party to make nationalist-étatist concepts the core elements of its economic doctrine, and to combine them with key notions from Keynesian economics” (p. 54). The “good match” between national-étatist thinking and Keynesian theory allowed the Nazi Party to develop “rather novel but nevertheless concrete economic policies” (p. 54). But can we call it coherent, and how novel is novel? Let us examine a core part of the Nazi platform, the “25-Points-Program” (*25-Punkte-Programm*) of February 1920, declared as “unchangeable” and reaffirmed in May 1926. Table 1 presents a summary of the main points (own translation).

This program is certainly not a showpiece of policy innovation. Six of its points (9, 10, 15, 17, 20, 21) are virtually identical to articles in the Weimar Constitution, and most others reflect popular requests among right-wing circles at that time. What stands out are certainly the anticapitalist elements (in terms of modern finance capitalism) as are the prominent quests for a central welfare state. What is not apparent is the Keynesian element. These thoughts came much later, *in the early 1930s*, and were influenced by the party’s left and not by its procapitalist wing. In any case, the point is that the Keynesian elements represent late innovations of Nazi policy making.<sup>2</sup>

Note, however, the prominent role of what we could call *gemeinwirtschaftliche* elements in the Nazi program. The principle of *Gemeinwirtschaft*, or communal economy, implies nonmarket, noncompetitive production of commodities and delivery of services. The principle rested

<sup>2</sup> We should emphasize that the Nazi Party adapted only selected elements of Keynesian thinking; only for recessionary times does Keynes suggest active government intervention in markets, deficit spending and related monetary policies to stimulate the economy; by contrast, the Nazi Party advocated far-reaching state involvement, government control, and market restrictions throughout.

TABLE 1  
THE 1920 NAZI 25-POINTS-PROGRAM

Program Point	Brief Description of Program Statement
1 .....	Demand self-determination of Germans
2 .....	Nullify the Versailles Treaty
3 .....	Demand colonies
4 .....	Restrict citizenship to Germans; Jews cannot be citizens
5 .....	Treat noncitizens as guests subject to special laws
6 .....	Open public office to citizen candidates only
7 .....	Care for the well-being of its citizens as the primary responsibility of the state
8 .....	Ban immigration of non-Germans; expel most resident immigrants
9 .....	Grant equal rights and responsibilities to all citizens
10 .....	Oblige all citizens to work; work must not harm the common good
11 .....	Eliminate interest income and capital gains
12 .....	Confiscate war profits
13 .....	Transform "trusts" into state corporations
14 .....	Establish profit sharing in large enterprises
15 .....	Expand old-age pension system
16 .....	Support middle class by the elimination of large department stores and offer subsidies to small businesses
17 .....	Direct use of land for public purposes and outlaw land speculation
18 .....	Combat speculation and profiteering
19 .....	Replace Roman law with new German public law
20 .....	Pay for universal education for all citizens
21 .....	Support public health efforts
22 .....	Remilitarize
23 .....	Control the press
24 .....	Promote religious freedom, positive Christendom, and public utility before private utility
25 .....	Establish central state authority

on the vision of a noncapitalist order that was less radical than Karl Marx's communist vision. The principle of *Gemeinwirtschaft* became important in the German cooperative and workers' movement and favored an economic system in which actors attempt to maximize common as well as private returns (see items 14–18 in table 1 above). This communal, presocialist tradition is most clearly expressed by the term *Gemeinwirtschaft* itself, which bears some affinity with Tönnies's notion of *Gemeinschaft* (community) and can be understood as a form of communal, though not necessarily local, economy and as a third way between free market capitalism and bureaucratic socialism. Moreover, it favored unions and revitalized rural traditions of self-help among independent producers, that is, the *Raiffeisen Cooperatives* for small-scale farmers or

cooperative banks for small-scale businesses in urban areas. It was, in part, this tradition the Nazis related to, but for a long time found it difficult to act these views, given the party's statist orientation.

Against this background, I find it difficult to accept the party program as a coherent system that combines Keynesian and statist elements. It seems at least equally valid to characterize it as an eclectic program that, built on commonplace nationalist and anticapitalist formulations, allowed for a maximum of opportunism and flexibility. Somewhat simplified, we could characterize National Socialism as the "master frame" for the dissatisfied that allowed them to read into the party whatever problems and solutions they felt as most applicable and pressing for their own plight. This is what gave Nazism its competitive edge in terms of policy formulation in the early 1930s. Of course, Keynesian elements entered the Nazi election platform in the early 1930s, but they were added opportunistically and remained unreconciled with the party program.

#### Economics versus Anti-Semitism

Finally, there is the question of anti-Semitism and the degree to which policies were perceived as "purely economic" versus "anti-Semitic" or merely "nationalistic." With Brustein I would argue that the strength of the Nazi Party was not based on the extent to which it catered to overt anti-Semitism; but at the same time I would also contend that it was equally not found in the brilliance and innovativeness of the party's policy proposals and economic programs. What seemed to matter were the subtle, often implicit, links that potential voters and members could draw between their current predicament (as victims) and their future prospects (as victors), while allowing them to apportion blame to generalized third parties ("Weimar," the Jews, the Versailles Treaty, international banks, the Young Plan, the Communists, the Democrats, etc.). In other words, what appeared to be racist frequently had economic policy implications, and what appeared to be economic policy was soon revealed as anti-Semitic and antidemocratic elements.

In sum, I disagree with Brustein that "anti-Semitism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia played a marginal role in the rise of the NSDAP" (p. 181). Given that anti-Semitism was an open theme of Nazi policies and traditions throughout, how could it have escaped the economic calculus of members and voters? I would be more comfortable with the following formulation: anti-Semitism and nationalism, as important elements of Nazi ideology, became increasingly integrated (in more or less subtle ways) into economic policies. While the policies as such may or may not have been perceived as anti-Semitic and blatantly nationalistic by potential members and voters alike, their implications should have been anticipated to those who were rationally applying interest-based accounts of political party affiliation and voting.

### Concluding Comments

The picture that Brustein seems to draw in the concluding pages of his book seems almost the opposite of what Goldhagen (1996) has painted in his recent analysis of anti-Semitism in Germany. It is probably fair to say that reality in the difficult and unhappy years of the Weimar Republic was somewhere in between, but certainly closer to Brustein's materialist position than to Goldhagen's moral indictment. Yet can we truly conclude that, voting their pocketbooks, Germans simply made a bad mistake, being misled by a party that offered an attractive package that turned sour in the end?

Economic reasons may indeed have been the *necessary condition* for making the Nazi Party more attractive to more potential members and voters over time. Yet were these reasons also *sufficient*? The answer is that they were most likely not. We can suggest that an opportunistic "package" of economic and ideological components, including anti-Semitism, accounted for the Nazi Party position in the early 1930s—a nationalistic position that combined modern and antimodern, procapitalist and anticapitalist, as well as prosocialist and antisocialist elements, among others. Brustein's important book has brought us a significant step closer to understanding how and why parts of this package became more attractive and acceptable to more people over time.

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## ON COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST

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Brustein's offering was the second provocative and important book on the Nazi phenomenon to appear in 1996. The first, Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, stimulated numerous reviews and discussions, and it is difficult to look at Brustein's book without refracting it through the lens of that discourse. Brustein has no reference to Goldhagen's work and does not enter into any dialogue with it, but the timing and the apparent tension between their central arguments makes comparison inevitable. Do they contradict each other or are they actually quite reconcilable? I will argue that, in spite of the undeniable differences in what they highlight, they can be synthesized, but only by addressing a number of issues that *The Logic of Evil* fails to address in sufficient depth.

### Self-Interest and Political Participation

During the heyday of mass society theory, support for social movements such as the Nazis was understood as the expressive reaction of victims of social pathology. In contrast, conventional political groups were a different species—acting to achieve goals rather than reacting to express distress. In the past 25 years, the field of social movements has rejected this distinction between two different kinds of politics. All political groups are assumed to have certain collective goals. People may join them for a wide variety of reasons. They may become active in the Republican Party because they seek camaraderie and fellowship and are pulled in by friendship networks, because they share its worldview and the policy programs that follow from it, because they find in their allegiance to the group a meaningful way of dealing with a confusing world, because they seek material rewards, status, and contacts, or because they seek an opportunity to exercise power over their fellow citizens. Presumably, the same array of different motives apply to those who joined the Nazis.

I have complete sympathy with Brustein's desire to break with this earlier social pathology tradition as a way of explaining Nazi support. It is more fruitful to look at those factors that one normally examines in explaining political behavior. I have complete sympathy with a theory of political allegiance that takes as its axiom that "individuals are purposeful, goal-oriented actors" (p. 177) rather than reacting unconsciously and irrationally to unrecognized social forces.

Brustein argues that the Nazis attracted a huge, broadly based constituency by appealing to people's material interests, making German voters "like voters elsewhere—voting their pocketbooks." It turns out, however, that the relationship between personal economic interest and voting is anything but simple and requires close examination. Clearly, people give

priority to issues that have direct and immediate consequences for their personal lives—proximity matters.

But this does not mean that they focus only or primarily on the consequences for their pocketbook; issues of health and safety, when they are threatened, are likely to trump bread and butter issues. Whether proximate means pocketbook depends on the context. Of course, in the Germany of 1925–33, economic issues undoubtedly dominated any rivals in the centrality of their consequences for daily life—so I have no trouble in accepting the translation of proximity into economic concerns in this instance.

However, the connection between one's personal economic situation and such political acts as voting, for example, is not straightforward. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) review a large number of studies that show that Americans sharply distinguish the quality of their personal lives and their judgments about public issues. For example, crime victims do not regard crime as a more serious problem for society as a whole than do those personally untouched by crime; even more to the point here, people's assessments of economic conditions are largely unrelated to the setbacks and gains in their own lives. And in making voting decisions, they do not ask whether they are personally better off than before, but whether people in general (or people like themselves) are better off. In short, there is a complex interpretive process that connects what is happening in one's own life to what is happening more generally, and finally to what one should do about it politically.

Finally, and especially when we consider such acts of participation as joining a political party, there is the issue of personal advantage and collective goods. "It is often taken for granted," Olson pointed out, ". . . that groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests. . . . It does *not* follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested" (1965, pp. 1–2; emphasis in original). Indeed, Olson argues that, except under special conditions, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests. It is against one's individual interests to pay any costs or take any risks, since one will enjoy the benefits produced by the group whether or not one has helped to support it. A person will be individually better off pursuing personal interests and taking an effortless, free ride while others take risks or make sacrifices in the group's interest. Olson's enduring contribution is to make problematic the connection between pursuing individual interests and collective interests—something that must be examined and explained.

When Olson's arguments for this kind of calculus of personal interests

have been applied to social movements, they have not held up well. People participate for many reasons in pursuing collective goods in spite of the “irrationality” of this behavior as defined in narrow utilitarian terms. The argument that participation in most movements can be accounted for by selective incentives has fared especially poorly in competition with such non-self-interested considerations as the value placed on collective goods, solidarity and collective identity, and judgments on the likely effectiveness of the collective effort.

Brustein recognizes the important difference between explaining the act of joining the Nazi Party and the act of voting for the party. Most Nazi voters were not party members. The party received a million votes in 1928 with a membership of 100,000 (1 in 10), 7.9 million in 1930 with a membership of 129,000 (1 in 60), and more than 14 million in 1932 with fewer than a million members (1 in 14).

Clearly, those who joined after 1930 were joining a different Nazi Party—not a marginal challenger but a serious contender for power with the possibility of being able to deliver important material incentives for joining, such as jobs. This underlines the importance of separating the analysis and explanation of the early joiners—for whom the balance of personal costs and benefits was a disincentive to be overcome—from later joiners—who hoped to gain personal advantage by becoming party members. For voters who did not join the party, of course, selective incentives were irrelevant. The self-interested rationality of joining for opportunistic reasons and voting for the Nazis because they might make life in Germany better are two different types of rationality that become conflated in Brustein’s work.

### The Role of Anti-Semitism

In fact, Brustein’s interest-based model tells us very little about the role of Nazi ideology and worldview in general, and anti-Semitism in particular, in the process. In this model, culture and cognition are inside a black box. We do not know what ideas people had in their head, and we do not need to know. The model has an “as if” quality to it. It is enough that people act as if they were operating in terms of their material self-interest for Brustein to predict that workers in import-dependent domestic industries were more likely to be Nazi joiners and voters than those in export-dependent industries. Hence, the model can be tested without peering inside the black box to understand the interpretive process by which workers connect the symbol of the Nazi Party with a political response.

Since the black box is never opened, there is nothing in Brustein’s model that would lead us to question the following claim, nothing inconsistent with it: German citizens were upset and dismayed by the economic depression and the Nazis offered an explanation and promises of a solu-

tion in which anti-Semitism, nationalism, and the like were thoroughly integrated in a broader meaning system. The scope conditions discussed by Brustein (p. 28) are met in a way that comfortably accommodates these ideological appeals in a definition of interest: actors are presented with choices between alternative courses of action, they associate a unique set of outcomes with each alternative action, assign a utility to each outcome, and assign a probability to the occurrence of each outcome contingent on the course of action chosen.

Ideology and interpretation do the work of associating outcomes with actions and assigning utilities to them as well as defining the nature of political opportunity. To the extent that non-Jewish Germans believed that Jews were among those responsible for their economic miseries and that the Nazis would do something about the "Jewish problem," there is nothing in an interest-based adherence model that contradicts the importance of anti-Semitism. Eliminating Jewish-owned department stores, subsidizing small businesses, expanding old age pensions, and depriving Jews of citizenship rights were all parts of the eclectic Nazi interpretive package.

Brustein's conclusion that "anti-Semitism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia played a marginal role" (p. 181) in the rise of the Nazi Party does not follow from his analysis. Rather, these themes were integrated with economic issues in the Nazis' interpretive package, and Brustein offers no evidence that they are any less a part of the utilities attached to the choice to support the party. As he concedes (p. 58), "Increasingly, anti-Semitic rhetoric was merged with economic and political issues."

There is no evidence here on the relative impact of different parts of the Nazi program or on which of the various themes were used in defining one's interest. The Nazis were engaged in a contest over meaning, and the distinction between rationalist and irrationalist appeals is not helpful in understanding how they succeeded. Successful interpretive packages combine moral and pragmatic elements, issues of honor and issues of economics, material appeals and cultural appeals. Symbolic appeals are not a matter of "either/or" but of "and/more." If many Germans came to believe that the Nazis offered them the prospects of a better life, what reason is there to dismiss the anti-Semitic programs as an integral part of that promise?

This question brings us back to Goldhagen. He is interested in explaining the willing and even enthusiastic cooperation of ordinary Germans with the Nazi program after 1933, but his arguments are relevant for the period that Brustein is exploring. His central argument is that a particularly virulent form of anti-Semitism—*eliminationist* anti-Semitism—had become an integral part of German culture by the 1920s. It was not something that the Nazis started but something on which they played, part of the larger German culture.

Brustein does not really challenge this and, in fact, supports it at various points. He reminds us that "the Nazi Party did not possess a monopoly on anti-Semitism, which existed in both the Catholic and Protestant

churches in Weimar Germany. . . . Protestant theologizing frequently included racist and anti-Semitic caricatures. Jews were depicted as corrupt and degenerate and eager to destroy German Christian morality" (p. 59). Nor was the Catholic Church immune. Even parties of the left could "be counted on to opportunistically tap into anti-Semitism." In fact, Brustein argues that Nazi leaders understood the need to merge anti-Semitic rhetoric with economic and political themes precisely because "it was part of everyday Weimar political discourse" (p. 60).

Interpretive packages succeed in part because their appeals resonate with broader cultural themes. The resonances increase the appeal of a particular interpretation or frame by making it appear natural and familiar. Those who respond to the larger cultural theme will find it easier to respond to a frame with the same sonorities. Goldhagen is not arguing that anti-Semitism was the primary motive for people joining the Nazi Party or voting for its candidates, but that hatred of the Jews had become embedded in German culture more generally. Part of the appeal of the Nazi package was its resonance and exploitation of this cultural theme. Nothing in Brustein's data or arguments contradicts this.

"If average Germans had known in 1932," Brustein argues (p. 182), "what they knew in 1945 about the consequences of Nazism, the Nazi Party would never have attracted a mass following." Of course, knowing that Germany would be defeated in a devastating war would have made the choice easy. But substitute 1939 for 1945—after *Kristallnacht*, the Nuremberg laws, and other anti-Semitic Nazi programs—and the claim seems extremely dubious. Brustein suggests that the Nazi Party "skillfully cloaked its aims until it had achieved power." Perhaps in some details, but their actions basically followed the promised direction, including the anti-Semitic parts of their program.

### Coming to Terms with the Past

Taken as social science, Brustein's and Goldhagen's contributions are complementary, not contradictory. Brustein largely ignores the interpretive process by which people connect the conditions of their lives with politics and the role of cultural resonances—including the resonances of anti-Semitism—in leading people to believe that the Nazis would produce a better life for non-Jewish German citizens. His claim that such themes as anti-Semitism, nationalism, and xenophobia played a marginal role is unproven and largely unexamined. Goldhagen offers an explanation in which the embeddedness of anti-Semitism in German culture produced resonances for a Nazi interpretive package that integrated these themes with its economic appeals. He would not offer anti-Semitism as a variable to account for differential Nazi success among workers in domestic rather than export-oriented industries. The two works emphasize different questions, and there is no inherent contradiction in their arguments and evidence.

No history about the Nazi period is ever merely history. It is part of a larger cultural discourse about coming to terms with a past that includes the Holocaust. There is a never-ending German word for it: *Ver-gangenheitsbewältigung*. The metamessages that Brustein and Goldhagen offer to this bridging project are very much in conflict. Here, the relevant criterion is not which is closer to the truth but which is more helpful to contemporary Germans in coming to terms with Germany's special history.

Brustein's metamessage is reassuring: Your grandparents and great grandparents were not supporting evil. They were pretty much like folks everywhere, struggling for survival amid economic turbulence and looking for some way of making Germany better. They did not know what they were getting. As a message in the bridging project, it encourages the idea that the crimes were committed not by Germans but, to quote Joffe (1996) "in 'the German name,' by 'them,' that is, by 'Hitler and his henchmen.'" He notes the tendency to "sterilize the past, to put a reassuring distance between murderers and the masses." Brustein's book encourages that tendency.

Joffe (1996) describes the abrupt turnaround in Goldhagen's German reception between the publication of the book (in English) in the spring and his German tour four months later on the publication of the German edition. He quotes liberally from the dismissive and hostile early reviews, suggesting that they could be summed up as "Don't Read This Book." In contrast, Goldhagen's September tour from Hamburg to Berlin to Frankfurt and then to Munich turned into a "triumphant procession" with "a small army of reporters and cameramen begging for yet another interview, coaxing him to take part in yet another talk show." Joffe tries to account for "the contrast between the experts' contempt in the spring and the public's unexpected eagerness to hear Goldhagen's case in the autumn."

Goldhagen's message—this is the evil that was done, this is who did it and how they felt—spoke especially to Germans under the age of 40. "They did not hear the story from their parents and grandparents, and if they asked, they were not told," Joffe observes. Goldhagen tells them, and they can "at last discover for themselves the evil their elders inflicted on the world; they could unearth the repressed knowledge that is the necessary step toward liberation and even redemption." Toward this project of coming to terms with the past, Goldhagen's bitter herbs heal more deeply than Brustein's balm.

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## WHO JOINED THE NAZIS AND WHY

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It would require many more pages than allotted to me to respond adequately to the many critical points raised in Helmut Anheier's and William Gamson's reviews of my book. My rejoinder will focus on those common criticisms to which both reviewers subscribe: the primacy of material interests or economic factors in the decision to vote for and/or to join the Nazi Party (NSDAP); a failure to separate my analysis and explanation of early joiners from later joiners; the coherence and novelty of Nazi Party programs; the importance of anti-Semitism in the decision to join the Nazi Party; and the unintended consequences of pre-1933 Nazi Party support.

### Self-Interest and Political Participation

Both Anheier and Gamson assert that my study exaggerates the role of the pocketbook or bread and butter motivation in explaining why Germans voted for or joined the Nazi Party. The goal of my study is to provide answers to two questions: who became Nazis and why they became Nazis. Traditional explanations of the sociology of Nazism—the movement's irrationalist appeal, lower-middle-class backing, political confessionalism, and the Nazi Party's status as a catchall party of protest—were found to be incomplete. As an alternative explanation of the sociology of Nazism I presented and tested an interest-based theory of political behavior. The principal axiom of the interest-based theory is that individuals are purposeful or goal-oriented actors. Although I am unable to interview them and therefore ascertain their goals, I assume that individuals have common as well as idiosyncratic goals. I assume that individuals prefer more wealth, power, and prestige to less. Thus, as long as individuals believe that one course of action will produce more of these resources, they will choose that course of action. I then apply this thinking to the Weimar era by positing that the set of choices available to the Germans were represented by the array of political parties that they could join. Individuals will support the party that they perceive will maximize their wealth, power, and prestige.

How can we then test the interest-based account? The way to test the model is not to test the assumptions about people's goals since we have no reliable information about their preferences (this is especially unrealistic for historical periods and even if we had information on people's preferences, we would have to question its reliability). Instead, I test the empirical implications of my model. My interest-based theory leads to a whole series of implications about who should have joined the Nazi Party. My theory predicts a unique set of implications about joining the

Nazi Party vis-à-vis other theories. The value of my approach is that even though we do not know what is in people's heads, we can test empirical implications based on assumptions about these goals.

I do not argue that all Germans who joined the party were motivated solely by their material self-interests. Certainly many people were drawn to the Nazi Party for noneconomic reasons. Indeed no single factor can explain why nearly 1.4 million Germans joined the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1933. Germans often had multiple reasons for joining the Nazi Party. For some it may have been Hitler's charisma, for others a general antipathy toward the Weimar Republic. People have multiple preferences and order their preferences in different ways; yet everyone prefers more wealth to less. For some people the preference for wealth may be higher within their set of preferences while for others it may be lower. I know of no other preference that is as widespread within the population as that for wealth. Wealth is commonly valued because it is highly fungible, that is, it can be easily exchanged for a wide variety of other goods. To illustrate, for enjoyment Boris in St. Petersburg prefers to dine regularly in restaurants while Omar in Cairo prefers attending professional soccer matches. But wealth allows both Boris and Omar to realize their pleasures. Even an altruist such as Mother Teresa has a preference for wealth, for she can employ it to help others. Following this reasoning, I have argued that wealth maximization, in comparison to other preferences, should have been the most common motivation among the more than 1 million Germans who joined the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1933. While we might find that the motivation of any given German to join the Nazi Party was noneconomic, we would likely observe that most Germans joined because of economic reasons, given the prevalence of the wealth maximization preference within people's set of preferences.

### Organizational Development

Anheier and Gamson note two distinct periods in the formation of the Nazi Party: February 1925–September 1930, when the Nazi Party was a marginal challenger, and September 1930–March 1933, when the party became a serious contender. According to Gamson, it is in the latter period that the "self-interested rationality of joining for opportunistic reasons" emerges as a critical factor. Both reviewers claim that I gloss over these two distinct periods in the development of the Nazi Party. They suggest that I should have separately analyzed the early joiners and the later joiners.

I agree that my study would have benefited from more extensive analysis of yearly variation in Nazi Party membership, as it would have benefited equally from greater attention to the political geography of membership. To the extent that the data permitted, I presented results of yearly variation in party membership. For instance, a number of charts (see charts 3.3, 3.5, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.3) in my book report yearly Nazi

Party joining by class, by gender within class, by marital status, and by age. The issues of variation over time and across space in Nazi Party membership are important and are presently being examined by a number of my students.

I restricted my study to the period before 1933 for exactly the reason Gamson states, the "self-interested rationality of joining for opportunistic reasons" (p. 212, above). The real change in the cost-benefit calculus of joining the party does not occur until 1933 with the Nazi takeover. Although following the September 1930 elections, the average German's perceptions of the Nazi Party's likelihood to achieve power changed, it was by no means certain that the party would come to power. In fact, the roughly four percentage point drop from 37.3% to 33.1% in the Nazi Party's national vote between July 1932 and November 1932 was interpreted by many German contemporaries as an indication that the party's popularity had peaked and that Hitler would fail in his goal to be appointed chancellor. Moreover, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the individual benefits of joining the party between 1930 and 1933 far exceeded the costs. The Nazi Party still had relatively few selective incentives to distribute, and the disincentives of arrests, physical violence, and job dismissal (e.g., government acts prohibiting membership in the Nazi Party by civil servants) increased between 1930 and 1932.

What I cannot agree with is Gamson's and Anheier's suggestion of separating the *explanation* of early joiners from later joiners. The interest-based theory of political behavior should be equally applicable for the pre-1930 period as for the 1930-33 period in explaining why individuals joined the Nazi Party. Why should we believe that a joiner in 1927 behaved differently from a joiner in 1932? Both made their decisions on the bases of their perception of the costs and benefits associated with the act of joining the Nazi Party. Self-interested behavior did not change between 1927 and 1932 but the political, social, and economic context and constraints in which those choices were made did. The effects of the 1930 depression led many more Germans than in the previous period to arrive at the judgment that, of all the competing Weimar political party programs, the Nazi Party's programs offered the most promising solutions to their economic ills. That so few Germans joined the NSDAP before 1930 compared to 1930-32 speaks to the predictive power of the interest-based model. Given the specific contents of the Nazi Party programs and general prosperity of the late 1920s in Germany, it comes as little surprise that so few Germans' constellation of material interests should have led them to vote for or join the Nazi Party before the economic malaise hit in 1930.

### Nazi Party Programs

Were the Nazi Party programs coherent or eclectic? Did the programs combine key elements from nationalist-éstatist thinking and Keynesian

economic theory or were they built on commonplace nationalist and anticapitalist formulations, allowing for a maximum of opportunism and flexibility? Challenging the first interpretation and supporting the second, Anheier characterizes National Socialism as “the ‘master frame’ for the dissatisfied that allowed them to read into the party whatever problems and solutions they felt as most applicable and pressing for their own plight” (p. 208, above). Anheier largely bases his contention on his analysis of the Nazi Party’s “25-Points-Program” of February 1920.

Anheier is certainly not alone in questioning the novelty and coherence of Nazi Party programs. Much of the literature on Nazism has focused either on the reactive character of the party’s programs or the “something for everybody” appeal. My reading of the Nazi Party’s pre-1933 programs has led me to a different assessment. Why does Anheier highlight only the 1920 party program and not other party pronouncements? It is important to understand that the Nazi Party programs were constantly evolving and taking more specific form. Certain themes were consistently stressed and never abandoned: autarkic economic development, economic protectionism, elimination of reparations, active state involvement, and a cheap money policy. As events (the 1930 depression) radically changed conditions, the party added new positions (albeit not contradictory ones) to address the problems, such as Keynesian policies of deficit spending, monetary policies to stimulate demand and supply, and job creation.

Despite philosophical differences within the Nazi Party, by 1925 a particular economic direction had emerged. In 1930 the party established the Department for Economic Policy. Between 1930 and 1933 the NSDAP presented a series of important party programs laying out the party’s general economic philosophy. Among these programs were the 1930 Agrarian Program, the 1930 NSDAP Employment Program, the 1931 WPA document (*Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung*), the 1932 Immediate Economic Program (*Wirtschaftliches Sofortprogramm*), and the 1932 Economic Reconstruction Plan (*Wirtschaftliches Aufbauprogramm*).

If Nazi Party programs were so eclectic, why do we find an overrepresentation of particular groups as joiners? If National Socialism was a “master frame” for the dissatisfied, why do the data demonstrate higher membership rates for livestock farmers, import-oriented blue-collar workers (e.g., construction, foodstuffs, woodworking, and clothing), and skilled laborers, and lower rates for grain growers, export-oriented blue-collar workers (e.g., chemicals, musical instruments, and electrotechnology), and unskilled and semiskilled laborers (see charts 3.4a, 3.4b, 4.2, and 4.4)? That the Nazi positions on protectionism and autarkic development corresponded closely to the economic interests of workers in the import-oriented industrial sector suggests that some groups found the specifics of the Nazi Party programs more appealing than others. Also, if the Nazi Party offered only well-trodden clichés, why did nearly 38% of the electorate vote for the party in July 1932 and approximately 1.4 million join the Nazi Party before 1933 rather than one of the other right-wing parties

offering similar cures for the disenchanted? My point is that, had the party not mapped out a distinctive political program, the Nazi Party could never have captured such significant popular support given the large number of competitors nor the particular kind of support.

### The Role of Anti-Semitism

We err if we attribute the Nazi Party's success to its professed anti-Semitism. Prior to 1933, the Nazi Party's anti-Semitism lacked originality and shared strong similarities with many other Weimar political parties. In my view, what was highly unoriginal in pre-1933 Nazi Party programs was its anti-Semitism. Nazi anti-Semitism borrowed heavily from the political writings and speeches of Adolf Stoecker, Hermann Ahlwardt, and Otto Boeckel in Germany, Georg von Schoenerer and Karl Lueger in Austria, Edouard Drumont and Maurice Barrès in France, and Henry Ford in the United States.

Anheier and Gamson are correct in commenting that nowhere in my book do I systematically test the importance of anti-Semitism as a motivation for joining the Nazi Party. The available data do not permit such a test. But how are we to make sense of the major empirical findings reported in my book regarding the kinds of groups more or less likely to join the Nazi Party? I cannot see how anti-Semitism explains why workers in clothing, foodstuffs, woodworking, metalwares were more likely to join the Nazi Party before 1933 than workers in chemicals, textiles, mining, paper, and rubber and asbestos. Anti-Semitism does not enable us to understand why Protestant livestock farmers had higher rates of joining than Protestant grain growers. Anti-Semitism cannot explain why single females in the new middle class and working class had higher rates of joining the party than married females in these same two classes. It does not seem plausible that these group differences can be explained by variation in anti-Semitic attitudes. What does seem reasonable is that these differences in Nazi Party joining were largely due to the compatibility between individuals' material interests and the Nazi Party economic programs. Furthermore, anti-Semitism does not explain why so few Germans joined the Nazi Party before 1930 or why people did not join the other parties with anti-Semitic platforms.

### Unintended Consequences

Gamson prefers Goldhagen's "metamessage" over mine. He is troubled by my conclusion that evil may be wrought regardless of how deliberate people are in scrutinizing the potential consequences of their choices. Gamson is also worried by my related implication that it is highly unlikely that the millions of self-interested German citizens voting for or joining the Nazi Party in 1932 could have realized at the time that their decision would culminate in a world war and finally the murder of mil-

lions of innocent people between 1939 and 1945. It was never my intent to "sterilize the past" or to relieve Germans of the moral responsibility for crimes committed during the Nazi regime. I do, however, realize that some will read my conclusion as a "balm" that exonerates Germans. However, my conclusion followed directly from the logic of my argument. I continue to believe that the average German who voted for or joined the Nazi Party before 1933 could not have envisioned Auschwitz, World War II, or the destruction of Germany. For if average Germans had known in 1933 what they knew in 1945 about the consequences of Nazism, they would never have voted for or joined the party. In this respect, Germans are no different from people elsewhere.

Gamson may be right that toward the project "of coming to terms with the past, Goldhagen's bitter herbs heal more deeply than Brustein's balm" (p. 215, above). However, in writing this book I saw myself not as a healer but as a social scientist. If I had an agenda in writing *The Logic of Evil*, it would have been the warning that murderous and destructive movements may prevail in other places and at other times when the sociological conditions are right.

## Book Reviews

*Urban Regimes and Strategies: Building Europe's Central Executive District in Brussels.* By Alex G. Papadopoulos. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. xviii+290. \$23.00 (paper).

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Alex Papadopoulos asks how the creation and expansion of the European Union (EU) headquarters in Brussels has shaped that city since the process began in the mid-1960s. The author tries to learn how growth machine dynamics operate when the most important development energy comes from a single institutional force, rather than when corporations or ball teams are the object of courtship.

Officially the headquarters are only temporarily in Brussels; the locals have been kept continuously on their toes lest Europe decide to move it to Bonn (rich in office space as the German capital vacates to Berlin) or to Strasbourg (appropriate given its dual German-French identity). Brussels has to use its national leaders' clout to insist on remaining the EU's Executive Center. Its developers press the case that since their office projects serve the EU and related firms, there should be minimal interference.

The Belgian nation supports the Brussels choice because it functions as a city of both Flanders (Dutch speaking) and Wallonia (French speaking), being geographically near the border of the two regions. Brussels was also a compromise between the French and the Germans, neither of whom wanted to put a capital of Europe within the borders of a rival. Keeping the wisdom of these dual compromises on the forefront sustains Brussels as the capital of Europe.

Other dynamics are less Brussels specific and appear whenever cities strive to cater to large employers. Providing Brussels with the kinds of infrastructure demanded by its new European role destroys blocks of housing, much of it at the expense of lower-income people. Wholesale demolition and rebuilding decreases open space and undermines the aesthetic value of what remains. The European center brings an éclat that attracts still other prestige land users, creating further gentrification problems. Groups of environmentalists, preservationists, and working-class advocates protested in the usual way but with only spotty victories.

Papadopoulos took the useful methodological step of asking a sample of active real estate professionals to specify the most significant assets and liabilities of the area in terms of marketing to international firms (his presentation, alas, does not include standard survey indicators like cell Ns or response rates). Amenities like open space, architectural resources,

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and other types of communal use values figured low in developers' lists of what was useful in selling local space. But when asked what the greatest liabilities were, the absence of some of these same assets figured high on the list. Hence developers, who otherwise scorned regulation, indicated that lack of visionary planning and weak architectural amenities had depressed rental revenues from the "characterless office buildings" (p. 140). This seeming contradiction highlights a useful finding that probably transcends this case: even when developers appreciate the long-term benefits of regulation for the rentier collectivity, they want only near-term profits on their own projects. They want to free ride on regulatory benefits.

Because, according to Papadopoulos, the developers have generally had their way, Brussels has not provided Europe the kind of capital which, from an aesthetic or symbolic point of view, would otherwise be appropriate. Taking place when the market rules supreme (no King Leopold to keep things more ambitious), expansion of the European Community (EC) has been bad news for social and aesthetic goals.

Along the path to these useful observations, Papadopoulos gets waylaid by digressions. Details of city block ownership and responses to survey questions go beyond their relevance to the text (they should have been appendixes). He reaches for structuration theory to frame his findings but loses his grasp. Most disconcertingly, he breaks into a lengthy manifesto for the applicability of rational choice and game theory for understanding urban growth. One of his issues, for example, is whether a given resident will "defect" from community and sell to a developer or hang on so that the community as a whole can reap collective gains from a preserved neighborhood life. As is usual with the genre, he keeps mounting assumptions about hypothetical rewards and punishments for choosing various options. Where there are relevant empirical materials in others' work that might help ground his suppositions, he does not use them and has not himself (and this is a general drawback) generated the kind of information about developers' actual behavior that would help. It all becomes far-fetched and in the end has no real payoff for understanding what happened in Brussels.

When he keeps it straightforward, Papadopoulos adds to what we know about the political economy of city development. His case study is strategic, he keeps it in comparative perspective, and he asks many of the right questions, including about the role of aesthetics as both a development and life-course benefit. The Brussels of the EC may be, as he believes, a morphological mess, but at least we now know more about why.

*Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighborhood Politics in Chicago and Pittsburgh.* By Barbara Ferman. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. Pp. xiv+192. \$35.00 (cloth); \$14.95 (paper).

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*University of Chicago*

This book makes two contributions: (1) a new conceptualization of urban politics and (2) case studies of Chicago and Pittsburgh showing how neighborhood issues link with citywide politics. The ideas are useful for analysts and activists in urban politics, community mobilization, and social movements in any city. The conceptualization casts these two well-known cities in a new light. For example, in Chicago, neighborhood groups (at least the progressive movements that Ferman studies) are distrusted by most elected political leaders; small decisions often become conflictual, cross multiple arenas, and involve general political leaders (i.e., mayor, council, etc.). But in Pittsburgh, neighborhood and civic groups often make compromises in arena-specific decisions separate from political leaders. Ferman's first step toward a new approach is to identify and label such differences based on comparisons of two city's many specific decisions.

The conceptualization combines elements of past works. The tradition from Floyd Hunter and Clarence Stone, which stresses business elites and holds that they encourage a progrowth coalition, is inadequate first to explain why Chicago and Pittsburgh differ and second to explain public policies (e.g., downtown development vs. neighborhood development). Ferman's comparative focus on the two cities shows how common explanations of urban policy are inadequate: "declining cities" versus "Sunbelt," large size versus small, central city versus suburb, machine versus reform, strong mayor versus city manager. These legal, geographic, and economic classifications all locate Chicago and Pittsburgh in the same cells. Yet the two deeply differ in decisionmaking processes and concrete policy direction. Why? Ferman answers by stressing three mutually reinforcing concepts: *arenas*, *institutions*, and *political culture*.

*Arenas* (like housing or mayoral elections) are introduced to stress that politics and rules of the game differ across arenas. Ferman makes a good point here: cities vary in general leadership due, in part, to the centrality of different arenas. Politics and the Democratic Party dominate Chicago. Progressive neighborhood politics often challenge party leadership and ignite racial issues because of Chicago's large proportion of geographically concentrated African-Americans. More than in Pittsburgh, this racial conflict for power in the city as a whole often underlies neighborhood issues and other specific issues. Protagonists fighting for political turf are less willing in Chicago than in Pittsburgh to accept compromise via non-political institutions. Jesse Jackson, Dorothy Tillman, and others, thus, took ostensibly minor issues "to the streets" and, with help from community groups across the city, mobilized African-Americans to elect Harold

Washington, toppling the Democratic machine. In Pittsburgh, most issues were resolved more easily within neighborhood and civic groups. Pittsburgh leaders left them alone or helped without dominating.

*Institutions* vary in importance across cities (neighborhood groups are more important in Pittsburgh than Chicago). Richard Mellon helped create many civic and neighborhood institutions that built homes and parks, cleaned up neighborhoods, and mobilized local residents on specific development issues—outside the political process. Pittsburgh had a strong political machine, but its leaders cooperated with the new neighborhood and civic institutions. By contrast, Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Chicago Democratic Party jealously guarded power, discouraged civic and neighborhood groups from acting autonomously, and treated them as political threats.

Thus, arenas, institutions, and cities vary in their rules of the game or *political cultures*. The power of cultural constraints, which Ferman documents forcefully, shows how leaders like Mayor Harold Washington tried and sometimes failed in attacking patronage and in transcending turf wars. Conversely, in Pittsburgh some potentially conflictual issues of race and redistribution were nearly taboo; the issues were too big for neighborhood groups to raise. Political cultures, thus, encourage some issues to emerge and others to remain “nondecisions.” Pittsburgh, no city-manager suburb, still harbors a more civic-spirited culture in its civic and neighborhood groups that stresses the public good more than turf wars. Chicago’s culture of rewarding supporters with city contracts and patronage jobs was common in Pittsburgh’s past political arena, but the new civic and neighborhood institutions questioned its legitimacy. Pittsburgh’s maverick leader was Mayor Peter Flaherty, who, like Harold Washington, sought to destroy the patronage machine and build up neighborhood groups. Both Flaherty and Washington clashed with the local political culture and left limited legacies.

The three concepts in *Challenging the Growth Machine* are not original. Arenas come from Robert Dahl and Paul Peterson, institutions from organization theory, and political culture from Gabriel Almond and others. Just as Theda Skocpol did not invent the state, however, Ferman “brings back” into economic-dominated analyses three useful concepts. Ferman’s comparisons seldom transcend Chicago and Pittsburgh, limiting the range of variables considered. Her comparison is largely inductive theorizing that she builds up from two cases: the theory is scarcely linked to comparative urban theories (e.g., Daniel Elazar). Linkages to other cases could be productively made by Ferman or others in the future.

*Caught in the Middle: Korean Merchants in America's Multiethnic Cities.* By Pyong Gap Min. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996. Pp. xi+261. \$45.00 (cloth); \$17.00 (paper).

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Pyong Gap Min's *Caught in the Middle* is thorough and up-to-date research on Korean immigrant businesses and race relations in New York and Los Angeles. Min draws on various sources of data (ranging from independent surveys to ethnic newspaper articles to interviews with community and business leaders) to provide information and insightful interpretations on various issues of the Korean-American community. He interprets Korean immigrant businesses and racial conflicts from the viewpoint of middleman minority theory. According to him, Korean merchants play a middleman role between white capitalists and low-income African-American customers, and that role is the structural cause of the African-Americans' hostility and rejection of Korean businesses. Faced with hostility from the African-American community, the Korean-American community is said to take united and collective actions to respond to the external threat, and in this course, ethnic solidarity is enhanced among Koreans. Thus, he uses middleman minority theory to explain the triangular relationship among middleman commercial activities, host hostility, and ethnic solidarity.

Although the same idea has already been proposed by Bonacich and Modell (*The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity* [University of California Press, 1980]) and applied to Japanese-American agricultural business on the West Coast before World War II, his study is significant because it examines in detail the procedures by which a group's economic position in society (middleman minority role from Min's viewpoint) enhances its ethnic solidarity. Moreover, his study refines and revises middleman minority theory by pointing out that middlemen can have conflicts with elite members of host society. According to his analysis of the Korean community in New York, Korean merchants have conflicts with white suppliers, white landlords, and government agencies as well as African-American customers, and the conflicts with whites also enhance ethnic solidarity among Koreans.

When he applies middleman minority theory to Korean immigrants, he successfully avoids structural determinism, the common error many other middleman minority theorists make. Although he argues that Korean immigrants' middleman role is the structural cause of the Korean-African-American conflict, he acknowledges that black nationalism, language barriers, cultural differences, and prejudice between Koreans and African-Americans play equally important roles. He also rejects the simplistic idea that the "white system" or "U.S. capitalism" is entirely responsible for the conflict. Instead, he shows that different social and political agencies and organizations, including the white media and black nation-

alists, contribute to the conflict while they seek their own narrow and selfish interests. Due to such a pluralist approach, he can expel several myths, such as the white media conspiracy to scapegoat Koreans during the Los Angeles Riots of 1992. He thinks the media sensationalized the conflict primarily because of its commercial purposes rather than its intention to make Koreans the scapegoat for African-Americans' anger. His line of reasoning may not be popular among younger generation Korean Americans, who want to see the white system as the common enemy of Koreans and African-Americans, but his effort to be academically as objective as possible is worthy of respect.

His book is a systematically argued and empirically grounded work, but it is still subject to several criticisms. First, it may be exaggeration to define Korean merchants as middlemen because a larger number of Korean merchants operate nonmiddleman businesses. The concept of "semimiddleman" businesses (e.g., retail of goods imported from Asian countries) seems to stretch middleman minority theory too far and thus blurs the boundary between middleman and nonmiddleman businesses. Second, it may be erroneous to treat white producers, suppliers, and landlords as a single, homogeneous class of white capitalists. Many of them are of various European descents and are small-scale business owners, far from big corporations. Third, middleman minority theory does not explain adequately why Korean merchants receive greater hostility and rejection from the African-American community than they do from the Latino community. The immigrant hypothesis, which Min rejects, should have been more seriously considered. Finally, Min tends to highlight ethnic solidarity and cooperation in the Korean-American community although he acknowledges divisions in the community, especially the generational division. As he claims, the concentration of Korean immigrants in small businesses does enhance internal solidarity among Koreans in relation to non-Koreans. But the same phenomenon can simultaneously increase internal conflicts and class divisions among Koreans. In other words, two contradictory forces (i.e., the centripetal force at the ethnic group level and the centrifugal force at the individual level) operate as a result of the concentration of Koreans in small businesses.

The above criticisms can never weaken the contributions of Min's book to the fields of immigration, ethnic and race relations, entrepreneurship, urban sociology, and public policy. It provides a wealth of detailed information and insights about the contemporary Korean-American community. It is required reading for those who want to understand intriguing interrelationships among ethnicity, entrepreneurship, and race relations.

*Understanding Urban Unrest: From Reverend King to Rodney King.* By Dennis E. Gale. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996. Pp. xii+228. \$48.00 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

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The 1992 urban rebellions in Los Angeles stunned much of the world and revealed deep dissatisfaction within a number of urban populations. This dissatisfaction was evident despite years of legislation apparently intended to improve urban conditions. Dennis Gale examines federal government responses to "urban mob violence" from the 1960s through the 1990s. He maintains that the preventative approaches to urban mob violence by the federal government have centered on funding programs that benefit specific poor neighborhoods. According to Gale, these programs, such as Model Cities during the 1960s or Empowerment Zones-Enterprise Communities (EZEC) during the 1990s cannot alleviate poverty or a penchant for mob violence.

Gale's work begins with a discussion of Los Angeles in 1992 and then traces the history of urban violence from 1964 up until the 1990s. Overall, Gale's work is based on a detailed analysis of internal congressional debates regarding urban conditions and policies. He also cites previous studies which indicate that both race and poverty have been motivating factors for urban mob violence. Gale takes a more comparative approach in his final two chapters, examining similarities and differences between the 1960s and 1990s.

As a government response, the Model Cities program of the mid 1960s was designed to rehabilitate urban neighborhoods within particular cities. According to Gale, government officials expected Model Cities to curb urban violence because it targeted those factors which they believed caused urban violence, particularly poverty and deprivation in urban neighborhoods. Despite the program, the late 1960s was significantly characterized by urban violence. In the 1990s, the federal government created the EZEC in the wake of mob violence. Gale indicates that this initiative also focused on poverty in urban neighborhoods.

Gale maintains that three contexts shape the character of 1960s relative to 1990s legislation: the problem context, which includes the shifting nature of urban poverty and interracial mob violence; the political context, including the changing environment in which the issues are debated and framed, and the policy context, including the altered structure and content of federal programmatic responses to poverty and mob violence. Model Cities was based on the idea that the poor needed a temporary helping hand, while EZECs are rooted in the idea that individual self-interest rather than government assistance will end poverty. Many of the 1960s urban rebellions were largely African-American, while the Los Angeles rebellions included interracial groupings. The Johnson administration in the 1960s clearly framed the issue in terms of "right" and

"wrong," but the more conservative climate of the 1990s leads President Clinton to avoid mentioning "urban." These are only a few examples of the critical comparisons that Gale pursues.

While Gale adds to our understanding of certain aspects of state responses to urban conditions, his work could have benefited from a keener analysis of repressive measures imposed on urban communities and of the interests of the state in its relationship to cities and poverty. Moreover, it is important for any examination of the relationship between the state and urban communities to analyze the two faces of the state apparatus. That is, the state has the mission of maintaining the status quo while concurrently enacting legislation to change and to improve urban conditions. Gale does not sufficiently explore this dynamic. For example, Gale concludes that a fundamental redistribution of wealth might curb urban violence but does not explore the broader degree of government interest in taking such radical measures. Analytically, the role of state-sponsored violence should not be disassociated from the traditional role of the state in maintaining existing social arrangements. Ironically, the enactment of EZECs paralleled congressional discussion of the Crime Bill. Gale's analysis would have been more robust if he had asked, If federal government officials were interested in improving urban conditions, why did they fail to critically examine policing, while simply increasing police power in urban communities? If the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles policemen sparked the Los Angeles rebellions, why did the federal government fail to explore the possibility of community control of policing?

In my view, Gale should have analyzed additional factors in order to reach an "understanding of urban unrest." In order to actually understand urban unrest, one would need data documenting the opinions and experiences of participants in rebellions as well as other residents of urban communities. Perhaps a combination of an ethnographic study coupled with an analysis of congressional hearings and government documents might help us understand this phenomenon in a more comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, Gale's work takes an important step in that direction.

*Urban Girls: Resisting Stereotypes, Creating Identities.* Edited by Bonnie J. Ross Leadbeater and Niobe Way. New York: New York University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi+409. \$55.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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Peter Adler  
*University of Denver*

Compiled by two psychologists and published by the pathbreaking New York University Press, this book presents original research from a variety

of scholars, including psychologists, sociologists, ethnographers, demographers, and social workers, who endeavor to teach us about the lives of teenage girls in urban settings. Though only two of the contributors are sociologists, the articles have a distinctly sociological bent. The editors represent an innovative breed of psychologists who, by eschewing the unidimensionality of so many of their brethren, have created a new humanistic branch of the discipline that considers traditional sociological variables such as socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, and gender. The volume is distinguished by its mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, drawing almost equally (there is a slight hew toward the qualitative) from both. Capitalizing on new directions in scholarly work that concern "writing culture," the authors of many of these articles, using a poly-vocal style, allow the low-income urban adolescent girls about whom they write to speak for themselves (they are even listed as coauthors). The result is a remarkable assemblage of scholarship that will go a long way toward promoting interdisciplinary work and that has the potential for making an impact on theory and policy.

The book is divided into seven sections that address the central concerns of urban adolescent girls: identity development, family relationships, peer relationships, mentoring relationships, sexuality, health risks, and career development. It would be impossible to review all 21 articles, but highlighting a few will suffice to give the gist of the others. Read the profoundly eerie prose of Jennifer Pastor, Jennifer McCormick, and Michelle Fine's (with their adolescent coauthors) chapter, "Makin' Homes: An Urban Girl Thing," and see how the words and poetry of the girls are used to describe the horrors of attending large, anonymous urban schools that more accurately represent totalitarian prisons than institutions of learning. The article ends with a sensible, perhaps even radical, prescription for improvement. This is postmodern ethnography at its finest. Look at how Mary Waters (in the only single-authored piece by a sociologist) examines the identities of the children of black Caribbean immigrants. Using qualitative interviews, she explores the intersection between their American, ethnic, and immigrant identities to suggest how gender-linked differences shape their choice of ethnic identity. Consider Janie Victoria Ward's study of how African-American parents successfully teach their daughters to resist, rather than cope with, the racism and sexism they experience. Her study is a beacon of light that will serve to empower African-American females in an otherwise darkened world. Finally, Niobe Way, an author as well as an editor, looks at urban adolescents' portraits of their relationships with peers. She finds that though boys have more difficulty making close friends than girls, distrust and betrayal are common characteristics that all of these adolescents assign to their friendships. Lodged in tumultuous school environments and lacking a solid relationship with their parents, these children's pessimistic views of friendships are affected by their social contexts. These are just four examples of the outstanding studies that can be found in this volume.

Although the research selected for this volume is extraordinary

throughout, the book could have been enhanced with the inclusion of a final chapter written by the editors that brings together the various points made by the authors. Ending as it does without a conclusion, readers may be left wishing for a statement that consolidates what has just been presented. In addition, the volume suffers some from its disciplinary boundaries, at times speaking to sociological concerns but not acknowledging them. For instance, some of the research is couched in traditional Blumerian symbolic interactionism, but this seems to remain far from the purview of the authors. The editors (p. 13) claim that research on how social context figures into adolescent identity development is sparse, yet sociologists have been considering these ideas for years.

Despite these relatively minor shortcomings, this edited volume is an exemplar of how research and practice can be wedded. With its beautiful design, useful index, and accessible prose, it can be assigned to undergraduates in social problems, urban sociology, gender studies, race and ethnicity, social psychology, and a host of other courses. Rare is the book that not only provides examples of first-rate scholarship but gives one hope that academic research can evince social change.

*The Art of Being Black: The Creation of Black British Youth Identities.*  
By Claire E. Alexander. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
Pp. xii+209. \$29.95.

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Claire Alexander's research on black identity construction is reminiscent of Howard Becker's exploration into becoming a marijuana user (*Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* [Free Press, 1963]). In Becker's formulation, a novice smoker cannot perceive smoking marijuana as pleasurable without the modeling, coaching, and reinforcement provided by fellow (veteran) users. In a similar way, Alexander argues that constructing a black youth identity requires a community within which members learn from, teach, and challenge each other and attempt to resolve the countless contradictions of ideal imaginations of blackness versus real practices. Yet, like a painting or a poem (using the author's "art" metaphor), the moment one assumes to have grasped an essential black youth identity, a crooked brush stroke or inconsistent tense blurs all that had once been clear. The only way to hazard an interpretation of black identity, Alexander argues, is to anchor that interpretation in the interactions of everyday life. To that end, Alexander reports on her 12-month study of two predominately male groups of young black Britons. As a roommate of one of the participants in the study, Alexander has special entrée to the informal and personal interactions between "the boys."

Drawing heavily from the theoretical contributions of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (including such authors as Stuart Hall

and Paul Gilroy), Alexander's aim is to offer a counter to the "black youth folk devil" that exists in the British and American popular media. Alexander offers a grounded depiction of how her informants construct their racial identity. They are very aware of mainstream stereotypes and are constrained by discrimination in the workplace and the leisure sphere but nonetheless find positive connotations of the notion of a "black community." This community is connected by similar ways of speaking, manners of joking, and in agreed upon displays of respect toward other black men and women. It is also constituted through racial opposites. Alexander finds that "to 'be black' was simply not to 'be white,' and was defined against this perceived yardstick" (p. 51).

The author's further investigation, however, fractures this facade of racial solidarity to expose cleavages of ancestry, class, place, and gender. Who is more black—someone whose family immigrated from the African continent or the child of Jamaican parents? Intraracial childhood taunts and humorous adult banter based on these ethnic differences undermine the notion of a singular black community. Even more important, class and place often overlap to divide segments of the black community. Alexander's informants often gauge someone's blackness by where they live, with the simultaneous understanding that they too are being judged based on their neighborhood. For example, one character, Pauline, thinks herself to be "more black" than Frank and Ricky because she lives in an all-black area, and they do not. While Frank and Ricky hold a certain amount of respect for residents of all-black areas because of the concentration of cultural resources, they have negative perceptions of Pauline's neighborhood because of its association with poverty and violence. This kind of constant jockeying for a positive racial identity based on one's position in the interrelated hierarchies of class and place lends support to Alexander's emphasis on the situationally based construction of blackness.

Alexander is skillful in presenting the "public fiction" of a singular black identity and then deconstructing that identity using the quandaries that her informants face amid the complexities of everyday interactions. Yet, despite this *theoretical assertion*, Alexander concludes that her informants often perform without pause the art of mending the schisms of being black and of being part of a particular class, gender, ethnicity, or neighborhood. She recognizes that "although [her] informants were aware of the mutability of their attitudes and behaviour, this was usually regarded with general disinterest" (p. 194) and that "the existence of a paramount black identity was more a fact of life than a matter of contention" (p. 50). The academic insistence on eschewing essentialist categories is, for the most part, lost on those who believe that the categories really do mean something, acting on them accordingly in their everyday lives.

The book's shortcomings lie in the underexplored area of gender. While two full chapters are devoted to "black masculinity," the equation of black identity with black male identity is a dangerous slip that has been made far too frequently in the literature on black communities. The

easier access to male public spheres and the desire to respond to media stereotypes of black men are not acceptable excuses. A narrow focus on black men only works to promulgate the public fiction of male domination of the black public sphere. While female informants are peripheral in Alexander's research, much of the male discourse is about women. An integrated account of male *and* female talk is needed to truly characterize the construction of black identity.

*An American Dilemma Revisited: Race Relations in a Changing World.*  
Edited by Obie Clayton, Jr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996.  
Pp. xxix+327. \$49.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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*An American Dilemma Revisited* is the published version of the symposium held at Morehouse College in 1994, which was organized in memory of Gunnar Myrdal, the author of the much maligned as well as celebrated work, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944). A number of noted scholars were invited to present papers that were to assess the progress of African-Americans since the publication of Myrdal's book. The upshot of the articles in Clayton's edited volume is summed up by Myrdal's daughter, Sissela Bok, in the forward. Most of the problems that her father discussed at length in his book have not changed much: high unemployment and crime rates, as well as racial prejudice and discrimination in the city and suburbs, continue to plague African-Americans. What can we learn from the articles in this volume?

The articles are of varying degrees of quality in terms of substantive depth as well as style. They range from the more insightful contribution of Stephen Graubard to the run-of-the-mill accounts of how the development of the "managerial class" has exacerbated the growth of the "black underclass" (e.g., the chapter by Darity).

Graubard (chap. 1) discusses how the Carnegie Foundation, cultivating the image of "corporate enlightenment," conceived of sponsoring a major race relations study. They enlisted the services of Gunnar Myrdal, who was supposed to be untarnished by the influences of living in a racially divided society. Graubard notes that the team of scholars was often embroiled in conflicts regarding the scope of the project, the contents of the final product, and the targeted audience. Graubard also examines briefly how *An American Dilemma* fared in the different presidential regimes, having its greatest impact in the 1960s. One reason why Myrdal's book has continued to command the attention of scholars is its complex layers of multiple realities that define the contours of racism and African-American existence in the United States.

Gunnar Myrdal was very critical of the widespread disenfranchisement of African-Americans through various legal as well as extralegal mecha-

nisms. He put much stock in electoral politics, examining the various scenarios in which African-Americans could exert political influence through the ballot. Using Myrdal's work as a baseline, Robert A. Dentler (chap. 2) traces the twists and turns of African-American political participation and the different interest groups and alliances that have been formed and reconstituted in dealing with specific issues. However, the increase in African-American political participation has not translated into the increased capacity to influence policy. In Republican times in particular, African-Americans have fared very badly.

In a similar vein, Reynold Farley (chap. 3) examines the trends in residential segregation since 1944. While the segregation of African-Americans remains higher than that of Latinos and Asians, Farley claims that there were some important developments in the 1970s and 1980s that tended to decrease the level of black-white segregation. Among these he includes new laws, new construction, some growth of the black middle class, continuing softening of racist attitudes among whites, and the movement of blacks into the new and rapidly expanding metropolitan areas.

The three articles by Ferguson, Darity, and Butler examine the economic conditions of African-Americans. I find these to be rather unsatisfactory, given the importance of the issue. Ferguson (chap. 4) examines the trends in the earnings of young black males from the period of the World War II to the 1980s. African-American males made a substantial gain in income, relative to their white male counterparts, that was sustained well into the 1960s. In the 1960s the antidiscrimination measures brought about another round of improvement in black male earnings, particularly in the South. However, the mid-1970s marked the beginning of the decline in the earnings of black males. While a number of the contributing factors introduced by Ferguson have some merit, they are remiss in their failure to take into account the structural crisis of capitalism that was quite visible in the late 1960s and took a turn for the worse in the early 1970s. The practice of focusing on attributes of individuals, who are then "aggregated into groups," is a methodology that is ill equipped to deal with such ponderous issues as the persistence of the economic degradation of African-Americans. This problem is compounded by the statistical practice of assigning causal efficacy to additive factors. The whole is never equal to the sum of its parts, notwithstanding the multiplicative effects that are introduced into regression equations.

The article by Darity (chap. 5) lacks focus as well as depth. He attempts to show that, due to its privileged position in the "production of ideas," the managerial class controls what happens to the economy and government. Counterpoised to the managerial class, which presumably consists of white males, is the proverbial underclass, which is disproportionately black. The causal nexus between the managerial class and the underclass is never demonstrated. This article suffers from some fundamental flaws in both the conceptualization of class and the role of ideas in the reproduction of relations of domination in society. The article also

continues the practice of demonizing impoverished African-Americans by using the term "underclass."

In an attempt to reclaim the equal opportunity of "ethnicity" for African-Americans, Butler (chap. 6) reiterates the same arguments of the "ethnicity theorists" of the 1970s (e.g., Moynihan, Glazer, and Sowell). But while the latter lambasted African-Americans for their cultural deficits, thanks to the legacy of slavery and the vicious cycles of deprivation, Butler claims that there was a period in history in which African-Americans made some substantial strides through self-help and entrepreneurship. He uses the so-called "middleman theory" to buttress his arguments. The trouble with this line of thinking is that African-Americans cannot be equated with other ethnic groups, due to the savagery of white racism. Even under ideal circumstances, it is not evident that one can uplift the whole condition of a group by prescribing entrepreneurship as a solution for socioeconomic inequality.

Walter Allen and Joseph Jewell (chap. 7) assess the condition of African-American education over the years. They observe that African-Americans have made remarkable progress. Relative to whites, African-Americans have achieved parity with respect to literacy rates, school enrollment, and median years of schooling. However, other measures show that African-Americans are significantly less likely to graduate from high school and college and that, for the same level of educational attainment, African-Americans earn less than their white comparison group. Allen and Jewell conclude with rather curious assertions, which, on the one hand, recognize the fact that racial "subjugation" is a "conscious" and "willful" act but, on the other hand, state that the "challenge" is whether white America can live up to its democratic creed.

In his article on the "Church and Social Change," Clayton shows the contradictory roles that the different Christian denominations have played in the quest for social justice. Some prominent personalities of the black church were at the forefront of the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, while others retreated into the background. Clayton contends that the failure of the churches in the urban areas in responding to social justice claims of the time was instrumental in creating a mood of disaffection, prompting a significant number of African-Americans to convert to Islam. What is remiss in Clayton's analysis is the fact that, while some black church leaders chose to stay on the side lines in the Northern "urban areas," there were a number of white progressive church leaders in these same areas who were fighting in the trenches alongside other civil rights activists.

Three articles examine the criminal justice issues since the publication of Myrdal's book. The article by Welch, Combs, Sigelman, and Bledsoe (chap. 9) deals essentially with black attitudes toward the police, using Detroit area survey data. The article does not say much beyond the banal observation that blacks have a greater mistrust of the police than whites. The article by Walker (chap. 10) can be described as nitpicking. It is devoted to demonstrating the flaws in Myrdal's methodology of collecting

data on criminal acts and police behavior. Of the three articles, the one by Spohn (chap. 11) is the most informative. The author shows how reforms have significantly changed the justice system that Myrdal described. Reforms have brought about a greater protection of defendants' rights and reduced the level of discrimination in jury selection, bail setting, right to counsel, and sentencing. However, there are still major racial inequities in the criminal justice system, evidenced by the fact that African-Americans are more likely than whites to be detained, charged, sent to prison, and condemned to death. It is important to note here that a good many of Spohn's observations regarding the criminal justice system are simply a rehash of the findings of other studies.

The article by Antonio McDaniel (chap. 12) examines how the changes in the U.S. population have contributed to racial problems. Most of the observations in this article are a very elementary discourse on racism. More important, the article has very little to say regarding the demographics of African-Americans in a racist society, except for the obvious fact that they are not being assimilated to the same extent as other groups.

The last contribution to *An American Dilemma Revisited* is by Doris Wilkinson (chap. 13), who takes as her point of departure Myrdal's comparison of the status of women with that of African-Americans. Wilkinson asserts that the significance of race over gender is demonstrated by the worldwide politicization of the health crisis that places black women at the center stage—the AIDS/HIV pandemic. In other words, the demonization of victims of AIDS/HIV has shifted from gay white males to black women. A racist ideology legitimizes the triple of oppression of black women by class, gender, and race.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the articles in *An American Dilemma Revisited* fall far short of the task of reassessing the trends in racial inequality in the United States since the publication of Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*. An inevitable comparison will be made by some readers between *An American Dilemma Revisited* and *Turning Back* (Beacon Press, 1995), due particularly to the fact that Steinberg also uses Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* as a point of departure. But while Steinberg's work is given to a critical analysis of the scholarship on race issues and social policies, Clayton's edited volume is concerned with the assessment of empirical trends. To that extent, there is some degree of complimentarity, despite my misgivings regarding the quality of the articles in *An American Dilemma Revisited*.

*Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth.* By Claude S. Fischer, Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann Swidler, and Kim Voss. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+318.

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Like a primitive tribe that concocts a myth to explain a pestilence, our society resurrects the inherited-IQ idea whenever the economy and polity create great disparities in social well-being. *The Bell Curve* (Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray [Free Press, 1994]) is the latest version. *Inequality by Design* is a thoughtful analysis of the many separate contentions in *The Bell Curve*. It rigorously reanalyzes the same data, and it finds many errors, most of which exaggerate the authors' intended conclusions. It presents a thorough critique, but it is much more. Fischer et al. take apart the central contentions of *The Bell Curve*, show the underlying assumptions that have usually been ignored, and subject these assumptions to logical and empirical examination. Like Christopher Jencks et al.'s *Inequality* (Basic Books, 1972), which emerged out of the last IQ controversy, they use a combination of rigorous analyses and easily understood examples to explain their points. This book is not just a careful criticism of a sloppy study. It is a careful analysis of a wide range of topics that pertain to the IQ argument.

Chapter 2 shows that, rather than proving how people are unequal in intelligence, psychometricians design tests to *make* unequal IQs, and items that do not differentiate are discarded, regardless of their importance in explaining intellectual performance. Similarly, the bell curve shape of intelligence is not a finding, but a model to which the actual skewed scores are standardized to fit. This procedure serves to exaggerate the influence of extremely high and low scores, while deemphasizing the middle 90% of scores.

Chapter 3 shows that the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) used in *The Bell Curve* is not a test of intelligence. It tests school achievement, often testing knowledge from specific school courses. The authors summarize analyses that indicate that years of schooling strongly influence AFQT, even after controls for initial IQ. This estimate, when performed correctly, is two to three times larger than the estimate in *The Bell Curve*. Fischer et al. conclude that the AFQT is not a test of intelligence but of "how much instruction people encountered and absorbed" (p. 62). Thus, the central measure of intelligence in *The Bell Curve* actually means something different than the book says.

Chapter 4 reanalyzes *The Bell Curve* status attainment model, correcting many errors (though not pursuing Melvin Kohn's suggestion to analyze reciprocity of effects [*Sociological Forum* (1996) 11:395–411]). The analysis finds that SES is as important as AFQT in affecting poverty, after technical errors are removed. The influence of social factors in-

creases even further after including community attributes, home environment, education, and so on. Fischer et al. conclude that if all adults had the same test scores (but different family origins and environments), income inequality would decrease by about 10%. In contrast, if all adults had the same family origins and environments (but different test scores), income inequality would decrease by about 37%. After documenting the obvious but important point about the ways various social and tax policies create social inequality, the authors conclude that the degree of inequality in American society is far larger than in other societies and creates barriers to our ideals and to society's functioning.

Looking back over this reanalysis, I conclude that *The Bell Curve* has actually made a contribution, although it is not the one its authors intended. Despite the many errors in *The Bell Curve* that exaggerate the importance of the AFQT, the corrected results are still large. But the key point is that the test means something entirely different: *The Bell Curve* is not about intelligence at all. Instead what it offers is an extended analysis of the factors that affect and are affected by school achievement, which is what their supposed measure of intelligence actually measures. The findings in both books indicate the pivotal importance of academic achievement on poverty, even after controlling for educational credentials.

This is an important finding, one that should be more strongly emphasized. Even individuals with the same diploma can vary by several levels in school achievement, which in turn affects poverty. Policies focused solely on credentials may not be sufficient to reduce poverty. Schools and employers should give students stronger incentives for school achievement, since it strongly affects later earnings (James E. Rosenbaum and Kevin Roy, "Long-Term Effects of High School Grades and Job Placements" in *Effective Programs for Students at Risk* [Allyn & Bacon, 1996]).

This is a terrific book, carefully analyzed and well written. Its style could be appreciated by scholars, students, and general readers. The weakest part is the conclusion, where the authors make a general appeal for egalitarian policies in schools, health care, neighborhoods, and tax policy. However, given the importance of achievement in their findings, it is surprising that they do not discuss some of the specific practices that have reduced inequalities in school achievement (e.g., R. E. Slavin, N. L. Karweit, and N. A. Madden, eds., *Effective Programs for Students at Risk* [Allyn & Bacon, 1996]; Gary Natriello, Edward L. McDill, and Aaron M. Pallas, *Schooling Disadvantaged Children* [Teachers College Press, 1990]; and James E. Rosenbaum, "Housing Mobility Strategies for Changing the Geography of Opportunity," *Housing Policy Debate* [1995] 6:231–70). Recalling that some of the 1970s IQ arguments were motivated by perceived failures of poverty programs, effective programs can provide some of the strongest arguments against *The Bell Curve*'s fatalism.

*Organising for Equality: The Evolution of Women's and Racial-Ethnic Organizations in America, 1955–1985.* By Debra C. Minkoff. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995. Pp. xv+176. \$48.00.

Milton Esman  
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The purpose of this short volume, the digest of an earlier dissertation, is to expand social movement theory to incorporate organizational analysis, with a special emphasis on organizational-environmental relationships. The author argues that standard social movements approaches, with their focus on resource mobilization and political opportunity structures, overlook an important determinant of success: the ability of organizations that enable purposeful, sustained social action to make their way in uncertain, changing, and often unsupportive environments. Diffuse cultural, ideological, and political trends may trigger and facilitate social movements, but sustained action and the purposeful pursuit of goals require formal organization. As the external environment changes, organizational leaders must adapt their strategies or lose their relevance and their constituencies. Thus, "the ecology of organizational development . . . mediates the role of resources and opportunities and . . . critically shapes the legitimacy of organized social action" (p. 128).

The social and political environment determines what kinds of organizations and what types of strategies are likely to qualify for legitimacy, including access to critical resources and which resources are likely to be foreclosed. Bellwether organizations that demonstrate success are emulated by similar organizations in parallel, noncompetitive social movements; they exchange mutual support. But within the same social movement, organizations may be highly competitive, struggling to mobilize unorganized constituents behind unfulfilled demands (grievances) in an effort to establish viable niches that enable them to survive and expand. The evolution of such organizations includes at least two phases, initial establishment and long-term maintenance; these present different challenges and require different leadership skills.

To test this approach, the author attempts a statistical analysis of 975 national voluntary associations dedicated to overcoming racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination and oppression in the United States during the three decades between 1955 and 1985. The components of the main identity-based movements in 20th-century America are the African-American, Hispanic-American, Asian-American, and feminist movements. While the unit of analysis is individual organizations, for the author the determinative context is a macrolevel construct, the sociopolitical environment that provides the incentives and the constraints to which individual organizations must accommodate. Though organizations exchange with the environment and the more successful among them may actually modify the environment in their favor, more often the environment sets the terms within which change-oriented organizations must

function and influences the longevity of associations committed to different strategies of action. In the United States during this 30-year span, advocacy organizations fared better than those committed to protest or to service activities, an unexpected finding that the author attributes to the expansion of government-provided services, and the legitimacy accorded by the environment to institutional advocacy. What the reader misses in this macro-organizational typology is the nuanced treatment of strategies and environmental responses, such as the richness and variability of the options and the agonizing decisions confronting organization leaders as they attempt both to maintain their organization and to cope with the often competing demands imposed on them by impatient constituents and a constraining environment.

During the 1960s this reviewer was associated with a pioneering venture, the Interuniversity Research Program in Institution Building, that sought to explore patterns by which change-oriented organizations could achieve internal viability and external acceptance in the context of socio-economic development. Central to that enterprise was the management of linkages between the organization and its external environment, especially linkages with other organizations on which it was dependent for funding, political support, and the exchange of services (*Institution Building: From Concept to Application* [Sage Publications, 1972]). This approach was an innovation in organization theory which, prior to that time, paid scant attention to external and interorganizational relations. In the intervening years, the approach has advanced so considerably. Thus, Minkoff can analyze and evaluate the emergence and evolution of major social movements as a process of interorganizational dynamics within the framework of a changing environment that sets the parameters in which different kinds of organizations pursuing different strategies may compete.

What this approach accomplishes is the expansion of the social movements paradigm, which remains anchored in the well-established resource mobilization and political opportunity traditions, to incorporate the critical dimension of organizational analysis. It serves to explain the main directions of identity-based movements in the United States and the distribution of different kinds of organizations within these movements. If it is to aspire to general theory it must be tested comparatively. First it must be tested against social movements in the United States that are not identity based, for example the environmental movement, then against social movements in other Western societies, and finally against less open systems where political constraints on voluntary associations limit the scope for peaceful advocacy. It is in these latter systems especially that the ingenuity and resourcefulness of change-oriented leaders are challenged and where painful trade-offs may be essential to the survival of organizations and social movements.

*Challenging Macho Values: Practical Ways of Working with Adolescent Boys.* By Jonathan Salisbury and David Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Falmer Press, 1996. Pp. x+304. \$24.95 (paper).

Michael Kimmel

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We fret about teen violence, complain about inner city youth or urban gangs, and express shock at revelations of sexual harassment, drugs, and violence in our suburban schools. Yet such daily news reports rarely, if ever, mention that whether white or black, inner city or suburban, the bands of marauding youths or troubled teenagers are a phalanx composed entirely of young men. Gender in general, and masculinity in particular, remains virtually invisible in our public discourse. In *Challenging Macho Values* Jonathan Salisbury and David Jackson, two British high school teachers who have been central to the growing understanding of the gendered specificity of these problems (Jackson wrote the impressive book, *Unmasking Masculinity* [Routledge, 1991]), address this invisibility in order to tackle perhaps the most difficult question in the study of men and masculinities: How can we get young men to change?

The authors dispense with theoretical equivocations and justifications. As they see it, the problem of adolescent male violence is so urgent that it brings practical matters to the fore. In the United States such questions are most frequently posed by therapists and social workers, while in Britain they are addressed as policy matters. One of Salisbury and Jackson's great analytic virtues is their ability to move easily between these two different ways of addressing the issue, revealing at once the theoretical poverty of their separation and providing a detailed theoretical argument coupled with some extremely valuable and practical lessons. It is rare to find a work that is both theoretically astute and practical.

*Challenging Macho Values* is loaded with hands-on strategies for intervention in young boys' lives. Such exercises allow adolescents to raise issues, confront fears, and overcome anxieties, and they allow teachers to dispel myths, encourage cooperation, and discourage violent solutions to perceived problems. The most valuable material helps boys to deconstruct myths of sexuality and to challenge sexual harassment and sexual violence. The authors see violence not as an expression of gender nonconformity but as located squarely within the normative definition of masculinity. "We believe that masculine violence is intentional, deliberate, and purposeful. It comes from an attempt by men and boys to create and sustain a system of masculine power and control that benefits them every minute of the day" (p. 108). Violence and bullying, they continue, "is an integral part of the social construction of masculinity" (p. 111). Such theoretical assertions are buttressed by several useful exercises that allow boys to show how they have used violence and how violence has been used against them to maintain gender hierarchies.

Throughout the book, Salisbury and Jackson follow the same organiza-

tion—a deft and detailed theoretical argument followed by authorial reflections about their own experiences in directing the workshops and exercises. Each chapter concludes with several pages of exercises, including materials needed, allotted time, likely results, troubleshooting hints, and ways to explore the boys' reactions. Many readers may find the structure a bit wearisome after a while (the authors warn that readers might want to dip into the book as needed, rather than to read it from beginning to end). Some exercises seem more tailored to the British audience and would be difficult to adapt to an American context. But these are minor issues and are easily outflanked.

A more fundamental problem is contained in the title of the work itself. If one is insistently and unceasingly challenging macho values, one might get the impression that masculinity should only be challenged, condemned, or overcome. At times, the authors are so relentless in their criticism of masculinity that the entire gender seems irredeemable. Their criticism may be satisfying in some theoretical circles, but it takes us nowhere if we want to reach young boys who are trying to negotiate their way through a contradictory and confusing normative construction of gender identity. For example, they invite boys to make a list of "fixed, narrow, and often untrue ideas about men" they find in a news story (p. 164)—an easy task, of course, but one that might be more profitable if coupled with the invitation to also come up with some positive ideas that are expressed in the story. Are there none?

Salisbury and Jackson argue that "the manliness of the school institution is fundamentally damaging to both girls and boys" (p. 32)—so much for those who claim that forcing boys to sit still, raise their hands, and be polite in school serves a civilizing, if not feminizing, function. The media collude in concealing the possibilities of tenderness. "What is being left out of the news are the everyday emotions, longing, desires, grief and loss of our lives" (p. 147). While this may be generally true, I am also aware that media coverage of Bosnia, Rwanda, or even your typical fire-murder-car wreck spots increasingly show men in pain, openly weeping, filled with anguish, tense with worry, or sobbing with relief. Men have a wider range of emotions than many critics of masculinity might think. Of course, such displays can also reinforce traditional notions by sensationalizing these nonconformist outbreaks—it must *really* be a tragedy if a man is crying—but it remains important to distinguish between flesh-and-blood men and the construction of a gender identity. Sports, too, serve the interests of power, violence, and hierarchy. "School sport isn't just an innocent pastime, but a heavily gendered, masculinizing process that builds a 'top dog' model of masculinity to aim for and live up to in many boys' lives" (p. 205). True, but one can find moments of transcendent tenderness and homosocial solace and compassion in sports as well as the most vicious brutality and unrepentant rage. If school, sports, and the media are all so corruptingly complicit in the construction of masculinity, then what we are, in effect, asking of these adolescents, who are still wrestling with the most tentative and fragile definitions of them-

selves, is that in order to be virtuous, ethical, and good, they must renounce masculinity and cease striving to be men.

For a book that claims in its subtitle to concern itself with practical ways of working with adolescent boys, I can think of few positions less tenable and, ultimately, less practical. Working with boys means also giving them something to hold onto—a sense that masculinity contains some virtues that can provide a foundation for a new definition that might, in fact, work better than the old one. If we throw these boys overboard, we have to give them more than a life raft; we have to teach them that it is still okay to swim.

*The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood.* By Sharon Hays. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xv+252. \$25.00.

Sandra L. Hofferth  
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Reading this book in the throes of designing a new study of the effects of families and communities on children's development caused me to rethink my assumptions. Are what we profess to be acceptable practices in child rearing based upon facts or upon ideology? Are parents, mothers in particular, exclusively responsible for how children turn out as adults? Can we somehow come up with a child-rearing set of guidelines based upon (social) scientific principles that will have a high degree of reliability and validity? This book provides an answer—what we believe about rearing children is based upon beliefs and ideology, with very little basis in fact. Even when these beliefs appear counter to practical market considerations—the need to participate and to compete successfully in the workforce—they are very strongly held and maintained. What is realistic to expect of parents and parenting and what is not?

These issues are addressed by Sharon Hays in a thoughtful and carefully written new book that provides excellent material for family demography or women's studies courses at the graduate level. Through intensive interviews with 38 mothers, the author raises the internal contradictions and ambivalence of motherhood. As the ideology of rationality, materialism, competition, efficiency, and individualism has flourished, so has the tenacity of the ideology of intensive mothering—that a mother should devote extensive time and energy to raising children and that the attention she and only she gives them provides an important edge relative to others as they mature.

The first chapter provides an excellent overview of the author's argument. I found myself saying, "but what about . . .," only to have the concern addressed in the following section or page. For example, much of the interaction between mother and child can be seen as a function of the love the mother expresses for her child. However, the author points out that love can be expressed in varying child-rearing practices around

the globe, including the process of female circumcision. Another concern is that children have certain basic needs. The author argues that, while basic needs for sustenance and nurturance must be met, there are a wide variety of ways and persons that could meet these needs. Furthermore, social science research notwithstanding, the *best* way to meet these needs is ambiguous. This book does not, therefore, address what is known or not known about the best ways to raise children but focuses upon the ideology of intensive mothering and why it is considered "correct" and "natural."

The ideology of intensive mothering developed out of the separation of private and public spheres with the movement of work outside the home resulting from industrialization. The values of the home developed as an explicit rejection of the values of the workplace. This distinction remains today. "The relationship between mother and child symbolizes . . . opposition to social relations based on the competitive pursuit of individual gain in a system of impersonal contractual relations" (p. 18). In chapters 2 and 3, the author develops the historical foundations of intensive mothering from Puritan New England to Dr. Spock and today's child-rearing manuals. Utilizing her small sample of mothers, she describes their beliefs and practices in rearing their own children and how they balance the two worlds of paid work and child rearing (chaps. 4-6).

As women gain more status, power, and material success outside the home, many have expected that their allegiance to intensive mothering will decline—they will remain childless or at least have fewer children. This has not happened in the United States at least. Instead, mothers rationalize their child-rearing practices. They "valorize their position as mothers to enhance their social status" (p. 158). "The more intensive the techniques of appropriate child rearing, the more mothers can claim that their job is a demanding and complex enterprise requiring high levels of knowledge and skill" (p. 159). Men are simply not acceptable substitutes as they do not appear to have bought into the intensive parenting ideology as mothers have. They do not think the same way, have laxer standards, and are less intensively involved in parenting. They are also better playmates than mothers, who are more concerned about caring than playing.

In chapter 7, the author raises the functionalist question of whose interest intensive parenting serves—the interests of the employer, of the government, of men—but leaves it unresolved. There are other ways child rearing could be organized that would be as or more efficient than intensive maternal care. Therefore, pinning the blame on an external agency does not seem possible. While the arguments are intriguing and thought provoking, as an empirical sociologist, I feel they need to be tested on larger, more representative U.S. samples and on mothers and fathers in countries where culture and public policy decisions may differ from those in the United States.

*Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage.* By Lee Ann Banaszak. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xv+291. \$49.50 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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This book is a significant addition to the growing literature on woman suffrage and women's movements in general. The purpose of *Why Movements Succeed or Fail* is ambitious and significant—to disentangle the relative importance of three factors that have been used to explain the progress of social movements: (1) resource mobilization, (2) political opportunity structure, and (3) values and beliefs of the participants. Banaszak, a political scientist, compares the post-World War II movement for woman suffrage in Switzerland with its pre-1920 American counterpart and concludes that, among all three factors, the most important reason for the 70-year delay of suffrage in Switzerland was related to collective values and beliefs, what has been variously termed "frames," "culture," or "discourse." The political structure and culture of Switzerland highly valued local autonomy and working with the established parties rather than using pressure group tactics and feminist lobbying efforts. Swiss suffragists, unlike the Americans, were much less likely to use confrontational tactics and, instead, tried to work within the establishment. Their alliances with socialist and Catholic women's organizations kept them from uniting and confronting the authorities with a single voice. It is this difference that Banaszak attributes to values and beliefs.

Banaszak's comparative design spotlights the importance of culture and opens the debate of whether her methods are adequate for her argument. Until now, only a few scholars—such as Eileen L. McDonagh's study of state suffrage referenda, (see, e.g., "Women's Right to Vote in a Gendered American State," Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, 1990) or Steven C. Hause and Anne R. Kenney's analysis of the adoption of woman suffrage in France (see, e.g., *Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic* [Princeton University Press, 1984])—have given as much emphasis to political structure or collective beliefs as factors in the acceptance of woman suffrage. This book, therefore, makes an important contribution by conceptualizing and measuring the incidence of various tactics and initiatives in a given structure of political opportunities.

However, the analysis stops short of providing an airtight case for the preeminent importance of shared values and beliefs. Banaszak fails to elaborate the meaning of culture sufficiently and ends up equating it with a degree of willingness to use confrontational tactics or to form alliances. Thus, her definition of culture is reductionist and is related to her first two variables in a circular way. She needs to delve more deeply into the question, Why are people willing to be rebellious or to forge ties to potential allies?

How could the problem be fixed? First, the vote should be recognized for what it is—not only a tool of democracy in the hands of citizens but a *symbol* tied to larger issues that vary by national setting. The associations with this symbol undoubtedly vary. Did the Swiss women associate the vote with the women's demand for equal opportunities to enter higher education or the professional world, or did they associate it with the demand to clean up politics, as did the American women a century earlier? Had Swiss feminist leaders experienced some major frustration of their educational, family, or career aspirations as Joseph Gusfield, Ruth Bordin, and I found among the American temperance and suffrage leaders? Answers to these questions are needed if one is to have an independent, rather than circular, explanation of a predisposition to certain tactics and alliances.

In addition, the comparative design has to be further limited. Contrasting two countries of such different physical, demographic, and economic dimensions, one is bound to have major differences in culture. The question is *which* values and beliefs are the crucial ones for shaping the outcome of a movement like woman suffrage. For explaining differences between feminist movements, the most illuminating value differences are likely to be found in prevailing ideologies about sex roles (i.e., the ways that having the vote will affect the belief that women and men are different or the same). Ideologies are likely to vary according to education, occupational status, and family status. Yet, nowhere in Banaszak's book can one find any tables on women's educational or employment levels or other demographic variables known to be correlated with feminist ideals. One would like to know more about the educational and labor force status of Swiss women who composed the two major feminist organizations in 1970 and in what ways they differed from suffragists of 1900 in the United States. What motivated the different groups of Swiss feminists? How were differences in their personal backgrounds and their interests apparent in their distinct styles of organizing? If we had these answers, we would be more readily convinced that differences in values and beliefs do, in fact, underlie a movement's choice of tactics and use of political opportunities. In the meantime, appreciation is due to this author for her meticulous research on the political styles of these contrasting woman suffrage movements. She has used them to point out a more comprehensive theory of social movements, and she has raised a number of interesting questions along the way.

*Building the Third Sector: Latin America's Private Research Centers and Nonprofit Development.* By Daniel C. Levy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. Pp. xx+348. \$45.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Edward H. Berman  
*University of Louisville*

This study of Latin America's private research centers (PRCs) provides insights into a network of institutions that are making significant contributions to that continent's growing research potential. Levy's focus leads to an examination of such topics as the role of international philanthropy both in shaping and in supporting domestic research agendas while simultaneously helping Latin American researchers strengthen their ties with the scholarly community beyond their national borders. Finally, the book raises questions concerning the role of nonprofit organizations in helping to redefine national political cultures, in this case political cultures with a decidedly authoritarian, and not infrequently totalitarian, bent.

The book's major theme is that "PRCs have displaced public universities as the region's leading producers and disseminators of social science and policy research" (p. 1). Levy marshals considerable evidence to explain how and why this has come about, the major reason being the paucity of research generated by Latin American public universities. The failure is attributable both to structural weaknesses within the institutions and to the debilitating effect of political regimes whose repressive policies make certain research agendas untenable when they do not physically drive social science and policy researchers into internal or external exile. It is ironic that such governmental policies frequently lead researchers to abandon public universities while simultaneously encouraging them to seek intellectual (and sometimes physical) sanctuary within the growing network of PRCs, which, ideally, offer a modicum of professional autonomy.

This apparently contradictory situation raises an obvious question: Given that PRCs frequently house critics of government policies, why are they allowed to survive? Levy cites several reasons, including the government's reluctance to antagonize even more important constituencies, especially the church (which often supports a variety of nonprofit organizations) and moderate domestic political opposition groups. At the same time, repressive governments are concerned about international opinion, regular rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. The presence of PRCs and other nonprofits is used to deflect external criticism that draws attention to the manner in which these governments violate human rights and stifle intellectual freedom. Yet another reason, and here the contradictions increase, is that PRCs sometimes provide advice that influences government decision making on social issues.

Levy spends considerable time discussing the funding sources for this expanding PRC network. Major North American foundations figure

prominently in his analysis, particularly the Ford Foundation and, to a lesser extent, the Rockefeller Foundation. He acknowledges that such external funding sources place PRCs in precarious situations, as they are dependent for their very existence on foreign largesse that is only sometimes supplemented by domestic sources. At the same time, he rejects the major contentions of dependency theorists concerning the distorting nature of the relationship linking donor and recipient organizations, arguing instead that the relationship can be better understood as one of shared interests rather than as one of control. To be sure, international philanthropy provides funding for projects that frequently have been determined in New York rather than in the host capital, and the pattern of short-term funding raises questions about program relevance as well as continuity. But, Levy argues, the commonality of interests between the foundations and the PRCs more than compensates for the inherently unequal relationship that characterizes the transaction. His discussion here is perhaps one of special pleading, especially as his major argument is drawn primarily from the one example of *El Colegio de México*, but at least he does explore the many facets of this controversial issue.

Latin American PRCs particularly, and nonprofit organizations more generally, must be understood as having a decidedly democratic influence; they not only give sanctuaries to threatened scholars (and who can but applaud both the PRCs and their foundation supporters for this?), they simultaneously expand the reach of civil society in countries where this sector has been notoriously weak. Levy applauds the way in which the PRCs have played a major role in "the transformation of political orientations toward moderate democratic visions" (p. 172) while arguing that their greatest contribution to pluralism is "to sustain and promote alternatives to government policy" (p. 160). Rather than being irrelevant to Latin American social and political change, as some critics argue, Levy contends that the PRCs give special attention to the region's poor and women, thereby helping to move (however modestly) some of society's most marginalized groups toward the mainstream.

This comprehensively researched book provides a detailed guide to a little-known sector of Latin America's higher education network. It also raises important questions concerning the necessary institutional arrangements required to nudge authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in more democratic directions. Levy notes early on that this is not an easy book. He is correct. It is at times ponderous, in some places long on rationalizations and justifications, and too frequently it lapses into academic jargon. But these are minor irritants in a book that provides serious, and at times convincing, insights into a topic deserving of a wider audience.

*The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India.* By Zaheer Baber. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. viii+298. \$71.50.

Joseph Gusfield  
*University of California, San Diego*

One of the arguments for colonial rule has been that it brought the benefits of science and western technology to peoples who had neither. In his evaluation of this view in *The Science of Empire*, Zaheer Baber eschews the argument, and he has made a useful contribution to a better understanding of the impact of science, both pure and applied, on India. Baber, a sociologist at the National University in Singapore, has written an historical account of Indian science and technology in pre-British eras and during British domination. His major assertion is that the development of science and technology in colonial India resulted from complex processes involving the state of scientific knowledge in precolonial India, Indian institutions, colonial imperatives, and the active role of both Indian and British scientists, engineers, and health personnel.

The book contains three distinct sections. The first, and introductory chapter, contains an excellent account of the current constructivist approach to the study of science. However the bulk of the study is of institutional and macroelements. In a second part of the book, the author draws on a variety of sources in Indian history to describe the indigenous institutions and scientific knowledge in ancient and medieval India. There were a number of instances of a scientific and inventive character that belie the view of "ignorance" which some, if not many, colonialists entertained. Examples are such matters as irrigation canals, Ayurvedic medicine and medicines, astronomical observatories, and, of course, the invention of the number zero. There was a two-way street, albeit narrow, between Western scientists and Indians in which each influenced the other.

Approximately the last two-thirds of the book are devoted to the colonial period. Baber devotes much attention to the technological and engineering feats which the British developed and supported, such as agricultural improvements, rail transportation, and the development of antimalaria medicines. He shows how many of these were responses to the imperatives of colonial rule as means to solve economic problems in Britain, improve the health and productivity of the Indian population, or protect and retain the health and safety of the British in India. Scientific research was often a solution to problems posed by colonial needs.

Baber also shows how the British drew on the indigenous technical culture of India and how the Indians, especially the middle class, sought and utilized scientific education for self-advancement. Much of the final chapter is a history of the ways in which needs for scientific and technical

personnel were reflected in the decisions the British made for the development of Indian education.

Despite the general utility of Baber's study, there are significant aspects of it that remain conspicuously neglected. There is no mention of the role of overseas education on Indians or of the emigration of Indian scientists, physicians, and engineers and their impact abroad. Baber does discuss at length the expansion of Indian education under the British and the arguments of a Western, English education versus a traditional, vernacular one. However, he fails to indicate two important consequences of Western education. One consequence is the emergence of an Indian administrative elite that has been responsible for an effective government after independence. In meeting colonial imperatives, the British ignored mass education at primary levels and opted for a system in which only a small segment of the population is educated at the primary level, with a high percentage of them going on to higher levels. A second, and perhaps more important, consequence that Baber ignores is the impact of expansion on the curriculum, the use of English, and the very networks that future independent leaders developed. Macauley may have been prescient in the mid 19th century. Influential in the decision for a Western-style education, he responded to critics who maintained that such an education would foster movements for Indian independence. Were that to be a result of British education, answered Macauley, it would be England's proudest hour.

I wish that Baber had analyzed a little more the general consequences of the transmission of science and technology on Indian civilization, its secular assumptions and the arousal of its consumer wants, and the attractions and repulsions which this has engendered in India. As Baber recognizes, but does not elaborate on, Western technology has not always been attractive to Indians, most notably Gandhi. Perhaps Baber will turn his attention to such matters in the future, having begun with this valuable study.

*Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War.* By Hugh Gusterson. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996. Pp. xviii+351. \$39.95.

Donald MacKenzie  
*University of Edinburgh*

At the start of this fine book, Hugh Gusterson describes the moment in 1984 when his research began. Then an antinuclear activist, he was debating against a nuclear weapons designer from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. His opponent, sick with a cold, struggled to explain to a hostile, heckling audience why he believed his work to be honorable and important. Gusterson found himself wishing the audience would be

quiet so that he would hear what the man had to say. "I knew my career as an activist was ending," says Gusterson (p. xi), and he began to feel a pull toward the anthropological fieldwork in and around Livermore that led to *Nuclear Rites*.

Gusterson describes the laboratory, its staff, and the community surrounding it. He examines recruitment (the Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories employ 6% of all U.S. physicists [p. 43]), and discusses the socialization of recruits as they learn the "central axiom" that "nuclear weapons exist to save lives and prevent war" (p. 57). The predominantly white, male, middle-class weapons scientists are not all hawks. Half of them had voted for Dukakis against George Bush; some had opposed the Vietnam War; a number were active environmentalists. Their workplace is a relaxed place, where they can dress casually, are not tied to fixed hours, and are free from the pressures of university life. One university physicist, many of whose students had gone to Livermore, says that "the weapons physicists often tend to be . . . gentler, less competitive types" (p. 46).

Yet, these gentle, liberal Christians (two-thirds are church members [p. 59]) are developers of the most terrifying of modern technologies. This paradox is Gusterson's central concern. He highlights it by contrasting the world of nuclear weapons designers with that of their 1980s peace-movement counterparts (also predominantly white and middle class) who demonstrated outside the Livermore Laboratory and at the Nevada nuclear test site. The barbed wire fence around the laboratory separated two realities: one of dispassionate, analytical thought in which the vulnerability of the human body is a matter for either joking or calculation; the other in which emotion is celebrated and bodily vulnerability and terror emphasized. The differences, Gusterson reports, even enter the world of dreams. While around two-thirds of peace group audiences had nightmares about nuclear war, almost no weapons scientists suffered them (p. 197).

Noting the important role played in peace groups by members of the welfare and caring professions, Gusterson sees the split, in part as one between the "technocratic" and "humanistic" wings of the new middle class (p. 193). It is also a gendered split between a world of "masculine rationality" and a movement, largely led and peopled by women, that "must be seen in part as an insurrectionary assertion of the culture of the domestic sphere against a masculine public culture of science and war" (p. 211). The moments when the two worlds meet are of particular poignancy. Gusterson retells (p. 100) the story of former nuclear weapons designer Ted Taylor weeping uncontrollably on a visit to Moscow's Red Square. He remembered being in the Pentagon and reading intelligence data on nuclear targets in Moscow, while his wife was giving birth to their child.

A crucial part of *Nuclear Rites* is Gusterson's anthropological analysis of the significance of nuclear testing. Testing had a ritual function as well as an overt purpose to gather data. While most people fear nuclear

explosions, weapons designers had to worry about their bombs not exploding—Livermore's early history was marked by humiliating test site fizzles. Gusterson argues that the sense of mastery gained from successful tests alleviated potential anxieties about the reliability not just of individual weapons but of nuclear deterrence as a whole. Testing was also crucial in a cognitive hierarchy in which the authority of "test-seasoned" designers was central. By necessity, the world of the nuclear weapons designer must be largely a closed one. Achieving the "Q-clearance" needed for access was only a first step; the nuclear test was a more discriminating initiation rite.

In a time of science wars—heated debates over a sociological perspective on science—Gusterson's book carries a lesson. He is honest about his antinuclear predilections, but also open about how his fieldwork experiences have changed him emotionally as well as intellectually; he reports the loss of his visceral fear of nuclear weapons. The man he debated against in 1984, Thomas Ramos, is one of nine participants whose comments on the text are reproduced. Says Ramos, "His observations rang true to me, even though they occasionally stung my sensitivities" (p. 247). Not all of Ramos's colleagues agree, but Gusterson's brave and honest book is testimony to his fieldwork skills and to his achievement of a measure of what one might even dare to call objectivity.

*Organisations in America: Analysing Their Structures and Human Resource Practices.* By Arne L. Kalleberg, David Knoke, Peter V. Marsden, and Joe L. Spaeth. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996. Pp. xvi+382. \$58.00 (cloth); \$27.95 (paper).

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For many years, social scientists have been lobbying the National Science Foundation (NSF) and various other federal agencies to support development of a matched national sample of organizations and employees. The argument has been that building a longitudinal data set could harness the power of the social sciences in tracking the changes in jobs and employment experiences in a manner useful for both basic and policy-relevant research. This book begins to test this idea. The authors analyze data from the National Organization Study (NOS), a representative sample of work establishments in the United States that was obtained by asking respondents to the 1991 General Social Survey (GSS) for the names and contact information of their places of work. Organizational data were then collected from personnel managers via telephone interviews.

Each chapter of the book is written by one of the authors and one or more colleagues. A wide range of topics are covered, arranged under three headings: (1) organizational structures (size, control and coordination sys-

tems, formalization, etc.), (2) human resource practices (staffing, training, unionization, earnings, and benefits), and (3) the changing workforce (contingent work and gender differences). By the end of the book, the reader has a pretty good idea of the strengths and weaknesses of this design and the data it generated.

Any survey is only as informative as the theoretical framework used to guide the choice of questions asked. The theoretical lens used to design a national survey that seeks to inform policy makers carries an especially heavy burden since it must be responsive to both current policy issues and future, often difficult to anticipate, shifts in policy agendas. In their introductory chapter, the authors outline their chosen model—a structural approach to organizations and employment practices. They trace the evolution of this structural perspective from the 1960s studies measuring organizational bureaucracies through the internal labor market models introduced in the 1970s to the "new" structuralist perspectives of the 1990s that seek to relate organizational and internal labor market features to social and economic stratification. While this is a broad and defensible approach, it produces a somewhat static and mechanical view of how employment relationships and organizations are determined and evolve. The analysis would have been greatly enriched by building in some complementary (and competing) perspectives on these issues from industrial relations (i.e., a greater focus on interests, power, the nature of union-management relations, and governance systems), from human capital (education, training, compensation, and mobility), or from strategic human resources (competitive strategies, leadership values, and the role of human resource professionals and line manager relationships).

The major contribution of the book is to provide a snapshot of the structural features and human resource practices of a representative sample of organizations circa 1991. The results reported provide a national benchmark against which the rate of change in practices and their consequences might be gauged if and when the survey is replicated. Most of the key findings reported relate to organization size. Size is positively correlated with formalization, decentralization, codification of rules, well-developed internal labor markets, the extent of training, high performance work systems, earnings and fringe benefit levels, and earnings inequality among managers. Widespread use of contingent workers and gender segregation are also reported. Many of these findings have been documented in prior studies with more limited samples, however, the value added here lies in the validation of these results and the more precise baseline measurement of the levels and variations in these organizational and human resource practices for comparison with future studies. For this reason alone, this book provides essential source material for all researchers engaged in research on workplace topics.

The biggest weakness of the design, as the authors note, is having only one employee observation per organization. This makes it impossible to sort out individual versus organizational effects when the two provide equally plausible explanations for a finding. The authors also note that

many of the most interesting issues related to the changes or transformations occurring in employment relationships today are difficult to see with these data. Policy analysts will undoubtedly add that the data provide only a general, five-year-old snapshot of the employment practices and are not directly useful for assessing options open to either program administrators or for assessing the performance of any particular policy or regulation.

These limitations are recognized by the authors and therefore should not diminish the contributions of this impressive complication of current practices and the potential value that can be realized by *replicating* and *enhancing* the design of this type of study. Of the enhancements suggested by the authors, the most valuable would be to add multiple employee respondents to the organizational samples in order to assess the effects of organizational structures and policies against the processes and relationships among workers, managers, and external institutions and networks. I would also urge an expansion of the theoretical lens guiding the choice of questions to better capture the essence of the transformations underway and to test alternative explanations for their consequences. Finally, to gain government support, future studies must be attentive to and flexible enough to speak to policy issues that will endure over the time span required to conduct and to report the results of the project. These are tall orders, however, they need to be tackled if the full potential of this important project is to be realized. I hope the authors and the NSF stay committed to the project.

*Consumption and Identity at Work.* By Paul du Gay. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996. Pp. vi+213. \$65.00 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

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Du Gay sets out to provide some answers to what he calls the question of identity in contemporary society: "This book is an attempt to explore some of the new articulations that are emerging within the world of paid work and organizations . . . it is concerned with delineating and examining the construction of new work identities and the production of different work-based subjects" (p. 3). He claims he will do this using theoretical tools derived from sources not traditionally associated with the study of work and organizations. In addition, as signaled by his title, he aims to investigate some of the ramifications of the stress on consumption in modern society.

In pursuit of these aims du Gay divides his book in two parts. The first part, consisting of four chapters, is intended to explore limitations in traditional approaches to the analysis of work identities and to construct an alternative framework founded on the concept of discourse (his new theoretical tool). The purpose of the second part is to develop the

themes raised in the first part through an examination of changes in retailing—a sector, du Gay believes, in which the blurring of boundaries between production and consumption identities is most pronounced. This section contains material drawn from his research of four retail organizations and is based on a small number of stores in and around London.

Du Gay has chosen a potentially interesting area to investigate, but he simply does not deliver on most of the claims he makes. Indeed, the book has a number of profound flaws that detract from its usefulness. I will detail just three main criticisms.

First, du Gay's theoretical approach is unconvincing. He begins by summarizing and appraising sociological approaches—the Marxist, neo-Weberian, and interactionist—to issues of work identity. This is done competently but similar points have been made many times before and nothing new is added to our understanding. Du Gay would surely have done better to start with some existing critiques of orthodox approaches to his main themes and move on from these. He also displays a penchant for paradoxes produced by French philosophers that pose as pertinent analytical *aperçus*. One phrase by Laclau, for example, is quoted on pages 2 and 37 and is paraphrased on page 48, and does not bear the weight of repetition. All we learn from the forage into "discourse theory" is that it is important to study "meaning" when thinking about identities. Fragmented theoretical musing takes up far too much of the book, and one result is that menus keep being proffered long after a substantial meal is due. More than halfway through the book, readers are still being assured that we will soon be shown how "interventions aimed at, and constituting, the subjectivity of the enterprising consumer have repercussions for the ways in which the work-based subject of retailing is produced and regulated" (p. 119), a dish that has been promised many times before.

Second, the empirical section of the argument is far too brief and does not do what du Gay suggests it will. I am not sure the information he collected, using interviews and a little nonparticipant observation, could ever have been particularly relevant to illuminating identities (surely participant observation would have been a more appropriate method). In any case, it is noticeable that in chapters 6 and 7 issues of personal (as opposed to organizational) identity are not really explored and such analysis as is offered depends more on the author's interpretation of people, situations, and events than it does on any systematic scrutiny of specific discourses. The unintegrated "theoretical" edifice, so elaborately erected, serves no real purpose here, or, at least, what we learn is that while managers say the worker's perception is usually this—none too startling a finding in industrial research. This point is all the more important because at the outset du Gay asserts, "What it means to be a worker is no longer as certain as it once was" (p. 3), but what comes through the empirical material is no "crisis of identity" but a few eternal verities of the experience and attitudes of those who have to sell their labor power.

Third, du Gay's study was produced as a thesis, and, whatever the reason, there are places where its effectiveness is lessened because it

seems to have been lying on the shelf for too long. Statements such as "Morris (1988) has recently provided . . ." (p. 58) are suggestive not only of lax editing but of the fact that other material, which has appeared recently on most of the issues under discussion, could have been included with advantage. So du Gay's arguments about "the pursuit of excellence," "customer care," and so on are just a little bit stale. Overall, to be frank, the book has little of importance to say about the effects of modern consumption on anyone's identity.

*Performing Rites: On the Values of Popular Music.* By Simon Frith. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. viii+352.

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Oxford and Berkeley trained, English scholar Simon Frith has had more of interest to say about rock music than any other sociologist. He has authored *Sociology of Rock* (Constable, 1978), *Sound Effects* (Pantheon, 1981), *Art into Pop* [Methuen, 1987] written with Howard Thorne), and *Music for Pleasure* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), as well as edited or coedited six anthologies relating to music in the 1990s. As important, Frith has applied his sociological sensitivities to pop music criticism in outlets ranging from the *Sunday Times of London* to the *Village Voice*. Weaned on cultural Marxism, Frith both uses and critiques the production perspective in cultural sociology to raise the basic question, What roles does music play in people's lives?

*Performing Rites* is divided into three parts. The first deals with how music is evaluated. In chapter 1, Frith says that pieces of pop music should not be judged by their market popularity any more than should pieces of classical art music. His focus on valuation foregrounds the role of the music critic relative to that of the social scientist, the musician, and the fan, but Frith makes this assertion seem less humanist-elitist by noting that all producers and consumers, not just writers, regularly make evaluations.

In the second chapter, Frith reviews the arguments about the distinctions that have been made between high art and low. His contribution is to see that art music, pop music, and folk music are not so much distinct art *worlds* as they are three evolving discourses and criteria of evaluation that play in every field of music. And he illustrates this point by presenting examples of fine art and folk culture criteria of evaluation in recent rock criticism. The valuable insight that pop, fine, and folk criteria operate as forms of evaluative discourses in all kinds of music should have been carried forward into later chapters, but Frith returns to seeing them as discrete art worlds or, as in chapter 11, as stages in technological change.

Chapter 3 richly illustrates the operation of the three different critical

discourses mentioned in chapter 1. In everyday musical practice, Frith suggests, differing lines of criticism are central to musicians, to audiences, and to the vast apparatus between them that he calls producers. He concludes the chapter by showing that to make sense of the musical landscape, producers and consumers alike throw up boundaries between genres of music, which, because of their inadequacies, change continuously. While his numerous illustrations are suggestive, Frith does not show us any underlying coherence in the process of distinction making or in the patterns of change in genre rules.

Part 2 of the book, "On Music Itself," richly illustrates the dictum that music is a social activity. Thus, for example, the answer to the question posed in chapter 5 ("Where does music come from?") is that it comes from social conventions about music making and appreciation. Chapters 6 and 7 about rhythm focus on the inadequacies of dualities often invoked in explaining rhythm: dualities embedded in prevalent ideologies of race, sex, body, time, and mind.

In chapter 8 on songs as texts, Frith argues persuasively that song texts cannot be meaningfully understood through the standard methods of content analysis because the meaning of the words is shaped by the music, by its performance, and by its reception. "Voice," the subject and title of chapter 9, for Frith has to do primarily with the question of authorship, that is, whose ideas and feelings are being expressed (those of the writer, the singer, the audience, etc.) and the conventions within which voice is interpreted. Frith begins chapter 10, "Performance," by distancing himself from the critical move of the moment that sees performance as text. He says that the meaning of performance, like the interpretation of words and voice, is shaped by the particular social context in which it is embedded.

Chapter 11, "Technology," suggests that contemporary devices of mechanical reproduction tend to separate particular music forms from the time, place, and social context of their production, and the new technologies make available a vast array of musics that can be summoned at will as discrete bits and pieces. Thus Frith sees that, in the era of mass production, music experience is individualized, and musical taste becomes a badge of personal identity.

The brief part 3 of the book asserts "Why Music Matters." Chapter 12, "The Meaning of Music," presents a reprise of earlier assertions—that music is a social experience, and so forth. Frith then asserts that music is experienced as something different from social experience as if its meaning is inherent in the music per se. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to refuting this appearance by reviewing notions of aesthetic value in three centuries of European art music.

Embedded in a discussion of popular music criticism, *Performance Rites* can be read as a thoroughgoing critique of the current humanist turn that sees art and everything social as if it were a text abstracted from social context and recontextualized à la ideological deconstruction. In insisting on performance, Frith is asserting that "musical meaning is

socially constructed" (p. 269). This may be news for those who view all life as text, but for the rest of us, I wish he had begun the book with the dictum with which he ends the final chapter: "The question is not how a piece of music, a text, 'reflects' popular values, but how—in performance—it produces them" (p. 270). This is a challenge for all cultural sociology.

*Sociologies of Food and Nutrition.* By William Alex McIntosh. New York: Plenum Press, 1996. Pp. xii+314. \$45.00.

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The sociology of food and eating is becoming something of a speciality in its own right. It has not yet attracted the numbers needed to create a section of its own in the ASA, but there are already other networks and groupings for those working in the field. By the early 1990s, it was judged to have generated a sufficient body of research for the International Sociological Association's journal *Current Sociology* for the first time to commission one of its lengthy survey articles (which was also published as a short book: S. J. Mennell, A. Murcott, and A. van Otterloo, *The Sociology of Food: Eating, Diet and Culture* [Sage, 1992]). The new sub-discipline comes of age, however, with the publication of McIntosh's long-awaited and altogether more ambitious full-length book.

What McIntosh seeks to provide is not just a survey of current knowledge in the field—though he does that very well—but also an application of recent sociological theories to problems of food and nutrition. "My goal," he writes (p. v), "is to persuade others to see the relevance of food and nutrition studies for further development of sociological theory." Food and foodways are indeed relevant to many of the eternal problems of sociological theory, thanks to food being—on the one hand—a basic biological necessity of life and—on the other hand—one of the most sensitive markers of cultural difference and cultural change.

McIntosh's survey of theoretical approaches to the field before the last decade or thereabouts is rather laconic and may not be fully comprehensible to undergraduate readers (though the graduate student part of the intended audience will, one assumes, have enough theoretical background to make sense of it). McIntosh excuses his brevity on the grounds that others, including Anne Murcott and I, have presented critiques of functionalist approaches (e.g., Audrey Richards's work), structuralist approaches (Lévi-Strauss's, Mary Douglas's, and Claude Fischler's work), and developmentalist approaches (Marvin Harris's, Sidney Mintz's, and my own work). Another excuse could have been that, prior to the mid-1980s, more theoretically inspired work had been done in this area by anthropologists than by sociologists. Nevertheless, a little too much is perhaps taken for granted in these early pages of McIntosh's book. He

is more surefooted in chapter 3, "Culture and Food," under which heading he discusses food in relation to modernization theory, critical theory, postmodernism, the theory of risk society, consumerism, and other recent fashions. More specifically, there are interesting explorations of the relevance to food (and vice versa) of the ideas of George Ritzer, Herbert Marcuse, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, Ulrich Beck, and Pierre Bourdieu. McIntosh's trust in the synthetic writings of Anthony Giddens is especially evident.

Other valuable chapters deal with food and the family, with particular reference to feminist theories; social stratification and the distribution of nutrition; the body and sociology, referring to the mass of writing on eating disorders and to the theoretical work of Turner and other sociologists of the body though not, surprisingly, to that of Pasi Falk; and the sociology of famine. I was somewhat less happy with the chapter "Food and Social Change" because the idea of studying "social change" as a separate topic in sociology seems curiously antediluvian—"everything changes all of the time"—and the old-fashioned air is emphasized by such subheadings as "evolutionary theories," "equilibrium theories," "conflict theories," and so on. That all seemed a bit of a throwback after the earlier chapter on "food and culture." I suppose McIntosh's rather disparate chapter headings reflect no more than the fragmented state of theoretical sociology today.

All in all, this is an extremely welcome book for all those who teach and research in the sociology of food and eating, and it also largely succeeds in its aim of making food a topic of interest to theorists. The volume is, however, marred by poor production standards. It is absolutely riddled with misprints, some of them seriously irritating. On page 30, Fischler's famous notion of *gastro-anomie* is printed as "gastromie," thus obscuring the whole meaning (and wit) of the original. On page 33, the word "bourgeoisie" twice appears as an adjective instead of "bourgeois." Names are a matter of hit and miss: on page 37, even the beer is misspelled twice as "Micheleob," and my former colleague Joanne Finkelstein consistently appears as "Finklestein" throughout the book. Judging from certain technical aspects of page layout (paragraphs not ranged left after headings, excessive indentations on first lines of paragraphs elsewhere), I would guess that Plenum set this book directly from the author's disks, with scarcely any professional editorial attention. I sympathize with McIntosh: I am a lousy typist too, but I look to my publishers to tidy up after me.

American Journal of Sociology

*Education and Democratic Citizenship in America.* By Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. xxi+268. \$48.00 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

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For the past several decades of intensive investigative labor into the mysteries of political participation, one of the most persistent puzzles has been this. At the individual level, the amount of formal education is the strongest predictor of most types of participation, including voting. In the society as a whole, however, though the aggregate level of education has steadily increased, voting participation has declined. Utilizing data from a large 1990 survey of citizen participation, Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry have crafted a persuasive solution to the puzzle.

The essence of their argument is that formal education operates through two quite distinct social processes in bringing about its effects on behavior. One is through enhanced cognitive proficiency (i.e., the more schooling people have, the more they know—about political and social things as well, presumably, as about other matters). But, say the authors, although simply knowing more does not necessarily lead to doing more, politically relevant action, while enhanced by education, reflects the individual's "engagement" in politics, not just her information stock. And engagement grows out of "social network centrality." The better connected the individual, the more likely she is to participate.

The concept of network centrality is critical to the argument, and so its construction must be understood. Respondents were asked whether they would personally be known or recognized by a member of Congress, or of any state or local elected body, or by someone from either the local or the national media. Nearly half of the public said they would not be known by any of the political "players," but about one-fifth claimed acquaintance with someone from three or more of these categories. Despite some inconsistency in language, it appears that the authors did not actually tally the number of elite members known but only the number of categories. The data show that about one-third claimed to be known by one or more of the local community leaders, but less than 10% by members of Congress or national media figures.

Whether or not this matters, the authors show that their social network centrality variable, while correlated with education, is affected indirectly through family income, organizational memberships, and the level of occupational responsibility and *not* by verbal proficiency or sheer information level. Moreover, network centrality generates political activity, not the other way around.

It does not follow, of course, that verbal proficiency and factual knowledge about politics make no difference. These educational results also matter but in a different realm. Tolerance, they find, is directly enhanced by education, and the increasing level of education in the United States

is reflected in a steady growth in tolerance for unpopular minorities and points of view. Younger age cohorts display greater tolerance, and so do they in six other democracies examined, albeit very briefly, by the authors. The importance of this last point is to hold out the hope that more detailed cross-national investigation will confirm the general validity of the argument.

To return to the social network effect, the authors contend that centrality is a necessary condition for political impact and that what one might call instrumental participation is driven by the desire to have some meaningful effect upon governmental outcomes. Political impact, they suggest, goes to the well positioned, to those who are close to the action. Whatever changes may occur in the attributes and characteristics of a population, including rising levels of education, wealth, life expectancy, and so on, the structures of potential influence do not necessarily display commensurate change. The seats near the center remain restricted in number. Whereas a given level of education may once have been enough to acquire the requisite level of network centrality, once it becomes common to nearly everyone, it no longer serves to differentiate the potentially influential from ordinary citizens.

Education, the authors contend, is a sorting mechanism as well as an instrument for cognitive growth, and in a society where such a large proportion have attained high levels of formal schooling, it no longer works very efficiently to generate political engagement. Engagement follows from the recognition of interests, a large fraction of which are generated by one's job or associational involvement, and those forces bear only indirect ties to the level of education.

Ironically, even as the baseline continues to rise, educational attainment today seems to have a greater role than ever in determining income levels and hence social equality. But, as this excellent study demonstrates, there is neither a simple nor even a direct link between the amount of one's factual knowledge about politics or commitment to democratic principles and one's political potential.

*Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism.* By David I. Kertzer. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xi+211. \$25.00.

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The study of the relationship between culture and politics in political science entered its mature phase with the publication of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1963). During the 1970s and early 1980s, the political culture approach—as it was then practiced—faced strong criticism, and its popularity within the discipline diminished sharply. Recently, however, there has been a re-

markable revival of interest in this approach (e.g., Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82 [December 1988]), coinciding with the far-reaching reconsideration of culture's role in social theory.

This renewed interest in culture's relationship with politics is clearly manifested in the studies on the effectiveness of democratic governance (e.g., Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* [Princeton University Press, 1993]), institutionalization (e.g., Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* [Chicago University Press, 1991]), protest and social movements (e.g., Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture* [University of Minnesota Press, 1995]), mechanisms of compliance (e.g., Richard W. Wilson, *Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture* [Oxford University Press, 1992]), and the symbolic foundations of politics and the symbolic dimension of political power (e.g., Myron Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* [Transaction, 1989]).

Kertzer's new book belongs to this last category. He tells two tales. The first is the story of the Italian Communist Party, "the largest Communist party ever found in a country where the CP was not in power" (p. 4), forced to transform its identity under the impact of Soviet Communism's fall. The second is an inquiry into the nature of politics: "Two questions are basic to any understanding of how politics works, how authority is established, and how power is wielded: (1) how are the symbols underlying political life constructed and altered? and (2) by what process do people come to recognize certain symbols as legitimate and others as illegitimate" (p. 5). In order to answer these questions, Kertzer focuses on the power of naming vested in or claimed by political leaders. Specifically, he takes a close look at Achille Occhetto, the reformist leader of Italian Communists since 1988, who, in 1990, successfully renamed and redefined the Partito comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) into Partito democratico della sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left).

After introducing the main concepts and themes of the book in the first chapter, in chapters 2 and 3 Kertzer reconstructs the formation of Italian Communists' identity. He demonstrates how myth building and history construction were intricately interwoven in a process that anchored the communists in a glorious past (the antifascist resistance), identified the main enemy (the United States, capitalism, and imperialism), glorified the savior (the Soviet Union and the communist bloc), and pointed out toward the victorious future (the full victory of communism). Also, a politically explosive process of interpreting such uncomfortable phenomena as Stalinism, Soviet invasions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1981 is carefully analyzed.

Chapter 4 offers a concise examination of the politics of naming. Relying mostly on Pierre Bourdieu, Kertzer demonstrates how naming constitutes a part and parcel of (re)constructing power relations in a society.

The minority of old communists, parading under the red flag adorned by the hammer and sickle, fought a fierce struggle against the majority-approved new symbol of "a powerful oak tree, composed of a sturdy trunk and abundant green leaves" (p. 81). Chapter 5 develops a thought that "changing current political identity meant successfully reconstructing the past" and introduces the most important analytical theme of the book: to be effective, politicians introducing a radical symbolic change (such as the renaming of a political party) must find a delicate balance between symbolic continuity and discontinuity. The former allows politicians to retain some old supporters, while the latter attracts new ones.

Chapters 6 and 7 tell a detailed story of the party congresses and meetings, during which the actual symbolic struggle took place. Occhetto won against a considerable opposition of the traditionalists, for whom the rejection of the party's old symbolic costume meant the destruction of their own personal identities. As the communists were undergoing their metamorphosis, the political system around them collapsed. The new political landscape that emerged from its ruins was populated by Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, the renamed neofascists, and the separatist Northern League. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party of the Left won a very respectable 20.4% of the vote. For the supporters of the new left it was not enough. As Italian politics entered a new era dominated by the parties of the new right, Occhetto resigned.

Kertzer argues that in order to find "the real stuff of politics" we should not be looking exclusively into the real world of material factors, for much of politics is about symbolic constructions of political and social realities within which political battles are fought. He also enters into a debate on the usefulness of rational choice approaches to politics; his analysis of the Italian communist's *svolta* (turnabout) reconfirms two common objections to this approach. First, rational choice is poorly equipped to deal with the symbolic construction of the world within which the rational actors operate. Second, people are often driven by non-rational motivations, for example, by emotions evoked by political symbols.

The book is very well written and carefully argued. Its analytical and theoretical dimensions are modest, which may prompt critical responses from the more theoretically minded students of political symbolism. Yet this theoretical simplicity is also a virtue; the work is particularly suitable for undergraduates, who need to be introduced to current thinking about the relationship between culture and politics.

*Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany.* By Donatella della Porta. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xviii+270. \$59.95.

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This is a book representing the best tradition of social movement research, and it is on a topic that social scientists do not often explore scientifically, left wing terrorism. Together with the book on this topic by Michel Wieviorka (*Sociétés et terrorisme* [Fayard, 1988]), *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State* is among the best work in political sociology. Using the most recent analytical advances in social movement research, della Porta addresses several questions: Why, in pacified societies, does violent conflict arise? What are the causes for the rise of spontaneous groups of democratically socialized actors that become political sects? How can we explain the vicious circle that develops out of the interaction of the state with radicalizing groups?

The theoretical discussion of theoretical explanations of political violence is short, mentioning Herbert Blumer, Neil Smelser, James C. Davies, Ted Gurr, and others. Della Porta's interest is in providing an analytical model and proposing a comparative strategy of analysis. The analytical model is straightforward and consists of the distinction of macrolevel factors (mainly the political opportunity structure), mesolevel factors (mainly organizational aspects of collective mobilization and social movements), and microlevel factors (the motivational and ideological orientations of the actors themselves) that, in their interaction, are supposed to explain the emergence and the dynamics of political violence. The comparative strategy of the analysis, based on firsthand knowledge of the German and Italian situations, provides an ideal set of cases. They are similar in several important respects—type of modernization, size, political institutions, political culture (including a fascist past), the rise of left-libertarian movements, and, finally, forms of political violence. They are, however, different in two respects, the level of political violence (the number of persons killed and the number of people involved) and in some procedural rules of the political system that affect the political opportunity structure. Della Porta's data consist of police and legal sources on the one hand, and oral life histories and written biographical material on the other hand. There are serious methodological problems with the use of such data. The methodological problems are, however, discussed by the author in a skillful way which preempts the likely critique.

The analysis first presents an analytically well-organized account of the timing and the structuring of violent protest in Germany and Italy that serves as the basis for the comparison that follows. Based on the idea that the interaction between the police, representing the state, and protest movements is the key mechanism for the generation of violence, the policing of protest is examined. This chapter provides information

not only on the amount of police resources mobilized by the state but also on institutional channels and cultural styles (i.e., constitutional culture, democratic-republican culture), and, finally, the configuration of political power (i.e., civil rights coalition vs. law-and-order coalitions) that push the evolution of protest policing. The intuitive idea that harsh police reaction will foster radicalization of smaller protest groups and lead them to become violent is corroborated in an analysis of the organizational dynamics of social movements.

An extremely stimulating chapter concerns the logic of underground organizations, an exciting foray into organizational sociology. Analyzing the organizational structures, the action repertoires, the action targets, and the ideological messages of the violent groups, the rationality particular to clandestine organizations is reconstructed and analyzed.

The chapter analyzing violent groups at the microlevel poses several problems. Microanalysis is defined as analysis on the level of perceptions and biographies. Such use of data would lead us normally to a social psychological investigation of violent groups for an explanation of the social conditions of the life histories of activists. The intention, however, is to analyze the symbolic forms and ideological worlds that are produced and reproduced by actors whose interactions are shaped by the specificity of clandestine organizations. Two short chapters treat both aspects. The first part of the analysis is a discussion of the psychological side of the activists and focuses on the life histories of Horst Mahler, a prominent figure in the German terrorist scene, and Marco, a prominent Italian terrorist. The second part is more difficult to pin down. The claim that life histories tell us about the formation of distinctive political countercultures raises many methodological problems. The analysis uses life histories, at least in the first of the two chapters devoted to the microlevel, simply as a source of information on the formation and reproduction of a political counterculture. Della Porta describes the emergence of a particular interpretation of the situation by terrorist actors, including the construction of the enemy (the State) and the depersonalization of the victims, and identifies some of the mechanisms that allowed its reproduction, including the recruitment of second generation activists and the formation of networks. The substance of the two chapters is exciting material. The analytical clarity of the macro- and mesolevel analysis is lacking. The link between network structures and collectively shared interpretations remains descriptive, as does the use of "micro" as a catchword for a bundle of theoretically unrelated phenomena. However, such a critique is easy because the analysis of cultural forms and their theoretical treatment is still beginning in the field itself.

By renouncing abstract modeling, engaging in parsimonious theorizing, and skillfully using empirical data that by its very nature is limited, Donatella della Porta gives us an exciting account of the formation of violent protest that is empirically well grounded. There could have been much more formalization of the negative feedback effects in the interaction between movements and the state and between different factions of the

movement itself. There could have been more discussion on the limits of rational choice perspectives in accounting for the phenomenon to be observed. However, this is not the intention of the author, as she states. There remains the problem of whether individual life histories and subjective ideological orientations are an adequate tool for analyzing the role of culture and symbolic forms in the making and unmaking of violent protest. All in all, this is an empirically solid, theoretically clear and, in substantive terms, extremely informative book on a topic that deserves much more theoretical attention. Donatella della Porta's book could provide the encouragement and an empirical base for a larger theoretical debate on the formation and function of collective phenomena and situational dynamics in social life.

*Trade and Transformation in Korea, 1876–1945.* By Dennis L. McNamara. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996. Pp. xix+228. \$59.00.

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The transformation of the Korean grain trade from the 1876 Kanghwa Treaty—when Japan “opened” Korea—to the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 provides Dennis McNamara with fertile grist for his intellectual mill. In cultivating an underdeveloped field of scholarly inquiry, he reaps a harvest not only for modern Korean historiography but also for contemporary economic sociology.

First, McNamara surveys conflicting Korean discourses on the foreign trade that marked encroaching Japanese rule and eroding local sovereignty. He painstakingly reconstructs the polemical screeds of conservative literati against, as well as the calculated acceptance of progressive reformers of, foreign trade. He underscores the nationalist impulse in both discourses and, most interestingly, argues that “reformers had introduced basic principles of capitalist society” (p. 88). McNamara’s summary of the intellectual debate not only provides a useful historical background but also constitutes a scholarly contribution in its own right. At times, however, he imposes contemporary Western categories on distinct historical discourses and does not go far enough in articulating discursive fields with institutional formations.

Second, the author provides an institutional history of the Korean rice trade and its commercial organizations. Rather than depicting a simple penetration of Japanese capital into the Korean periphery, he demonstrates the persistence and transformation of local networks of mills and merchants. The Korean business community (*chaegye*)—characterized by ethnic identity, subordination to state authority, and cooperative practices—developed in and occupied a niche left vacant by the Japanese. According to McNamara, the need for local expertise and the insufficient number of Japanese merchants enabled the limited successes of the Kore-

ans in the expanding Korean rice trade. The Japanese neither expunged the Korean merchants nor rendered them as compradors. As he concludes: "The comparative significance of the Korean experience lies neither in discrimination nor in economic collaboration, but rather in the simultaneous dynamic of separation and reintegration" (p. 173). In tracing the complex institutional history of the Korean merchants and their articulation with the Japanese, McNamara illuminates a dark corner of colonial-period Korea.

Third, and most important, McNamara brings to bear Korean materials on theoretical issues in economic sociology. On the one hand, the Korean case questions the simple demise of traditional commercial networks and organizations in the "great transformation" to the market or in the incorporation of the periphery into the capitalist world-economy. Rather than abrupt discontinuities, McNamara's institutional approach allows us to see the tangle of continuities and discontinuities. His historical evidence suggests the potential reward of a more nuanced institutional approach to unveiling commercial transformations. On the other hand, the empirical complexity raises doubts about the efficacy of received categories, such as the simple distinction between the state and the market, or between private and public. Both in intellectual discourses and in institutional formations, the Korean case transgresses the received and polarized categories. Networks of institutions and practices exist in the interstices of, or overlap, the state and the market. Neither are they obviously public or private. Although McNamara does little in the way of offering new concepts and frameworks, his history highlights the need for more nuanced concepts to make sense of institutional complexity.

This book is not for everyone. It is densely written and presupposes a fair amount of background knowledge. There are also some shortcomings. In engaging with numerous scholarly arguments and debates, McNamara does not fully develop his tantalizing suggestions or pursue potentially rewarding leads. Moreover, it remains unclear how the grain trade articulates with other economic processes or how it is embedded in larger structures. Nonetheless, McNamara's careful depiction of the Korean rice trade contributes not only to modern Korean historiography, but it also raises important questions for contemporary economic sociologists.

*The Great Transformation: Social Change in Taipei, Taiwan since the 1960s.* By Robert M. Marsh. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Pp. vii+410. \$62.95 (cloth); \$27.95 (paper).

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Robert M. Marsh has been one of the pioneers of the sociological analysis of the society of modern Taiwan. In 1963, working with an assistant who is now the head of the Institute of Ethnography at the Acadmia Sinica,

he conducted a carefully designed survey of residents of Taipei, the capital of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This survey was intended to provide data on the way that people, living in this large and bustling city in northern Taiwan, saw such social phenomena as class, class consciousness, stratification, and mobility, as well as on the patterns of urban and rural living, family relationships, and family solidarity. There were 507 respondents to his first survey. Marsh returned to Taiwan in 1991 and conducted the same survey with 545 respondents. The second group was similar in terms of class and other parameters to the first group. Discussions of data gathered from these two surveys provided Marsh with a core body of evidence that he discusses in this long, detailed, and very impressive volume.

Marsh begins *The Great Transformation* with a discussion of the theoretical constructs he uses to frame and buttress his argument. He covers the basic theories on modernization and shows us why he chose to make use of neomodernization theory as a means of discussing the situation in Taiwan—more specifically, the nature of and the people's perceptions of the island's rapid and dramatic social transformation that had been created by, and, in turn, helped advance, the Taiwanese economic miracle.

Marsh's carefully written and very clear introduction is followed by his discussion of the methodology he used to gather the data and then to analyze it. Those among his readers who are statistically oriented social scientists can see exactly what he was trying to do and measure the results accordingly. Marsh's concern for making the readers know just what he is doing and just what he expects to see is refreshing; it is the mark of a mature scholar who is secure in who he is and what he does. Here and elsewhere in this very readable volume, Marsh shows that he is a scholar who is determined to communicate and, thus, enter into dialogue with his readers.

The major chapters of the book deal with the key questions he asked his respondents. He begins with a chapter on social stratification and social class, then goes on to a chapter that covers the world of work. A third chapter deals with relationships with parents and a fourth covers relationships with extended kin. These chapters establish sets of contexts by placing the respondents within the formal structure of society, within the work environment, and within the matrix of family and kinship. The format of these contextual chapters and those that follow is almost the same. Marsh begins with a discussion of the relevant literature. He then places his findings within the larger scholarly context and discusses the findings of the survey that cover the topic to be examined in that chapter, covering each by category and taking us through what the results mean or suggest. When he discusses his findings and presents his own analysis, he places them against the existing body of literature. He summarizes his presentation in a carefully worded and tightly written conclusion that ends each chapter.

The next chapter deals with the amount of and the process of social mobility. He moves from static to dynamic aspects of social mobility and

stratification. In his discussion of the actual processes of such mobility, he also deals with the roles of the relationships covered in some of his previous chapters. He shows us distinct shifts in patterns of occupational choice and in patterns of actual social mobility. His chapter confronts us with the reality of a dynamic society that is continuing to reinvent itself. The next two chapters follow this one examining, as they do, subjective class position and class consciousness. These are difficult and rather loaded topics and, recognizing this, Marsh again grounds the discussion of his findings in the existing literature.

The final chapters cover questions of attitude. He first explores attitudes toward life chances and mobility. He then discusses attitudes toward social issues. These chapters help focus on one of the major concerns of the book: the need to show both social reality and perceived social reality, where in society people are and where they think they are. Again we have a nuanced discussion of the actual survey results and of the fit between these results and the conclusions drawn by other social scientists and observers.

Marsh concludes his work by suggesting the implications of his study. He returns to the question of neomodernization theory. He argues that it provides the most coherent and close-to-the-hard-data means of analyzing and attempting to understand the phenomena of modernization. He also discusses the relationship between modernization—as suggested by neomodernization theory—and the role of kinship and argues that the processes of modernization do affect the nature of kinship. He argues, based upon his evidence, that Taiwan's modernization had its effects on social stratification. He believes that his demonstration of the links between the process of modernization and the basic process of change within the society is the major contribution of his volume. I would not disagree but would add that other contributions are the very style of the book and the author's ability to convey a sense of engagement with his readers that draws them into dialogue with him as *The Great Transformation* unfolds. It is my opinion that Robert Marsh's book, with its clarity, grace, and score of perceptive insights, should be read by all "Taiwan hands," by students of Chinese society, and by anyone, specialist or non-specialist, who is interested in processes of social change in the late 20th century.

*East Asia and the World Economy*. By Alvin Y. So and Stephen W. K. Chiu. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995. Pp. xii+307. \$49.95 (cloth); \$24.00 (paper).

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*East Asia and the World Economy* examines the development of the East Asian region through the lens of world-systems analysis. After consider-

ing the strengths and weaknesses of four other perspectives on East Asian development—those of neoclassical economists, culturalists, political scientists, and dependency theorists (pp. 4–22)—the authors explain why they prefer the world-systems approach (its later and more mature versions as articulated by Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and others): “world-systems analysis contributes by examining the following five kinds of global dynamics that go beyond the confines of the nation-state: *incorporation* [of large areas in the world], *deepening* [of commodification and industrialization], *social construction* [of race, nation, even civilization], *cyclical rhythms*, and *antisystemic movements*” (p. 25; emphasis added). The authors then use these categories to interpret the trajectories of Japan, Korea, and China beginning with the imperial impact in the 19th century and ending in the mid-1990s.

This broad-gauged optic enables the authors to examine comparatively three societies usually studied in isolation from each other, to analyze the economic, social, and political forces that have shaped the entire East Asian region over the past 150 years, and to situate the countries and the region in the world at large, particularly through comparisons of Western and East Asian development and the international systems led by Britain (empire) and by the United States (hegemony). Unlike most other contemporary accounts of East Asian development, the authors also include pre-1978 China and socialist North Korea, seeking to use their general categories to accomplish a theoretical and holistic analysis through world time and across East Asian space.

At this broad and even sweeping level, the authors succeed. This book is written with great economy of style, both in theoretical and narrative exposition, making it extremely useful in the classroom. So and Chiu have read the secondary literature widely to find the best studies of a given problem, regardless of method and approach. Predictably, the authors cite many historians, for example, Fred Wakeman, Kozo Yamamura, and Carter Eckert. Wakeman’s classic account of the events provoked by the San Yuan Li incident (*Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861* [University of California Press, 1966]) is used to good effect to illustrate the social tensions that exploded with the intrusion of the British into the Canton Delta (pp. 39–40). Just as predictably, any attempt to summarize many years of history will discomfit, those who prize historical nuance and accuracy. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and the Tonghak Rebellion in Korea that helped to provoke it, for example, are covered in two paragraphs (see p. 89) that say nothing one would not find in a standard textbook. Japanese imperialists eliminate the Korean aristocracy on page 93, only to find the same aristocracy is holding the peasants in place on page 95 and fomenting nationalist resistance many years later on page 97. The analysis of China’s Cultural Revolution is both dated and oddly free of the violence and death that afflicted Mao’s last attempt at revolution.

*East Asia and the World Economy* does not advance world-systems analysis, preferring instead to use concepts primarily identified with Wal-

lerstein to interpret and reinterpret East Asian social change. Sometimes these concepts are depreciated, for example, "mercantilism" is a blunt instrument, indeed, to treat Chinese, South Korean, and North Korean development in the 1950s–70s (pp. 141–45, 150–59) and "corization" (of Japan, p. 160) is a word I hope never to see again. On the whole, however, the authors effectively deploy a theoretical apparatus that allows them to understand East Asian development both from the outside in and from the inside out, a real improvement over a large body of country-specific literature that reads China, Korea, and Japan from the inside in.

This same conceptual apparatus, however, causes the authors to make a major—but still interesting—error. In spite of first appearing in 1995 the book seems dated. Kim Il Sung died in 1994 but will be happy to know that he is still alive in this book (p. 159). Much more important, Japan is said to be economically ascendant at the expense of the United States with a technological prowess that has overwhelmed American industry (pp. 224–27). This will be news to Japan's leaders in 1997 and can only come from the authors' reliance on secondary sources from the 1980s and a theory of hegemony that only applies to unusual periods of world-ranging power (e.g., England, 1815–50, and the United States, 1945–70). The mature hegemon is, indeed, *primus inter pares* (p. 217), which means "first among equals" the last time I checked; it seems that the United States has been at least equal since 1945 and is likely to continue to be so well into the next century.

*Social Systems*. By Niklas Luhmann. Translated by John Bednarz, Jr. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Pp. lii+627. \$69.50 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

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This book is likely to prove difficult reading for the Anglo-American audience. Luhmann's "flight above the clouds" is a work comparable in conceptual abstraction (and lack of empirical concretion) to Spinoza's *Ethics*, Hegel's *Logic*, or Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge*. To be sure, there are at least three ways in which such a conceptual tour de force makes perfect sense. From one perspective, we can see Luhmann's work as a sociology of knowledge and culture. In Luhmann's other books, systems theory is applied to particular domains of modern or contemporary European society. In *Social Systems*, he updates his conceptual tool kit. From another perspective, we can read this book as a thorough and philosophically serious critique of "Old-European" habits of thought, as a rejection of the subject and action as basic concepts for understanding society. This critique puts Luhmann's work into the same boat as so-called postmodern critiques of foundationalist subjectivity and autonomous agency. However, the most straightforward aim of *Social Systems*

consists in the application of recent developments in *general* systems theory to an explanation of *social* systems. Here, the idea of "autopoiesis" (self-creation) of systems is crucial for the theoretical foundation of functionalist social analysis.

Luhmann's book, however, does not offer a systematic theory of systems. *Social Systems* is less architectonic and more like a conceptual mobile, where concepts are related to each other in complex constellations and nonlinear ways. However we assess the result, Luhmann's redefinitions of "meaning," "communication," "social interaction," "time," "social conflict," and so on achieve this much: There will be no return to criticisms of systems theory as a static concept of society unable to deal with temporal process and social change. This is because social systems emerge from the "double contingency" experienced by interacting agents (who are free interpreters of each other's behavior and who both know it). By creating a social-*symbolic* reality via the establishment of the difference between a system's identity and its environment, the improbable, contingent, and instable interaction between two agents crystallizes into probable, organized, and trustworthy networks of meaning and behavior. Yet, in spite of this symbolic crystallization, contingency and instability remain at the very core of social reality. Although Luhmann himself points to the emergence of social systems from processes of social interaction, he fails to connect the contingency and openness of systems to their intersubjective origin. Autopoiesis thus means that a higher self-referential reality emerges that is structurally independent from interacting or conscious agents.

Autopoietic self-attribution operates by means of "generalized symbolic media." These communicative codes mediate and thus constitute the "basal self-reference" of social systems that are internally differentiated by a factual, social, and temporal dimension. Social systems are thus taken to be socially shared, actualized interpretive schemes (or institutionalized symbolic orders) that are both closed, that is, self-referential, and open, that is, operationalizing information. This takes care of a second criticism with regard to classic functionalism: Instead of a fixed set of preestablished functions, there is a temporized process of communicative self-constitution that first defines "functions" according to symbolic codes. Accordingly, modern society can now be thematized in terms of the symbolico-functional differentiation of subsystems like science, education, politics, economy, and so on that organize themselves semantically via codes such as truth, *Bildung*, power, efficiency, and so on.

Autopoiesis is supposed to replace "intentionality" and "causality" as foundational or constitutive concepts of sociology. However, this attempt at a total switch toward autopoiesis creates particular problems with regard to the symbolic and social dimensions of "meaning." Social systems are self-referentially organized through generalized symbolic media. Symbolic forms, however, imply an implicit or explicit reference to conscious or reflexive understanding. A symbol means something for someone, its very symbolic nature implies a representative, and thus reflexive, self-

relation. Although it is true that shared symbolic meaning cannot be derived from individual consciousness and that the symbolic network as a whole escapes awareness, first-person reference remains nonetheless built into any shared symbolic structure. Besides the overhasty exclusion of intentional consciousness, the exclusion of causal analysis is equally detrimental. According to Luhmann, social systems are meaning-systems which only refer to meaning. Causal influences are thereby excluded from an analysis of meaning constitution in social systems. Yet, while it is plausible to deny reasonable interactions between chemical or communicative processes, the causal effects of social environments on linguistic, cultural, and perceptual capacities of agents has to be taken into account. It is those contexts that equip agents with the skills and capabilities crucial for success in code-organized functional subsystems. Both criticisms suggest that instead of hypostatizing functional subsystems into self-created symbolic orders, we should perhaps rather thematize how institutional and semantic contexts function both as a background for socially situated agents and as a site of the causal reproduction of social structures.

*Ordinary Knowledge: An Introduction to Interpretative Sociology.* By Michel Maffesoli. Translated by David Macey. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. Pp. 196. \$64.95.

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Blurbs on the dust jacket of this book call it stylish and elegant but it is not always a pleasure to read, and it is not easy to know what to make of it. Maffesoli is fond of words like "coenaesthetic," "apophatic," and "imbricated"—this last of which, a large dictionary eventually informed me, means layered or overlapping rather like roof shingles or fish scales. He is also full of annoying verbal tics like frequent use of Latin expressions where the English (or original French) would be sufficient and of a recurrent "in the strict sense" to qualify the use of a word vague to begin with. On the other hand, there is an occasional attractive gurulike vigor in Maffesoli's advocacy of a sort of Romantic sociology, adventurous, nonconformist, "liberated," in which nothing human is alien to the interpreting observer.

What is clear is that Maffesoli is dissatisfied with most of the major traditions of sociological theory that aspire to "science." He opposes positivism, functionalism, and causal analysis of any kind that tries to reduce the welter of confusing, paradoxical, and multifaceted heterogeneities of social life to lifeless generalizations. He seems to like Weber (especially on ideal types) and Simmel and Schutz as well as Nietzsche, Jung, and Pareto for their emphases on intuition, empathy, and the irrational, mythic, and archetypal dimensions of social life.

Maffesoli's text itself manifests some of the contradictions and ambiva-

lences that he sees as constitutive of social life. Surely there are plenty of these. But it is not outrageous to expect a thought-through published book to make sense of them rather than to duplicate them. Maffesoli repeatedly inveighs against the moralistic "oughts" of theorizing that dictate what rigor is in research practice and conceptual thinking. Yet Maffesoli's rhetoric itself contains a portentous moralistic posture. Full of "we must" and "we ought," the text is polemic against what he sees as the arrogant frozen deadness of positivist concepts and causal categories. Moreover, Maffesoli clearly does not like reifications, yet he does not hesitate to use abstractions as the noun-subjects of active or transitive verbs (e.g., "'formism' emphasizes appearances, spectacles, images" p. 84).

Much of this is unavoidable, of course. In order to think at all abstractly, we all rely on relatively undeconstructed concepts. Here is the rule: deconstructive criticism of concepts stops with the concepts essential to one's own efforts at abstract thinking. The alternative is a kind of cognitive paralysis. If nothing else, prudence suggests a certain restraint in savaging the perhaps calcified concepts of others. Maffesoli prefers "notions" to concepts (thus inadvertently evoking Herbert Blumer's old distinction between "sensitizing concepts" and "variables"), although the difference is not entirely clear—unless, like Marshall McLuhan's "probes," one can easily disavow or retreat from them if and when they come under criticism. "Everyday life," for example, is a notion plainly favored by Maffesoli. In it he sees the "ordinary knowledge" (myths, ambivalences, and the imaginary) that constitutes for him the fundamental "sociality" of human life. Now, I am not entirely certain of the subtler connotations of the French *la vie quotidienne*, but it is usually translated as "everyday life." In English, though, it is one of those relatively unanalyzed abstractions: everyday as distinguished from what? Saturdays? Sundays? Vacations? Maffesoli characterizes everyday life here as that dimension of social life filled with complexity, myth, and irrationality, with what Pareto called "residues." I have never doubted their prominent presence. Still, the routine everyday lives of bankers, professors, surgeons, politicians (and most others, I would wager) are filled with "ordinary" (though specialized) knowledge on the basis of which they have to make decisions and take actions involving more or less rational calculations that consider causes and consequences: to cut or not to cut, to lend or not to lend, to take this or that or no position at all on a public issue, to publish or to perish.

There is a sense in which Maffesoli's criticism of a sociology shaped by a model of routine science is beside the point; the sort of sociology he seems to prefer can and already does coexist with his despised positivism. What exactly is this preference? It sounds to me very much like what is today known as "cultural studies." Apparently written in the early 1980s (published in French in 1985) when the cultural studies bubble was just being formed, Maffesoli's book makes no reference to that field as such. But it is clear that his notion of the sociological task is for us to use an historically informed sensibility to perceive and to interpret those Paretan

residues in current everyday life and, by so doing, to help create the dominant myths of our time. His image of the sociologist is very much an image of the intellectual/philosopher/journalist (Baudrillard is cited several times) who hangs around the sites of everyday life (the "saloon-bar" is a recurrent image of where to get important insights) listening, observing, taking notes, and noticing the parallels, analogies, and correspondences with recurrent themes and images in other sites. If "all politics is local" for Tip O'Neill, for Maffesoli all sociology is local. The commonalities to be found, if any, will constitute that basic "sociality" out of which Maffesoli would hope to discover a series of quasi-Simmelian "forms."

So what we have here in this book is a notion of sociology as a locally descriptive/interpretive enterprise devoted to searching out the irreducibly collective character of fundamental sociality. Sounds to me like what we here in the United States call "culture." Maffesoli's understanding of it, though, seems to me to blur the difference between cultural studies and the sociology of culture. The former is a "humanist" enterprise whose quality is assessed by its compelling plausibility—although the criteria that compel remain elusive or unstated. The latter is a "scientific" enterprise looking for verifiable generalizations. Take your pick. Sociologists do both and will continue to do so as long as the sciences and the humanities remain separable sectors in the division of cognitive labor. Sociology almost inevitably straddles the two, impure as ever.

*On Social Structure and Science.* By Robert K. Merton. Edited by Piotr Sztompka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. vii+393. \$55.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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Merton's work to a large extent has been a summary and critical synthesis of the theories and research of his times. This collection of excerpts from Merton's writings for the Heritage of Sociology series provides an overview of much of 20th-century sociology. Inadvertently, these articles, stretching from the 1930s to the 1990s, depict the rise and fall of the functionalist paradigm.

The key to understanding Merton's influence may be found in a central point of his sociology of science. That scientists often converge on the same discovery had often been pointed out before Merton's 1961 article on the subject. Merton drew together a series of related points: priority disputes and races for discovery imply that multiple discoveries are the normal condition of scientific life. How then does any individual scientist stand out from the crowd? Merton's best answer is given in a 1973 article: the scientist who already has a reputation gets more attention for whatever subsequent multiple discoveries she or he is involved in. This self-exemplifying idea is not unique; it is the general principle of cumulative

advantage in stratification. I suggest another explanation for Merton's influence: when similar theories are made in a loosely integrated field like sociology, the version that becomes famous is the one expressed in the most memorable phrase. Merton did not discover cumulative advantage, but he coined the phrase "the Matthew effect" (from Matthew 13:12), which succinctly and colorfully summarizes a host of theorizing and research.

Merton's best contributions are in his titles. "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" applies a basically symbolic interactionist idea of W. I. Thomas to race relations. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Social Action" combines forerunners ranging from Adam Smith's invisible hand and Weber's Protestant ethic to Keynes's discussion of economic investment. "Manifest and Latent Functions" restates the main idea of Durkheimian social anthropologists on the solidarity-generating effects of ritual and applies it to the perpetuation of corrupt political machines. Merton's talent has been to boil down earlier theories to a phrase and to show why that phrase sheds light on some current issue or social problem.

Merton's contributions to substantive ("middle range") theory are typically not pure functionalism but pull in ideas from rival viewpoints. Symbolic interactionism plays its part not only as mentioned above but in "the role-set," which translates the Meadian problem of taking the role of the other into a functionalist problem of how multiple situational roles are reconciled. "The reference group" is another reformulation of role taking in terms of structures. Merton's 1938 article, "Social Structure and Anomie," incorporates the quasi-Marxian point that the economic have-nots are impelled to deviate into crime by the very value placed on economic success. The fate of this line of argument reveals the weakness of even the "liberalized" Mertonian version of functionalism. This article was heavily cited in the deviance literature around midcentury, but researchers eventually moved on because they ran up against the pattern that large numbers of the poor are not criminals and crime is common among the wealthy as well. Merton had argued that it is the distinctively American emphasis on career success that forges a link between poverty and crime, whereas more rigidly unequal precapitalist societies would not have had this link; the rise of historical criminology has disproven that, too, with evidence that crime rates were much higher in the past.

Merton's attempts to subsume Marxism into functionalism did not satisfy the conflict-oriented movement of sociology in the 1960s and 1970s. Merton argued that Marxism is itself a functionalist theory, but this applies best to the Marxian system of economic reproduction of class structure and, more marginally, to the self-transforming dynamic of business cycles leading to system crisis. This substantive part of Marxism was never incorporated, which suggests that the "Marxism is functionalism, too," ploy was little more than a rhetorical put-down. Functionalists could not digest key points of the conflict perspective: dominant and dominated groups have life-shaping interests in dominating others or in escaping subordination, and social stasis, as well as change, is produced by

the distribution of material (and therefore also of ideological) resources for mobilizing these interests. Merton, like the allegedly more hard-line functionalist, Talcott Parsons, remained committed to a shared and uncoerced value system as his analytical starting point. (Deviance occurs because of the shared American value of success; scientists operate under an institutional value system that they violate only in order to live up to it better.) The analytical priority of values remained even as Merton attempted to shore up empirical weaknesses on this point by pointing to the ambiguity and situational multisidedness of actors' values in the actual working out of roles. Elites always remained the analytical good guys of the system, never essentially the dominators of others.

Over the long view, Merton's writings represent a series of retreats from functionalism. His 1949 "Paradigm for Functional Analysis" criticized anthropologists of the functional school (Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown) for seeing all institutions as functional, integrated with one another, and indispensable. Merton loosened the model by arguing that all these propositions needed to be tested empirically by cross-cultural comparisons and that such research should look for functional alternatives and for situations of functional disequilibrium producing internally driven change. This sensible program of research in fact was never carried out. In the heyday of functionalism (1945–60), the theory was typically applied in a noncomparative way by freely conjecturing functions for whatever institution one happened to be studying. In the 1960s came a tidal flow; the research program of functionalism was increasingly abandoned while attention flowed to rival premises of conflict theory and radical microconstruction. Merton's essays in this period appear to be trying to keep up with the tide by emphasizing the need to study social dysfunctions (1961). He even dropped the label "functionalism" in favor of a "Paradigm for Structural Analysis" (1975), an article that attempts to hitch the falling fortunes of the school to the shooting star of Lévi-Straussian structuralism. By this time, functionalism resembled one of Thomas S. Kuhn's paradigms in its crisis phase when baroque epicycles are added to the once simple pattern, trying to save the theory by complicating it virtually beyond recognition.

The trajectory of Merton's sociology of science is roughly the same. The 1938 publication of his dissertation was notable for applying the Protestant ethic thesis to the rise of science in 17th-century England. In the 1940s, Merton formulated the value system of science: universalistic, unselfish, disinterested, and skeptically empiricist rather than dogmatic. It was an appealing model in the context of Nazi attacks on "Jewish science" and of politically motivated coercion in Soviet science; true science became identified with a perfect liberal democracy. Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, the empirical research field took off, studying scientific citations, networks, organizations, and eventually the practices of scientists themselves. Historians and philosophers of science, especially Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, punctured the picture of the disinterested, self-skeptical scientist. Interest-driven and conflict-oriented models of science came to

the fore; the privileged exemption of the contents of scientific knowledge from sociological explanation was broken through. The radical empiricism of ethnomethodologically inspired researchers began to see laboratory practices as socially constructing dominance in the discourse of scientific knowledge rather than uncovering disinterested truth. This movement of research has washed back over its origins, the "Merton thesis" of Puritanism as cultural impetus to modern science. It is not merely that researchers discovered Catholics and non-Puritan Protestants were earlier and more central in forming modern science; the question of what is to be explained, what actually constituted the change in the practice of science in the 17th century, has led beyond Merton's idealized portrait of the official values of science.

In Merton's hands, functionalism became an edifice of qualifications. His principal tactic for shoring up its inadequacies was to argue that the integration of structures is no sure thing and that dominant values could give rise to subordinate and even conflicting values. Eventually most sociologists lost faith that the research program would ever work out; they threw it over and began to build explanations beginning with conflict, interests, costs, or actor constructions as starting points. *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

*Pitirim A. Sorokin: An Intellectual Biography.* By Barry V. Johnston. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Pp. xii+380. \$45.00.

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Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968) was a titanic figure in sociology and a prominent public intellectual of the mid-20th century. A Russian peasant who became the founding chairman of the Department of Sociology at Harvard University, he exhibited the seemingly boundless energy and capacious ego of the self-made man. There are sociologists alive today who remember his long harangues at sociology conferences—so protracted that one could leave the meeting, eat lunch, and return to find Sorokin still speaking at the lectern. When in an interview he was asked how he wanted to be remembered, he said as a moral leader of America. He was released from Russian prison by Lenin's order, assisted in America by Edward A. Ross, deposed from leadership at Harvard by Talcott Parsons, admired for his pacifism by Albert Einstein, and privately funded by Eli Lilly. Such a complex and controversial figure deserves an intellectual biography that offers a balanced assessment of both the man and his numerous works. Barry Johnston has written such a book.

In seven substantial chapters that are enriched by 15 evocative photographs, the author charts the beginning of Sorokin's Russian journey to the intellectual life, the details of his emigration to the United States, and

the vicissitudes of his research and professional reputation in this country. To the readers of Sorokin's autobiographies, *Leaves from a Russian Diary* (1924) and *A Long Journey* (1963), much of this story will be familiar. But Johnston has dug deep into the rich vein of archival information, as well as conducted lengthy and informed interviews, to uncover new insights into Sorokin and his career. In this respect, perhaps the most insightful chapter is the last one, "From Outcast to Elder Statesman." It provides an important case study in the rehabilitation of intellectual reputation, showing how autobiography and commemorative volumes can give a lift to a stalled career. In addition, it tells the inside story of the grassroots campaign to honor Sorokin with the presidency of the American Sociological Association. Sorokin served as president in 1965, and he was the first to be placed on the ballot by a write-in campaign of members.

The book's greatest merit, however, is its balanced consideration of Sorokin's critiques of and contributions to sociology. Sorokin was a prolific writer and an equally prolific critic of sociology. Johnston reveals a rare ability to survey and to assess dispassionately the value of this work. For example, after examining the generally disparaging reviews of Sorokin's four-volume study, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Johnston offers a considered and convincing reappraisal of that work. He agrees with the reviewers that Sorokin's methods were flawed. But, he maintains, those critics were too quick to bury the work in ridicule and invective; consequently, they missed the abiding value of its epistemology and "substantial insights" (p. 128) into culture and social change. Johnston is no less discerning when he analyzes Sorokin's own criticism. He challenges Sorokin's unfair and intemperate attacks and defends his fair and accurate ones.

The biography is less satisfying when it strays from the texts and archival data and relies on abstract theoretical models to understand biographical and historical events. This is the case with Johnston's discussion of the divergent careers of Sorokin and Parsons. The book provides an accurate and detailed review of the steps that led to Sorokin's removal as chairman of the Harvard sociology department, Parsons's promotion to full professor and chairman, and sociology's reorganization into the Department of Human Relations. But it is less satisfactory when it addresses the larger question of Parsons's success and Sorokin's marginalization. Here sociological literature on schools and theory groups displaces archival evidence in both the body of the text and notes. The result is a formal and speculative analysis of the conditions that *may* have been responsible for their divergent careers. Far more satisfying than this over-theorized explanation is William Buxton's (in *Sorokin and Civilization: A Centennial Assessment* [Transaction, 1996]) account, which is based on careful analysis of the archival sources.

This specific lapse, however, does not diminish the value of Johnston's achievement. He has written the most engaging, informed, and balanced account of Sorokin's character and career now available. More impor-

tant, the book represents and achieves the culmination of Sorokin's intellectual rehabilitation. In the flesh, his arrogance and temper led to strained relations and rejection by many of his colleagues. In Johnston's hands, Sorokin's rough edges are smoothed and sculpted into a figure to be esteemed for all time. To quote the book's closing words, "Sorokin belongs to history" (p. 273).

# **Manifesto for a Relational Sociology<sup>1</sup>**

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Sociologists today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in substances or processes, in static "things" or in dynamic, unfolding relations. Rational-actor and norm-based models, diverse holisms and structuralisms, and statistical "variable" analyses continue implicitly or explicitly to prefer the former point of view. By contrast, this "manifesto" presents an alternative, "relational" perspective, first in broad, philosophical outlines, then by exploring its implications for both theory and empirical research. In the closing pages, it ponders some of the difficulties and challenges now facing relational analysis, taking up in turn the issues of boundaries and entities, network dynamics, causality, and normative implications.

Sociologists today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static "things" or in dynamic, unfolding relations. Large segments of the sociological community continue implicitly or explicitly to prefer the former point of view. Rational-actor and norm-based models, diverse holisms and structuralisms, and statistical "variable" analyses—all of them beholden to the idea that it is entities that come first and relations among them only subsequently—hold sway throughout much of the discipline. But increasingly, researchers are searching for viable analytic alternatives, approaches that reverse these basic assumptions and depict social reality instead in dynamic, continuous, and processual terms.

The purpose of this "manifesto" is to lay out the essential features of this latter point of view. It begins by presenting the relational perspective in broad outlines (by way of a comparison with competing substantialist

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Ronald Breiger, David Gibson, Jeff Goodwin, Michèle Lamont, Ann Mische, John Mohr, Jeffrey Olick, Shepley Orr, Mimi Sheller, Charles Tilly, and Harrison White for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank participants in seminars at Princeton University and at the New School for Social Research, and in the Monthly Discussion Group on Theory and Culture in New York City, for their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. Direct correspondence to Mustafa Emirbayer, Department of Sociology, New School for Social Research, 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003.

approaches), then explores its implications for both theory and empirical research. In the closing pages, it also ponders some of the difficulties and challenges now facing relational analysis. (The essay focuses throughout upon ontology, largely—but certainly not exclusively—bracketing associated questions regarding epistemology.) I do not claim to have been the first to elaborate any of these themes; on the contrary, many distinguished sociologists, from a wide range of theoretical and empirical perspectives, have long been working within a relational framework of analysis. Indeed, this framework itself has long been propounded by social thinkers and philosophers, arguably going as far back as the pre-Socratics. Nor do I claim to be exhaustive in either my textual discussions or bibliographic references. “You can be assured that, for each idea, quite a number of substantial, and often independent, discussions and implementations could be cited: Ideas that have any importance, any impact, do, after all, come in company, not as isolates, and the essayist is mostly a transcriber of ideas abroad in his networks” (White 1994a, p. 4). What I have done here is merely to bring together the various lines of reasoning in this perspective (philosophical, theoretical, and empirical); to clarify how they present an overarching challenge to reigning assumptions; and to seek thereby to prevent the sort of eclecticism, the easy mixing together of substantialist and relational assumptions, that renders even many innovative studies today partially problematic.<sup>1</sup> The key question confronting sociologists in the present day is not “material versus ideal,” “structure versus agency,” “individual versus society,” or any of the other dualisms so often noted; rather, it is the choice between substantialism and relationalism.

#### SUBSTANTIALIST AND RELATIONAL THINKING

The relational point of view on social action and historical change can most usefully be characterized by comparing it with its opposite, the substantialist perspective. The latter takes as its point of departure the notion that it is *substances* of various kinds (things, beings, essences) that constitute the fundamental units of all inquiry. Systematic analysis is to begin

<sup>1</sup> Given these purposes (together with severe limitations of space), it has been necessary to suppress two other sorts of analysis that would be integral to any fuller scholarly treatment: careful, judicious consideration of the substantialist alternatives (of promising developments in substantialist lines of theorization, enduring strengths of these approaches, and so on) and discussion of internal differences among relational thinkers themselves: the issues, in other words, that divide them as well as bring them together. In other writings (Emirbayer and Mische 1995; Emirbayer 1996; Emirbayer and Sheller 1996; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996, 1997), I attempt to develop one specific mode of relational theorizing, which I term *relational pragmatics*, and to argue for its strengths vis-à-vis alternative relational as well as substantialist approaches.

with these self-subsistent entities, which come "preformed," and only then to consider the dynamic flows in which they subsequently involve themselves. "Relation is not independent of the concept of real being; it can only add supplementary and external modifications to the latter, such as do not affect its real 'nature'" (Cassirer 1953, p. 8). One social theorist, Norbert Elias, points out that substantialist thinking corresponds closely to grammatical patterns deeply ingrained in Western languages. An extended quotation regarding these modes of speech and thought serves nicely to introduce this perspective in general terms:

Our languages are constructed in such a way that we can often only express constant movement or constant change in ways which imply that it has the character of an isolated object at rest, and then, almost as an afterthought, adding a verb which expresses the fact that the thing with this character is now changing. For example, standing by a river we see the perpetual flowing of the water. But to grasp it conceptually, and to communicate it to others, we do not think and say, "Look at the perpetual flowing of the water"; we say, "Look how fast the river is flowing." We say, "The wind is blowing," as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of processes to static conditions, which we shall call "process-reduction" for short, appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages. (Elias 1978, pp. 111-12)

In a little-known but important discussion, John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley (1949) distinguish between two varieties of substantialist approaches. The first they term the perspective of *self-action*; it conceives of "things . . . as acting under their own powers" (Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 108), independently of all other substances. The relational matrices within which substances act provide, in this view, no more than empty media for their self-generating, self-moving activity. Dewey and Bentley see such a perspective as most characteristic of ancient and medieval philosophy. "Aristotle's physics was a great achievement in its time, but it was built around 'substances.' Down to Galileo men of learning almost universally held, following Aristotle, that there exist things which completely, inherently, and hence necessarily, possess Being; that these continue eternally in action (movement) under their own power—continue, indeed, in some particular action essential to them in which they are engaged" (Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 110).<sup>3</sup> The Christian doctrine of the "soul," culminating in the theological system of Thomas Aquinas, epitо-

<sup>3</sup> One commentator provides further explication: "In Plato's concept of the soul, the capacity for self-motion or self-action is the essential feature of the soul, and Aristotle tells us quite explicitly in his *Physics* that of those things that exist by nature . . . 'each of them has within itself a principle of motion'" (Bernstein 1966, p. 81).

mized this viewpoint.<sup>4</sup> But after Galileo's time, advances in physics and in the natural sciences eliminated most such traces of self-action from the study of inorganic matter.

In modern philosophy, however, the notion of self-action lives on in various doctrines of "the will" and in liberal political theory (since Hobbes, Locke, and Kant), while in the social sciences it retains surprising vigor in the form of methodological individualism. "All the spooks, fairies, essences, and entities that once had inhabited portions of matter now [take] flight to new homes, mostly in or at the human body. . . . The 'mind' as 'actor,' still in use in present-day psychologies and sociologies, is the old self-acting 'soul' with its immortality stripped off" (Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 131). One increasingly prevalent approach begins with rational, calculating actors but assumes the givenness and fixity of their various interests, goals, and "preference schedules." Rational-choice theory takes for granted, as Jon Elster puts it, that "the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals" (Elster 1989, p. 13). When actors become involved with other actors whose choices condition their own, yielding results unintended by any one of them taken alone, rational-choice theorists have recourse to game theory. Here again (in at least *some* of its versions), pre-given entities are seen to generate self-action; even as actors engage in game playing with other actors, their underlying interests, identities, and other characteristics remain unaltered. Game theory assumes that "there are two or more *players*. Each of them has the choice between two or more *strategies*. Each set of choices generates a set of *rewards*. The reward of each player depends on the choices made by all others, not only on his own decision. The players are assumed to make their choices *independently* of each other, in the sense that they cannot make binding agreements to coordinate their decisions" (Elster 1989, p. 28). With its analytic sophistication and rigor, the rational-actor approach (together with complementary versions of game theory) is fast becoming the major alternative to the relational approach that I shall outline below.

Another popular approach, only *apparently* the chief rival to rational-choice models, takes norm-following individuals, or more specifically, the vital inner forces driving them, as its basic unit of analysis. It depicts individuals as self-propelling, self-subsistent entities that pursue internalized norms given in advance and fixed for the duration of the action sequence under investigation. Such individuals aspire not to wealth, status, or power, but rather, to action in conformity with the social ideals they

<sup>4</sup> For Aquinas, God Himself was the most perfect self-acting substance.

have accepted as their own. Nonrational action thus becomes the special province of this mode of analysis, long a staple of sociological inquiry. To mark itself off from economics, which endorsed the rational-actor approach early on, sociology had from its beginnings “a fundamental need of a theory of action that defined different types of action on the basis of their specific difference from rational action. It required a theory of society as a complex of interrelated actions that was more than the unintended interconnecting of self-interested actions. . . . As a safeguard against the utilitarian dangers of the theory of rational action, the founding theorists of sociology [had to] have recourse to Kant and his notion of free, moral action” (Joas 1993, pp. 246–47). To this day, the norm-following, neo-Kantian perspective lives on in various forms of critical theory, value analysis, and microsociology.

In a very different way, the idea of self-action also insinuates itself into social thought by means of holistic theories and “structuralisms” that posit not individuals but self-subsistent “societies,” “structures,” or “social systems” as the exclusive sources of action. Proponents of these approaches, from neofunctionalists and systems theorists to many historical-comparative analysts, all too often fall back upon the assumption that it is durable, coherent entities that constitute the legitimate starting points of all sociological inquiry. Such entities possess emergent properties not reducible to the discrete elements of which they consist. Not individual persons, but groups, nations, cultures, and other reified substances do all of the acting in social life and account for its dynamism. In some cases, even *sequences* of action may discharge such a function: social movements or nationalist struggles, for example, are seen as propelling themselves along trajectories “that repeat . . . time after time in essentially the same form” (Tilly 1995a, p. 1596). Processes as well as structures thus appear as self-acting entities in many concrete instances of social inquiry.

The second key category of substantialism that Dewey and Bentley consider is that of *inter-action*.<sup>5</sup> This approach, which is frequently confused with more truly relational points of view, posits “thing [as] balanced against thing in causal interconnection” (Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 108), where entities no longer generate their own action, but rather, the relevant action takes place *among* the entities themselves. Entities remain fixed and unchanging throughout such interaction, each independent of the ex-

<sup>5</sup> My use of hyphenation here follows Dewey and Bentley’s own practice and underscores that I am employing their terminology differently from how such words as “interaction” and, as we shall see, “transaction” are used in everyday language. (Often, e.g., interaction and transaction are employed as synonyms, whereas here they represent very specific—and distinct—philosophical positions.) This point should be borne carefully in mind even when these words reappear without hyphenation later in the essay.

istence of the others, much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian mechanics. Indeed, it was Sir Isaac Newton who actually gave the interactional perspective its consummate expression. "For many generations, beginning with Galileo after his break with Aristotelian tradition, and continuing until past the days of Comte, the stress in physical inquiry lay upon locating units or elements of action, and determining their interactions. Newton firmly established the system under which particles could be chosen and arrayed for inquiry with respect to motion, and so brought under definite report. . . . The inter-actional presentation had now been perfected" (Dewey and Bentley 1949, pp. 105, 111).

The idea of interaction finds its home today in a viewpoint that explicitly or implicitly dominates much of contemporary sociology, from survey research to historical-comparative analysis. This is the so-called "variable-centered approach," which features, as Andrew Abbott (1988, p. 170) points out, a compelling imagery of fixed entities with variable attributes that "interact, in causal or actual time, to create outcomes, themselves measurable as attributes of the fixed entities."<sup>6</sup> What decidedly do not do the acting in this perspective are the substances in question; all of the relevant action takes place *among* them—they provide merely the empty settings within which causation occurs—rather than being generated by them. If anything, it is the variable attributes themselves that "act," that supply initiative, in interactional research; "disadvantaged position leads to increased competitiveness," for example, without any particular actor engaging in competitive behavior. "It is when a variable 'does something' narratively that [analysts] think themselves to be speaking most directly of causality," notes Abbott. "The realist metaphysics implicit in treating variables (universals) as agents was last taken seriously in the age of Aquinas . . . but in this [approach] the 'best' causal sentences are clearly realist ones in which variables act" (Abbott 1992a, p. 58). Variable-centered researchers employ a variety of quantitative methods to test their causal hypotheses, including multiple regression, factor analysis, and event history approaches.

Fundamentally opposed to both varieties of substantialism is the perspective of *trans-action*, "where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to 'elements' or other presumptively detachable or independent 'entities,' 'essences,' or 'realities,' and without isolation of presumptively detachable 'relations' from such detachable 'elements'" (Dewey and

<sup>6</sup> In Abbott's (1988, p. 181) portrayal, the interactional approach further assumes "that these attributes have only one causal meaning at a time; [and] that this causal meaning does not depend on other attributes, on the past sequence of attributes, or on the context of other entities."

Bentley 1949, p. 108). In this point of view, which I shall also label “relational,” the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction. The latter, seen as a dynamic, unfolding process, becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements themselves. Things “are not assumed as independent existences present anterior to any relation, but . . . gain their whole being . . . first in and with the relations which are predicated of them. Such ‘things’ are terms of relations, and as such can never be ‘given’ in isolation but only in ideal community with each other” (Cassirer 1953, p. 36). Although it can be traced back to the writings of Heraclitus, this transactional mode of theorizing first becomes widely influential with the rise of new approaches in physics, mathematics, and the natural sciences. Most strikingly, Einstein’s theory of relativity “brought space and time into the investigation as among the events investigated [and] prepared the scene for the particle itself to go the way of space and time. These steps were all definitely in the line of the transactional approach: the seeing together, when research requires it, of what before had been seen in separations and held severally apart” (Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 112).<sup>7</sup>

Relational theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis (as in the self-actional perspective). Individual persons, whether strategic or norm following, are inseparable from the transactional contexts within which they are embedded; as Michel Foucault puts it, the “soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge” (Foucault 1979, p. 29).<sup>8</sup> By the same token, structures

<sup>7</sup> In his masterful history of modern science, *Substance and Function* (1953), Ernst Cassirer distinguishes between the “relation-concepts” pertinent to this transactional approach and the “thing-concepts” central to substantialist ways of thinking since Plato and Aristotle. He charts the rise of relational theorizing in a multiplicity of problem-areas, including the theories of space and number, geometry, and the natural sciences. Today the most sustained and philosophically subtle exploration of the transactional perspective can be found in the writings of Margaret Somers (1993, 1994, 1995; see also Somers and Gibson 1994).

<sup>8</sup> Relational thinkers are relentless in their critiques of such concepts as “the soul” or “person.” Consider, e.g., Harrison White (1992, p. 197, n.21): “Person should be a construct from the middle of the analysis, not a given boundary condition. Personhood has to be accounted for . . . But in most present social science ‘person’ is instead taken as the unquestioned atom. This is an unacknowledged borrowing and transcription of the soul construct from Christian theology. . . . The ultimate fixity of the soul, carried over to hobble social science, was a Pauline theological imperative.” Or consider Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 106–7): “When I talk of [any given] field, I know very well that in this field I will find ‘particles’ (let me pretend for a moment that we are dealing with a physical field) that are under the sway of forces

are empty abstractions apart from the several elements of which they are composed; societies themselves are nothing but pluralities of associated individuals. Transactional theorists—starting, in fact, with some of the “founders” of sociology—are in virtually complete agreement on this point. Karl Marx (1978, p. 247) argues, for example, that “society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.” Near the end of *Capital*, volume 1, he further observes that “capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons which is mediated through things” (Marx 1977, p. 932). Georg Simmel, the classical sociologist most deeply committed to relational theorizing, notes that “society is the supra-singular structure which is nonetheless not abstract. Through this concept, historical life is spared the alternatives of having to run either in mere individuals or abstract generalities. Society is the generality that has, simultaneously, concrete vitality” (Simmel 1971, p. 69). And even Émile Durkheim, the “founder” most identified with substantivist ideas, acknowledges that “the force of the collectivity is not wholly external. . . . Society can exist only in and by means of individual minds” (Durkheim 1995, p. 211; see Emirbayer 1996).<sup>1</sup>

Variable-based analysis (as in the interactional perspective) is an equally unviable alternative; it, too, detaches elements (substances with variable attributes) from their spatiotemporal contexts, analyzing them apart from their relations with other elements within fields of mutual determination and flux. As Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson (1994, pp. 65, 69) point out, “While a social identity or categorical approach presumes internally stable concepts, such that under normal conditions entities within that category will act predictably, the [relational, transactional] approach embeds the actor within relationships and stories that shift over time and space and thus precludes categorical stability in action. . . . The classification of an actor *divorced* from analytic relationality is neither ontologically intelligible nor meaningful” (see also Somers 1994; Bates and

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of attraction, of repulsion, and so on, as in a magnetic field. Having said this, as soon as I speak of a field, my attention fastens on the primacy of this system of objective relations over the particles themselves. And we could say, following the formula of a famous German physicist, that the individual, like the electron, is an *Ausgekettelt des Felds*: he or she is in a sense an emanation of the field.”

<sup>1</sup>In the present day, Niklas Luhmann (1995, pp. 20, 22) suggests in similar fashion: “There are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements. . . . Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this system.” And Harrison White (1992, p. 4) turns to material science to make a similar point, likening sociocultural reality to dense, partly fluid matter within which no self-subsistent entities ever fully crystallize: “There is no tidy atom and no embracing world, only complex striations, long strings reptating as in a polymer goo.”

Peacock 1989; Breiger 1991; for a summary of this line of critique, see Wellman [1988], pp. 31–33). A corollary to this view calls into question attempts by statistical researchers to “control for third variables”; all such attempts, too, ignore the ontological embeddedness or locatedness of entities within actual situational contexts.<sup>10</sup> Even as statistical models grow ever more complicated, even alert to the “interaction effects” among variables, these problems, rooted as they are in fundamental assumptions, fail to go away.

What is distinct about the transactional approach is that it sees relations between terms or units as preeminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances. “Previously constituted actors enter [transactions] but have no ability to traverse [them] inviolable. They ford [them] with difficulty and in [them] many disappear. What comes out are new actors, new entities, new relations among old parts” (Abbott 1996, p. 863).<sup>11</sup> The imageries most often employed in speaking of transactions are accordingly those of complex joint activity, in which it makes no sense to envision constituent elements apart from the flows within which they are involved (and vice versa). Dewey (1929, p. 142), for example, states in *Experience and Nature* that “the import of . . . essences is the consequence of social interactions, of companionship, mutual assistance, direction and concerted action in fighting, festivity, and work.” Dewey and Bentley (1949, p. 133) further point out that “no one would be able successfully to speak of the hunter and the hunted as isolated with respect to hunting. Yet it is just as absurd to set up hunting as an event in isolation from the spatio-temporal connection of all the components.” In *Social Organization*, Charles Horton Cooley (1962) supplies a vivid analogy to “joint music-making” to convey similar insights,<sup>12</sup> while Norbert Elias (1978, p. 130) invokes “game playing” to explicate his key concept of fluid “figurations”: “By figuration we mean the

<sup>10</sup> “Nothing that ever occurs in the social world occurs ‘net of other variables.’ All social facts are located in contexts. So why bother to pretend that they aren’t?” (Abbott 1992b, p. 6).

<sup>11</sup> Actually, social actors, the parties to ongoing transactions, can just as well be communities, firms, or states as they can individual persons (although the latter is what one typically has in mind). Indeed, they can even be *events*: any actor, after all, is but a series of “events that keep happening in the same way,” events with “stable lineages” (Abbott 1996, pp. 873, 863).

<sup>12</sup> “Whether, like the orchestra, [social organization] gives forth harmony may be a matter of dispute, but that its sound, pleasing or otherwise, is the expression of a vital cooperation, cannot well be denied. Certainly everything that I say or think is influenced by what others have said or thought, and, in one way or another, sends out an influence of its own in turn” (Cooley 1962, p. 4).

changing pattern created by the players as a whole . . . the totality of their dealings in their relationships with each other.”<sup>13</sup> One might just as well speak here of *negotiations* or *conversations*; the underlying idea would remain the same—regarding the primacy of contextuality and process in sociological analysis.<sup>14</sup>

To be sure, the transactional viewpoint—like its two main substantialist rivals—rarely corresponds with exact precision to any one school of thought or individual’s life work; what is often of great interest, in fact, is exactly how these ideal-typical approaches, on the one hand, and actual authors, texts, or research traditions, on the other, crisscross one another; how, for example, a given thinker shifts back and forth (often implicitly) among several different points of view.<sup>15</sup> This is evident in the case of both classical and contemporary thinkers. Marx, for instance (as the earlier quotations from him suggest), was a profoundly relational thinker; this is clear from his early analyses of alienation (Ollman 1971), his discussion of commodity fetishism, his keen insights into the internal relations among production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, and, indeed, his understanding of the capital/wage-labor relation itself.<sup>16</sup> And yet, even Marx exhibits substantialist tendencies, most notably in his reification of class interests, in his assumption that actors within the same class category (to the extent that they are a “class-for-itself”) will act in similar ways even when differentially situated within flows of transactions or “relational settings” (Somers 1994). Meanwhile, from the opposite direction, the now classic theorist Talcott Parsons exhibits tendencies seemingly in line with substantialism. His theory of action strongly tends in the direction of self-actional, norm-based reasoning, while his ideas about order often suggest holism and the reification of system goals. Yet, even Parsons,

<sup>13</sup> Zygmunt Bauman (1989) underscores the “remarkable affinity” that this imagery of gamelike configurations bears with Anthony Giddens’s “structuration theory.” “Game-playing” clearly means something quite different here, of course, from the self-actions of game theory (although see the paragraph that follows).

<sup>14</sup> The preeminently *agentic* nature of the above-mentioned analogies, their emphasis upon transformation as well as iteration, might be noted, this opens up questions, too seldom addressed, regarding the normative dimensions of social action. I shall take up such issues below.

<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the theorist who most firmly grasped this distinction between the analytical and the concrete was Talcott Parsons (1937). “At no point . . . [did] Parsons claim that theories which actually existed in history are identical to the different logical positions he has outlined. Most of them are in fact opaque versions or combinations of several of these logical alternatives” (Joas 1996, p. 12).

<sup>16</sup> “Within a relational view [such as Marx’s], the working class is defined by its qualitative location within a social relation that simultaneously defines the capitalist class. . . . Classes as social forces are real consequences of social relations” (Wright 1979, pp. 6–7).

especially after the development of his later "interchange model" and theory of "generalized media" (Parsons 1953, 1969), moves decisively in the direction of a relational, transactional point of view.<sup>17</sup> And finally, among contemporary theorists and research traditions, game theory is emblematic of rational-actor (i.e., self-actional) models, as mentioned above. And yet it, also, often sounds emphatically transactional themes, as in studies of repeated games within which temporally embedded actors engage with each other in sequences of mutually contingent action (see Kreps 1990; Macy 1991).

Despite these various concrete examples, however, the point still holds that substantialism (in both its self- and interactional forms) and relationalism (or transactionalism) represent fundamentally different points of view on the very nature and constitution of social reality.

### THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The implications of the transactional approach are far-reaching. In what follows, I shall specify these implications from two different points of view in turn: those of key sociological concepts and of levels of inquiry—from "macro" to "micro."

To begin with, the central concepts in sociological analysis—for example, power, equality, freedom, and agency (to mention several of the most pervasive)—are themselves open to extensive reformulation in terms of relational thinking. Take the key concept of *power*, which is typically seen in substantialist terms as an entity or a possession, as something to be "seized" or "held."<sup>18</sup> In the transactional approach, "the concept of power [is] transformed from a concept of substance to a concept of relationship. At the core of changing figurations—indeed, the very hub of the figuration process—is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving

<sup>17</sup> As Jeffrey Alexander points out, it becomes quite illuminating to see how such discordant trends in the classical theorists—e.g., Marx and Parsons—later manifest themselves in their followers' writings: "The members of a sociological school change the founder's thought as much as they faithfully articulate it, and . . . they change it, moreover, in a manner that can be systematically related to the analytic tensions in the original theoretical position" (Alexander 1983, p. 277).

<sup>18</sup> This conceptualization is still popular to the extent that Weberian understandings of power retain (explicitly or implicitly) their influence in political sociology. "Max Weber proceeds from the teleological [i.e., self-actional] model of action in which an individual or a group has a set purpose and chooses the means suitable for realizing it. The success of the action consists in bringing about a condition in the world that fulfills the purpose set. To the extent that this success depends on the conduct of another subject, the agent has to dispose of the means that instigate the desired conduct on the part of the other. This manipulative power over the means that afford influence on the will of another Max Weber names power" (Habermas 1983, p. 173).

to and fro. . . . This kind of fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration" (Elias 1978, p. 131). Contemporary social-network analysts define power in similarly relational terms, as an outgrowth of the positions that social actors occupy in one or more networks (Knoke 1990). So too do theorists such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. "Relations of power," in Foucault's words, "are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations" (Foucault 1990, p. 94). Bourdieu similarly argues for a relational view: "By field of power I mean the relations of force that obtain between the social positions which guarantee their occupants a quantum of social force, or of capital, such that they are able to enter into the struggles over the monopoly of power" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 220–30). Far from being an attribute or property of actors, then, power is unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the very way in which figurations of relationships—as we shall see, of a cultural, social structural, and social psychological nature—are patterned and operate.

The idea of *equality* can also be recast in transactional terms. Typically, equality (like inequality) is defined essentialistically as a matter of individual variations in the possession of "human capital" or other goods.<sup>19</sup> The primary causes of equality (and inequality), moreover, are located in the orientations and actions of entities such as groups or individuals, rather than in the unfolding relations among them: in attitudes such as racism, sexism, and ethnic chauvinism. Yet, in Charles Tilly's (1995b, p. 48) words, "bonds, not essences, provide the bases of durable inequality." Inequality comes largely from the solutions that elite and nonelite actors improvise in the face of recurrent organizational problems—challenges centering around control over symbolic, positional, or emotional resources. These solutions, which involve the implementation of invidious categorical distinctions, resemble "moves" in a game, or perhaps even attempts to change the *rules* of the game. Members of a categorically bounded network, for example (such as recently arrived immigrants), ac-

<sup>19</sup> "Faced with male-female differences in wages, investigators look for average human-capital differences among the individuals involved. Encountering racial differences in job assignments, researchers ask whether across categories individuals distribute differently with respect to residential location. Uncovering evidence of sharp ethnic differences in industrial concentration, analysts only begin to speak of discrimination when they have factored out individual differences in education, work experience, or productivity" (Tilly 1995b, p. 9).

quire control over a valuable resource (e.g., information about employment opportunities), hoard their access to it (e.g., by sharing it only with others in their personal networks), and develop practices that perpetuate this restricted access (e.g., by staying in touch with their places of origin through frequent correspondence and visits home). Hard, durable differences in advantages and disadvantages then crystallize around such practices. Unfolding transactions, and not preconstituted attributes, are thus what most effectively explain equality and inequality.

Third, the notion of *freedom* is also open to far-reaching reformulation in relational terms. A very common way of thinking about freedom (or liberty) is in substantialist fashion, as a possession, a “legal status represented in laws” (Stinchcombe 1995, p. 126), and as contrasted with the equally essentialist status of slavery. But, as Arthur Stinchcombe (1995, p. 126) indicates, freedom is best described pragmatically as a set of “liberties . . . in fact enjoy[ed], whether or not they are defended in the law.” Drawing upon John R. Commons (1924, p. 19), who cautioned that ideas such as liberty refer not to the “thing itself but [to] the expected ‘uses’ of the thing, that is, [to] various activities regarding the thing,” Stinchcombe (1995, p. 126) regards freedom not as a fixed, pre-given attribute, but rather as *what we can do* under given circumstances: “A liberty creates an *exposure* of others to the different consequences of different choices by the free person. . . . The definition, then, is a sum of practically available liberties, including in particular the social capacity to get others to suffer the consequences of [one’s] practical . . . freedom . . . to decide.” Freedom, in other words, means nothing apart from the concrete transactions in which individuals engage, within cultural, social structural, and social psychological contexts of action; it derives its significance entirely from the ongoing interplay (akin to a game) of decision, consequence, and reaction. “I . . . argue,” asserts Stinchcombe, “that this tack toward understanding variations in freedom helps get us out of the box of defining freedom, or slavery, by its essence. Defining things by their essences is always troublesome in an explanatory science” (Stinchcombe 1995, p. 130).<sup>20</sup>

Finally, and relatedly, the idea of *agency* can also be reconceptualized

<sup>20</sup> A similar conception of freedom can be found in Simmel’s work, especially in *The Philosophy of Money* (1990) and *Sociologie* (1950): “[The category of freedom] implies not a mere absence of relationships but rather a very specific relation to others” (Simmel 1990, p. 298; quoted in Breiger 1990, p. 457). “Freedom itself is a specific relation to the environment . . . It is neither a state that exists always and can be taken for granted, nor a possession of a material substance, so to speak, that has been acquired once and for all. . . . [It] is not solipsistic existence but sociological action. . . . This is suggested by the simple recognition of the fact that man does not only want to be free, but wants to use his freedom for some purpose” (Simmel 1950, pp. 120–21.) For a discussion of Simmel on freedom, see Breiger (1990).

from a transactional perspective. (Of course, this exercise in reconceptualization could just as well be extended to other key terms in the sociological lexicon.) Agency is commonly identified with the self-actional notion of “human will,” as a property or vital principle that “breathes life” into passive, inert substances (individuals or groups) that otherwise would remain perpetually at rest. By contrast, the relational point of view sees agency as inseparable from the unfolding dynamics of situations, especially from the problematic features of those situations. As it is conceived of elsewhere (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), agency entails the “engagement by actors of different structural environments [which] both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.”<sup>11</sup> Viewed internally, agency involves different ways of experiencing the world, although even here, just as consciousness is always consciousness of something (James 1976; Husserl 1960), so too is agency always “agency toward something,” by means of which actors can enter into relationship with surrounding persons, places, meanings, and events. Viewed externally, it entails concrete transactions within relational contexts (cultural, social structural, and social psychological) in something much like an ongoing conversation. Agency is always a dialogic process by which actors immersed in the *durée* of lived experience engage with others in collectively organized action contexts, temporal as well as spatial. Agency is path dependent as well as situationally embedded; it signifies modes of response to problems impinging upon it through sometimes broad expanses of time as well as space.

In addition to these general concepts, the transactional point of view allows for the reconceptualization of distinct, *sui generis* levels of inquiry, on a continuum from “macro” to “micro.”<sup>12</sup> At the most macroscopic level, for example, *society* is often interpreted as an autonomous, internally organized, self-sustaining “system.” Sociological thinkers often assume that inquiry ought to begin with such naturally bounded, integrated, sovereign entities as national states or countries. And indeed, this approach is not entirely implausible, for not only has the European state system been ascendant for two or more centuries, but also, throughout much of world history, disparate interaction networks—economic, military, political, and

<sup>11</sup> Such a conception corresponds closely to classical pragmatist thought: “The subject is that which suffers, is subjected and which endures resistance and frustration; it is also that which attempts subjection of hostile conditions; that which takes the immediate initiative in remaking the situation as it stands” (Dewey, quoted in Colapietro 1990, p. 653). I shall discuss this theoretical connection to pragmatism in greater detail below.

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of analytic levels similar (but not identical) to that which follows, see Wiley’s [1995, chap. 6] fourfold distinction among self, interactional, social-organizational, and cultural levels.

the like—have frequently converged (or been “institutionalized” [Mann 1986]) in coherent, distinct societies. Yet, boundaries of national states do overlap unevenly with populations, territories, production and consumption patterns, cultural identities, collective emotional commitments, and so on, while “interstitial interactions,” both within and across these bounded units, also repeatedly belie visions of the latter as unproblematic, unitary entities: “Societies have never been sufficiently institutionalized to prevent interstitial emergence. Human beings do not create unitary societies but a diversity of intersecting networks of social interaction. The most important of these networks form relatively stably. . . . But underneath, human beings are tunneling ahead to achieve their goals, forming new networks, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view with rival configurations” (Mann 1986, p. 16). As Michael Mann (1986, p. 1) observes, “societies” are best seen as “constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.”<sup>23</sup> Somers (1994, p. 72) goes even further in replacing the term “society” with “relational setting,” which she defines as “a patterned matrix of institutional relationships among cultural, economic, social, and political practices.”<sup>24</sup> Such a conclusion does not invalidate the historical-comparative study of national states or “countries” (see Goodwin 1995), but it does prescribe considerable caution in assuming their primacy as units of sociological analysis.

At the “meso-level” as well, the relational perspective leads to significant reconceptualizations. To the extent that they had been theorized, *face-to-face encounters* were most typically seen (at least prior to Erving Goffman) in self-actional or interactional terms, as a question of the mutual interplay among preconstituted, self-subsistent actors. It is precisely this framework that Goffman explodes in his celebrated studies of “co-presence” and the “interaction order.” Of paramount importance in “the proper study of [face-to-face] interaction,” he argues, “is not the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another” (Goffman 1967, p. 2). A “sociology of occasions” is called for that takes as its unit of analysis a gamelike, unfolding, dynamic process, one developing within cultural, so-

<sup>23</sup> I shall focus in the following section upon several such network contexts.

<sup>24</sup> “For most practicing social science research, a society is a social entity. As an entity, it has a core essence—an essential set of social springs at the heart of the mechanism. This essential core is in turn reflected in broader covarying societal institutions that the system comprises. . . . [By contrast,] the most significant aspect of a relational setting is that there is no governing entity according to which the whole setting can be categorized; it can only be characterized by deciphering its spatial and network patterns and temporal processes. As such, it is a relational matrix, similar to a social network” (Somers 1994, pp. 70, 72; see also Somers 1993; Somers and Gibson 1994).

cial structural, and social psychological matrices. (In what could well serve as an epigraph for this entire manifesto, Goffman [1967, p. 3] asserts: "Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men.")<sup>25</sup> The study of face-to-face encounters thereupon becomes a matter of locating regularities across such transactional processes, of specifying recurrent mechanisms, patterns, and sequences in meso-level "occasions."

At the microscopic level of analysis, similarly, the notion of *individual* can also be significantly reworked from a relational point of view. Individual identities and interests are not preconstituted and unproblematic; parties to a transaction do not enter into mutual relations with their attributes already given. By reinterpreting Hobbes's construct of the "state of nature," Alessandro Pizzorno (1991) shows how such arguments are internally self-contradictory; they regard as self-subsistent entities what are in fact actors lacking in stable, durable identities to begin with. Selves, not to mention the interests corresponding to them, require mutual trust and reciprocal recognition to come into being, conditions that happen to be absent in the state of nature, where a "war of each against all" prevails. "Individuals threatened by nature to impermanence" achieve "preservation of self, real *formation of self*" (Pizzorno 1991, pp. 220, 218) only through transactional processes of recognition and what Pizzorno terms mutual "name-giving": "The fiction of individuals not yet involved in social relations but originally knowing what their interests are and what the consequences of their choices can be is discarded in favor of a view in which the interaction between persons mutually recognizing their right to exist is the only originally conceivable reality. No preestablished interests are imagined. The individual human agent is constituted as such when he is recognized and named by other human agents" (Pizzorno 1991, p. 220). Individual identities are thus constituted within "circles of recognition," while interests (a secondary construct) "grow out of different positions in the[se] networks and circles" (Pizzorno 1991, p. 219).<sup>26</sup> Such circles of recognition can include "virtual" circles with cultural ideals and fanta-

<sup>25</sup> Goffman (1967, p. 2) characterizes these moments as "shifting entit[ies], necessarily evanescent, created by arrivals and killed by departures." As Arthur Stinchcombe (1991, p. 373) further explains it: "The same people act differently if they are inside the temporal and spatial and communicative boundaries of [such] situation[s] than if they are outside those boundaries." See also White (1973).

<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the relational dimension of *collective* identity that develops (albeit implicitly) along similar lines to that of Pizzorno, see Melucci (1996). In true transactionalist fashion, Melucci emphasizes the fluid, processual nature of collective identification, a point of view, however, that sits uncomfortably with his own substantivist terminology, as he himself acknowledges "We should . . . take notice of the fact that the term 'identity' remains semantically inseparable from the idea of permanence and may, perhaps for this very reason, be ill suited for the processual analysis for which I am arguing" (Melucci 1996, p. 72).

sized objects, as well as circles of interpersonal, social relationships. (Recent feminist theorists have developed quite similar insights; indeed, gender theory in general might well be the approach that in recent decades has most widely disseminated transactional modes of reasoning within the social sciences. See, e.g., Scott [1988]; Benhabib [1992]; see also Somers's important work on "narrative identity" [e.g., Somers and Gibson 1994].)

Delving more deeply still into the individual level, relational perspectives also make possible the recasting of long-established lines of theorization regarding *intrapsychic processes*. In the psychoanalytic literature, for example, the standard view is that of drive theory, which conceptualizes the individual actor as a separate, monadic entity with physically based urges that seek out psychical expression in the form of sexual and/or aggressive desires. These desires, which are preconstituted, conflict with the demands of both human civilization and the natural world; psychical life builds around "compromises" between them and the defenses that control and channel them. By contrast, a new school of thought in psychoanalysis emphatically rejects this essentialist perspective and proposes instead a theory of "relational individualism," one that sees transactions with others, and not pre-given drives, as the basic units for psychological investigation. "Object-relations theory does not need to idealize a hyper-individualism; it assumes a fundamental internal as well as external relatedness to the other. The question is then what kind of relation this can and should be. The relational individual is not reconstructed in terms of his or her drives and defenses but in terms of the greater or lesser fragmentation of his or her inner world and the extent to which the core self feels spontaneous and whole within, rather than driven by, this world" (Chodorow 1989a, p. 159).<sup>27</sup> Freudian gender theorists (e.g., Chodorow 1978, 1989b; Benjamin 1988) utilize such insights with great effect.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> These very same assumptions are crucial to the new "relational school" of psychoanalytic theory. In this approach, as Stephen Mitchell (1988, p. 3) summarizes it, "We are portrayed [as] shaped by and inevitably embedded within a matrix of relationships with other people. . . . *Desire* is experienced always in the context of relatedness, and it is that context which defines its meaning. Mind is composed of relational configurations. The person is comprehensible only within this tapestry of relationships, past and present."

<sup>28</sup> Transactional thinking appears in nonpsychoanalytic theories as well. For example, Norbert Wiley argues against both old and new versions of faculty psychology, which posits pre-given, innate properties in human nature, in favor of a more "dialogic" perspective influenced by C. S. Peirce and George Herbert Mead. For him, the self is a structure consisting of three elements, the I, you, and me, in continual interaction with each other and with other selves in an ongoing "semiotic flow" of meaning. From Wiley's (1994, p. 72) transactional perspective, the self is "a kind of public square . . . the members of which are in constant conversation." Also relevant here are the writings of Kenneth Gergen (e.g., 1994).

## RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

In addition to having far-reaching implications for theoretical inquiry, the transactional perspective also opens up many new, exciting directions for substantive research. In this section, I shall consider several of these more empirical lines of investigation, using as my main organizing principle the idea of three transpersonal, relational contexts within which all social action unfolds: social structure, culture, and social psychology. Each of these “environments” (Alexander 1988), I assume, operates according to its own partially autonomous logic, intersecting with the others in varied and interesting ways that require empirical study (for a fuller discussion, see Emirbayer and Goodwin [1996, 1997]; Emirbayer and Sheller [1996]). I shall also discuss new research at the individual level, research that likewise builds upon transactional assumptions.<sup>29</sup>

The best developed and most widely used approaches to the analysis of *social structure* are clearly those of social-network analysis. This perspective is not primarily a theory or even a set of complicated research techniques, but rather a comprehensive new family of analytical strategies, a paradigm for the study of how resources, goods, and even positions flow through particular figurations of social ties. Eschewing self-actional approaches that begin with preconstituted individuals or groups, as well as interactional approaches such as statistical (variable) analyses, network analysts pursue transactional studies of patterned social relationships (Breiger 1974). They adhere to what has been termed an “anti-categorical imperative” (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994), rejecting the primacy of attributional categories and other substantives in favor of dynamic, “observable processes-in-relations” (White 1997, p. 60)—notice the felicitous combination here of temporal and spatial imageries—through which pass money, friendship, information, and other elements.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Although I shall range widely across a number of different empirical literatures, I wish to underscore here the desirability of eventually elaborating a common relational language within which to theorize about all these various contexts and levels of analysis.

<sup>30</sup> Peter Bearman supplies a vivid illustration of the comparative utility of network-analytic and categorical approaches for understanding elite social action in England from 1540 to 1640: “Consider the tortuous debate over the appropriate bases for classifying the gentry that arose because historians came to recognize that the gentry as a group acted neither coherently nor uniformly with respect to interests. A primary solution to the problem has been a continued subcategorization, and we now have as salient groups the middling, official, rising, falling, court, and country gentry, to name only the most prominent. These subcategories do correspond to attributes that real gentry had. . . . But it was as likely that court gentry would rise as fall; that Puritan gentry would be at court or in the country; and that official gentry would be as mere as the middling or as grand as the rising. Gentry assigned to the same category frequently acted at cross-purposes. . . . The solution to understanding elite social action [thus] cannot be further subclassification from received categories. Categorical models

(This does not mean that in certain cases network analysts do not unduly privilege synchrony over diachrony, spatial over temporal configurations, a point to which I shall return below. Nor does it mean that they never import into their explanations self- or interactional assumptions, most problematically a *rational-choice* approach to action; for a critique of such eclecticism, which occurs in other lines of transactional research as well, see Emirbayer and Goodwin [1994].) Important here is the notion that social networks *cut across* discrete communities and other entities—are “interstitial”—even though in certain cases they may also congeal into bounded groups and clusters (network researchers speak in such instances of “CATNETS” [CATEgories + NETworks; see White 1966; Tilly 1978]). Significant as well is the insight that transactions unfolding within social networks are not always symmetrical in nature: flows are often “directional” in content and intensity, with significant implications for actors’ differential access to resources. Finally, often important is the patterning of invisible relations among actors—“relations visible only by their absence” (Burt 1992, p. 181)—since such “structural holes” or gaps in networks usually mean disparities in access to both information and control benefits.

Network analysts draw heavily upon the methodologies of sociometry and graph theory (the mathematical study of structural patterns in points and lines) to formally represent social configurations. They also draw upon the techniques of “multidimensional scaling” to map out sometimes complex patterns in such ties, and upon set theory to model role structures algebraically (for an overview, see Scott [1991]). These methods figure prominently in cluster analyses as well as in studies of structural equivalence, the two central currents in social-network research.<sup>11</sup> The former approach focuses attention upon actors’ direct and indirect ties, explaining social processes through the very fact of connectivity itself, as well as through the strength, density, and so forth, of the ties that bind. It seeks to specify the relative centrality of actors within networks, the “prominence” of such actors, and the subgroupings to which they belong. “Network structure is described in terms of the typical relations in which individuals are involved and the extent to which actors are connected within cohesive primary groups as cliques” (Burt 1980, p. 81). The latter approach emphasizes more the patterning of actors’ ties, not with one

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alone rarely partition people in a way that confirms with observed action, because individual activity in the world is organized through and motivated not by categorical affiliations but by the structure of tangible social relations in which persons are embedded” (Bearman 1993, pp. 9–10)

<sup>11</sup> In Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), these were referred to as “relational” and “positional” currents, respectively—the term “relational” having a different meaning there than in the present context.

another, but with third parties; the relevant question here is the specific position or role that a set of “structurally equivalent” actors occupies within a given network. “Network structure is described as interlocked, differentially prestigious status/role-sets, in terms of which actors in a system are stratified” (Burt 1980, p. 81). An algebraic procedure called “block-modeling” partitions overall populations into such equivalency classes.<sup>12</sup>

Relational approaches to the sociological study of *culture* are not nearly so well developed as those concerned with networks of social relationships. Yet they share many of the same basic assumptions, beginning with the notion that cultural formations entail, not individual “attitudes” or “values,” much less disembodied “systems,” but rather bundles of communications, relations, or transactions. Relational methodologies come into play when analyzing the meaning structures that order or organize these patterns. Such methodologies are transactional or relational precisely because they involve “a shift away from thinking about a concept as a singular *categorical* expression to regarding concepts as embedded in complex *relational* networks that are both intersubjective and public. . . . That is, concepts cannot be defined on their own as single ontological entities; rather, the meaning of one concept can be deciphered only in terms of its ‘place’ in relation to the other concepts in its web. What appear to be autonomous categories defined by their attributes are reconceived more accurately as historically shifting sets of relationships that are contingently stabilized” (Somers 1995, p. 136). Such insights, of course, are familiar from Saussurean linguistics and structural anthropology (Saussure 1959; Lévi-Strauss 1963), both of which stress in eminently relational terms that meaning derives not from the intrinsic properties of signs (understood dyadically as “sound-image” and “concept,” “signifier” and “signified”), but rather from their differences from all other signs within a semiological system.<sup>13</sup> Such ideas are also central to two other sources of semiotic theory that are perhaps less familiar, but even more congenial to transactional thinking: Peircean semiotics and Bakhtinian dialogism. Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of both pragmatism and semiotics, agrees on the relational embeddedness of symbols but diverges sharply from the Saussurean tradition in taking as his unit of analysis not dyadic structures or snap-

<sup>12</sup> Expressed more accurately, blockmodeling *tests the hypothesis* that a set of relations breaks down into a set of equivalency classes specified a priori.

<sup>13</sup> Also relevant here is the seminal work of Roman Jakobson: “Jakobson was drawn to the fact that for Einsteinian physics, as for Cubism, everything is based on relationship. . . . The artist’s credo ‘I do not believe in things, I believe in their relationship’ (Georges Braque) thus joined the mathematician’s motto ‘It is not things that matter, but the relations between them.’ . . . Or as Jakobson himself put it much later, ‘Attention must be paid not to the material units themselves but to their relations’” (Waugh and Monville-Burston 1990, p. 5).

shots, but rather a triadic process of “sign,” “object,” and “interpretant”: “A sign . . . is something which stands to somebody [interpretant] for something [object] in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody” (Peirce 1931–58, p. 228). As one commentator observes, for Peirce “a sign only has meaning in the context of a continuing process of interpretation. Because [of this], his theory is intrinsically processual and thus incompatible with Saussure’s dyadic and intrinsically static theory” (Rochberg-Halton 1986, p. 46). A similarly processual approach to language and culture can be found in the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin, who takes the “utterance” as his point of departure. Words, concepts, and symbols derive their meaning only from their location within concrete utterances, but these in turn only make sense in relation to other utterances within ongoing flows of transactions: “The utterance is filled with *dialogic overtones*. . . . Each individual utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication. . . . Like Leibnitz’s monad, [it] reflects the speech process, others’ utterances, and, above all, preceding links in the chain” (Bakhtin 1986, pp. 92–93).

Cultural analysts are increasingly turning toward such relational approaches for methodological guidance in studying conceptual or symbolic networks. Much empirical research in anthropology, history, and sociology, for example, draws upon the semiotic theories mentioned above in analyzing the internal logics and contradictions of cultural languages, idioms, and meaning systems. Research programs articulated by Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith (1993), Eugene Rochberg-Halton (1986), and Marc Steinberg (1996) exemplify these Saussurean (cum Lévi-Straussian), Peircian, and Bakhtinian perspectives, respectively. In a more formalized fashion, researchers are also drawing upon sociolinguistics in analyzing “speech communities,” or sets of transactions marked by shared “knowledge of the communicative constraints and options governing a significant number of social situations” (Gumperz 1972, p. 16).<sup>4</sup> Finally, certain analysts of culture are drawing, not upon semiotic or linguistic analysis, but rather upon the relational social-network strategies outlined above. One such line of work features cluster or connectivity analysis, measuring the ties between “focal concepts” and other symbols within “semantic networks” in terms of their “density,” “conductivity,” and “consensus” (Carley and Kaufer 1993; Carley 1994). Another line of work pursues a structural equivalence approach, using blockmodeling to determine the formal structure of “discourse roles” or positions within classification schemas, rhetorics, or other sets of cultural practices (Mohr 1994). Together, these lines of inquiry provide a wealth of techniques for modeling the internal struc-

<sup>4</sup> See also Halliday (1976, 1978) on “speech registers,” or shared modalities of language use *within* a speech community, and Hanks (1990) on “discourse genres”; the latter is deeply influenced by Bakhtinian dialogic theory.

ture of cultural formations, techniques that yield important results at both micro- and macroscopic levels of investigation.<sup>15</sup>

Relational studies of *social psychology* are perhaps the least well developed of the three categories of research (but see Ritzer and Gindoff 1992). Here the objects of analysis are psychical patterns that constrain and enable action by channeling flows and investments of emotional energy—durable, transpersonal structures of attachment and emotional solidarity, as well as negatively toned currents of hostility and aggression. The emotions, from this point of view, inhere not in “‘entities’ that have been located in individuals, such as ‘personalities’ or ‘attitudes,’” but rather in “*situational* ways of acting in conversational encounters” (Collins 1981, p. 1010), that is, in transactional dynamics. Some of the most significant research done in this vein appears in the “new structural social psychology.” Randall Collins, for example, argues that enhanced levels of the physical density of transactions, together with the increasing ecological boundedness of a group, raise the group’s focus of attention and the intensity of common emotions. For any actor, social life consists in a long series of such interaction rituals, “an intermittent chain of IRs” (Collins 1993, p. 210), with levels of emotional energy accumulating gradually across them. Collins envisions an emergent market of such rituals, with certain figurations yielding higher emotional energy rewards than others, yet requiring higher entry costs in the coin of emotional “investment.” In this way, he opens up possibilities for mapping the structure of emotional flows across the broader social psychological environment. Structures of energy-enhancing ritual interactions would parallel in such a mapping the social structural and cultural figurations of the other two relational contexts of action. Collins is currently developing new computer software to chart these emotional flows with greater specificity.

Finally, relational analyses of *self-dynamics* and *individual psychology* have become increasingly prevalent. (Such investigations appear at a different level of analysis than those discussed above, the former being personal and the latter *transpersonal* in nature.) Relational studies of personality conceptualize it, not as fixed traits or dispositions that endure across times and contexts, but rather as a stable configuration of “distinctive if-then situation-behavior” transactions, or characteristic patterns of behavior within distinct but meaningfully similar circumstances. While the traditional substantialist perspective regards situations as “error” and aims to average out their effects by aggregating across them, the transactional approach takes the actor’s pattern of engagement with “evoking situations” as its basic unit of analysis. “This shift call[s] attention away from

<sup>15</sup> Mention should also be made here of the work of Bruno Latour (1987), which combines relational thinking at both the social structural and cultural levels of analysis.

inferences about what broad traits a person *has*, to focus instead on what the person *does* in particular conditions in the coping process" (Mischel 1990, p. 116). One especially rich line of substantive research on such "behavioral signatures" is that of Walter Mischel and his associates in a series of studies of children in a residential summer camp. Through analysis of observations and computer codings of the children's behavior (undertaken by camp counselors as well as independent judges), these researchers find that "there are characteristic intraindividual patterns in how [the children] related to different psychological conditions and that these patterns form a sort of behavioral signature that reflects personality coherence" (Mischel and Shoda 1995, p. 251). Mischel and his associates do not map out these behavioral patterns sociometrically, but their findings certainly do point them in precisely such a direction (see White 1994b).

#### PERPLEXITIES, DIFFICULTIES, CHALLENGES

Thus far, I have discussed the considerable promise of transactional theory and research, saying relatively little about the issues that it has *not* yet fully resolved. Despite its many important contributions, this perspective still confronts a number of unanswered questions. In the section that follows, I shall survey the most significant of these problems, taking up in turn the issues of boundaries and entities, network dynamics, causality, and normative implications.

The problem of *boundary specification*, of moving from flows of transactions to clearly demarcated units of study, from continuity to discontinuity, is perhaps the most frequently encountered of all challenges to relational analysis. Social-network researchers, for example, continually grapple with the question of where to draw lines across relational webs possessing no clearcut, natural boundaries. Analogous questions arise in respect to cultural and social psychological matrices. No definitive solution has been found to such difficulties.<sup>16</sup> According to one set of network investigators, two basic strategies exist for demarcating boundaries: "realist" and "nominalist." The first takes the point of view of the actors involved, treating a network "as a social fact only in that it is consciously experienced as such by the actors composing it." The second proceeds from the concepts and purposes of the social-scientific observer instead,

<sup>16</sup> For studies of boundary drawing, see Silverstein (1979), Zerubavel (1991), and Lamont and Fournier (1992). Ronald Breiger notes (personal communication, July 11, 1996) that one "approach . . . is to internalize, or endogenize, or 'make reflexive' this problem within the frame of a relational analysis. (Substantialist) boundaries are [then] played off against boundaries defined by relations" For a substantive example, see Breiger (1981).

taking the correspondence between “the investigator’s analytically drawn boundaries and the subjective awareness of these boundaries by participants [as] an empirical question rather than an assumption” (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983, pp. 20–21).<sup>37</sup> Thus, Bourdieu’s concept of a “field of practice” falls squarely within the “nominalist” side of this distinction: its boundaries are drawn in accordance with the observer’s (and not the participants’) frame of reference. The overall intractability of the boundary problem, on the other hand, is eloquently attested to by the apparent circularity in Bourdieu’s own “solution” to it: “We may think of a field as a space within which an effect of field is exercised. . . . The limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 100). When beginning with ramifying webs of relations rather than substances, it becomes notoriously difficult to justify the empirical boundaries that one draws.

Behind the analytical and methodological difficulties in setting boundaries, moreover, stand fundamental questions of an ontological nature. Once one defines the boundaries around a given matrix of transactions, how does one characterize what obtains *inside* those boundaries? When, if ever, does a set of relations actually count as a “thing,” a substance, or an entity? In *Identity and Control*, Harrison White (1992) points out that some (although not all) clusters of events or transactions may be deemed entities. An entity or “identity,” he asserts, is “any source of action not explicable from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning. . . . Clusters can come to be perceived as and act as identities, if they reappear repeatedly or in a variety of other contexts” (White 1992, pp. 6–7). Andrew Abbott (1996) further makes clear that not all “zones of difference” within a social process or social space become entities; the “entitativity” (Campbell 1958) of a recurrent phenomenon consists in its exhibiting two key features: “coherence,” some structure of causes internal to it that permit it to recur, to “keep happening in the same way,” and “causal authority,” an “independent standing as a site of causation, as a thing with consequences . . . [an ability] to create an effect on the rest of the social process that goes beyond effects . . . merely transmitted through the causing entity from elsewhere” (Abbott 1996, p. 873). The difficulty, of course, is that neither element in Abbott’s definition can be seen as given in a processual ontology; both must be explained. Identities

<sup>37</sup> Laumann et al. (1983) add that one can further distinguish three approaches (each with its attendant methodologies) that cut across the two just mentioned strategies for determining whether or not given actors will be included inside a boundary possession of a specified attribute; involvement in a specified type of relationship; or participation in a given event or activity.

and entities are problematic in transactional approaches in ways that they never can be in a substantivist mode of analysis.<sup>13</sup>

Closely related to the vexing issues of boundaries and identities is that of *network dynamics*. Paradoxically (for a mode of study so intently focused upon processuality), relational sociology has the greatest difficulty in analyzing, not the structural features of static networks, whether these be cultural, social structural, or social psychological, but rather, the dynamic processes that *transform* those matrices of transactions in some fashion. Even studies of "processes-in-relations," in other words, too often privilege spatiality (or topological location) over temporality and narrative unfolding.<sup>14</sup> (The reason for this state of affairs can probably be traced back to the same hegemony of substantivism that makes self- and interactional approaches so very prevalent.) Again, the most promising "ways out" come from the relational analysis of social structures. In his inquiry into "structural holes," for example, Ronald Burt (1992) surveys the circumstances that maximize "structural autonomy," the capacity to exploit entrepreneurially whatever information and control benefits a network affords.<sup>15</sup> Burt's insight is that what best explains action are not the attributes of social actors themselves, but rather the complex configurations of relations (especially relations of absence, or "holes") to which they respond. (In principle, parallel arguments could also be developed in respect to cultural and social psychological configurations.) In a major network study,

<sup>13</sup> There is, in other words, an unavoidable trade-off in attendant "problems" when shifting from substantivist to relational points of view: "By making change our constant, we also exchange our explananda. It becomes necessary to explain reproduction, constancy, and entity-ness, rather than development and change." More to the point, Abbott continues, "the central reason for making this [shift] is practical. It is possible to explain reproduction as a phenomenon sometimes produced by perpetual change; it is not possible to explain change as a phenomenon sometimes produced by perpetual stasis" (Abbott, 1997, p. 98). It is difficult to imagine a more concise and persuasive articulation of the relative advantages of transactional vis-à-vis substantivist perspectives.

<sup>14</sup> For a classic case in point, see the celebrated article on blockmodeling by White, Boorman, and Breiger (1976), which provides no more than a mere succession of static representations (or "snapshots") of social structure. (For a critical analysis, see Emirbayer and Goodwin [1994].) More recent approaches (e.g., the special issue on network dynamics published by the *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* [1996]) provide exciting technical innovations but do not satisfactorily resolve the problem. In the area of cultural analysis, meanwhile, much the same can be said of the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963), which itself rests quite explicitly upon a conceptual dichotomization of structure and time.

<sup>15</sup> According to his definition, "Players with relationships free of structural holes at their own end and rich in structural holes at the other end are structurally autonomous" (Burt 1992, p. 45).

John Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993) combine this structural autonomy notion with a focus upon “robust action,” the “flexible opportunism” made possible by certain actors’ “structurally anomalous” locations within social networks marked by deep structural holes. Still other analysts (e.g., Gould and Fernandez 1989) examine the pivotal roles that “brokers” play in dynamic processes-in-relations. These researchers all converge upon the idea that network dynamics are dialectically related to network structures, each of these “moments” partially conditioning the other.

Yet another inquiry into dynamic processes is currently being carried out by Harrison White, whose major contribution has been to shift the analytic focus of attention away from social networks alone toward socio-cultural units which he terms “network-domains,” or “netdoms.” (White speaks relatively little about social psychological formations.)<sup>41</sup> Actors continually “switch” between netdoms as they negotiate the subtle transitions, sometimes barely perceptible, among the various modes of social interaction that mark everyday life. “Publics,” a simple example of which is the momentary “coffee break,” facilitate such transitions; in them, social times and meanings pertaining to specific netdoms are suspended and network-domains themselves are “decoupled” from one another in a sort of “temporary bubble” of “continuing present time.”<sup>42</sup> Switches also occur *within* netdoms, among the various “stories” or accountings of social reality that together are borne by and serve to constitute each network-domain. “In ordinary, everyday social relations,” writes White, “multiple alternative accounts are being carried along until temporary resolutions at disjunctions which I call switches. At a switching, the continuing juggling among a set of stories is resolved into the account from which the next phase of reality constructing takes off, among relations cohering through that there and then” (White 1996, p. 1049). Here White invokes from statistical science the idea of “Bayesian forks” to capture the uncertainty or ambiguity—“What’s going on here?”—that arises and is resolved at network switchings. By means of such phenomenological categories, White helps to enhance our understanding of the mechanisms driving network processes. What still remains missing from his account, on the other hand (as from other approaches to network dynamics outlined above), is any

<sup>41</sup> “Networks catch up especially the cross-sectional patterns of connection and resonance in interaction. Domains catch up especially the meanings and interpretations which are the phenomenology of process as talk. These two, networks and domains, come together for the type of tie and . . . for construction of social meanings and times” (White 1996, p. 1038).

<sup>42</sup> Publics ease switches because “it is easier to evolve a mere  $2n$  ways to enter and exit a common public state from  $n$  distinctive network-domains than it is to evolve the much larger ( $n$  times  $n - 1$ ) number of ways to switch from one to another of the network-domains” (White 1996, p. 1056).

systematic, normative consideration of the role of what Dewey termed “intelligence” in the intentional guidance and direction of human affairs. Social actors’ reflexive engagement with the problems confronting them in their everyday lives remains significantly undertheorized in recent studies of network processes (more on this below as well).

A third related challenge facing the relational approach concerns *causality*. How are network dynamics to be accounted for? How are shifts in the content and direction of transactional flows to be explained? One persistent problem, yet another outgrowth of substantivist ways of reasoning, is the tendency even of many relational thinkers to depict causes as immaterial phenomena. Entities such as “forces,” “factors,” and “structures” are said to “impel” social substances, including persons and groups, down the causal path. Even figurations or patterns of relations (including structural holes) become substantives that putatively “move” action along in some fashion. Can causality be conceptualized in a more satisfactory way? One writer begins to address this problem by calling for a new “action language” for the social sciences. Roy Schafer (1976), a psychoanalytic theorist, proposes that we “regard each psychological [and, by extension, social] process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth to be called action, and . . . designate each action by an active verb stating its nature and by an adverb (or adverbial locution) when applicable, stating the mode of this action. Adopting this rule entails that, insofar as it is possible to do so sensibly, we shall not use nouns and adjectives to refer to [transactional] processes, events, etc.” (Schafer 1976, p. 9). A sentence such as “their disadvantaged position led to heightened competitiveness” should thus be translated as “they responded to their disadvantageous situation by acting more competitively.” Social actors themselves, in gamelike transactions within ever-changing contexts, do all of the acting in social life, not some imaginary entities within or without them, as in the substantivist worldviews of self- or interaction.

Of course, such a methodological prescription remains useful only insofar as one bears in mind that not all social actors are individual persons: in certain contexts, organizations or other identities might also be deemed actors for purposes of transactional analysis. More important, social actors are always embedded in space and time; they respond to specific *situations* (opportunities as well as constraints) rather than pursuing lines of conduct in purely solipsistic fashion. The narratives of their responses (together with the situations within which these occur) help to explain how causes actually produce effects in history. Action language, in other words, clears the ground for causal analysis by eliminating reified structures as “causal factors,” yet it needs to be supplemented by an explicit concern for the “situational mechanisms” (Stinchcombe 1991) that actually channel flows of events. Such mechanisms provide an answer to those who would sug-

gest (as variable-centered analysts often do, e.g.) that action language abandons the search for causal generalities in social life. Tilly provides an example of the sort of mechanism one might now be looking for: "The relationship among an activity, the set of agents that control the means that might make that activity possible, and the bargaining that goes on between the agents of the activity and those who hold the resources, produce unexpected sets of structures that themselves constrain the next round of action. . . . The causal mechanism lies in the bargaining that comes out of resistance to release the resources that are already committed to other ends. . . . The general cause lies in that struggle over control over wanted resources" (Tilly 1993, p. 6). This approach to causation retains the action orientation that Schafer advocates, yet avoids the latter's tendency toward pure voluntarism by insisting upon a search for robust explanatory processes that operate across a multiplicity of social situations.

Finally, the *normative implications* of relational inquiry come into question when one considers what sorts of moral and practical leverage such inquiry might provide in respect to social realities. We can distinguish here between "critical" and "reconstructive" implications. Preeminent among the former is the capacity afforded by transactional thinking to "unfreeze" static, substantialist categories that deny the fluidity—hence, the mutability—of figural patterns. In present-day cultural studies, for example, "essentialist" modes of thinking all too often see individuals and collectivities as possessing singular, unitary "identities" rooted in race, class, gender, or sexuality; putatively, such fixed attributional features explain both "interests" and action unproblematically.<sup>43</sup> Nor is such essentialism limited to cultural analysis alone; contemporary "identity politics" largely revolves around the attempt similarly to thematize (as well as to legitimize) particular collective identities (e.g., "African-American," "Latina woman") long devalued in mainstream culture. More clearly pernicious essentialisms (e.g., racism, [hetero-]sexism, xenophobic nationalism) share in such reasoning, if not in its progressive ideological agenda. Now, categories certainly do matter a great deal in social life; as W. I. Thomas famously pointed out, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas 1928, p. 572). Moreover, categorical thinking can have crucial critical implications, such as normatizing previously devalued categories or redistributing resources by means of social policy. Yet, transactional thinking contests the intrinsically

<sup>43</sup> Versions of cultural studies that speak in more nuanced terms of the intersection of *multiple* identities, as in the category of "black lesbians," add considerable complexity to the picture, yet still do not escape the difficulties that pertain to all categorical, substantialist thinking.

reified nature of *all* categories: it shows how they “totalize” identities that are in fact often multidimensional and contradictory; prescribe modes of thought and action against which alternatives can only be labeled “deviant”; naturalize rigid distinctions that suppress possibilities for creative (self-) transformation; and, most generally, accept rather than contest the historically variable relational matrices that serve to constitute invidious distinctions and categorizations in the first place (Somers and Gibson 1994, pp. 55–57).<sup>44</sup> Transactional thinking, in a word, deconstructs a taken-for-granted moral universe; in so doing, it attacks in moral and practical life the very same tendencies toward “process-reduction” that Elias so forcefully underscored at the level of cognition.<sup>45</sup>

In a more reconstructive vein, relational reasoning also speaks directly to the problem of what is to count as a “better” or “worse” line of conduct (or end point of action), from an ethical or political point of view. If values are not preconstituted substances, then whence do they arise and how are they to be evaluated? What kinds of transactions ought to be most highly valued in a processual, relational view of the world? Such issues, which have long vexed transactional theorists, are perhaps most provocatively addressed by classical American pragmatists such as John Dewey—with whom we began—and George Herbert Mead (although they were also engaged with in similar ways by Bakhtin [1993] and later by Jürgen Habermas [1984–87]). For the pragmatists, normative implications flow naturally out of the central concept of transaction itself: “Values are not simply objective givens, which are independent of human existence. They are, however, also not merely the product of the subjective evaluation of objects which are essentially neutral with regard to this evaluation. Rather . . . the evaluation is the result of an ‘interaction’ [or transaction] of subject and object” (Joas 1985, p. 131). Thus, values are by-products of actors’ engagement with one another in ambiguous and challenging circumstances, which emerge when individuals experience a discordance between the claims of multiple normative commitments. Problematic situa-

<sup>44</sup> See n. 38, above. In practical politics and cultural struggle, social actors often invoke collective identities strategically, even as they question categorical thinking theoretically. “The point . . . is not to stop studying identity formation, or even to abandon all forms of identity politics, but rather . . . to rely on notions of identity and identity politics for their strategic utility while remaining vigilant against reification” (Epstein 1994, p. 197).

<sup>45</sup> For examples of self-consciously deconstructionist, “poststructuralist” thinking in respect to questions of identity, see Scott (1988) and Sedgwick (1990). Relationalism by no means entails adoption of all aspects of deconstructionism, even if it does share important features with it. The continuities (and discontinuities) between deconstructionism (Derrida 1974), on the one hand, and contemporary relational perspectives—from neopragmatism (esp. Rorty 1982) to social-network theory (esp. White 1992), on the other—would make for a valuable comparative study.

tions of this sort become resolved only when actors reconstruct the relational contexts within which they are embedded, and in the process, transform their own values and themselves: "The appearance of . . . different interests in the forum of reflection [leads to] the reconstruction of the social world, and the consequent appearance of the new self that answers to the new object" (Mead 1964, p. 149).

Appealing visions of both action and order follow directly from this line of reasoning. The rational resolution of problem-situations—a matter of action—requires capacities for prudential reasoning and practical judgment, which the pragmatists (beginning with Dewey) termed "intelligence." In this mode of action, "the individual . . . take[s] into account all of those interests [that are implicated in a given situation] and then make[s] out a plan of action which will rationally deal with those interests" (Mead 1934, p. 388; see Emirbayer and Mische, *in press*). The actor puts himself in the place of the other, broadens his own point of view through argumentative engagement with the latter, and attains in this manner to ever more comprehensive, cosmopolitan, universalistic perspectives. In parallel fashion, the ideal mode of mutual engagement or transaction—a matter of order—entails a free and open communication of actors in a universal community, a relational matrix within which both cooperation and conflict are rationally regulated. This "mode of associated living"—in a word, democracy—embodies moral intelligence on a transpersonal scale; it involves "conjoint communicated experience" in which practical reasoning is undertaken in common, through inquiry into moral and political problems on the model of an experimental science (Dewey 1980, p. 93). Such a point of view—as it pertains to both action and order—does resolve many problems concerning the normative implications of relational reasoning, while also remaining well within a transactional frame of reference. What it does not adequately address, however, is the question of whether the relevant standards of normative judgment are to be substantive or merely procedural: Does the idea of free and open communication in transactional processes mean nothing other than a formal method of intelligent reasoning, or does it lead to a view of moral character and collective social arrangements that is more contentful? This is a question that relational thinkers continue to be troubled by (to the extent that they address it at all), and that they have not yet—and may never—satisfactorily resolve.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> One of the most serious shortcomings of relational sociology to date is its relative neglect of normative concerns, despite the profound interpenetration (in true transactionalist fashion) of all questions of "is" and "ought" in social-scientific analysis.

## CONCLUSION

Such unresolved issues and problems notwithstanding, of course, the promise of a relational mode of sociological inquiry remains considerable. Philosophically, theoretically, and empirically, it offers a compelling alternative to the currently ascendant perspectives of self- and interaction, and to their present-day champions in rational-choice, neo-Kantian, structuralist, and variable-based sociologies. New and exciting approaches to cultural, social structural, and social psychological analysis already exemplify this vast potential; ongoing efforts at the reconstruction of major theoretical concepts further attest to it. Moreover, social thinkers from a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds, national traditions, and analytic and empirical points of view are fast converging upon this frame of reference, often without even grasping its full significance. A set of assumptions—some might call it a paradigm—that first attained to systematic expression in sociological theory, as in other fields such as physics, near the turn of the century (its antecedents reach much farther back in time, of course) is finally now, at the close of the century, starting to receive the widespread attention it so richly deserves. Despite the sharp attention accorded to so many other debates, dualisms, and oppositions in sociology, the choice between substantivist and relational modes of inquiry, a choice of bedrock assumptions regarding the very nature of social reality itself, is fast becoming the most important and consequential dividing line in sociological investigation.

Many challenges lie ahead; the preceding section discussed only a few of the most significant. Relational theorists and researchers must now focus upon several tasks. One is to explore ever more aggressively the analytical levels of culture and collective emotions, importing into these problem areas many of the same insights and research techniques already elaborated by network analysts but also exploiting, for example, the exciting new approaches developed by sociolinguists and social psychological researchers. (Analysts have been moving into the culture field in ever increasing numbers but as yet the study of transpersonal emotional flows—the social psychological dimension—has remained seriously underdeveloped.) Second, and relatedly, transactional researchers must strive resolutely to maintain theoretical consistency *across* levels of analysis, not only in their more case-specific explanations, but also, and especially, in their general efforts at theory-building. Often the wariness of social thinkers today regarding comprehensive theorization (an outdated carryover from earlier battles against the Parsonian legacy?) leads to an all too easy acceptance of hybrid models (e.g., juxtapositions of rational-actor with network-analytic approaches). The richness and breadth of relational ways

of thinking allow one to avoid such ad hoc reasoning and to develop causal explanations more self-consciously within a unitary frame of reference. And finally, transactional thinkers must begin to systematize some of the alternative ways in which central issues and problems have been thematized from within their own tradition. Internal debates will be lifted to a much higher plane—and theory-building facilitated—once analysts begin to see differences, for example, between Bourdieu and Foucault on “power,” between Tilly and Somers on “culture,” or between Dewey and White on “intelligence,” as alternative ways of proceeding from the selfsame philosophical premises regarding processes-in-relations. Only then will transactional sociologists be able fully to grasp the possibilities and choices confronting them; only then will they (and the sociological discipline more generally) finally arrive at the theoretical clarity and reflexivity that they have long been capable of attaining.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Lest this “manifesto” seem incomplete without one, I shall offer one final rallying-cry: *Entities of the World—Relate!* Both descriptive and prescriptive, with implications both causal and normative, this statement (despite slight interactional overtones) nicely captures the rich possibilities inherent in the relational, transactional vision of social reality.

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# **Collectivist versus Individualist Mobility Regimes? Structural Change and Job Mobility in Four Countries<sup>1</sup>**

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Job mobility is produced by structural forces of expansion and contraction as well as by individual choices. But labor market structure and welfare state policies will create distinctive national patterns of labor force adjustment to shifts in technology, markets, and the consequent demand for particular forms of labor. In a four-nation comparative study, U.S. rates of job mobility showed the greatest sensitivity to structural change and to the labor market resources of individual workers. The Netherlands was at the opposite pole, with worker outcomes largely insulated from structural forces. Germany's strong labor market boundaries channeled adjustment within sectors or between employment and nonemployment, while Sweden's pattern was intermediate between that of the United States and Germany.

## **INTRODUCTION**

This article develops a synthesis of labor market and welfare state theory to account for cross-national differences in the labor market response to the changing occupational and industrial distribution. We test this theory

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with a multilevel dynamic model of both demand- and supply-based determinants of job mobility. We use this model to study a decade of change in four industrialized countries, the United States, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, which are characterized by important differences in labor market structure and in welfare-state policies that influence the pattern of worker response to structural change in the labor market. We show how nationally distinct combinations of labor market and welfare state structure have produced distinctive national responses to the adjustment process.

Dislocations in the labor market have become a prominent feature of advanced industrial societies during the past couple of decades. The presumed causes are well known: technological change in the manufacturing sector, the development of a global market, the growth of the service sector, changes in the role of women, and the continued development of the welfare state. The most visible manifestations of these dislocations include rising inequality in wages, the decline of the working class, growth in unemployment, declining labor force participation by men over 50, and markedly expanded opportunities in managerial and professional occupations.

The process of change has not been uniform across all countries. However, a satisfactory account for cross-national differences has been elusive. A principal reason for this difficulty is the still-existing separation between market and state-based theories in stratification research. Comparative analyses of wages draw heavily from the literature on neocorporatism to contrast the decentralized, dualist, market-based wage-setting mechanisms found in the United States and the more centralized wage-setting institutions in many European countries (Goldthorpe 1984). The literature on work careers typically relies on distinctions between "open" and "closed" employment relationships (Sørensen and Tuma 1981), or between

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occupation-based, organization-based, and "secondary" labor markets (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981). These concepts continue to be useful tools for comparative research. However, as explanations for the dynamics of labor market adjustment, they are incomplete. They conceptualize outcomes only in terms of labor market resources that are attached to particular positions in the labor market. Yet the recent dynamics of advanced industrial societies have involved forces that change the supply of positions within occupations and within organizations. These changes require reallocations of workers that cannot be fully accounted for by the labor market resources vested in now-vanished jobs.

The process of adjustment inevitably involves life-course disruption, and this disruption inevitably triggers the social insurance programs of the modern welfare state. The best-known taxonomies of welfare states (Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990) focus on the extent of benefits and the conditions of eligibility. Institutional differences between "liberal," "conservative," and "social democratic" welfare-state regimes clearly affect the financial consequences of career misfortune. However, state policies can also influence the structure of career flows that constitute the process of adjustment to structural change.

Structural change is the process of change in the distribution of jobs across the occupational or industrial spectrum. It arises from a combination of economic and technological developments as they are enhanced, damped, or otherwise mediated by the sociopolitical environment. Absent any institutional regulation, these pressures would work through the system in a highly turbulent way, leading to the restructuring of many existing establishments and firms, the death of some, and the birth of others. This turbulence, however, can be damped or channeled when institutional forces (e.g., collective bargaining or union strike threats, laws or administrative regulations, or more diffuse cultural forces) create incentives or disincentives for particular organizational or individual adaptive responses. Through these incentives and disincentives, institutional forces can change the balance among the five fundamental types of mobility events that contribute to the process of structural change, namely (a) entry into the labor force by young workers or recent immigrants, (b) job mobility of those already in the labor force, (c) exit and reentry of midcareer workers, (d) exit and entry into the labor force by women during their childbearing years, and (e) retirements and other long-term exits.

Because the structure of institutional constraints and inducements differs across nations, we expect that nations will differ in the extent to which institutions shield or channel the impact of structural change on individual outcomes. At one extreme, shielding is at a minimum and market mechanisms determine the nature of the link. In such an environment,

we expect individual-level labor market resources to play a major role in differentiating the fates of workers. Such an environment might be characterized as an "individualist" mobility regime (with the United States being perhaps the outstanding example) in contrast to a "collectivist" regime, where an individual's structural location or resources play a more restricted role in labor market outcomes.

But if the United States is one polar extreme, the preceding discussion suggests that there need not exist a simple unidimensional contrast (i.e., a prototypical polar opposite), because the five different flows that make up adjustment will all be influenced, generally in different ways, by a society's labor market and welfare state institutions. As a form of suggestive imagery, the individualist-collectivist dichotomy is attractive. But as an *explanation* for cross-national variation, this polarity is too simple, because it fails to reveal *how* institutional channeling occurs in a context where multiple forms of institutional channeling are possible. This complication can be illustrated against the backdrop of existing welfare state taxonomies, where Sweden, as a "social-democratic" state comes closest to being the polar opposite of the "residualist" United States, with the Netherlands and Germany occupying intermediate positions. In this scheme, life chances in Sweden are made uniform through the process of decommmodification induced by universal, citizenship-based welfare benefits. However, this process of decommmodification, which detaches an individual's life chances from his or her career outcomes, does not necessarily place restrictions on the freedom of action of employers or workers. In fact, the result could be quite the opposite, because pressures to reduce job mobility can be diffused by policies that reduce the impact of forced mobility on an individual's social welfare.

In our view, an adequate conceptual scheme for distinguishing stratification outcomes must make use of both labor market and welfare state dimensions while recognizing that these two institutional axes are fundamentally linked (Rein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990). State regulatory policies can affect the level of turbulence of the labor market, that is, the aggregate level of job mobility.<sup>2</sup> They also can affect the size of the mobil-

<sup>2</sup> Overall levels of job mobility are determined in part by birth and death rates of jobs, which themselves are largely a function of the birth and death rates of establishments and firms (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996). Determinants of national rates of birth and death of jobs, establishments, and firms include (1) the technological mix of the economy, (2) the size distribution of firms in the economy, (3) the level of product market competition, which is affected by factors such as antitrust regulation and other market governance mechanisms that increase or decrease the rate of opportunities for firm, plant, and job births and deaths (Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Leonard and Schettkat 1991; Hannan and Carroll 1992), (4) the size of the state sector, which is generally more stable than the private sector, and (5) the level of employment security, which may influence the rate of job deaths. Existing studies suggest that the United

ity components that together produce the net *direction* of mobility flows generated by structural change. It of course must be the case that workers flow away from jobs that are eliminated and toward jobs that are created. Furthermore, it is now well established that many workers are hired by organizations that are contracting, just as workers often exit organizations that are expanding (Davis et al. 1996; Lane, Stevens, and Burgess 1996). On balance, however, workers will flow out of declining sectors and occupations and will flow into expanding ones.

But the workers who leave contracting establishments, occupations, or industries are not necessarily the *same* workers who take jobs in expanding sectors. Workers who leave contracting sectors can move relatively quickly into new jobs, or they can become jobless for a short or an extended time. Indeed, contraction that is achieved through the retirement of older workers does not generate any job-to-job mobility flows. Similarly, expansion can be achieved either through job mobility or through imbalances across sectors in the rate of accession from the ranks of the nonemployed (especially the cohorts newly entering the labor market). The particular labor market and welfare-state characteristics of a society will determine the overall amount of mobility that is generated by the process of job creation and destruction, as well as its direction.<sup>3</sup>

Four dimensions that are intrinsic to welfare state and labor market institutions influence both the size of excess job flows (those not strictly required by the process of job creation and destruction) and the direction of these flows in response to structural change. The first is the *level of job security*. Countries differ in the ease with which workers can be separated from their jobs and the conditions under which separations can occur. These differences follow partly from official policies to protect workers and/or to increase market efficiency by reducing the moral hazard problems that arise when employment security is left to the realm of private contracting between employers and workers (Büchtemann 1993, pp. 55–

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States has higher levels of job creation and destruction than Germany (Leonard and Schettkat 1991) and comparable levels to those of Sweden (Davis et al. 1996). Data on the Netherlands are unavailable, but birth/death levels presumably are in the same range as Germany.

<sup>3</sup> Various estimates suggest that roughly two-thirds of job moves do not involve a just eliminated or a newly created job (Davis et al. 1996; Lane et al. 1996; Anderson and Meyer 1994). An unknown additional fraction of mobility may indirectly result from the process of vacancy creation and destruction (e.g., when a worker changes jobs to take a job that was vacated by a worker who moved to a newly created job, or when a worker loses his job because his employer would prefer to replace him with a worker seeking a new job because his old job was eliminated). Each society probably has a third component of "pure" exchange mobility that is not directly or indirectly linked to the process of job creation and destruction, but estimates of this third component must await more precise estimates of the size of the first two components.

59). They also arise from the agreements negotiated between unions and employers. Cross-national differences in the average level of employment security affect the rate of separation, and possibly also the balance between accessions and structural change as components of the adjustment to structural change. The other three dimensions concern the direction of mobility when it does occur. *Employment-sustaining labor market policies* are policies that facilitate employment and are specifically targeted at workers seeking either a job or a new job. This group would of course include workers whose jobs had become redundant as part of the larger process of structural change. *Welfare-sustaining employment exit policies* on the other hand are designed to insure against serious declines in living standards for those workers who leave employment. A dominant component of these polices is the public pension system for those leaving the labor force at the normatively prescribed retirement age. An important additional component, however, consists of programs that stabilize social welfare for those who leave employment because of job loss, or disability, or in some cases as part of an early retirement program. The fourth dimension, the *strength of labor market boundaries* between organizations, occupations, or industries, regulates both the amount of job mobility and the direction such mobility takes. Taken together, these four dimensions influence the contribution of particular mobility pathways to the overall process of adjustment.

Neither a pure welfare state approach nor a pure labor market approach can by itself account for a country's placement within these four dimensions. The Esping-Andersen taxonomy is centered on the concept of decommodification. It nicely distinguishes the Scandinavian social democratic societies, where social rights are individual-based and universal, from "corporatist" welfare states, such as Germany and Austria, that attempt to protect against a change in a worker's market-based "life chances" without undermining traditional status or family structure. But the decommodification dimension does not adequately address *how* social welfare is maintained. Incomes policies, employment protection policies, and social insurance against employment loss can all play a significant role in this process.

All three European societies give workers certain incumbency rights to their job (Büchtemann 1993; OECD 1994).<sup>4</sup> The United States is generally

<sup>4</sup> Virtually all rankings place the United States lower than the European countries in employment protection. Mayes and Soteri (1994), Bertola (1990), and Grubb and Wells (1993) rank Germany as more protective than the Netherlands, while Emerson (1988) reverses their ranking. Emerson and Grubb and Wells rank Sweden as less protective than Germany and the Netherlands, while Laxear (1990), who did not rank the Netherlands, placed Germany and Sweden together in a middle group with the United Kingdom and the United States at the low end.

considered to have the weakest job security policies of any of these four countries. But Sweden's version of job security must be understood within the context of the Scandinavian model of social democracy. This model included a core commitment to full employment that was not predicated upon iron-clad incumbency rights (Therborn 1985; Moene and Wallerstein 1995). On the contrary, the Swedish model of wage compression was expected to generate labor turnover by using wage pressure to force technologically backward firms out of business (Rehn and Meidner 1953; Björklund and Holmlund 1987; Swenson 1989; Moene and Wallerstein 1995). Full employment was to be maintained through a combination of macroeconomic policies that kept aggregate employment high (Calmfors 1993) and active labor market policies that facilitated job mobility through retraining, mobility grants, and temporary jobs.<sup>5</sup>

Germany, in contrast, embarked on what has been called a "concerted transition from work to welfare" in which older workers came to be seen as the source of "a highly flexible adjustment potential to changes in the demand for labor" (Naschold, Oppen, Peinemann, and Rosenow 1993, pp. 117, 119). Through disability programs, through long-duration unemployment and generous income assistance benefits, and through retirement programs linked to the state of labor demand, the gap between Sweden and Germany in labor force participation of men in their fifties and sixties grew rather wide during the 1970s and 1980s. The welfare-sustaining labor market exit programs of the Netherlands were even more liberal than those of Germany, so that by 1990 only two-thirds of men in their late fifties and only 23% of men in their early sixties were still working in the Netherlands (as compared with 79% and 34% in Germany, and 88% and 63% in Sweden, respectively). As of 1994, 44% of private-sector companies in the Netherlands were operating early retirement plans (Foster 1994). Furthermore, the disability programs of the Netherlands reached ever-larger fractions of the workforce, so that by 1989 13.7% of the employment age population of the Netherlands was participating in a disability program as compared with 7.8% in Germany and 5.5% in

<sup>5</sup> Sweden's active labor market policies are easily the most extensive in Europe (Rehn 1985). Certain components of the "Swedish model" lost momentum in the 1980s. Wage compression came to a halt in that decade, as did the highly centralized system of wage negotiations. Heavy devaluations in 1981 and 1982 relaxed the pressure on firms to economize, even if outright subsidies to economically troubled firms ended with the return of the social democratic government in 1982. There is also some evidence that wage-driven mobility due to "solidaristic" wage compression was lower in the 1980s than the two previous decades (Edin and Topel 1997). Nonetheless, the extensive active labor market programs that were designed to facilitate job mobility and support full employment were not cut back.

Sweden. In contrast to Germany and the Netherlands (and in keeping with the social democratic model), Sweden's generous unemployment benefits are limited to one year (OECD 1994), thus providing incentives for workers to enroll in active labor market programs (Calmfors 1993). In the United States, in contrast to the European societies, unemployment benefits are both low and of short duration.

The strength of labor market boundaries between jobs will also play an important role in channeling and limiting the job mobility component of structural adjustment. Germany in particular, with its strong credential-based occupational structure, its strong links between school and work, and its high labor costs, has restricted the viability of midcareer shifts as a tool of structural adjustment (Blossfeld and Mayer 1988; Müller, Steinmann, and Ell, *in press*). Sweden, in contrast, has much weaker occupational boundaries; Swedish labor organizations placed greater emphasis on class than on occupational solidarity and the credential barriers found in Germany never reached similar heights in Sweden (Therborn 1988). Sweden also has relatively low organization-based labor market boundaries due to the fact that welfare benefits are universal rather than tied to a specific job with a specific employer. Occupational boundaries in the Netherlands appear to be intermediate in strength between those of Sweden and Germany (den Broeder 1995, 1996). The Netherlands has a well-developed system of vocational education, but educational credentials are not a prerequisite for occupational entry to the same extent as in Germany (den Broeder 1995; de Graaf and Ultee, *in press*; Müller et al., *in press*; Müller and Shavit, 1997).

The distinction between collectivist and individualist mobility regimes remains a viable and indeed fundamental distinction. However, the above discussion suggests that collectivist regimes can take many forms. Table 1 ranks the countries in our study along the four dimensions that shape the direction of mobility.<sup>4</sup> The United States is always at the right side of the diagram, reflecting its "residual" welfare state and relatively unregulated markets. Either Sweden, the Netherlands, or Germany takes the opposite pole, depending on the dimension. Thus, we expect the adjustment process to be multidimensional, with outcomes a function of the particular configuration of institutional mechanisms that characterize a country's labor market and welfare state. We formalize these expectations in the following section, which first focuses on expected commonalities in the adjustment process, and then on country-specific differences.

<sup>4</sup>We include Italy and Spain on the employment security dimension to emphasize that none of the countries in the current study belong at the left end of this dimension.

TABLE 1

## COUNTRY RANKINGS BY SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES AND LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE

LEVEL AND DIRECTION OF MOBILITY				
	High		Low	
Stability of jobs (barriers to job creation)			Germany	United States
Employment security	(Italy, Spain)	Germany	Netherlands(?) Sweden United States	
Employment-sustaining active labor market policies	Sweden		Netherlands Sweden Germany Netherlands	United States
Employment-sustaining employment exit policies	Netherlands		Germany Sweden	United States
Occupational boundaries	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	United States

## HYPOTHEZIZED CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE ON MOBILITY OUTCOMES

In this section, we offer hypotheses about several forms of job mobility. We begin by clarifying our terminology. We refer to job mobility with the same employer as "within-employer" mobility. Job mobility involving employer change to another job in the same industry is referred to as "between-employer/within-industry" mobility or more succinctly as "within-industry" mobility. Employer change accompanied by a change of industry is referred to as "industrial" mobility, while job change involving a change of occupation is referred to as "occupational" mobility. Finally, "employment exit" is a change from the employed state either to unemployment—for reasons other than temporary layoff—or out of the labor force.

Structural change is by definition a shifting of the industrial and occupational structure of a society. Therefore, it *must* have implications for the jobs and for the careers of the workers who make up the workforce. The mere fact of structural change does not, however, predetermine the pattern of worker response, because—as we noted in the previous section—there are multiple mechanisms by which labor force adjustment can occur. Generally speaking, however, we expect changes in adjustment flows to mirror the overall direction of change in the size of the category. That is, we expect industries with contracting employment to have relatively greater levels of job separation as well as lower rates of accession. Simi-

larly, we expect growing occupations to have higher rates of accession and lower rates of separation. These expectations, which we formulate in the first two hypotheses, must of course be understood as predictions that are *net* of the inherent rate of turbulence—that is, the overall rate of job mobility—that characterizes a particular occupation or industry.

*HYPOTHESIS 1.—Industrial and occupational mobility is a positive function of contraction in the origin industry and in the origin occupation.*

*HYPOTHESIS 2.—Employment exit is a positive function of contraction in either the origin industry or the origin occupation.*

The relationship between structural change and within-industry or within-employer job mobility is more complicated because offsetting effects may be operating.

*HYPOTHESIS 3.—Within-industry mobility should be a positive function of job creation within the origin industry (which pulls individuals into new jobs), but possibly also of job elimination within the origin industry (which stimulates job mobility). Given the difficulty of displaced workers finding new jobs in contracting origin industries, however, we expect the net effect of contraction on within-industry mobility to be negative, and thus the net effect of expansion on within-industry mobility to be positive.*

Finally, we conjecture that within-employer mobility should be a positive function of occupational or industrial expansion (which creates new opportunities in many organizations), but also of occupational or industrial contraction (which stimulates reorganizations that in turn stimulate within-employer job mobility). The balance of these effects is a matter for empirical investigation.

Next, we formulate hypotheses about cross-national differences in the relationships between individual resources, structural change, and job mobility. We first state these hypotheses in an abstract way. Their specification for the particular countries in our study follows in a straightforward fashion from the ranking of these countries in table 1.

*HYPOTHESIS 4.—The effects of structural contraction on job mobility to new occupations and industries is inversely related to social welfare programs that make nonemployment an attractive option, and to the strength of job security, which forces greater reliance on hiring reductions and early retirement as a way for organizations to shrink.*

*HYPOTHESIS 5.—The effects of structural contraction on job mobility to new occupations and industries is stimulated by active labor market policies designed to facilitate job mobility.*

*HYPOTHESIS 6.—The effects of structural contraction on job mobility to new occupations and industries is an inverse function of the strength of labor market boundaries.*

HYPOTHESIS 7.—*The effects of structural contraction on employment exit is a positive function of labor market boundaries and a positive function of welfare-sustaining employment exit policies.*

HYPOTHESIS 8.—*The effects of structural expansion on job mobility within the occupation or industry is directly related to the strength of labor market boundaries, which inhibit mobility to other occupations or industries.*

The rationale for these hypotheses follows naturally from the theoretical discussion of the previous section. Structural contraction will generate flows out of contracting occupations and industries, and the destination is more likely to be nonemployment or other occupations and industries in proportion to (1) the attractiveness of nonemployment, (2) the effectiveness of policies designed to facilitate job mobility, and (3) the strength of labor market boundaries that might impede these flows. The effect of job security is also to reduce the amount of job mobility in response to contraction, because employment security pressures employers to lower the rate of new hires or to induce voluntary retirement in order to accomplish employment reductions. In table 2, we diagram the country-specific implications of these hypotheses. Our hypotheses imply that Sweden should exhibit positive effects of contraction on occupational and industrial mobility. The United States has relatively meager active labor market policies, but hypotheses 4 and 6 imply that the United States should also have high occupational and industrial mobility in response to contraction. Our hypotheses predict moderate to low occupational and industrial mobility for Germany and the Netherlands. Hypothesis 5 predicts that employment exit is stimulated by contraction in the face of strong labor market boundaries and strong welfare-sustaining employment exit policies. Germany and the Netherlands have the strongest labor market boundaries, and these countries also have the strongest welfare-sustaining employment exit policies. Thus, we predict the strongest impact of contraction on employment exit should be found in Germany and the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and the United States. The ordering of countries from hypothesis 8 follows naturally from our reading that Germany's labor market boundaries are highest, closely followed by the Netherlands, and more distantly by Sweden and the United States.

We make no prediction about how labor market structure and welfare state policies might modify the effect of net change on internal reassignment. Greater protection against layoff should motivate employers to retrain and reassign redundant workers internally (Sengenberger 1990).<sup>7</sup> It

<sup>7</sup> For example, the rate of internal reassessments in the German system is enhanced by social plans negotiated by the works councils that encourage capital investment

TABLE 2  
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS

	MOBILITY			
	High		Low	
Contraction effects on mobility to other categories:				
Hypothesis 4	United States	Sweden	Germany Netherlands	
Hypothesis 5	Sweden	Germany Netherlands		United States
Hypothesis 6 Summary (4 + 5 + 6)	United States United States Sweden	Sweden	Netherlands Germany Netherlands	Germany
Contraction effect on employment exit:				
Hypothesis 7	Netherlands Germany		Sweden	United States
Expansion effect on within-category mobility:				
Hypothesis 8	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	United States
Importance of individual-level resources				
Hypothesis 9	United States	Sweden	Netherlands	Germany
U-shaped tenure and experience effects:				
Hypothesis 10	Netherlands	Germany	Sweden	United States

is frequently argued that workers in the three European countries that we consider are more broadly trained than American workers and thus more easily reassigned (Allaart, Praat, and Vosse 1994; Sengenberger 1990), which should boost their rates of within-employer mobility in contracting sectors. However, the functional relationship between net change and within-employer mobility also depends upon the extent to which industrial or occupational expansion is accomplished primarily through growth of existing organizations (which may generate promotions) or through the creation of new organizations (whose vacancies initially are filled only through hires). Little is known about the ratio between these two kinds of job creation across countries. Furthermore, the level of

to save jobs and rotation exchange (*Ringtausch*) linked with early retirement. This system has been particularly effective in the steel industry (Thelen 1991).

within-employer mobility during reorganizations may also be enhanced by higher levels of employment exit from the firms, since these departures (or exits) create pressure for reassignment to cover the functions once handled by departing workers. We leave the cross-national pattern of within-employer response to structural change as a matter for empirical investigation.

We finally propose two hypotheses concerning the implications of welfare state and labor market policies for the relationship between an individual worker's labor market resources and the rate and direction of job mobility.

*HYPOTHESIS 9.—Mobility rates vary more strongly with a worker's labor market resources in countries with weaker employment protection and weaker labor market boundaries.*

*HYPOTHESIS 10.—The relationship of employment exit to tenure or labor force experience will be more steeply curvilinear (falling and then rising) in countries with strong welfare-sustaining employment exit policies.*

Hypothesis 9 follows from the claim that labor market regulations have the biggest impact on workers with the lowest level of labor market resources. In relatively unregulated labor markets, workers gain stability through their own personal characteristics. Workers with valuable job skills in unregulated labor markets can use their skills to gain the kind of employment security that is extended to a broader class of workers through regulation in countries with more highly regulated labor markets (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981). Of the four countries in this study, the United States has the most unprotected and hence "dualistic" labor market. We therefore expect individual resources—specifically education and employer tenure—to differentiate the level of protection more sharply in the United States than in the three European countries. Sweden's employment security system is more tenure based than is the system of either the Netherlands or Germany (where security is afforded to nearly all workers after an initial probationary period). Therefore, we expect Sweden to be an intermediate case in the relationship between employer tenure and job mobility. The Netherlands and Germany should have the least differentiated workforce.

The greater use of early retirement and disability in the process of labor market adjustment in Germany and the Netherlands would lead to the prediction of a stronger curvilinear relationship between age or experience and employment exit in the Netherlands and Germany than in the United States or Sweden (hypothesis 10). However, this prediction is somewhat undermined by an offsetting relation: while early "permanent" exit may be rarer in the United States, short-term exit (followed by reentry) is rather common. In this article, because we look at any type of exit regardless of duration, the effects of age or experience will depend upon the relative

mix of long-term and short-term exits as well as on the structural determinants of each type of exit.

### A BASIC MODEL

Ideally, one would like to specify a macro-micro model based on three structural components: the rate of job creation, the rate of job elimination, and the inherent (equilibrium) tendency toward turbulence for any particular job category. Such information is very difficult to obtain for entire economies even for a single nation.<sup>8</sup> Information on turbulence and on net structural change, which is generally available from survey data, is therefore a useful approximation, especially if the categories have reasonably fine detail. In our work, therefore, we use net change in the most detailed occupations and industries available in national data sets along with a measure of turbulence as our operationalization of structural forces.

The algebraic relationships between turbulence, gross flows, and net change can be expressed rather simply. Let

- $n_j$  = the size of category  $j$  in year  $t$ .
- $\Delta n_j$  = the change in size between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ , that is,  $\Delta n_j = n_{j+1} - n_j$ .
- $S_j^+$  = the gross flow into category  $j$  between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ , that is, the total number of workers who entered category  $j$  between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .
- $S_j^-$  = the gross flow out of category  $j$  between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .
- $S_j$  = the average flow, what we call "turbulence," that is,  $S_j = (S_j^+ + S_j^-)/2$ .
- $R_j$  = the net change, that is,  $R_j = S_j^+ - S_j^-$ .
- $s_j$  =  $S_j/n_j$ ,  $r_j = R_j/n_j$ , the rates of turbulence and net change, respectively.
- $p_i$  = the probability of job mobility of the indicated type for individual  $i$  between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ .

Using the above terminology, we specify a "turbulence-change" model for job mobility as

$$\frac{p_i}{1 - p_i} = e^{\alpha_1 \log(s_j) + \alpha_2 \log(1+r_j) + \Sigma_i^j}. \quad (1)$$

In this discrete-time log-logistic model (Cox and Oakes 1984; Yamaguchi 1991),  $t$  indexes years,  $\alpha_1$  is the effect of turbulence on job mobility, and

<sup>8</sup> Rates of job creation and destruction are available in the United States for the manufacturing sector and for selected states (see Davis et al. 1996). Comparable databases are not publicly available for the Netherlands, Germany, or Sweden.

$\alpha_1$  is the effect of net change;  $X_{it}$  is a vector of possibly time-varying individual-level labor market resources and liabilities known to affect rates of job mobility, and  $\beta$  is the time-independent vector of coefficients for the variables in  $X_{it}$ , including an intercept term. We specify  $s$  and  $r$  as logarithms in order to maintain a sensible relationship between these variables and  $p$ .<sup>9</sup> This model estimates what might be termed the "push" effects of structural change. In other words, it can estimate how structural change in the origin position combines with individual-level variables to generate job mobility (the differential "pull" of possible destinations is a topic we leave to future research).

To estimate the turbulence-change model, we combined data from longitudinal surveys with data from repeated cross-sectional labor force surveys for each of the four countries (in the case of Germany, we included only the former West German states). We estimated our models for a period of roughly 10 years beginning in the early 1980s and ending in the early 1990s, with some cross-national variation in the exact starting and ending year attributable to practical data-related considerations. We provide details concerning the data sources for each country in the appendix. Time-series data from the labor force surveys in each country were used to estimate yearly net change rates for detailed occupations and industries. Data on job mobility, on worker attributes, and on turbulence were obtained from the panel data available for each country. Our analysis focuses on male workers, ages 18–64 in the origin year (16–63 in Sweden). We excluded the agricultural sector from our analysis.

We specified five parallel models, one for each of the following dependent variables: within-employer mobility, within-industry mobility, industrial mobility, occupational mobility, and employment exit. In each case the risk set was defined as everyone who had a job as of the survey date in year  $t$ . Changes in status between that time and the time of the survey in year  $t + 1$  were used to define events.<sup>10</sup> Industrial and occupational mobility were measured with respect to detailed occupation and industry codes. To reduce the effects of coding error in our analysis, we only counted instances of occupational mobility when the head or partner actually reported job mobility during the relevant period of time, and we only counted instances of industrial mobility that were accompanied by

<sup>9</sup> Since  $p$  is typically small,  $p/(1 - p)$  is approximately equal to  $p$ . For a given individual  $i$ , therefore, eq. (1) reduces approximately to  $p_{it} = k_i s_i^{\alpha_1} (1 + r_i)^{\alpha_2}$  where  $k_i$  is an individual-specific constant. If the rate of net change were zero, this becomes  $p_{it} = k_i s_i^{\alpha_1}$ .

<sup>10</sup> We only counted instances of employment exit when the sample member was still not employed as of the survey date in year  $t + 1$ . This allowed us to make use of questions that distinguish true job separation from temporary layoff.

a change of employer or a change involving self-employment status. We were able to use three-digit coding schemes for the United States, the Netherlands, and (in the case of occupations) for Germany. However, we were constrained by data limitations to using two-digit occupation and industry codes for Sweden, and to using two-digit industry codes for Germany. Thus, the analyses for within-employer mobility and for employment exit are quite comparable for all four countries. Analyses of occupational mobility are comparable for the United States, the Netherlands, and Germany, while the results for Sweden are probably influenced somewhat by the higher level of aggregation, which will reduce the level of observed mobility. In the case of within-industry and industrial mobility, comparisons between the United States and the Netherlands, and between Germany and Sweden involve a similar level of disaggregation for the dependent variable.

For each model, we included the following individual-level covariates:<sup>11</sup>

1. Potential experience (age – education – 6) and the square of this variable, measured as of year  $t$ .
2. Education measured with a set of categories that is appropriate for each country's educational system (see the appendix).
3. Years of tenure with the current employer as of year  $t$ .

Our two macrovariables were measures of turbulence and net structural change. We obtained information on net change rates from repeated cross-sectional labor force surveys. We estimated net change rates at the level of detailed occupation and industry codes, as described above, and in more detail in the appendix. For the U.S. and the Dutch data, we used polynomial smoothing in order to reduce the level of noise in year-to-year net change for the detailed occupations and industries. We then further adjusted the yearly change scores of both countries so that they would be consistent with measures of structural change at the industrial- or occupational-sector level from the same data.<sup>12</sup> The German 1% *Mikro-*

<sup>11</sup> The German results also controlled for membership in the foreign oversample. This coefficient was significantly negative for within-employer mobility, but otherwise did not achieve statistical significance. The use of additional covariates for the American case (race and average firm size in the industry) can be found in DiPrete and Nonnemacher (1997). The results are not greatly changed by the inclusion of these additional covariates.

<sup>12</sup> For the U.S. data, we further adjusted the individual time series so that the 10-year rate of growth was equal to the 10-year rate of growth estimated from the 1% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for the 1980 and 1990 census. As a final step for both the Dutch and the U.S. data, we estimated yearly net change for the detailed categories in each country as a weighted average of net change for the detailed category and net change for the occupational or industrial sector to which it belonged. The weights

*sensus* has a much larger sample size than the labor force surveys of the other three countries, and we were therefore less concerned about sampling fluctuations in the German data. Sampling error was also less of a concern for the Swedish case because of the greater aggregation in the occupational and industrial categories.

To measure turbulence, we obtained information from the panel studies for the United States, the Netherlands, and Germany, and from the labor force surveys for Sweden. These tabulations were done at an aggregate (industrial or occupational) level, which was necessary because of the relatively limited sample sizes in the panel studies. Our estimates of both turbulence and net change are based on the entire population of workers, including both men and women. In effect, we measure how men's mobility responds to structural change in the entire employment structure of a nation.

The Dutch longitudinal data differ from the data of the other three countries in that job mobility is measured on a biannual rather than an annual basis. We converted the reported rates to one-year rates to make them comparable with our measures for the other three countries. The Swedish longitudinal data differ in certain respects from the other three countries (see the appendix). After confirming with the Level of Living data (see below) that the macroeffects were not changed much by the use of a reduced set of individual-level variables, we estimated the model with both the Level of Living and the Labor Force Survey data sets. We report below the coefficients for the macrovariables using the Labor Force Survey data, and we report the coefficients for the individual-level variables using the Level of Living data.

## RESULTS

### Rates of Net Change and Gross Flow

Table 3 presents summary information about the average yearly net change rates, average yearly gross flows, and estimates of average yearly mobility rates of various types for industry sectors and for EGP classes (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero [1979], as modified by Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman [1989]) as computed from our data for each country.<sup>12</sup> Table 3 shows broadly similar change in all countries: the service

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for the category score were directly proportional to the sample size for that category in the labor force. For categories with a sample size of about 50 in each year's labor force survey, the weights for the net change at the occupational or industrial-sector level and at the detailed category level are about equal.

<sup>12</sup> In Sweden the Level of Living survey was used to cross-classify Erikson and Goldthorpe's actual EGP codes with detailed occupations and industries. This cross-

sector expanded relatively rapidly while the manufacturing sector either experienced slow growth or contraction.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, growth rates were relatively high for the service class, for routine nonmanual workers, and for EGP class IVa and IVb (the self-employed except for self-employed service class workers and self-employed farmers). In contrast, net change rates for manual workers were stagnant or slightly declining.

These industrial and occupational trends have occurred against a background of sharply different growth rates in the labor force of the four countries (OECD 1993). The labor force of the United States grew substantially—between 1979 and 1989 employment increased by 3.5% per year in the United States. In contrast, the labor force of Western Germany was on average fairly constant in size, but this average rate (0.7% per year) hides a rather high growth rate starting around 1988 that offsets a near stagnant growth rate at the start of the 1980s. The growth rates of Sweden (2.3% per year) and the Netherlands (1.4% per year) fell in between these two extremes.

Table 3 also shows the rates of gross inflow and outflow by industry sector and by EGP class for the four countries. Overall, gross flow rates were highest in the United States. Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands had lower and fairly comparable rates of gross flow during this period.<sup>15</sup> In all four countries, gross flow rates were highest for wholesale and retail trade. Gross flows were generally lower for manufacturing, mining, and utilities, for transportation, storage, and communication, and for community, social, and personal services. With respect to EGP classes, gross flow rates in the United States were relatively high for routine nonmanual workers, for semi- and unskilled manual workers, and for class IVa and IVb workers when compared with either the service class or with skilled manual workers. The German, Dutch, and Swedish patterns are generally similar to that of the United States, except for the comparatively lower gross flow rates for the self-employed in these three countries.

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classification was used to create a modified EGP scheme that could be used with the Swedish labor force surveys.

<sup>14</sup> The manufacturing sector shrank more rapidly in relative terms in the United States than in the Netherlands, Germany, or Sweden, though the more rapid growth of the labor force in the United States caused the actual growth rate of manufacturing in the United States to approximate the rate in the other three countries (OECD 1993).

<sup>15</sup> Summary estimates of these flows are available for the United States and Germany using establishment surveys for the United States and using the *Arbeitskräftegesamtrechnung* for Germany. Scheitkau (1992) computed a yearly "substitution rate" for the two countries. His measure also shows that the German flow rate is much lower than the American one.

TABLE 3

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YEARLY NET CHANGE, GROSS FLOWS AND INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY RATES

	NET CHANGER	GROSS INFLOW	GROSS OUTFLOW	WITHIN- FIRM MOBILITY	RATE OF EMPLOYER CHANGE	EMPLOYER MOBILITY	INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY	EQP EMPTIMENT	EQP EXIT
Netherlands									
Germany									
Manufacturing, mining, utilities	-.009	.083	.092	.063	.072	.055	.052	.018	
Construction	.013	.083	.069	.029	.099	.043	.048	.019	
Wholesale/retail trade	.026	.126	.100	.043	.090	.063	.054	.021	
Transportation/communication	.017	.078	.061	.059	.053	.029	.032	.026	
Business services	.043	.128	.085	.047	.098	.059	.048	.019	
Personal/government services	.021	.100	.079	.061	.057	.031	.040	.028	
Service class, I/II	.027	.130	.103	.063	.074	.046	.040	.023	
Routine nonmanual, III	.029	.157	.129	.061	.072	.046	.068	.019	
Self-employed, IVa, IVb	.016	.130	.114	.000	.041	.019	.015	.015	
Skilled/manual supervision, V, VI	.008	.099	.091	.050	.073	.045	.050	.027	
Semi- and unskilled, VIIa	.021	.136	.116	.038	.088	.056	.050	.036	

	United States					
	Manufacturing, mining, utilities	Construction	Wholesale/retail trade	Transportation/communication	Business services	Personal/government services
Manufacturing, mining, utilities	-.001	.13	.13	.090	.081	.060
Construction	.024	.19	.17	.038	.166	.101
Wholesale/retail trade	.019	.24	.22	.046	.160	.103
Transportation/communication	.019	.12	.10	.089	.102	.058
Business services	.043	.20	.15	.059	.141	.085
Personal/government services	.015	.14	.13	.084	.083	.055
Service class, V/II	.029	.17	.14	.074	.097	.060
Routine nonmanual, III	.023	.28	.26	.105	.129	.096
Self-employed, IVa, IVb	.020	.27	.25	.014	.127	.083
Skillled/manual supervision, V, VI	.007	.18	.17	.072	.114	.071
Semi- and unskilled, VIIia	.010	.26	.24	.073	.134	.096

	Sweden					
	Manufacturing, mining, utilities	Construction	Wholesale/retail trade	Transportation/communication	Business services	Personal/government services
Manufacturing, mining, utilities	-.007	.092	.099	.045	.069	.048
Construction	.007	.109	.102	.020	.091	.035
Wholesale/retail trade	.010	.142	.131	.031	.100	.059
Transportation/communication	.016	.091	.075	.038	.056	.031
Business services	.045	.125	.080	.050	.076	.043
Personal/government services	.014	.106	.092	.049	.079	.043
Service class, V/II	.025	.099	.074	.054	.073	.037
Routine nonmanual, III	.008	.121	.113	.038	.086	.050
Self-employed, IVa, IVb	.011	.110	.099	.000	.044	.023
Skillled/manual supervision, V, VI	-.005	.096	.101	.030	.082	.049
Semi- and unskilled, VIIia	-.006	.112	.118	.039	.085	.055

### Within- and Between-Employer Job Mobility

U.S. rates of internal mobility were substantially higher than were the internal mobility rates for the other three countries. Germany and Sweden had relatively comparable rates of internal mobility, while the Netherlands occupied an intermediate position. The high rates for the United States are consistent with the structure of its internal personnel system, which has been based on relatively narrowly defined jobs, and which in recent years has been highly volatile (Kalleberg 1988; Osterman 1993). The lower rates for Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany are consistent with their broader job definitions, and perhaps less rapidly changing firms at least over the time period under study here.<sup>16</sup> With respect to industry variation, rates of internal mobility were generally lower in construction and in wholesale and retail trade than in the other sectors in all four countries.

Rates of between-employer mobility were generally higher in the United States than in Sweden or the Netherlands, which in turn had higher rates than Germany. It has been reported elsewhere that Germany's rates of job mobility are low in comparison with the United States (Carroll and Mayer 1986) and that the Netherlands, until the mideighties, had relatively low rates compared with the United States or Sweden (Van Ours 1990). Our results thus differ from previous research in finding a smaller difference between Dutch and Swedish rates than expected. Relatively high rates of external mobility in the United States are explainable by the lack of job security in the United States, the high rate of firm births in

<sup>16</sup> Another possible source of cross-national difference would be differences in the distribution of firm size by employment. All other things equal, one would expect a higher rate of internal job mobility in countries where the average firm size was larger and where a larger fraction of workers were located in large firms. In the United States, for the year 1990, the distribution of employment by establishment size (excluding government employees, railroad employees, which comprise 7% of the employed workforce, and the self-employed, which is another 7% of the workforce) is 1–19, 26%; 20–99, 29%; 100–499, 25%; 500+, 20% (U.S. Bureau of the Census: County Business Patterns, table 857; see U.S. Department of Commerce 1995). For Sweden, the corresponding percentages, which are taken from the Swedish Register of Firms and Establishments, are 1–19, 28%; 20–99, 29%; 100–499, 24%; 500+, 19%—but these figures include government workers (though they exclude the self-employed, who constitute 9% of the employed workforce). Assuming that the missing U.S. government workers are relatively more likely to work in moderate size or larger establishments, it would follow that U.S. workers are somewhat more likely to work in moderate size or large establishments than were Swedish workers. In the Netherlands, the corresponding figures (taken from the *Enquête Beroepsbevolking* 1993, including government workers but not the self-employed) are 1–9, 12%; 10–99, 27%; 100+, 58% (3% unknown). Thus, the Dutch workforce is more heavily concentrated in moderate or large establishments than either the American or the Swedish labor force.

the United States,<sup>17</sup> and the tendency for U.S. employers to hire from the outside market. The biggest cross-national difference concerned the self-employed. Rates of employer change were generally lower for the self-employed than for wage and salaried workers in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden, but not in the more turbulent markets of the United States. With respect to industry variation, rates of employer change were generally higher in construction, in trade, and in business services than in manufacturing, transportation and communications, or community, social, and personal services in all four countries.

Employer change can either take place within the same industry or between industries. Table 3 shows the rates of mobility between detailed industries (rates of within-industry mobility equal the difference between the columns for employer change and for industrial mobility). Rates of industrial mobility were generally highest out of wholesale and retail trade. In all four countries, the rates of industrial mobility were relatively high for semi- and unskilled manual workers and for routine nonmanual workers. The rate of industrial mobility from classes IVa and IVb were quite low in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, while in the United States the rate was similar to rates for wage and salaried workers. This cross-national difference stemmed mostly from the cross-national differences in the overall rate of mobility from the self-employed state.

Rates of EGP mobility in all four countries were relatively low for the service class and for skilled manual workers. The EGP mobility for self-employed workers was most common in the United States, which follows directly from the high rate of exit from self-employment in the United States.

### Employment Exit

The United States and Germany had the highest rates of employment exit, followed by Sweden and the Netherlands. In all four countries, rates of employment exit were relatively high from the construction industry and the semi- and unskilled manual class. Rates of employment exit were relatively low from banking, insurance, and business services, and from the service class. The rate of employment exit from EGP classes IVa and IVb was relatively high in the United States and relatively low in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands.

<sup>17</sup> In the United States, the number of new incorporations per year has been on the order of 8%–12% of the total number of businesses. Birch (1979) has argued that 4/5 of the new jobs created in the United States are in firms less than five years old. This tendency to create jobs via firm births is reportedly lower in Germany (Wohlers and Weinert 1988).

TABLE 4  
INDUSTRY TURBULENCE AND INDUSTRY NET CHANGE EFFECTS FOR MODEL 1

	$\alpha - 1$ (Turbulence)		$\alpha - 2$ (Net Change)	
	Coefficient	t-ratio	Coefficient	t-ratio
<b>Netherlands:</b>				
Within-employer mobility	-.04	.1	-.84	1.7
Within-industry mobility	.04	.1	1.14	1.6
Industrial mobility	1.91	5.7	.26	.5
Occupational mobility	.98	3.5	-.63	1.4
Employment exit	-.50	1.1	.37	.4
<b>Germany</b>				
Within-employer mobility	-1.32	3.7	-1.55	.9
Within-industry mobility	1.36	3.8	5.88	3.4
Industrial mobility	1.12	3.8	1.88	1.3
Occupational mobility	.26	1.0	3.49	2.6
Employment exit	.80	3.5	-.40	.4
<b>United States</b>				
Within-employer mobility	-1.04	9.9	-3.45	5.9
Within-industry mobility	.66	5.3	2.08	2.4
Industrial mobility	.65	7.5	-.98	1.7
Occupational mobility	.13	1.7	-1.56	3.2
Employment exit	.24	2.3	-2.37	3.7
<b>Sweden:</b>				
Within-employer mobility	-.23	1.3	1.43	1.2
Within-industry mobility	.93	4.5	3.37	2.2
Industrial mobility	1.23	6.9	-1.05	.8
Industrial mobility (age 45+)	.64	1.2	-9.63	2.4
Occupational mobility	1.24	6.7	.75	.6
Employment exit	.13	.7	-3.89	2.8

Note.—Education, experience, and tenure coefficients ( $\beta$  coefficients of eq. [1]) are reported in table 6 below.

### Effects of Industrial and Occupational Expansion and Contraction on Job Mobility

We report our results from the turbulence-change model in table 4, table 5, and table 6. Table 4 reports the effects of industry-based structural change, while table 5 reports the effects of occupation-based structural change. Table 6 reports the effects of individual-level attributes associated with the industry net change effects shown in table 4.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The coefficients of individual-level variables when we control for industry net change effects are rather similar to the results we obtain when we control for occupation net change effects. These latter results are available from the authors upon request.

## Mobility Regimes

TABLE 5

## OCCUPATION TURBULENCE AND OCCUPATION NET CHANGE EFFECTS FOR MODEL 1

	$\alpha - 1$ (Turbulence)		$\alpha - 2$ (Net Change)	
	Coefficient	t-ratio	Coefficient	t-ratio
<b>Netherlands:</b>				
Within-employer mobility .....	.67	2.1	.46	1.7
Within-industry mobility .....	.50	1.2	-.19	.3
Industrial mobility .....	.37	1.1	2.01	3.7
Occupational mobility .....	1.35	4.6	.68	1.5
Employment exit .....	-.96	2.0	-.41	.6
<b>Germany:</b>				
Within-employer mobility .....	-.10	.3	1.41	.9
Within-industry mobility .....	-.46	1.3	4.11	2.3
Industrial mobility .....	1.13	4.2	-.12	.1
Occupational mobility .....	.80	3.4	3.55	2.7
Employment exit .....	.27	1.3	-3.75	3.5
<b>United States:</b>				
Within-employer mobility .....	-.24	1.9	-2.08	3.4
Within-industry mobility .....	-.47	2.9	2.36	2.9
Industrial mobility .....	.62	5.3	-.24	.4
Occupational mobility .....	.70	7.0	-1.27	2.8
Employment exit .....	.98	7.0	-2.02	3.3
<b>Sweden:</b>				
Within-employer mobility .....	.18	1.1	-.21	.1
Within-industry mobility .....	.21	1.2	1.67	1.1
Industrial mobility .....	1.12	5.7	.75	.6
Occupational mobility .....	1.43	9.6	-.58	.4
Occupational mobility (age 45+) .....	1.21	2.8	-8.64	2.2
Employment exit .....	.32	2.0	-3.89	2.7

NOTE.—Education, experience, and tenure coefficients ( $\beta$  coefficients of eq. [1]) are not reported for the occupation turbulence/change model.

Generally speaking, rates of mobility were higher when turbulence was higher. For some transitions, this positive result is essentially tautological, though (as discussed above) it is important to control for this factor to avoid contaminating our estimate of the effects of net change. It is notable, however, that effects of turbulence on rates of within-employer mobility tend to be negative (i.e., higher rates in low turbulence industries) in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. This result, we believe, stems from the tendency for internal mobility to be relatively high in manufacturing, which generally has strong internal labor markets and therefore low turbulence.

The more interesting structural effects concern the net change variable, which measures the effects of "push" from the origin industry and occupa-

tion. In the United States, industrial contraction created a structural "push" into new occupations or industries (referred to here as "push effects" or "push forces").<sup>19</sup> The effect of industrial contraction on occupational mobility was even larger than was the effect on industrial mobility. The effect of structural contraction on industrial mobility was numerically as large in Sweden as in the United States, though the standard error for the Swedish estimate was considerably larger than that for the U.S. estimate. Further investigation of the Swedish data revealed the hypothesized effect of contraction on industrial mobility, but the effect was limited to the population of older workers (see table 4).<sup>20</sup> The Netherlands had no measurable increase in job mobility following industrial contraction, while in Germany the effects were actually positive, contrary to expectations. We discuss this anomaly in more detail below.

With respect to the occupation-based structural-change model, American male workers were more likely to exhibit occupational mobility as a consequence of occupational contraction, and older Swedish workers were similarly more likely to exhibit occupational mobility in response to occupational contraction. For the Netherlands there was an unexpected increase in industrial mobility in response to occupational expansion, while for Germany there was an unexpected positive effect of occupational expansion on occupational mobility.

Next, we focus on the relationship between employment exit and structural change. Industrial contraction clearly increased the rate of employment exit in the United States and in Sweden. The effect of industrial contraction on employment exit in the United States was about twice as large as was the effect on industrial mobility. The effect in Sweden was roughly 50% higher than in the United States. The effects were not significant in Germany or the Netherlands. Workers in three of the four countries experienced significant rises in employment exit in response to occupational contraction (the Netherlands was the exception). The employment exit rate for German workers was more sensitive to occupational than to industrial contraction, which is probably a consequence of the fact that German labor markets are primarily occupational in character. The Swedish effects were the largest, followed by Germany, the United States, and lastly the Netherlands. The results for Germany, Sweden, and the

<sup>19</sup> A one-standard-deviation increase in the rate of contraction increased the exit rate from industries, occupations, and from employment by 3.3%, 5.1%, and 7.9% respectively, according to these estimates.

<sup>20</sup> The effect in Sweden is actually significant if the cutoff is made as low as age 30. We report the results using the age 45 cutoff in table 4 to keep the presentation consistent with table 5. There was no increased tendency for older Swedish workers to change occupations in response to industry contraction.

United States are generally consistent with our expectations. The Netherlands is out of line in its unexpectedly weak employment-exit response to structural change.

As expected, industrial expansion proved to be positively related to within-industry mobility in all four countries. An increase in the growth rate of one percentage point raised the probability of a within-industry mobility by roughly 1.1% in the Netherlands at the low end and 5.9% in Germany at the high end. In Germany and in the United States, men were more likely to change employers within the same industry in response to the opportunities afforded by occupational expansion, with the German effects being the larger of the two. With respect to both the industry- and the occupation-based structural-change models, our results are largely in line with our theoretical expectations, with only the Netherlands being out of the predicted order.

Finally, we examine the effects of structural change on within-employer mobility. Industrial expansion was negatively related to internal movement in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. We interpret this negative relationship as a consequence of internal reorganizations that occurred more frequently in contracting or slow growing industries, particularly in manufacturing.<sup>21</sup> Such reorganizations have clearly been ongoing in the United States at a rather intense rate. Germany also has been experiencing internal restructurings in manufacturing in the period under study here (Sengenberger 1987; Bosch 1990), as has the Dutch economy. The lack of negative effects in Sweden suggest that this country has a different mix of the two major sources of internal mobility (the filling of vacancies created by growth, and internal reassessments as part of a restructuring).<sup>22</sup>

In most respects, the results are consistent with our hypotheses. The effects of net change on industrial or occupational mobility were larger in the United States and Sweden than in the Netherlands and Germany, as predicted. The country ordering for hypothesis 7 (effects of contraction on employment exit) and for hypothesis 8 (effects of expansion on within-

<sup>21</sup> This negative relationship is consistent with the connection seen in table 3 between the relatively low growth rates in manufacturing and relatively high rates of within-employer mobility in that sector. While one might expect higher internal rates in industries (such as manufacturing) where the average establishment size is relatively large, other work (DiPrete and Nonnemacher 1997) shows that a significant negative effect remains when the average establishment size in the detailed industry is controlled.

<sup>22</sup> We also estimated models in which we included quadratic effects of net change, in order to see whether the offsetting effects discussed in hypothesis 3 led to a U-shaped effect. A significant U-shaped effect was present in the Netherlands and Germany, but not in the other two countries.

industry mobility) were as predicted for all countries except the Netherlands, which is the major anomaly in our results.

We believe the Dutch anomaly stems from the character of the Dutch welfare-sustaining employment exit policies. In a purely market-driven economy, labor force adjustments are made by individual employers in response to market conditions. However, in more collectivist regimes, the available mechanisms for labor force adjustment are determined partly through collective decisions made at higher levels than the employing organization, which are then institutionalized into pathways made available to most or all members of the workforce. The Netherlands provides by far the best example of this process by virtue of its extensive welfare-sustaining employment-exit programs, as noted above. To the extent that these schemes were only used by employers in contracting industries, they might enhance the employment-exit response to net change (while changing the mix of the employment-exit response toward voluntary and away from involuntary exit). However, as companies in contracting industries resorted to early retirement packages as incentives to induce separations, the very attractiveness of these packages motivated powerful unions in other industries that were not contracting to demand similar packages for their members. Meanwhile, the use and misuse of disability programs as vehicles for early retirement spread throughout the country during the 1980s.<sup>23</sup> In their case studies of four firms in growing as well as contracting sectors, Trommel and de Vroom (1993) noted a high exit rate via early retirement in all four firms. They named this phenomenon as “the Loreley effect of early exit; it refers to the continuous ‘suction’ exerted by the exit option itself, without regard to the social, organizational or financial desirability and/or opportunities” (pp. 107–8).

The consequence of the diffusion of adaptation mechanisms based on job separations through the economy would be twofold. First, this diffusion would wash out the *local* (to the industry) effects of contraction. Models of job mobility would show no effect of contraction or expansion on exit from the category, whether through job mobility or through employment exit. Second, the Loreley effect would necessarily affect a company’s use of accessions as a mechanism for adjusting its workforce. As a consequence of the Loreley effect, accession rates in stable or contracting industries and occupations should, *ceteris paribus*, be relatively low in comparison with countries where this effect is absent. However, accession rates

<sup>23</sup> During the 1990s, the eligibility conditions for disability programs were tightened, rates of exit via disability dropped, and some of the disabled who could not substantiate their disability were forced back into the workforce. Early retirement rates have also recently declined. These changes occur after the period covered by our data, however.

of growing firms need to be even higher in order to offset the employment losses into disability and early retirement. A direct test of these conjectures must be left to an analysis of the role of accession in labor force adjustment, which is outside the scope of this discussion.

The fact that push effects in Sweden were not found for younger workers in Sweden (under 30 years old for the industry model and under 45 for the occupation model) was unexpected. This result may imply that Swedish establishments that are shutting down or laying off workers have relatively older employees. Further research is of course needed to confirm such speculation. We also note that our need to use more aggregated occupational and industrial categories probably produced an underestimate of the push effects in Sweden.

The unexpected positive effect of industrial or occupational expansion on occupational mobility in Germany appears to result from the strong labor market boundaries that characterize the German economy. An examination of the five most populated occupations from the set of most strongly contracting occupations (miners and quarry workers; butchers and meat preparers; police and detectives; bakers, etc.; roof-tile layers, natural stone layers, and tile layers) shows that all five had below-average rates of mobility compared to other occupations. We speculate that these occupations in Germany have limited mobility pathways to other occupations, and thus contraction must occur through reduced accessions and through employment exits. Similarly, the six most populated occupations from the set of mostly rapidly growing occupations (electrical engineers; mechanical engineers; rubber and synthetic fiber product makers; correspondents and reporting clerks; construction engineers; stock supervisors) all had relatively high rates of occupational mobility. At least some of these occupations have natural career pathways to other occupations (e.g., the engineers could move into management), and so rates of occupational mobility were relatively high despite the absence of any push forces. This result emphasizes that structural change is only one among many factors that determine rates of job or occupational mobility.

#### Individual-Level Variation in the Rates of Job Mobility

Table 6 shows the effects of experience, education, and employer tenure on the five types of job mobility that we study. Because the individual-level coefficients are similar when we specify occupation or industry gross flows in the model, we limit ourselves here to the interpretation of effects for the industry turbulence-change model.

Experience, education, and tenure all affect rates of job mobility, though somewhat differently in the four countries. In the United States, a higher level of education was associated with higher rates of within-

TABLE 6

## INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL COEFFICIENTS INDUSTRY GROSS FLOWS MODELS

	Within-Employer Mobility	Within-Industry Mobility	Industrial Mobility	Occupational Mobility	Employment Exit
<b>Netherlands<sup>a</sup></b>					
Intercept	-1.90 (3.3)	-1.85 (2.5)	2.16 (3.5)	.48 (.9)	-3.35 (4.3)
Experience	.003 (.2)	-.059 (2.7)	-.029 (1.6)	-.033 (2.0)	-.140 (5.4)
Experience <sup>2</sup>	-.0011 (2.4)	.0007 (1.3)	-.0005 (1.0)	-.0004 (1.0)	.0052 (9.6)
Tenure with employer	.012 (1.7)	-.015 (1.5)	-.048 (5.2)	-.014 (2.1)	-.003 (4.4)
Lower secondary	-.35 (1.7)	.07 (.3)	.01 (1.1)	.25 (1.3)	-.41 (1.8)
Higher secondary	-.01 (.0)	.02 (.1)	-.13 (.7)	.30 (1.7)	.07 (3.3)
Tertiary vocational	.35 (1.9)	.21 (.8)	-.20 (.9)	.55 (2.8)	.50 (2.0)
Tertiary academic	-.12 (.4)	.39 (1.2)	-.12 (4)	.16 (.6)	.46 (1.0)
<b>Germany</b>					
Intercept	-6.07 (6.7)	.283 (.3)	.44 (.6)	-1.753 (2.6)	1.09 (1.8)
Experience	-.039 (2.2)	-.010 (.5)	-.041 (2.3)	-.025 (1.7)	-.231 (22.6)
Experience <sup>2</sup>	-.0009 (2.0)	-.0005 (1.1)	-.0005 (1.0)	-.0007 (1.7)	.0054 (25.9)
Tenure with employer	.031 (4.0)	-.153 (12.5)	-.109 (10.1)	-.064 (8.2)	-.013 (2.9)
Low secondary, no vocational	.230 (.8)	-.30 (1.1)	-.32 (1.4)	.447 (2.0)	-.53 (1.7)
High secondary, no vocational	.25 (6)	.05 (.1)	-.36 (.9)	.256 (8)	.11 (3.3)
Secondary + vocational	.27 (.9)	.17 (.7)	.23 (1.0)	.35 (1.6)	-.64 (2.1)

Tertiary vocational .....	-.08	-.73	.46	.311	-.83
Tertiary academic .....	(2)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(2.3)
United States:					
Intercept .....	-4.27	-1.34	.01	-.57	-1.12
Experience .....	(19.0)	(5.3)	(1)	(3.6)	(5.4)
Experience <sup>2</sup> .....	-0.043	.010	-.027	-.058	-.098
Experience <sup>3</sup> .....	-0.0006	-.0003	.0002	.0007	.0026
Tenure with employer .....	(4.3)	(7)	(3.0)	(7)	(10.7)
High school .....	(3)	(1.0)	(.9)	(3.9)	(14.5)
Some college .....	.017	-1.70	-.167	-.074	-.035
Bachelor's degree or higher .....	(3.8)	(17.6)	(24.3)	(17.3)	(9.1)
Sweden:					
Intercept .....	-2.94	.36	1.07	1.6809	-.08
Experience .....	(3.2)	(5)	(1.5)	(2.6)	(1.)
Experience <sup>2</sup> .....	-.003	-.037	-.085	-.0705	-.295
Experience <sup>3</sup> .....	-0.0112	.0002	.0012	.0007	.0060
Tenure with employer .....	(2.2)	(4)	(3.4)	(2.4)	(18.3)
Lower secondary .....	.046	-.033	-.044	-.0199	-.003
Higher secondary .....	(4.5)	(3.9)	(5.0)	(2.8)	(3.)
Lower tertiary .....	.01	-.10	.16	-.0094	-.31
Higher tertiary .....	(.0)	(5)	(1.0)	(.1)	(1.5)
	.79	-.05	.15	.1816	-.41
	(4.5)	(4)	(1.1)	(1.6)	(2.6)
	-.80	.11	.09	.0878	-.64
	(4.6)	(9)	(8)	(8.)	(4.3)
	.68	.335	-.113	-.2684	-.1551
	(3.4)	(2.3)	(7)	(1.8)	(4.7)

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are t-ratios.

employer mobility and lower rates of industrial mobility, occupational mobility, and employment exit. In the Netherlands education had weak or inconsistent effects on job mobility. The more highly educated Dutch workers actually had higher rates of employment exit than their less educated coworkers, which is quite different from the U.S. pattern. Germany, like the Netherlands, lacked a clear pattern of educational effects on within-employer mobility, within-industry mobility, industrial mobility, or occupational mobility (see also Blossfeld and Mayer 1988). Unlike the Netherlands, however, more highly educated German workers had lower rates of employment exit than the less well educated.<sup>24</sup> Sweden was similar to the United States in that the more highly educated had higher rates of within-employer mobility and within-industry mobility and lower rates of occupational mobility and employment exit.

Next we consider the effects of experience and tenure on job mobility. The effect of an additional year of experience on outcomes will generally differ depending on whether it is an additional year of experience before or after the start of work with the current employer (experience after the start of work with an employer is of course the same thing as employer tenure). Using the coefficients from table 6, table 7 displays these two effects measured at different levels of total experience.<sup>25</sup> Overall, tenure effects on within-employer mobility were negative in the United States and in Germany. In Sweden, early years of tenure actually increase the probability of internal mobility, but this increment diminishes with each additional year of tenure and eventually the increment becomes zero. Initial years of tenure have no effect on Dutch rates of internal mobility, but eventually each year reduces the probability at about that same rate as found in Germany and the United States. The United States and Germany had the strongest (and negative) effects of preemployer experience on internal mobility, while the Dutch and Swedish effects were much weaker.

<sup>24</sup> For the employment-exit model the baseline educational category consists only of ethnic Germans. Members of the foreign sample who were coded into the lowest educational group are probably more heterogeneous in their educational backgrounds than were the ethnic Germans, because they may have had education in their home country that did not correspond to the German secondary school categories. Foreign workers coded in the lowest educational category had significantly lower rates of employment exit than did ethnic Germans in this category. For the other models, the interaction between foreign workers and the lowest educational category was not significant, and so was not included in the models reported in table 7.

<sup>25</sup> If we labeled the effects of experience, the square of experience, and tenure as  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ , and  $\beta_3$ , respectively, then the partial effect of a change of one year of tenure on the log odds of the hazard rate =  $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + 2\beta_3 E$ , where  $E$  = total years of experience. Similarly, the partial effect of a change of one year of prefirm experience =  $\beta_1 + 2\beta_2(E_p + T) - \beta_1 + 2\beta_2 E$ , where  $E_p$  = prefirm experience, and  $T$  = tenure. Taking the antilog of these quantities gives a good approximation for the change in the yearly rate of job mobility when tenure or prefirm experience is changed by one year.

TABLE 7

## CHANGE IN RATES OF MOBILITY, BY TENURE AND PREEMPLOYER EXPERIENCE

	PREEMPLOYER EXPERIENCE					
	TENURE EFFECTS AT EXPERIENCE LEVEL			EFFECTS AT EXPERIENCE LEVEL		
	1 Year	5 Years	20 Years	1 Year	5 Years	20 Years
<b>Within-employer mobility:</b>						
Netherlands .....	.012	.004	-.028	.001	-.008	-.039
Germany .....	-.013	-.019	-.042	-.042	-.048	-.070
United States .....	-.026	-.026	-.028	-.042	-.043	-.044
Sweden .....	.041	.031	-.005	-.005	-.015	-.050
<b>Within-industry mobility:</b>						
Netherlands .....	-.07	-.06	-.04	-.06	-.05	-.03
Germany .....	-.13	-.14	-.15	.01	.01	-.01
United States .....	-.15	-.15	-.16	.01	.01	.00
Sweden .....	-.07	-.07	-.06	-.04	-.03	-.03
<b>Industrial mobility:</b>						
Netherlands .....	-.08	-.08	-.09	-.03	-.03	-.05
Germany .....	-.14	-.14	-.16	-.04	-.04	-.06
United States .....	-.18	-.17	-.17	-.03	-.02	-.02
Sweden .....	-.12	-.11	-.08	-.08	-.07	-.04
<b>Occupational mobility:</b>						
Netherlands .....	-.05	-.05	-.06	-.03	-.04	-.05
Germany .....	-.09	-.09	-.11	-.03	-.03	-.05
United States .....	-.18	-.17	-.17	-.03	-.02	-.02
Sweden .....	-.09	-.08	-.06	-.07	-.06	-.04
	1 Year	5 Years	20 Years	1 Year	5 Years	20 Years
<b>Employment exit:</b>						
Netherlands .....	-.12	-.09	.12	-.12	-.08	.13
Germany .....	-.21	-.17	.03	-.20	-.16	.04
United States .....	-.12	-.10	.00	-.09	-.07	.03
Sweden .....	-.25	-.21	.00	-.25	-.21	.01

Rates of within-industry employer change were strongly affected by tenure. In the United States and Germany, the negative effects of tenure were strong, while they were considerably weaker in Sweden and the Netherlands. Tenure had negative effects on both industrial and on occupational mobility; these effects were strongest in the United States, moderate in Sweden and Germany, and smallest in the Netherlands. Pre-employer experience also lowered rates of industrial and occupational mobility, but its effects were not as large as tenure effects were.

Tenure and preemployer experience had strong negative effects on employment exit, at least early in the typical career. The protection of a year of tenure for very inexperienced workers was stronger in Germany and

Sweden than in Netherlands or the United States. German and Swedish men also enjoyed substantially more protection from preemployer experience than did American or Dutch men.<sup>26</sup> The Dutch case is distinguished by its relatively strong U-shaped pattern of effects. By the time one had acquired 25 years of experience, each additional year of either tenure or preemployer experience was considerably *rising* the Dutch log rate of employment. This distinctive Dutch pattern is no doubt explained by the pervasiveness of early retirement in the Netherlands. German rates are also positive by the 25-year point, and are second strongest among the four countries, although they lag considerably behind the Dutch rates in this respect.

To summarize, then, the effects of education were strongest in the United States and Sweden, which is consistent with hypothesis 9. Except for the case of employment exit, employer tenure had the largest effects in the United States, which also is consistent with hypothesis 9. The effects of tenure in Germany were stronger than expected, but in other respects the results are consistent with our expectations: individual resources had the largest effects in the country (the United States) with the least protected labor market. The U-shaped effect of experience on employment exit for the Netherlands is consistent with hypothesis 10. Germany shows the second quickest sign reversal for tenure and experience effects after the Netherlands, a finding that is also consistent with predictions.

## DISCUSSION

The United States is clearly the country that comes closest to having an individualist mobility regime, where structural position and individual resources determine outcomes. Tenure and education differences were quite important in shaping American mobility rates. American workers were also relatively sensitive to industry or to occupation-based structural change. The results suggest that the outcomes for American workers diverged sharply depending upon individual circumstances and structural location. In only one respect is the pattern of individual-level heterogeneity in the United States relatively weak, and this concerns the effects of tenure and preemployer experience on employment exit. Swedish, Dutch, and German workers were much more rapidly integrated into the workforce than were American workers, as measured by the sharp drop-off in rates of employment exit with tenure during the early years of a typical career.

As expected from our theory, Sweden had the next-strongest effects of

\* The German result is to be expected as a consequence of its strong occupational labor markets. The Swedish result suggests that general skills are an effective form of employment protection in that country.

contraction on occupational or industrial mobility and had strong effects of individual resources on mobility. The outcomes for Swedish workers differed sharply by education levels. Tenure effects are also prominent in Sweden, though not as prominent as in the United States. If the United States is at one extreme on a continuum of "individualized" to "collectivized" mobility chances, Sweden is a notch closer to the collective side. The reason that Sweden, a social democratic welfare state, could be so similar to the United States is precisely because Swedish welfare state benefits are citizenship based rather than employment based. The similarity between the United States and Sweden is heightened by the fact that both societies have relatively low labor market boundaries, though for very different reasons. It is the combination of welfare state policies and labor market structure that locates Sweden relatively close to the U.S. case, despite the large difference between the welfare state structures of the two countries.

In contrast, male workers in Germany and the Netherlands exhibited no tendency to change industries or occupations in response to contraction. The reason for this cannot be the lack of connection between structural change and individual mobility; indeed, both Germany and the Netherlands show an effect of structural expansion on within-industry job mobility. But labor market boundaries inhibited adjustment via occupational or industrial mobility. Instead, the effect of contraction is handled primarily through employment exits and possibly also through adjustments of hiring rates.

The Netherlands is at the other extreme from the United States in the lack of individual-level sensitivity to structural change. Our results suggest that labor force adjustment in the Netherlands has been accomplished largely through accession and employment exit. However, the Dutch results also show a highly diffuse response of employment exit to industrial or occupational contraction. We have argued that this weak response arose from the spread of the early retirement model in the Netherlands to organizations in expanding as well as contracting industries. The weak education and tenure effects, the weak response to structural push, and the pervasiveness of early retirement suggest that the Netherlands mobility regime is appropriately described as collectivist in opposition to the individualist mobility regime of the United States. But the collectivist-individualist distinction is clearly not a unidimensional continuum. The multidimensional adjustment process is influenced by an interconnected but multidimensional array of institutional policies and practices. It is only by a consideration of this multidimensional array that labor market processes become understandable.

Our approach constitutes a general strategy toward comparative research that we believe was productive in our particular analyses and use-

ful as a starting point for further work in this area. Our research, of course, raises additional questions even as it suggests some interesting answers. These findings are the product of an effort to make data from four countries as comparable as possible. However, in light of the complications arising from cross-national differences in the design of surveys and the collection of data, the results need to be tested against alternative plausible operationalizations of the variables. It would also be useful to explore alternative specifications of the model. In addition, the model needs to be extended to other processes of labor force adjustment. For example, our interpretation suggests that institutional mechanisms should also affect the role played by labor force accessions of young workers, mid-career workers, and new immigrants in response to the forces of structural change. This idea needs to be directly tested. Also, the complexity of our four-nation comparison dictated that we restrict our attention to men. Women, however, indisputably play an important role in the adjustment process, which must be a subject of further research.<sup>7</sup> Finally, there has been considerable speculation in recent years that Europe will be forced by global competition to make its labor markets more "flexible" and hence more individualistic in order to save its economy from stagnation. If true, this prediction would suggest that the structure of European job mobility in the middle and late 1990s may increasingly resemble the U.S. pattern. Time will tell whether this prediction turns out to be true.

## APPENDIX

### Data Sources and Variable Definitions

#### *Data Sources*

*Netherlands*.—Dutch time-series data on occupations and industries are from the Labor Force Surveys (*Enquête Beroepsbevolking*) from Statistics Netherlands for the years 1987–94, with an employed sample size ranging from 46,000 to 65,000, while Dutch longitudinal data are from the Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research (*Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek*; OSA) prospective labor market supply panel, with data collection waves in October 1986, October 1988, October 1990, October 1992, and October 1994. The person-year sample size used in our analyses is 4,550. The Dutch sample is restricted to those who worked 12 or more hours in the reference week, because the labor force surveys do

<sup>7</sup> Research reported in DiPrete and Nonnemacher (1997) found a different mobility response (particularly for the case of job-to-job mobility) for women than for men in the United States.

not contain information on occupation for those who work fewer hours per week, nor does it count them as part of the workforce unless they are looking for a job with more hours. This omission is not a major issue when the analysis focuses on men, as it does in this article.

**Germany.**—German time-series data on occupations and industries are from the West German *Mikrozensus* (a 1% sample of the German population) for the years 1982, 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1991, while West German longitudinal data are from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1984–91 for Western Germany only. Our data includes the “foreigner” (*Ausländer*) oversample. The person-year sample size used in our analyses was approximately 18,000. The German SOEP data unfortunately has a rather high (about 20%) rate of missing data on occupation and industry. These cases had to be dropped from the analysis.

**United States.**—Time-series data on occupations and industries are from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS), the 1% 1980 and 1990 census, while U.S. longitudinal data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1981–89, with a person-year sample size of approximately 26,000. The March 1971–March 1988 CPS files come from a data set put together by Mare and Winship (1989, 1990), while later CPS files come from the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

**Sweden.**—Time-series data are first-quarter respondents from the Labor Force Surveys (*Arbetskraftsundersökningarna*) who were interviewed in two successive years for the years 1980–91. The age range is 16–63 years and the sample size in person-years used in our analyses is approximately 28,000 for analyses involving occupation and 31,000 for analyses involving industry (because of the change in occupation codes between 1984 and 1985, data for this transition were dropped from analyses involving occupation). The Swedish retrospective longitudinal data are from the 1991 Level of Living Survey (*Levnadsnivåundersökningen*), with a person-year sample size of about 13,000. In the retrospective data, the age range is 17–65 (individuals born between 1925 and 1965 were interviewed in 1991). The Labor Force Surveys differ from the Level of Living Surveys in that they lack a measure of employer tenure and labor force experience. We therefore used the Labor Force Surveys to estimate the effects of turbulence and net change using measures of age and education as covariates. We also estimated the turbulence-change model using the Swedish retrospective data with the full set of covariates and report the individual-level coefficients from these estimates in table 6. Our estimation omits transitions for the 1986–87 period, because education was not available in the 1986 Labor Force Survey.

The time periods covered in the four countries overlap but are not iden-

tical. Differences in time periods are taken into account in the models, because for each country we specify job mobility as a function of its own pattern of structural change.

*Industrial and Occupational Categories:*

*Netherlands.*—We used three-digit occupation codes based on the four-digit CBS *Beroepenclassificatie* 1984, which is very similar to the 1968 international standard classification of occupations (ISCO; available from the International Labour Office [ILO 1968]) having only some modifications in the third and fourth digits (CBS 1984). The detailed industry codes for the Netherlands were also three-digit codes (CBS 1974).

*Germany.*—We used three-digit 1968 ISCO occupational categories. The industrial categories are contained in the 37-category scheme used in the German SOEP.

*United States.*—We used three-digit 1970 census occupational and industrial categories. We converted the 1980 census codes found in the 1983–93 CPS files to 1970 codes using the probabilistic map created by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989). The 1990 census codes were also converted to 1970 codes, (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983, 1993, 1994). Because of our concern that the 1980 and 1990 census codes do not convert accurately into the 1970 residual industrial and occupational categories (the “not elsewhere classified” categories), we dropped these residual categories from the analyses. The differences in estimates are generally insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these categories, however.

*Sweden.*—The Swedish occupational schema consists of 50 categories that are very similar to a two-digit ISCO classification. The industrial schema has 66 categories, essentially a collapsed four-digit standard classification.

*OECD Industrial Sectors*

The OECD sectors are as follows: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) manufacturing, (4) electricity, gas, and water, (5) construction, (6) wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels, (7) transport, storage, and communication, (8) finance, insurance, real estate, and business services, and (9) community, social, and personal services. Because mining and utilities are relatively small categories, we sometimes combined these with manufacturing.

*Education*

*Netherlands.*—We used five educational categories, based on the first digit of the Dutch educational classification system: (1) primary education,

(2) secondary education, lower level (low vocational training, low general education), (3) secondary education, upper level (intermediate vocational training, high general education), (4) tertiary education, lower level (vocational colleges), and (5) tertiary education, upper level (university).

**Germany.**—As in the Dutch case, we used five categories: (1) lower secondary, which requires completion of *Hauptschule* or *Realschule*, but no vocational training; (2) upper secondary (completion of an *Abitur* or *Fachhochschule*, but no vocational training); (3) secondary with vocational training, (completion of lower or upper secondary and also a program of vocational training); (4) tertiary vocational (completion of a vocational college); (5) tertiary academic (completion of an academic university degree).

**United States.**—Education in the United States is covered by four categories: (1) less than high school completion (less than 12 years of completed schooling); (2) high school completion (12 years of completed schooling); (3) some postsecondary education (13–15 years of completed schooling); (4) bachelor's degree or higher (16 or more years of completed schooling).

**Sweden.**—Five categories are applied to education in the Swedish case: (1) elementary, which includes only compulsory schooling (ranging from six to nine years dependent on age) or compulsory schooling plus vocational training of less than two years; (2) lower secondary, which is vocational training of at least two years; (3) higher secondary, a two-year high school with theoretical rather than vocational content (although some of the individuals in this category have additional vocational training); (4) lower tertiary, a longer high school of at least three years (some of these individuals have additional vocational training or a short or incomplete college education); (5) higher tertiary, the completion of university education.

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# Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working Class, 1887–1894<sup>1</sup>

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How can abstract symbols provide the basis for organizational cohesion? In the early 1890s, the general strike provided such a symbol for French trade unions. In rallying around this symbol, the unions broke free from competing political loyalties and brought about a fundamental realignment of the French labor movement. The article argues that organizational cohesion emerges through the interplay between powerful symbols, political discourse, and social or interorganizational networks. Using archival records and a statistical analysis of the watershed vote for the general strike, the author demonstrates how the organizing power of this symbol was embedded in local multitrade union federations known as *bourses du travail* and in the corporatist discourse they evoked.

The French philosopher Georges Sorel (1950, p. 127) observed that the myth of the general strike connected all the “noblest, deepest, and most moving sentiments” of the working class together into “a coordinated picture.” Sorel argued that this condensation of meaning spurred the French proletariat to action against their capitalist enemies. This article embraces Sorel’s view of the general strike as a powerful symbol but argues that its more immediate relevance was to crystallize the working class’s organizational commitments. By voting in favor of the principle of the general strike at an 1894 congress, French trade unions broke free from competing political loyalties and established a quasi-constitutional basis for pan-union unity. To Sorel, writing in 1906, the general strike appeared in hind-

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sight like an ageless myth. Yet as this article shall demonstrate, this “condensation symbol” arose only in the course of intra-working-class struggles over how best to organize.

In organization theory, Cyert and March (1963, p. 32) long ago observed that organizational coalitions are often united around “nonoperational” goals—abstract goals never directly acted upon. Yet they failed to note their paradox: Why pay lip service to such goals if the coalition was fundamentally held together, as they emphasized, through side payments? Part of the answer is that organizing symbols create a shared interpretative framework that facilitates coordination, exchange, and ultimately commitment (March and Olsen 1989). But this answer also pushes the paradox back a step: How do organizational commitments converge upon shared interpretative frameworks in the first place—especially in light of ambiguity and heterogeneity?

This article argues that it is through the interplay between organizing symbols and social or interorganizational networks—sets of multilateral linkages between individuals or organizations—that organizational cohesion emerges. The networks underpinning the general strike symbol were local trade union federations known as *bourses du travail* or labor exchanges. While these federations might equally be described as “institutions” or “associations,” “network” calls attention, critically, to who is connected to whom and how that matters. The key characteristic of the bourses du travail was that they created linkages between unions of different trades. Organized at the city level, these cross-trade federations provided unions and workers with a number of basic support services from job placement to training. This multiplicity of services allowed the bourses du travail to create an organizational network that crosscut divisive political allegiances.

With respect to organizational cohesion, the link between networks and symbols is not obvious without resorting to a facile functionalism. Networks and symbols operate at different levels of analysis and the literatures that deal with them tend to posit quite different mechanisms through which they have their effects on social interaction. Networks refer to particular patterns of relationships between individuals or groups and network analysis focuses on the systemic *structure* of these relations.<sup>2</sup> Symbols refer to particular representations of meaning and cultural analysis

<sup>2</sup> Network theory has sometimes seen itself in opposition to cultural analysis (DiMaggio 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). But for a range of recent work by network theorists attempting to integrate structure and meaning, see Gould (1995), Anheier, Gerhards, and Roma (1995), Kumbasar, Romney, and Batchelder (1994), Somers (1994), Bearman (1993), White (1992), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990), Krackardt (1990), Provan and Milward (1991), Erickson (1988), Galaskiewicz (1985), and Fine and Kleinman (1983).

has focused on how these *significations* interact with the values and beliefs of individuals. I suggest here that the idea of linguistic codes as developed by Basil Bernstein provides a useful bridge between these two levels of analysis, one that is particularly helpful in understanding the emergence of organizational cohesion.<sup>3</sup>

A linguistic "code" is, in Bernstein's terminology, a "regulative principle which underlies various message systems" (Atkinson 1985, p. 136). Codes "select and integrate 'relevant meanings'" (Atkinson 1985, p. 83). Bernstein argues that different types of codes generate and mediate different forms of social relationships because they embody presumptions about how people should relate to one another. Thus, by referring simultaneously to social relationships and to the symbolic integration of groups, Bernstein's concept of codes usefully links networks to symbols. By describing how interaction between social networks, symbols, and linguistic codes produces organizational cohesion, this article builds on and contributes to recent work in both social movement theory and organization theory.

Social movement theory has been increasingly attentive to cultural processes in shaping collective action. The concepts of "cultural frame," "consensus mobilization," and "collective identity," each try to understand the way in which the collective representations produced by social movements are linked to movement participation and commitment (see McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Tarrow 1995; Klandermans 1992, 1988; Morris and Mueller 1992; Melucci 1988; Snow et al. 1986). These concepts would encompass my use of "symbol," which refers more specifically to highly condensed but multivocal representations. Swidler (1995) has stressed the theoretical utility of the concept of codes for social movement analysis, and Snow and Benford (1992) specifically cite the relevance of Bernstein's notion of linguistic codes for describing cultural frames. A new interest has also developed in the relationship between discourse and collective action (Gamson 1988, 1992; Ellingson 1995; Johnston and Klandermans 1995). The role that social and organizational networks play in political mobilization continues to be a major topic of interest for this literature (see Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam and Fernandez 1990; Friedman and McAdam 1992; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp and Gern 1993; and Gould 1995).

The organization theory literature has also been attentive to the role of

<sup>3</sup> The core of Bernstein's work is developed in three volumes entitled *Class, Codes, and Control* (1971, 1973, 1975). For an easily accessible overview of Bernstein's work, see Atkinson (1985). Recent edited volumes by Atkinson, Davies, and Delamont (1995) and Sadovnik (1995) explore Bernstein's ideas from many different perspectives.

symbolic and network processes. New sociological institutionalism has been particularly interested in the role of symbolism and cultural processes in the structuring of organizational fields (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Douglas 1986; Scott 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Although the central structural concept of this literature is "institution" rather than "network," DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Galaskiewicz (1985), and DiMaggio (1986) have emphasized how these cultural processes can work through professional and interorganizational networks. DiMaggio (1982a, 1982b) has drawn explicitly on Bernstein's ideas on framing and classification to describe cultural organizing in 19th-century Boston.

By developing this idea of linguistic codes, I intend to show how the interaction between networks and symbols can mediate large-scale realignments of social actors and provide new bases of organizational cohesion. Precisely because they reveal the processes through which organizational commitments are reorganized around new interpretative frameworks, such realignments are analytically interesting. This analysis shall proceed as follows: the second section will develop Bernstein's distinction between restricted and elaborated codes as critical concepts for understanding organizational cohesion; the third section will apply these concepts to describe four overlapping discourses in which French working-class organization building was embedded—republicanism, socialism, anarchism, and corporatism; the fourth section then shows how the rise of the bourses du travail altered the structural relationships between different groups in the French labor movement and mixed these discourses in new and old ways; the fifth section demonstrates how these altered relationships and blended idioms came to be expressed in the form of a new organizational symbol—the general strike. Finally, I analyze a vote on the principle of the general strike taken at an 1894 union congress to demonstrate that this argument is borne out at an aggregate level.

#### SYMBOLS, NETWORKS, AND LINGUISTIC CODES

A central distinction in Bernstein's work on linguistic codes is between *restricted* and *elaborated* codes. Restricted codes are forms of discourse that emerge in tightly bound social groups where everyone has "access to the same fundamental assumptions" (Douglas 1982, p. 22). The highly self-referential character of the discourse invokes and reinforces traditional social roles, norms, and statuses. Communication via restricted codes relies heavily on tacit knowledge. In contrast, elaborated codes are more open-ended and flexible. They encourage individuation and personal introspection rather than conformity with social roles and universal and abstract principles in place of group-specific norms. Elaborated codes are therefore less directly regulative of social behavior than restricted codes.

As Mary Douglas (1982) argues, restricted and elaborated codes are directly linked to the cosmologies of their speakers. Precisely because their linguistic practice is high on tacit knowledge, communities that communicate through restricted codes tend to be exclusionary. In contrast, elaborated codes promote "universalist" cosmologies inclusive of all. To speakers of a restricted code, mobilizing appeals are made in symbolic terms that represent the shared tacit knowledge of the community. Symbols express this tacit knowledge, which is often endowed with strong emotional content precisely because it is unspoken and difficult to articulate. With elaborated codes, mobilizing appeals are expressed as appeals to individual conscience.

Restricted codes imply a powerful but parochial form of group cohesion. Calhoun has described this form of cohesion as the "radicalism of tradition." Small, densely networked social groups—communities—have great internal resources for rapid and solidaristic mobilization (Calhoun 1983; see also Hirsch 1990). Modern forms of organization that link individuals and groups together in ways that crosscut traditional communal solidarities mobilize instrumental commitments but not the emotional commitment and social solidarity of traditional communities. Thus, restricted codes are powerful in mobilizing potential but parochial in scope; elaborated codes are universal in scope but limited in their emotive appeal.<sup>4</sup>

Networks are typically thought of as social conduits through which influence, communication, and resources flow. Network theory has suggested two types of mechanisms for diffusion and contagion through networks: *proximity* and *position* (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). Proximity implies contagion and diffusion through direct, dyadic ties. The mechanism is interactional. Direct face-to-face interaction and negotiation lead to the development of locally shared assumptions, attitudes, and meanings. Thus, this mechanism is very close to the idea embodied in restricted codes that face-to-face interaction leads to assumptions "shared by all."

Positional diffusion, in contrast, exploits the power of indirect relations. The argument is that people who are in the same structural position vis-à-vis third parties will exhibit similar behaviors or embrace similar ideas. The triad rather than the dyad is therefore the basic unit of analysis. Contagion and diffusion flow across reference groups who share ties to the same third parties despite their lack of direct interaction. Meaning is not

<sup>4</sup> Restricted codes parallel the idea of "strong," transitive, and multiplex networks—social ties with strong emotional content that tend to turn inward on themselves, promoting the creation of cliques. Elaborated codes, in contrast, parallel "weak" intransitive and specialized ties, which are limited in their emotional intensity but promote cosmopolitan social integration. Thus, network theory maps easily onto the pure cases of restricted and elaborated codes.

directly and locally negotiated through face-to-face interaction, but rather develops through “symbolic role playing” of people or groups in similar positions. Because it links groups across similar positions, it generates a “class” of actors. Therefore symbolic role playing will promote the creation of general and universal categories.<sup>5</sup>

Yet we can also imagine the way in which networks might combine the mobilizing power of the restricted code with the universality of the elaborated code. Network theory argues that individuals and organizations are simultaneously embedded in multiple networks—some parochial, others more cosmopolitan. Therefore, networks may connect different types of discourse in new combinations. The mobilizing potential of networks may be enhanced when they combine powerful but parochial restricted codes with weak but universal elaborated codes. For example, in Roger Gould’s (1995) recent work on the Paris Commune, he shows how solidarity built on local neighborhood networks diffuses across the city through weaker ties associated with membership in cross-neighborhood national guard units. Proximate and positional diffusion can combine the emotive and solidaristic power of the restricted code with the greater social scale of the elaborated code. This combination can become the basis for large-scale organizational cohesion because it simultaneously exploits the social solidarity of local community with the scale of modern organization.

#### CORPORATISM, REPUBLICANISM, SOCIALISM, AND ANARCHISM

French workers were simultaneously embedded in at least four different but often overlapping discourses: corporatism, republicanism, socialism, and anarchism. Appeals for political mobilization were made and the purposes and identities of trade unions and political parties were crafted through the rhetorical power of these idioms (on the “linguistic turn” in French working-class history, see the collection of essays in Berlanstein [1993]). In this section, I will argue that corporatism is a restricted code and republicanism an elaborated code, with socialism and anarchism as distinctive hybrids.

William Sewell (1980) has drawn attention to the survival of corporatist language among tradesmen after the French Revolution. After the Le Chapelier law banned labor organizations in 1791, this language was preserved and fostered by secret fraternal organizations called *compagnonnages*. These fraternal mutualist organizations aided journeymen to make

<sup>5</sup> Peter Bearman (1993, 1991) has provided concrete examples of both types of diffusion in his studies of Civil War desertions and Puritanism.

their *Tour de France*—a regular circuit around France to perfect their craft.

Cynthia Truant (1994) has written an extensive study of the compagnonnages with specific attention to their rituals and symbolism. The compagnonnages were essentially exclusive communities. In keeping with this exclusivity, the journeymen adopted distinctive dress and a language regarded as arcane by their contemporaries. The central metaphor of compagnonnage was the rite de passage: an extended ordeal through which the journeymen gradually achieved full membership.

The compagnonnages fit well the description of a restricted code. As Bernstein argues, a restricted code demarcates one community from others and also reinforces status differences within the community. Moreover, the elaborate rite de passage at the heart of compagnonnage ritual accords well with an argument Bernstein has made about the character of pedagogy in schools organized around a restricted code: the idea that education is a process of gradually (and exclusively) revealing a mystery (Atkinson 1985, p. 148). As a gradual refinement of skill developed by traveling between cities and culminating in the completion of a masterwork, compagnonnage embodied this pedagogic philosophy. “Trade secrets” were at its core. This style of learning, common to crafts, elevates “tacit” knowledge above explicit (and therefore public) knowledge. Finally, the heightened sense of ritual kept “sacred and transcendent forces present in the lives of ordinary people and relevant for everyday institutional transactions” (Bergeson 1977, p. 223).

Republicanism overlapped with corporatism in a number of important ways. Most important, republicanism and corporatism were both based on the idea of egalitarian fraternity. Whereas the compagnonnages were a ritualized rebellion against the paternal authority of the master, republicanism revolted against the patriarchal authority of the king. Herein lies the symbolic significance of the maternal figure of Marianne, the female symbol of the Republic (Agulhon 1981). The journeymen *compagnons* also embraced this familial metaphor in referring to the boarding house where they lived communally (and usually run by a woman) as the *mère* (mother).

Although republicanism could manifest a more exclusivist form as it did in Blanquism, it was generally a much more inclusivist and universalist language than corporatism (on Blanquist ideology, symbolism, and ritual, see Hutton [1981]). The “people,” after all, were a rather inclusive category. Nor did French republicans necessarily intend to stop at national borders. As Lynn Hunt (1984, p. 28) writes, “the republicans of Greece and Rome had invented liberty and the mission of France was to bring the good news to all men.” Republicanism was an elaborated code. It promoted the universal participation of citizens in public life as individuals

rather than groups (a position most forcefully expressed by Jacobin republicanism). It rejected tradition and status as a basis for political participation in favor of the universal development of individual faculties of critical reasoning (to be supplied by mass education). In contrast to the corporatist pedagogy that made learning a mystery, republicanism had a faith that everyone could have access to the same knowledge if only the superstitions of religion and folkways were suppressed (Hazareesingh 1994, pp. 68–75).

French workers had several varieties of socialist discourse to draw on: an indigenous tradition associated with the utopian communism of the 1830s and the Proudhonian anarchism of midcentury or a Marxist tradition associated with the First International (Goldberg 1962; Judt 1989; Lichtheim 1966; Vincent 1992; Derfler 1991; Maitron 1975; Stafford 1971). In practice, these languages often became complexly entwined. The indigenous tradition was strongly linked to republicanism, amending it by referring to the “social republic”—a reference to the democratization of the economy as well as the polity. In distinguishing themselves from republicans, however, socialists of various stripes tended to agree on the goal of “collectivization” (although anarchists were suspicious) and on the “abolition of private property” (with the blessing of anarchists). Socialists, of course, also replaced the “working class” or the “proletariat” for the “people” as the central agents and the central victims of change.

Socialist and anarchist discourse does not fit easily the categories of restricted and elaborated code. Socialism, and particularly Marxian socialism, had inherited the universalism of the Enlightenment. Even more than republicanism, socialism insisted that everyone could and must participate in governance. Inequalities had to be reduced so that each citizen was not only juridically but also substantively equal. Despite this universalism, socialism was not in the first place about the development of individual capacities (as suggested by the pedagogic model of the elaborated code). Rather it was about defining and developing a collective actor—the working class.

In contrast, anarchism was more individualistic than socialism but less inclusive than republicanism. Anarchists strived toward the development of individual faculties and were noted for their interests in the expressive arts and for their autodidacticism. They stressed individual freedoms and chaffed at organizational discipline. At the same time, they were sectarians who promoted the creation of a distinctive subculture complete with its own argot. They distinguished themselves in terms of their “purity” as revolutionaries. In cultivating a romantic countercultural mystique, they embraced much the same pedagogical style as did the compagnonnages—learning as mystery (Sonn 1989).

Figure 1 summarizes the differences between these four forms of dis-




FIG. 1.—Discourse as linguistic codes

course. As this figure shows, socialism and anarchism are hybrids of Bernstein's pure forms of restricted and elaborated code as represented by corporatism and republicanism.

#### JACK-OF-ALL-TRADES: THE BOURSES DU TRAVAIL

This section examines the development of a new interorganizational network in the French labor movement—the bourses du travail. This institutional form was the major impetus for the reorientation of trade union allegiances and alignments in the early 1890s. To understand their effect on unions, it is necessary to first describe the particular organizational context into which they were born.

With respect to cooperation among themselves, the French trade unions were deeply polarized by linkages to competing party groups. Throughout the 1880s, the French labor movement stood carved up into a set of warring party sects competing for the mantle of "the" socialist party of France. The Guesdists, Possibilists, Blanquists, anarchists, and independent socialists, as these sects were informally known, all sought to build very different socialist movements (Humbert 1911; Hutton 1981; LeFranc 1963; Maitron 1975; Moss 1976; Noland 1956; Stafford 1971; Willard 1965). While the Guesdists envisioned a disciplined Marxist party like the German SPD, the Possibilists developed a labor party of the British sort. Whereas the Blanquists were a charismatic clique, the anarchists were a more open fraternal network. The independent socialists were personali-

ties who appealed to the working class on the basis of their notability. All sought, however, to bring the trade unions into their political sphere.

The result was balkanization. The trade unions became deeply divided among themselves by their allegiances to these rival party sects. Consequently, the trade unions' own attempts to unify themselves were defeated by the inevitable politicization of attempts at organization. In 1887, for instance, the unions held a national trade union congress that resulted in the creation of a national union federation. When the unions from one party sect, the Guesdists, quickly gained the upper hand in this federation, the unions associated with other sects immediately defected. This politicization would frustrate attempts to nationally unify the unions until the creation of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in 1895 (as a result of the 1894 general strike vote).

The balkanization of the labor movement was built around a polarization of the discourses of republicanism, socialism, anarchism, and corporatism. This polarization is exemplified by the set of organizational schisms that led to the first attempt to organize a national working-class party. At an 1879 congress, a majority coalition distinguished itself from radical republicanism by voting in favor of the "collectivization of the means of production" as a founding principle. In 1880, the anarchists broke off from the newly formed French Socialist Party. In 1884, the remainder of the party split down the middle with the Guesdists adopting a version of Marxism and the Possibilists adopting a corporatist-inspired rhetoric. To complete this balkanization, groups adopting a hybrid discourse like the Blanquists and the independent socialists set themselves up alongside these other sects.

Even a gallant attempt at theoretical reconciliation—Benoît Malon's attempt to create an "integral socialism"—could not overcome the polarization of these divisions. However, as we shall see, the realignment of the unions around the symbol of the general strike was just such a blending of these different discourses. To understand why the general strike could meaningfully promote unity where Malon's integral socialism could not, we must look to the creation of the bourses du travail.

No less than Edouard Vaillant, major Blanquist leader and future architect of both union and party unity, cajoled the Paris municipal council in 1886 to vote funds for the establishment of the first bourse. "Voting for the bourse," he told the other councilors, "would be an eminent service to the working class, because it would make them recognize the need . . . to group themselves, to organize themselves, to defend themselves" (Schöttler 1985, p. 74; my translation). Yet not even Vaillant foresaw the rapid imitation of the Paris bourse when he dreamt of the day when not just Paris but "all the working-class centers would be provided with a bourse du travail" (Schöttler 1985, p. 74; Butler 1960, p. 72). The city of

Nîmes organized a bourse in 1887, followed by Marseilles in 1888, and then six more cities in 1889. By 1894, 40 bourses du travail were in operation.

Nor did Vaillant imagine the day when the bourses du travail would be, as a police report intoned in 1894, "little revolutionary citadels" (Archives Nationales [AN], F7 12491).<sup>6</sup> His vision, though certainly political, was more prosaic: the bourse, by providing a real service to the unions, would strengthen the capacity of workers to organize, both economically and politically. The other socialists on the municipal council, of various stripes, agreed, each seeing in the bourse a means of increasing their grip over the unions (Schöttler 1985, pp. 72–73). Little did they yet know that the opposite would result.

The bourses du travail linked the unions together across the political divisions into a loosely coupled network. In purely practical terms, they were jacks-of-all-trades. The bourses du travail provided housing for traveling workers as well as a travel subsidy if a job was not available. To improve technical skills, they instituted professional courses and set up libraries, and they created strike funds and consumer cooperatives (Pelloutier 1971). Perhaps their most characteristic function was as public placement bureaus, where workers, regardless of whether they were union members or not, could come to find a job. In 1891, for instance, the bourse of Marseilles filled 3,372 jobs, most of them in the food, wood, building, and metal industries (Schöttler 1985, p. 265).

More important, the bourses du travail provided a headquarters for all the unions of a city. In practice, the administration of the bourse became synonymous with the administration of a Union des Chambres Syndicales—a local federation of unions. Sometimes these federations existed prior to, and were even responsible for, the organization of the bourse; at other times, these federations were organized to administer the bourses du travail. In Marseilles, this local federation had been created in 1884 and was followed by the creation of the bourse in 1888. Thereafter, these two organizations were administered by the same council. By 1889, 48 unions representing 5,911 union members were affiliated (Pellissier-Guys

<sup>6</sup> The archives consulted for this work include the Archives Nationales (AN) 11, rue des Quatre-fils, Paris; the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, 4, rue de la Montagne-St.-Geneviève, Paris; and the Archives Départementales (AD) of the Bouches-du-Rhône (66, rue Saint-Sébastien, Marseilles), Loire-Atlantique (8, rue de Bouillé, Nantes), Rhône (2, Chemin de Montauban, Lyons), and Côte-d'Or (8, rue Jeannin, Dijon). The cited materials are primarily police reports exclusively available in these archives. I also utilized the collection of union and party congresses available at the Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale (IFHS), also at 11, rue des Quatre-fils, Paris. These materials are difficult to find elsewhere but not exclusive to the IFHS. All translations are mine.

et al. 1923, pp. 203–7). Thus, the bourses du travail created or consolidated local, intertrade networks.

Beyond these somewhat prosaic functions, the bourses du travail had a quite unintended effect on local union strategies in some cities: the new institutions facilitated the coordination of strikes. Sometimes the bourses du travail facilitated strikes by acting as an intermediary between unions, channeling resources from nonstriking trades to those on strike. Of the bourse at Tours, the prefect of Indre-et-Loire wrote that “at the end of November 1892, at the time of the cabinetmaker’s strike . . . the *bourse du travail* has played an active role by making an appeal to the diverse unions to support the strikers” (AN, F7 13603). More dramatically, the bourses du travail occasionally encouraged a territorial coordination of unions that united workers in broad multitrade strikes. The prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, for instance, wrote to the minister of the interior in 1894 that the “*bourse du travail* of Nantes has provoked not less than 40 partial strikes, including the strike of April–May 1893, which extended to 33 worker corporations” (AN, F7 13606). Shorter and Tilly (1974, p. 164) have argued that strikes mobilized by city (and presumably by the bourses du travail) were at least as important in France as those organized by occupation.

The bourses du travail unintentionally blended the diverse ideological tendencies and cultural repertoires of the French labor movement. From the outset, these institutions were born of two worlds. One world was that of republican party politics. Republicans were split into two broad ideological camps, the opportunists and the radicals. The former, favoring a more laissez-faire approach to the economy and a less confrontational stance toward the church, controlled government throughout the 1880s. The radicals, adopting a more aggressive stance toward both the economy and the church, became the opposition. Trade union organization was one of the “social questions” upon which the radicals challenged the hegemony of the opportunists. It was in this light that they became fervent supporters of the project of forming a bourse du travail in Paris (Loubere 1962). From Paris, the bourses du travail spread to other cities where radicals, allied with socialists, voted funds to organize these new institutions (Schöttler 1985, p. 95).

The other world from which the bourses du travail sprang forth was that of the working class itself. One of the traditional concerns of the working class was the problem of job placement. Employers often utilized private placement bureaus to fill their labor needs. These placement services charged workers a hefty fee, a burden particularly imposing for crafts in which job changes were frequent (Berlanstein 1984, p. 108). Collusion with the placement bureaus also gave employers great leverage

over workers, allowing them to effectively blacklist rebellious workers. Parisian workers formed the League for the Suppression of the Bureaus of Placement in 1886, which culminated in the formation of the Paris bourse (Schöttler 1985, p. 71).

The praxis of the bourses du travail intertwined both worlds. The bourses du travail combined, as Peter Schöttler has shown, the Enlightenment concerns of republican theory with the traditional corporatism of the French working class. Liberal economist Gustave de Molinari, who had formulated a project for a bourse du travail as early as 1843, saw the placement services of the bourses du travail as a way of freeing up the stickiness of the labor market (Schöttler 1985, pp. 37–38). Radicals, although critical of classical liberalism, sought social peace through the republican concept of solidarism: the creation of moral solidarity through interdependence and mutual cooperation (Stone 1985, p. 27).

At the same time, the bourse invoked corporatist traditions. The idea of the bourse as a place where workers could find both a job and a professional community was akin to the compagnonnages. When journeymen entered a new city they immediately sought out their *mère* (Sewell 1980, p. 48), where journeymen were placed in a job.

The tendencies toward broad based unity and fragmentation were equally endemic to the traditions of compagnonnage. Journeymen brotherhoods historically manifested both broad intertrade solidarity and sectarian rivalries. They were alternately capable of impressive political mobilization and a tendency to repress political discussion altogether.<sup>7</sup> In other words, the divisiveness of the party sects and the broad pan-unionism of the bourses du travail were two sides of the corporatist coin. However, no logic internal to this tradition dictated which of these tendencies would prevail at a given time.

By transforming the traditions of compagnonnage into a more modern guise, the bourses du travail transformed the internal meanings attributed to corporatism. Already appearing archaic by the end of the 19th century, compagnonnage was by the 1890s predominantly a preserve of the most elite trades. Conservative politically, these trades were also typically antagonistic toward strike action. Moreover, the bourses du travail were competitors of this traditional compagnonnage. The Nantes police, for instance, noted the local leaders of the *sociétés compagnonniques* complaining of the “ascendence” of the bourse over the younger workers. Nevertheless, the police also observed that Nantes, whose bourse was the

<sup>7</sup> Article 2 of the statutes of the *Union Compagnonnique* states the intention of this society to remain apolitical (Archives Départementales [AD] Côte-d'Or, 20M 24, Statutes de l'Union Compagnonnique).

spearhead of the realignment, “remains one of the cities of France where *les sociétés compagnonniques* remain the most numerous and conserves best what remains of the old corporations” (AD Loire-Atlantique, 1M 475, monthly report, April 12, 1894). In Nantes and in other cities where compagnonnage had strong roots, corporatist traditions inspired and permeated bourses du travail. Yet experience in the bourses du travail, in turn, encouraged unions to reinterpret these traditions along solidaristic rather than sectarian lines.

If the bourses du travail created a certain moral solidarity among workers, as the radicals desired, they did not achieve social peace; if they created community, as a journeyman might have hoped, “life at the local bourse had a tendency to blur occupational and professional lines within the working class” (Butler 1960, p. 81). It was this mixing of republican and corporatist discourses and the subsequent blurring of lines between them that marked the integrative potential of the bourses du travail. By virtue of loosely linking unions together into a multifunctional organization, the bourses du travail created a community that housed all the various tendencies of the French labor movement.

The bourses du travail, however, were still fundamentally assemblages of multiple identities. And if this internal diversity was their strength, it was also their flaw. While the bourses du travail could unite constituencies across different political and trade sectors, these same constituencies could by the same token colonize the bourses du travail. In 1893, for instance, the prefect of the Rhône reported that the administrative council of the bourse du travail of Lyon “is composed of municipal militants of all the schools [e.g., party sects]” (AN, F7 13612). As the bourses du travail revealed their structural potential, they increasingly became the central arena in which to contest the control of the larger labor movement. The Guesdists, in particular, posed a strong counterweight to realignment. Originally skeptical of the bourses du travail, they were soon actively seeking to control them. However, in the heat of battle, a new symbol was articulated that metaphorically represented the alignment of different discourses tentatively achieved within the bourses du travail.

#### THE GENERAL STRIKE AS STRATEGY AND SYMBOL

I begin this section by asking more generally how symbols have powerful mobilizing affects. In the discussion that follows, I am referring specifically to “condensation symbols”: symbols that condense meaning and thereby evoke an emotional response (Edelman 1964, p. 6; Firth 1973, p. 75). Such symbols allow people “to experience and communicate what is beyond the bounds of existing speech” (Verkuyten 1995, p. 269). This

argument fits well with Douglas's argument that restricted codes, high on tacit knowledge, tend to also be high on ritual solidarity (Douglas 1982).

The mobilizing power of symbols rests on an important duality: powerful symbols are both particularistic and universalistic at the same time. On the one hand, symbols must be "anchored" in a concrete reality that "objectifies" meaning in terms of everyday life (Verkuyten 1995, pp. 270–71). At the same time, they refer to abstract concepts that communicate the tacit feelings and associations of groups. Symbols are powerful when they link the particular to the universal in an organic way.

Symbols that do this are likely to be what Victor Turner calls *dominant symbols*: symbols that stand at the relational center of a web of signification (Turner 1967). By virtue of linking many different meanings together, dominant symbols have the notable aspect of being "multivocal" in that they speak to different people in different ways and they have multiple layers of meaning. Such symbols are powerful precisely because of their multivocality and because of their metaphorical linkage between different levels of meaning.

Building on this idea of a dominant symbol, I suggest that symbols will assume the role of dominant symbols not only when they join together different discourses in a condensed, vivid representation, but also when they metaphorically link the tacit, emotionally charged particularism of the restricted code with the abstract universalism of the elaborated code.

The general strike had many of the symbolic properties just described. It was anchored and objectified in the common experience of the strike, broadly familiar during this period to French workers. Strikes had many context-specific meanings that stemmed from an ongoing debate over the efficacy of strikes for particular workers and for the working class in general. These debates were often conducted in the vernacular of corporatism, for which strikes evoked a deep set of meanings. At the same time, strikes bore a strong resemblance to the festive street revolts associated with the barricades. Thus, the general strike metaphorically linked the theme of ritual solidarity associated with the restricted code of corporatism with the more abstract and universal category of revolution—a legacy of both republicanism and socialism. In the remainder of this section, I shall show how the emergence of the general strike as a symbol was directly connected to the experiences of trades unions in the bourses du travail.

The general strike was not a *deus ex machina* emerging suddenly as the functional solution to the problem of the bourses du travail's uncertain corporate identity. Instead, the general strike only gradually assumed its symbolic meaning in the course of disputes over practical strategy that

took place within the bourses du travail. Although the concept of the general strike had known a long history, by the mid-1880s it had ceased to be a topic of political debate.<sup>8</sup> During the early and mid-1880s the general strike met "hardly an echo" when proposed (Perrot 1987, p. 90). When the Paris bourse was established in 1887, the general strike was still only an occasionally utilized local strategy.

Already from 1888 onward the general strike "ceased to be a tactic, a technique, and became instead a priority" (Perrot 1987, p. 92). Its initial impetus came with the formation of the Paris bourse du travail in 1887.<sup>9</sup> From its inception, the bourse became the setting for conflict between the party sects. Possibilist municipal councilors maintained control over the bourse through their strong presence on the Paris municipal council. The Paris bourse became the focal point for a faction within the Possibilist party that rejected this political control (Butler 1960, pp. 99–100).

The strike of the Paris ditchdiggers in the summer of 1888—a strike orchestrated by the Paris bourse du travail—reinvigorated the concept of the general strike (Néré 1959, vol. 1, chap. 10; Perrot 1987, p. 92; Schöttler 1985, p. 79, n.205). The Possibilist councilors were opposed to this strike and tried to discourage the intervention of the bourse (Schöttler 1985, p. 79). During a strike meeting at the bourse du travail, Tortelier, a leader of the Paris carpenter's union, is quoted as saying: "It is only by the universal strike that the worker will create a new society" (Maitron 1972–77, 15:241). This was one of the first invocations of the general strike as an instrument of fundamental social transformation as opposed to simply a local strike strategy. In this practical dispute over local strike control, the general strike became a symbol of opposition to Possibilist political control over the Paris bourse du travail.

One consequence of the conflict at the Paris bourse was the schism of the Possibilists at their 1890 congress, with the bourse du travail faction following Jean Allemane to form the Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Révolutionnaire. The Allemanists, as they came to be called, inscribed the general strike as one of their cardinal party principles. Soon, the Paris Allemanists spearheaded a campaign for neutrality in the Paris bourse du travail vis-à-vis the rival party sects. The result brought Allemanist, anarchist, and

<sup>8</sup> Notably, the idea had been advocated by the anarchists of the First International (Maitron 1975, p. 280). For a broad history of the general strike, see Goodstein (1984); for the history of the general strike in France, see Brécy (1969).

<sup>9</sup> The idea of the general strike emerged on the international scene in 1886 with the holding of May 1 demonstrations. The demonstration in Chicago led to the Haymarket riots, which brought international publicity to the general strike (Brécy 1969, pp. 19–20; see also Dommangeat 1972, pp. 45–49)

Blanquist unionists together with moderate unaligned unionists into a grand coalition against the Possibilists (Butler 1960, p. 98; Schöttler 1985, p. 78). By 1891, this coalition, crosscutting party cleavages, defeated Possibilists in gaining control of the Executive Commission of the bourse du travail (Moss 1974, p. 284). Prior to this election, the police reported that the general strike was spoken of as the platform around which all groups regardless of party affiliation could unite against Possibilist control (Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Ba1608, police reports of January 22 and July 26, 1891).

This multivocal appeal allowed the symbol of the general strike to diffuse outward from Paris to other provincial centers where bourses du travail had been organized (Julliard 1971). In 1890, the anti-Possibilists at the Paris bourse sent a manifesto to provincial bourses du travail and unions calling upon them to support the idea of a revolutionary general strike.<sup>10</sup> Representatives of the dissidents at the Paris bourse also went directly to other cities to promote the idea.<sup>11</sup> The initial reception of the idea was not necessarily enthusiastic. After listening to a representative of the Paris bourse promote the general strike, union presidents in Nantes “contested” its utility and “refused to promote the idea in the various ateliers.”<sup>12</sup> In the context of battles for control of local labor movements, however, unions in provincial bourses du travail also began to embrace the idea of the general strike. In the fall of 1893, for instance, police noted that among the Marseilles unions, previously rather ambivalent about the idea of a general strike, “a divergence of views began to manifest itself” (AD Bouches-du-Rhône, 1M 1511, police report of September 29, 1893). Just as conflict within the Paris bourse arose over Possibilist control, in Marseilles the bourse du travail was controlled by the Guesdists. Internal

<sup>10</sup> Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Ba1608, police report of January 28, 1890. This manifesto was received in the major industrial centers of Lyon and Marseilles (AD Rhône, 10Mp C5; AD Bouches-du-Rhône, 1M 1481).

<sup>11</sup> For instance, while passing through the city of Nantes in late 1890, Brunet, affiliated with the Paris bourse, is reported to have met with several union presidents to promote the idea of the general strike (AD Loire-Atlantique, 1M 619, police report of November 5, 1890). At approximately the same time, Tortelier, an anarchist connected with the Paris bourse du travail, was assisting at an anarchist congress in the region of Lyon where the agenda included a discussion of the general strike (*L'Echo du Lyon*, September 4, 1890, in AD Rhône, 4M 251). A year later, Tortelier gave a conference on the general strike in Dijon (AD Côtes-d'Or, 20M 1205, police report of December 13, 1891).

<sup>12</sup> AD Loire-Atlantique, 1M 619, police report of November 5, 1890. As late as October 1893, police noted that with the exception of certain “personalities” there were few supporters of the general strike among Marseilles workers (AD Bouches-du-Rhône, 1M 1511, police report of October 5, 1893).

conflict within the Guesdist camp, however, led the dissidents to make alliances with other groups in the bourse and to support the general strike.<sup>13</sup>

Conflict in local labor movements revolved around two basic issues: electoral strategy and strike control. These conflicts were not particularly new. However, when these conflicts were overlain by the bourses du travail, coalitional dynamics were altered. By linking unions across political allegiances, the bourses du travail tended to embroil conflicts over electoral strategy with disputes over strike control. And when internal party divisions over electoral strategy coincided with movements to build broad-based strike support, the bourses du travail encouraged alliances to form among unionists across party allegiance. Although each of the four strikes that occurred in Lyon in 1889 was limited in scope and involved different trades, the local police noted that they promoted political discussion that led the "revolutionaries" among the unions to support the general strike (AD Rhône, 10Mp C 5, undated report).

The structure of the bourses du travail promoted both proximate and positional diffusion. Management of the bourses du travail and utilization of their services increased the interaction of unions with different political affiliations. These *proximal* relationships, however, also interacted with opposition within each party sect. The bourses du travail linked together groups who were in the same oppositional *position* vis-à-vis their respective party sects. The general strike appealed symbolically to those who either opposed the dominant electoral strategies of their own party or who sought to extend and to reinforce union cooperation across party divisions. This combination of motivations peaked in 1889 and again in 1893 with the coincidence of strike waves and legislative elections.

This combination of proximal and positional diffusion encouraged or strengthened hybrid discourses that cut across the prevailing sectarian cleavages. Born in a schism from the corporatist Possibilists, the Allemans made direct appeals to anarchists: "We are surprised to see a prolonged antagonism between the two *enfants terrible*, that is, the anarchists and ourselves. For this antagonism is founded on nothing serious. We say to the anarchists: comrades, you were right to remain apart from us as long as a misunderstanding gave our Party to the Lavys and the Broussists. But today, we are no longer separated by any principle" (cited in Butler 1960,

<sup>13</sup> At a meeting of the Marseilles bourse du travail in July 1893, Desgrès, one of the leaders of the dissident wing of the Guesdist party, articulated his rejection of the general strike (AD Bouches-du-Rhône, 1M 1482, police report of July 10, 1893). By December of 1893, however, as leader of an alliance of different party groups closely connected with the dissidents at the Marseilles bourse, Desgrès "shows himself a resolute partisan of the general strike" in December of 1893 (AD Bouches-du-Rhône, 1M 1418, police report of December 14, 1893).

p. 109). At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the independent socialists began to expand rapidly around 1893. They blended republicanism and socialism, stating that “the object of their party was to group together all the socialists who do not want to confine their doctrine to a formula whose narrowness could not hold the multiple aspirations of the modern world” (Orry 1911, p. 19). Similarly, Edouard Vaillant blended traditional Blanquism (itself a hybrid of anarchism and republicanism), with the Marxism that he had picked up firsthand from Marx during his exile in London and with the corporatism of the unions (on Vaillant’s somewhat iconoclastic blending of Blanquism and Marxism, see Hutton [1981, pp. 106–7]).

As suggested in figure 2, part of the realigning potential of the bourse du travail and the general strike lay in their relationship to these hybrid discourses. Allemanism, independent socialism, and Blanquism were far from congruent with each other, but they shared a common rejection of the existing political cleavages between republicanism, corporatism, socialism, and anarchism. Fernand Pelloutier, who would soon become the leader of the national federation of bourses du travail, wrote in late 1892 that the general strike appeared “destined to become the basis of unity [*trait d’union*] that will fuse all the socialist sects [*les écoles socialistes*] into a single party, that of the proletariat.”<sup>14</sup>

Despite their commonalities, the Allemanists, Blanquists, and independent socialists were still essentially political groups with radically different conceptions of politics. Union unity in the framework of the bourses du travail rested at a level deeper than these political identities. It rested on the appeal of the general strike to the tacit traditions of compagnonnage. In the restricted code of compagnonnage, journeymen were a status order organized around the sacredness of skilled labor. The general strike spoke directly to workers in terms of their status as *producers* rather than as *citizens*. By withdrawing their labor, they would be the ultimate arbiters of the fate of the nation.

The coalitions to take control of the bourse du travail in the name of the unions had invoked the fraternal unity of the compagnons against the masters. Traditionally, this horizontal solidarity extended across trades and valorized the independence of the journeymen. Analogously, the general strike appealed to the independence and horizontal solidarity of the unions vis-à-vis their political masters. Thus, as support for the general strike gathered momentum in different cities, its meaning became more general. It became more than a weapon against local Possibilist or Guesdist intrusion into the affairs of the local bourse; it gradually became

<sup>14</sup> Editorial, “The General Strike” in Pelloutier’s newspaper, *Démocratie de l’Ouest*, September 25, 1892 (AD Loire-Atlantique, 1M 620).

a more general symbol of the autonomy of the unions. In the fall of 1892, Aristide Briand, representing the St. Nazaire bourse du travail, placed the general strike on the agenda of a national union congress associated with the Guesdist party, whose leaders had expressed their opposition to the idea. To the surprise of everyone, the union congress voted in favor of the general strike, an embarrassing defeat for the Guesdist party leadership. In a speech upon returning to St. Nazaire, Briand is reported by police as having told his audience: "It has been noted that a partial strike has some benefit, that a local strike was better, a regional strike even better, a national strike still superior. An international and general strike will have uncontestable results. . . [On the contrary,] universal suffrage has given nothing to the worker; it is exploited to the profit of the bourgeois" (AD Loire-Atlantique, 1M 620, police report of October 4, 1892). The speech drew the link between the more common experience of unionists (partial or local strikes) and a grander vision of the strike as a political weapon that substituted for voting. By examining the decisive 1894 vote for the general strike, the next section examines whether the argument as developed thus far is borne out at the aggregate level.

#### ANALYSIS OF THE 1894 VOTE

In September 1894, in the port city of Nantes, French unions assembled the largest and most inclusive national congress to that date. To the chagrin of much of the national leadership of the Guesdist party, the Nantes bourse du travail had organized the congress as a joint meeting of unions aligned with the Guesdist party and the National Federation of Bourses (Geslin 1977). On the third day of the congress, the "principle" of the general strike was passed to a vote (*Congrès National des Syndicats de France* 1894, pp. 42–51). Proponents of the general strike decisively carried the vote (65 votes against 37). The delegates represented 18 bourses du travail, 172 unions, and 17 miscellaneous labor organizations. On the basis of this agreement, the unions met again in 1895 to set up the CGT. Although organizational consolidation of the labor movement was still far from complete in 1895, this quasi-constitutional agreement on the general strike was the basis for a fundamental realignment in the French labor movement. Half-hearted attempts to preserve the identity of a separate Guesdist-aligned union federation were unsuccessful.

The following is a summary of this article's argument to this point: The third section argued that in mobilizing politically and economically, the French working class had access to a number of different discourses: republicanism, socialism, anarchism, and corporatism. Corporatism and republicanism were identified as representing relatively pure cases of a restricted code and an elaborated code respectively, while anarchism and

socialism were hybrid codes. Though these discourses were overlapping, the balkanization of socialist parties in the 1880s and 1890s reflected a polarization around these different discourses. The fourth section described how the creation of the bourses du travail created a structural bridge that crosscut these different party sects and, in practice rather than theory, mixed these discourses. In addition, the bourses du travail accentuated the corporatist heritage of the unions, and particularly the latent traditions of compagnonnage, and thereby invoked the emotive power of that restricted code. The fifth section argues that the general strike was a “dominant symbol” that represented the metaphorical blending of the ritual solidarity inherent in the corporatist and anarchist traditions with the universalistic appeal of the republican and socialist traditions.

It was the interplay between these three levels—discourse, network structure, and dominant symbol—that produced the realignment of the French working class. Discourse provided the idiom in which workers framed their organizing strategies and their roles and relationships *vis-à-vis* other workers and social groups. Network structure linked individuals and groups of workers together in selective ways around a particular set of concrete political and economic practices and in doing so accentuated particular types of discourse. The dominant symbol created a collective representation of a group identity that simultaneously expressed the group-specific mobilizing power of the restricted code with the universal framing associated with the elaborated code.

This argument has a set of implications at the aggregate level that can be explored by analyzing the 1894 vote for the general strike. In the first place, the key causal shift that brings about the realignment is the creation of a network structure that bridges across the extant divisions between party sects. Thus, we expect that unions will be more likely to support the symbol of the general strike if a bourse has been formed in their city. Given that support or opposition to the general strike is to be understood here as a symbolic reordering of the relationship between unions and party sects, we should also expect party activists to stake out positions *vis-à-vis* the general strike. At least two parties had staked out well-defined positions prior to the congress: the Guesdists, defending a socialist position, sought to maintain the privileged position of party over union and were vigorous opponents of the general strike; the Allemanists, who were closely affiliated with the Paris bourse, and who melded corporatism and anarchism, sought to elevate unions to preeminence over party—they were vigorous proponents of the general strike. Other party sects did not have such clear positions.

Table 1 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of support for the general strike at the Nantes Congress (see table 2 for a description

TABLE 1

## LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GENERAL STRIKE

Independent Variable	Estimate	Model 1			Model 2			
		Odds Ratio	95% Upper Bound	95% Lower Bound	Estimate	Odds Ratio	95% Upper Bound	95% Lower Bound
Bourse du travail .....	2.376*** (.735)	10.757	45.437	2.547				
Compagnonnage .....					1.335* (.671)	3.798	14.144	1.020
Gueulard .....	-.325*** (.081)	.722	.847	.616	-.321*** (.075)	.726	.841	.626
Allemanists .....	.118*** (.041)	1.125	1.218	1.039	.147*** (.039)	1.158	1.251	1.073
Union Congress X independent socialist .....	0.12*** (.004)	1.012	1.020	1.004	.007* (.003)	1.007	1.014	1.001
Establishments struck .....	-.334*** (.086)	.716	.847	.605	-.212*** (.066)	.809	.921	.711
Constant .....	2.519*** (.658)				2.486*** (.740)			
-2 log likelihood ( $\chi^2$ P-value) .....	85.659**** 85.058				77.898**** 84.204			
% correctly predicted .....								

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs. N = 203.

\*  $P < .05$   
 \*\*  $P < .01$   
 \*\*\*  $P < .001$

TABLE 2  
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description
Vote*	1 = support for the general strike; 0 = opposition to the general strike.
Bourse du travail†	1 = city has a bourse du travail, 0 = no bourse.
Compagnonnage‡	1 = city has a tradition of compagnonnage, 0 = no tradition.
Guesdists§	No. of groups from the city participating in the 1894 national congress of the <i>Parti Ouvrier Français</i> .
Allemanists¶	No. of groups from the city participating in the 1894 national congress of the <i>Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Révolutionnaire</i> .
Establishments struck'	Mean no. of establishments struck per strike in the department between 1890 and 1894.
Union Congress**	No. of unions from the city attending the 1892 congress of the <i>Fédération Nationale des Syndicats</i> .
Independent socialists††	No. of groups from the city representing either the <i>Fédération Socialiste Révolutionnaire</i> or the <i>Fédération Socialiste Indépendante</i> at the 1899 socialist unity congress.

\* Sixième Congrès National des Syndicats, Groupes, Fédérations, Unions, et Bourses du Travail, Nantes, September 17–22, 1894 (Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale).

† Bourses du travail participating in the Troisième Congrès de la Fédération National des Bourses du Travail, Lyon, June 25–27, 1894 (AN, series F# 12493) or identified by the Ministère du Commerce (1892–94, 15 397).

‡ A city is coded as having a tradition of compagnonnage if it was either represented in the contemporary *Union Compagnonnique* (Statutes of l'Union Compagnonnique, 1894, AD Côte-d'Or, series 20m, dossier 22) or identified by Moussonier as being a city on the traditional compagnonnage route or welcoming compagnons in the first third of the 19th century (Moussonier 1993, p. 81).

§ Douzième Congrès National du Parti Ouvrier Français, Nantes, September 14–16, 1894 (Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale).

¶ Douzième Congrès National du Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Révolutionnaire, Dijon, July 14–22, 1894 (Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale).

' Tilly and Jordan (1988).

\*\* Quinzième Congrès National des Syndicats et Groupes Corporatifs Ouvriers de France, Marseille, September 19–22, 1892 (Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale).

†† Congrès général des organisations socialistes françaises, Paris, December 3–8, 1899 (Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale).

of variables and data sources). Model 1 shows that the existence of a bourse du travail in a city significantly increases the tendency of unions from that city to vote in favor of the general strike. The coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level and highly substantively significant as well.<sup>13</sup> The odds ratio is nearly 11, which means that a union in a city

<sup>13</sup> For an introduction to logistic regression models, see Aldrich and Nelson (1984). Following DeMaris (1993, p. 1063), I report the odds ratio, which he argues is "analo-

with a bourse is nearly 11 times more likely to support the general strike than in one without a bourse. Guesdist and Allemanist representation in a city also proved highly statistically significant (.001 and .01 respectively), though their substantive significance is less clear.<sup>16</sup> In both cases, the coefficients were in the expected direction.

The representation of Blanquists and independent socialists in a city did not reveal the expected positive support for the general strike. This may, in part, be a consequence of only being able to systematically gauge the representation of these two party sects five years after the general strike vote in 1899. We do find, however, that interaction between attendance at an 1892 national union congress and representation, by city, of independent socialists (in 1899) does yield positive support for the general strike. Recall that a central goal of the independent socialists was to transcend sectarian divisions. This group sought to stake out a position midway between republicanism and socialism, and they rejected the Guesdist emphasis on disciplined, centralized party organization and sharp class boundaries. Recall also that the 1892 union congress evidenced the desire on the part of unions to escape from Guesdist control of the national union federation. The statistical interaction suggests that the desire of unions to escape from the political tutelage of the Guesdists was interacting with the desire of political activists to escape from their electoral discipline. This interpretation fits with the claim that the bourses du travail linked electoral disputes within parties to the desire for greater unity among unions.

These statistical findings support and reinforce the qualitative interpretation of the general strike presented in previous sections. The final variable in model 1 is the mean number of establishments struck between 1890–94.<sup>17</sup> This variable, which arguably provides the best measure of the inclination of a region to engage in broad strike actions, proves quite statistically significant. However, the sign is in the opposite direction than expected: apparently, the more expansive the strikes (the larger number of establishments involved), the less support there was for the general strike. Although the precise interpretation of this finding is not clear, it

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goes to the partial slope in multiple linear regression" in that it "summarizes the net impacts of predictors by indicating the multiplicative impact on the odds for a unit increase in a given predictor, net of all other covariates in the model." The odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to the probability that it will not.

<sup>16</sup> The substantive significance is in question because the odds ratios are not significantly higher than one.

<sup>17</sup> Note that the variables for strikes were aggregated at the departmental rather than the city level.

reinforces the claim that support for the general strike is a *symbolic* commitment rather than a direct expression of strike militancy.

As model 2 shows, the bourses du travail strongly tapped into the restricted code of compagnonnage. Although seemingly anachronistic and seen by most contemporary unionists as too conservative, compagnonnage was still a powerful latent tradition. By its very structure and by the functions it discharged, the bourses du travail evoked a set of tacit assumptions about the character of the trades as a status group complete with its own internal norms and style of life. An eyeball glance at a map of cities with bourses du travail and cities with a tradition of compagnonnage suggests a strong correlation (Moissonier 1993, p. 81). When coded as a variable, the tradition of compagnonnage strongly competes with the bourses du travail (see table 1). Both of their effects wash out when both are included together in the same equation. Therefore, in model 2, compagnonnage is substituted for the bourses du travail as a variable. This model shows that compagnonnage is also a quite powerful variable in explaining the outcome, although not quite as powerful as the bourses du travail. Given that compagnonnage as an institution had been sidelined by modern trade unionism, this finding supports the idea that it was the bourses du travail that were evoking and manifesting these traditions.

## CONCLUSION

In 1894, the French labor movement underwent a realignment that would ultimately lead to the creation of the CGT. This realignment contains two puzzles: first, how did unions break away from the political allegiances that divided them? And, given this fragmentation, how were they able to bind themselves together into a cohesive organization where previous attempts to unify unions on a national scale had failed?

This article began by suggesting that unions rallied around a particular symbol, the general strike, and this symbol became the quasi-constitutional basis for establishing a new union confederation. Yet how could this symbol bind unions together when it was, at best, a project for an uncertain future? In the short-term it was a “nonoperational goal.” Moreover, how did it succeed where Malon’s gallant attempt to synthesize the competing ideas of the labor movement in the early 1880s had failed?

Answers to these questions begin with the properties of the symbol itself. Symbols are not all equally powerful in their mobilizing potential nor is the same symbol equally powerful at all times. The symbol must provide a concrete way for its audience to perceive an abstract concept. In the case of the general strike, the symbol represented, in terms familiar to most unions in this period, the abstract ordering of relations between unions and parties: union unity *should* take precedence over political affiliation.

The general strike was also a *dominant symbol*. As figure 2 suggests, the general strike sat at the center of a web of signification. Like Benoît Malon's attempt to provide an intellectual synthesis of competing intellectual currents in the 1880s, the general strike mediated between the different discourses of the French labor movement; it did so by metaphorically representing the general strike as the revolution. Unlike Malon's effort, the general strike represented this synthesis in a condensed and vivid way.

For all its representational power, the general strike was only meaningful in a particular context. This context was defined by the bourses du travail—local institutions that created linkages between unions with allegiances to competing party sects. Through practical activities rather than symbolic representation, this multipurpose interorganizational network mixed and blended the different discourses through which the competing party sects distinguished themselves. In other words, like the general strike symbol, the bourses du travail stood at the center of a web of signification.

A key link between the bourse and the general strike is the restricted code of compagnonnage. As we have seen, compagnonnage was built around the idea of fraternal solidarity between journeymen. The language of the compagnons was highly charged with symbolism and their organizations were built around ritual solidarity. The unions had often been organized in opposition to the more archaic of these traditions. But the bourse evoked and updated many of the traditions of compagnonnage in the guise of modern unionism. The symbolism of the general strike built on the emotive power of this restricted code.

Figure 2 also suggests that this symbolic network accentuated hybrid rather than pure forms of discourse. In their pure form, these discourses were divisive. Hybrid groups created a set of overlapping discourses. This is clear in the case of the Allemanists, who were born in the Paris bourse, and who mixed corporatist and anarchist ideas together. The statistical analysis also suggested that this may have been the case with the independent socialists, who sought to bridge the gulf between socialism and republicanism. We also know that Blanquists, who also embraced a hybrid language, were prominent supporters of the bourses du travail. Of the four Blanquists at the 1894 congress who can be identified, all four voted in favor of the general strike.<sup>18</sup>

This finding suggests that the deeper power of the symbolic network is not simply due to its multivocality *per se*. It is also due to its ability to

<sup>18</sup> Cordier, Capjuzan, and Besset were identified as Blanquists; all three were active in the Paris bourse du travail and were important leaders in the union movement. Pommier was also a Blanquist and a secretary of the Tours bourse du travail (Maitron 1972–77). All four voted in favor of the general strike at the 1894 congress.

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appeal to groups who themselves are trying to bridge between different languages of social action.

Finally, the structure of the bourses du travail combined both proximate and positional network diffusion of support for the general strike. In terms of proximity, unions otherwise separated by different political affiliations found themselves managing the same institution. This proximity accentuated a language common to many of the trade unions—the language of compagnonnage and its emphasis on fraternal solidarity between the trades. In terms of position, the bourses du travail joined together opposition groups from within each of the party sects into a common front against political parties. This pattern of positional diffusion operated both within and between bourses du travail and as it did, the general strike became a more universal symbol of union revolt against the party sects.

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# The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Trends in Educational Attainment in the People's Republic of China<sup>1</sup>

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This article examines the effects of social origins on educational attainment, using data from the 1982 census of the People's Republic of China. Analysis of intergenerational relationships in China using census data is possible because nearly half of Chinese adult men live with their fathers. The authors show that the educational attainment of men is highly egalitarian with respect to social origins and has become increasingly so over time. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the advantage of coming from an educated family or an intelligentsia or cadre family was drastically reduced. The weak association between father's socioeconomic status and son's educational attainment reflects massive state intervention.

Education is the engine of social mobility in modern societies. In all industrialized or industrializing societies for which we have data, the central answer to the question "who gets ahead" is "those who get educated" (Treiman 1996).

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man and Yip 1989; Müller and Shavit 1997, p. 1). For this reason, the question of who gets educated has assumed a central place in stratification research. The dominant concern of this research has been to document and to understand the basis of variations in the role of social origins in educational attainment across societies and over time.

Of particular interest for us are claims that command societies (such as East European communist societies) substantially detached educational attainment from social origins by rapidly expanding the availability of education (particularly at the primary level), by substantially reducing or eliminating tuition fees at all levels, and by subsidizing students at higher levels, which removes the opportunity costs of electing further education over employment (see, e.g., Simkus and Andorka 1982). In addition, a kind of "affirmative action" was practiced, at least in some periods, in which children from worker and peasant origins were favored by the educational system and children from bourgeois or professional origins were disfavored (Parkin 1971).

Despite these claims, however, there is little evidence that the pattern of educational attainment in East European societies during the communist era was distinctive. Blossfeld and Shavit (1993), reviewing studies of educational attainment in 13 countries, detect no systematic difference between three then-communist East European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland) and 10 market-oriented industrialized countries. Other studies reach similar conclusions.

Surely, if state educational policies matter, communist and noncommunist regimes should differ. Perhaps the problem is that Eastern Europe was not communist enough. Despite the rhetoric, the actual educational practices of European communist regimes may not have been radically different from those of West European countries. Moreover, the effect of state interventions to promote equality may have been weak relative to the effect of structural changes affecting West and East European societies alike.

We investigate a case that provides clear evidence of state interventions in the educational system for the explicit purpose of reducing class differences in educational achievements: China. From the outset of the communist regime in 1949 through the Cultural Revolution, which ended in 1976, the Chinese government tried, in a variety of ways (see below), to promote educational opportunities for the children of peasant and worker families at the expense of those from higher status backgrounds. Thus, if state policies matter at all, they should matter in China. We study the impact of these policies by analyzing trends in the effect of social origins on educa-

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tional attainment in China over a 20-year period, for cohorts born between 1945 and 1964.

To date, no national sample survey of China has included the information required to assess intergenerational social mobility.<sup>2</sup> Thus, very little is known about the stratification system of the largest country in the world. For this reason, we decided to exploit an unconventional source—the 1982 census of China. The Chinese government has released a 1% public use sample of returns to the 1982 census, the first modern Chinese census.<sup>3</sup> Since the public use file is organized by households and since a large fraction of the population of China lives in “multiple generation households” (i.e., households in which there are two or more generations of adults), the census data are a potentially useful source of intergenerational information.<sup>4</sup> The obvious question is whether, or rather to what extent, a sample of multiple generation households is biased in ways that will affect the validity of conclusions regarding the effect of social origins on educational attainment. We return to this question below, after sketching the Chinese educational system.

#### THE CHINESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM SINCE 1949

China adopted an American-style school system in 1922 (Gao 1985) and now has a 6-3-3-4/5 structure, that is, six years of elementary school, three

<sup>2</sup> Published studies concerned with status attainment exist only for China's three largest cities: Beijing (Xie and Lin 1986); Tianjin (Blau and Ruan 1990; Lin and Bian 1991; Bian 1994); and Beijing and Shanghai (Zhou, Tuma, and Moen 1996), but these are very atypical places. We know of only three other Chinese surveys containing information on father's occupation: (1) A 1988 survey in six of the 29 provinces of China, “Social Structure in Modern China,” was conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with separate questionnaires administered to urban and rural samples, but so far as we know only one paper, on intergenerational occupational mobility (Cheng and Dai 1995), has been published from it. (2) Davis (1992a, 1992b) has compiled life histories from 1,023 adult members of 200 families in Shanghai and Wuhan, but these are not from probability samples of these places and overrepresent high status families and individuals. (3) After our analysis was completed, an unpublished study of educational transitions during the communist era, based on data from 17 cities in five provinces (Zhou, Moen, and Tuma 1996) came to our attention. Its results are broadly similar to our own.

<sup>3</sup> We thank the UCLA Social Science Data Archive for obtaining the census file for us from the (unfortunately now defunct) China Statistical Archives at the University of Illinois, Chicago. As of this writing, tabulations from these data are available electronically from the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN).

<sup>4</sup> A more extended exploitation of these data to study intergenerational social mobility and status attainment in China can be found in the first author's 1993 doctoral dissertation, “Status Attainment in China, 1949–1982” (Deng 1993).

years of lower secondary school (corresponding to American junior high school), three years of upper secondary school (corresponding to American senior high school), and four or five years of university education. After 1949, China's educational system fell under Soviet influence; thus, in 1951, China's Department of Education proposed a system of five years of primary school, five years of secondary school, and four years of university. But most school systems did not carry out this reform, retaining the 6-3-3-4/5 structure, with secondary education divided into academic and vocational tracks (Unger 1982, pp. 12, 33). Thus, the Chinese school system is structurally similar to that of industrialized countries. However, it was frequently subject to explicit political interference.

Nominally, China's system operates in a highly centralized way. All schools at a given level use the same textbooks and arrange their courses, requirements, teaching hours, and lesson speed according to teaching plans issued by the national Department of Education. Admission examinations are required for promotion to each higher level, starting with junior high school (except that examinations were suspended during periods of political upheaval such as the Cultural Revolution).<sup>5</sup> The higher the level, the more centralized are the admission examinations. The entry examination for junior high school was and is normally developed by the school itself; the examination for senior high school is developed by the education bureau of the city or county; and the nationally competitive examination to university or vocational college emanates from China's Department of Education in Beijing. China's examination system is intended to promote intellectual competence as the sole criterion for advancement.

However, for the first 30 years of the communist period, and to some extent even today, three criteria governed advancement through the educational system: academic performance, assessed by the entrance examinations, family class origin, and the student's own political loyalty (Shirk 1982, p. 41; Unger 1982, pp. 12–16).<sup>6</sup> The relative importance of these

<sup>5</sup> The Cultural Revolution (1966–76) was a decade-long mass movement, unleashed and, at least initially, orchestrated by Mao Zedong and his agents. Universities were shut down entirely from 1966 to 1972; students and other urban workers, especially professionals, were "sent down to the countryside" to work as peasants; political loyalty rather than competence became the main criterion for advancement. For good accounts of this period in Chinese history, see Bernstein (1977) and Lee (1978).

<sup>6</sup> In the 1950s, the Communist Party assigned a permanent "class" designation, inheritable in the male line, to each family on the basis of the family head's source of income, employment status, and political status in the years just prior to Liberation (Unger 1982, p. 13). These designations, which were included in student and employment dossiers, faded in importance only during the reform period beginning in the late 1970s. There were three main categories, good-class origins, middle-class origins, and bad-class origins, with many detailed subcategories. Here is (a slight adaptation of) Unger's (1982, pp. 13–14) specification of the entire scheme:

## The Impact of the Cultural Revolution

criteria varied substantially among different types of schools and over time, as we will see below.

One reason that family class origin was used as an admissions criterion was to give priority to the children of workers and peasants. Admission examinations permit students who have enjoyed superior prior schooling to obtain superior results. This favors students from urban areas, where the schooling is generally better. In addition, there are class differences in the acquisition of cultural capital at home, since family cultural capital depends substantially upon parental education and parental occupation (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Robert 1990, p. 95; Peng and Treiman 1993), and family cultural capital has been shown to strongly affect educational attainment (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; De Graaf 1986, 1988).

Unequal cultural capital in the population, and differential school quality, undermined the communist goal of "eliminating the distinctions between town and country, industry and agriculture, physical and mental labor" (*China Youth Daily* 1959). Prior to and during the Cultural Revolution, Communist Party pronouncements repeatedly emphasized that relying solely on examinations to select students unwisely favored students who, for reasons of family background or level of environmental sophistication, were better prepared to take examinations than were the children of workers and peasants. According to party ideology, cultural capital

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- I. Good-class origins (*jieji chengfen haode*), also referred to as the "five red kinds" ("hongwulei")
  - A. Politically red inheritances (the families headed by pre-Liberation party members, plus the orphans of men who died in the revolutionary wars)
    - 1. Revolutionary cadres
    - 2. Revolutionary army men
    - 3. Revolutionary martyrs
  - B. Working class
    - 4. Pre-Liberation industrial workers and their families
    - 5. Former poor and lower-middle peasant families
- II. Middle-class origins (*yibian chengfen*)
  - A. Nonintelligentsia middle class
    - 1. Families of pre-Liberation peddlers and store clerks, etc.
    - 2. Former middle-peasant families
  - B. Intelligentsia middle class (families of pre-Liberation clerks, teachers, professionals, etc.)
- III. Bad-class origins (*jieji chengfen buhaode*)
  - A. Families of former capitalists
  - B. Families of "rightists" (a label denoting those who were too outspoken in the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957)
  - C. Pre-Liberation rich peasant families
  - D. Families of "bad elements" (a label denoting "criminal" offenders)
  - E. Pre-Liberation landlord families
  - F. Families of counterrevolutionaries

breeds social "elitism," in which the children of workers and peasants fall victim to "examination discrimination" (Munro 1972, pp. 276, 294; Montaperto 1979, p. 94; Smerling 1979, p. 94).

### State Interventions to Promote Educational Equality

China's communist government utilized three techniques to promote and improve educational opportunities for workers and peasants and their children. They expanded the formal education system, established an informal "mass education" alternative, and employed different enrollment criteria for people with different social backgrounds.

*Expanding the educational system.*—In common with many other countries, the Chinese government sought to increase educational opportunity for the children of workers and peasants by providing more schools. The number of schools at each level and the portion of school age children enrolled in them both increased continuously from the 1950s through the 1970s (China Department of Education 1982). By 1981, primary schools were three times more numerous than they had ever been before 1949. The fraction of children of primary school age enrolled in school rose from 20% in 1949 to 85% in 1965 and to 93% in 1981. By 1981, almost every commune had its own lower secondary school. Also, the number of tertiary educational institutes in China increased from 210 in 1950 to 434 in 1965 and to 704 in 1981.

In addition to promoting the expansion of state-run, full-time school systems, China's central government also encouraged new types of primary and secondary schools. These new schools included collective-owned schools (owned by communities, villages, and factories) and "convenient primary schools," which operated on an irregular schedule or in a variable location in order to accommodate rural and migrant children needed at home for work. In 1965, there were 849,000 children enrolled in various types of convenient primary schools. By 1981, more than 25 million students were enrolled, accounting for 22% of the nation's primary school pupils (China Department of Education 1982, p. 124).

The political measures designed to equalize educational opportunity and reduce the influence of inheritance also included affordable primary and secondary education and free tertiary education. The state appropriated all universities and colleges in 1950, abolished tuition fees, provided subsidies for students, and guaranteed jobs following graduation. In this way, students were freed from constraints imposed by their ability to pay or their need to work to help support their families.

*Mass education programs.*—"Mass education" for adults was also introduced. Examples include the "schools for accelerated education of workers and peasants," introduced in 1951–55, and the "red and expert universi-

ties," introduced in 1958–60. These schools declared education for political consciousness their first goal. They gave priority in admission to adults of working-class and peasant backgrounds. Their courses stressed the Marxist classics and the works of Chairman Mao Zedong. These schools trained cadres or potential cadres (workers and peasants identified by the regime as politically outstanding).<sup>7</sup> An important feature of these schools was that they shortened the school program at both the primary and the secondary level, permitting adults to obtain a high school diploma in seven years, instead of the usual 12. Graduates of this mass system were declared qualified to take the admission examinations to universities and were given priority in admission because of their class background and political consciousness.

Mass education schools were mostly short-lived. As a result of their adult students' poor educational background, these schools often had very high dropout rates. The mass education schools were created out of political furor, and they lost their appeal when the political furor died away. However, while they existed, they permitted some otherwise uneducated adults to complete high school. Some of these students later continued their education in universities. Those successful trainees often were appointed to cadre positions. Mass education thus increased the formal education of some workers and peasants even though the curriculum and quality of the mass education system were inferior to and incompatible with the education system's normal requirements (Yao 1984; Gao 1985).

*Special administrative methods.*—With varying intensity over time, special administrative methods were applied to the regular education system in order to increase educational opportunities for those from worker and peasant origins. In recruiting students, the government emphasized "working class" background (which, in China, includes the peasantry), especially at the tertiary level. Starting in the 1950s, the government pressed schools at all levels to increase their enrollment of students of worker or peasant origins (Xu 1982). During some periods, the Department of Education even issued enrollment quotas—the minimum proportion of such students that must be enrolled in each school.

The policy of Open the Door of High Education for Workers and Peasants began in 1953 (Gao 1985). Priorities in college enrollment were given to "worker/peasant speeding-education middle school" graduates, indus-

<sup>7</sup> Cadres are political appointees whose responsibilities principally include political management of the work unit to which they are attached. Paid by their work unit or firm, cadres are Communist Party functionaries in the workplace. In addition to these political functionaries, the term "cadre" (*ganbu*) also encompasses administrators of government and Communist Party units, public institutions, and state-run economic enterprises.

trial workers, and children of "revolutionary cadres and martyrs."<sup>8</sup> This was done in two ways. First, during some periods admission was granted to some students by "recommendation only," allowing them to bypass the recruitment examination. Students who received such special treatment usually had made contributions to the revolutionary cause (e.g., they were veterans of the Chinese Civil War or of the Korean War). This recommendation method was used extensively during the early period of communism in order to educate the Communist Party's political elite so they could run the country (Sun 1958). The result was to substantially increase the proportion of students of worker/peasant origin among newly enrolled college students. Not surprisingly, there was, however, a concomitant decline in the academic level, and in 1959 the national college recruitment examination was reinstated. A similar "recommendation only" policy was instituted again in 1964–65, just before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and continued throughout that period—when the universities were open at all (see below).

Even during periods when the "recommendation only" method was not used, preference was given to students with desirable class backgrounds through the policy of "priorities among equivalents." While the actual examination procedures were never compromised for political purposes, and examination scores were based strictly on performance, political criteria were and are used extensively to select among those who achieved minimally acceptable scores.<sup>9</sup> This is possible because the number of eligible applicants far exceeds the number of spaces available in Chinese secondary schools and universities.

The two methods had unequal impact. "Priorities among equivalents" was much milder than the method of recommendation only, since the political selection was only among those who met the academic standards.

<sup>8</sup> "Worker/peasant speeding-education" was an adult educational program of the early 1950s. The students in this program were generally semi-illiterate cadres—including veterans of the People's Liberation Army and cadres in communist local governments. The students enrolled in the program were exempted from their regular jobs during their period of enrollment but continued to receive their regular wages. They typically completed a six-year middle school education in three years (Yu 1982). "Revolutionary martyrs" are those communist soldiers and cadres who died for the communist cause, such as those who died in wars against the Japanese or the Nationalists or those who died in jail (Hu 1964).

<sup>9</sup> The Chinese college recruitment examination emulates the ancient administrative recruitment examination in its strict organization. It is not only illegal but exceedingly difficult to cheat in the examination. Mao, complaining about the strict examination system, described it as "to treat students as enemies." It was on this ground that during the Cultural Revolution all examinations were abolished. If anyone proposed an examination, he or she would be accused of "treating [the examinees] as enemies" (Mass Criticism Group of the Education Department 1973).

Hence, this method did not satisfy the radical demands of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, despite the fact that the proportion of worker/peasant students in higher educational institutes had increased systematically over time since the beginning of the communist era: such students accounted for 28% of all tertiary students in 1953, 55% in 1958, and 71% in 1965 (China Department of Education 1982, p. 338).<sup>10</sup> Not surprisingly, therefore, the peak use of the “recommendation-only admission” method was during the Cultural Revolution.

*Cultural Revolution.*—In May, 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong began a purge of Communist Party officials, with a campaign that relied heavily upon the mobilization of mass support, particularly among youth. More than simply an attack on his political opposition, however, the Cultural Revolution was a “fundamentalist revival of political orthodoxy” (Vogel 1969, p. 321) in which political loyalty, rather than expertise, was the main criterion for advancement. The main target of the Maoist attack on “capitalist-roaders” was the emerging bureaucratic class and the elite privileges they enjoyed. “Mao saw a threat to the socialist revolution not only from the remnants of the old upper classes but even more so from ‘newly engendered bourgeois elements’ in the political superstructure, who might become a ‘privileged stratum’ and take the capitalist road, as allegedly has happened in the Soviet Union” (Bernstein 1977, p. 19). However, as the Cultural Revolution widened and chaos spread, all high status groups became subject to attack. In particular, Mao’s suspicion of the intelligentsia was given free rein. Although the children of prerevolutionary intelligentsia were considered to have neither “good” nor “bad” class backgrounds (see n. 6), during the Cultural Revolution intelligentsia origins were often treated as tantamount to “bad” class backgrounds (Bernstein 1977, p. 18). Moreover, the intelligentsia were in the difficult position of being perceived as the embodiment of bourgeois ideology—but of having no political power with which to protect themselves.<sup>11</sup> Cadres under attack

<sup>10</sup> Due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution, comparable figures are not available from 1965 through 1982, the end of the period under study here. See the discussion below.

<sup>11</sup> In the colorful language of the Chinese communists, the intelligentsia were described as the “‘Smelly no. 9’ bad element” (Lin and Xie 1988, p. 811), but not as important enough to be a main target of the Cultural Revolution. Mao said the intelligentsia were not even a class but rather “hair attached to the skin [of the class they serve]. If the skin is eliminated, how can the hair survive?” (Mao [1938] 1961). The intelligentsia “have tens of thousands of ties with the classes that were overthrown by the communist revolution” (*Light Daily* 1966). They “peddle feudal, bourgeois, and revisionist rubbish in universities.” They are “intellectual aristocrats who ride on the working people. They thought they were knowledgeable, actually they were ‘the most stupid,’ because their knowledge has no use to the working people whatsoever.” They were not good believers in socialism and communism because of their lack “of correct class standing, correct class consciousness, and correct class sense.” They should be “reborn”

might be able to use their political leverage to protect themselves and their families, but this generally was not possible for the intelligentsia. Because of this, it is likely that the "cost" of the Cultural Revolution to those from high status origins was not borne equally but was particularly heavy for the children of the intelligentsia.

The Cultural Revolution resulted in a massive disruption of education in China. Although most primary schools continued to operate as usual, almost all secondary and tertiary level institutions were shut down completely from 1966–68 and most tertiary level institutions remained closed until 1972 (Bernstein 1977; Unger 1982). After the secondary schools reopened in 1968, they faced the problem of having two extra cohorts of students to contend with—those whose schooling was disrupted or delayed during the two years in which the schools were closed—and a shortage of teachers, since many had been purged. The solution was to "send-down" (*xiaofang*) the older cohorts to work on farms and factories. Problems of too many students and too few teachers continued to plague the schools well into the 1970s, particularly since they were not permitted to recruit new teachers on the basis of "bourgeois expertise" but rather on the basis of political credentials (Unger 1982, p. 155). When the universities were reopened in 1972, they faced similar problems. Recruitment examinations were abolished. The major criteria for college admission became class background and party loyalty rather than academic achievement (Shirk 1982, pp. 45–46). The only eligible applicants were "workers, peasants, and soldiers with two or more years of working experience, having knowledge equivalent to junior middle school graduates or more." The first and most important criterion for admission was political performance. Small quotas (not exceeding 5%) were established for students from undesirable class origins, who were identified as "educable children [of class enemies]" (Mass Criticism Group of the Education Department 1973). Moreover, the universities also faced the problem of multiple cohorts seeking a limited number of openings. One solution to these problems, which was consistent with Maoist notions of combining theory with practice, was to institutionalize a system in which students were not permitted to apply to tertiary level institutions until they had had two or more years of work experience. The effect of this policy is unclear, but whatever the impact it has little consequence for our analysis since

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through continuous criticism and self-criticism. They should "tuck their tails, be obedient pupils to the mass" (*Worker's Daily* 1968). Teachers and professors were driven from their positions at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution with the comment of Mao that "we could no longer tolerate the ruling of bourgeois intellectuals over our schools" (*People's Daily* 1966).

throughout the period under study only extremely small fractions of each cohort (less than 2%) obtained any tertiary education (see figs. 2–4 below).

Although the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution are generally regarded as continuing for some 10 years, until the death of Mao in 1976, there was a gradual “return to normalcy” throughout the 1970s. There was an explicit program of “return to the team,” by which many professionals (and other workers) resumed the positions they had held before the Cultural Revolution. Some members of the last five pre-Cultural Revolution cohorts of college graduates, who had been assigned nonprofessional jobs during the Revolution, were able to obtain professional jobs. In addition, many cadres returned to the positions they held before the Revolution—although they often had to share their positions with the new cadres promoted during the Revolution. Entrance examinations were reestablished, first at the high school level and finally, in 1977, at the university level (Yang 1978; Li 1978; Unger 1982, pp. 207–17; Du 1992). How complete the recovery was especially for the cohorts most damaged by the Cultural Revolution, remains an open question.

*Summary.*—At various points over its first 30 years of rule but particularly during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government introduced strong policies to favor people of working class and peasant origins. One set of policies structurally expanded the educational system, raising the educational level of the population in general, and of the peasantry and proletariat in particular. In theory, such an expansion of educational opportunities should reduce the effects of social origin on educational achievement (Mare 1980, 1981). Moreover, other educational reforms promoted the educational achievement of the children of peasants and workers at the expense of those from classes normally considered of higher status. By substituting students of “good” class background (which, from a numerical standpoint, was composed mainly of those from working-class backgrounds) for those from “middle” and “bad” class backgrounds (who consisted mainly of the former bourgeoisie and intelligentsia), this set of reforms was specifically designed to reduce the effect of social class origins on educational attainment.

Because these reforms were more thoroughgoing than state interventions in Eastern Europe, we should expect a smaller effect of social origins on educational attainment than is characteristic of the countries studied to date. However, the character of the state intervention, in which political criteria played a major role in determining opportunities, leads to two additional expectations: (1) the strength of the political effect should vary over time and should be most pronounced during the Cultural Revolution, and (2) the brunt of the effect should be borne by the sons of the intelligentsia while the sons of cadres—the other group of equally high status (Lin

and Xie 1988)—should have been somewhat protected from the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. Before turning to tests of these hypotheses, however, we first must describe our data and demonstrate that they are suitable for our task.

## DATA

We exploit the 1% Public Use Sample from the 1982 census of China (China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Center 1989). This is a hierarchical file, containing information on the household and on each member of the household for a systematic sample of every hundredth household included in the 1982 census. We first describe these data and then assess the magnitude and consequences of bias introduced by our restriction of the data to men living in multiple generation households (MGHs).

### Sample and Variables

The analysis is based on four variables, measures of father's and son's educational attainment, father's occupation, and year of birth.<sup>12</sup> We also distinguish the farm and nonfarm populations on the basis of industry and restrict much of our analysis to the nonfarm population.

**Education.**—In the 1982 Chinese census, educational attainment is measured by a six-category classification, shown with the percentage of males, ages 18–69 years old in 1982, who had attained each level: illiterate or semiliterate (21.0%), primary (37.4%), lower secondary (27.5%), upper secondary (12.6%), some tertiary (.4%), and completed tertiary (1.1%). It is clear that the level of education in China is very low, with about 20% of the male population illiterate in 1982 and fewer than 2% with any tertiary education. Trends in educational attainment, shown in figures 1–4, are discussed below. We analyze educational attainment in two ways: with a summary measure of "years of schooling," which we construct by recoding the education categories to "0," "6," "9," "12," "14," and "16," respectively; and with a dichotomous measure, distinguishing those with

<sup>12</sup> In an earlier version of the article, we also included a dichotomous variable for urban vs. rural residence, on the ground that urban residence is an important advantage in China (Hannum and Xie 1994). However, since the census variable refers to current residence and since education often is sought in order to escape from rural residence, rendering the causal order somewhat problematic, we omitted this variable in the present analysis. In the analysis including the residence variable, urban residence creates the expected advantage and the impact of father's education and father's occupation differs little from what is reported in the present analysis.




FIG. 1.—Mean years of schooling obtained by Chinese men, by year of birth




FIG. 2.—Percentage of Chinese men obtaining successive levels of schooling, by year of birth (total male population). (Since almost no one has incomplete tertiary education, the trend lines for "some tertiary" and "completed tertiary" are indistinguishable.)




FIG. 3.—Percentage of Chinese men obtaining successive levels of schooling, by year of birth (farm population). (Since almost no one has incomplete tertiary education, the trend lines for "some tertiary" and "completed tertiary" are indistinguishable.)




FIG. 4.—Percentage of Chinese men obtaining successive levels of schooling, by year of birth (nonfarm population). (Since almost no one has incomplete tertiary education, the trend lines for "some tertiary" and "completed tertiary" are indistinguishable.)

"upper secondary" or more from those with less education. Father's education is measured by the "years of schooling" scale.

**Occupation.**—In the Chinese census, occupation is coded into a three-digit classification that closely resembles and therefore was readily converted into the categories of the *International Standard Classification of Occupations, Revised Edition 1968* (ISCO; International Labour Office 1969) as enhanced in a previous publication (Treiman 1977, app. A). To assess the adequacy of the sample, we assigned International Socio-Economic Index of Occupations (ISEI) scores (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992) to the ISCO categories for respondent's occupation. To analyze the effect of father's occupation, however, we devised an eight category scheme by modifying the major group classification used by the Chinese census (shown with the percentage of males, ages 18–69, in each category):<sup>13</sup> scientific and technical staff (5.5%); administrators in govern-

<sup>13</sup> Note that "father's occupation" refers to the father's present occupation, not to the father's occupation when the respondent was completing school and about to enter the labor force. Fortunately, this should not introduce too much bias, since men's careers tend to stabilize by middle age. Since the mean age at paternity for the fathers of sons in MGHs was 31, the mean age of the fathers when the sons were 14 years old was 45 years. The mean age of fathers at the time of the census was 56 years, so evidence of stability in occupational status between ages 45 and 56 years would give substantial assurance that using father's occupation at the time of the census is a reasonable approximation for father's occupation when the respondent was 14 years old. While we have no data for China, there is some pertinent evidence from other countries. For example, in Japan, the correlation between the prestige of men's occupations when they were 45 years old and when they were 55 years old was .91, based on data from the 1975 National Mobility Survey (we thank Mariah Man-Tsun Cheng, Carolina Population Center, for providing these computations). Hout (1989, p. 260) shows that in Ireland, 73% of men held jobs in the same occupation category (of a 16-category classification) when they were 35 years old and when they were 45 years old; he did not present evidence of mobility among older men, presumably because there was so little. In China, the strict labor allocation system in place until the reforms of the 1980s makes it extremely unlikely that many people shifted jobs late in their careers. The labor allocation system allowed virtually no interfirm shifts, status exchanges among nonmanual, manual, and peasant occupations, or opportunities to return to school to obtain additional education (with the exception of the required work experience between senior high school and university instituted during the Cultural Revolution, which therefore pertain to the sons but not to the fathers). Of course, the possibility remains that there were substantial dislocations during the Cultural Revolution. Although no figures are available, it is probable that most of those who lost their jobs during the Cultural Revolution got their old positions back, during the period of "return to the team" referred to above. Thus, the long-term effects of the Cultural Revolution probably fell most heavily upon those just beginning their careers rather than those in midcareer. Finally, it is uncommon in China (unlike Japan) for men to take "retirement jobs" that are different from the job they held most of their working lives (Din 1985). Those fathers who have retired are shown as not having an occupation, which we treat as a separate category. We are confident that father's current occupation satisfactorily proxies father's occupation when the respondent was making schooling and career decisions, when he was about 14 years old.

ment, parties, social organizations, enterprises, and institutions (2.5%); office workers and related staff (1.7%); commercial workers (1.7%); service workers (1.9%); workers in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery (61.1%); production, transportation, and related workers (17.7%); and those without occupations (7.9%).<sup>14</sup> We made several modifications to the census scheme to create a more sociologically sensible classification. (1) We divided "scientific and technical staff" into two categories, "intelligentsia" and "lower professionals and technicians" on the ground that it was the intelligentsia who were particularly vulnerable during the Cultural Revolution, much more so than lower professionals and technicians.<sup>15</sup> (2) We combined "commercial workers" and "sales workers" into a single category because these are relatively small groups and have similar status. (3) We moved "production brigade leaders" (category 600 in the three-digit occupation classification used by the 1982 census) from the agricultural category into the cadre category and "staff for political affairs and security" except firefighters (321–323, 329) from the office worker category to the cadre category. (4) We moved firefighters (324) into the manual category. (5) We moved buyers (421) and several technical occupations (962–964, 992) into the lower professional category. (6) We moved examiners and inspectors (961) into the office worker category. (7) Finally, we created a new category, "no occupation," which enabled us to retain in the sample the 19.6% of fathers for whom there is no occupational information (presumably because they are retired); by doing this we are able to utilize information we have on their educational attainment (there are no missing data on education in the census file).

*Year of birth and period effects.*—We restrict our attention to men 18–37 years old in 1982.<sup>16</sup> The upper bound was chosen because few men

<sup>14</sup> In an earlier version of the article, we also analyzed the effect of father's occupational status by assigning ISEI scores to father's occupation. The results were substantially similar to those reported here.

<sup>15</sup> "Intelligentsia" occupations include scientific researchers, engineers and engineering technicians, aircraft and ship's pilots, physicians and veterinarians, statisticians, economic planners, legal professionals, secondary and postsecondary teachers, journalists and other writers, translators, librarians and archivists, and similar occupations (CSCO codes 011–064, 071–073, 079–092, 101–112, 119–122, 141–142, 144–149). "Lower professional and technical" occupations include nurses and other health personnel, customs, finance, and accounting staff, primary and preprimary teachers, artists and performers, coaches and athletes, draftsmen and other technicians, and similar occupations (CSCO codes 069, 074–078, 093, 096–099, 113–116, 123–139, 143, 150, 421, 540, 962–964, 992).

<sup>16</sup> Our data are not suited to the analysis of female educational attainment since China is a patrilocal society, which means that a much smaller fraction of adult women live with their parents than do adult men. For an analysis of gender differences in educational attainment, see Hannum and Xie (1994).

more than 37 years old—less than 10% of each cohort—were co-resident with their fathers. The lower bound ensures that, in principle, our respondents either will have completed their education or will have entered upper secondary school.<sup>17</sup> From inspection of figures 1–4, it may appear that the most recent cohorts are severely censored. However, this is not the case, even though for the youngest cohorts with upper secondary education, substantial portions were still in school in 1982: 3.5% of the 1961 cohort, 8.5% of the 1962 cohort, 17.0% of the 1963 cohort, and 31.9% of the 1964 cohort. Rather, starting with the 1962 birth cohort, there was a systematic decline in the fraction of men obtaining upper secondary education and a smaller but also systematic decline in the fraction obtaining lower secondary education starting about 1964.<sup>18</sup> Computations from the 1990 census by birth cohort show annual variations in the mean years of schooling, the proportion obtaining lower secondary education, and the proportion obtaining upper secondary education between 1958 and 1964 that closely mirror those we report here.<sup>19</sup> The seeming inconsistency between the large proportions still in school in 1982 and the similarity in the educational distributions of matching cohorts in 1982 and 1990 is explained by the fact that below the tertiary level the 1982 census did not distinguish between enrollment and completion of education.

Studying the effect of historical events on processes that cover several years, as education does, is difficult, since it is unclear where in the process the impact will be greatest. Should we define cohorts by the age at which people enter school, the age at which they leave school, or some other age? It is not at all obvious, since “period effects” such as the Cultural Revolution are likely to influence the life chances of many cohorts—denying education in some cases, delaying it in others, and devaluing it in still others (see Hannum and Xie [1994] for a similar discussion). Moreover, while the beginning of the Cultural Revolution can be pinpointed quite

<sup>17</sup> Only for the 1964 cohort is this assumption at all problematic. Among those born in 1964, 6.4% of those with lower secondary education were still in school.

<sup>18</sup> Hannum and Xie (1994, fig. 2) show a similar downturn in the transition from primary to secondary school.

<sup>19</sup> Although the response categories for educational attainment changed between 1982 and 1990, we still can achieve an approximately comparable series for 1982 and 1990. In 1990, a category was added for “technical school” and a distinction was made between those who graduated, failed to graduate, and were still enrolled, which may have affected the way respondents answered the question. In the 1990 data, we combined “technical school” with “upper secondary.” As measured in 1982, the proportions attaining upper secondary schooling or more, for the 1958 through 1964 birth cohorts, were .279, .324, .362, .382, .341, .308, .257; as measured in 1990, the corresponding proportions were .294, .323, .357, .344, .320, .285, .241. The proportions attaining lower secondary schooling or more, as measured in 1982, were .675, .704, .742, .776, .783, .786, .760; as measured in 1990, they were .693, .720, .760, .771, .787, .784, .755.

precisely—May 1966—the ending is less clear, as we noted above. Still, it seems evident that the birth cohorts most strongly affected with respect to educational attainment were those of secondary school age during the early years of the Cultural Revolution decade. We operationalize this category as consisting of those born between 1950 and 1957, who thus were between nine and 16 years old in 1966 at the start of the Cultural Revolution and between 19 and 27 years old in 1977 after the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution unambiguously had ended.<sup>20</sup>

### How Representative Are MGHs?

To assess the validity of the Chinese census for studying intergenerational status transmission, we address two specific questions: (1) In what ways and to what extent do men living in MGHs differ from a random sample of the Chinese male population, and (2) how different are patterns of status attainment derived from a random sample of the population and a sample of those residing in MGHs?

We define MGHs as consisting of two or more adult generations living together, organized along parent-child or parent-child-grandchild lineage relationships. In 1982, 39% of men 18–37 years old lived in the same households as their fathers (ranging from 11% of those 37 years old to 73% of those 18 years old). The crucial question is whether these men are similar to the total male population with respect to the characteristics of interest to us. If so, we can legitimately tag them with their fathers' characteristics in the same way that we typically ask representative samples of men in surveys to report on their fathers' characteristics.

It is, of course, obvious that sons residing in MGHs are much younger than a random sample of Chinese men, since the fathers of older men are increasingly unlikely to still be alive. Because they are younger and because education expanded dramatically (see below), sons residing in MGHs will be more highly educated and will have more highly educated fathers than will the average Chinese man. But this is not a problem so long as sons residing in MGHs are not strongly biased with respect to socioeconomic characteristics *within* cohorts.<sup>21</sup> Figure 1 shows the close

<sup>20</sup> In 1977 university entrance examinations were reestablished and were opened to all persons less than 30 years old to accommodate those from the "lost generation" of the Cultural Revolution decade (Pepper 1980, p. 16).

<sup>21</sup> Although it might seem obvious that sons living in MGHs will be less well educated than those living separately because well-educated men are likely to have been assigned jobs in distant parts of the country, a number of factors mitigate against this possibility. First, it is in fact common for persons to be assigned jobs in their home towns. Second, those who do relocate may bring their parents to join them. This is even true of persons from peasant backgrounds who acquire urban residential status through education. In small cities and towns, many households include those with

resemblance in mean years of schooling between sons in MGHs, 18–37 years old in 1982, and all Chinese men of the same ages, within the farm and nonfarm sectors. Sons in MGHs have somewhat lower average schooling than do all Chinese men of the same age; however, this reflects the greater propensity of peasants to live in MGHs (44% of farm men 18–37 years old compared to 29% of nonfarm men) and the lower level of education among peasants than among other Chinese.

The similarity between MGH sons and all men of corresponding age with respect to the mean level of education is mirrored in the similarity in the percentage obtaining each level of schooling (see figs. 2–4). So long as we distinguish between nonfarm and farm men and appropriately control for year of birth, it appears that a sample of MGH sons is, from a practical point of view, indistinguishable from a probability sample of all Chinese men.

Next we ask whether status attainment processes are similar for sons in MGHs and for all Chinese men. Table 1 shows estimates of a simple OLS model in which occupational status (ISEI) is predicted from years of school completed and type of place of residence, by single years of age, for all men in China not employed in agriculture and for sons in the MGH sample not employed in agriculture.<sup>22</sup> It is necessary to study single years of age since OLS estimates are sensitive to the distributional properties of the sample—specifically, in this case, to the very different age distributions of the random and MGH samples, which are not adequately controlled by the introduction of a linear, or even a curvilinear, age variable. Inspecting the coefficients, it is clear that the random and MGH samples yield substantively similar results. This can be seen graphically in figure 5, which shows the expected level of occupational status for urban men with, respectively, 6, 9, and 12 years of schooling, estimated from the coefficients in table 1. Although there is a slight tendency for the MGH-sample predictions to be lower than the random-sample predictions for those with upper secondary education (12 years of schooling), we would arrive at the same substantive conclusions regarding the effect of education on occupational attainment, and trends in these effects, whether we used data from the random or MGH samples.

In sum, several different tests strongly suggest that our sample of sons in MGHs provides a valid basis for inferences about the process of edu-

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both farm and nonfarm jobs and even those with rural and urban residential status (Chen and Zhang 1986).

<sup>22</sup> We combined categories of China's administrative hierarchy with the urban-rural distinction described by Chan (1994) to create a three category variable: residents of cities, residents of towns, and rural residents (the reference category). We restricted the analysis to those not employed in agriculture since there is virtually no variance in occupational status in the peasant population.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF RANDOM AND MGH SAMPLES WITH RESPECT TO THE REGRESSION OF OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (ISEI) ON YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED (*S*) AND TOWN OR CITY (vs. RURAL) RESIDENCE, NONFARM MEN

BIRTH YEAR	SAMPLE	METRIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS				<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>N</i>
		Constant	<i>S</i>	Town	City		
1945 (37) .....	Random	24.4	2.77	-3.50	-5.70	.279	18,867
	MGH*	22.0	3.00	-5.32	-5.43	.255	1,118
1946 (36) .....	Random	23.0	2.82	-2.73	-5.19	.289	20,502
	MGH	20.9	3.01	-2.29	-5.85	.276	1,245
1947 (35) .....	Random	23.5	2.65	-2.56	-5.26	.258	22,409
	MGH	23.5	2.62	-2.89	-6.36	.224	1,504
1948 (34) .....	Random	23.6	2.58	-2.70	-5.33	.244	22,468
	MGH	21.9	2.77	-4.37	-5.60	.245	1,735
1949 (33) .....	Random	23.7	2.54	-3.41	-5.66	.236	23,154
	MGH	23.7	2.47	-3.44	-6.20	.221	2,053
1950 (32) .....	Random	22.9	2.56	-3.26	-5.09	.227	27,694
	MGH	22.8	2.51	-3.21	-6.15	.200	2,801
1951 (31) .....	Random	22.5	2.51	-2.90	-4.61	.213	25,808
	MGH	22.7	2.47	-4.24	-4.83	.199	2,952
1952 (30) .....	Random	22.2	2.45	-2.77	-4.18	.216	29,459
	MGH	22.3	2.25	-2.69	-3.35	.176	4,072
1953 (29) .....	Random	21.4	2.44	-2.16	-4.23	.218	30,106
	MGH	21.6	2.26	-3.37	-3.71	.196	4,928
1954 (28) .....	Random	21.3	2.40	-2.52	-4.64	.208	32,958
	MGH	22.2	2.16	-1.50	-4.65	.181	6,631
1955 (27) .....	Random	20.6	2.38	-2.67	-4.65	.204	35,147
	MGH	21.1	2.19	-2.07	-4.00	.175	8,638
1956 (26) .....	Random	20.3	2.31	-2.48	-4.73	.188	32,606
	MGH	22.2	1.96	-1.74	-4.03	.142	9,871
1957 (25) .....	Random	20.3	2.25	-2.63	-5.18	.179	34,486
	MGH	22.2	1.89	-2.05	-4.30	.135	12,359
1958 (24) .....	Random	21.7	1.99	-2.24	-5.09	.149	36,667
	MGH	23.5	1.61	-1.35	-3.70	.111	14,931
1959 (23) .....	Random	22.7	1.81	-1.81	-4.74	.128	26,529
	MGH	24.5	1.43	-.68	-3.58	.096	12,058
1960 (22) .....	Random	22.6	1.72	-1.54	-4.12	.112	26,715
	MGH	23.8	1.43	-.84	-3.03	.088	13,448
1961 (21) .....	Random	23.1	1.62	-1.40	-3.96	.099	19,310
	MGH	24.7	1.25	-.13	-2.46	.069	10,172
1962 (20) .....	Random	20.9	1.80	-.72	-3.50	.109	21,547
	MGH	23.5	1.32	.46	-2.04	.074	11,844
1963 (19) .....	Random	22.0	1.56	-.14	-2.54	.090	34,161
	MGH	24.2	1.11	.89	-.94	.060	19,763
1964 (18) .....	Random	24.4	1.21	.35	-1.92	.065	25,628
	MGH	26.3	.81	1.14	-.53	.041	15,384

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are ages in 1982.

\* The data used in the subsequent analysis consist of these data plus a small number of additional cases that are missing data on occupational status (about 3% of the MGH sample).

## The Impact of the Cultural Revolution




FIG. 5.—Predicted ISEI scores for nonfarm men residing in cities, with 6, 9, and 12 years of schooling, by year of birth.

tional attainment in China, so long as we conduct our analysis within age groups and separately for the farm and nonfarm populations.

### ANALYSIS

In China, as in virtually every country in the world, education has expanded dramatically throughout the 20th century. As is clear from figure 1, the mean years of schooling obtained by Chinese men born between 1900 and 1964 increased in an essentially linear way from a low of about two years for men born in the first years of the century to a high of 9.3 years for men born in 1961.<sup>23</sup> Similar trends are observed for farm and nonfarm men, although the nonfarm men are much better educated (we truncate these distributions at 1917 since for earlier years fewer than half of all men reported an occupation or industry, so the farm/nonfarm distinction could not be made). There are only two exceptions to the linear trend, both of which are evident for all three trend lines. There was no educational expansion and, indeed, a slight reduction in educational attainment among nonfarm men born in the early 1940s to early 1950s and among farm men born from about 1945 to 1950. For farm men this reversal probably reflects the disaster of the Great Leap Forward (1958–61)

<sup>23</sup> The trend line for the first 17 years of the century should be interpreted with caution, since it refers to men 65–82 years old in 1982 and hence is subject to whatever bias may be introduced due to differential mortality by education.

since, as we will see, it is most pronounced with respect to attainment of middle school education. For nonfarm men the period of educational stagnation or decline was much more extended and could as well reflect the chaos associated with the Liberation and the attempt of the Communist government to consolidate power. The second exception is the decline in the mean for the youngest cohorts, which we have already noted. It is likely that this decline reflects the increased opportunity costs of education resulting from the economic reforms that began in the late 1970s, particularly the "household responsibility system" that permitted peasants to sell a portion of their produce directly on the market (White 1993, pp. 53–54, 100–101). However, these deviations are small relative to the overall upward secular trend in average educational attainment.

As is not uncommon, the trends in the means mask a more complex story. Figures 2–4 show the percentage of Chinese men attaining each level of schooling, for the total population, the farm population, and the nonfarm population. These figures reveal a dramatic expansion of primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary education, starting at successively later points in the 20th century. Among those born at the beginning of the century only 30% had any schooling at all whereas among those born in the 1960s more than 96% had at least some primary schooling. Among the farm population the expansion of primary education is particularly marked, from about 30% among those born in 1917 to about 95% among those born in 1964, whereas for the nonfarm population nearly 70% had primary schooling as far back as the 1917 birth cohort. The trend in lower secondary school attendance confirms the disruptive effect of the Great Leap Forward, especially for the peasantry, since there is a more or less continuously upward trend except for cohorts born in the 1940s who would have been of lower secondary school age during the Great Leap Forward (Hannum and Xie 1994, pp. 77–78), and the reversal was much more pronounced for farm than for nonfarm men.<sup>24</sup> There is also a slight tailing off in the proportion with lower secondary education in the most recent cohorts, which is also more pronounced among farm men, as would be expected on the assumption that opportunity costs of continued schooling were greater for farm than for nonfarm families. With respect to the percentage attaining upper secondary schooling, the difference between farm and nonfarm men is quite pronounced. Among farm men, only those born after 1949 had any chance for upper secondary schooling.

<sup>24</sup> According to Hannum and Xie (1994, p. 76), in China children typically began school when they were seven years old, which means they began middle school when they were 13 years old and, by extension, began upper secondary school when they were 16 years old and tertiary education when they were 19 years old, except for those who were required to gain work experience between secondary and tertiary schooling.

## The Impact of the Cultural Revolution

For those who came of age just before or during the Cultural Revolution, the chance of attaining upper secondary schooling increased steadily to a peak of greater than 25%, only to fall sharply over the next several years. Among nonfarm men, by contrast, the story is somewhat more complex. The percentage with upper secondary education rose above 25% for those who came of age during the early years of the communist era, between 1954 and 1959, but then fell to a little above 10% by the start of the Cultural Revolution. Despite the disruptions of the period the proportion with secondary education rose steadily until the 1960 cohort, when it began to drop just as precipitously. These shifts result in part from a complex, and frequently changing, set of educational policies put in place by the Ministry of Education (for reviews of these policies, see Bernstein [1977], pp. 33–83; Shirk [1982], pp. 24–62; Unger [1982], pp. 11–65). Finally, it is evident from figures 2–4 that tertiary education was extremely rare in China, enjoyed by virtually no farm men and only small fractions of nonfarm men. Here, however, there clearly is some censoring of the data for the nonfarm population since the 1982 data show no more than 1.2% of nonfarm men born after 1958 with any tertiary education while the 1990 data show fractions ranging from 5.8% for the 1958 cohort to between 10% and 11% for the 1961–64 cohorts. As we have noted above, one important effect of the Cultural Revolution, and of the recovery in its aftermath, was that many men entered tertiary institutions after a period of work experience. This has little impact on our analysis—to which we now turn—since the overall fraction of men with any tertiary schooling was small.

### Trends in the Effect of Social Origins on Educational Attainment

Recall that we wish to address three claims. First, due to government policies promoting education for the children of the peasantry and proletariat, educational attainment in China is less dependent upon parental status than it is in other countries. Second, due to the campaign against elites during the Cultural Revolution, the advantage due to high status origins was diminished during that period. Finally, due to the relative powerlessness of the intelligentsia, the deleterious effect of the Cultural Revolution was felt more strongly by their sons than by the sons of cadres.

We test all three claims simultaneously by estimating a model in which educational attainment is predicted from father's education, father's occupational position, and year of birth, for men 18–37 years old in 1982. Because of the marked differences between the farm and nonfarm populations and because the Cultural Revolution was not at all aimed at the peasant population, we analyze only the nonfarm population.

To assess how the effect of social origins on educational attainment

varies over time and in particular is affected by the Cultural Revolution; we estimate a fixed-effects model of trends in years of schooling in which we posit a discontinuity in the effect of, respectively, father's occupation and father's years of schooling at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution—that is, for those men who were born in 1950 or later (and hence were 16 years old or younger in 1966)—and in which we also allow an abrupt change, but not a discontinuity, in the trend line for men born in 1957 and later. The reason we posit a discontinuity between the 1949 and 1950 birth cohorts but not between the 1957 and 1958 birth cohorts is that, as we have suggested above, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution was massively disruptive, with schools closed and Red Guards rampaging in the streets, but there was no similar "revolutionary" change at the end of the Cultural Revolution; rather, there was a gradual return to normalcy as the schools were reopened, entrance examinations resumed, conventional curricula restored, and political loyalty replaced by academic excellence as the criterion for advancement. While it would be plausible to posit no abrupt change in the slope of the trend line at the end of the Cultural Revolution, we think it historically more sensible to explicitly represent the end of the Cultural Revolution by permitting the trend line to vary for birth cohorts born before and after 1957.

To represent this pattern of trends, we estimate a model of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{S} = & b_0 + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_i(O_i) + b_8(E) + b_9(Y) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{10+i}(YO_i) + b_{17}(YE) + b_{18}(D_{49}) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{19+i}(D_{49}O_i) + b_{26}(D_{49}E) + b_{27}(Y_{49}) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{28+i}(Y_{49}O_i) + b_{35}(Y_{49}E) + b_{36}(Y_{49}^2) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{37+i}(Y_{49}^2O_i) + b_{44}(Y_{49}^2E) + b_{45}(Y_{57}) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{46+i}(Y_{57}O_i) + b_{53}(Y_{57}E) + b_{54}(Y_{57}^2) \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_{55+i}(Y_{57}^2O_i) + b_{62}(Y_{57}^2E),
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where  $S$  is years of school completed by the respondent;  $O_i$  is father's occupation category (1 = intelligentsia, 2 = cadres, 3 = lower professionals and technicians, 4 = clerical workers, 5 = sales and service workers, 6 = manual workers, 7 = fathers without occupations; the omitted category is agricultural workers);<sup>25</sup>  $E$  = father's years of schooling;  $Y$  = year of birth - 1945, so that those in the first birth cohort are scored "0" and so on;  $D_{49}$  is scored "0" for those born in 1949 or earlier and "1" for those born after 1949;  $Y_{49}$  is scored "0" for those born in 1949 or earlier and is  $Y - 4$  for those born after 1949;  $Y_{49}^2$  is the square of  $Y_{49}$ ;  $Y_{57}$  is scored "0" for those born in 1957 or earlier and is  $Y - 12$  for those born after 1957;  $Y_{57}^2$  is the square of  $Y_{57}$ . The remaining variables are products of the just defined variables. The coefficients associated with these product terms indicate how the effects of each father's occupation category and father's years of schooling change over time. This sort of model is known as a "spline" model, although the coefficients are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.<sup>26</sup>

The coefficients estimated from this model are shown in table 2. But, as is typical of models that include quadratic and interaction terms, the coefficients are almost impossible to interpret directly. To see how the effects of the social origin variables change over time, we plot these effects against year of birth in figures 6-8. Figure 6 shows the difference in the expected years of schooling between intelligentsia sons and cadre sons, respectively, and the sons of peasants, net of father's education. Figure 7 gives the increment in years of schooling associated with a one-year differ-

<sup>25</sup> One of the *AJS* referees expressed concern about the choice of agricultural workers as the omitted category on the ground that opportunities for mobility out of agriculture varied substantially over time, with high rates in the 1950s and again in the 1980s and lower rates due to more restrictive policies during the intervening years. Apart from the fact that it is not clear what consequences we should expect from variation in mobility opportunities out of agriculture, the referee's concern is based on an incorrect premise. It turns out that the proportion of the sons of agricultural workers leaving agriculture was remarkably constant over the 20-year period studied here, as nearly as we can tell from the MGH sample: for each birth cohort about 15% of the sons of peasants worked outside of agriculture.

<sup>26</sup> Spline functions can be estimated via OLS by writing the model as in eq. (1), where the "trick" is to represent the successive segments by what Smith (1979, pp. 57-62) calls "+" functions. Each line segment is represented by a separate variable, and years are recoded so that for each segment all years up to and including the last year of the previous segment (and thus the first year in the new segment, except where there is a discontinuity) are scored "0," the second year of the new segment is scored "1," etc. For example,  $Y_{49}$  is scored "0" for those born in 1949 and earlier, "1" for those born in 1950, "2" for those born in 1951, etc. For additional discussion on the estimation of spline functions, see Greene (1990, pp. 248-51).

TABLE 2

COEFFICIENTS FOR A MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING, SONS BORN 1945-64, LIVING IN MGHs, AND NOT ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

VARIABLE	MAIN EFFECT	INTERACTIONS					
		$Y$ (.006)	$D_{\text{ss}}$ (-.574)	$Y_{\text{ss}}$ (.457)	$Y_{\text{ss}}^2$ (-.027)	$Y_{\text{ss}}$ (.281)	$Y_{\text{ss}}^2$ (-.015)
$O_1$	(2.031)	-.063	.466	-.222	.037	-.490	-.024
$O_2$	(2.496)	-.210	.194	-.064	.026	-.270	-.017
$O_3$	(1.411)	-.135	-.062	.088	.007	-.079	-.008
$O_4$	(2.267)	-.135	-.305	-.201	.038	-.359	-.032
$O_5$	(1.155)	-.136	.151	-.012	.018	-.229	-.012
$O_6$	(.730)	-.190	.639	.032	.020	-.139	-.027
$O_7$	(.920)	-.061	.559	-.290	.039	-.379	-.030
$E$	(.227)	-.008	-.006	-.026	.003	-.017	-.004
Constant		6.826					
$R^2$		.124					
SEE		2.370					

NOTE.— $N = 157,507$ , data column headings and the first column are main effects, indicated by parentheses. Definition of variables:  $O_1-O_7$  are categories for father's occupation;  $O_1$  = intelligentsia;  $O_2$  = cadres,  $O_3$  = lower professional and technical workers,  $O_4$  = clerical workers;  $O_5$  = sales and service workers,  $O_6$  = manual workers;  $O_7$  = fathers without occupations;  $O_8$  (the omitted category) = agricultural workers;  $E$  = father's years of schooling (codes given in text);  $Y$  = year of birth - 45,  $D_{\text{ss}}$  = 0 for those born between 1945 and 1949 inclusively and 1 for those born after 1949,  $Y_{\text{ss}}$  = 0 for those born between 1945 and 1949 inclusively and year of birth - 49 for those born after 1949;  $Y_{\text{ss}}^2$  = 0 for those born between 1945 and 1957 inclusively and year of birth - 57 for those born after 1957, and  $Y_{\text{ss}}^2$  and  $Y_{\text{ss}}^4$  are the squares of  $Y_{\text{ss}}$  and  $Y_{\text{ss}}^2$ , respectively (see the text for details on the construction of these variables).

ence in father's years of schooling, net of father's occupational position.<sup>27</sup> Figure 8 shows the trend in the intercept, which—because of the way we have defined our variables—is the expected years of schooling for men whose fathers are unschooled peasants, that is, who have zero years of schooling and are in the omitted category of the father's occupation classification. To give some sense of how stable these estimates are, we also have plotted the corresponding coefficients derived from an OLS regression equation that predicts years of schooling from father's years of schooling and father's occupational category separately for each year, that is, an equation of the form:

$$\hat{S} = b_0 + \sum_{i=1}^7 b_i O_i + b_8 E. \quad (2)$$

<sup>27</sup> This graph is derived by generating an expected education variable,  $\text{sed} = 227 - .008 Y - .006 \times D_{\text{ss}} - .026 \times Y_{\text{ss}} + .003 \times Y_{\text{ss}}^2 - .017 \times Y_{\text{ss}}^4 - .004 \times Y_{\text{ss}}^6$ , which is then plotted against year of birth. The remaining graphs are created in the same way.




FIG. 6.—Trends in the comparative educational advantage of intelligentsia sons and cadre sons relative to sons of peasants (nonfarm men).




FIG. 7.—Trends in the effect of father's years of schooling on son's years of schooling (nonfarm men).




FIG. 8.—Effect of educational expansion, for nonfarm men (trend in the intercept of the educational prediction equation).

Returning to equation (1), note that there is no  $Y^2$  term. Since, as is evident from inspection of figure 7 and especially figure 6, the single-year estimates for birth years 1945–49 are quite unstable, the inclusion of a squared term for these years amounts to little more than a curve-fitting exercise and leads to uninterpretable results. We considered pooling these years to get single point estimates for all pre-Cultural Revolution years combined but in the end decided to get linear trends for the effect of father's occupational position and years of schooling for the pre-Cultural Revolution years. We would caution that the slopes of these linear segments should not be taken too seriously.

Turning now to our hypotheses, we start by noting that, as predicted, the effect of social origins on educational attainment is very weak by international standards, even at the beginning of the period under study. For example, an analysis of 21 countries (Treiman and Yip 1989) and an analysis of 26 countries (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993) both found that each additional year of father's schooling returned about a half year of education (on average), compared to about .23 years for the oldest cohorts of Chinese men and about .11 years for the youngest. While neither of these studies is precisely comparable to the present one, the large differences in the size of the coefficients strongly suggest that the effect of father's education on educational attainment is weaker in China than in most other nations. Also, both of these studies found a stronger effect of father's occupational status on respondent's educational attainment than appears to

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be true for China (although differences in measurement make precise comparisons difficult). Previous research using prestige as the measure of father's status (Treiman and Yip 1989) found an average coefficient of .035, and research using ISEI (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993) found an average coefficient (for the 1930 cohort) of .058.<sup>28</sup> In an analysis not reported here, in which we use ISEI rather than the occupation classification, the ISEI coefficient ranges downward from .041 to .015. So, all in all, China appears to be an unusually egalitarian society with respect to educational opportunity. This outcome may well reflect the concerted and sustained attempt by the Chinese authorities to promote educational opportunities for the sons of workers and peasants reviewed above, although, absent more direct evidence, we cannot be certain of this inference.

Since education has been expanding steadily in China, and since, as we noted above, this increase is largely the result of the expansion of educational opportunities for the children of peasants, we would expect the effect of social origins on educational attainment to decline over time (Mare 1980, 1981; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993). That is, educational expansion generally results in greater educational equality.<sup>29</sup> China proves to be no exception. As figures 6–7 clearly show, the net effects of father's occupational status and father's education have both declined dramatically over the 20-year period analyzed here.<sup>30</sup>

Our second expectation is that the effect of social origins declined during the Cultural Revolution period. From inspection of figures 6–7, it is evident that this is so.<sup>31</sup> Beginning with the 1950 birth cohort, there was an abrupt decline in the advantage associated with cadre or intelligentsia

<sup>28</sup> Two studies conducted in the late 1980s in Tianjin, the third largest city in China (Blau and Ruan 1990; Lin and Bian 1991), show results similar to our results for nonfarm men: a small effect of father's education and essentially no effect of father's occupation. Since these findings were from surveys in which information about the father was collected from probability samples of the current population, they lend credence to the results from our sample of sons living in MGHs.

<sup>29</sup> The exception is when educational expansion occurs in such a way as to increase the variance in years of schooling. This seldom happens, since the dominant pattern is to expand education in the least educated sectors of the population, which typically has the effect of reducing rather than increasing the variance in years of schooling. See Ganzeboom and Treiman (1993) for an extended discussion of this issue.

<sup>30</sup> Note that, as Mare (1980, 1981) has shown, this does not imply that the effect of social origins on the likelihood of advancing from any educational level to the next has declined over time. Educational transition probabilities, however, represent a different aspect of educational inequality. Given the length of the current article, we analyze only one such transition (see below).

<sup>31</sup> A formal test of the superiority of the model represented by eq. (1) against a model that simply posits a smooth trend in the parameters may be made via an assessment of the significance of the increment in  $R^2$ ; the increment is significant at beyond the .001 level.

origins, net of father's education, and in the advantage associated with father's education net of father's occupation. Thus, initially the Cultural Revolution had its intended effect—to reduce inequality of attainment on the basis of social origins. After the first few years, however, the decline leveled off and finally was reversed so that for birth cohorts born in the second half of the 1950s the advantage of coming from an educated family or from a high status family began again to increase. Beginning with the 1957 cohort, there appears to have been a "return to normalcy," with the resumption of a modest downward trend in the effect of social origins on educational attainment, consistent with continuing educational expansion. The weakness of this post-Cultural Revolution trend, however, perhaps reflects the reversal of educational expansion after the introduction of the "household responsibility system" noted above. The gross trends shown in figures 1–4 are mirrored in figure 8, which shows the expected average level of schooling attained by the sons of unschooled peasants. The disaster of the Great Leap Forward is reflected in the flat trend line for the cohorts born in the 1940s and the opportunity costs of education after the introduction of the economic reforms is reflected in the downward trend for cohorts born in 1962 and later.

Our third claim—that the brunt of the attack on elites during the Cultural Revolution was borne by intelligentsia sons and that cadre sons escaped relatively unscathed—may be assessed by comparing the two trend lines in figure 6. From inspection of the figure, our claim appears to be confirmed. Indeed, it is difficult to discern much of a Cultural Revolution effect on the educational attainment of cadre sons, whereas for intelligentsia sons there was a clear decline in advantage relative to the sons of peasants. We can formally test the claim that the two trend lines are different by contrasting the  $R^2$  derived from equation (1) with the  $R^2$  from an otherwise identical model in which intelligentsia and cadre sons are combined into a single category. The increment in  $R^2$  is, indeed, significant at the .01 level.

*Odds of obtaining upper secondary schooling.*—Because, as we have noted, there is some censoring of the data for the youngest cohorts with respect to the proportions attaining any tertiary schooling, we repeat the analysis shown in table 2 and figures 6–8 by estimating trends in the odds of obtaining any upper secondary education, via logistic regression procedures. These results are reported in table 3 and figures 9–11. In general the results are very similar to those discussed above with respect to the average level of educational attainment. There are only two notable differences. First, the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the chances of cadre sons obtaining upper secondary education was nearly as strong as for intelligentsia sons. (Formally, a comparison of the likelihood ratio chi squares for the model shown in table 3 and a model that combines intelli-

TABLE 3

COEFFICIENTS FOR A MODEL OF THE LOG ODDS OF ATTENDING UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL, SONS BORN 1945-64, LIVING IN MGHs, AND NOT ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

VARIABLE	MAIN EFFECT	INTERACTIONS					
		$Y$ (-.020)	$D_{\alpha}$ (-1.124)	$Y_{\alpha}$ (4.03)	$Y_{\alpha}^2$ (-.014)	$Y_{\beta}$ (1.38)	$Y_{\beta}^2$ (-.042)
$O_1$	(1.578)	-139	-.466	-.211	.051	-.547	-.042
$O_2$	(1.606)	-183	.182	-.263	.053	-.456	-.048
$O_3$	(1.323)	-.253	-.515	.226	.015	-.200	-.018
$O_4$	(2.166)	-.338	-1.261	.169	.038	-.376	-.045
$O_5$	(.981)	-.178	-.392	-.031	.034	-.350	-.031
$O_6$	(.898)	-.311	-.041	.124	.033	-.244	-.045
$O_7$	(.870)	-.132	.302	-.354	.059	-.520	-.054
$E$	(.167)	-.014	-.015	-.025	.004	-.030	-.004
Constant		-1.661					
Model $L^2$		15,679					
$df$		62					

NOTE.—For the definition of variables, see note to table 2;  $N = 157,507$ , data column headings and the first column are main effects, indicated by parentheses.




FIG. 9.—Trends in the log odds that intelligentia sons and cadre sons get upper secondary education or more relative to the odds that the sons of peasants do so (nonfarm men).




FIG. 10.—Trends in the effect of father's years of schooling on the log odds of getting upper secondary education or more (nonfarm men).




FIG. 11.—Trends in the log odds that the sons of unschooled peasants will get secondary education or more (nonfarm men).

gentsia and cadre fathers into a single category shows that the two categories do not differ significantly from one another—although this outcome may be an artifact of the way we specified the model since the single year estimates for intelligentsia sons are consistently lower than those for cadre sons for the 1951–56 birth cohorts.) For both groups the cost of the Cultural Revolution was very severe; indeed, as we see from the micromodel estimates (the points in fig. 9), for the 1951–54 birth cohorts the odds of obtaining an upper secondary education were actually smaller for intelligentsia sons than for the sons of peasants, net of father's education, and the same was true of cadre sons born in 1954. In contrast, both before and after the Cultural Revolution, both cadre and intelligentsia sons were two to five times as likely as the sons of peasants to obtain upper secondary schooling, again net of father's education. Second, as can be seen in figure 11 (and, of course, in fig. 4 as well), there was a sharp reduction in the odds of obtaining secondary education for the 1950–52 birth cohorts, men who were in lower secondary school at the start of the Cultural Revolution. The single-year estimates in figure 11 show a dramatic drop in the intercept, which means that even for the sons of unschooled peasants, the odds of secondary education were abruptly reduced at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It appears that these cohorts were never able to recover from the 1966–68 school closings.

### CONCLUSION

China is a particularly interesting case for students of comparative stratification because it represents an extreme example of state intervention to promote the social mobility of some groups at the expense of others. The educational policies of the Chinese government favored those with “good class backgrounds”—precommunist revolutionaries, workers, and peasants—from the outset of the communist regime until well into the 1980s. But the purity of these policies varied substantially over time. They were most pronounced during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–76. Universities were shut down altogether in 1966, and exclusively political criteria for admission were employed when they reopened in 1972; similar interventions occurred at the secondary school level as well.

The effects of these policies on educational reproduction have remained unknown until now. One possibility was that those from politically incorrect origins eventually were able to find ways around the political criteria and to secure admission to secondary school and then to university. The available evidence suggests that this was exactly the case in Eastern Europe. Although during the 1950s many East European communist regimes had educational policies favoring the children of workers and peasants, just as China did, it is very difficult to find any empirical evidence of

damage to the educational outcomes of those from politically suspect backgrounds or any boost to the educational outcomes of the children of workers and peasants. In light of the East European evidence, China is a crucial test case. If state policies affect educational attainment anywhere, they should do so in China, and, indeed, they did.

We exploited a novel data source, the 1% public use sample of returns to the 1982 census of China. We could use the census to study intergenerational mobility because nearly half of adult Chinese live in MGHs and there is little bias in a sample of sons from MGHs, compared to all Chinese men of the same age, with respect to their socioeconomic characteristics, especially when the farm and nonfarm populations are considered separately. The current analysis was restricted to nonfarm men.

We used these data to test three hypotheses: that the effect of social origins on educational attainment is weaker in China than in other nations, that the advantage of high status origins declined during the Cultural Revolution years, and that the decline was greater for the sons of the intelligentsia than for the sons of cadres. To test these hypotheses, we estimated a simple educational attainment model for men born between 1945 and 1964, in which we posited that educational attainment depends on father's education and father's occupational position but to a varying degree for different cohorts. In particular, we posited a discontinuity in the social origin effects between the 1949 and 1950 cohorts and a sharp change (but no discontinuity) for the 1957 cohort. We estimated our model twice: via an OLS regression in which the dependent variable was a measure of years of school completed and via a logistic regression in which the dependent variable was a dichotomy distinguishing those who did and did not obtain any upper secondary education.

All three hypotheses were supported by the data. First, the dependence of educational attainment on social origins appears to be substantially weaker in China than in other countries for which comparable data are available, even at the beginning of the period under study (and to decline over time as average educational attainment increased). This certainly is consistent with and perhaps results from the concerted attempt of the Chinese government to promote educational opportunities for the children of peasants and workers by creating special schools and short courses and also, from time to time, using political credentials in addition to or instead of examination scores as admissions criteria.

Second, there was a marked decline in the advantage of high status origins during the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, from 1966–76 and particularly 1966–72, was a period of extreme reliance on political criteria. For nonfarm men from normally advantageous backgrounds, the Cultural Revolution was a disaster. Specifically, the advantage usually associated with coming from an educated professional or

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managerial family was substantially reduced during this period, particularly at the beginning, but there was a return to normalcy toward the end of the Cultural Revolution. In our data, it appears that for the 1957 and younger birth cohorts the effect of the Cultural Revolution has been completely eliminated.

Finally, there is some evidence that the decline was greater and more precipitous for intelligentsia sons than for cadre sons. This clearly was the case with respect to years of school completed; while the prospects of intelligentsia sons were substantially injured, there is little evidence of a decline in the advantage held by cadre sons. With respect to the odds of upper secondary attainment, by contrast, the effect of the Cultural Revolution was felt strongly by both groups of sons, although perhaps more strongly by intelligentsia sons. By contrast, with the exception of the 1950–52 cohorts, who were lower secondary school students in 1966 and thus victims of the massive school closings and disruptions of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, we found no effect of the Cultural Revolution for those from peasant origins, but rather a steadily increasing average level of educational attainment (until the reversal associated with the economic reforms subsequent to 1978). Thus, the Cultural Revolution succeeded—temporarily—in dismantling a reemerging stratification system for the benefit of the peasantry.

The Cultural Revolution was probably the most drastic attempt the world has yet seen to reduce the intergenerational transmission of advantage. Did it succeed? In the short run, the answer is yes but, in the long run, no. While the Cultural Revolution, at the cost of enormous human suffering, managed to temporarily accelerate the trend toward a reduction in intergenerational educational reproduction, it is ironic that within seven years there was a return to the secular trend—a tendency for social origins to matter less and less for educational attainment as the educational system expanded. Even in China, it was policies promoting educational expansion and not policies favoring one social group over another that ultimately had the greatest impact on increased equality of educational opportunity.

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# **Intergenerational Solidarity and the Structure of Adult Child–Parent Relationships in American Families<sup>1</sup>**

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The authors investigate the structure of intergenerational cohesion by examining social-psychological, structural, and transactional aspects of adult child-parent relations. The authors use latent class analysis to develop a typology based on three underlying dimensions of intergenerational solidarity: affinity, opportunity structure, and function. The same five types are found for relations with both mothers and fathers: *tight-knit, sociable, intimate but distant, obligatory, and detached*. Relationship types are also differentiated by sociodemographic characteristics; relations with fathers and divorced parents tended to have the weakest cohesion. The authors conclude that adult intergenerational relationships in American families are structurally diverse but generally possess the potential to serve their members' needs.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Recently there has been much scholarly debate concerning the decline of the contemporary American family (Popenoe 1988; Stacey 1990; Skolnick 1991; Bengtson, Rosenthal, and Burton 1995). This debate centers on whether the family has become ill equipped to handle the problems and dependencies—and to ensure the well-being—of its members. Proponents of the “family decline” hypothesis primarily focus on the negative conse-

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quences of changing family structure—resulting from divorce and single parenting—for the psychological, social, and economic well-being of dependent children (see Popenoe 1993). Further, they maintain that social norms legitimating the pursuit of individual over collective goals and the availability of alternative social groups for the satisfaction of basic human needs have fatally weakened the institution of the family as an agent of socialization and a source of nurturance (Lasch 1977).

When the “family decline” hypothesis has been extended to adult intergenerational relations, it has typically focused on the residential independence of elderly parents from their adult children as a sign that the family has lost its earlier function of serving the needs of older dependent members. The trend over the last half century for older people to live independently of their children (Thornton and Freedman 1985) has fueled pronouncements that the family has been stripped to little more than its nuclear functions of procreation and child rearing. In this view, the isolation of the nuclear family from extended relatives has effectively “split up” the generations (Popenoe 1993).

The argument that the family has lost its principal functions represents the completion of a circle in sociological theorizing about kinship relations. Almost 60 years ago, Ogburn (1938) wrote that six of the seven basic functions of the family had been transferred to other social institutions. Among these transferred functions is the family’s role in protecting the welfare of its older members, including the provision of housing to dependent parents. In Ogburn’s view, the decline of intergenerational coresidence signaled the decline in the function of the family as a source of old age security.

The theme of family decline is echoed in the writings of a later generation of structural-functional theorists who considered nuclear family isolation to be an inevitable fixture of an economically developed society (Parsons 1944; Goode 1970). From this perspective, adult children, if they are to maximize their occupational mobility, must distance themselves—both geographically and socially—from their parents or else face socioeconomic stagnation. Thus, to better meet the needs of a modern economy for a mobile and educated labor force, nuclear families *should* be isolated from their older relatives. Isolation from the extended family was considered a functional adaptation for the old as well as the young. For instance, the disengagement of the elderly from intergenerational family roles was thought to minimize the social disruption caused by their eventual physical decline and mortality (Cumming and Henry 1961).

However, by the 1960s empirical evidence suggested that reports of the demise of the extended family were premature. Studies of intergenerational family relations revealed that adult children were not isolated from their parents but frequently interacted and exchanged assistance

with them—even when separated by large geographic distances (Shanas 1979; Adams 1968; Sussman 1959; Rosenmayer and Kockeis 1963). Further, the strength of obligation and positive regard across generations was little diminished by geographic separation. In light of such evidence, family sociologists suggested that the extended family maintains cross-generational cohesion through modern communication and transportation technologies that allow contact in spite of centrifugal social forces that distance family members (Litwak 1960; Sussman and Burchinal 1962; Troll 1971; Bengtson and Black 1973). A distinctive feature of this type of extended family—labeled “modified extended”—is its capacity to respond to the needs of its members. For instance, even adult children who live far from their parents provide assistance to them when they become impaired (Dono et al. 1979; Sussman 1965).

A broader conceptualization of the contingencies inherent in family relations (as exemplified by the modified-extended family) has been termed the *latent kin matrix*—“a web of continually shifting linkages that provide the potential for activating and intensifying close kin relationships” (Riley 1983, p. 441). Increasing heterogeneity in intergenerational family structures—due to divorce/remarriage, the prolongation of intergenerational ties, and geographic dispersion—and the more voluntaristic, less contractual basis for maintaining intergenerational relations are taken as evidence for growing uncertainty in the function of kinship ties. An important feature of the latent matrix is that family members may remain dormant for long periods of time and only emerge as a resource when the need arises (Riley and Riley 1993). If family relationships alternately shift between latency and activity, then it is important to consider the latent potential of kinship relations—insofar as it triggers or enables manifest functions—before making pronouncements about the utility of the contemporary family. Indeed, research demonstrates that the strength of earlier emotional attachment to parents motivates adult children to enact supportive intergenerational roles later in the life course (Silverstein, Parrott, and Bengtson 1995; Whitbeck, Hoyt, and Huck 1994).

Thus, in this research, we stress the importance of considering latent forms of cohesion in assessing the strength and structure of intergenerational family ties. We define latent forms of cohesion as those factors that enable functional roles to emerge—broadly categorized as affinity and opportunity. Taken together with functional aspects of intergenerational relations (exchanges of assistance), we consider three dimensions of attachment that underlie intergenerational family relationships. Using data from a nationally representative sample, we examine diversity in the principal types of relationships between adult children and their parents based on their position on these dimensions. In the first stage of our analysis, we develop a typology of intergenerational relationships and examine the dis-

tribution of types in the population (with particular reference to differences between child-mother and child-father relations). In the second stage we test whether sociodemographic characteristics of parents and children differentiate the derived intergenerational types.

### Intergenerational Solidarity

Building on theoretical and empirical advances in the social psychology of small group and family cohesion (Hechter 1987; Homans 1950; Heider 1958; Jansen 1952; Rogers and Sebald 1962; Hill and Hansen 1960; Nye and Rushing 1969), our previous research has codified six principal dimensions of solidarity between generations (Bengtson and Schrader 1982; Roberts, Richards, and Bengtson 1991). These dimensions comprise (1) structure (factors such as geographic distance that constrain or enhance interaction between family members), (2) association (frequency of social contact and shared activities between family members), (3) affect (feelings of emotional closeness, affirmation, and intimacy between family members), (4) consensus (actual or perceived agreement in opinions, values, and lifestyles between family members), (5) function (exchanges of instrumental and financial assistance and support between family members), and (6) norms (strength of obligation felt toward other family members).

We adopt the paradigm of intergenerational solidarity to guide our analysis for three reasons. First, the solidarity paradigm represents one of the few long-term efforts in family sociology to develop and test a theory of family integration (Mancini and Blieszner 1989). Indeed, the solidarity model has guided much of the research studying adult intergenerational relationships over the past quarter century (e.g., Atkinson, Kivett, and Campbell 1986; Lee, Netzer, and Coward 1994; Markides and Krause 1985; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Starrels et al. 1995; Rosenthal 1987). Second, measures based on the dimensions of solidarity comprise a valid and reliable tool for assessing the strength of intergenerational family bonds (Mangen, Bengtson, and Landry 1988; Bengtson and Roberts 1991). Third, and key to the present analysis, the construct of solidarity is sufficiently broad to include *latent* forms of solidarity—affectional, consensual, associational, and structural dimensions—in its conceptual range.

Despite desirable measurement properties, the dimensions of intergenerational solidarity are not simply additive and thus do not form a unitary construct (Atkinson et al. 1986; Roberts and Bengtson 1990). Consequently, we maintain that classification analysis (resulting in typologies) is better at depicting the complexity and contradictions of family life than are additive models (Marshall, Matthews, and Rosenthal 1993; Mangen 1995). Becker (1992, p. 210) has discussed this enterprise as requiring a reconceptualization of the dependent variable from one that can be ex-

pressed as "one number on a ruler" to one that is represented "as a complex of activities, itself seen as multidimensional." Classification schemes for describing diversity in the structures and functions of family relationships have been developed with respect to nuclear families (McCubbin and McCubbin 1988), sibling relations in later life (Gold, Woodbury, and George 1990), and transfers of support between parents and adult children (Eggebeen and Hogan 1990; Hogan, Eggebeen, and Clogg 1993; Silverstein and Litwak 1993; Marshall, Rosenthal, and Daciuk 1987) and grandparent-grandchild relations (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1986).

Especially relevant to the present research is work by Hogan et al. (1993), which used nationally representative data to develop an innovative typology based on exchanges of support between generations in American families. Their research found that more than half the U.S. adult population can be characterized as "low exchangers." However, without examining latent dimensions of intergenerational relationships (i.e., the potential for support) the degree of intergenerational cohesion may be underestimated. We expand on their effort by examining a wider range of dimensions that includes social, emotional, structural, as well as transactional aspects of adult parent-child relations.

### Hypotheses

We propose that social forces have sufficiently diversified families such that affinity, opportunity, and function are no longer coincident in adult intergenerational relationships. Therefore, latent forms of solidarity may or may not accompany overt supportive behaviors across generations. Our theorizing maintains that three metadimensions characterize intergenerational family relations and, further, that they are more often discrepant than they are concordant. Thus, we propose our first two hypotheses.

*HYPOTHESIS 1.—The dimensions of intergenerational solidarity will cluster such that (a) emotional closeness and perceived agreement between generations characterize affinity in intergenerational relationships, (b) frequency of contact and residential propinquity between generations characterize opportunity structure in intergenerational relationships, and (c) flows of instrumental assistance between generations characterize functional exchange in intergenerational relationships.*

*HYPOTHESIS 2.—Adult intergenerational relations will be characterized by types that are congruent on affinity, opportunity, and function and by types that are incongruent on those factors, and the majority of relationships will be incongruent.*

Further, we expect that there are important sources of diversity in the structure of adult child-parent relations. We focus on gender, divorce, and age as key factors in this regard because research suggests that these

factors structure family life in important ways. Given the matrilineal tilt often found in family relations (Hagestad 1986; Rossi 1984; Rossi 1993; Spitzé and Logan 1989), we expect that relations of adult children with mothers will reflect different profiles based on the three metadimensions of solidarity than will their relations with fathers. Further, given the unique strengths of the mother-daughter bond in terms of greater lifelong contact and exchanges of functional assistance, we also expect that daughters and sons will have qualitatively different types of relations with mothers. We predict that daughters and mothers have more cohesive intergenerational relations than do sons and fathers. Thus, we derive our third set of hypotheses.

*HYPOTHESIS 3.—Adult children will be more integrated (based on congruent and incongruent combinations of affinity, opportunity structure, and functional exchange) with mothers than with fathers. Daughters will be more likely than sons to be integrated with parents, and particularly with mothers.*

Of particular concern in the "decline of family" debate is the role that divorce plays in fracturing intergenerational ties. Clearly, divorce and remarriage have created complex family structures, often with ambiguous and sometimes tenuous lines of responsibility across generations. Further, research documents that divorced fathers have weaker emotional attachment with their adult children and greater parental role strain compared to married fathers (Bumpass 1990). A persuasive explanation of this phenomenon is that custody decisions serve to distance children physically from their divorced fathers during early developmental stages of the family (Amato, Rezac, and Booth 1995; Umberson 1992; Umberson and Williams 1993; White 1994).

Therefore, we propose our fourth hypothesis with respect to parental divorce.

*HYPOTHESIS 4.—Adult children will be less integrated (based on congruent and incongruent combinations of affinity, opportunity structure, and functional exchange) with divorced parents than with married parents. Further, this difference will be more pronounced in relations with fathers than in relations with mothers.*

Finally, we turn our attention to the influence of age. The longevity revolution of the 20th century has enhanced the probability that parents and children cosurvive each other into old and middle age, respectively (Uhlenberg 1980). The increase in the duration of shared lives between adult generations has raised the intriguing possibility that later-life intergenerational relationships will be characterized by greater solidarity as the needs of older parents become more acute. In such a pattern, solidarity declines from young adulthood to early middle age as adult children adopt family and work roles that cause them to be more autonomous from their

parents but *increases* after middle age as the frailty and dependency of very old parents place children in supportive intergenerational roles. Therefore, we propose that there are life-cycle variations in intergenerational solidarity such that in early adulthood children will distance themselves from parents as their concerns shift toward family formation and career and later establish more integrated relationships with their parents (see Rosow 1985). Therefore we make our fifth hypothesis with respect to age of child.

HYPOTHESIS 5.—*Adult children will be less integrated with their parents following young adulthood (based on congruent and incongruent combinations of affinity, opportunity structure, and functional exchange), but this decline will moderate as children pass beyond middle age.*

In testing our hypotheses, we are guided by the following research questions: How many types are needed to represent adequately the diverse forms of adult intergenerational relationships in American society? How can these types best be characterized, and what is their representation in the population? Considering gender differences, do the same types emerge for relations of adult children with mothers as for relations with fathers? If so, are there differences in the distribution of types between the two kinds of relationships? Are demographic characteristics of adult children and parents associated with the type of relationship they are likely to have with each other?

## METHOD

### Sample

We address the research questions raised above using data from a nationally representative survey undertaken by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) in collaboration with a research team from Harvard University and the University of Southern California. The survey involved a sample of 1,500 adults ages 18–90 years old from randomly selected households in the 48 contiguous states, who were interviewed by telephone in July and August of 1990. One resident from each contacted household was randomly selected for interview; residents of institutions and group quarters were not part of the sampling frame. The average interview lasted 35 minutes. The main purpose of the survey was to address issues of cross-generational relationships in American society. Sample weights are used in subsequent analyses to adjust for differences in the probability of selection within contacted households (for details, see Bengtson and Harootyan [1994]).

Since our analysis focuses solely on the relations of adult children who live apart from their parents, we exclude the 3.8% of adult children in the sample who live with their mothers and 1.5% who live with their

TABLE 1  
ANALYTIC VARIABLES FOR ADULT CHILDREN

Variable	Mean	SD	Range
<b>Gender.</b>			
Female .....	.60	.49	0-1
(Male) .....	(.40)		
<b>Race/ethnicity:</b>			
Black .....	.07	.26	0-1
Hispanic .....	.05	.23	0-1
(White) .....	(.88)		
<b>Marital status</b>			
Divorced or separated .....	.15	.36	0-1
Never married .....	.22	.41	0-1
(Married) .....	(.43)		
<b>Missing income:</b>			
Missing .....	.06	.24	0-1
(Valid) .....	(.94)		
<b>Home ownership:</b>			
Owns home .....	.58	.49	0-1
(Does not own home) .....	(.42)		
<b>Parent's marital status:</b>			
Divorced or separated .....	.19	.39	0-1
Widowed .....	.33	.47	0-1
(Married) .....	(.48)		
Age in years .....	35.32	10.50	21-72.5
Household income in thousands of dollars .....	39.06	28.56	5-150
Log of household income in thousands of dollars .....	3.40	.78	1.61-5.01

**NOTE**—All variables refer to characteristics of the adult child, unless otherwise indicated. Reference category for dichotomous variables is noted in parentheses. *N* = 971.

fathers. Thus, the operational sample consists of 971 adult children who have at least one surviving nonresident parent. Of these, 61% have two living parents, 28% have only a living mother, and 11% have only a living father. Adult children in the sample evaluated a total of 1,564 parental relations, 864 (55%) with mothers and 700 (45%) with fathers. Characteristics of the operational sample are described in table 1.

#### Measures of Intergenerational Solidarity

Adult children in the sample were asked a series of questions about the nature of their relationship with each surviving biological parent. These questions, reflecting five of the six dimensions of intergenerational solidarity, form the building blocks of our typology. We note that normative solidarity is not considered in the typology because it is measured in the

AARP survey as a *generalized* sense of responsibility for older parents and not as the responsibility felt by each respondent for his or her own parents.

Six dichotomous indicators are used to represent the dimensions of intergenerational solidarity considered in the analysis: frequency of contact, emotional closeness, similarity of opinions, geographic proximity, receiving instrumental assistance, and providing instrumental assistance. It is important to note that functional solidarity is measured as a bidirectional flow of assistance since adult children tend to rely on parents for help as much (if not more) than they provide help *to* them (Mutran and Reitzes 1984; Morgan, Schuster, and Butler 1991). In order to capture more widely the presence of functional assistance between generations, our measures of functional solidarity are inclusive with respect to the types of instrumental activities considered and the time frame in which they were exchanged. The survey questions and original response categories for the indicators can be found in the appendix.

In order to reduce sparseness in the cross-classification table, we collapse three indicators (contact, closeness, and opinions) from polytomous scales into dichotomous scores. The thresholds used for collapsing were chosen on the basis of findings from previous research using this data set (see Lawton, Silverstein, and Bengtson 1994). The remaining three indicators (proximity, receiving assistance, and providing assistance) are measured in the survey with dichotomous response categories. The six manifest indicators of the dimensions of intergenerational solidarity and their distributions are described in table 2. It should be noted that we treat relationships with mothers and relationships with fathers as independent analytic units. Dependence of measures across parental relationships (among children with married parents) is of minor concern since our purpose is to describe the gross attributes of each relationship. Comparing child-mother and child-father relationships reveals that, on each of the six measures of solidarity, relationships with mothers are more cohesive than those with fathers. The most striking gender difference is with respect to affectual solidarity, with 73% feeling "very close" to their mothers compared to 57% feeling similarly close to their fathers.

### Latent Class Analysis

Since we are proposing that intergenerational family relations can be characterized as a circumscribed set of "ideal" types that are empirically manifested by combinations of observed variables, we use latent class analysis (LCA) to examine the typological structure underlying intergenerational solidarity. LCA is a statistical method that allows researchers to test whether a set of unobserved, or latent, classes accounts for the association

TABLE 2

## DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS MEASURING DIMENSIONS OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

INDICATOR OF SOLIDARITY	RELATIONS WITH MOTHERS		RELATIONS WITH FATHERS	
	N	%	N	%
<b>Emotional closeness:</b>				
Very close .....	655	72.9	405	57.0
Somewhat close or not close .....	243	27.1	306	43.0
<b>Similarity of opinions:</b>				
Very or somewhat similar .....	622	69.3	428	60.2
Very or somewhat different .....	276	30.7	283	39.8
<b>Geographic distance:</b>				
Lives within one hour .....	509	58.9	384	54.9
Lives more than one hour away .....	355	41.1	316	45.1
<b>Contact:</b>				
At least once a week .....	623	69.4	417	58.6
Less than once a week .....	275	30.6	294	41.4
<b>Provides instrumental assistance:</b>				
Yes .....	318	35.4	205	28.8
No .....	580	64.6	506	71.2
<b>Receives instrumental assistance:</b>				
Yes .....	292	32.5	195	27.4
No .....	606	67.5	516	72.6

among cross-classified categorical variables (Clogg and Goodman 1984; Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968; McCutcheon 1987). A key assumption of LCA is that membership in a latent class is the true source of covariation among measured variables. Thus, a given set of latent classes is acceptable to the extent that it minimizes the *within-class* association among observed indicators—the assumption of local or conditional independence. This property underlies a statistical test of whether a theoretical model adequately describes the observed data and provides a basis for comparing alternative theoretical specifications.

Formally, the latent class model is defined by latent variable  $X$  with  $T$  categories (corresponding to latent types of intergenerational relations) that are described by variables  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ , whose levels are indexed by  $i$ ,  $j$ , and  $k$  respectively. The probability of membership in an observed cell  $(ijk)$  is defined as follows:

$$\Pi_{ijk} = \sum_{t=1}^T \Pi_x(t) \Pi_{A|x=t}(i) \Pi_{B|x=t}(j) \Pi_{C|x=t}(k),$$

where  $\pi_X(t)$  is the probability that  $X = t$ ,  $\pi_{A|x=t}(i)$  is the conditional probability that item  $A$  takes on level  $i$ , given that latent variable  $X$  is at level  $t$ ; the other conditional probabilities are defined similarly.

The cross-classification table of the six dichotomous indicators of solidarity results in 64 response patterns, which are analyzed for latent class structure using the MLLSA program as adapted by Eliason (1990). Two kinds of parameters are estimated for each model tested: conditional probabilities and latent class probabilities. Conditional probabilities reflect the distribution of observed indicators for members of each latent class. These estimates are analogous to factor loadings in that they represent the association between observed and latent variables and are useful for characterizing the nature of the latent classes. Latent class probabilities signify the distribution of members *across* types, making it useful for describing the prevalence of types within a population and for comparing prevalence between subpopulations.

The adequacy of each model tested is assessed using several goodness-of-fit measures: the likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic ( $L^2$ ), the Bayesian informal criterion (BIC) statistic, and the index of dissimilarity (ID). The  $L^2$  tests for statistically significant discrepancies between a theoretical model and the observed data, providing a basis for judging the adequacy of a given specification through statistical inference. The BIC statistic (Raftery 1986) is useful when selecting the best fitting model *among* reasonable but competing models, especially when choosing among non-nested models and where large sample size causes otherwise acceptable models to be rejected based on the  $L^2$ . The most desirable property of the BIC is that, compared to the  $L^2$ , it is less likely to disadvantage more parsimonious models—those that have fewer latent classes and estimate fewer parameters—in the selection process. The ID is a goodness-of-fit indicator not directly tied to the chi-squared distribution and signifies the percentage of cases misallocated by the theoretical model (Clogg 1995).

### Measurement Model of Intergenerational Types

In identifying types of intergenerational relationships, we use LCA in an exploratory fashion with no a priori assumptions about the number or nature of the classes (Goodman 1974). We test, separately for child-mother and child-father relations, a series of models that successively add a latent class until an acceptable fit to the data is reached. We base our selection of the “best” model on the goodness-of-fit indicators discussed earlier. Minimally, this model fits the observed data based on the  $L^2$ ; competition among models that meet this first criterion is resolved by searching first for the lowest BIC and then the lowest ID.

A summary of the goodness-of-fit statistics for six models is shown in

table 3 for relations with mothers and with fathers. The first model is the one-class or independence model, which assumes that there are no associations among the six manifest indicators. Not surprisingly, this model fits the data poorly, based on the  $L^2$ , for both kinds of relations. The two-, three-, and four-class models also do not fit the data well. The five-class model exhibits a marginally good fit to the observed data for both relations with mothers and relations with fathers. While the six-class model appears to be superior to the five-class model based solely on the  $L^2$  statistics, the much lower BIC statistics of the latter suggest that the five-class model is preferable. The ID for the five-class models demonstrates reasonable misclassification rates of 7% and 8% for relations with mothers and fathers, respectively. Therefore, we accept the five-class model as that which best fits the data, with confidence in our selection further strengthened by the concordance of evidence across the two types of parental relationships.

Before interpreting the five latent classes, we examined whether the five-class model similarly characterizes relations with mothers and relations with fathers. To do this we compared the  $L^2$  fit of a model where equality restrictions are imposed on conditional probabilities across parent-groups to the  $L^2$  fit of a model where the conditional probabilities are free to vary across parent-groups. Table 4 shows that the decrement in fit due to adding equality constraints is not statistically significant ( $P = .977$ ), indicating that little fit to the data is lost by accepting the equivalence model. The finding that child-mother and child-father relationships have both the same number of latent classes and a common underlying measurement structure suggests that the five classes can be similarly labeled and meaningfully contrasted between the two sets of parental relationships.

The task of labeling the latent classes requires inspection of the conditional probabilities associated with the manifest indicators within each class, as shown in table 5 (probabilities greater than .6 are shown indicated with an asterisk). Using the pattern of these probabilities, we have assigned the labels defined in table 6 to describe the latent classes.

It is important to note that, consistent with our expectations, the conditional probabilities associated with the six manifest indicators cluster into three groups of two dimensions each. One pair, comprising emotional closeness and consensus of opinions, reflects *affinity* between the generations. A second pair is comprised of geographic proximity and frequency of contact, reflecting the *opportunity structure* of the relationship—the necessary condition for exchange behavior. A third pair, comprised of providing and receiving assistance, reflects *functional exchange* between the generations. These pairings suggest that greater parsimony is achieved by modeling the structure of intergenerational solidarity with three, rather than six, underlying dimensions.

TABLE 3  
LATENT CLASS MODELS OF INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS USING SIX DICHOTOMOUS INDICATORS OF SOLIDARITY

UNRESTRICTED HETEROGENEOUS MODELS	RELATIONS WITH MOTHERS				RELATIONS WITH FATHERS					
	L <sup>1</sup>	df	P	BIC	ID	L <sup>1</sup>	df	P	BIC	
<b>One-class model</b>										
(complete independence) .....	631.65	57	.000	246.33	.304	647.93	57	.000	274.58	.364
Two-class model .....	219.22	50	.000	-118.78	.194	248.80	50	.000	-78.70	.239
Three-class model .....	171.52	43	.000	-119.16	.155	133.14	43	.000	-148.51	.156
Four-class model .....	89.52	36	.000	-153.84	.090	79.61	36	.000	-156.19	.106
Five-class model .....	45.76	29	.025	-150.28	.068	43.75	29	.039	-146.20	.080
Six-class model .....	32.96	22	.062	-115.76	.046	27.94	22	.178	-116.16	.049

NOTE.—N = 864 for relations with mothers; N = 700 for relations with fathers.

TABLE 4

TESTS OF EQUIVALENCE OF LATENT CLASS PARAMETERS  
FOR FIVE-CLASS MODEL BETWEEN CHILD-MOTHER  
AND CHILD-FATHER RELATIONS

Across-Parent Equality Restrictions	$\Delta L^2$	$\Delta df$	P
Conditional probabilities .....	16.58	30	.977
Latent class probabilities .....	10.10	4	.039

NOTE.—The difference in the likelihood ratio between a five-class two-group model with no restrictions on parameter estimates and the same model with equality restrictions across parental groups is indicated by  $\Delta L^2$ . The difference in the degrees of freedom between unrestricted and restricted models is indicated by  $\Delta df$ .

The five derived classes typify various sociological models of contemporary families. The *tight-knit* class is most characteristic of the traditional (or corporate) extended family, while the *detached* class is most emblematic of the isolated extended family (Parsons 1944). Relationships in the other three classes are connected on some but not all the dimensions of solidarity, representing "variegated" forms of child-parent relations. The *sociable* and *intimate but distant* types are forms of the modified extended family in which functional exchange is absent, but where high levels of affinity may hold the potential for future exchange (Rosenmayer 1968; Litwak 1985). Yet, in intimate-but-distant relations, goodwill between the generations translates neither into action nor interaction. That these two types of relations are functionally independent, in spite of being otherwise integrated, may be related to the lack of *need*, or a preference for intergenerational autonomy. Interestingly, we also found evidence for an *obligatory* type of extended family that is structurally connected and has an average level of functional exchange but lacks strong positive sentiment. We attribute the structural and functional integration of generations in the absence of affinity to a sense of duty on the part of the adult child.

#### Distribution of Intergenerational Types and Gender of Parent

Next we examine whether the distribution of latent types in the population is the same for relations with mothers and relations with fathers. The distributions can be seen by examining latent class probabilities, which are shown separately for child-mother and child-father relationships in table 5. Latent class probabilities are reported in unweighted and weighted form; applying weights insures that the sample reflects a national profile on key demographic characteristics.

TABLE 5

LATENT CLASS COEFFICIENTS FOR FIVE-CLASS/TWO-GROUP MODEL OF ADULT CHILD-PARENT RELATIONS WITH ACROSS-PARENT EQUALITY RESTRICTIONS ON CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

	Indicator of Solidarity	Tight-Knit	Sociable	Intimate but Distant	Obligatory	Detached
<b>Emotional closeness.</b>						
Very close .....		.974*	.983*	.790*	.059	.042
Somewhat or not close .....		.026	.018	.210	.941*	.958*
<b>Similarity of opinions.</b>						
Very or somewhat similar .....		.764*	.766*	.874*	.396	.245
Very or somewhat different .....		.236	.240	.126	.604*	.755*
<b>Geographic distance</b>						
Lives within one hour .....		.893*	.656*	.058	.839*	.202
Lives more than one hour away .....		.107	.344	.942*	.161	.798*
<b>Contact</b>						
At least once a week .....		.976*	.894*	.205	.723*	.077
Less than once a week .....		.024	.106	.795*	.277	.923*
<b>Provides instrumental assistance:</b>						
Yes .....		.685*	.132	.191	.373	.032
No .....		.315	.863*	.809*	.627*	.968*
<b>Receives instrumental assistance:</b>						
Yes .....		.675*	.019	.191	.375	.032
No .....		.325	.981*	.809*	.625*	.968*
<b>Latent class probabilities</b>						
<b>Relations with mothers:</b>						
Unweighted .....		.319	.266	.198	.148	.068
Weighted .....		.311	.277	.187	.159	.065
<b>Relations with fathers:</b>						
Unweighted .....		.216	.237	.136	.164	.247
Weighted .....		.204	.230	.137	.161	.268

\* Conditional probability &gt; .6

TABLE 6  
LATENT CLASSES OF INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

Class	Definition
Tight-knit	Adult children are engaged with their parents based on all six indicators of solidarity.
Sociable	Adult children are engaged with their parents based on geographic proximity, frequency of contact, emotional closeness, and similarity of opinions but <i>not</i> based on providing assistance and receiving assistance.
Obligatory	Adult children are engaged with their parents based on geographic proximity, and frequency of contact but <i>not</i> based on emotional closeness and similarity of opinions. While only about one-third of children in this class are engaged in providing and receiving assistance, this proportion is slightly higher than that for the sample as a whole.
Intimate but distant	Adult children are engaged with their parents on emotional closeness and similarity of opinions but <i>not</i> based on geographic proximity, frequency of contact, providing assistance, and receiving assistance.
Detached	Adult children are <i>not</i> engaged with their parents based on any of the six indicators of solidarity.

We formally test the hypothesis that the distributions between child-mother and child-father relationships are different by comparing the fit of a model where latent class probabilities (unweighted) are restricted to be equal between groups to a model where the probabilities are free to vary between groups. As seen in table 4, equality restrictions placed on latent class probabilities result in a statistically significant decline in model fit to the data ( $P = .039$ ), suggesting that the distribution of latent classes are best estimated independently. Thus, we can conclude that intergenerational relationships of adult children are differently parsed among the five types depending on whether the parent is a mother or a father.

Since unweighted and weighted probabilities are not substantially different, we discuss only the weighted latent class probabilities when contrasting the prevalence of each type by gender of parent. For adult child-

mother relations, the most common type is the tight-knit, with nearly one in three (31%) of such relations falling into this, the most cohesive group. The next most common type, consisting of more than one-quarter (28%) of adult child-mother relations, is the sociable, followed by the intimate but distant (19%), the obligatory (16%), and last, the detached (7%).

Where detached relations are relatively rare among child-mother relations, they are the most prevalent among adult child-father relations, comprising more than one-quarter (27%) of all such relations. The sociable is the next most common child-father type (23%), followed by the tight-knit (20%), the obligatory (16%) and the intimate but distant (14%).

The most striking contrast between the two distributions is that the detached type is *least* common among child-mother relations and *most* common among child-father relations. Additionally, child-mother relations are more likely than child-father relations to be either tight-knit, sociable, and intimate but distant and less likely to be obligatory. Taken together, these gender-related patterns demonstrate that adult intergenerational solidarity is stronger with mothers than with fathers.

### Differentiating among Types of Intergenerational Relations

**Method.**—In this section we examine whether characteristics of adult children and parents are associated with the five latent classes characterizing their relationships. The dependent variables are the set of probabilities that children with response pattern *ijklmn* (corresponding to the 64 patterns for each parental relation) derive from latent class *t*, where *t* refers to the range of five latent classes (Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968; Clogg 1995). We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine—by gender of parent—how sociodemographic characteristics are associated with the probability of membership in each of the five latent classes.

**Independent variables.**—While our analysis focuses on the effects of gender and age of child and marital status of parent on the structure of parent-child relations, other factors known to influence intergenerational family relations, such as socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, and having a dependent child, are also controlled in multivariate equations. Independent variables include the following sociodemographic variables corresponding to characteristics of adult children: age in years and the natural log of total household income in thousands of dollars (cases with missing values are assigned to the mean value of logged income). The following dummy variables describing adult children are also tested (reference group indicated in parentheses): female (male), African-American and Hispanic (non-Hispanic whites), divorced/separated and the never married (married), missing income (valid income), owns home (does not own home), and has a dependent child in the household (does not have

such a child). In addition, marital status of the parent is coded as two dummy variables indicating that the parent is divorced/separated from the biological parent of the child or widowed (married to biological parent). The distribution of the independent variables is found in table 1.

In addition to age of adult child, we include age squared to test for curvilinear effects of child's age on the probability of class membership (the mean is subtracted from age to reduce collinearity between those two variables). We base this test on our hypothesis that the probability of having a more cohesive type of intergenerational relationship follows a U-shaped pattern over the life course.

*Relations with mothers.*—Equations in table 7 show parameter estimates predicting the types of relationships that adult children have with their mothers. Turning first to the effects of child's gender, we note that, consistent with our expectations, daughters are more likely than sons to have a tight-knit relationship with their mothers and are less likely than sons to have an obligatory relationship.

Parental marital status is also related to the type of relationship adult children are likely to have with their mothers. Marital disruption in the parental generation appears to weaken the strength of the maternal bond. Adult children are more likely to have obligatory and detached relations with divorced/separated mothers than they are with married mothers. In addition children have a higher probability of having obligatory relationships with widowed than with married mothers.

Age has a linear effect on the three types of relationships with mothers. Older adult children are less likely than younger adult children to have tight-knit relations and more likely than younger children to have sociable and detached relationships with mothers. However, there are no significant quadratic effects of age in these equations, providing little evidence for a resurgence in relationship quality with the aging of the child.

Divorced children are less likely than married children to have intimate but distant relations. Otherwise, marital status of child exerts little influence on relationship qualities.

Race and ethnicity variables are associated with types of maternal relationships. Both blacks and Hispanics are less likely than non-Hispanic whites to have obligatory relationships with their mothers, and blacks are less likely than whites to have detached relationships. This suggests that intergenerational contact and exchange between generations in minority families may be based more on altruistic than on obligatory or utilitarian motivations—affirming the cohesive strength traditionally ascribed to black and Hispanic families (McAdoo 1981; Burton 1996) and the matrifocal tilt of intergenerational relations in such families (Taylor and Chatters 1991).

TABLE 7

REGRESSION EQUATIONS PREDICTING PROBABILITY THAT ADULT CHILD-MOTHER RELATIONSHIPS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY EACH OF FIVE LATENT CLASSES

Independent Variable	Tight-Knit	Sociable	Intimate but Distant	Obligatory	Detached
Female*	.088***	-.027	.003	-.062**	-.004
Mother divorced/separated <sup>b</sup>	-.057	-.032	-.053	.077***	.063***
Mother widowed <sup>b</sup>	-.050	.015	-.009	.050*	-.004
Age-mean <sup>c</sup>	-.006***	.003**	.002	-.001	.002*
(Age-mean) <sup>d</sup>	-.00014	-.00004	.00011	.00009	-.00008
Divorced/separated <sup>c</sup>	-.021	.037	-.072*	.022	.031
Never married <sup>c</sup>	-.031	.001	.013	.002	.013
Black <sup>e</sup>	.081	.043	.066	-.132***	-.051*
Hispanic <sup>f</sup>	.089	.058	-.019	-.090*	-.035
Log of income <sup>g</sup>	-.046*	.014	.021	.001	.008
Missing income <sup>h</sup>	-.019	.017	.001	-.008	.011
Own home <sup>i</sup>	.063**	.061*	-.102***	.030	-.046**
Has child in household <sup>j</sup>	.046	-.035	-.048*	.023	.014
Intercept	.394***	.170***	.247***	.126*	.067
R <sup>2</sup>	.058	.044	.035	.040	.038

\* Reference group is male.

<sup>b</sup> Reference group is married.

<sup>c</sup> Reference group is mother married.

<sup>d</sup> Reference group is white non-Hispanic.

<sup>e</sup> Reference group is valid income.

<sup>f</sup> Reference group is does not own home.

<sup>g</sup> Reference group is no child in household.

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .

Income is inversely associated with having tight-knit relationships with mothers. That adult children with lower income have a greater likelihood of having this, the most cohesive type of relationship, is consistent with research showing stronger family orientations among lower- and working-class individuals (Kulis 1991). Homeownership is associated with four out of the five types of maternal relationships. Homeowners are more likely than those who rent to have tight-knit and sociable types of relations and less likely to be intimate but distant or detached. Homeownership may reflect the preference of adult children to purchase a home based on its proximity to parents with whom they desire to have regular interaction and exchanges (O'Bryant 1983).

Respondents who have at least one dependent child in the household have a significantly lower probability of being intimate but distant with their mothers. Given inequality in child-rearing duties between men and women, we also tested for interactions between gender of adult child and having a dependent child in the household. Significant effects were found for predicting the probability of having tight-knit relations with mothers. Confirming our expectation, the interaction term (not shown) indicates that when a dependent child is in the household, daughters are more likely than sons to have tight-knit relationships with mothers. It is likely that mothers are providing services that help their daughters cope with the demands of raising children.

*Relations with fathers.*—The equations in table 8 show parameter estimates predicting the probability of having each of the five types of relationships with fathers. Gender of child does not significantly predict membership in any of the latent classes. However, father's marital status is an important predictor of relationship type. Adult children are less likely to have tight-knit, sociable, and intimate-but-distant relationships and are more likely to have detached relationships with divorced/separated fathers than with married fathers; indeed, relations with divorced fathers are 33% more likely to be detached. In addition, relations with widowed fathers tend less to be tight-knit and tend more to be detached compared to relations with married fathers.

Age is also a significant predictor of paternal relationship types. As with relations with mothers, older children are less likely than younger children to have tight-knit relations with fathers and more likely to have sociable and detached relations with them. The quadratic age-squared term is significant in predicting detached relationships, signifying a curvilinear pattern with age. Further analyses of adjusted predicted values reveal that the probability of being detached from fathers is low in young adulthood (.13 at 21 years old), increases with age, peaking in middle age (.27 at 43 years old), after which it begins to decline as the adult child reaches old age (.13 at 68 years old).

TABLE 8

REGRESSION EQUATIONS PREDICTING PROBABILITY THAT ADULT CHILD-FATHER RELATIONSHIPS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY EACH OF FIVE LATENT CLASSES

Independent Variable	Right-Knit	Sociable	Intimate but Distant	Obligatory	Detached
Female*	-.024	.037	-.020	-.014	.020
Father divorced/separated*	-.186***	-.134***	-.053*	.038	-.335***
Father widowed*	-.202***	-.053	-.002	.070	.187***
Age-mean	-.006**	.003*	.001	-.002	.006**
(Age-mean)*	.00022	.00004	.00001	.00001	-.00027*
Divorced/separated*	.011	.008	.030	-.031	-.017
Never married*	-.048	.033	-.039	.010	.044
Black*	-.018	.045	.033	-.035	-.005
Hispanic*	.008	-.066	-.018	.030	.046
Log of income	-.028	-.012	.031*	-.008	.017
Missing income*	-.015	.048	-.046	.012	.002
Own home*	.112***	.087***	-.035*	-.012	-.122***
Has child in household*	.022	-.021	-.039	.014	.023
Intercept	.316***	.208***	.159*	.214***	.123
R <sup>2</sup>	.112	.089	.026	.018	.207

\* Reference group is male.

\* Reference group is married.

\* Reference group is father married.

\* Reference group is white non-Hispanic.

\* Reference group is valid income.

\* Reference group is does not own home.

\* Reference group is no child in household.

\* P < .05

\*\* P < .01

\*\*\* P < .001.

Neither race/ethnicity nor child's marital status predict child-father type. However, higher income is associated with a greater probability of being intimate but distant with fathers. This is consistent with the greater geographical dispersion and lower affiliation with extended family typically found among those with higher social class.

In addition, homeownership differentiates child-father relations. As in the analysis of child-mother relations, owning a home is associated with a higher probability of having tight-knit and sociable relations with fathers and a lower probability of having intimate-but-distant and detached relations with them. However, having a dependent child in the household does not predict type of relationship with fathers nor does this variable significantly interact with adult child's gender.

## DISCUSSION

We began this article by suggesting that contemporary social commentaries that paint the family as an institution in decline have used too broad a brush to characterize intergenerational family relationships. Portrayals of the family solely in terms of lost functions fail to capture the diversity, as well as the latent potential, embedded in such relationships. Using the conceptual model of intergenerational solidarity as a theoretical guide, we have identified five underlying types of intergenerational family relationships. In doing so we have attempted to advance the development of measurement models in the study of family relations. In support of our first hypothesis, we have shown that three metadimensions—comprising affinity, structure, and function—more parsimoniously describe the ways that families are integrated across generations than the original six dimensions of solidarity (Bengtson and Roberts 1991).

Several aspects of the resulting typology are noteworthy in light of the current decline-of-family debate. First, none of the types constitute a majority of relationships or represent a "typical" relationship: for example, among child-mother relations, the most common type—the tight-knit—comprises less than one-third of total relations, while for child-father relations the most common type—the detached—comprises about one-quarter of total relations. Given the heterogeneity of types, we conclude that it is misleading to generalize about a "modal" type of intergenerational family, as is often done on both sides of the debate.

Second, the prevalence of "variegated" types (i.e., those other than tight-knit and detached) represent a majority of relations with mothers (62%) and with fathers (53%), supporting our second hypothesis. Several of the "variegated" types in particular—the sociable and the intimate but distant—evoke earlier sociological models of intergenerational kinship struc-

tures, collectively labeled "modified-extended," where family members are geographically dispersed but not necessarily emotionally or socially distanced. While functional exchanges are less prominent in these types of families, a reservoir of latent solidarity may motivate or enable the exchange of assistance should it be needed in the future.

There are also important sources of heterogeneity in the distribution of types with respect to gender, marital status, and age. Most notable is the importance of parents' gender in structuring intergenerational relationships. In support of our third set of hypotheses, we found a wide schism in the types of relations that adult children maintain with their mothers and with their fathers. Indeed, almost four times as many children are detached from their fathers as from their mothers, supporting claims that it is the "disappearance of fathers" that is responsible for family decline (Furstenberg and Nord 1985). It is likely that the weakness of child-father relations in adulthood has its antecedents in early family socialization, including gender-specific allocation of nurturing roles to women and in custody decisions that favor mothers over fathers (Hagestad 1986; Rossi 1984; Rossi 1993).

The gender of the adult child plays less a role than predicted by our third set of hypotheses. While daughters are more likely to be tight-knit and less likely to have obligatory relations with mothers, there are no differences between daughters and sons in relations with fathers. These results suggest that there is a unique salience to the mother-daughter bond and that paternal relations are relatively weak with both sons and daughters.

Our fourth hypothesis concerning the effects of marital disruption of parents on intergenerational relations is supported. The divorce or separation of parents weakens intergenerational relations with both mothers and fathers, as it is positively associated with each relationship being detached, and, for fathers, it is also inversely associated with having a relationship characterized by strong affinity. Thus, as predicted, the magnitude of the effects of marital disruption are more pronounced in relations with fathers than in relations with mothers; the effect of parental divorce/separation on the likelihood of having detached relations is about five times greater with fathers than it is with mothers. These results echo other findings documenting the deleterious effects of parental divorce on intergenerational relations with fathers (Umberson 1992; White 1992). Widowhood also erodes relationships of children more so with fathers than with mothers. The potential for the dependencies associated with widowhood to strain close family relationships (Ferraro and Barresi 1982; Morgan 1984) is heightened among widowed fathers who generally lack the skills necessary for household management (Umberson, Wortman, and Kessler 1992).

In addition, since widowed fathers have a greater chance of remarrying than widowed mothers (Goldscheider 1990), widowers may be more likely than widows to have dual family allegiances. Taken together, our results concerning the effect of marital disruption on intergenerational relations suggest the tenuous role played by divorced and widowed fathers in the lives of their biological children (Amato et al. 1995; Cooney and Uhlenberg 1990) and foreshadow possible deficits in their social support portfolio when they reach old age (Goldscheider 1990).

With respect to age, our results suggest that there is a realignment of child-parent relations with the aging of the child, supporting our fifth hypothesis. Consistent with the life-course theoretical perspective (Bengtson and Allen 1993; Elder 1984; Elder and O'Rand 1995), younger adult children are more likely than older children to have integrated relations with their mothers and their fathers and less likely to have detached relations with them. Young adults who have just been launched from the parental household are in the most need of social and tangible resources from parents, while in middle age, children occupy career and parenting roles that may limit their ability to invest in parental relationships. Children in young adulthood are enmeshed with their parents to satisfy emotional and material needs resulting from their transition to independence, and middle-aged children disengage from their parents because alternative family and occupational demands may supersede functional integration with them.

Further, we found a curvilinear relationship between age of child and whether relations with fathers are detached. When the child passes beyond middle age (and when their fathers pass into advanced old age) the likelihood of being detached is as low as it was in young adulthood. This pattern suggests that adult children reconcile with their elderly fathers at a stage of the fathers' lives when support needs are at a maximum and when intimate family relationships become most salient—an interpretation consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory in developmental social psychology (Carstensen 1992). Nevertheless, it should be noted that while we use respondent's age as a proxy for life stage, the effects of age confound birth cohort with maturational differences. Thus, we advise caution when attributing age effects to developmental factors in these cross-sectional data.

We note that several factors deserve more detailed attention than we were able to pay in this analysis. For example, physical and mental disabilities of parents (measures of which were not included in this data set) may be important forces in structuring intergenerational relations—especially in the older family. In addition, differences in family relations across ethnic groups deserve further consideration. We suggest that the intergen-

erational types found in our study can serve as the basis for investigations of minority families in order to highlight their distinctive patterns. Our findings about the relative strength of intergenerational relations of African-American families differ from those of Hogan et al. (1993), suggesting that cross-ethnic comparisons may be sensitive to the multiple dimensions of solidarity considered in this analysis.

## CONCLUSION

In this analysis we have capitalized on the conceptual model of intergenerational solidarity (1) to develop a multidimensional typology of adult intergenerational relations in American society, (2) to develop a nomenclature to describe five empirically generated types, and (3) to examine individual and social-structural characteristics that differentiate the types.

We have drawn on modified-extended models of the family to incorporate latent forms of intergenerational attachment in describing family relationships. While we propose that latent dimensions of solidarity will serve as a cognitive-emotional blueprint for future action (particularly as a response to emergent needs and crises experienced by family members) the transition between latent and active solidarity is clearly probabilistic; not all families with great support potential will become great support providers. The longitudinal analysis of intergenerational types is necessary to discover the degree to which this transition is actually made (Collins and Wugalter 1992).

Other questions remain concerning the state of the contemporary multi-generational family. Our analysis examined the point of view of only one partner of the intergenerational dyad—the adult child. Would the same typology hold if the responses of parents were analyzed? Existing evidence reveals that the same factor structure of the dimensions of solidarity holds for both generational perspectives, suggesting that the family position of the informant may make little difference to the relational typology (Silverstein, Lawton, and Bengtson 1994). And how about adult intergenerational stepprelations? Given the proliferation of complex family structures resulting from the rise in divorce and remarriage rates in American society, it would be instructive to examine relations of adult children with their stepparents as well. Are these relations weaker than relations with biological parents? Does the gender of the stepparent make a difference? We hope that future research will incorporate multiple family perspectives and include stepprelations in considering the strength of intergenerational relationships.

We have used in this research a typological approach to the investigation of family relationships. How useful is this epistemological strategy in

studying intergenerational relationships compared to more conventional assessments of individual survey items? We feel there are three important benefits of such an approach: (1) it applies multiple indicators to complex and multifaceted family phenomena, (2) it derives from a grounded theoretical perspective concerning family interactions and sentiment, and (3) it reflects a more holistic empirical approach to the study of family relationships. We urge future researchers of family structure and process to take advantage of the opportunities and challenges of typological investigation.

In summary, our findings portray adult intergenerational relationships in American families as diverse but reflecting five principal types based on affinal, structural, and functional dimensions of solidarity. At the broadest level, heterogeneity in intergenerational relationships can be attributed to historical trends over the past century, such as geographic and economic mobility of generations, the surge in divorce rates, increasing numbers of later-life families, and a shift away from the family of orientation as the basis for everyday social life in adulthood. For intergenerational families, particularly in paternal relations, these trends may have increased the uncertainty associated with enactment of supportive roles. On the other hand, our research demonstrates that adult children, especially daughters, serve as significant elements in the kin matrix of mothers. This suggests that the primacy of the mother-daughter bond—rooted in biosocial mechanisms of early socialization—extends through much of the adult life course (Rossi 1984).

Finally, we conclude that latent kin attachment is an important aspect of intergenerational family life, as it represents an enduring form of solidarity and a possible prelude to action and support (Riley 1983). Research that focuses exclusively on (more episodic) functional exchange is likely to underestimate the strength of intergenerational bonds and exaggerate the extent to which the family is in decline. We strongly suggest that multiple dimensions of solidarity be considered when assessing intergenerational relations in the modern family.

## APPENDIX

### Survey Questions Measuring Intergenerational Solidarity

#### *Structural solidarity*

Does your (mother) (father) live within one hour driving time from you?  
(yes/no)

#### *Associational solidarity*

How often do you see or have contact with your (mother) (father)?

       daily

       two to six times a week

- once a week
- two to three times a month
- once a month
- five to 11 times per year
- three to four times per year
- two times per year
- once a year
- less than once a year
- never

*Affectual solidarity*

In general, how close do you feel to your (mother) (father)?

- very close
- somewhat close
- not at all close

*Consensual solidarity*

How similar are your opinions to those of your (mother) (father)?

- very similar
- somewhat similar
- somewhat different
- very different

*Functional solidarity*

1. Now, please think about help that *you provide* for free to neighbors, friends, and family members who don't live with you. This might include doing things like babysitting, running errands, or helping with repairs. Do you ever provide this type of help to neighbors, friends or family members? (yes/no)

If yes, who do you help in this way?<sup>2</sup>

- mother
- father

2. Now, please think about help *you receive*, that you don't pay for, from neighbors, friends, and family members who don't live with you. This includes free help you receive for things like baby-sitting, household chores, home repairs, shopping and transportation. Do you ever receive this type of help from neighbors, friends or family members? (yes/no)

If yes, who are the people who help you?<sup>2</sup>

- mother
- father

<sup>1</sup> Responses are open ended and coded into 19 possible categories, including mother and father.

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## Review Essay: Old Wine in New Bottles<sup>1</sup>

*Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach.* By Margaret Archer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xii+354. \$59.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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Metatheoretical debates in the social sciences are continued not on the basis of firmly entrenched theoretical camps but with reference to persisting issues and recurring oppositions, which may change their phrasing and conceptual colors from generation to generation but rarely find their ultimate solution. The opposition between causal explanatory and interpretative hermeneutical methodologies, the opposition between identity and utility as the main patterns of agency, or the opposition between micro- and macrotheoretical approaches are enduring issues that thrust for solutions and synthesis but are never really settled. In particular, the micro-macro debate has attracted much attention on the part of eminent theoreticians and social philosophers; it underwent significant transformations from the philosophical controversy between individualism and collectivism, through the methodological debate about reductionism, to simultaneous attempts of different theoretical camps to overcome the opposition by linking two levels of empirical reality or by conceiving of it as two coexisting perspectives on the same reality.

Margaret Archer's book, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, joins these attempts and advocates strongly the realist conception of two irreducibly different but interlinked levels of social reality. The first part of the book attacks individualism and collectivism for conflating the fundamental difference between structure and agency. According to Margaret Archer, individualism can claim a widely accepted ontology but falls short of practical explanatory successes, whereas collectivism can be accused of a questionable ontology but offers a rich methodological heuristic for sociological explanation. But individualism and collectivism are not the only positions under fire. In a detailed and convincing chapter, the book scrutinizes the shortcomings of a third position called elisionism, which tries to overcome the dichotomy of structure and agency by conceiving of it as a rule and its instantiation. Rules exist only insofar as they are applied in actions, and actions can be understood only

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with respect to rules. The elisionist conflation, which points unmistakably to Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration, fails—according to Margaret Archer—to account for the objectivity and externality of social structure and self. This objectivity is attributed to the material effects on social structures and to the knowledge orienting the action. The realist position insists on the possibility of an undistorted access to material reality as well as on the transcendental grounding of truth. It does not sacrifice the grand tradition of 18th-century science and the commonsense foundation of science to the excitement of radical new perspectives. Certainly, Archer's realism appears to be slightly old-fashioned and less innovative than the elegant problem shifts of radical constructivism in Giddens, Luhmann, or Garfinkel, but it can claim to answer questions that constructivist approaches tend to disregard: Why do collectively shared expectations fail? Why can surprising and unexpected events be socially observed? Why can external factors limit and interfere with social communication, and so forth. Realism provides a simple and straightforward solution to the problem of surprise and unexpectedness: there is an external reality that can resist social construction and that has a causal impact on social processes.

The second part of the book elaborates the morphogenetic approach to the problem of structure and agency. Both levels are not only linked by contingent causal relations but sequentially ordered: existing structures produce actions, which on their turn produce new structures, and so forth. The idea of a temporal sequence in the relationship between micro- and macroevents is very convincing and one of the points where Archer advances the current state of the debate. Nobody has focused on it before in a similar manner. The core of the second part consists of a highly systematic investigation of different situational logics that are generated by structural and cultural conditions, of the morphogenesis of agency, and of the elaboration of structure. Here Margaret Archer offers an impressive conceptual paradigm that rearranges classical macrosociological explanations and provides the necessary illustrative hints at historical cases (most convincingly with respect to examples from the educational system).

Margaret Archer's book represents the best of British social theory in its being argumentative, analytical, and exceptionally clear in an intellectual landscape where theoreticians frequently take verbal fuzziness for ingenuity and originality. It represents also the tradition of British social philosophy in abstaining from lengthy treatments of intellectual history and in insisting on a deductive and strict way of presenting the argument. But it is also very British in its splendid isolation from references to Continental or American contributions to its central issue. Not every comment in this abundant debate is worth being mentioned, but it is hard to imagine today a book on the micro-macro problem that completely ignores major benchmarks of contemporary debates such as Coleman's rational-choice individualism or Luhmann's radical system theoretical holism. The range of theoretical positions that are seriously taken into

consideration by Margaret Archer is limited to the deservedly famous and predominantly British debate on individualism and collectivism during the 1960s and 1970s and to the writings of Archer's declared opponent, Giddens, to her ally, Bhaskar, and to Lockwood, whose famous distinction between social integration and system integration is used as a major conceptual heuristic. This limitation certainly streamlines the argumentation but renders it also somehow parochial and outdated, thereby blurring the impact and the merits of the thesis itself.

To talk about individualism and collectivism as if there would be just one individualism or one collectivism fails to account for the diversity and refinements of the contemporary debate. Starting with the different models of the micro-macro connection that are tacitly assumed by working sociologists would certainly have shown this diversity. Instead the book takes a principled and ontological starting point that fosters radical distinctions and a certain conceptual fundamentalism. But it never explores the philosophical basis of the problem. It is probably due to a sociologist's reluctance to engage in philosophical debates that Margaret Archer mentions the most important philosophical position, which supports the central argument of the book (and which is also very British), only once and very casually: Karl Raimund Popper's distinction between the material world, the world of consciousness, and the world of ideas. In *Objective Knowledge* and later on in *The Self and Its Brain*, Popper suggested that, to dispense with all problems of materialist and idealist monism as well as with epiphenomenalism, all three worlds should be conceived of as real and interacting with each other, and it was Popper who could claim to have defended stubbornly theoretical realism against instrumentalist or empiricist conflations. Without admitting it, Margaret Archer is walking on a well-prepared and firm philosophical battleground, and she is redressing the opponents of the old mind-body debate in sociological color. It is certainly an important cause she is defending, but she is not the only one, and the arms are not entirely new.

## Book Reviews

*Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism.* By Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose. New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. 344. \$18.95

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The argument of this book is very simple: replace old style conspiracy theories with collective collusion. There is a global movement, here labeled "fundamentalism," which runs in tandem with corporate capitalism and consumer culture and is spread by an aggressive sales corps of Koreans, Filipinos, Brazilians, Australians, and Guatemalans. The product is "made in America" and is simultaneously hierarchical and egalitarian, authoritarian and participatory, nationalist and internationalist, fissiparous and ecumenical, pseudoscientific, and technically sophisticated. It combines a Calvinist sense of election of vaguely Scots-Irish provenance with Arminian inclusiveness and so succeeds in slipping across barriers of ethnicity, culture, and class to create recognizable global affinities. Moreover, it is opposed to its global rivals, notably communism and Islam but also Catholicism, and might, by the sheer success of its "spiritual warfare" give rise to even more conflict than do its rivals. As the global power of the United States diminishes, its place has been taken by the appeal of a religious version of its nonelite culture, notably an increasingly vibrant variant offering universal shares in the goods of health and prosperity.

The book appears to be a spin-off from the sumptuously funded Fundamentalism Project, more particularly in its use of the catchall category of fundamentalism and the discussion of very disparate movements under a rubric derived from the cultural conflicts of North America. Thus, the Unification Church is brought into the frame alongside Pentecostalism. Again, the approach of certain international versions of neo-Pentecostalism, especially as purveyed among middling participants in the corporate world through modern communications and personal mobility, is shifted onto Pentecostalism as such.

Overall, the characteristics of the Pentecostal majority are short-changed, in particular their capacity to be absorbed and spread by local populations. The crucial point is the way that the capacity for growth is fueled by the egalitarian availability of the "gifts of the Spirit," especially among women, rather than by a North American rhetoric of inerrancy.

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The "Spirit of Pentecostalism" is able to coalesce with indigenous spiritualisms, such as shamanism in Korea, as well as with the desire for betterment of body and soul that informs spiritist faiths the world over.

The book offers perspectives at once too wide and too narrow: too wide in its category of fundamentalism, too narrow in its focus on American origins, forms, labels, and cultural conflicts. Such a perspective is compounded by what the authors recognize as a deployment of "extreme cases" (p. 249) with marked histories of American penetration such as Liberia, Guatemala, South Korea, and the Philippines. Had the analysis rested on an extended account of Chile for example—including an informed understanding of the partial co-option of both Protestant and Catholic leaders by Pinochet—a very different emphasis would have emerged to the resonance of the message, above all the importance of independence from America and of indigenous carriers. Nor need one travel so far, since the analysis of Mexico in Kurt Bowen's *Evangelism and Apostasy* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996) establishes the identical point. The message can hardly be spreading among Chinese, Cubans, and European gypsies for the reasons adduced by these authors.

A skewed deployment of materials links up with R. Scott Appleby's commendation of the book as part investigative journalism and part exposé. This feature is more obvious in some sections than in others, but it compromises rather different material presumably written by particular authors, for example Paul Gifford on Liberia. In the more "investigative" chapters, qualifying and positive elements are relegated to the small point, and critical elements within otherwise sympathetic accounts, such as Rowan Ireland's *Kingdoms Come* on Brazil (Pittsburgh University Press, 1992) and Ruth Marshall's work on Nigeria, are given undue exposure. The analysis by John Burdick and Roger Lancaster concerning the creativity of these excluded groups is ignored, and Elizabeth Brusco's influential discussion of the feminization of discourse is skated over. Jean-Pierre Bastian's doubtless uncongenial characterization of Pentecostalism as a return of folk culture is a notable absentee. As for speculation in chapter 5 about overt politico-religious collusion in the Philippines (p. 91), it is supported, in the *admitted* absence of evidence, by relaying the views of a liberationist priest that it "fits in very well" and of a mainline Protestant bishop "wondering [about] the possible connection." Most bothersome is the contrast between a selectively hostile account of the reality of Pentecostalism and an idealistic gloss on the declining liberationist minority in Catholicism. One can hardly be surprised that John Burdick's *Looking for God in Brasil* (University of California Press, 1993) stays uncited.

In this kind of book, one cannot expect an exploration of sociological paradox, though understanding Pentecostalism depends on probing its potent ambiguities. One such paradox is the dialectic of authority and participation, whereby the chance to exercise authority on the part of the poor and unlearned creates a secure arena for general participation. Another paradox is the way an ambiguous reform of gender relations

pushed forward by women, especially women of color, simultaneously restores the respect, role, and responsibility of the husband while rejecting machismo and promoting reciprocity. Yet another paradox is the way groups veering toward prosperity gospel nevertheless evince self-protective reserve toward consumerism. There is, finally, the manner in which the multiplication of confident alternatives, each concerned with moral conservation, leads to the most radical change of all: the breakdown of hegemony.

*Second Coming: The New Christian Right in Virginia Politics.* By Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+285. \$32.95.

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In the early 1980s, the emergence of conservative Christians as a political force precipitated both press attention and scholarly study. By the end of the decade, however, the movement seemed to be in trouble, and its most visible spokesman, Jerry Falwell, had retired to his Virginia pulpit. Meanwhile, another Virginian, Pat Robertson, had also tried his hand at national politics and apparently failed. Robertson, however, had also organized the Christian Coalition, a group whose strategies have been the prototype for 1990s Christian Right politics; the remnants of Falwell's movement provided experience and energy for this transformed political effort. Taking Falwell's and Robertson's home state as their focus, Rozell and Wilcox examine the current shape of Christian Right activity. While some aspects of Virginia's political structure and history make it unique, it nevertheless affords a valuable laboratory for exploring the tactics, organizations, and cleavages that now characterize this movement. Through interviews with over 100 Republican Party and Christian Right activists, surveys of party convention delegates and committee members, and a thorough review of recent state political history, these two political scientists offer their readers an in-depth look at who the religious activists are, what they want, and how they are organizing to get it.

The central thesis of the book is that in the 1980s, the Christian Right was a "disorganized, decentralized social movement" that is now in the process of being transformed into a "collection of interest groups and party factions" (p. 4). In the 1980s, groups like the Moral Majority tapped the discontent of a significant segment of the American populace, offering an ideology that explained their distress and urging them to become politically active. Millions did, but the 1980s social movement rarely had effective local organizations, and the leadership was too narrowly sectarian to welcome any but their own brand of true believers. This sectarian narrowness, in turn, lent a radical tone to movement rhetoric that turned away more voters than it attracted.

What evidence is there for a transformation? Rozell and Wilcox's look at Virginia's recent history leads them to believe that in recent years "the more doctrinaire [conservative] activists left politics in disgust, and those that remained have become more pragmatic as they learned the rules of the game" (p. 58). They point to the increasing willingness of movement leaders to "mainstream the message." The people they interviewed counsel their followers to "know their audience," saving the Bible talk for insiders and emphasizing issues like schools and taxes for the broader electorate (p. 73). They have also learned to compromise, even on the most central issues. They are willing to pursue "half a loaf (and a few fishes) from a more secular conservative candidate" (p. 221). Add this new pragmatism to their already-impressive mobilization strategies (action alerts, phone trees, voter registration drives, training workshops) and increasing ability to share supporter lists across a wide network of conservative causes, and Christian conservatives should be a formidable political force.

The strength of this book is that Rozell and Wilcox not only document this larger organizational and strategic shift—demonstrating its reality among Virginia's state-level organizations—but they also unravel the intricate political contingencies that have given the Christian Right only very mixed results in this key state. In two central chapters in the book, they focus in on the 1993 gubernatorial race (in which a moderate Republican endorsed by the Christian Right won, but a Christian Right activist lost the lieutenant governorship) and the infamous 1994 senatorial campaign that pitted a morally tainted incumbent Democrat (Chuck Robb) against convicted Iran-Contra figure Oliver North. North ran an extravagantly financed and explicitly Christian Right campaign—Bible in hand—but still lost to Robb, and the experience of his candidacy further exacerbated divisions in the Republican Party.

In both cases, Republican losses came in large measure because the party itself is deeply divided between old-line moderates and newly active religious conservatives. Using surveys of the convention delegates, Rozell and Wilcox demonstrate that this divide is, not surprisingly, more a matter of social and moral issue differences than an economic or foreign policy divide. The two factions are also rather similar on demographic measures. Despite the core of agreement, however, there really are factions, coalescing primarily around dislike for each other's recent candidates and tactics. The depth and contentiousness of this divide may be unique to Virginia, they argue, but the fact of emerging, well-organized factional politics in state Republican parties is not. And party factions, they remind us, have a pragmatic power that decentralized social movements do not.

This is a book with real strengths. It has documented a trend many thought they saw—the pragmatic move of the Christian Right to local contests and strategic compromise—but no careful study had previously shown. This book is strategically focused and uses solid and well-conceived data. While the authors have done the careful multivariate analysis that supports their conclusions, they have kept the tables dis-

played in the text at the descriptive level. The book is likewise full of the intricate details of state party politics but manages to tell the story without getting utterly lost in those details. It is conceptually clear as well. The authors build on a base of research and theory in political science, without overwhelming the reader with arcane arguments. In large measure it succeeds at walking the difficult middle path between scholarly excellence and public accessibility. That will probably mean that some on each side will not be pleased. There will be too many numbers and too many political details for some in the public, and there will be too few conceptual arguments and statistical proofs for some in the academy. But even if readers are not utterly satisfied, they will have learned a great deal about American politics in the 1990s.

*Resurgent Evangelicalism in the United States: Mapping Cultural Change since 1970.* By Mark A. Shibley. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. Pp. x+156. \$24.95.

Mark Chaves  
*DePaul University*

Mark Shibley has produced a valuable contribution to our understanding of contemporary evangelical Protestantism in the United States. Partly based on analysis of national survey data and partly based on fieldwork in four evangelical congregations—three in California and one in Illinois—this book stands in a long tradition of work that examines how religious belief and practice is shaped, sometimes profoundly, by its social and cultural context. In a moment when too much sociology of religion examines national trends in “evangelical” or “fundamentalist” religion as if those categories have the same cultural content across time and space and in a moment when the apparent organizational vitality of many self-identified evangelical groups is sometimes declared to be causally connected to those groups’ allegedly uncompromising insistence on traditionally strict belief and practice, Shibley’s book offers a welcome corrective.

*Resurgent Evangelicalism* makes at least five distinct contributions. First is its argument that an identifiably Southern religious style—associated with though not identical to evangelicalism—has diffused throughout the country. Shibley shows that, outside the South, affiliation with evangelical denominations has increased most rapidly within states with the most in-migration from the South. Recognizing that this sort of correlation in highly aggregated data is not itself definitive, Shibley supplements his quantitative results with compelling historical and qualitative evidence documenting plausible institutional and demographic mechanisms by which a Southern religious style became unmoored from its regional anchors to emerge as a truly national phenomenon.

Second, this book alerts us to the regional variability of religious expression in the United States. This is not a new discovery, but it bears

repeating. Because most of his fieldwork was done in California congregations whose ties to the South vary, Shibley is able to compare Southern evangelical culture with West Coast evangelical culture. Perhaps not surprisingly, the regional differences in cultural style appear to be more socially significant than the theological similarities in evangelical faith.

Third, Shibley documents the extensive variation of social settings in which American evangelicalism can be found. Some evangelicalism is Southern; some is not. Some evangelical congregations are filled with older people; some are filled with younger people. Some evangelicalism appeals to low-income groups, some to high-income groups. This social variation is important, among other reasons because it mediates the relationship between evangelical theology and cultural conservatism. To give just one example, among those affiliated with evangelical denominations, the proportion who say that "a woman's place is in the home" ranges from 45% for Southerners who are 40 years old or over to 18% for those not from the South who are under 40 years old (p. 124). Shibley argues persuasively that this sort of intraevangelical variation raises questions about the extent to which resurgent evangelicalism implies resurgent cultural conservatism.

Fourth, this book, especially its congregational case studies, adds to the growing literature contradicting the recently revived notion that, except at the extreme, more demanding religious groups enjoy an advantage when competing for members. Shibley's work illustrates two relevant points. It is a serious mistake to attribute "strictness" or "high demand" to a congregation simply by virtue of its denominational label or theological identity. Some evangelical or fundamentalist congregations are, in some sense, strict; others are not. Furthermore, in these case studies, organizational vitality and growth accompany accommodation, not resistance, to local norms. Given these findings, Shibley notes the dubiousness of attributing evangelical denominations' growth to the demands their congregations allegedly make on members.

Fifth, beyond their relevance to ongoing theoretical debates, Shibley's congregational case studies—which compose about half the book—offer intrinsically interesting portraits. The voices he records—from one pastor's statement that "we are guerrillas invading the enemy territory" to another's message that "the highest Christian duty is to love others, not to judge them" (pp. 65, 106)—illustrate again the rich variety of meanings found within American religious life.

There are places in the book at which readers may hesitate. At times I was not completely sure whether "Southern" meant a cultural style or a literal geographical region. And I wished for more elaborate controls in the penultimate chapter's quantitative analysis purporting to show that people with "personal problems" are disproportionately drawn to evangelical religion (p. 125). But an occasional lapse in developing a subsidiary argument ought not distract us from the book's substantial achievement. In the finest tradition of the sociological study of religion, Mark Shibley has shown that placing the same theological content—here,

belief in an inerrant Bible, a born-again experience, and the imperative to convert others to Christianity—in different social contexts substantially changes the religious expression of that content. More, he shows us something of how that is happening within Protestant evangelicalism, and he shows us why it matters.

*The Eclipse of Eternity: A Sociology of the Afterlife.* By Tony Walter. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. ix+222. \$59.95.

**Marion Bowman**  
*Bath College of Higher Education*

Describing *The Eclipse of Eternity* as a really useful book is not to damn with faint praise. When, as a religious studies lecturer, I encounter a thought-provoking book I enjoy, which has the additional merits of being written in a disarmingly straightforward, accessible style with great potential for informing and stimulating students on a variety of topics, it is a great discovery.

Tony Walter, whose previous books include *The Revival of Death* (1994) and *Funerals—and How to Improve Them* (1990), is a lucid, stimulating author. His skill lies in methodically reviewing the theological, historical, and sociological literature, setting out hypotheses, examining them, and then more or less leaving the reader to make up her or his own mind. As he admits at the end of the book, he leaves "more questions than answers, more theses than evidence" (p. 195).

Walter's starting point is deceptively simple. He reminds us that textbooks tend to assert that dealing with death is one of the major functions of religion. He observes in Europe, North America, and Australia (the "restricted" scope of this study concentrates on the conventional Christian majority in these areas) the "theological and ethical diffidence about the hereafter" (p. 2) and "the removal of death and the afterlife from the churches' agenda" (p. 3). "How," Walter asks, "could the purported motive for religion collapse, and sociologists of religion not notice?" (p. 3).

Walter therefore sets out to explore the meaning of eternity in everyday life and in the social organization of death. He looks not only at beliefs about heaven and hell, life and death but at the social, physical, and individual contexts in which such beliefs occur. In the course of this exploration, Walters considers a huge number of issues and ideas, clearly labeling his chapters so that one can home in on areas of particular interest. He looks at the history of theological thought about the afterlife, comparing it with contemporary views. He makes the point that there need be no coherence between a person's intuitions about an afterlife and the rest of her or his religious or nonreligious belief system. Walters also highlights the pitfalls of interpreting survey data in relation to such complex ideas.

Naturally, his examinations lead to some consideration of the relation-

ship between the decline of belief in the afterlife, the modern way of death, and secularization. Walter looks at changes in the timing, context, and meaning of death that influence how death is regarded, developments in pastoral care, and the shifts in emphasis from eschatology to bereavement and from the fate of the deceased's soul to the feelings of the survivors. Commenting on the extent to which the focus of Western Christianity (through prosperity theology and social gospel) has shifted to this world, Walter speculates on the consequences of "a society and a religion premised on this life only . . . without the carrot of heaven and the stick of hell" (p. 7). He then looks at the current interest in other aspects or interpretations of life after death, such as near death experiences, reincarnation, and ghosts posing the question "Are they peripheral phenomena, or signs of a renewed or continuing interest in life after death?" (p. 7).

Walter examines four possible theses about the demise of the social significance of belief in life after death, presenting the pros and cons of each. The first thesis is predicated on the notion that philosophical attacks on heaven, hell, and an immortal soul has won the battle of ideas. The second thesis is that the practice of medicine, bureaucratic and commercial practices for the disposal of bodies, the institution of the modern family, and the ideology of romantic love have combined to cause the church to abandon responsibility for the dying, the dead, and the bereaved. The third is that Christianity has been hampered throughout its history by an overliteral understanding of heaven and hell and that people are now exploring the true spiritual reality underlying the symbols of heaven and hell. A fourth thesis notes the resurgence of fundamentalism in North America and the expanding Islamic world, indicating that it is possible to be modern and technological without being secular and materialist. This idea raises the prospect that secularization is a "curiously provincial feature" (p. 195) of Western Europe (minus Ireland and Poland) and Australia.

I was particularly interested in Walter's portrayal of the contemporary religious scene, especially as it relates to ideas of past lives, reincarnation, and spiritual growth. Inevitably, in a book of such scope, one can think of omissions—or, more correctly, of additions that could usefully have been made, such as the impact of Theosophy. I feel that Walter tends to underestimate the impact of New Religious Movements and New Age ideas, the latter appearing unflagged in all sorts of guises from popular magazine articles to management training, and also the length and strength of the phenomenon of "believing without belonging."

But these are quibbles. The strength of Walter's book lies in its bold agenda, its bringing together of themes and ideas that one finds oneself still pondering days (weeks, months) later. It is a book that stimulates thought and inspires discussion; it is a starting point, not the final word on the subject. Walter has therefore succeeded in his aim "not to provide answers or to 'prove' any one thesis" but "to ask with clarity the questions that so many students of modern religion and of society have hitherto so curiously failed to ask" (p. 195).

*The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe.* By Stathis N. Kalyvas. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Pp. x+300. \$45.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Anthony Gill  
*University of Washington*

Over the past decade, there has been an increasing tendency to examine religious phenomena from a rational choice perspective. With the publication of his first book, Stathis Kalyvas brings this theoretical approach to bear on the topic of religion and politics. Interestingly, Kalyvas picks up on the utility of rational choice without having dipped into the works of Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, or Laurence Iannaccone, the most preeminent proponents of this new paradigm. In many respects, Kalyvas's findings can be declared a theoretical victory for the "religious economy" school.

Kalyvas investigates the following paradox: Why did confessional (i.e., Catholic-based) political parties arise in Western Europe during the late 1800s against the desires of the Catholic Church and "religion friendly" conservative parties? The paradox is theoretically interesting, since it raises the question of how actors rationally pursuing well-defined goals can produce outcomes contrary to their own interests. Rational choice theory is often criticized for its failure to explain unintended consequences within a strategic action framework. Kalyvas's model of confessional party formation demonstrates how strategic choices at one period of time can generate new actors who are important in subsequent periods. These new actors may possess autonomous interests and, given sufficient power to act upon those interests, may produce outcomes that differ significantly from the desires of those who created them.

Specifically, Kalyvas shows how the Catholic Church (along with conservatives), mobilized lay Catholics to combat anticlerical attacks from liberals in a democratic environment. Although Catholic bishops intended for these lay groups to remain under strict episcopal control, the need to rally votes against liberals provided lay organizers an independent source of power and legitimacy—that is, voters. Furthermore, the electoral success of incipient confessional organizations provided lay leaders with a stake in expanding democratic governance, something both the church and conservatives tried to prevent. Thus, examined in a dynamic context, where actors and interests are created or destroyed over time, unintended consequences are perfectly understandable from a rational choice perspective.

Kalyvas further details the creation of a new political identity among lay Catholics. The choice of an ambiguous "Christian" identity resulted from the need to develop a source of legitimacy autonomous from the church, while simultaneously preserving the religious "glue" that bonded members of different economic classes together. (The success of the Christian Democrats followed largely from their ability to appeal to voters

across class cleavages.) In other words, identity formation can result from the strategic choice of political entrepreneurs. Moreover, he convincingly argues that the secularization of European politics resulted not from social “modernization” (à la traditional secularization theory) but, rather, from the conscious choice of strategic actors seeking to broaden their base of political support. By moving away from a strictly religious platform and distancing themselves from the Catholic episcopacy, Christian Democrats could appeal to a wider array of voters and win seats in government, the primary objective of all democratic political parties. These two findings should generate serious debate among scholars investigating identity politics and secularization.

Methodologically, Kalyvas generates a deductive model of party formation and tests it using comparative historical analysis. His cases include countries where confessional parties successfully were formed (i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Italy) and one outlier—France—where Christian Democracy never took hold. His examination of France actually bolsters his theoretical model as he points out how the church never provided the proper environment for lay Catholics to build autonomous political organizations. Kalyvas’s excellent command of European history and of several languages allows him to rely on a diverse range of primary and secondary sources. Although much of the evidence is anecdotal, he carefully arranges it in such a way that substantiates the causal linkages in his model.

The primary weaknesses of this work are relatively minor. First, although Kalyvas shows how the behavior of Catholics and conservatives was strategically motivated, he ascribes ideological motivations to liberal actors. In explaining the reasons behind the anticlerical attacks that provoked bishops to defend their institutional interests, Kalyvas asserts that liberals acted out of “myopia, caused by the . . . blind belief in secular progress” (p. 106). This problem remains minor only in that the actions of liberals are taken as exogenous to his model. The study could be improved by addressing the strategic concerns behind anticlerical attacks (he briefly hints at some on pp. 172–73), but failing to do so does not damage the central thesis. Second, Kalyvas implicitly overestimates the degree of religiosity in Europe prior to the 1800s and incorrectly claims that Christian Democracy caused the secularization of *society* (p. 261), as opposed to merely the desacralization of government. The theoretical leap to explaining society’s loss of religiosity is slightly beyond the purview of his model. Nonetheless, I concur with his general finding that secularization results from conscious political decisions.

Kalyvas’s work demands a wide audience. This is a superb piece of scholarship that works at many levels. Methodologically, it provides an exemplary blend of deductive theory building and empirical analysis. Theoretically, Kalyvas widens the scope of rational choice theory with his focus on explaining unintended consequences. Substantively, it should interest scholars studying a wide array of topics, including secularization, the intersection of religion and politics, and the formation of social move-

ments. Any work that manages to cross this many boundaries in such a well-founded manner deserves high praise.

*The Sacralisation of Politics in Fascist Italy.* By Emilio Gentile. Translated by Keith Botsford. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp ix+208. \$49.95.

David I. Kertzer  
*Brown University*

Fascist Italy has occupied a privileged place in the development of research on the symbolic dimension of politics. Such studies were once largely an anthropological preserve, the focus of such classics as Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard's *African Political Systems* (Oxford University Press, 1940). However, scholarly reactions to the rise of fascism and Nazism ultimately helped bring the issues of the power of symbol, rituals, and myths in modern Western political life to center stage.

Although Nazi Germany has received the most attention from this perspective with the Soviet Union perhaps in second place, many studies are now available that concern the rise of Mussolini and the Italian fascist regime in these terms. Emilio Gentile, a professor of contemporary history at the University of Rome, joins the fray attempting to shed light on the "institutionalization of the 'Fascist religion' as a collective cult seeking to involve the whole Italian people in the myths and rituals of the régime" (p. x). In this effort he builds self-consciously on George Mosse's classic examination of the rise of Nazism as a mass religion.

The Italian case is of particular interest because, as Gentile argues, the modern Italian nation-state was formed in the 19th century in the absence of any strong identification by Italians with the nation. The new state's inability to foster a civil religion—and with it, any sense of allegiance to the "fatherland"—continued to plague Italian governments in ensuing decades, all the more so because of the fierce opposition of the Vatican to the existence of an Italian state. Gentile traces the ineffectual attempts of government leaders in the late 19th century to construct a civic liturgy based, in part, on the monarchy and the military and argues that it was the cult of the fallen, which arose from World War I, that offered modern Italy its first broadly felt opportunity for the sacralization of secular politics. "A new altar to the nation had been raised" (p. 18), Gentile concludes, a cult that the fascists expropriated in their first step toward constructing a complex political liturgy tying the masses to the fascist state.

Gentile proceeds to examine the rise and evolution of what he refers to as "fascist religion." It is based on a set of myths that centered on the sacrality of the nation, and the symbols and rites that were given a central place in planning political activity. He tells of the symbolism of the *squadristi*, the bands of fascists whose violent sorties helped destabilize the

liberal state and whose offensive, Gentile observes, was fought in good part through a "war of symbols." Gentile then distinguishes two stages in the institutionalization of fascist liturgy: an early period (1923–26) when the fascists attempted to "gain full control over the symbolic universe of the state," and a subsequent period (1926–32) when the liturgy was "consolidated and absorbed the cult of the fatherland" (p. 33).

The bulk of the book is devoted to examining the multiplicity of forms that the new fascist religion took, from the penchant for monumental architecture to the construction of the myth—and, subsequently, the cult—of the Duce. The latter is most important in understanding the development of Italian fascism, a process that Gentile labels the "Mussolini-zing" of fascism (p. 136) in a chapter titled, "Italy's New God."

Gentile concludes with a theoretical discussion of the role of myth, symbol, and ritual in modern political life arguing that "the process by which politics has become sacred has gone hand in hand with the growing autonomy and secularization of political power" (p. 154). In Durkheimian fashion (though he does not cite such neo-Durkheimian students of civil religion as Robert Bellah), he argues that in secularized societies a need arises for some mechanism to provide social integration. Political liturgy (worship of the state and its leader) can offer such a basis for social communion. It is in this light that Gentile concludes his book, characterizing it as a contribution to the "history of the political theology of the 20th century," a phrase borrowed from Clifford Geertz (p. 161).

This is a lucidly written and nicely translated study engaging a crucial set of theoretical issues and presenting highly absorbing historical materials. The book is not without its blind spots. Very little is said about the role of the Catholic Church in the promulgation of fascist ritual, and, more generally, Gentile is eager to distinguish the ever skeptical Italians from the sheeplike Germans in comparing the political religion of fascist Italy to that found in Nazi Germany. However, for those interested in the sociology of politics, religion, and political culture, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* is a richly rewarding book.

*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* By Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Pp. 367. \$25.00

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In the 1950s and 1960s, modernization analysis of liberal inspiration provided the major paradigm for macro comparative analysis; in the 1970s and 1980s, world-system analysis of Marxist inspiration took on that mantle. Changing world conditions—the foremost being the consequences of the cessation of a bipolar power structure—and new factors, such as resurgent nationalism and fundamentalism, have provided new foci of attention, such as changing group identities that call for a rethink-

ing of our conceptual framework in the present decade. What, then, is an appropriate global paradigm for the 1990s and the next century? Arguably it is one that takes a different track from a version of linear Western triumphalism common to both the early modernization analysis and the world-system perspective.

One global paradigm that is a prime candidate to replace the first two is, broadly speaking, civilizational analysis, which very forcefully frames the present work. Although not written by a sociologist, *The Clash of Civilizations* is a study whose author is conversant with current macro analyses as well as with the intellectual background of a partially neglected sociological tradition of civilizational analysis in writings of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Benjamin Nelson, and, especially, Pitirim Sorokin, and a broader spectrum represented by such figures as Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Until now, much of civilizational analysis has had a peripheral status in comparative social science research and theory. But this may soon change, especially given the stature of the author, past president of the American Political Science Association, and the wide attention that greeted the original seminal article "The Clash of Civilizations?" when it appeared in the influential periodical, *Foreign Affairs* (vol. 72 [summer 1993]). Huntington is well versed in the comparative sociological literature, and, although most of his analysis reflects his concerns with international security matters, this work is not only rewarding but essential reading for sociologists interested in the "big picture."

Huntington's paradigm takes stock of the post-1990 world as one where "local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations" (p. 28). The schematic presentation of today's world on map 1.3 shows nine civilizations, and the ensuing discussion focuses on three major actors: Western, Sinic (called Confucian in the 1993 article), and Islamic civilizations. The others (Latin American, African, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese) are important as potential allies in what is, essentially, a global conflict situation. Following earlier civilizational analyses Huntington takes a cultural core, particularly religion, as a primary focus of civilization in motivating and mobilizing people (p. 66); some civilizations have dominant "core states" (as in the case of the West) while others (such as Islam) do not. Western expansion and its claims of universalism are rejected by Huntington as unwise, immoral, and dangerous, particularly in a period when, on the one hand, China is emerging as a hegemon for Asia (backed up by the rest of Sinic civilization's economic surge) and on the other, sharp Muslim demographic growth provides "recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration" (p. 103). The West may have provided earlier the impetus for modernization to the rest of the world, but it would be a mistake now to think that modernization will lead to further westernization, including democratization. The message of Huntington, if I understand him correctly, is that for the West, in a period of incipient decline (internally but also demographically and economically vis-à-vis other civilizations),

discretion is the better part of valor. What he calls the "abstention rule" requires that the core state abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations (p. 316), a rule which the United States has not heeded either in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. Especially to be avoided is for the West (and for Huntington, the United States is the core state of the West) to drive Islam into the arms of Sinic civilization.

Due to space limitation, I have just sketched bits of this far-ranging study, which draws on a large literature and utilizes important empirical documentation. Its assertion of the decline of the West will bother some, as did Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* and Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Random House, 1987). I would have liked to see in the last chapter greater attention to the dynamics of intra-civilizational decline and, more generally, to the variety of intra- and intercivilizational encounters some of which are conflictual but others may also be mutually enriching for the interactive civilizations. There is a brief, hopeful concluding note regarding the "commonalities of civilization," but the title of the book lacks the question mark that was in the title of the original article. In any case, this work is a major launching pad for reconceptualizing the world order and its major units of analysis. Sociologists will find in this text and its rich footnotes and in S. N. Eisenstadt's recent complementary civilizational "case studies" (*Jewish Civilization* [State University of New York Press, 1992] and *Japanese Civilization* [University of Chicago Press, 1996]) ample materials for rethinking the culturally centered paradigm appropriate to our global period of transition.

*The Agony of the Russian Idea.* By Tim McDaniel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. x+201. \$24.95.

Mark R. Beissinger  
*University of Wisconsin—Madison*

The issue of Russian exceptionalism arguably has been the dominant theme of Russian political discourse over the past two centuries and has been central in Western scholarship on Russia, as well. In *The Agony of the Russian Idea*, Tim McDaniel explores how these claims to uniqueness have had tragic consequences for modern Russia.

The book is a series of interpretive essays on 20th-century Russian history revolving around what McDaniel sees as its central unifying theme, "the Russian idea." It is defined as "the conviction that Russia has its own independent, self-sufficient, and eminently worthy cultural and historical tradition that both sets it apart from the West and guarantees its future flourishing" (p. 11). Elaborating on the arguments of Nicholas Berdyaev and others, McDaniel contends that the Russian idea has been a cultural trap for Russia, reversing Western values rather than providing an alternative to them. Indeed the "Russian idea" is "more hostile to the logic of

"Western institutions" than the responses of elites to the threat of Westernization in other non-Western civilizations (p. 26). It rejects private property, respect for law, and individualism and embraces a society based on a unitary and compulsory truth, a desire for a higher moral community, an emphasis on equality of outcomes, and a paternalistic conception of government. McDaniel asserts that in both the late tsarist and communist periods the state's attempts to modernize by incorporating elements of the Russian idea contradicted critical imperatives of modernization and gave rise to a profound moral crisis evident, for example, in a widening gap between professed belief and actual practice. The result is that Russian history is characterized, in McDaniel's words, by "a distinctive rhythm: a pattern of repeated social breakdown, with little capacity to build upon past failures" (p. 17). One of the interesting discussions in the book is McDaniel's analysis that postcommunist Russia reproduced the Russian idea in spite of Yeltsin's efforts to impose a radical break from the past. McDaniel depicts contemporary Russia as dominated by "a reigning mood of cynicism and apathy" and "sentiments of bewilderment, powerlessness, and betrayal" (pp. 6–7).

The story McDaniel tells is depressing but so is modern Russian history. It is a tale that will, no doubt, resonate with many experts on Russia. McDaniel's use of the Russian idea as his central narrative, however, leaves many questions unanswered. While he recognizes that the "Russian idea" is not uniquely Russian, the assumption of Russian exceptionalism as both the cause and the outcome drives the larger argument. Some may question whether McDaniel has not exaggerated the extent to which Russia's woes have been unique and its values so patently inimical to those of Western civilization. He does not provide larger generalizations based on the Russian experience that might be tested in other contexts.

Moreover, McDaniel's use of the Russian idea encompasses nearly every Russian idea, from the Slavophiles' rejection of European culture to the Westernizers' embrace of it, from Lenin's synthesis of Marxism to Stalin's forced industrialization, from Brezhnev's conservatism to Gorbachev's reformism, and from today's market reformers to their nationalist opponents. No one would deny that Russian ideas are critical for explaining Russia's lot, but one is left wondering whether there is such a thing as *the* Russian idea in the broad sense in which McDaniel wields the term, and whether the cloth of 20th-century Russian history is as seamless as he makes it out to be. Just as McDaniel cannot demonstrate empirically that the Russian idea (as opposed to Russian rulers or other factors) is responsible for Russia's path, the argument is not falsifiable.

From such a vantage point, all of modern Russian history begins to appear to be natural and inevitable—the product of a national hubris of trying to be different and failing wretchedly at it. As a Russian student, echoing this same sense of fatality, once told me, "Every nation deserves its rulers." Despite nods in their direction, viable alternatives, cacophonous voices, path dependency, and counterfactuals seem swallowed by

the requirements of modernization and the uniformity of culture. McDaniel suggests no way out of the reproduction of Russian misery other than "a return of a sense of national dignity" in the wake of what he calls "the nightmare of a failed Americanization" (p. 19) under Yeltsin. This is, indeed, the solution proffered by some Russian nationalists today, though one wonders whether such an awakening would only exacerbate the claims to distinctiveness that McDaniel identifies as the source of Russia's historical dead end. Despite these problems, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* is a serious, original, and provocative work that deserves to be read widely.

*Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* By Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. xx+479. \$55.00 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

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University of California, Los Angeles

In *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, two wise observers of many regime transitions over several decades propose some new arguments about democratic consolidation. The first is that nationalism and nation building can and often do impede full democratization. They also argue that different forms of authoritarianism constrain democratic transition in characteristic ways and systematically create different obstacles to democratic consolidation.

The argument about the possible ill effects of nationalism on democratization arises from the observation that political mobilization of the dominant ethnic group in support of nation building can entail real disadvantages and even exclusion from citizenship for minorities. It can also lead to intense conflict among multiple aroused nationalities. Both the exclusion of significant parts of a population from political participation and violent conflict can be expected to undermine democratic stability.

In one of their most interesting arguments, Linz and Stepan suggest that holding founding elections in the preexisting multinational state prior to regional elections, as happened in Spain, rather than holding regional elections first, as in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, will reduce the temptation of politicians to arouse and appeal to exclusionary ethnic sentiments and thus increase future chances of democratic stability. When the first elections occur in ethnically identified federal units, nationalism may be the most powerful mobilizing device available to ambitious candidates. This mobilization in its turn can create or deepen ethnic hostilities that had less importance before democratization. Responses to public opinion surveys done in Spain showing that many Spanish citizens identify as both Catalan or Basque and Spanish support the claim that primordial hatreds play a lesser role in the emergence of ethnic hostilities

than is often thought. The very high rates of intermarriage among Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in pre-1990 Bosnia lends credence to Linz and Stepan's claim that the multiple identities characteristic of Spanish citizens are, or were, also possible in formerly communist Europe. More work on other cases would be needed to prove the argument, however, since there are lots of other differences between Spain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, on the other, that might account for the difference in their ability to handle subnationalism democratically. Most important, the Spanish subnationalities have been part of Spain for hundreds of years, in contrast to the Soviet and Yugoslav subnationalities, most of which were yoked together only after 1918. It is nevertheless a very interesting argument, worthy of future research.

Because the authors' argument about the effects of different forms of authoritarianism relates prior regime type to preconditions for consolidation identified by themselves, it is necessary to begin discussing their argument with their definition of consolidation and its preconditions. This contains both logical and normative elements; they do not claim to derive it from flawed "real existing democracy."

Consolidation is complete, according to the authors, when no important actors engage in trying to overthrow the regime, when most of the public supports democracy as the best way to govern their society, and when both government and others become accustomed to resolving differences within the laws, procedures, and institutions of the democratic regime (pp. 5–6). It would be hard to disagree with this, though one might cite examples of countries in which these elements of consolidation were present one month and gone the next. The novel aspect of the argument arises from the authors' claims about a set of very demanding prerequisites for consolidation. They argue that for democratic consolidation to occur, six other conditions must be present: a state with mostly uncontested borders; a social and political environment conducive to the growth of "civil society," meaning associational groups not formally linked to government or political parties; a functioning and respected "political society," meaning parties and other institutions for choosing leaders and policies; the rule of law; a usable bureaucracy; and an "institutionalized economic society," meaning independent economic actors and the laws and institutions that make private economic activity profitable and safe, though not necessarily the only or main form of economic activity.

The authors then divide authoritarianisms into multiple categories, the most important of which are civilianized authoritarianism (with Franco Spain as the ideal type), rule by the hierarchical military, sultanism (an extreme of personalized dictatorship), totalitarianism, and posttotalitarianism. Within each type there are further variations, but the most basic argument is that different types of authoritarian regime affect the subsequent trajectory of efforts at democracy in systematic ways. Rule by the hierarchical military hinders full transition because military rulers try to negotiate a continuing role for themselves as unelected veto players in future otherwise democratic governments. Sultanism and totalitarianism

impede consolidation because they typically leave at least five of the six preconditions for consolidation unachieved. Posttotalitarianism is less of a hindrance because it has often allowed the prior development of civil society and some elements of political society, though economic society, a usable bureaucracy, and the rule of law will need to be developed during and after the transition. Finally, civilianized authoritarianism offers the best prospects for democratic consolidation because in such regimes most of the preconditions for consolidation have developed prior to democratization.

The authors support these arguments with a series of short case studies, the basic features of most of which will be familiar to readers who have paid attention to the transitions literature during recent years. If the authors' ideas about the preconditions for democratic consolidation are accepted, then it is hard to disagree with their arguments. These preconditions are quite restrictive, however. Most new democracies fail to meet them, and yet most seem likely to endure. This raises a question unaddressed by the authors: What features of imperfect fledgling democracies naturally impel them toward more thorough—that is, more open and inclusive—democratization and ultimately toward consolidation, and which cause them to lean in the other direction?

*From General Estate to Special Interest: German Lawyers, 1878–1933.*  
By Kenneth F. Ledford. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
Pp. xxxv+351. \$49.95.

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Explaining the failure of German lawyers in private practice to successfully challenge their “coordination” by the National Socialists in 1933 is the central theme of Kenneth Ledford’s richly detailed history of private lawyers in Germany during the Second Empire and the Weimar Republic. Ledford attempts to “move beyond analyses based upon economic exigency. . . . or moral and ethical failure” to explanations based on social diversification within the German private bar, its diminished policy influence, and its procedural focus (p. 296). Ledford thus informs the ongoing debate of how the Nazis came to control Germany in the 1930s. Because of its approach, the book will be of interest not only to political sociologists, but also to sociologists who engage in the comparative study of law, lawyers, or organizations.

Ledford begins by recounting the high expectations for the private bar in the late 19th century, documenting the belief that its independence from state intervention was crucial to the success of the “middle-class project” of protecting individual freedom against arbitrary administration (p. 1). In the first three chapters of the book, Ledford provides the historical context for, and a detailed description of, the Lawyers’ Statute

(RAO) passed in 1878 as part of the Imperial Justice Laws, which unified the legal system of the new German Empire. The RAO created an institution of self-governance for lawyers, the decentralized system of “lawyers’ chambers.” Whereas lawyers in private practice had been similar to state officials (at least in Prussia) prior to the passage of the legislation, after the creation of the RAO private lawyers achieved freedom from disciplinary oversight by the state. In 1878, the question was whether the new framework for private lawyers would lead to parallel political changes in the freedom of individual citizens against unwanted state intrusion.

The answer to the question of whether a less regulated bar would represent the general public interest was no, and Ledford explains why. Chapter 4 links the fragmentation of the bar to its inaction. The lawyers’ chambers created by the RAO and the popular local bar associations lacked central coordination, while the centralized national bar association was not representative of the private bar as a whole. The three levels of organization, each in its own way incapable of adequately representing the entire private bar, made concerted action on policy nearly impossible. Diversification within the private bar also impeded its action (chap. 5–7). Using data from the province of Hannover in the district of Celle, Ledford makes a strong case that lawyers became more stratified during the period both in terms of social origins and in terms of occupational divisions between the lower-status but numerous district court lawyers and the higher-status superior court lawyers. The deterioration of the bar as a cohesive social actor coupled with the German economic crisis of the late 1920s caused the bar to set aside the principles of economic liberalism on which the RAO was founded and to limit the number of lawyers who could be admitted to practice (chap. 8). In the midst of its internal upheaval, the bar attempted specific resistance to three public policy changes that directly affected lawyers. Its objections were futile in each case (chap. 9).

With this background, Ledford brings his readers up to 1933 Germany when the National Socialist ministry of justice deposed the members of the Celle lawyers’ chamber and called for an emergency meeting of lawyers to elect a new lawyers’ chamber. With only minimal resistance, the German lawyers in the district succumbed to this demand for a new election. Ledford attributes this lack of resistance to the internal discord within the private bar and its recent political defeats. Given the political situation in Germany at the time, when most (if not all) private associations were falling prey to the pressures of the Nazis, the deference of the private bar is hardly surprising—indeed, resistance would have been more surprising. The near inevitability of the result Ledford studies lends a teleological character to his analysis. At various times, Ledford suggests that the bar’s focus on procedural rather than substantive justice tied the hands of German private lawyers. This connection between the procedural focus of the bar and its inaction is difficult to prove, and, despite its richness, Ledford’s account ultimately fails to be convincing.

Because Ledford is a historian, the book provides more social history than sociology, that is, it leaves it up to the reader to make the association between particular historical incidents and the ultimate concession of the private bar to the Nazis. This would be easier for the reader if Ledford were not trying to explain two phenomena simultaneously: that the private bar failed to represent the general estate *and* that the private bar was ineffective at resisting Nazi encroachment over its particular interests. But these issues do not detract greatly from a carefully constructed volume. As a meticulously crafted tale of the rise of an interest group accorded the status to speak for the general good, the group's failure to live up to such status and the group's ultimate inability to put forward even its own special interests, Ledford's book will prove informative reading.

*Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present.* By Elliott A. Krause. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp xi+305. \$37.50.

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This is an ambitious book in which Krause sets out to respecify the agenda for the sociology of the professions by analyzing what he describes as "guild power" as expressed in the experience of the professions of medicine, law, engineering, and university teaching in five countries—the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Germany—since 1930. The book's ambition is ultimately both its strength and its fatal weakness.

The aspiration to unite the sociology of states and the sociology of professions should be taken seriously. This book contributes to the latter field's rediscovery that occupational/organizational environments do matter: professions cannot be understood purely in terms of their own projects and their *demand* for licensure without reference to the features of the state and the market, or, as Krause prefers, capitalism, which influence its *supply*. However, it is not clear that the case for considering modern professions through the lens of guild power is sustained. The field is prone to the nominalist fallacy that, just because the terms "physician," "attorney," and "professor" have survived since medieval times, their referent is unchanged and can sensibly be analyzed as historically continuous. The London physicians who received a royal charter in 1518 were a small elite group whose monopoly was limited to the city and who struggled to maintain even that in a free market for healers. Their relationship to the modern occupational corporation created in the second half of the 19th century seems much better understood as an expression of the importance of antiquity to the legitimating rhetorics of the later period.

More worrying is the reliability of the supporting evidence. I am not an expert on four of the five countries featured. However, my failure to recognize the country described as Britain leaves me very skeptical about the other accounts. This chapter, like the others, uses a limited range of sources and takes very little account of developments since about 1985. In this case, however, the sources are recognizably tailored to the procrustean bed of Krause's ideology. Space only permits two specific examples.

The creation of the National Health Service (NHS) after World War II is said to be an advance of the interests of capitalism through an arrangement between the state and the doctors from which the public and other health professions were excluded (p. 92). This is bizarre. The policy was a Labour initiative, led by Aneurin Bevan, one of the most committed socialists ever to hold government office in the United Kingdom. Bevan's own speeches, including a key speech to the physiotherapists' annual conference, and his writings make it clear that he saw himself as acting on behalf of a public that needed free health care and should not be subjected to the restoration of capitalist values after the collective experiences of wartime. The numerous assertions about specialist dominance of the subsequent NHS also seem questionable in the light of post-1989 developments, which are not discussed, and the creation of GP (general practitioner) fundholding, where family physicians act as proxy purchasers of specialist care for their patients, subordinating the specialists to their preferences and priorities.

The description of university teaching relies heavily on one polemical book published in 1983 at the height of the panic created by the government's desire to make higher education more accountable, a Conservative continuation of 1970s Labour policies. No one reading this account would know that the 1980s and 1990s had seen a spectacular growth in the participation rate, to about 30% of 18–21 year olds, and in the opportunities for nontraditional entrants, now slightly over half of all students. Britain now has a mass system of higher education, within which sociology has been doing reasonably well. Social science research funding has steadily recovered from the trough of the early 1980s and has been seen as an increasingly important element of the national science effort. University teachers' work is more closely audited, both in teaching and research terms, but there has been little effort to influence content directly rather than to ensure that publicly salaried workers actually deliver an appropriate quality and quantity of service.

It is not difficult to spot compromising minor errors elsewhere: Yves Dezelay is consistently cited as Desolay; the English professor Stacey is Margaret not Margot (p. 300); the *McGill Law Journal* is not a critical legal studies journal (p. 230), there is no such body as the World Court sitting in Brussels (p. 277); and so on. Krause points the voyager in the right direction, toward the triangle of professions, states, and markets, but his unreliable navigation suggests that this particular construction of the triangle may be more Bermudan than Euclidean.

*Stratification and Power: Structures of Class, Status and Command.* By John Scott. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. Pp. x+284.

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As a title, *Stratification and Power: Structures of Class, Status and Command* can hardly be improved: it has all the keywords of the social stratification field (with the addition of "command"), and, at the most basic level, it will provide sociology students with a readable, compact, and cogent presentation of the arguments of the masters together with an attempted synthesis. ("Command," incidentally, acts as a substitute for the more commonly known "party" or "power" of the Weberian tradition.) The book also suits the sentiments of the age. The word "postmodernist" lurks around the text, but, perhaps surprisingly, this is not a book of deconstruction nor does it advance the claim that the concept of class can no longer be a central narrative. What, then, does it attempt? *Stratification and Power* is primarily an *exposition* of major contributors to the stratification debate (and here its roots in a thesis and a lifetime of teaching are apparent), it is fair, lucid, and scholarly. It also advances Max Weber's account (mainly in *Economy and Society*) as a reformable framework for encompassing apparently conflicting and competing accounts, and it follows Dahrendorf's earlier attempts, in *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, to synthesize by resisting the attempt to update or modernize a Marxian approach. The first part of the book, then, advances the classic "three-dimensional" Weberian framework as a comprehensive, encompassing Broad Church. It interprets Marxian approaches as the property and market facet of class, identifies Warner as the chief exponent of class-as-status with Parsons and the functionalists as its inheritors, and locates the work of Mosca, Pareto, and reformist Marxists as expositors of the elite-centered model. This is good, if unadventurous.

The final three chapters advance the more enterprising aspects of the book. In chapter 6, "authority" becomes the key concept, Dahrendorf's "quasi-groups" and Erik Olin Wright's "rational-choice marxism" are both accused of conflating "command" with "class." The author argues strongly for their analytic separation. Chapter 7 finally takes up the key modern debates and addresses the problem of class schemata and occupational stratifications. In so doing, the vexed issues of the unit of stratification and of the "genderization" are tackled, and more recent disputes (especially within the British context of the John Goldthorpe social mobility research) are discussed. It is here that Scott pulls back from following the logic of his own argument. While acknowledging that Goldthorpe has now jettisoned the Weberian search for social classes (or at least the identification of them; see p. 215), he allows him to preserve the semblance of so doing, in keeping the Goldthorpe-Hope schema also demoting it to an heuristic (the revised schema is described by Goldthorpe as

an *instrument du travail* rather than as a descriptive map in *The Constant Flux* [Clarendon Press 1993, p. 46]). Here is the rub: the synthetic exercise begun in *The Affluent Worker* (Cambridge University Press, 1968) and carried through the British social mobility studies ends by disposing of the framework and measurement in a way that makes Ludwig Wittgenstein's disposal of the ladder in the *Tractatus* look halfhearted.

In the end, Scott is satisfied that there remains a descriptive and an analytical language for continuing studies of social class in a Weberian setting. I am not so sanguine, and I think Scott pinpoints the crucial issue. At root, the question is how accounts of class given by participants (one is almost tempted to use *vestehen*)—and the lay sociologist is perfectly content to give them still—is supposed to relate in a representational way to the structure of classes (or, indeed, to structures of status, power, or command) that are claimed by sociologists to exist as an independent entity: “Where members of the various social classes in a society describe their own characteristics and those of their class in the vocabulary of ‘class,’ using a distinctively class imagery, they will have some conception of the number and attributes of the social classes which exist in their society and they will probably have specific names for some of these classes” (p. 225). Indeed they do (see, e.g., A. P. M. Coxon and C. L. Jones, *Class and Hierarchy* [Macmillan, 1979]), but note that unless that class terminology is simply a derivative distortion of an authentic, uncontested, correct sociological account (and here the Marxist notion of false consciousness has coherence and cogency), then the sociological account must derive from (or both accounts must derive from) the same stock of concepts, constructs, and rules for determining whether classes have particular properties. The ideal-typical construct of a Weberian (or any other) social class will not pass muster as a generically different (and superior) animal to the social actor’s account as the “objective” vs. “subjective” social class conceptualizations tried to claim. This is not least because, as Winch argued some decades ago, the materials, the constructions, and the rules of both social class conceptualizations are constructed of the same material, so there is no privileged method open to the social scientist that is not, in principle, also open to the person in the street.

If some accounts of social class and of social stratification can be adjudged better than others however (and only an absurdly radical relativist would deny this), then the criteria for identifying instances, for inferring structure, and for developing rules for allocation to classes must be public and must be stated in a way that makes the resultant model (or, more likely, models) transparent. This is the precise juncture at which representation and measurement become relevant, and it is what is lacking from Scott’s account (and, to be fair, Weber’s account). On this at least, Goldthorpe and the earlier Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan traditions agreed (the latter curiously missing from Scott’s exposition). They rightly see the necessity for a plurality of models and representations so that to ask of “the” number of classes, or of “their” characteristics *tout*

court is to misrepresent not only what is practical but also what is possible in sociological study.

It is to Scott's great credit that these fundamental and protean problems of social stratification surface so naturally in his account. But whether his version of Weber can succeed in encompassing the complexity and multiplexity of meaning of the concept of class unfortunately remains undemonstrated.

*American Elites*. By Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+176. \$26.00.

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In 1982, the political scientist Stanley Rothman and a colleague, S. Robert Lichter, published a book on the American student movement of the 1960s. The book gave rebellious students no quarter. Skeptical both of the expressed ideals of student radicals and of social psychological studies that consistently found them "democratic" and "humanistic" in temperament, Rothman and Lichter used thematic apperception tests to unmask what they interpreted as the hidden power motives and narcissism that drove the protest movement. While thoroughly one-sided, the book revealed a little-appreciated aspect of the student movement, one that any honest veteran of that movement would be able, in retrospect, to confirm. Moreover, Rothman and Lichter argued their case in an engagingly vigorous manner.

Rothman subsequently turned his attention to the "march through institutions" of these student radicals and the elders who supported them. Beginning in the later 1970s, Rothman began to survey American elites—first in business and journalism and later in other fields—guided by the working hypothesis that the "adversary culture" (and the deeply troubled psyches driving it) were beginning to undermine American society from the inside. The "new elites" were located in more "intellectual" occupations—the mass media, the universities, the entertainment industry, the federal bureaucracy, and nonprofit organizations. This is a story line that will be familiar to anyone who has read the work of the political journalists Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. Rothman and two husband-wife teams (first Linda Lichter and Robert Lichter, now Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai) have now published some five books drawing on the results of the surveys, with more in the works. The latest is an effort to summarize the study findings and to place them in relation to the tradition of elite theory that extends back to Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels.

On the evidence of this volume, we will have to keep looking for a

Mosca for our time. The book is not so much about American elites as it is about American elite ideologies. The gist of the argument is that American elites, once united by a common commitment to Victorian bourgeois morality and patriotism, are now divided between market and welfare state boosters, between social conservatives and trendy modernists, and between old-fashioned patriots and critics of American power. The major faultlines divide business and military elites, on one side, and cultural elites, on the other. (However, labor elites anchor the liberal line on welfare state issues while cultural elites defect to a degree that is not very comfortable for the underlying thesis of an "adversary culture.")

It is by no means clear that we should trust the findings of the study. The samples can only be described as conceptually dubious and methodologically unsound. The authors' understanding of the composition of the American elite is eccentric. Business is one of 12 "strategic elites" studied. Three of the elites are from popular culture industries: film, television, and journalism. The others come from the military, the federal bureaucracy, labor unions, congressional aides, the judiciary, corporate law, public interest organizations, and organized religion. While congressional aides are included as a strategic elite, politicians are not. Intellectuals are a major target of criticism in the book, but neither academics nor public intellectuals are sampled. (Limp explanations for these omissions are provided in footnotes.) A deeper question is this: What if both the center of gravity and the major conflicts in the American elite are based in one or two segments rather than in 12 equally "strategic" elites? Businessmen and politicians certainly deserve more attention than they receive here. Why is Wall Street missing? Why are there no comparisons between dynamic sectors, such as computer technology or biotechnology, and older sectors? And what about management and political consultants? Perhaps they deserve to be considered as "strategic elites."

The methodology could not pass a first-year research methods course. No standard set of procedures were used in drawing the 12 elite samples. Something approaching stratified random sampling was used to draw several of the elite samples, but the business sample was drawn exclusively from seven corporations. Top-ranking bureaucrats were purposely sampled to draw equal numbers from "activist" and "traditional" agencies. The sample of religious leaders was collected using snowball methods, which somehow failed to qualify any Jews or Muslims as religious leaders. Response rates ranged from 54% for the fairly well-drawn sample of labor leaders to 96% for the dubious sample of business leaders. It is odd to see these muddled samples so confidently labeled as "business leaders," "labor leaders," "top-level bureaucrats," and "religious leaders" in the tables and text. Eleven organizations collected the data, yet the possibility of house effects is not mentioned. The samples were drawn over a six-year period straddling the election of Ronald Reagan, yet the possibility of period effects is not mentioned.

Once readers have swallowed hard on the methodology, they will have to get past some loaded political language and assumptions. Support for

government social welfare programs is "collectivist liberalism"; the Cold War era terminology suggests a Communist plot. Writers for the *New York Review of Books* are "alienated intellectuals" rather than, say, fine stylists and deep thinkers. Those who think that the American legal system favors people with money and power (including a majority of even the most conservative elites) are "alienated from the system" rather than, for example, knowledgeable members of their society.

Though they do not give businessmen and politicians their proper weight, it is possible that the authors' findings about the dimensions and divisions in American elite ideology are otherwise essentially correct for the time period they studied. The findings are not too different, after all, from those of Allan Barton and his colleagues at Columbia University from 10 years before. Even so, time has not been an ally of Rothman and his colleagues' efforts. I mean this in two senses: First, the major conflicts in the political arena have changed since these data were collected. The evidence seems not to have crossed these authors' field of vision, but the right won on issues of the welfare state and business regulation. Most leading Democrats now speak quite like Republicans on these issues. "Expressive liberalism" is still around, of course, but it is not a very convincing regime threat. It is important primarily for fueling consumer markets among young urbanites, the more adventurous of their affluent elders, and those in the suburbs who want, at least occasionally, to share this uninhibited sensibility. "Anti-Americanism" is off the radar screen. At the same time, inequality has increased and money has, in some ways, become even more important in politics and cultural life. Under these circumstances, the neoconservatives' vision of an embattled bourgeoisie fighting dangerous "new-class" antagonists no longer arouses much alarm or indignation. Nor has time been an ally in the writers' own literary development. Perhaps sensing that this material no longer rings emotional bells, Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman have given us a flat book, lacking scholarly depth and intellectual energy. In this respect, it is a book very much unlike Rothman's earlier volume on the student movement. It seems to have been written more out of a determination to follow through to the end on a large investment than out of any real passion to understand what is happening among elites in American society.

*The New Pediatrics: A Profession in Transition.* By Dorothy Pawluch. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996. Pp. xii+175. \$41.95.

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The processes of professionalization and medicalization are two subject areas of central interest to medical sociologists. Dorothy Pawluch's book on "the new pediatrics" is a laudable attempt to link these issues together. The book quite successfully examines the professional ambitions of pedia-

tricians within the context of medicalization (i.e., the process whereby an increasing number of human behaviors come to be framed and treated as medical problems). Although the central focus of the book is on pediatricians' struggles to carve out their own professional niche and to justify the continued existence of their field, it simultaneously provides valuable insights into the medicalization of borderline medical problems of childhood and of adolescence.

Following a brief overview of the early history of the profession, Pawluch examines the social forces that prompted the emergence of a new definition of pediatrics, a practice that no longer is concerned only with children's physical health but with their emotional, social, and even spiritual well-being as well. The new pediatrics largely emerged as the result of pediatricians' effort to survive as a professional specialty at a time when child morbidity and mortality rates decreased drastically due to the decline in infectious diseases and improved nutritional standards.

By organizing professionally, and by taking over the task of disease prevention during the era of the baby boom, pediatrics did not decline as a medial specialty but thrived. Yet the decade of the 1950s signaled a new pessimistic attitude among pediatricians: "the dissatisfied pediatrician syndrome." The new focus on prevention and routine care of children left many practitioners with a sense that their profession had a "lack of challenge and stimulation"—what one pediatrician referred to as the tedium of "playing grandmother" (p. 45). To resolve this sense of tedium, an expansion of the role of pediatricians to include behavioral and developmental issues, such as children's school problems, and adolescent issues—such as drinking, drug use, and sex education—seemed to some practitioners to be the best solution. To justify their foray into these non-traditional aspects of pediatric care, proponents of the new pediatrics used both the rhetoric of "endangerment" and "entitlement," that is, the argument that negative childhood experiences could have far-reaching negative personal and social effects and that all children have a right to maximal growth and development (p. 99).

Pawluch's analysis of the emergence of the new pediatrics is, however, by no means a simplistic and straightforward tale about medical imperialism. The main strength of the book is the detailed attention to rhetorical strategies and conflicts inherent in the process of professional change, especially within the pediatric community itself. The new pediatrics was never embraced by all pediatricians, and, at times, the parents of children in treatment seemed much more interested in making use of the behavioral aspects of new pediatrics than the practitioners were willing or able to provide it. Clearly, many practicing pediatricians and academics felt that the new "pediatrics was venturing into areas in which it did not really belong and in which pediatricians had no expertise" (p. 59). Another significant obstacle was presented by the academic medical institutions, which, traditionally, have been both unwilling and unprepared to provide their students with proper psychosocial training. And, finally, proponents of the new pediatrics had to carefully develop rhetorical strat-

egies to delineate their expertise from the expertise of other health care professionals, such as psychiatrists and pediatric nurse practitioners.

While Pawluch briefly mentions the consequences of the new pediatrics for its clients, the book lacks an in-depth discussion of the effects of the new pediatrics on our concept of childhood and social definition of "normal" childhood behavior. Another issue that is not sufficiently explained in the book is the impact of the economics of managed care on the pediatric profession. It is a well-known fact that providers of managed care (including pediatricians) are increasingly encouraged by insurance companies and employers to deal with psychosocial issues in terms of cost effective drug treatments rather than by more time-consuming therapeutic approaches (see p. 98). In light of the increased popularity of managed care, the new definition of pediatrics as a behavioral specialty appears to increase the tendency to solve childhood and adolescent problems by means of psychotropic drugs. Finally, Pawluch fails to mention that the emergence of the new pediatrics coincided with the feminization of the medical profession and that female physicians remain comparatively overrepresented among pediatricians. It is not unlikely that the new definition of pediatrics as both a "caring" and a "curing" field of expertise, at least in some respects, is related to the feminization of the specialty. Yet, Pawluch's book clearly deserves attention from medical sociologists, medical historians, and child welfare professionals in general.

*The Socially Responsive Self: Social Theory and Professional Ethics.* By Larry May. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. xii+209. \$35.00 (cloth); \$15.95 (paper).

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Larry May, a philosopher with a distinctively sociological imagination, is the author of numerous works on group and professional ethics. In this his most recent work he investigates how social theory can inform the understanding of the problems and prospects of professional ethics. In doing so, he draws heavily on the works of classical and contemporary sociological theory highlighting insights into the ethical dilemmas professionals face in institutionalized social settings often overlooked by sociologists of professions.

May's argument is centered on a series of fundamental sociological propositions about the nature of professional life. The socially constructed nature of the self affects the way questions of professional integrity are understood and actuated. The sense of solidarity with primary and secondary social groups provide support for ethically directed behavior. Moral authority and obligation are linked to collective consciousness not simply to qualities of individual character. People learn their sense of obligation as they are socialized into specific groups for better and for

worse. In the classical Weberian contrast between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of ultimate ends, the responsibility in question is social to different social groups.

May uses these propositions to argue for what he calls a progressive communitarian perspective on social theory and professional ethics and applies it to a series of case studies: the public relations professional, the problem of conflicts of interest as it is manifested in such professions as real estate professionals, the dilemmas of legal advocacy, the tension between the professional claims of medicine and the claims of Christian Science, and the role professional associations can play in supporting scientific whistle-blowers. Each of the cases is considered as a way to illustrate his theoretical argument; representativeness is an unaddressed issue. May's consideration of empirical cases is used in much the same way that hypothetical cases are used by analytic philosophers. Nonetheless, the proposed theoretical position is sufficiently broad ranging and provocative to warrant a serious reading even by the most skeptical empiricist. May draws upon the insights of critical theory and classical sociology (Durkheim and Weber are given fresh readings in the development of his position). He uses postmodern analysis to develop a pluralistic ethics.

In one of his more interesting theoretical moves, May presents a critique of the ethics of bureaucracy drawing upon the insights of Hannah Arendt. Citing Arendt's famous essay, "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil," he observes that certain institutions instill in their members a willingness to do just about anything, even evil. They come to think that they are not responsible for the actions they take as members of a bureaucratic organization, that they are just doing their jobs as defined by organizational imperatives. They separate themselves as persons from their office and from its role requirements in the bureaucratic organization. May maintains that this central feature of Weber's ideal-type of rational legal bureaucratic organization is especially pernicious when the members of the organization see themselves as perfectly replaceable and when their commitment to their family's well-being makes them feel materially vulnerable. People then come to operate in a way that allows the organization to define the limits of their ethical concerns. They lose a sense of personal and social responsibility. This is of crucial importance today for the ethics of the professions, May observes, because professionals are most often found working in large scale social organizations.

May draws from this a general observation: "Strong social bonds plus a diminished sense of personal autonomy are what create the 'cogs in the machine' mentality of bureaucrats" (p. 75). Yet his analysis is, in my judgment, too one-dimensional. He observes that Jürgen Habermas also once understood the negative consequences of socialization in his analysis of "the political anonymization of class rule. . . . But in his recent concerns with the positive connections between socialization and individual maturation that he forgets the negative features of socialization (p. 76). May seems to think that these two positions are mutually exclusive. Either

institutions negatively or positively affect ethical action. The awareness that they do both and the sociological determination of when they are likely to lead to one outcome or the other are beyond the reach of his inquiry. When it comes to the problem of bureaucracy, his is an analysis that seems to emphasize the ethical dimensions of Weber's iron cage and not Weber's observations of the efficiency and rationality of modern organizations. The perpetually problematic connection between these two Weberian insights goes unexamined.

There is a tendency in this text to present theoretical arguments that appear to be too general to do the practical work to which they are being applied. Institutional mediation, profession, the self (responsive and otherwise), and the community are all presented at a high level of generalization and seem to act in characteristic ways that are more problematic than May seems to recognize. The self is divided and socialized by multiple associations and memberships both as the object of action and the source of participation and ethical responsibility. For the philosophical postmodernists, the antipostmodernists, and May, a mediator in their disputes, such matters must be decided at the most general of levels. But it seems to this reader that it is only in the concrete particulars that such matters are to be decided, and they will be decided differently, in different ways, among different groups, at different times. This is the way sociologists handle such matters. Yet, philosophic considerations of sociological questions do highlight the general stakes involved, and for doing so with clarity and persuasiveness, May has made an important contribution to the study of social and professional ethics.

*Poor Richard's Principle: Recovering the American Dream through the Moral Dimension of Work, Business, and Money.* By Robert Wuthnow. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+429. \$24.95.

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Robert Wuthnow's new book, *Poor Richard's Principle: Recovering the American Dream through the Moral Dimension of Work, Business, and Money*, is a rich, sprawling journey through the world of work, money, and morality. Its central argument is that Americans have lost an effective moral language to navigate the pressing conflicts between their economic commitments (jobs and money) and their human ones (family, community, and spirituality). The American Dream, which once accomplished this integration, has become more problematic as earnings are decoupled from hard work, and our sense of what is enough in the consumer sphere is disappearing. The loss of moral discourse, Wuthnow argues, is the central culprit for widely recognized problems plaguing the American workforce, such as overwork, stress, inadequate incomes, and consumer debt. In his view, these problems are only superficially eco-

nomic maladies. Underlying them is a profound inability to mobilize a moral framework to tame the expansionism of the market, its overt pressures, and, most important, its alluring siren call.

Wuthnow—one of the nation's leading authorities on the relationship between religion, economics, and society—has marshaled impressive evidence to construct his case, a 2,000-person nationwide survey consisting of 500 questions plus 200 two-hour personal interviews. Based on this rich evidence, "Cultural Construction of Material Life," part 2 of his book, is fascinating to read. He begins by arguing that work is important not mainly for the money it makes (a point I think almost no one would disagree with, even my own tribe of economists) but because it allows people to create legitimating "accounts" of themselves as individuals. But these accounts, he goes on to show, are circumscribed by the constraints of the workplace: they are formulaic, narrow, and silent on most important issues. In short, they are accounts largely borrowed from the institution's legitimation of itself. As such, the accounts are sadly inadequate ways to help people set limits on work time or to aid them with the inevitable ethical compromises of working life.

Wuthnow's second topic is money. Here he argues that there are powerful taboos against private discussions of money and that the responsibility for money has become highly privatized. As a result, Americans have a tremendous anxiety about money, no way to assess "how much is enough," and no framework for judging consumption decisions other than that offered by the market (i.e., is it a good value for the money?). The decision about whether to make a purchase is relegated to an ethical never-never land that few of us ever visit. Yet we are troubled by this state of affairs. We have a strong sense that we work too much and that our society has become fatally corrupted by materialism. Money is widely believed to be impure, defiled, and at odds with "the human spirit." From this perspective, *Poor Richard's Principle* proceeds to interesting discussions of middle-class conceptions of poverty, volunteering, family, community, and spirituality, as well as to analyses of two important surviving strands of moral discourse: ascetic and expressive moralism.

Wuthnow's book is a powerful one and should be read by anyone interested in these issues. However, I did not always find it convincing. An example is the claim that economics is secondary to understanding contemporary maladies. As evidence Wuthnow points to the association between workplace stress and the questioning of values. The causation could easily be reversed, however: stressed-out individuals contemplate major work-life changes, which naturally lead them to think about the big issues. The ethical complexities are not causing the stress but are a result of it. I also question his view that individuals' long hours are due mainly to a lack of moral restraint rather than to pressures from their employers. In fact, his excellent discussion of how people internalize the work norms of their organization is consistent with my view. What is missing is the recognition that the economic structure imposes significant penalties on people who do not internalize those norms. Similarly, the

discussion of spending behavior lacked an analysis of the underlying competitive structure of consumption. Here, I believe, the missing piece is the dynamic of escalating consumer norms in an environment where social inequality enforces "keeping up" behavior.

At times, I also wondered whether a bit of golden age-ism was creeping into the story. Was the relation between the economy and the "human spirit" really so unproblematic in the past? What about robber barons, the Depression, or post-Civil War debt peonage, and the populist and class protests these episodes spawned? Would not the American Dream also have been problematic then? Finally, I wondered if the world Wuthnow has constructed is not a little too comfortable. Where are the angry white militamen, downshifters, compulsive shoppers, and kids killing for Nikes? Could they have surfaced between 1992 (the year of the survey) and the present?

These are only quibbles. Wuthnow's central argument—that Americans need better moral languages with which to confront and restrain the market economy—is absolutely right and of urgent concern. This book will undoubtedly help in the search for such discourses.

*The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity.* By Kristen Renwick Monroe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xix+292. \$29.95.

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Monroe's *Heart of Altruism* has two related purposes. First, it attempts to identify the causes of altruism and the ways in which altruists are different from the rest of us. Her conclusion is that there may be a variety of factors that enter into the development of altruism in an individual but that the central way altruists differ from others is on their perspective. She claims that while most people think in terms of "us" and "them," altruists see each other person as a member of a common humanity. Her second purpose is, essentially, to attack rational choice theory. It is her belief that there is far too much emphasis on self-interest as the sole motivational principle in human behavior. She uses her interviews with altruists to attempt to undermine this monolithic philosophical view.

The book consists of an introduction, 11 chapters, and a conclusion. The chapters are organized into four parts. The introduction and first chapter set up the problem in terms of the importance of altruism both theoretically and practically. The following four chapters present, in turn, her four groups of respondents—entrepreneurs, philanthropists, heroes/heroinies, and rescuers of Jews in Europe (altruists)—by quoting one "exemplar" extensively. Part 3, also consisting of four chapters, presents her analysis of four explanations of altruism: sociocultural, economic, biological, and psychological. Part 4 presents her own view on the causation

and nature of altruism and perceived implications for political behavior.

The major strengths of this book lie in her extraordinarily scholarly review of the literature in biology, psychology, and economics and in her sensitive presentation of her interview materials. All respondents were intensively interviewed, the interviews were recorded on audio- or videotape, and extensive questionnaire materials were also collected. Monroe has fascinating, rich information on her respondents and a wonderful ear for what they are telling her. The individuals presented in detail leap from the pages and become real.

One major weakness of the book—which leads me not to recommend it—lies in her sampling. A month into the very basic research methods course I teach, even the weakest of my students would know that her data cannot be generalized. She nowhere states how she chose her sample—five each of entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and heroes/heroines, and 10 altruists/rescuers. All we know is that the heroes/heroines came from the Carnegie Hero Commission and the rescuers from Yad Vashem. She does mention that all respondents are “over 50”—which is intended as a cohort control. Since, by 1988–1992, when she conducted these interviews, the rescuers *had* to have been at least 65 and were probably closer to 75 or 80, this is not much of a match. They also were all (by definition) born and raised in Europe, while the members of the other groups were for the most part raised in this country. She also says that she “tried to match entrepreneurs with philanthropists on critical background characteristics, such as initial socioeconomic situation, education, religion and so forth” (p. 21), but no matching of the other groups is noted. Furthermore, it appears that she chose the most interesting rather than the most “typical” to present. Thus it is even difficult to know how these very small groups of individuals vary among themselves.

Another weakness lies in the “sociocultural” explanations chapter, in which Monroe completely ignores the sociological perspective and sociological research on altruism. For example, she fails to cite an *Annual Review of Sociology* chapter on altruism that appeared in 1990, which essentially makes the same basic point about self-interest. She discusses identity without referring to Sheldon Stryker, Ralph Turner, or McCall and Simmons and uses the term “framing” without any reference to the origins of the term or to the sociological literature. While she talks about the prisoner’s dilemma, she never refers to the work on differences in motivation between individuals placed in this situation, which would actually strengthen her arguments regarding the different perspective of altruists on social relations. She also does not refer to any research on blood donation after Richard Titmuss’s *The Gift Relationship* (Pantheon, 1971), or Roberta Simmons’s extensive work on organ and marrow donation. This is unfortunate for her argument concerning perspective. Given the nature of how blood and bone marrow are distributed, these donors are clearly willing to give to *all* others, not just those defined as “we.” Furthermore, her review of all the areas seems to have mainly ended in

1991. The only exceptions are citations of *Political Psychology* right up through 1995, and the edited volume by Pearl Oliner et al., *Embracing the Other* (New York University Press, 1992), which focuses heavily on rescuers during the holocaust.

This book is unlikely to prove convincing to sociologists or social psychologists. For a more compelling discussion of the rescuers of Jews, I recommend Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliners's *The Altruistic Personality* (Free Press, 1988), which employs a control group of contemporaneous nonrescuers. For a more convincing presentation of the arguments against self-interest as the only human motivation, try Jane Mansbridge's edited *Beyond Self-Interest* (University of Chicago Press, 1990).

*Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Life.* By Patricia Boling. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+192. \$37.50 (cloth); \$15.95 (paper).

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In the last two decades, feminist theorists have radically transformed conventional conceptions of the public and private spheres. They have demonstrated that privacy is an ideological construct that often veils and legitimates gender inequity. In cases of spousal abuse, rape, and even reproductive freedom, the right to make a private choice is a luxury poor women cannot afford. Privacy rights apply to everyone but women, poor people, and gays and lesbians, whose lives are subject to intervention because the state has a demonstrated interest in protecting normative families and, hence, in enforcing heterosexuality, procreation, and traditional gender roles.

In *Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Life*, Patricia Boling defines privacy in affirmative terms that assimilate this feminist critique of the liberal, negative conception of privacy (i.e., freedom from state interference). But Boling also wants to carve out a private sphere that cannot be reduced to a political one. In their eagerness to deconstruct privacy, says Boling, feminists have failed to protect or validate the private *qua* private and have inadvertently replicated in their own politics the imperative to conform to normative ideals—feminist ones. The personal is not always political; and, when feminists conflate the two realms, the intimate need for privacy that makes us human is violated.

Boling turns to Hannah Arendt's recently revived work in order to undercut a sharp division between or conflation of private and public. Although Arendt devalues the private in favor of the polis and political life, she also recognizes the complicated ways in which the private impinges on the public and celebrates the significance of intimate life. Boling takes the relation between private and public as her starting point

in order to address the *process* by which the private becomes public. In so doing, she seeks to articulate what is properly private and what kinds of issues require a public approach. Moreover, she seeks to define the content of privacy in substantive terms. Privacy must be conceived as an affirmative right that the state has an interest in protecting for all.

Boling makes this argument by analyzing privacy in three contexts: reproductive rights, debates about mothering, and gay and lesbian rights. The book makes a strong case for the revision of feminist critiques but does not make a persuasive revision of the concept of privacy in a way that moves beyond such critiques. The book is marked by tension between the ideal of formal equality, and the author's recognition that inequality exists. Boling wants all of us to shed our differences in order to participate in political life as equals. She believes that we can achieve this if we redefine liberal concepts of privacy and avoid the feminist subsumption of the private into the public. But she offers no clear conceptual framework by which that goal might be achieved. After all, how do individuals shed differences when they are ruthlessly defined by them? Boling both acknowledges this unpleasant fact and insists that those stigmas can be shed if privacy were to be defined affirmatively. However, it is not clear how an affirmative definition of privacy would transform the normative framework of "likeness" (white, bourgeois masculinity) and difference that defines citizenship in the first place. Her chapter on "outing" in the gay community is conscious of and, yet, denies structural inequity so dramatically that she actually equates the exclusionary tendencies of some lesbians in their own community to homophobia itself: "The pressure for self-revelation and openness about intimate life, . . . if one . . . fails to meet the community's standards, parallel the exclusion and medicalization of homosexuality by heterosexual society" (p. 141).

The venom reserved for gays and lesbians in this book (outing and cultural feminism represent a minority view in those communities, and Boling knows this even as she holds them up as exemplary) is matched only by Boling's sensitivity to the plight of marginalized people, including gays and lesbians. In the beginning of the book, she defines our reluctance to "chastise our colleagues for being too fat" as a "privacy norm" (p. 3). Our silence is far more comprehensible paradoxically as the public recognition that one's colleague has already been defined and stigmatized as a fat person. That "privacy norm" only reinforces normative social organization. Later in the book, Boling notes that "coming out as fat" is a means of taking control of a stigmatizing discourse—it makes something private (the stigma) public in an empowering fashion. This empowering discourse, however, demonstrates that the private experience of the stigma was always public knowledge: the person now proclaims *she* controls that knowledge. *Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Life* uses logic similar to that underlying these two examples to demonstrate a *difference* between private and public. This project thus falters in its effort to articulate a relation between private and public because it reinscribes a fundamental dichotomy between them.

*Making Peace with the 60s.* By David Burner. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. 295. \$29.95

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By writing this book, David Burner may have made peace with the 1960s. However, *Making Peace with the 60s* will not generate peace for those seeking a balanced, objective account of the 1960s. Nor will this book produce peace among the more radical elements of the 1960s who came to believe that radical approaches had to be pursued if structural changes were to be achieved. Readers who either lived through this tumultuous decade or who are familiar with the vast literature of the 1960s will learn little new from this book.

*Making Peace with the 60s* will remind the reader just how unique and deeply challenging this decade was because Burner is an excellent storyteller. He begins with an original and intriguing account of how the works of the beatnik writers of the 1950s anticipate the rebellious 1960s. The developments of the 1960s—the Civil Rights movement, the Kennedy administration, the black power movement, the student rebellions, the antiwar movement and the Peace Corps, and the antipoverty wars—roll off the pages as if they were being dramatically reenacted before our eyes. At times, the author takes us backstage to reveal interesting tidbits that gave the decade its alluring qualities. But it is Burner's interpretation of these pivotal developments, coupled with his naive longings, that stifle the drama and cause us to reflect more deeply on this troubling decade.

In Burner's view, liberalism was the impulse that drove the multifaceted dynamics that unfolded in the 1960s. Liberalism took root during the New Deal and burst into full bloom in the 1960s. It is surprising that Burner fails to define liberalism given the analytical weight he accords it by asserting it to be the driving force behind the 1960s. It is clear, however, that, for Burner, liberalism refers to a philosophy that maintains that human problems can be solved by the objective and active application of science and technology. As a result, social justice will triumph, secondary irritants, such as racism and poverty, are no match for the superior power of a science and technology that unleash economic growth because of their reliance on impersonal knowledge and refined educational skills. Thus, an American liberal is a nationalistic individual who actively seeks progressive change but is characterized by self-control, caution, patience, and, above all, an unyielding faith in knowledge and intelligence.

For Burner, the major movements and efforts of the 1960s were the offspring of liberalism. Nevertheless, aggressive developments like the Civil Rights movement, the Cuban missile crisis, and the antipoverty wars represented critiques of classical liberalism's overreliance on patience and its failure to address racism and poverty head-on. But the

astute reader will recognize that *Making Peace with the 60s* celebrates those movements adhering to Burner's sense of self-control, intelligence, emotional constraint, and sweet reason. By this yardstick, the nonviolent Civil Rights movement represented moral perfection and epitomized self-control. Likewise, President Kennedy and his cabinet personified academic reason and approached explosive problems like cool logicians. The Peace Corps received similar genteel treatment. While Burner revealed some shortcomings of these efforts, his thrust was to praise them, for in his eyes they were characterized by some major tenets of New Deal liberalism.

No such luck for the black power movement or the radical wings of the student movement—especially the Weather Underground and radical feminism. Burner's accounts of these groups drip with dismissive contempt. They were enemies of reason and knowledge. They violated the most sacred tenets of liberalism. Black power and its adherents are singled out for the most scathing criticism. Burner does not like black power. In his chapter on black power, entitled "Killers of the Dream," he claims that this movement was a disaster because it alienated whites, trampled on the glory of nonviolence, and told black people "to look first not to their individual resources but to their skin to tell them who they are" (p. 50). In his view, this is black racism. Even worse, these black militants came to be the symbols that white militants and others imitated naively. The result is that such groups—blacks, women, gays and lesbians, and Hispanics—turned inward and celebrated every twitch of the hedonistic self. They became worshipers of selfhood and exploited the victim's role.

Burner does not understand what it meant to be black in America, especially before the 1960s. Regrettably, he does not seek to explore the social basis of black power. Prior to the 1960s, both blacks and whites were taught that blacks, along with their culture, institutions, and skin color, were inferior. This view gained ascendancy because of the superior institutional and ideological power of the dominant white society. Consequently, this outlook was programmed into the social psychological makeup of blacks and whites and retains potency even today. Black power resonated in the black community because it attempted to overthrow the awesome burden of an externally imposed sense of inferiority and to reveal the liberating potential of black culture and institutions. In this vein, black power was a positive development that deserves serious analysis. To view it as merely the flip side of white racism is to misunderstand the American dilemma.

The larger point is that one runs into analytic trouble when movements and an entire era of protest are assessed according to personal likes and dislikes, even when they are wrapped in the garments of philosophies such as liberalism. Because of this tunnel vision, Burner fails to adequately analyze why the most powerful nation on earth failed to make the activities—even misguided ones—of militants and revolutionaries unnecessary when it was confronted with naked truths about racism and

the Vietnam War. While Burner points a critical microscope on "irresponsible revolutionaries," he swings the angle of vision away from understanding, in any deep sense, why our government shot students in the back at Kent State and the Black Panthers while they slept. To make peace with a turbulent era like the 1960s, one must dissect both God and the devil and treat both impostures the same.

*Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds.* By Lawrence A. Hirschfeld. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. Pp. xvi+225. \$35.00.

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"Race is a category of power because it is a category of mind" (p. 187) is the central argument of Lawrence Hirschfeld's book, *Race in the Making*. In building up this claim, the author makes a provocative contribution to a troubled topic. Hirschfeld writes at a time when most scientists agree that race has no biologically grounded meaning, but folk theory persists in presuming embodied, essential, and categorical differences between types of people. Hirschfeld's goal is to examine the persistent core of racial thinking that "creates rather than discovers the reality to which it is tethered" (p. 190) and to show how young children acquire conventional folk beliefs about race.

Hirschfeld, an anthropologist with expertise in cognitive developmental psychology, anchors his densely reasoned argument in cross-cultural and historical research and in original experiments involving young children. He is clear that race is a social and historical construction deeply invested in relations of power, and he is alert to the wide variation across time and place in conceptions of difference. But he posits a universal cognitive mechanism, "an independently emerging essentialized strategy for reasoning specifically about human collectivities" (p. 194), that explains patterns that recur through this variation. The book is an effort to explore this universal dimension without adopting similarly universal, biological notions of race.

Hirschfeld also seeks to reconcile constructionist approaches of anthropology and history with cognitive psychology's search for basic structures of the mind. He is impressively well grounded in both approaches but separates the two in a sort of intellectual division of labor. Rather than contemplating a mutually constitutive relationship between mind and society, he posits a "special purpose cognitive device" that works "in articulation with a particular cultural system" (p. 195). He acknowledges enormous variations in racial classifications, which underscore the strength of culture and the significance of specificity, and he notes the persistent tie of racial thinking to structures of domination. But Hirschfeld sees historically specific relations of power as additive—they are "parasitic on a

domain-specific competence for perceiving and reasoning about human kinds" (p. 72). Ultimately, he privileges the epistemology and practices of cognitively oriented research; in his own experiments he gives little information about his subjects, relying instead on the folk beliefs of the larger culture as the context for his work.

Does Hirschfeld adequately demonstrate the universality of a cognitive mechanism that differentiates human kinds? He has not, of course, examined the entire human record across cultures and history; the literature he covers highlights historical changes within Western thinking, rather than changes in thinking across cultures. Similarly, Hirschfeld's research privileges comparative studies of children's thinking within one cultural system, focusing principally on the U.S. black/white racial divide, rather than comparative studies across contexts (though he plants the seeds of a cross-contextual argument through a few studies of French and Latino children in the United States). This limits Hirschfeld's ability to prove his claims, but he does illuminate recurring features that suggest the force and persistence of a category-producing mode of thought.

Using a systematic progression of experiments, Hirschfeld uncovers an important finding: young children do not form their beliefs about race from simple observation of surface cues. Instead, they seem to pick up the idea of race from their discursive environment—from talk about "intrinsicities and naturally grounded commonalities" (p. 193) that are important for the social organization of their culture. Only later do they attend to the physical correlates that the adults of their culture believe are important: "[they] initially do not *see* race; they *hear* it" (p. 195). This critical claim is at odds with traditional thinking about how young children form racial ideas.

Hirschfeld builds his argument carefully, consistently exploring alternative interpretations of each set of results. In the end the studies do not substantiate Hirschfeld's larger theoretical claims as strongly as he asserts. This is partly because he gives inadequate attention to problems inherent in the experiments that are set up like tests and force choices between bounded social categories (e.g., "pitting gender against race," [p. 147]). In addition, Hirschfeld decontextualizes his assertions about children without giving much information about the experiences particular children have had and the social practices in which they participate. This information is needed to probe constructionist arguments that might challenge the universalizing claims of cognitive science.

In the end, what Hirschfeld offers is an intriguing reworking of psychological arguments about how children acquire the particular forms of essentialist thinking that are important in the social world. He does not claim that cognition drives racial classifications (and racism) but does argue that humans are predisposed to cognize about intrinsic differences in human kinds and implies that the power that is built from these categorizations is rooted in basic structures of the human psyche. Would this limit the possibilities of creating a profoundly different social order? This

is where Hirschfeld's argument is especially though provoking, even explosive. *Race in the Making* deserves close attention from scholars across the disciplines.

*Representing Black Culture: Racial Conflict and Cultural Politics in the United States*. By Richard M. Merelman. New York: Routledge, 1995. Pp. xiv+330. \$17.95 (paper).

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In *Representing Black Culture*, Richard Merelman seeks to understand how racial conflict in the United States is expressed across a vast and often politically charged cultural landscape. Merelman begins his ambitious project with the following claim: black cultural projection in the United States has increased significantly over the last 10–20 years. What does the author mean by the term "black cultural projection"? Cultural projection refers to "that portion of a group's culture that reaches large numbers of people in other groups" (p. 4). The author goes on to state that the representation of a group's culture never captures the nuances and complexities of the projected group. Merelman is primarily interested in one broad question: Has the increased projection of black culture altered white perceptions of and racial attitudes about African-Americans? Further, he goes on to make the important claim that the cultural projection of African-Americans has evolved into a contentious terrain upon which competing cultural producers and sites of cultural production produce different narratives, representations, and ideas that struggle to define how African-Americans experience the world. While the author proposes some interesting questions in the proceeding chapters, unfortunately, they are not as well developed.

First, it is not clear how the author employs the concept of black cultural projection. Merelman examines the projection of black culture in middle school and higher education curricula, popular media entertainment, television news, and government legislation. By addressing such varied locations of cultural representation, the book fails to adequately define if the author is interested in how blacks represent themselves, specifically, or how black culture is represented more generally. Merelman is quite right when he argues that the representation of African-Americans has intensified. As a result, the cultural field has transitioned into a more explicitly contested territory in which the nature and scope of racial conflict has developed historically specific formations.

But what accounts for the seemingly accelerated production, commodification, and popularization of black popular cultures, for example? Unfortunately, Merelman leaves this site of questioning untouched. As a result, there is no serious attempt to understand the complex network of

factors, conditions, and transformations that enable new forms of black cultural projection to take shape. Whereas a sociologist of culture might consider the organizational sites from which cultural products are manufactured, Merelman tends to overlook this sphere of inquiry.

The author accurately posits that racial politics develop intense cultural manifestations. The struggle to shape popular ideas about the experience of race is, indeed, a complicated sphere of ideological contestation. Ultimately the book's ability to hold the reader is undermined by vaguely employed statistical and content measurements that are designed to reveal, among other things, how whites feel about characters in Spike Lee's film, *Do the Right Thing*, or the degree to which television news broadcasts show whites unified or divided over racial matters. Such measurements can be useful elements in further developing cultural studies, but the manner in which they are employed in this study makes it difficult to keep the author's concept of black cultural projection in focus. For example, while his content analysis of news representations of blacks is helpful, alone it is neither convincing or satisfying. Whereas the various content measurements tell the reader certain things about news reports, it fails to provide a more nuanced portraiture of how the news constructs race. News reports are narratives that develop conventions for telling stories that convey ideas and values about a complex society. Merelman's assessment of television news would be more instructive and dynamic if he discussed the narrative elements and visual strategies that give meaning and texture to the routine ways in which news gatherers make sense of race relations.

Moreover, Merelman seems to equate the purpose and ultimate function of black cultural projection with changing the hearts and minds of ordinary white Americans. While this is a laudatory goal, it misses some of the more crucial motivations that continue to drive the popular cultural practices of African-Americans: the struggle to carve out spaces of pleasure, individual and collective agency, and entrepreneurial opportunities in a media universe typically shaped by white cultural producers. For Merelman, the primary significance of black cultural projection is its capacity to transform white cultural hegemony into a new American culture marked by what he calls "syncretism." By syncretism he means an ideological world in which whites are able to modify their views about blacks by recombining their hegemonic views with the counterhegemonic viewpoints expressed by blacks into a new racial psychology. Merelman presupposes that white attitudes and perceptions of blacks should govern the articulation of black cultural politics. But black cultural politics are motivated by varying interests: political, racial, and commercial. The intentions that give shape and resonance to the representational politics of African-American filmmakers, writers, music producers, and publishers are as differentiated and complex as the distinct terrains upon which they operate. So, while it is true that black cultural producers are concerned with challenging conventional representations of blacks, other priorities continue to both mark and enliven their representational politics.

*Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Post-industrial New York.* By Roger Waldinger. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. x+374. \$35.00.

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In the late 1960s, African-Americans in New York City had unemployment rates only slightly higher than whites and well below the national black average. But by 1990, the city's African-American men were three times more likely than whites to be jobless. Over this same period, near-record numbers of immigrants arrived and managed to find work at close to the white employment rate. What can account for these sharply divergent trends?

Roger Waldinger offers an explanation based on analysis of 1940-90 census data and interviews with employers, workers, and union officials in several industries. In an argument sustained through nine chapters, he describes how the postwar outflow of whites created large numbers of job openings at all skill levels. Vacancies appeared even in shrinking manufacturing industries as whites left at a faster rate than labor demand declined. Despite often weak English-language and educational skills, foreign-born newcomers have won a disproportionate share of these openings. But they have not done so by directly displacing African-Americans from their jobs. Contrary to the influential skills mismatch hypothesis, Waldinger shows that African-American New Yorkers never had much of a presence in manufacturing and were becoming even more underrepresented in that sector long before immigration accelerated in the 1970s. In fact, the industrial distributions of African-Americans and nonwhite immigrants have seldom overlapped. He also finds little evidence to support claims that the availability of immigrant labor has indirectly displaced natives by enabling employers to keep wages and working conditions at unattractive levels. For example, real wages in the apparel industry began their long stagnation in the low-immigration years of the 1950s. Likewise, in hotels the fast job and real wage growth in recent years has not stopped the seepage of African-Americans from an industry in which they were overrepresented from the 1940s through the 1970s.

Instead of immigration, Waldinger assigns greatest importance to racial discrimination and African-Americans' rising job aspirations. Even as the white exodus picked up speed in the 1950s and 1960s, many white employers, workers, and union officials persisted in blocking African-Americans' access to training and promotional opportunities in key industries. Discriminatory treatment was most flagrant in the high-wage construction trades but about equally effective in lower-paying garment firms and hotels. Nonwhite immigrants have also suffered discrimination, but they tend to be far more willing to accept job slots at the bottom of the ethnic queue in exchange for wages well above those in their home-

land. Faced with scant prospects of upward mobility out of dead-end, low-skill positions, more and more African-Americans have spurned these industries in favor of the greater job security, wage equality, and training options of the public sector.

If immigration was not a cause of African-American employment problems in the past, Waldinger nonetheless worries that "the immigrant incursion into New York's economy makes it unlikely that African-Americans will reap the dividends of any future urban economic growth" (p. 316). This concern stems from the success that recent immigrants have had in carving out strong ethnic niches in a variety of industries. As these niches are consolidated and as employers increasingly rely on ethnic networks for recruitment, outsiders will be effectively excluded from most low-skill jobs. He argues that African-Americans are particularly vulnerable because their growing concentration in municipal employment, where high educational thresholds already offer little hope to less-skilled job seekers, has come at the cost of losing their earlier private-sector job networks. However, the author makes no attempt to reconcile his claim that African-Americans' rising expectations have led them to spurn most low-wage jobs with the prediction that future recessions will drive them into competition with immigrants now holding such jobs.

Unfortunately, this provocative book also has a number of more significant shortcomings. First, chapters 3 and 4 seek to trace postwar changes in native and immigrant shares of New York City jobs by calculating, for each census year, the fraction of employed city residents of each major race/nationality group. But this method fails to count the growing number of city jobs held by nonresidents. If one instead uses the information on each worker's actual city of employment contained in these same Public Use Macrodata Sample files, it turns out that 23% of all New York City jobs (and 19% of those in manufacturing) were in the hands of suburban commuters by 1990. Since most of these were white, Waldinger's figures systematically overestimate the extent to which the suburbanization of whites has opened up vacancies for native- and foreign-born minorities. The book makes no mention of this estimation problem.

The author also says far too little about gender differentials, despite the evidence (e.g., fig. 2.6) that African-American women have had employment trajectories much closer to those of native whites and Hispanic immigrants. The book's attempts to evaluate immigration's labor market impacts would have been strengthened by examining the large economic and sociological empirical literature on intercity differences in immigration and native jobholding. But this research is barely mentioned in passing in the final summary chapter. Equally neglected are the benefits of immigration for African-Americans: Without it, New York's population would have shrunk dramatically in recent decades, and the smaller tax base would have supported far fewer municipal jobs for native blacks. Finally, in my view, any book with so many worrisome things to say about racial discrimination, unemployment, immigration, labor unions,

and other controversial topics should also offer at least some discussion of the policy implications of its findings.

Nevertheless, this book is an ambitious exploration of key structural and demographic changes in postwar New York, written in clear, non-technical prose. Its detailed case studies of employment in the apparel, construction, hotel, and government industries will be of great interest to all those concerned about New York City's future.

*The Assault on Equality.* By Peter Knapp, Jane C. Kronick, R. William Marks, and Miriam G. Vosburgh. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. Pp. x+281. \$65.00 (cloth), \$22.95 (paper).

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*The Assault on Equality* is essentially a 240-page book review. Its primary focus is on Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's book, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (Free Press, 1994). The great majority of its content is a detailed critique of that well-known book presented in several forms. Some of it is an attempt to show that *The Bell Curve* serves the purposes of "the new right," but most of it is an attack on Herrnstein and Murray's "tricky" way of stating their case and a detailed discussion of their data and methods of analysis.

A good amount of thoughtful scholarship went into this book, and it reflects the different disciplines of its authors—sociology, social work, and biology. *The Bell Curve* is attacked from many directions based on our knowledge of genetics, demography, race relations, social stratification, value systems, political processes, social policy, and more. There is an impressive bibliography spanning many areas of inquiry.

Because of its multidisciplinary foundation, most readers will encounter new ideas and information in *The Assault on Equality*. I found the genetics discussion of particular interest. There are also sociological contributions that I had not seen before. For example, there is a replication of Herrnstein and Murray's analysis of the association between IQ and the probability of being in poverty. It uses IQ measurements from some of the *The Bell Curve* samples made at younger ages to replace the original Armed Forces Qualification Test scores Herrnstein and Murray used. The results are decidedly different, calling into question Herrnstein and Murray's assumption that IQ is a fixed entity.

Yet, I am left uncomfortable by the book. There have been many other reviews of *The Bell Curve*, and the authors even cite books that review the reviews of *The Bell Curve*. So, do we really need another one? And a book-length review, at that? The authors' constant reference to the specifics of Herrnstein and Murray's analysis and discussion is particularly troubling. The reader is led through whole sections of *The Bell Curve* in great detail. There are numerous references to the specifics (i.e., "Chapter

15," "the next paragraph," or "the section on crime"). If the reader has not read *The Bell Curve* carefully quite recently, it is sometimes hard to follow the discussion. I found that kind of specificity and detail distracting because it made it difficult to see the woods for the trees.

The authors clearly have a guiding purpose in writing the book: to show that we know a great deal about the reasons for success and failure in this society and that they are due to many things besides native ability. Their overall approach is one most sociologists will find appealing because it emphasizes social structures and socialization processes. But the book does not systematically present that alternative view. The authors devote so much of the book to the fine-grained critique of Herrnstein and Murray's logic and methodology that they are much more successful at tearing down *The Bell Curve's* thesis than at replacing it.

Occasionally they present complex figures that purport to show the "self-reinforcing cycles of deprivation at the aggregate and individual levels" (p. 72) or "an overview of some of the forces that have affected race inequality in the last two decades" (p. 114). They might well have been able to use such figures to help explain these complex processes, but their discussion of the figures is so brief that the meaning is left cloudy. At the very end of the book, they say: "We have tried to give the reader a more balanced picture of the existing social research" (p. 240). Unfortunately, the balance is tipped heavily toward attacking Herrnstein and Murray rather than presenting a basis for a "more balanced picture."

Although the authors clearly believe that there is a linkage between *The Bell Curve* and the New Right, the intense focus on detail makes their discussion of even that linkage less than systematic. Occasional reference is made to the writings of Dinesh D'Sousa, Newt Gingrich, and others, but it is not until the next to last chapter in the book that they turn to a discussion of the political philosophy of elitism. This topic could have provided an organizing theme for the whole book had it been presented at the outset and followed systematically throughout.

The statement on the back cover of the book says that "this is an appropriate supplement to courses such as race relations, stratification theory, policy, and research methods." The book is certainly relevant to all courses that discuss these issues. It is difficult to imagine, however, how it could be used to teach students who had not already read *The Bell Curve* or who were in the process of reading it.

*Resources, Deprivation, and Poverty.* By Brian Nolan and Christopher T. Whelan. New York: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x+261. \$65.00.

Dalton Conley  
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At the start of their ambitious volume, Nolan and Whelan liken the search for an objective or scientific method of setting a poverty line to

the quest for the philosopher's stone that "would turn base metal into gold" (p. 2). Despite their own forewarning, off they go, in search of a better method of poverty measurement and analysis. Their attempt at alchemy, however, is not by any means a bad one. The authors start with the very reasonable premise that low income and low consumption (i.e., deprivation) are not one and the same as most of the poverty literature implicitly assumes. Building on the classic work of Peter Townsend (*Poverty in the United Kingdom* [Penguin, 1979]), they attempt to combine a resource-based approach with indices of deprivation in order to arrive at a poverty measure that more adequately captures the underlying social condition of poverty.

By beginning with a literature review that highlights the rather arbitrary ways of measuring poverty in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Community, they provide an excellent launching pad for their endeavor. Using data from Ireland, they first construct an index and three subindices of deprivation—a basic necessity index, a housing index, and a secondary item index for less critical consumption items (such as having an annual holiday away from home). The authors are careful statisticians for the most part, providing support for every step they take. The book is full of sensitivity analyses and significance tests. Their indices demonstrate an advantage over previous attempts since they allow the sample to define what constitutes "necessities" and then let them cluster by factor analysis. However, following this logic to its ultimate end, each society in each epoch would have to construct its own scale of items. In this sense, theirs is a truly relative measure of deprivation that will not allow for easy comparisons over time and space.

Nolan and Whelan go on to show that deprivation and income poverty are not one and the same. From their regressions, we see that over and above income level, occupational class position, family composition and history, employment status, as well as liquid and illiquid assets (in the form of home ownership) all contribute to a family's risk of being deprived. They use ordinary least squares regression when the distribution of deprivation scores might have called for bi- or multinomial logistic regression. Nonetheless, this analysis provides as rich a texture to the social context of income poverty as can be hoped for from quantitative, cross-sectional analysis, illustrating how heterogeneous the low-income population can be and how the three indices are differentially affected by the set of predictor variables.

By defining poverty as lacking two or more basic necessities while, simultaneously, not having adequate income to purchase them, the authors then attempt to fuse consumption and income measures into one golden indicator. This is where they run into trouble on several counts. First, their own analysis showed that income is just one factor among many affecting consumption levels, so adding an income component to their definition of poverty only captures part of the resource story. More important, their basic deprivation index partly measures deprivation and partly resources. Among items such as the lack of "two pairs of strong

shoes" is being in "arrears or debt." Debt is a resource issue and belongs on the other side of the equation along with income, home ownership, and assets, not with measures of consumption. And, it is not surprising that it is the debt/arrears question on their eight-item scale that most commonly elicits a "deprived" response. In other words, it is carrying more than its share of the variance.

Despite these limitations, the book provides an excellent portrait of poverty in Ireland. Further, it does much to address the issue of the "underclass" in the Irish context, demonstrating that the location and concentration of the poor population does not seem to have the same effects that some researchers claim it does in the context of the racially divided United States. Rather, they show that housing tenure has the most important interaction with income to determine social "marginalization." This finding alone should provide American scholars and policymakers with an important new direction of inquiry that has not yet been fully exploited. Ultimately, however, it will be future researchers who determine the merits of this volume. Once the methodological kinks have been worked out, the real test for combined resource-deprivation measures of poverty is how far they go toward an explanation of other social phenomena. Does adding these indicators of consumption explain other outcomes significantly better than income, assets, and debts (i.e., resources) alone? Only the next book that longitudinally analyzes infant mortality, inter-generational class mobility, educational achievement, or family processes using the Nolan-Whelan method can tell us the answer to this important question. A poverty measure is only as good as what it can predict.

*Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities.* By George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles. New York: Free Press, 1996. Pp. xvi+319. \$25.00.

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This book examines the problem of restoring and maintaining order in urban communities characterized by high levels of fear, crime, social disorder, and physical decay. It is a report by academic policy entrepreneurs interested in further stirring the already bubbling stewpot of innovation that is feeding surprisingly hungry police departments around the nation. The "broken windows" metaphor reiterated in the title was first made famous by Kelling who, in a 1982 article with James Q. Wilson, resurrected interest in the police order maintenance function with the argument that soft crimes like vandalism beget harder ones and thus provide a valuable intervention point for street cops. The claims made in that article had a tremendous effect on policymakers and practitioners, and the metaphor has become part of the common parlance of both researchers and police officers. As for the "fixing" portion of the title, this book

contributes a great deal more than could the original article to the question of what the police can actually do to maintain order lawfully in tough environments. The authors integrate research on urban security and the effectiveness of policing with their own observations in a number of American cities and prescribe a number of practices they think would contribute to reversing the spiral of decline characterizing many inner cities.

One of the contributions of this volume is the clearer understanding that readers will find of the political realities and legal niceties surrounding policy-making in the order maintenance arena. Case studies from New York, San Francisco, Baltimore, and Seattle illustrate how pressure groups use police efforts to deal with aggressive panhandling, threatening "squeegee men," public defecation, and mass camping in prominent locations to impress on the public their own views of the social policies these issues demand. Kelling and Coles take a tough-minded view of who the street denizens we frequently label "the homeless" really are and what they are doing. The case studies describe their impact on transit passengers, shoppers, and neighborhood residents. The authors are convinced that the spillover consequences of street disorder for the sustainability of mass transit, the viability of commercial strips, and the desirability of residential areas are great enough to demand the attention of police who would otherwise avoid these problems. On the side of the police, these problems are seen as "social work" issues that seem less serious than the kinds of crimes they are prepared to handle.

There are also issues raising complex legal and administrative questions. There is always a tension between the exercise of police discretion to control untoward situations on the street and protecting individual liberties described in the Constitution. Like vagrancy before it, aggressive street disorder in the 1990s raises important questions about that balance and how it can be managed by mayors and police executives in an environment in which heightened consciousness about individual rights inevitably dumps important policy questions for policing into the hands of judges. Judges end up deciding how much order and liberty all of us will enjoy often on the basis of politically constructed images of claimants like "the homeless" that little resemble the aggressive, conniving, often drug-crazed schemers that Kelling and Coles see populating the streets. In response, they present one of the book's major contributions: an analysis for nonlawyers of what legally defensible order maintenance policies must look like. In brief, these policies must be a component of a documented municipal campaign to attack the underlying problems of the people in question; they must include a plausible argument that public safety or freedom of movement is being protected by them; the policies must be narrowly tailored to target specific behaviors at particular times and places; and advocates cannot be allowed to succeed in labeling those behaviors as "free speech" or other activities protected by the Constitution. It is also important to be attentive to the struggle outside the courtroom: How will the case be spun by the media and received by the pub-

lic? These guidelines can be hard to follow, and the book describes the sorry consequences for cities that did not succeed in following them.

While this analysis focuses primarily on the role that police can play in order maintenance, it makes reference to programs that run in parallel with order maintenance policing. These include community-based prosecutors, business improvement districts, community crime-fighting groups, the burgeoning private security industry, and multiagency municipal problem-solving efforts. What most of these have in common is the instinct that the legitimacy and support that they can gain from closer involvement with the community will make their contribution more effective and politically sustainable. This book will be of great interest to anyone interested in policing, or in how policy analysis can be informed by research in the area of crime.

*Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence.* By Scott H. Decker and Barrick Van Winkle. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xi+303. 59.95 (cloth); 18.95 (paper).

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This book and the research on which it is based reflect the resurgence of interest in research on gangs in the United States during the past decade. Unfortunately, much of that research is based on secondary data alone, leaving gang life a "black box" about which little is known. *Life in the Gang*, as the title implies, is not such a study; rather, it reflects the emphasis on field research and *Verstehen* that characterized Chicago school sociology and criminology, including Thrasher's pioneering study of gangs in Chicago (*The Gang* [University of Chicago Press, 1927]). The authors also endeavor to portray gang life through the perspectives of the gang members themselves, analyzing their individual and collective values and the group dynamics within the overall context of social institutions and culture.

The book is based on three years of federally funded ethnographic fieldwork with 99 active gang members and 24 of their family members in a city (St. Louis) that is characterized by a reemerging (rather than a chronic) gang problem, deindustrialization, depopulation, chronic unemployment, and deteriorating housing. The inclusion of gang members' families is a welcome departure from the extant literature, where gang members' families have received even less attention than the lives of the gang members themselves. Following an opening chapter that places the study in the context of previous research and introduces the book's theoretical framework (based on the concept of "threat" and its role in gang dynamics), the authors utilize their field data to address issues such as the origins of gangs and the decision to join the gang, gang activities

and their relationship with social institutions, social processes that sustain gangs and spur their growth, and the reciprocal views of gang members and their families concerning each other. The book concludes with the authors' recommendations for public policy initiatives.

In addition to including family members in the study of gangs, it is noteworthy that the authors chose to identify their sample of gang members *exclusively* on the basis of initial field contacts, followed by "snowball" sampling, rather than relying on referrals from social service or law enforcement agencies, as is more commonly (and more easily) done. While such field-based, snowball sampling strategies have their own associated difficulties, they provide an alternative method of sampling what is, after all, an unknown universe—active gang members in any major metropolitan area. Those samples that rely exclusively on official sources (law enforcement, social service agencies, or correctional institutions, e.g.) are more likely to be nonrepresentative of the universe of active gang members in these communities.

A central organizing theme that permeates this book is the preeminent role of violence and the threat of violence in the life of the gang. The threat of violence is identified as a primary motivating factor in the decision to join the gang and in the decision to leave the gang. Such a perceived threat exacerbates the aggressive activities of the gang and strengthens bonds to the gang. Yet, when individuals leave the gang, they often cite the constant threat of violence as a primary factor in their gang desistance. The study also addresses the popular myth that once one joins a gang, it is impossible to leave. Relying on their interview data, the authors reveal the complexity that surrounds one's decision to leave the gang and demonstrate that leaving the gang is made difficult by the fact that many relationships among gang members predate gang membership. Nonetheless, a significant number of gang members do leave the gang, utilizing desistance strategies that are discussed by the authors.

Most important, *Life in the Gang* provides the reader with valuable insight into the culture of the gang and the gang's interaction with societal institutions by revealing the perspectives of gang members and their families who are living in neighborhoods where both the economy and traditional social control mechanisms have deteriorated. The authors conclude by recommending that public policy initiatives should emphasize the development of social capital for gang members and their communities.

*Life in the Gang* should be read by those seeking greater understanding of the lives of gang members, gang culture, the relationship between gang members, their families, and societal institutions, and the role of threat in inducing, sustaining, and (sometimes) weakening the bonds between the individual and the group. It should be on the list of recommended reading for any course in which the subject of gangs is discussed. It will also be useful in courses or discussions focusing on qualitative, ethnographic methods.

*Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to the Inner City.* By David T. Courtwright. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii+357.

Dov Cohen  
*University of Illinois*

In *Violent Land*, historian David Courtwright takes a sweeping look at violence in America. Combining work of evolutionary psychologists, historians, and sociologists, Courtwright argues that disorder is found where there is a surplus of young single men not reigned in by family, community, and religious commitments. Such a surplus of males, he argues, occurred on the frontier because men could not marry (there were not enough eligible women) and in the inner cities because men did not have to marry (their scarcity gives them the power to avoid the commitment that marriage entails).

He buffers his case by examining violence in the mining towns of the West, the cowboy subculture, the Chinatowns that had huge gender imbalances due to immigration restrictions, and the "floating armies" of itinerant men who built the infrastructure of America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. All these cultures, Courtwright argues, were dominated by the values of single men. Further, he follows the decrease in violence through the marriage boom of the 1940s and 1950s and its subsequent increase as traditional nuclear families began to come apart.

Generally, it is true the world over that single young men are most likely to be involved in violence. So, of course, the more single young men, the more crime there will be. But Courtwright's book also makes a point about concentration effects as he describes the macho cultures that develop among groups of unattached men. "Many peers and few wives and children made for a world of arrested male adolescence" (p. 80) he says, in this case describing the mining towns of the West.

The rich descriptions of these single male cultures are the book's strength. As a historian, Courtwright fleshes out the lives of the men in a colorful and engaging style. Courtwright's telling is fresh, to the point, and, occasionally, moving. Other books have laid out more fully the theory and data as to why young men should be the most violent (see Martin Daly and Margo Wilson's *Homicide* [Aldine de Gruyter, 1988]) and why family and community breakdown should facilitate such aggression (see the large amount of work on social disorganization). This book illustrates the point in concrete personal terms, while never letting the reader forget about the larger social forces at work.

Indeed, this is related to one thing that will probably frustrate some readers. That is, Courtwright appropriately throws a lot into the mix: gender imbalance, alcohol use, the culture of migrants to a region, racism, frontier conditions, widespread gun ownership, group psychology, lack of religion, vice industries, television, and so on. Anyone looking for a

precise estimate of how large a role these factors played in producing violence will be frustrated. But these factors should enter into the discussion, and the book is a good source for hypotheses to be tested more quantitatively.

Somewhat neglected is the hypothesis that certain economies and ecologies are more susceptible to developing the type of violent cultures Courtwright described (Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen, *Culture of Honor* [Westview Press, 1996]). Specifically, cultures are likely to be more violent in places where people have to depend on themselves for protection—especially so when wealth can be accumulated and can be easily stolen by others. This point about portability of wealth and the connection to violence is true in herding economies the world over and in the drug economies of the inner cities. One suspects the vulnerability was also shared by the miners and, to a lesser extent, the itinerant workers Courtwright describes. Courtwright does note that farming communities tended to be less violent than frontier communities. He attributes this to the presence of women as a stabilizing force, but it is also possible that farming communities are less violent partly because farmers are less vulnerable to losing everything to human predators and do not need to maintain a hypervigilant macho stance.

The above points are small complaints, however, and Courtwright makes a compelling case for the role women play in reducing violence. Indeed, perhaps his most interesting chapter describes how the frontier was civilized as women came and families were started. "Though the story of the triumph of law and order on the frontier is often told from the vantage of determined marshals . . . it is more properly and essentially a story of women, families, and the balancing of the population" (p. 131). Women brought with them the stability of family life, educational and cultural opportunities, and something of a "moral counterrevolution" (p. 144) to the region.

Overall, the book is a nice integration of perspectives and a coherent, historical argument for the social disorganization approach. Well written and engaging, it fleshes out the theory in its human form.

*Disability and the City: International Perspectives.* By Rob Imrie. New York: St. Martin's, 1996. Pp. viii+200. \$39.95.

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*University of Illinois at Chicago*

At his best, Rob Imrie provides the refreshing perspective of economic geography in analyzing the place of persons with disabilities in society. His background is in town planning and industrial sociology. While the book is subtitled "International Perspectives," the author is firmly situated in the United Kingdom, primarily making comparisons between England and the United States. His focused visits to the United States have

made him sensitive to the American scene, issues, and social policies affecting persons with disabilities.

Extending sociological and political economic analyses of disability, the "book explores one of the crucial contexts within which the marginal status of disabled people is experienced, that is, the interrelationships between disability, physical access and the built environment" (p. vii). The strength of the book is in arguing that people with disabilities are marginalized, oppressed, and isolated by the interactive forces of government agencies, industry, and design professionals such as architects and city planners. For example, he argues that "the spatial structure of the modern city reproduces dominant power relations, so contributing in subtle ways to the oppression and exclusion of large parts of the population," in this case, persons with disabilities.

The book is divided into eight chapters that consider the argument and key issues (chap. 1), disability theory (chap. 2), state policy and the production of disability (chap. 3), the design of disabling environments (chap. 4), the creation of accessible environments (chap. 5), institutional mediation and planning for access (chap. 6), diversity, difference, and the politics of access (chap. 7), and looking beyond disabling environments (chap. 8). This presentation lays a solid conceptual foundation for examining how physical and social space work together to affect the daily lives and prospects of persons with disabilities. It then describes how government, industry, and design professionals have and continue to construct barriers preventing persons with disabilities from participating in activities of daily living such as cooking and going to the toilet by themselves and from much of the life of the larger community. A powerful use of photographs reinforces the narrative. The last portion of the book grapples with solutions.

The proposed ideal is to design and create accessible environments. Imrie, however, argues that architects, planners, and those who control industrial design have few incentives to apply their skills to build accessible environments. On their list of priorities in building, accessibility is not paramount. Persons with disabilities are not equal in power to the other influential stakeholders in the disability business so they experience frustration in seeking to open and expand their worlds. Imrie argues that this produces the "prisoner syndrome" where persons with disability not only are isolated and marginalized from the larger society but even have difficulty in organizing among themselves. Persons with disabilities experience an unjust distributional system of goods and services and have their access to the public environment, education, and jobs limited by architecture, access to resources, and public attitudes. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in the United States attempted to redress such injustices. In the United Kingdom, there has been parallel government interest in the conditions of persons with disabilities represented by the Snowdon Report in the 1970s and more recent legislation but nothing resulting in as public a statement as the ADA.

This book is important because it directs attention away from disability

as defined in terms of an individual's impairments and functional limitations toward the concept of disability as the interaction between a person's physical and social environment and the individual's capacities. The book adds to the disability literature by demonstrating how the design and use of physical space reflects an underlying stratification system where persons with disabilities rest near the bottom. Furthermore, the book convincingly argues that the design of public and private spaces will not change until public values are fostered to include persons with disabilities in the larger society. This is a difficult but not insurmountable task.

The book would be stronger if the author had kept one theoretical perspective. His strength is in analyzing the interactive forces of economic geography and social values on shaping the lives of persons with disabilities. The author also could have made a more cogent theoretical contribution if he had more extensively delineated the connections between physical and social space and how these constructs, taken together, reflect a stratification system inherent in society. Behind these forces that determine social position are value systems that again are specific to social class, culture, gender, age, and race. A complete theory of stratification and social change pertaining to persons with disabilities needs to examine how shared values drive the stratification system and possibilities for change. In sum, Rob Imrie has produced a book that will stimulate sociologists and disability studies scholars to think more clearly about the relation of individuals to their environments and about the social meanings and consequences of constructing physical and social spaces the way we do.

*Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalisation: Reinventing the Globe.* By Steven Yearley. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996. Pp. x+162. \$69.95 (cloth), \$22.95 (paper).

Anthony McGrew  
Open University

There exists a vast and rapidly growing literature on globalization and environmentalism. It might, therefore, seem somewhat overly ambitious, especially in the context of a short introductory volume, to attempt a critical synthesis of the sociologies of globalization and environmentalism. Yet, the author succeeds majestically in doing so while also advancing the sociological understanding of the dynamics of, as well as the limits to, contemporary globalization. Yearley's volume delivers a critical reflection upon the nature of contemporary globalization and its articulation in global environmental problems, activism, and consciousness.

The primary aim of the book is to "investigate globalization in a major policy arena . . . and to take a look at how the 'globality' of global issues is constructed" (p. x). The rationale for focusing on environmental global-

ization, in particular, apart from being the specialist research interest of the author, is twofold: First, because environmentalism is very much a "globalist" discourse, it offers a strong test of the globalization thesis. As Yearley observes, environmentalism "surely counts as one of the best candidates we have for a global ideology and globalizing movement" (p. 151). Second, sociological approaches to globalization tend to pay scant attention to environmentalism or, alternatively, to take for granted the global nature of environmental problems. By combining an investigation of globalization and environmentalism, Yearley offers a valuable critique of existing sociological accounts of globalization.

Yearley's critique is executed in the space of five concise chapters. Chapter 1 offers an overview of sociological approaches to globalization from Roland Robertson through Anthony Giddens and the failure of traditional sociological theory to come to terms with global processes. Through an exploration of global environmentalism in chapters 2 and 3, Yearley provides a thorough and interesting reflection upon the objective and subjective dimensions of environmental globalization. This analysis investigates, respectively, the "global" character of supposedly global environmental problems and offers fascinating insights into the social construction of global environmental challenges from ozone depletion to global warming. Chapter 4 considers the role of the universalization of scientific and technical discourses in the construction of global environmental problems and the ways in which such discourses tend to promote Western interests (or Northern interests) in the global politics of international environmental policy-making. The final chapter concludes that "environmental problems and environmental 'consciousness' constitute strong evidence in support of the significance of processes of globalization" (p. 142) but then goes on to qualify this assertion by noting the unevenness of environmental globalization and its deeply contested nature.

Threaded through these chapters is an important argument concerning the form of contemporary globalization. Yearley is rightly skeptical of the assumption that the globalization of environmental issues and problems necessarily generates a "global common interest" (p. 145). On the contrary, he forcefully demonstrates how the political construction of global environmental issues furthers the economic and ideological interests of the North at the expense of the South. Accordingly, there is not much evidence of globalization's contribution to the emergence of a global society but, rather more conspicuously, of its contribution to further global fragmentation. The implication of this is that the unevenness of globalization must figure more prominently on the sociological agenda. In addition, he makes a strong case for considering contemporary globalization as a sociologically complex phenomenon that can only convincingly be understood as the product of a "multiplicity of causes" (p. 143). Validating Giddens's and Robertson's accounts of globalization, Yearley makes an important contribution to the continuing debate about the underlying causal processes and dynamics of globalization. His critique of the demo-

cratic credentials of environmental movements and their supposedly global scope is particularly insightful. Though perhaps not entirely novel, these are all important interventions in the broader debate about globalization.

In such a concise volume there are inevitably compromises made with the existing literature on globalization and environmentalism. In particular, the specification of accounts of globalization in chapter 1 might have encompassed a greater variety of recent work in social geography, international relations, and political science, for much of the more interesting recent work on globalization has an interdisciplinary flavor. In addition, the construction of the concept of globalization would have benefited from a little more exploration and evaluation. As the argument unfolds, the conceptual distinctions between globalization, internationalization, and transnationalism become somewhat blurred. Furthermore, while Yearley delivers a powerful demolition of the liberal (and ecological) fallacy that global environmental problems necessarily generate a common global interest, there is a tendency to ignore the ways in which political processes within international environmental regimes redefine interests. Thus, to argue that "the global interest" is simply a synonym for the interests of the North (the West?) may be somewhat simplistic in the context of an otherwise sophisticated argument.

This is a valuable and welcome contribution to the globalization literature. As a critical introduction to and scholarly examination of the sociology of environmental globalization, it is a remarkably accessible work.

*The New American Reality: Who We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We Are Going.* By Reynolds Farley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996. Pp. x+385. \$34.95.

Samuel H. Preston  
*University of Pennsylvania*

This is a fascinating and authoritative account of American social history since 1960 as viewed through the prism of government statistics. Some of the data used are available in nearly any public library, while many others are extracted with considerable effort from census microdata files. They are used not to paint a portrait—often said to be the basic function of a census—but to film a motion picture. Farley is interested in documenting social change and understanding what is causing it. He focuses on the two central domains of most people's lives: work and family.

As documentation, the volume succeeds admirably. Farley asks interesting questions and knows where to look for the answers. Long chapters on changes in family structure and occupations and the industries of the work force, immigration, population redistribution, and racial inequality are the heart of the book. Much of what transpires in these chapters amounts to adding valuable detail about familiar trends (e.g., the emer-

gence of service industries and of one-parent families). For example, the well-known increase in male rates of return to schooling since 1970 is shown to be a product not of increased earnings for college graduates but exclusively of larger reductions in the earnings of nongraduates. Men ages 25–34 who completed four years of college earned an average of \$43,194 in 1970 but only \$36,818 in 1990, even though the latter group worked an average of 201 more hours per year (p. 100). Among women, on the other hand, the earnings of young college graduates actually increased.

There are hundreds of such factoids in the volume, many produced (as is the above) from Farley's careful manipulation of large data files: Female immigrants from Jamaica, 99% of whom identify themselves as black, earned 10% more than white women in 1990 controlling for education, age, and other standard demographic variables; between 1980 and 1990 income inequality increased by larger amounts in cities that received more immigrants; residential segregation by race in the South and West is declining faster than elsewhere, and so on. This assemblage of detail cannot help but remind the reader of how vast is the website we call the United States, but this is not simply another statistical abstract. Farley weaves the facts and figures into an appealing narrative with interesting illustrations and useful interpretations. For example, we learn that the Jamaican women were mostly New York secretaries and that annexation practices in the South and West help account for the disparate segregation trends.

What does it all add up to? There is a strong temptation to use the compilation to assess whether "things" are getting "worse" or "better." Such an assessment requires either that all trends be headed in the same direction, which they certainly are not, or that a reasonably coherent weighting system be used which the social sciences have yet to develop. For the most part, Farley resists the temptation. His basic message is that the changes are complex, manifold, and far too variegated to sum up in one directional indicator. This is a message with which many will grow impatient, especially those who subscribe to the amazingly popular "America in decline" literature that Farley summarizes in a pungent introductory chapter. The "reality" is different; over the last 25 years earnings have gone down, per capita income has gone up, elderly poverty has gone down, child poverty has gone up, gender inequality in earnings has gone down, racial inequality in earnings has remained flat, life expectancy has gone up, the number of two-parent families has gone down, wealth has gone up, equality in wealth has gone down, and so on.

If there is a common theme underlying the discussion of these issues, it is the restructuring of industry, the decline of manufacturing jobs, and the rise of services. These changes are well documented in the volume, and Farley makes clear that they have disproportionately aided the economic prospects of women and the well educated and harmed those of blacks and rust belters. The sources of industrial restructuring are less visible. Farley is not a macroeconomist, and his efforts to use chronologi-

cal narratives to identify and interpret macroeconomic forces are not always fully convincing. For example, no reference is made to the impact of Reagan-era federal deficits on exchange rates and manufacturing exports, nor is the controversy over the Consumer Price Index discussed, a controversy that bears significantly on trends in real income.

In discussing changes in the family and in racial and gender inequality, Farley sprinkles in additional flavoring from attitude surveys, federal policy debates, and judicial decisions. They depict two directions of normative change—(1) toward egalitarianism and (2) toward individual license—that Farley believes will occur essentially independently of economic shifts. He does not use this material to ask big questions about the relative influence of culture and economy on behavior; rather, both are taken to be self-evidently important. But they do interact. For example, Farley notes that stereotypes about black intelligence are far more damaging in today's job market than they were 30 years ago.

*The New American Reality* does not ring alarm bells in flamboyant, self-important language. Therefore, it will not make the best-seller list, nor will it excite coastal intellectuals. The volume is thoroughly midwestern. It uses publicly available data, straightforward methods, and modest, almost self-effacing language, to provide more information and insight about recent social trends than any other volume in print.

*The Rise of the Network Society*. By Manuel Castells. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Pp. xvii+556. \$59.95 (cloth); \$25.95 (paper).

Alberto Melucci  
*University of Milan*

We are all naive anthropologists of our own societies, and the question of what type of society we are living in is always implicitly addressed, even when analyses are devoted to specific aspects of social life. Contemporary debates on postmodernism, postindustrialism, and the globalization of the world system are based on underlying theoretical assumptions that inevitably raise the question of the overall definition of contemporary society.

In this book, Manuel Castells explicitly addresses this question and gives an account of the economic and social processes of the new society based on information. A major work that blends social and economic theory and detailed empirical information, this book is part of an ambitious project (*The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*) in three volumes, whose summary is already provided to the reader. This first volume deals with the overall logic of technological and economic changes, while the second (*The Power of Identity*) relates these changes to the self and the third (*End of Millennium*) provides a general interpretation of current historical transformations at the world scale. The scope of the project could seem far beyond the reach of a single author and its

intention sounds like a renewal of the Weberian tradition, in its widest breath. But Castells does not appear to be cowed by such an endeavor and, judging by this first volume, the results are not below the ambition of the project: by filtering in an original way an impressive body of literature (50 pages of bibliography list 1,000 references) this book draws a convincing picture of the technological and economic changes defining "the network society."

Whatever this definition could mean, a fundamental split is pointed out between abstract and universal instrumentalism supported by the new information technologies and global markets and particularistic identities around which people organize their meaning. The bipolar opposition between "the Net" and "the Self" seems to be the structuring logic of our societies. The information technology revolution, the process of globalization of the informational economy, the transformation of the organizational settings for the production of goods and services are analyzed in detail. The network enterprise, the emerging form of organization, implies a profound redefinition of work and employment, and the labor market is increasingly fragmented among networkers, the jobless, and flextimers. From the rise of mass media culture to the multimedia as symbolic environment, Castells draws a picture of what he calls "the culture of real virtuality": a system in which people's material and symbolic existence is fully immersed in a world of virtual images that become the experience itself. The transformations of space and time implied by this new field of experience are also analyzed. In the passage from the space of places to the space of flows, the urban form is deeply affected and the informational city is symbolized by the new architecture relying on a sort of transhistorical spatial repertoire. Time overcomes its linear dimension and becomes flexible, shrinking and twisting in the working conditions, blurring during the life cycle, losing its relation to biological rhythms and particularly to death, increasingly becoming a virtual dimension of experience. In this scenario, inequalities are increasingly those between "the interactives and the interacted," between those who are able autonomously to select their own circuits of communication, multidirectional and flexible, and those who are provided with a restricted number of rigid choices, decided and defined by others.

This book is a key contribution to present debates and will be widely discussed even if an overwhelming flow of definitions, hypotheses, and theoretical insights risks blurring the picture; over the pages, the reader gets sometimes lost. One could also argue that the three volumes' project based on the sequence of technology leading to economy, to society, and to culture is still echoing a too linear and "modern" underlying frame, at odds with the idea of a "network society." And, finally, "the network society" seems to be more an appealing specification added to the many others that we use when referring to present-day society than a concept capable of conveying distinctive analytical qualities of this social structure. Here the linguistic question is not simply a matter of naming. The need for adjectives and metaphors is a major symptom of the current theoretical

difficulty. We need linguistic specifications because the paradigms in which the interpretation of modern society has been grounded are no longer useful for the interpretation of changes that we definitely know, empirically, but on whom we are still unable to build an overall interpretation, theoretically grounded. No doubt that Manuel Castells makes an important effort in this direction and takes us a significant step further in the understanding of the information age.

*The Myth of Social Action.* By Colin Campbell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 Pp. 199. \$49.95.

Norman K. Denzin  
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

Occasionally a critical work has the potential of causing a field of inquiry to take reflective notice of where it has come and where it is going. This is the promise of Colin Campbell's new book, a carefully crafted, closely argued work that wants to bring Weber's theory of action back into contemporary sociology. Campbell's thesis is simple and direct. Classic Weberian action theory has been undermined by the many branches of interpretive sociology, including phenomenology (Alfred Schutz and Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann), linguistic philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch), the vocabulary of motives perspective (C. Wright Mills and Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott), ethnomethodology (Harold Garfinkel), symbolic interactionism (Herbert Blumer), dramaturgical sociology (Erving Goffman), communicative action (Jürgen Habermas), structuration (Anthony Giddens), and rational choice theory (James S. Coleman). In 15 closely reasoned chapters, Campbell offers a genealogy of how the situationalists took over action theory.

It all started with the linguistic turn in 20th-century social theory. A major culprit was C. Wright Mills, whose 1941 vocabulary-of-motives article shifted attention from action to accounts. Campbell's genealogy then takes up Schutz's reworking of Weber's concept of meaningful action, Winch's 1958 (*The Idea of a Social Science*) application of Wittgenstein to the idea of a social science, Blumer's extension of Mead to symbolic interactionism, Goffman's dramaturgical sociology, Garfinkel's ethnomethodological project, Giddens's structuration theory, and finally Habermas's theory of communicative action. In rejecting these models Campbell attacks all contemporary versions of interpretive sociology.

These situational models ignore the fundamental tenet of Weberian action theory, namely Weber's tripartite distinction between behavior (involuntary, reactive responses), action (voluntary, subjectively meaningful conduct), and social action (meaningful orientation to others). In Weber's model, social action is a subtype of "the more general and basic category action" (p. 25). Contemporary theorists (especially British) have ignored Weber's distinction between action and social action. Conse-

quently the concept of social action is no longer dependent on the more general term action. This means that the key assumptions in Weber's model are also lost, including the emphasis on voluntarism, the actor's subjective point of view, emotionality, meaning, processual interpretations, and causal explanations (how and why people act).

The social situationalists assume that action is overt, public, contextual, and situational, that meaning is accomplished in and through interactional practices, that motives are linguistic accounts offered for problematic action, that all action possesses meaning, and that all meanings are social, hence all actions are social (p. 38). The refusal to honor Weber's original model has negative consequences for the general discipline of sociology.

The social situationalists study words and symbols (accounts), not actions. They argue that subjective meanings either do not exist, are not a part of social action, or are subsumed under the heading of social meaning. They have no adequate theory of action, mind, culture, process, language, or meaning. They equate meaning with naming (e.g., Blumer). They generalize their theory of communicative interaction to all forms of social action, when in fact "the vast majority of human actions . . . do not deserve the designation 'social'" (p. 131). They do not offer causal explanations for how and why particular actions happen. In rejecting the subjective point of view, the situationalists privilege the observer's perspective, thereby ignoring the meaning of action to the person.

Campbell is quite firm in his conclusions. Today the social sciences need a revived version of Weber's theory of action. Chapter 15 ("Bringing Action Back In") is a relatively disappointing attempt to redress the current situation. I wanted but did not find a full-scale theory of action and agency. Along with Campbell, I want a theory of action that will bury rational choice theory, but I cannot agree with his attempt to locate the situationalists in one tiny corner, the study of communicative action. I am not sure we need to go back to Weber in the ways that Campbell argues.

There are several problems at work here. Not all would agree with Campbell's dismissive reading of this century's main interpretive social scientists. Certainly good things that have come from the linguistic turn in social theory, including powerful criticisms of naive social science positivism and simplistic theories of meaning and interpretation. Garfinkel's project alerted us to the constitutive features of meaningful social action. Many would reject Campbell's attempt to reclaim a category of action that is not social in nature. Few would place Garfinkel and Blumer in the same grouping. Blumer, perhaps more than any other theorist, stressed the importance of the actor's point of view, as have Giddens and Habermas (the double hermeneutic). Weber's view of subjectively intended meanings did not always produce adequate causal explanations of an instance of action. His ideal-types slighted the actor's definition of a situation.

There is more. As sociologists take stock of where they have come in

the twilight years of this century, another set of questions needs to be asked. What do Weber's conceptions of action have to say about the mass media, sexuality, gender, and feminist, postcolonial, and queer theory? Mills reminded us that we live in a secondhand world. The communications and cultural industries mediate consciousness and material existence. How do we fit a reflective theory of action into this communication system?

Finally, and oddly, Campbell does not stress the cultural, phenomenological, and political economy side of Weber. This side opens the way for an interpretive theory of action fitted to a critical reading of the current historical moment. I hope Campbell will give us this in his next book.

*Can Education Be Equalized? The Swedish Case in Comparative Perspective.* Edited by Robert Erikson and Jan O. Jonsson. Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1996. Pp. x+293. \$64.00.

Theodore P. Gerber  
*University of Oregon*

Given its postwar record of prosperity, egalitarianism, and generous social welfare policies, Sweden would seem a good candidate for equalizing the educational opportunities of different socioeconomic classes. Indeed, previous research on Sweden has demonstrated a highly exceptional long-term equalization of educational opportunity. The contributions to this volume document more fully the equalizing trend in Sweden, compare the Swedish pattern of educational stratification with those in other countries, and offer conclusions regarding the causes of class inequalities in educational attainment, possible remedies, and the significance of education in the larger stratification processes of postindustrial society.

The methodological uniformity and theoretical scope of the collection will enhance its appeal to those interested in educational stratification. The empirical contributions employ a standard classification of social classes (the "Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero" schema) and a consistent modeling approach where the key dependent variable is the log odds of successfully completing a given educational transition (e.g., completion of secondary school). For the most part, trends in class inequalities are identified using log linear or logistic regression specifications of uniform difference (unidiff) models. Unidiff models constrain the *pattern* of class differences in the log odds of success at a given transition to be constant over time (i.e., across cohorts) while allowing the *magnitude* of the differences to vary. Readers unfamiliar with this approach to modeling educational attainment patterns may find the text difficult.

However, three primarily theoretical contributions will be accessible and interesting to all readers. The editors' introduction examines why classes persistently attain unequal levels of education despite reforms, expansions, and global upgrading of social origins. Class differences in

educational performance and in the propensity to continue to higher educational levels contribute in roughly equal measure. The differences, in turn, stem from contrasting perceptions of the relative costs, benefits, and risks associated with different educational trajectories, all mediated by the institutional structure of school systems and class disparities in cultural and economic resources. The cost-benefit calculus most strongly discourages working-class students early in their educational careers. Thus, institutional reforms that reduce the costs of education and effectively postpone the initial continuation decision are the most promising ways to reduce class differentials in the propensity to continue to higher levels. In another theoretical chapter, Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Yossi Shavit propose that the widespread equalization of the educational attainments of men and women hinders class equalization, since middle- and upper-class women benefit the most from educational expansions. John H. Goldthorpe's coda to the volume is a thoughtful critique of the view that increased returns to education can be equated with increased meritocracy.

Three empirical chapters deal exclusively with Sweden. The editors establish the historical and institutional context and trace trends in class-based educational inequalities based on a cohort analysis of a very large data set. One might prefer a different measure of the total association between class and education than the Yule's Y-transform of the odds ratios of classes I and VI-VII combined (based on a unidiff model whose fit statistics are not provided). However, their claim that class-based educational inequalities decreased in Sweden between 1970 and 1930—but not before or after—seems empirically justified. Erikson attempts to disentangle the effects of the temporally covarying factors that might explain the Swedish equalization. He perhaps stretches the evidence from a detrended time-series analysis a bit far in concluding that reduced income inequalities, themselves attributable to political intervention, were the strongest forces driving the equalization. Jonsson shows how Swedish trends contradict the widespread view that industrial development increases the rewards to achievement (represented by education) relative to ascription (represented by social origin).

The Swedish patterns are somewhat difficult to assess on their own. Thus, the three contributions directly comparing Sweden with other countries are particularly valuable. Analyzing nine European countries, Walter Müller finds minimal international differences in patterns of class inequality in education, a general trend of *increased* inequalities following expansion (based on percentage differences, not odds ratios), and an intermediate position for Sweden's level of class inequalities. Michael Hout and Daniel P. Dohan compare Sweden and the United States. They confirm the cross-cohort trend toward equalization in Sweden but conclude that now class differences appear no weaker there than in the United States, where they have remained constant at each of three transitions throughout this century. Jonsson, Mills, and Müller detect incremental and decelerating equalizations in Germany and Sweden but not

in Britain. Overall, the comparative chapters leave the impression that, in fact, the Swedish equalization is neither unique nor particularly substantial in real terms. As Hout and Dohan put it, the results should remind us "that statistically significant change may be too modest a goal for social reforms" (p. 229).

One can fault a number of the contributions for problematic indicators, lapses in clarity, or debatable interpretations. But they raise a broad array of important issues, are technically sophisticated, and sufficiently diverse in perspective to make for a stimulating collection, certain to be of great use to students of stratification.

*Wasting Away: The Undermining of Canadian Health Care.* By Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. vi+245. \$24.95 (paper).

James J. Hughes  
University of Connecticut

Since the 1970s, progressive health care reformers in the United States considered Canada's universal health insurance the model for U.S. reform, partly because Canadian federal budgeting had helped constrain health inflation as compared with that of the United States. But while health care in Europe and Canada is far less expensive than in the United States, the innovation of new technologies has produced similar rates of health care inflation in all industrialized countries. Colliding with the two-decade-old fiscal crisis of the welfare states, health care inflation has led every industrialized country to attempt to pare back the generosity of their health insurance systems, along with all social welfare programs.

Armstrong and Armstrong focus on the impact of the Canadian government's efforts at retrenchment on three approaches to health care: public health, personal health, and medical care. Their argument is that the various panels and agents of the Canadian government have been quick to use all criticisms of the medical care approach to rationalize cutbacks in services, while offering personal and privatized health care as the only alternative. Armstrong and Armstrong argue that shifting greater responsibility for health care to individuals has a great potential for harm for workers and consumers and may be counterproductive if carried too far. They believe the state should be preserving its fiscal commitment to medical care, albeit redirected into a lower-technology, primary care, and allied health worker-centered model. They also argue that the state should tackle health problems through public health interventions, such as improved housing, worker safety, and income redistribution.

Unfortunately, the book reads less like a review of solid research on the harms done by cutbacks or a well-structured argument for an alternative course of health care reform than like a review of medical sociology

and the structure, functioning, and recent history of the Canadian health care system. These are also valuable, but the reader keeps waiting to pick up the thread of the argument, which is only present in gestalt.

The authors have focused most of their previous research on women and work, and that focus strengthens this book. The effect of health care retrenchment on women patients, caregivers, and health care workers is systematically addressed. The book includes many quotes from interviews with health care workers, which were arranged by their unions. Hundreds of consumers were also contacted and interviewed after calling a union toll-free number to express complaints about their health care.

This focus on maintaining a pro-labor, pro-consumer stance, with a heavy reliance on anecdotal accounts, however, also leaves many questions for a critical reader. The complex effects of various reforms are often framed as supposed good things that actually are bad. For instance, in order to contain costs, the Canadian governments have encouraged patients not to come to the emergency room with colds, have reformed their priority-assignment algorithms for waiting lists, and have expanded allied health worker authority, reforms that should be unambiguously positive for the authors.

Few empirical studies are referred to that support the central contentions of the book. While cutbacks certainly reduce nursing visits, prescriptions, inpatient days, surgeries, and so on, U.S. researches have been hard pressed to find areas where cost containment or work reorganization (lay-offs) have harmed health outcomes. Yet, there are such studies, and they are not referred to. Perhaps this omission is as much a reflection of the weakness of outcome measures, the smaller size of the Canadian health services research community, and the difficulty and expense of mounting such studies. But some acknowledgment of the missing smoking guns, and the need for outcome studies, would have been welcome.

Finally, there is no articulation of the public health alternative to health care reform, or how these alternatives might work fiscally. The authors defend the existing level of medical expenditure, while arguing for an ill-defined expansion of the welfare state, because they believe the fiscal crisis of the welfare state is a mythic construction. This seems peculiarly insensitive to the dilemma of North American capital mobility, which constrains even the most progressive provincial or federal government, such as the socialist Ontario administration of the early 1990s under which this book was written.

Nonetheless, this is probably an important book for anyone interested in the fate of the principal model for U.S. reform. Even if the central arguments are poorly made and defended, the book works well as a review of recent Canadian health care policy and the potential weaknesses of the Canadian health care system, before and after cost containment.

*The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830–1860.* By Robert Gray. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+253. \$59.95.

Michael Dintenfass  
*University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee*

Robert Gray's point of departure in *The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830–1860* is that "industrialisation has to be considered as a cultural transformation. . . . A process of invention, not just of machines, but of ways of life understood as 'industrial,'" industrialization forged "cultures of industrial work" in the textile districts of the North of England by imparting particular, and antagonistic, meanings to the concepts of "capital, labour, work, wages, [and] consumption." Gray's project in this book is to explore the making of these contested meanings" (p. 1).

Gray divides his study into two parts. The first, entitled "Voices in a Debate, c. 1830–1850," examines "some of the positions" in the controversies about factory regulation and legally mandated limitations on working hours, including "popular radical ideas of citizenship and labour as property, patriarchal values, evangelical religion and patrician philanthropy" (p. 22) as well as the brands of political economy current among the mill owners. The second, "Factory Regulation, c. 1840–1860," takes up, in turn, the enforcement of the Factory Acts of 1833, 1844, and 1847, the resistance to them and compliance with them, industrial action and popular protest in the textile North in the wake of the acts, and the attempts in the 1850s and 1860s to extend factory regulation beyond the cloth trades to other industries.

The shift from a cultural to a social approach that is evident in the structure of the volume is characteristic of the entire work. Discussions that begin with a language of *discourses, rhetorics, constructions, and representations* invariably detour onto a discursive terrain of *social facts and real effects*. Gray's inquiry into how the factory masters construed labor, the market, and the state moves quickly from a brief consideration of a single industrialist's commentary on these matters to a statistical depiction of employers' responses followed by an 1833 questionnaire about factory legislation and an extended reconstruction of the economic characteristics of the districts in which the respondents' works were located. His section on rituals of reconciliation veers from the unveiling of a statue of the 10-hours activist Richard Oastler in Bradford to the provision of housing and chapels by mill owners subject to state regulation.

Such cultural readings as Gray actually undertakes are quite idiosyncratic. For example, his chapter in part 1 on "employers' responses to the factory question [and their relation] to some broader issues of entrepreneurial middle-class culture and attitudes" (p. 98) is far more concerned with the pronouncements of clergymen than with the literature, well documented in the footnotes to the chapter on the 10-hour day in part 2, that the cotton, woolen, and worsted lords of Lancashire and the West

Riding of Yorkshire themselves produced. Gray's engagement with his chosen texts, moreover, is almost always with the arguments that they explicitly put forth rather than with the idioms and inflections expressive of the understandings that informed the overt ideologies.

As a result, *The Factory Question and Industrial England* is very much a revisiting of familiar motifs (the manliness of the male worker and the vulnerability of the female employee; the affinities of mammon with the moralities of Dissent) within the confines of a well-worn narrative (from the conflicts of the 1830s and 1840s to a mid-Victorian consensus). The meanings with which industrialization invested such categories as capital, wages, and consumption remain elusive and the lineaments of the "distinctive industrial cultures" (p. 235) of England's textile communities barely are delineated. These are projects that promise to speak eloquently about industrialization as a sociological and an historical event. We should be grateful to Robert Gray for seizing upon them and regretful that he has not taken fuller possession.

# Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement<sup>1</sup>

Mary Bernstein  
*Arizona State University*

Critics of identity politics decry the celebration of difference within identity movements, yet many activists underscore their similarities to, rather than differences from, the majority. This article develops the idea of "identity deployment" as a form of strategic collective action. Thus one can ask under what political conditions are identities that celebrate or suppress differences deployed strategically. A comparison of strategies used in four lesbian and gay rights campaigns shows that interactions between social movement organizations, state actors, and the opposition determine the types of identities deployed. The author suggests the model's application to the Civil Rights and feminist movements.

[The organizers of the 1993 lesbian and gay march on Washington] face a dilemma: how to put forward a set of unsettling demands for unconventional people in ways that will not make enemies of potential allies. They do so by playing down their differences before the media and the country while celebrating it in private. (Tarrow 1994, p. 10)

Sidney Tarrow's portrayal of the 1993 lesbian and gay march on Washington highlights a central irony about identity politics and the decline of the Left: Critics of identity politics decry the celebration of difference

<sup>1</sup> I thank Edwin Amenta, Ellen Benoit, Nancy Cauthen, Kelly Moore, Gilda Zwerman, Yvonne Zylan, and the members of the New York University Politics, Power, and Protest Workshop for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as the *AJS* reviewers for helpful suggestions. I greatly benefited from both discussions with and comments from David Greenberg and Francesca Polletta. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Franqui for her crucial assistance on this paper. This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Dissertation grant (9623937) and by a New York University June Frier Esserman Dissertation Fellowship. Direct correspondence to Mary Bernstein, School of Justice Studies, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 870403, Tempe, Arizona 85287-0403.

within contemporary identity movements, charging them with limiting the potential for a “politics of commonality” between oppressed peoples that could have potential for radical social change (Gitlin 1995). On the other hand, the lesbian and gay movement seems largely to have abandoned its emphasis on *difference from* the straight majority in favor of a moderate politics that highlights *similarities to* the straight majority (Seidman 1993).

Over time, “identity” movements shift their emphasis between celebrating and suppressing differences from the majority. For example, the Civil Rights movement underscored similarities to the majority in order to achieve concrete policy reforms. At other times, movements that assert radical racial identities to build communities and challenge hegemonic American culture take center stage. The American feminist movement has alternately emphasized innate gender differences between men and women and denied that such differences exist or that they are socially relevant. Under what political conditions do activists celebrate or suppress differences from the majority? Why does the stress on difference or similarity change over time?

To answer these questions, this article draws on evidence from several campaigns for lesbian and gay rights ordinances.<sup>2</sup> The lesbian and gay movement was chosen because it is considered the quintessential identity movement (Melucci 1989; Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). The cultural barriers to acceptance of homosexuality and the challenge of self-acceptance for lesbians and gay men require cultural struggle. However, the lesbian and gay movement has been altered from a movement for cultural transformation through sexual liberation to one that seeks achievement of political rights through a narrow, ethnic-like (Seidman 1993) interest-group politics. This well-documented transition (Altman 1982; Paul 1982; Escoffier 1985; Epstein 1987; Seidman 1993; Ganson 1995; Vaid 1995) has yet to be explained.

This research will show that celebration or suppression of differences within political campaigns depends on the structure of social movement organizations, access to the polity (Tilly 1978), and the type of opposition. By specifying the political conditions that explain variation in strategies within movements, one can better understand differences in forms of collective action across movements.

<sup>2</sup> Human rights ordinances typically provide protection from discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommodations on the basis of characteristics such as sex, race, and national origin. “lesbian and gay rights bills” typically add “sexual orientation” to this list of protected categories.

## IDENTITY AND MOVEMENT TYPES

Attempts to classify social movements have typically centered around the distinction between “strategy-oriented” and “identity-oriented” movements (Touraine 1981). Abandoning this distinction, Duyvendak and Giugni argue instead that “the real difference is, however, the one between movements pursuing goals in the outside world, for which the action is instrumental for goal realization, and identity-oriented movements that realize their goals, at least partly, in their activities” (1995, pp. 277–78). Social movements, then, are classified on “their logic of action,” whether they employ an identity or instrumental logic of action, and whether they are internally or externally oriented. Movements such as the lesbian and gay movement are internally oriented and follow an identity logic of action. Instrumental movements, by contrast, engage in instrumental action and are externally oriented (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995, pp. 84–85).

This mechanical bifurcation of movement types, reflected in the division between identity theory on the one hand and resource mobilization and political process theory on the other, has left the literature on contentious politics unable to explain changes in forms of collective action. First, the casual use of the term “identity” obscures fundamental distinctions in meaning (e.g., Gitlin 1995). Second, I argue that theorists must abandon the *essentialist* characterization of social movements as expressive or instrumental because it impairs the study of all social movements. This essentialist characterization stems from the conflation of goals and strategies (i.e., that instrumental strategies are irrelevant to cultural change, while expressions of identity cannot be externally directed) apparent in resource mobilization, political process, and new social movement theories. Finally, attempts to integrate these theories have been unsuccessful.

Subsumed under the rubric of new social movements, “identity movements” have been defined as much by the goals they seek, and the strategies they use, as by the fact that they are based on a shared characteristic such as ethnicity or sex. According to new social movement theorists, identity movements seek to transform dominant cultural patterns, or gain recognition for new social identities, by employing expressive strategies (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985, 1989).

New social movement theory suggests that movements choose political strategies in order to facilitate the creation of organizational forms that encourage participation and empowerment. Thus strategies that privilege the creation of democratic, nonhierarchical organizations would be chosen over strategies narrowly tailored to produce policy change.

For resource mobilization and political process theorists, identity may play a role in mobilization through solidary incentives (Klandermans

1984, 1988), but once the “free rider” problem is overcome (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982), all other collective action is deemed instrumental, targeted solely at achieving concrete (i.e., measurable) goals. Resource mobilization and political process theorists have neglected the study of identity movements with their seemingly “nonpolitical,” cultural goals. Even when culture is recognized as an integral part of sustaining activist communities, changing or challenging mainstream culture is rarely considered a goal of activism. Strategies are seen as rationally chosen to optimize the likelihood of policy success. Outcomes are measured as a combination of policy change (“new advantages”) and access to the structure of political bargaining (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Gamson 1990). Such a narrow framing of social movement goals can lead to erroneous assumptions about the reasons for collective action and for strategy choice (Turner and Killian 1972; Jenkins 1983). Where goals are cultural and therefore harder to operationalize, theorists assume collective action has no external dimension but is aimed simply at reproducing the identity on which the movement is based (see Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). This leaves theorists unable to explain social movement action that seems to be working at cross purposes to achieving policy change. Furthermore, it relegates “prefigurative” (Breines 1988; Polletta 1994) politics—a politics that seeks to transform observers through the embodiment of alternative values and organizational forms—to the realm of the irrational.

Although political opportunity or political process (McAdam 1982) models share resource mobilization’s assumptions about the relationship between strategies and goals, they provide a more useful starting point for understanding how political strategies are chosen. According to Tilly (1978), forms of collective action will be affected by “political coalitions and . . . the means of actions built into the existing political organization” (p. 167). These short- and medium-term “volatile” (Gamson and Meyer 1996) elements of “political opportunity” (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1996; Kriesi and Giugni 1995) include the opening of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages among elites (Tarrow 1988; Kriesi and Giugni 1995). As the political context changes, strategies should also change. Yet political opportunity models lack specificity in analyzing why or under what political conditions movements choose particular forms of collective action.

Attempts to reconcile the disjuncture between new social movement and resource mobilization or political process theory center on the relationship between forms of collective action and the movement’s life cycle. The emergent “new social movements” of the 1960s and 1970s seemed so striking because they utilized innovative, direct action tactics. According to Calhoun (1995):

As Tarrow (1989) has remarked, this description confuses two senses of new: the characteristics of all movements when they are new, and the characteristics of a putatively new sort of movement.

It is indeed generally true that any movement of or on behalf of those excluded from conventional politics starts out with a need to attract attention; movement activity is not just an instrumental attempt to achieve movement goals, but a means of recruitment and continuing mobilization of participants. (P. 193)

In this view, a lack of historical perspective has mistakenly led new social movement theorists to label behavior "distinctive" when it is simply behavior indicative of an emergent social movement.

This criticism of new social movement theory glosses over important empirical and theoretical distinctions. First, not every emergent social movement employs novel or dramatic tactics in order to gain new recruits. Religious right organizations that arose in the 1970s drew on the dense network of conservative churches as well as direct mail lists to mobilize; they did not employ innovative or novel tactics (Diamond 1989). Rather than misattributing certain forms of collective action to the newness of social movements, one should ask what accounts for different forms of mobilization. Furthermore, attributing certain forms of collective action to the newness of social movements precludes an understanding of why such forms of collective action may emerge at later points in a movement's protest cycle.

Second, the glib dismissal of the sorts of political action attributed to new social movements (Duyvendak 1995; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995) as simply expressive, or unrelated to political structure, ignores the external or instrumental dimensions of seemingly expressive action. If putatively new social movements do challenge dominant cultural patterns, then theorists must take seriously the political nature of such collective action. Social movement theory must examine the challenges all social movements present to dominant cultural patterns.

This research seeks to provide a more complete understanding of the role of identity in collective action. I build in part on political process theory, while incorporating new social movement theory's emphasis on the importance of cultural change to movement activism. I argue that the concept of "identity" has at least three distinct analytic levels, the first two of which have been developed in the social movement literature. First, a shared collective identity is necessary for mobilization of *any* social movement (Morris 1992), including the classic labor movement (Calhoun 1995). Second, identity can be a goal of social movement activism, either gaining acceptance for a hitherto stigmatized identity (Calhoun 1994) or deconstructing categories of identities such as "man," "woman," "gay," "straight" (Gamson 1995), "black," or "white." Finally, this research argues that expressions of identity can be deployed at the collective level as a political strategy, which can be aimed at cultural or instrumental goals.

Once the concept of identity is broken down into these three analytic dimensions, then one can explore the political conditions that produce certain identity strategies.

The next section examines analytic uses of the concept "identity" in the social movement literature. Then I present a general model to explain identity strategies. The following sections elaborate the general model by drawing on historical research and interview data to explain diverse identity strategies used in campaigns for lesbian and gay rights ordinances. The essentialist assumptions embedded in new social movement, resource mobilization, and political process perspectives limit their ability to account for these variations. The case studies will show that forms of collective action are the result of specific features of social movement organizations, the type of opposition, and concrete interactions with the state. Finally, I suggest the model's application to the Civil Rights and feminist movements.

### THREE ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY

The creation of communities and movement solidarity, which the bulk of research on collective identity examines (Williams 1995), is necessary for mobilization. I define *identity for empowerment* to mean the creation of collective identity and the feeling that political action is feasible (see table 1). In other words, some sort of identity is necessary to translate individual to group interests and individual to collective action. All social movements require such a "political consciousness" (Morris 1992) to create and mobilize a constituency (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Calhoun 1995).

Identity for empowerment is not necessarily a consciously chosen strategy, although it is a precursor to collective action. If a movement constituency has a shared collective identity and the institutions or social networks that provide a cultural space from which to act, then community building and empowerment will be forfeited to "instrumental" goals of policy attainment. In the absence of visibility or movement organizations, more work must be done to build organizations and recruit activists.

Collective identity can also have an external dimension in mobilization. Beckwith (1995) argues that an actor can use her or his identity to gain "political standing" (i.e., to legitimate participation) in a social movement in which she or he is not directly implicated. So, for example, women involved in coal mining strikes who are not miners can justify participation based on their relations to the miners, such as mother, sister, or wife. The choice of identity (e.g., wife of miner vs. working-class woman) can have implications for future activism.

Identity can also be a goal of collective action (*identity as goal*). Activists may challenge stigmatized identities, seek recognition for new identi-

TABLE 1  
THE THREE ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF "IDENTITY"

Dimension	Description
Identity for empowerment ...	Activists must draw on an existing identity or construct a new collective identity in order to create and mobilize a constituency. The particular identity chosen will have implications for future activism.
Identity as goal .....	Activists may challenge stigmatized identities, seek recognition for new identities, or deconstruct restrictive social categories as goals of collective action.
Identity as strategy .....	Identities may be deployed strategically as a form of collective action. <i>Identity deployment</i> is defined as expressing identity such that the terrain of conflict becomes the individual person so that the values, categories, and practices of individuals become subject to debate. <i>Identity for critique</i> confronts the values, categories, and practice of the dominant culture. <i>Identity for education</i> challenges the dominant culture's perception of the minority or is used strategically to gain legitimacy by playing on uncontroversial themes.

ties, or deconstruct restrictive social categories. New Left organizations of the 1960s, for example, sought not only concrete policy reform, but thought that the creation of alternative cultural forms could foster structural change. Polletta (1994) asserts that "student-organizers of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) saw their task as to mobilize and secure recognition for a new collective identity—poor, 'unqualified' southern blacks—in a way that would transform national and local politics by refashioning criteria of political leadership" (p. 85). Feminists influenced American culture by challenging and altering conventional usage of sexist terms in the English language. Gamson (1995) argues that social movement theory must take seriously the goal of contemporary "queer politics" to deconstruct social categories, including "man," "woman," "gay," and "straight." Without a broader understanding of the goals of collective action and their relationship to the structural location of the actors, social movement theory cannot adequately explain strategy choices made by activists.

In addition to influencing motivations and goals of collective action, "cultural resources also have an external, strategic dimension" (Williams 1995, p. 125). I define *identity deployment* to mean expressing identity such that the terrain of conflict becomes the individual person so that the values, categories, and practices of individuals become subject to

debate. What does it mean to “deploy identity” strategically? Taylor and Raeburn (1995) view identity deployment as a way to contest stigmatized social identities for the purposes of institutional change. Yet contesting stigma to change institutions is not the only reason for identity deployment. The goal of identity deployment can be to transform mainstream culture, its categories and values (and perhaps by extension its policies and structures), by providing alternative organizational forms. Identity deployment can also transform participants or simply educate legislators or the public.

Identity deployment can be examined at both the individual and collective level along a continuum from education to critique.<sup>3</sup> Activists either dress and act consistently with mainstream culture or behave in a critical way. *Identity for critique* confronts the values, categories, and practices of the dominant culture. *Identity for education* challenges the dominant culture’s perception of the minority or is used strategically to gain legitimacy by playing on uncontroversial themes.<sup>4</sup> Although the goals associated with either identity strategy can be moderate or radical, identity for education generally limits the scope of conflict by not problematizing the morality or norms of the dominant culture.

Identity deployment should be understood dramaturgically (Goffman 1959) as the collective portrayal of the group’s identity in the political realm, whether that be in city council hearings or at sit-ins in segregated restaurants. The strategic deployment of identity may differ from the group’s (or individuals’) private understanding of that identity. In this research, I examine identity deployment at the collective level.

It is important not to conflate the goals of identity deployment with its form (i.e., critical or educational). Both can be part of a project of cultural challenge or a strategy to achieve policy reform. Whether these strategies are associated with organizational forms that encourage participation and empowerment by privileging the creation of democratic, nonhierarchical organizations, as new social movement theory would suggest, or with narrow interest group strategies designed to achieve policy change, as resource mobilization and political process perspectives would suggest, then becomes an empirical question, not an essentialist assumption based on movement types.

<sup>3</sup> Individual-level identity-for-critique strategies rooted in oppositional cultures might include feminists not wearing bras or shaving their legs to challenge gender-based appearance norms.

<sup>4</sup> Of course justification for political participation can have subversive effects. For example, women in the late 19th century justified their incursions into politics as a natural extension of their role as men’s moral caretakers (e.g., Kraditor 1981). Political activism then changed views about women’s appropriate roles.


Understanding identity as a tool for mobilization, as a goal, and as a strategy will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of social movements. Instead of asking whether identity plays a role in a given movement, we can ask several questions: What role does identity play in mobilization? To what extent is identity a goal of collective action? Why or under what political conditions are identities that celebrate or suppress differences deployed strategically?

### GENERAL MODEL

I argue that identity strategies will be determined by the configuration of political access, the structure of social movement organizations, and the type and extent of opposition. In addition to affecting political outcomes (Zald and Ash 1966; Gamson 1990), the characteristics of movement organizations should also influence political strategies. I define *inclusive* movement organizations to be those groups whose strategies, in practice, seek to educate and mobilize a constituency or maximize involvement in political campaigns. *Exclusive* organizations actively discourage popular participation, choosing strategies unlikely to mobilize a movement constituency. Changes in the political context should also influence political strategies (Tilly 1978). I consider that a movement has *access* to the polity if candidates respond to movement inquiries, if elected officials or state agencies support and work toward the movement's goals, or if movement leaders have access to polity members (e.g., through business affiliations, personal contacts, or official positions in political parties). Organized opposition is also an important part of the political context (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Most contemporary American social movements eventually face organized opposition to their goals, and this should influence the types of identities deployed. *Routine opposition* will refer to polity insiders (Tilly 1978); that is, those who by virtue of their institutional position (such as a cardinal of the Catholic Church) have the ear of policy makers. *Opposing movements* will refer to groups outside the polity mobilized around the issues of contention (Bernstein 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

The role of identity in mobilization will differ across movements, but not because of some abstract essentialism of movement types. For example, identity for empowerment may play a smaller role in mobilizing movements sparked by a "moral shock"—such as the antiwar movement, the antinuclear movement, or the animal rights movement—than in mobilizing movements based on a shared characteristic or identity. But once a movement has emerged, I suggest that the same conditions that determine identity deployment should also apply to movements started by moral shocks.

In order to emerge, a social movement requires a base from which to



\* This path represents the pre-mobilization stage of advocacy

FIG. 1.—Identity deployment in the lesbian and gay movement

organize and some sort of collective identity to translate individual into group interests. Movements with access to the structure of political bargaining *or* strong organizational infrastructures that have fostered a shared identity will tend to seek policy change, emphasize sameness rather than difference, and will use identity for education rather than identity for critique (see fig. 1, paths 1, 2a).<sup>5</sup> However, if the movement faces organized opposition from outside the political establishment, and if the movement

<sup>5</sup> Before a movement has emerged publicly, opposition will be routine, because the embryonic movement poses no threat (the apex of fig. 1). Scapegoating would be one exception to this generalization. Movements in this premobilization stage, by definition, lack political access, and if organizational actors exist at all, they are likely to be exclusive, placing little emphasis on mobilization.

is led by exclusive, narrowly focused groups uninterested in movement building, the movement may split, with some groups emphasizing differences and community building, while the exclusive groups continue to emphasize sameness and narrowly focused policy change (a mixed model; see fig. 1, path 2b). In such cases, critical identities may be deployed as much in reaction to movement leadership as to the opposition.

When an emergent movement lacks both political access and an organizational infrastructure or collective identity, then an emphasis on difference will be needed to build solidarity and mobilize a constituency (fig. 1, path 3). Such movements will tend to focus on building community and celebrating difference, as will those sectors of a movement marginalized by exclusive groups encountering nonroutine opposition (fig. 1, path 4b).

Once a movement has been established—with constituency and organizational actors—then movement between the cells in figure 1 may take place as organized opposition emerges or declines, political coalitions shift, and the structures of movement organizations change over time.

After a movement's emergence, the types of identity deployment will be related to the structure of social movement organizations, access to the polity and whether opposition is routine, deriving from polity insiders, or external, arising from organized opposing movements. Changes in short- or medium-term elements of the political context should have a determining effect on forms of collective action such that greater access produces more moderate forms of collective action and identity for education strategies, while closing opportunities will lead to an emphasis on identity for critique. When the polity is relatively open and diverse segments of the activist community are represented in movement organizations or are included in political campaigns, there will be less emphasis on criticizing normative values. Because identity is deployed in the context of concrete interactions, the baseline against which activists define themselves will be influenced by opposing movements. Exclusive social movement organizations, the presence of a strong opposition, and negative interactions with the state will likely result in greater dissension within the community. That dissension will lead to factionalization and will produce moderates who will focus more on education and traditional lobbying tactics and radicals who will focus on criticizing dominant values (a "mixed model"). Radicalization in the movement can stem as much from reaction to movement leaders as from reactions to the political context. In short, identity deployment in the political realm will depend on the structure of and relations among movement organizations, the extent of political access, and the type of opposition. The next section draws on evidence from the lesbian and gay movement to suggest more concretely the causal processes that lead to certain types of identity deployment.

THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT

Detailed historical and qualitative research was employed to understand how political strategies were chosen by activists under distinct political conditions. I conducted field research on city and state campaigns for lesbian and gay rights ordinances in New York City, Vermont, and Oregon. The cases were chosen to vary on the independent variables. Through archival research, I examined movement documents such as press releases and position papers, newspaper accounts from both lesbian and gay and mainstream presses, and transcripts from public hearings. Interviews with selected informants were used to supplement the written material. For each case, I traced the development of state-oriented lesbian and gay organizations, including foundational and position papers that delineate goals, strategies, and guiding principles. For illustrative purposes, I also briefly discuss gay and lesbian responses to antilesbian and antigay legislation in Colorado. The opposition was investigated through secondary sources.

When lesbians and gay men deploy their identity strategically, debates may center around whether sexual orientation is immutable, what constitutes "homosexual practices," or whether pedophilia is the same as homosexuality. Lesbian and gay lives become the subject of conflict. Nothing about the lesbian and gay movement dictates the strategic use of identity at the collective level. For example, activists could draw attention to discriminatory employment practices, with a universal appeal to everyone's right to a job based on their skills. That is different than disclosing one's sexual orientation to legislators or neighbors, saying "Here I am, know me."

In the case of the lesbian and gay movement, identity for education challenges negative stereotypes about lesbians and gay men, such as having hundreds of sexual partners a year or struggling with uncontrollable sexual urges (Herman 1994), while identity for critique challenges dominant cultural assumptions about the religious or biological "naturalness" of gender roles and the heterosexual nuclear family. Arguably the greatest success of the women's movement has been to break down the division between public and private through challenging traditional notions of gender (Gitlin 1994). Both identity for critique and identity for education can be part of broader projects seeking cultural change or policy reform.

Although many have looked at the relationship between lesbian and gay culture and individual-level identity strategies (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1995), few have examined this phenomena empirically, as a collective, consciously chosen political strategy. The rest of this article explores identity strategies along the continuum from critique to education at the collective level. As Seidman (1993, pp. 135–36) argues, we must

"relate the politics of representation to institutional dynamics" rather than reducing cultural codes to textual practices abstracted from institutional contexts. The lesbian and gay movement has challenged a variety of institutions in American society, but I will restrict my analysis to interactions with the state because, with the onslaught by the Religious Right, the state has become one of the central loci of identity deployment. Future research will have to determine the ways diverse institutional dynamics (e.g., the church or psychiatry) influence the creation and deployment of identities.

#### THE HOMOPHILE MOVEMENT

A collective identity among lesbians and gay men emerged prior to the strategic recruitment of a constituency by organizational actors, as long-term structural changes brought increasing numbers of gay men and lesbians together in urban settings (D'Emilio 1983). The secretive nature of the early homophile organizations (Licata 1980/81; D'Emilio 1983), however, precluded mass mobilization. The only public meeting places for lesbians and gay men—cruising places and Mafia-run bars (Nestle 1987; Chauncey 1994)—were ill-suited for mobilization. Cherry Grove, Fire Island, a visible lesbian and gay summer community, may have provided a more hospitable avenue for mobilization (Newton 1993) but was not linked to a broader organizational infrastructure.

The predominantly underground homophile movement of the 1940s and 1950s has been well documented (Licata 1980/81; D'Emilio 1983). Groups such as the Daughters of Bilitis and the Mattachine Society had exclusive organizational structures,<sup>6</sup> lacked access to the polity, and faced routine opposition from the state (see fig. 1, path 4a). The goals of the homophile movement varied over the years as some sought assimilation while others thought homosexuality was a distinctive and positive trait that should not be subsumed by mainstream culture. Yet both sides agreed on strategies: homophile activists would educate professionals (in particular medical professionals) about the realities of homosexuality; those professionals would in turn advocate for changes in state policies on behalf of homosexuals.

As the social strictures against homosexuality loosened, the lesbian and gay movement became more public through the 1960s (Weeks 1989). Much of the emergent movement's activism appeared to be "expressive," aimed for and at lesbians and gay men. In part, that perception was

<sup>6</sup> The homophile organizations did not publicize their meetings for fear of exposing their members as homosexuals (Marotta 1981; D'Emilio 1983).

strengthened by the connection of many activists in post-Stonewall organizations to the New Left (e.g., Radical Lesbians, the Furies, and the Gay Liberation Front [Teal 1971; Marotta 1981; Cruikshank 1992])<sup>7</sup> who felt that alternative cultural forms would lead to a revolutionary restructuring of society. The visible and outspoken nature of 1960s and 1970s activists accounts for the perception by scholars that the lesbian and gay movement was fundamentally different from other social movements.

But this perception is misguided because it ignores the diversity within the lesbian and gay movement, even around the time of Stonewall. The development of these local movements and the strategies they chose depended on their access to the polity, on their organizational structure, and on the type of opposition they faced. For example, where movement leaders had access to the polity, usually in smaller cities where gay white businessmen had contacts in government (Gay Writers Group 1983) or where earlier movement activities had created political access, as in Washington, D.C. (Johnson 1994–95), expressive action was minimal. In most cases, local movements lacked access to the polity and had to create a constituency. To do so, they had to locate others like themselves. The lack of lesbian and gay institutions, such as churches or bookstores, forced leaders to construct those spaces as well as to launch political campaigns.

When groups lack their own institutions and a political consciousness, they will concentrate on identity for empowerment and community growth. Over time, as institutions and opportunities to act develop, what was once seen as an expressive movement will come to be seen as instrumental as political representation increases and the emphasis on empowerment decreases. Once a movement has been established, forms of collective action will depend on access to decision makers, the extent of opposition, and the degree of inclusiveness of movement organizations.

#### NEW YORK CITY AND OREGON

In 1971, New York City's Gay Activists Alliance (GAA) launched a campaign to add "sexual orientation" to the list of protected categories in the city's human rights ordinance.<sup>8</sup> Although GAA engaged political authori-

<sup>7</sup> "Stonewall" refers to the 1969 riots that took place in New York City when patrons of the gay afterhours club, the Stonewall Inn, fought back during a police raid. The weekend of rioting that ensued sparked national publicity for the movement, and dozens of new gay liberationist organizations formed (Teal 1971, Marotta 1981, Duberman 1993), accelerating the trend toward radicalism that had begun earlier in the 1960s.

<sup>8</sup> In addition to secondary sources, I examined the papers of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, from 1973 to 1993, and the collection of veteran gay activist Bruce Voeller, housed at the Cornell University Human Sexuality Collection.

ties in the public realm, it emphasized identity for critique, seeking to increase publicity and refusing to compromise for the sake of policy change (fig. 1, path 3). Activists borrowed freely from the tactics of other contemporary movements, turning sit-ins into “kiss-ins” at straight bars to protest bans on same-sex displays of affection (*Advocate* 1970a). They held peaceful demonstrations protesting police brutality (Rosen 1980/81) and infiltrated local political clubs to “zap” public officials with questions about police raids on gay bars, entrapment, and support for antidiscrimination policies (Martello 1970b; *Gay Activist* 1972a). Activists consistently refused to dress in accordance with mainstream culture, using their identity to criticize gender roles and heterosexual norms. In short, they used theatrical tactics that increased the scope of the conflict, demanding publicity, regardless of its potentially dilatory effect on achieving policy change. For example, Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair of New York City’s Commission on Human Rights, offered GAA members the option of holding private hearings on the ordinance. GAA refused, declaring that it would only participate in open hearings, although that was less likely to achieve policy change. GAA finally secured public hearings after a demonstration—intended to be peaceful—outside General Welfare Committee chair Saul Sharison’s apartment building turned bloody when Tactical Police Force officers taunted and then beat demonstrators with their clubs. Despite dissension within GAA, drag queens were ultimately allowed to participate in the hearings. City council members would subsequently exploit the confusion between transvestism and homosexuality to defeat the ordinance (Marotta 1981).

The fight for antidiscrimination legislation in Oregon contrasted sharply with the battle in New York City. Activists in Portland and Eugene in the 1970s—primarily gay white men—had easy access to the polity because of their status as business persons. The Portland Town Council (PTC), an informal coalition of gay-oriented businesses and organizations, was founded in 1970. Due largely to the lack of opposition and the semi-insider status of its members, the PTC won a series of incremental victories culminating in Portland’s passage of a law to prohibit discrimination against city employees on the basis of sexual orientation (*Gay Blade* 1975; PTC 1976). In Eugene, activists also capitalized on their insider status by choosing strategies that discouraged mass participation, including secret meetings with council members. In 1977, Eugene passed a lesbian and gay rights ordinance (Gay Writers Group 1983).

The PTC also spearheaded efforts to add sexual orientation to the state’s human rights statute. Despite agonizingly narrow defeats of statewide antidiscrimination bills (by one vote in 1975), activists continued to work with state officials. In 1976, at the PTC’s request, Oregon Governor Straub created the Ad Hoc Task Force on Sexual Preference to conduct

factual research and to make policy recommendations to the Oregon legislature. The PTC served as an advisory board, recommended areas for research, and facilitated interactions between lesbian and gay communities and the task force (PTC 1976; Coleman 1977).

The strategies employed in New York City and Oregon contrasted sharply. When given the choice, New York City activists consistently privileged strategies that challenged dominant cultural values over those that would maximize the likelihood of policy success. By refusing to hold private hearings with the Human Rights Commission, activists increased the scope of conflict. Rather than allaying the fears of legislators and the public by reassuring them of the incremental nature of the policy reform, activists exacerbated those fears by having transvestites testify at public hearings. In Oregon, activists were content to hold secret meetings with lawmakers in order to gain legal change.

What accounts for these diverse approaches to political change? The early stage of New York City's lesbian and gay liberation movement appears to be consistent with a new social movement interpretation. At the time, movement theorists stated explicitly that the battle was over ending oppressive gender roles and the restrictive categories of heterosexuality and homosexuality that inhibited everyone's true bisexual nature (Wittman 1972; Altman 1993; Seidman 1993). Thus activists chose strategies that highlighted differences from the straight majority, seeing themselves as the embodiment of the liberation potential. Uncompromising strategies that reproduced the identity on which the movement was based and created participatory organizations took priority over goals of achieving policy reform. Creating a sense that gay was good and should be expressed publicly, with pride, would not come through secretive meetings with city officials or concealing drag queens.

In Oregon, on the other hand, little emphasis was placed on creating democratic organizations. The goals in Eugene, Portland, and at the state level were to obtain narrow legal protections. Rather than focus on mobilization, the PTC hired a lobbyist to advocate for the new antidiscrimination legislation (PTC 1976). The comparison of Oregon to New York City suggests that newly emerging social movements will only emphasize differences through expressive tactics to the extent that they lack access to the polity and a strong organizational infrastructure.

Political access and differing resources explain in part the different orientations of the Oregon and New York City activists to cultural and legal change. In New York City, activists faced a closed polity. New York State retained an antisodomy statute, which effectively criminalized the status of being lesbian or gay (Copelon 1990; Cain 1993) and was used to justify police entrapment and bar raids. The New York City police routinely used violence to quell peaceful lesbian and gay demonstrations and were

unresponsive to lesbians and gay men who were the victims of violence (*Advocate* 1970b, 1970c; *Gay Activist* 1972b).

Lesbians and gay men needed to become a political minority. To do so, they had to increase visibility at the expense of losing short-term policy battles. Influenced as well by other contemporary movements (e.g., the Civil Rights, New Left, and feminist movements) activists had little to lose and much to gain by radical political action. Although deploying identity for critique may have had long-term political benefits, many saw the goal of a political battle in terms of empowering the lesbian and gay communities. In short, the political battle was an opportunity to create a cultural shift in sensibilities among lesbians and gay men (Marotta 1981).

Despite the importance of the political context, it was in interactions with the state that identities were formed and deployed. Although activists' analysis of the relationship between political and cultural change (Marotta 1981)—either that political campaigns served the purpose of empowering activists or that political reforms would enable cultural change—produced and reinforced critical identities, negative interactions with the state entrenched an oppositional dynamic. The New York City Council's initial refusal to hold public hearings, in addition to the police repression (Rosen 1980/81) that included the attack on demonstrators outside Sharison's building, cemented the antagonistic relationship between activists and the state. Because organizations were inclusive and the lesbian and gay social movement sector was relatively undifferentiated, a cultural critique could only be expressed in the political realm. There was nothing about the movement per se that dictated the deployment of critical identities. Activists' interpretations of the relationship between culture and politics and the types of identities deployed were contingent on interactions with the state.

A second part of the formation of a critical identity was the absence of an organized opposition. Because opposition was routine, lesbians and gay men had only to define themselves against mainstream cultural views in order to criticize the dominant culture. Identities were constructed through interactions with the state, in the absence of organized third parties. In short, inclusive movement organizations, lack of access to the polity, negative interactions with the state, and routine opposition produced critical identities.

Activists in Oregon had greater resources than did activists in New York City, due in part to class and gender differences. The unique access to government officials facilitated by business connections enabled quick passage of local legislation and almost won passage of statewide legislation. Unlike GAA, the PTC had had mostly positive relations with state authorities in Portland, Eugene, and the state capitol. So after narrow losses in the state legislature, rather than respond in a critical way through

dramatic demonstrations, the PTC approached Governor Robert Straub for redress (PTC 1976). Had Governor Straub not been responsive to lesbian and gay demands, or, similarly, had the Eugene City Council initially rebuffed the gay activists, critical identities would have been deployed, as much in reaction to the elite gay leadership as to the state (which is what happened in Oregon more than a decade later).

Critical identities, however, were not deployed in Eugene, and success came easily as a result of political access and the low-key tactics of the gay activists. The elitist attitude and nonparticipatory stance of the gay leadership, however, created antagonisms between different lesbian and gay communities. But because interactions with the state had been positive, as shown by the bill's relatively quick passage, these tensions lay dormant. When newly organized religious right groups placed a referendum to repeal Eugene's lesbian and gay rights ordinance on the ballot, the dissension within the lesbian and gay communities made it difficult for them to present a united front, and the antilesbian and antigay referendum ultimately passed (Gay Writers' Group 1983).

By the end of the 1970s, the lesbian and gay movement had undergone profound internal change.<sup>9</sup> Activists no longer placed the same emphasis on challenging gender roles and the construction of heterosexuality in state-oriented lesbian and gay rights campaigns. As many have observed, an ethnic- or interest-group model that sought achievement of rights replaced the liberation model that sought freedom from constraining gender roles and sexual categories (Altman 1982; Paul 1982; Escoffier 1985; Epstein 1987; Seidman 1993; Gamson 1995). Institutionalized, professionally led organizations often supplanted the grassroots groups of the early 1970s in leading campaigns directed at the state. The gay liberation fronts and the gay activists' alliances had all but disappeared. In addition to internal changes within the lesbian and gay movement, by the end of the 1970s the religious right emerged and worked to oppose all of the changes sought by lesbian and gay activists (Adam 1987).

The next section explains why these changes within the lesbian and gay movement occurred and what accounts for the continued variation in forms of collective action across the United States. Access to political decision makers produced identity for education, as in Vermont (fig. 1, path 1). However, where exclusive groups faced organized opposition, as in

<sup>9</sup>I am referring here to the lesbian and gay movement that sought policy change from the state. Much lesbian and gay activism was not oriented toward the state. For example, during the 1970s, lesbian feminists split off from the feminist and gay movements to form separatist institutions and communities (Cruikshank 1992). The political nature of the radical feminist community has been described by others (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Here I refer only to those lesbian or gay organizations that targeted the state.

Colorado, a mixed model of identity deployment was produced as marginalized groups within the lesbian and gay movement reacted to the lesbian and gay leadership and to the opposition (path 4b). In Oregon, exclusive leadership and intense opposition would later produce a mixed model (path 2b). But as activists realized that sustaining a prolonged campaign against the religious opposition required cooperation among diverse lesbian and gay communities, organizations became more inclusive and an educational model prevailed (path 1).

## VERMONT

Vermont's lesbian and gay community began organizing more than a decade after the Stonewall riots.<sup>10</sup> Although Vermont had a strong lesbian-feminist community with developed organizational and personal networks, it had not targeted the state about specifically lesbian or gay issues. Motivated by the religious right's attack on lesbian and gay rights, activists decided to work for passage of a statewide bill that would protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination.

Activists quickly obtained official recognition from the governor's office of community-appointed male and female liaisons to the lesbian and gay communities. The liaisons fostered contact with elected officials as well as with the attorney general's office and the Vermont Human Rights Commission. Close collaboration with both offices resulted in the inclusion of protection based on sexual orientation in the state's Hate Crimes Bill

<sup>10</sup> Data for this section come from personal interviews with both lesbian and gay activists and state officials as well as an analysis of *Out in the Mountains* (monthly issues, 1986–92), Vermont's only lesbian and gay newspaper. Interviewees included Keith E. Goslant, liaison to the Vermont governor's office from the lesbian and gay community and member of the Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights (hereafter Vermont Coalition) (personal interview, February 25, 1995); Linda Hollingdale, activist with the Vermont Coalition (personal interview, February 22, 1995); Mary Hurlie, cochair of the Vermont Coalition (personal interview, February 23, 1995); Bill Lippert, activist, and openly gay member of the Vermont State Legislature (personal interview, February 22, 1995); Peggy A. Luhrs, organizer of Vermont's first lesbian and gay pride march, board member of the Vermont Coalition, and director of the Burlington Women's Council (personal interview, February 25, 1995); Paul Olsen, activist; M. Holly Perdue, liaison to the Vermont governor's office from the lesbian and gay community and member of the Vermont Coalition (personal interview, February 24, 1995); Howard Russell, organizer of Vermont's first lesbian and gay pride march and of Vermonters for Lesbian and Gay Rights, first openly gay candidate for the Vermont State Senate, member Vermont Coalition (personal interview, February 23, 1995); Susan Sussman, director of the Vermont Human Rights Commission (personal interview, February 24, 1995). It should be noted that lesbian publications existed prior to the publication of *Out in the Mountains*, but the lesbian feminist movement did not target the state about specifically lesbian and/or gay issues (Luhrs, personal communication), so those publications are excluded from this analysis.

(Sussman, see n. 10 above). The Vermont legislature also passed important legislation sought by the AIDS communities (Goslant 1991).

Unlike New York City activists of the early 1970s, the Vermont activists whom I interviewed did not see policy campaigns as a vehicle for staging a cultural critique. In fact, many claimed not to see the issue of gay rights as a cultural battle at all, but as simply a matter of social justice. They took a laissez-faire approach to organizing, and they encouraged participation. They made no attempts to constrain testimony in the public hearings on the lesbian and gay rights bill. Ironically, lesbians and gay men showed up for the hearings conservatively dressed, in clothes many had probably not worn since their first job interviews, choosing in this way not to challenge dominant gender norms. One of the liaisons recounted that she would dress in her "Republican drag" when attending hearings at the statehouse (Perdue, see n. 10).

In the final push for the lesbian and gay rights bill, Vermont activists chose to "put a face on lesbian and gay rights," by fostering personal contact between constituents and their legislators. In addition to telephone campaigns, they activated friendship, organizational, and professional networks to arrange meetings between legislators and their gay and lesbian constituents and other supporters of the bill—what they called "coffee klatches" (Hurlie, see n. 10 above). During these meetings, traditional educational work and identity for education activities took place. Legislators were educated about the scope of the bill, emphasizing that the bill did not endorse a lesbian and gay "lifestyle" but was simply a question of justice. Activists used the meetings to dispel the myth that passing a nondiscrimination law would lead to affirmative action for "queers" (Hurlie, see n. 10) or to certain defeat for legislators who supported the bill. Although fact sheets dispelling myths about, for example, gay men as child molesters, were distributed to each state senator and representative, the meetings capitalized on personal relations (rather than social science studies) to dispel myths about homosexuality (Olsen, see n. 10). By fostering personal contact, activists themselves became the contested terrain. Activists initially targeted the swing votes on the judiciary committee so that the bill could reach the floor, successfully swaying several votes; they then targeted other key legislators. Politicizing the personal also took place among legislators as one closeted gay legislator came out to his colleagues (Hurlie, see n. 10).<sup>11</sup>

New social movement approaches are clearly unable to explain the conservative tactics, the narrow focus on policy reform, and the lack of attention to creating a lesbian and gay constituency in Vermont. The activists

<sup>11</sup> At the time of my interviews, this legislator had still refused to come out publicly (Hurlie, see n. 10 above).

I interviewed stated that if a lesbian and gay movement came out of the gay rights campaign, that would be fine, but their goal was to pass the bill. Part of the problem with new social movement theory is its failure to specify the conditions under which collective action is aimed either at strengthening communities and organizations or at changing perceptions of the public and institutional authorities. Activists in Vermont deployed identity for education, but did not seek cultural change through influencing public opinion or creating democratic organizations. In fact, the creation of an ongoing organization was an unintended consequence of the grassroots style of organizing used by activists. The positive interactions with the state and the feeling that victory was possible validated activists' choice of strategies.

The structure of the lesbian and gay organizations running the political campaigns in New York City in the 1970s and in Vermont in the 1980s were similar, yet the two groups adopted vastly different strategies. While New York City activists deployed identity for critique, Vermont activists used identity for education. No formal organizational structure existed in Vermont until after the passage of the statewide lesbian and gay rights bill. Attempts to create a formal structure in Vermont resulted in the demise of the first lesbian and gay political organization, later to be replaced by the Vermont Coalition (see Russell, no. 10 above). In fact New York City's groups may have been somewhat more hierarchically structured, with the Gay Activists Alliance following *Robert's Rules of Order* (Martello 1970a). During the Vermont lesbian and gay rights campaign, there were no official titles (with the exception of the two community-appointed liaisons) or paid positions in the Vermont Coalition. Everyone was encouraged to attend organizational meetings and public hearings and to participate in community events such as the annual pride marches. For example, Holly Perdue (see n. 10), one of the liaisons, recounts that members of the male leather community would be encouraged to serve donuts and coffee at a gay pride rally in an effort to maintain diversity within the movement.

Lesbian and gay activists were able to foster cooperative relationships with polity members in part because of long-term shifts in Vermont politics. Considered a one-party Republican state since the 1950s (Jacob and Vine 1965), by the early 1980s Vermont had a liberal Democratic governor (**Madeline Kunin**) and a Democratic majority in both houses. Burlington, one of the state's largest cities, elected self-proclaimed socialist Bernie Sanders mayor.

The insider status of Terje Anderson, an openly gay state and national Democratic Party activist and movement leader, also facilitated access to the polity. Because of his party work, Anderson had access to Governor Kunin who, in 1985, largely at Anderson's request, officially recognized

the two liaisons (Hurlie, see n. 10). In 1986, Anderson became chair of the platform committee of the state Democratic Party. Partly as a result of Anderson's efforts, support for lesbian and gay rights was included in the official platform of Vermont's Democratic Party (*Out in the Mountains* 1986). But unlike the early gay rights campaigns of Oregon, where gay men with access to the polity excluded community participation (Gay Writers' Group 1983), Vermont activists encouraged participation in the political process. Furthermore, several state agencies had a tradition of activism, which created more political leverage (Sussman, see n. 10).

A lack of organized opposition also influenced the types of identities deployed. All of the activists I interviewed felt that the emotional outbursts and the lack of decorum characteristic of the mostly church-based religious opposition helped the case for lesbians and gay men. Once again, identities are deployed in the context of real-life interactions in specific social settings. The presence of a religious opposition (no formal, conservative social movement organizations were in evidence) that relied on emotional and religious appeals gave lesbian and gay activists a visible opponent against whom to define themselves. Given that context, it makes sense that activists, of their own accord, would distinguish themselves from the opposition through conservative appearance and professional demeanor.

The interactions between activists and members of the polity and among groups within the activist community produced strategies that emphasized similarities to the straight public and the incremental nature of policy reform. The inclusive nature of the campaign, access to the polity, and the presence of a church-based opposition effectively severed the cultural challenge from the political battle over rights. The next section looks at movements that faced organized opposition.

## OREGON

Eugene, Oregon, was among the first cities whose antidiscrimination statute was targeted for repeal. After the repeal, the lesbian and gay community maintained good relations with the state Democratic Party (*Journal* 1977), despite repeated defeats of the statewide antidiscrimination bill. Activists also worked to foster relations with the state's Republican Party. In October 1987, following another defeat of Oregon's statewide lesbian and gay rights bill, Oregon governor Neil Goldschmidt issued an executive order prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation by state agencies. The order was payback for lesbian and gay support during his election campaign (Towslee 1987). During that same year, the conservative Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA) was founded. Early the following

year, OCA announced that it would begin a drive to overturn the governor's executive order through a ballot initiative (Towslee 1988b). By November, OCA had achieved its first major victory as Measure 8 was passed and the executive order was repealed (Towslee 1988a).

Bolstered by its success, OCA went on the offensive, seeking to pass a statewide initiative that would condemn homosexuality, nullify existing local ordinances, and prohibit the enactment of future legislation to provide protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation. In 1992 and 1994, OCA gathered enough signatures to place antilesbian and antigay initiatives (Measure 9 and Measure 13, respectively) on the state ballot. OCA also campaigned for a series of local antilesbian and antigay measures, passing such laws in 20 localities by March 1994 (*Lesbian/Gay Law Notes* 1994a).

As the OCA campaigns gained momentum, reported incidents of antilesbian and antigay hate crimes skyrocketed (Egan 1992a). Although neither side was immune from the violence—churches on both sides of the debate were vandalized and OCA leaders received verbal threats (Egan 1992b)—lesbians and gay men experienced the bulk of actual physical assaults (Bull and Gallagher 1996).<sup>12</sup>

What strategies were available to Oregon's lesbians and gay men in the face of such virulent opposition? Activists could have responded to the opposition in a number of ways. They could have used identity for critique to challenge the values and practices of the sex-phobic society by portraying their own sexuality as liberated, free from the debilitating impact of strict gender roles. Additionally, they could have challenged the idea that sexuality is static, fixed throughout a person's entire lifetime, thus decentering heterosexuality as a norm from which homosexuals deviate.

Alternatively, activists could have used identity for education to show that they were just like everyone else. In Vermont, this had taken the form of coming out to legislators, by constituents and by other legislators, as a way to counter myths that homosexuals were sex-obsessed creatures who preyed on innocent children.

Identity strategies were not the only tactics available to lesbian and gay activists in Oregon. Strategies that did not make lesbians and gay men the contested terrain could have been used. Activists could have formed coalitions with ethnic and racial minority groups. They could have focused attention on abstract principles of discrimination and found evidence to support their claims.

The "No on 9" campaign, like Oregonians for Fairness, the group that

<sup>12</sup> Articles appearing between 1988 and 1995, found in an extensive search on Nexis, support this conclusion.

(unsuccessfully) fought the repeal of Governor Goldschmidt's executive order in 1988 (UPI 1988a), refused to refute the OCA charges point by point (Johnston 1994). Both embarked on slick media campaigns with commercials that never mentioned the words "gay," "lesbian," or "homosexual" (e.g., Richardson 1992). Activists feared making the campaign a referendum on homosexuality. They were afraid that, given a choice, the population might genuinely prefer to discriminate against a minority many despised. There was also concern that addressing OCA's allegations would lend credence to the charges (Johnston 1994).

No on 9's philosophy was to wage and to win a limited campaign. Its goal was not to disrupt dominant notions about homosexuals or to challenge the sex/gender system (Johnston 1994). Nor was its goal to create a long-term organizational infrastructure that could continue to fight OCA initiatives or advocate proactively for legislation. According to Holly Pruett and Julie Davis (1995, p. 7),<sup>13</sup> "The unofficial slogans of CHFO [Campaign for a Hate Free Oregon, which became No on 9] could have been 'campaigns are about getting 50% + 1 on election day—nothing else' and 'a campaign is not a movement.'"

The No on 9 leadership wanted to avoid any type of cultural challenge. Those who deviated most from conservative, heterosexual appearances—that is, those who seemed to fit lesbian and gay stereotypes as "bull dykes" or effeminate men and grassroots activists who wanted to disrupt dominant notions of sexuality—were increasingly distanced from the campaign. According to Bull and Gallagher (1996, p. 53), for example, Metropolitan Community Church pastor Gary Wilson "was asked to pass the word to direct action groups like Queer Nation to keep their activities low-key during the campaign so as not to cause any embarrassment." Fissures in the lesbian and gay communities became more pronounced as the campaign drew on. According to movement leader Julie Davis, Kathleen Saadat, an African-American woman snubbed by the No on 9 leadership, formed the group African-Americans for Human Rights to pursue her own style of organizing (personal communication 1996).

Unlike the New York City activists who embraced the unconventional or the Vermont activists who let each individual present their own case, the No on 9 activists dodged the issue of morality, preferring to focus on abstract principles of discrimination (Johnston 1994). The direct action groups reacted as much to the elitist efforts of the No on 9 leadership as to the opposition. These grassroots, direct action organizations employed more radical tactics, increasing publicity through public demonstrations and civil disobedience (Bull and Gallagher 1996). Spurred by the exclusive

<sup>13</sup> Davis and Pruett were the campaign managers in the 1994 "No on 13" campaign.

leadership and (lack of) response to the organized opposition, the ideological schism embodied in separate organizations became about the relationship between political campaigns and cultural change. The grassroots groups saw the bill as an opportunity to strengthen the lesbian and gay communities and to combat homophobic stereotypes, whereas No on 9 saw the bill as a crucial political goal.

By avoiding identity strategies, specifically by avoiding a defense of homosexuality, Oregon activists exacerbated existing tensions in the lesbian and gay communities. By 1992, the lesbian and gay movement was split, with one faction focusing on abstract principles of discrimination, underscoring sameness rather than difference (No on 9), while another side became more militant and deployed identity for critique (ACT UP, Queer Nation, Bigot Busters; see Bull and Gallagher 1996). Many lesbians and gay men, including Johnston (1994), resented the fact that homosexuality, itself was avoided by the No on 9 leadership. Avoiding identity strategies necessarily entails a focus on similarities to the majority, and the Oregon campaign was no exception. Had educational strategies been combined with inclusive movement strategies, as in Vermont, the movement would have been strengthened. But by focusing only on winning the immediate campaign, other issues, such as combating negative stereotypes, building a movement, and empowering communities were neglected so the community was divided.

What explains the mixed model of identity deployment that we see in Oregon in the late 1980s and early 1990s? New social movement perspectives help explain the tactics of the radical organizations involved in the rights campaign. The frustration within the lesbian and gay communities over No on 9's failure to dispel myths about homosexuality, and the lack of democratic participation within both the organization and the political campaign, fit with the view that new social movements are about cultural production. However, they are unhelpful in explaining No on 9's strategies.

Activists in Oregon, as in Vermont, brought political experience and professional skills to the rights campaign, yet the structure of the organizations in the two states differed. Although neither stressed public education or community empowerment as a goal, Vermont activists relied on interpersonal networks and grassroots participation, whereas No on 9 limited participation. Unlike the exclusive organizations in Oregon in the 1970s, Oregon activists in the 1980s and early 1990s faced an organized opposition, a circumstance that fostered dissension within the community and led to the deployment of both educational and critical identities (a mixed model, see fig. 1, path 2b).

Political coalitions partly explain No on 9's avoidance of identity strategies and emphasis on sameness in pursuit of instrumental gains, despite

the potentially alienating effect on lesbian and gay communities. Those who opposed Measure 9 read like a *Who's Who* of political notables. Current and past Democratic governors as well as Republican gubernatorial hopefuls opposed OCA's measures (UPI 1987, 1988b; Raric 1990, 1991). OCA leader Lon Mabon's hard line on an array of social issues, and the hatred his organization seemed to promote, led to a split in the Oregon Republican Party, so that in the end the party stood firmly against the OCA's antilesbian and antigay rights initiatives.<sup>14</sup> In fact, Oregon's entire congressional delegation, including Republican Senators Hatfield and Packwood opposed Measure 9 (Richardson 1992). Community support for lesbian and gay activists also came from newspapers and civil libertarian and religious organizations, including the Oregon Catholic Conference (Baker 1992; *Atlanta Journal and Constitution* 1992; Quindlen 1992).

Measure 9's defeat was a Pyrrhic victory for Oregon's lesbian and gay movement. It became immediately clear that the enemy was not going anywhere. After their loss, the indefatigable OCA members dusted themselves off, got out their clipboards, and began gathering signatures to place Measure 13, a new antilesbian and antigay statewide initiative, on the 1994 ballot. To consolidate its local victories OCA placed numerous antilesbian and antigay charter initiatives on city ballots across Oregon (*Lesbian/Gay Law Notes* 1994a, 1994b). Lesbian and gay activists needed to recover from the internecine fighting that had worsened schisms within the movement.

In direct response to the exclusive strategies of the No on 9 campaign, which left the lesbian and gay communities badly divided, the "No on 13" leadership sought to build an inclusive campaign that would embark on long-term educational projects and was designed to foster organizations that would last beyond election day (Pruett and Davis 1995) (Path 2b to Path 1). Another group launched a "Speak Out" campaign. In this, quintessential identity for education strategy, 60 people wrote to every radio station, TV network, and chamber of commerce in Oregon, to say that they would present their side of the story. They called to follow up, sent letters to the editors of local newspapers, and spoke at Kiwanis Clubs, Lions Clubs, and other civic, business, and community groups.

In neighboring Colorado, similar splits handicapped the campaign to defeat Amendment 2, that state's antilesbian and antigay initiative. The main difference between Colorado and Oregon was the extent of state

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that after the 1992 defeat of Measure 9, activists from OCA began a concerted effort to take control of the Oregon Republican Party. At one point the party's leader threatened to create a second Republican Party, in response to the covert takeover mounted by OCA members (Feeley 1993).

support. Whereas in Oregon the political establishment lined up firmly against the OCA measures, important members of Colorado's Republican Party and key state agencies supported Amendment 2. The Catholic Church remained silent, which was probably construed as tacit endorsement of the measure (Bull and Gallagher 1996, p. 118). Unlike in Oregon where both Measure 9 and Measure 13 were defeated, Amendment 2 passed. Regardless of political access, exclusive movement leadership in the face of organized opposition in both Oregon and Colorado created a mixed model of identity deployment, as diverse segments of the activist communities reacted to both the opposing movement and the lesbian and gay leadership.

### IMPLICATIONS

This approach to understanding the strategic deployment of identity has potential applications to other movements based on a shared characteristic. For example, the Southern Civil Rights movement that emerged in the 1950s followed path 1 as shown in figure 2. The complex organizational infrastructure of the South, which included black colleges, black churches, and even beauty parlors, provided a locus from which to organize (Morris 1984). Thus when federal policies began to change, leaders were able to mobilize from an existing base (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Emergent, inclusive civil rights organizations underscored sameness rather than difference and sought concrete policy goals.

Over time, the focus on identity for education often gave way to identity for critique as the black power movement gained momentum (fig. 2, path 3). According to Robert Scheer (1970, p. 202), black power, or "black revolution [is] the statement of an alternative system of values, the move to acquire power to assert those values, and the express willingness to respond with revolutionary violence to the violence inherent in established power." By fostering an identity based on differences from the majority, black nationalism was a way to challenge dominant cultural values, to build communities, and to create revolutionary change. Leaders hoped that deploying critical identities based on perceived cultural differences would be a crucial step toward economic independence and political power.

I suggest that local variations in political access and organizational infrastructures, as well as the degree of exclusivity of African-American leadership would also account, in part, for the relative stress placed on deploying critical or educational identities. In short, local conditions (political access and the type of opposition) as well as the relationships among African-American political organizations should help explain the vicissi-




FIG. 2.—General model of identity deployment

tudes in the deployment of radical racial identities on the one hand and educational identities on the other.

When the feminist movement began to emerge in the 1960s, two activist factions were identified. Older professional women appointed to state governmental commissions on the status of women created formal organizations and began to lobby (Evans 1979; Freeman 1984). What came to be known as the liberal wing of feminism (Eisenstein 1983) stressed similarities to the majority, deployed identity for education (i.e., that there were

no socially significant differences between men and women), and focused attention on gaining formal policy reforms (fig. 2, path 1; see Evans 1979; Freeman 1984). Because of their political access, older feminists stressed similarities to men.

The other wing of the emergent feminist movement was dominated by college-age women. Lacking the political access of the older wing, and of course influenced by the New Left, these women stressed identity for critique and their activism followed a dramatically different path from that of the older wing (fig. 2, path 3; see also Evans 1979). The younger wing, which eventually became identified with radical feminism, drew attention to “women’s values” deriving from motherhood (Eisenstein 1983) as a positive and distinct characteristic that set women apart from men in socially meaningful ways. Rather than devaluing these traits, critical female identities were deployed to criticize problematic manifestations of male dominance (such as violence [Brownmiller 1975] and nuclear arms [Caldicott 1986]).

Reforming policy and challenging culture was a goal of both strategies. Suppressing differences to denaturalize categories such as “family” challenged the cultural underpinnings of existing policies based on an allegedly natural, gender-based public/private distinction. Stressing differences was also a part of a broader project of normative challenge.<sup>15</sup> Over time, the relative emphasis on stressing similarities or differences changed as local conditions varied.

This brief overview of the feminist and Civil Rights movements broadly suggests how the differing structural locations of the actors, the extent of political access, and the strength of the organizational base from which these movements could mobilize influenced the types of identities deployed. This cursory overview of the movements cannot (and is not meant to) capture their complexity, but only to suggest the importance of understanding identity deployment and *why* certain movements *appear to be* internally or externally directed, and why they seem to seek “instrumental” or “identity” goals.

<sup>15</sup> Even movements not based on a shared characteristic—particularly those mobilized around a moral shock—must decide whether or not to deploy identities strategically. For example, animal rights activists criticize the instrumental rationality of science that privileges human life over animal life to justify animal research. Animal rights activists often deploy critical female identities as moral caretakers to underscore the inhumanity of scientific experiments on animals. At other times, animal rights activists criticize animal experimentation on “rational” scientific grounds as redundant, wasteful, and unnecessary research. In turn, scientists deploy identities by bringing forth pictures of adorable children whose lives were saved as a result of animal research (Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Jasper and Poulsen 1993). In short, scientists combat identity with identity to refute the cultural critique of instrumental rationality.

## CONCLUSION

Essentialist characterizations of social movements as either cultural and expressive or instrumental and political miss the reality that goals and strategies, including identity for education or critique, are related to concrete institutional dynamics and to the structural location of the actors. Collective celebration or suppression of differences in political campaigns is the result of political access, movement interactions with opposing movements and with the state, as well as of interactions among groups within activist communities. Activists' interpretation of the relationship between culture and politics will depend on whom they are being defined against, on prior successes and failures, and on their interactions with polity members.

In New York City during the 1970s, grassroots organizations that emphasized cultural goals faced a closed and hostile polity. Opposition was routine, leaving activists to define their identities in response to state authorities. Negative interactions with the state and the lack of political access led to the deployment of ever more critical identities. By contrast, in Oregon in the 1970s, gay men with insider status by virtue of their race, gender, and class had access to the polity, and local antidiscrimination legislation passed.

In Vermont, democratic movement organizations with easy political access deployed identity for education. The presence of a church-based foe, but lack of organized opposing movements, left activists to construct identities in opposition to the emotional and unprofessional religious opposition. In Oregon in the 1980s, exclusive leadership faced with hostile opposition created dissension among lesbian and gay communities, leading to a mixed model of identity deployment. Responding to the factionalism, new leadership emerged to pursue an inclusive educational strategy. Colorado's lesbian and gay movement also split as a result of infighting, lack of political access, and the exclusive lesbian and gay leadership. Unlike Oregon, however, Amendment 2's passage left the future of Colorado's lesbians and gay men up to the courts.

The tension between political and cultural goals will always be an issue for social movements, not just for the lesbian and gay movement. For example, battles rage over the wisdom of pursuing cultural as opposed to structural and economic change to end poverty among African-Americans in inner cities (West 1993). The interactional framework developed in this paper can be used to explain these tensions.

By understanding the role of identity in social movements, we can move beyond narrow conceptualizations of movements as entities with static goals and strategies in order to understand the relationship between struc-

tural location and cultural and political change. Movements employ innovative direct action tactics at various points throughout their life cycle, not just when they are emerging. Such action can be internally or externally directed, depending on the type of movement organizations, level of political access, and the extent of opposition. Instead of asking what is "new" about "new social movements," we should focus on explaining the structural relationship between identity and mobilization, when identity is a goal of collective action, and under what political conditions activists either deploy educational or critical identities or avoid identity strategies altogether.

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# **Sex Segregation and Glass Ceilings: A Comparative Statics Model of Women's Career Opportunities in the Federal Government over a Quarter Century<sup>1</sup>**

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A comparative statics model is utilized to examine mechanisms of gender inequality: gender distribution (skew), gender segregation (composition), occupational captivity, hierarchical ceilings, glass ceilings, and internal labor market (ILM) structure/network linkages. The analysis examines new linkages between sex segregation and glass ceilings; two elements of sex segregation—composition and captivity; and two elements of glass ceilings—pathways inside and outside one's original ILM. Gender-specific career trajectories were constructed to analyze women's career opportunities in 22 occupational ILMs in the U.S. federal government for two periods between 1962 and 1989, demonstrating how to extract career implications from much shorter periods of time. There is a very large differential effect by gender when staying within one's occupational ILM; however, when pathways that include changing ILMs are considered, women's opportunities to enter the top tier become almost equivalent to those for men in the second period.

## **INTRODUCTION**

It has now been over 30 years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and yet the ceaseless efforts to bring women and minorities into the upper level of management in corporate America and government still

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fall far short. The same point may be said for equality in the workplace in general. Sex segregation, for example, has been extraordinarily stable relative to the dramatic changes in both composition of the labor force and occupational structure. Even in 1986, almost 60% of women who were employed would have had to change their occupational category to equalize the occupational distribution by gender (Jacobs 1989). The glass ceiling also remains intact; 97% of senior managers at the Fortune 1,000 industrial corporations are dominated by white males, and only 5% of the top managers at Fortune 2,000 industrial and service companies are women (U.S. Department of Labor 1995). These persistent findings lead us to ask how opportunities for women have in fact changed since the beginning of the civil rights era. With a new comparative statics model, we assess the degree to which opportunity structures for women in the labor market have changed over a quarter century from right before the passage of the first major civil rights act in this century and how such changes took place. Focusing on 22 detailed occupations within the U.S. federal government, we construct career trajectories of men and women in each of the occupations within the context of an organization and its internal labor markets (ILMs) and analyze how and to what degree opportunity structures for men and women in these occupations differ. We also examine the impact of four structural factors on women's career opportunities in each occupation—its female composition, its hierarchical structure, its degree of occupational captivity, and whether or not it has a glass ceiling. In brief, this analysis provides: (1) a model to assess the changing nature of job opportunities and the long-term career implications of such changes, (2) new linkages between sex segregation and glass ceilings in a wider scope of analyses than has generally been conducted, and (3) a first attempt at using this approach in assessing the changes in opportunities by gender, looking at professional, administrative, and technical jobs.

#### Evaluation of Changes in Labor Market Opportunities and Their Implications: Comparative Statics and Careers

How does one assess the nature of change, if any, in labor market opportunities for women?<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most often used tactic has been to examine

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<sup>2</sup> Of course, this question is not limited to women but applies to an analysis of changing opportunities for any group of individuals.

the change in distributions over time. For instance, with respect to sex segregation in jobs, the primary strategy has been to analyze the trends in the sex distribution of job holders (see Beller 1984). A second tactic has been to examine the flows of workers rather than the end distribution. Thus, for example, one examines the extent of movement by women from female- to male-dominated jobs (see Rosenfeld 1984; DiPrete and Soule 1986). Each of these approaches complements the other. The first details the outcomes; the second examines critical aspects of the processes rendering the outcomes. As we show below, however, these two approaches, when used separately as is often the case, are unable to grasp an overall picture of gender inequality in the workplace or its underlying mechanisms, though each may shed light on a particular aspect of sex segregation or the glass ceiling. To incorporate both approaches and to capture the changes in opportunity structures of men and women, we utilize the career pathway structure (CPS) model (Stewman and Yeh 1991). The model constructs an average individual's entire career trajectory within an organization, that is, given the initial entry occupation and grade, how far and where he or she goes, from hire to exit, with the odds specified at each node. Our analysis is unique in two aspects. First, we use the constructed career trajectories as a theoretical metaphor for eliciting an actual labor market's operative opportunity structure. Second, taking advantage of the model's ability to construct full-career trajectories, we examine the implications of the existing opportunity structure from entry to final exit from the organization. In previous work (Stewman and Yeh 1991), there was no examination of heterogeneity within the occupational ILM of the organization, nor analyses of change in the opportunity structure over time. Thus, the comparative statics power of the model was not elicited. Here we address gender inequality across a substantial period of time with a particular focus on change in opportunity.

This article also builds on the work of DiPrete (1989), which was especially directed to ILM boundary crossings, a process generally not studied. It is a process, however, that we will show may take on increasing significance for gender inequality, especially in an era of economic globalization with its attendant organizational restructuring. Here, we include intraorganizational ILM boundary crossings, as well as intraoccupational ILM moves to derive the complete career trajectory within the organization. The analysis thus has implications for both sex segregation and glass ceilings within the organization.<sup>3</sup> The work also extends the time horizon another decade beyond that examined by DiPrete (1989), and it is in this period that the greatest changes for women occurred.

<sup>3</sup> The approach can also be extended to interorganizational moves (see Haveman and Cohen 1994), where the data are available.




FIG. 1.—Sex segregation and glass ceiling

### Sex Segregation and the Glass Ceiling

We argue that the concept of worker flows plays a crucial role in revealing critical dimensions of sex segregation and glass ceilings and in linking the two. It has been argued that sex segregation in jobs accounts for as much as one-third of the earnings gap between women and men (Treiman and Hartmann 1981). Petersen and Morgan (1995), using distributional data, looked at the significance of sex segregation for 705 blue-collar and clerical occupations, as well as for 10 administrative and professional occupations in determining wage and inequality; they report that among blue-collar and clerical jobs, about 40% of the existing gender differential in wages is explained by occupational segregation.<sup>4</sup> Here we probe further to look at the processes beneath the distribution for a set of occupations. At least two factors are involved—the lower pay and lower number of grades, or shorter career track, in female-dominated occupations and a lack of access to male-dominated alternative occupations with higher pay and higher number of grades, as schematically depicted in part A of figure 1. However, even if equal access to occupations with higher grades is attained to reduce skewed gender composition, an earnings gap would remain if there is a glass ceiling within these occupations (see part B of fig. 1). Thus,

<sup>4</sup> There are, however, wide variations in the estimates of the impact of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap, ranging from 0% to 40% (see Sorensen [1990] for a review of previous studies). In some recent studies (e.g., MacPherson and Hirsch 1995; O'Neill and Polachek 1993) the impact of occupational segregation, measured as the percentage of females, *per se*, was found negligible, while variables on work/skill-related occupational characteristics were found as a major factor for the narrowing of the wage gap.

there are two separable dimensions of notable importance—sex segregation across jobs and glass ceilings within jobs.

Occupational sex segregation has been one of the most commonly used indicators in examining gender inequality in the workplace, and various theoretical explanations for the cause and its persistence have been postulated (for reviews, see England [1984, 1994] and England and McCreary [1987]) though none has yet been empirically supported (England 1984). Tacitly assumed in these theories is that little, if any, mobility exists across gender-segregated occupations, thus implying gender as the cause of occupational segregation. However, a series of empirical studies (Corcoran, Duncan, and Ponza 1984; DiPrete and Soule 1986; DiPrete 1989; England 1982; Jacobs 1989; Rosenfeld 1983, 1984; Rosenfeld and Spenger 1992) identified the movement of women across occupations of different gender composition. Jacobs (1989), in his attempt to account for the paradox between the persistence of extremely low female composition in certain occupations and the influx of women into these occupations, proposed a theory of "revolving doors": women, though successfully moving into male-dominated occupations, are pressured to leave because of the existing institutional and informal social controls, thus leaving a skewed gender composition intact. Jacobs's (1989) reconciliation highlights both processual and distributional features in the theory of gender inequality in the workplace: the notion of flows of individuals across occupations and the gender composition of an occupation. We stress the importance of both the distributions and the flows that underlie such distributions. Accordingly, we propose to explicitly distinguish these two aspects of occupational segregation and define them independently. The distributional dimension, *gender composition*, refers to the percentage male or female in an occupation. The flow or processual dimension, which we define as *occupational captivity*, refers to the degree of closedness of an occupation—the degree to which flows of individuals do not move into and/or out of the specific occupation vis-à-vis all other internal occupations during a certain period of time *regardless* of the existing gender composition of the occupation.<sup>5</sup> It is thus possible that occupations with highly skewed gender compositions, as well as well-balanced ones, may have varying degrees of occupational captivity. When, however, both skewed gender composition and higher degrees of occupational captivity are jointly observed, clearly such jobs are sex segregated. We analyze both dimensions of sex segregation—composition and captivity.<sup>6</sup> Considering women's limited

<sup>5</sup> We are grateful to one of the *AJS* reviewers who coined the term *occupational captivity* to clarify the concept as well as to avoid unnecessary confusion surrounding occupational segregation and gender composition.

<sup>6</sup> Captivity can operate in two respects—as a disadvantage when internal opportunities are more limited, as is often the case for women, or as an advantage when internal

opportunity structures within a particular occupation, it becomes increasingly critical to ask if there exist avenues to other occupations in which they can advance their careers.

Glass ceilings are another major area in which sociologists and economists analyzing gender inequality in the workplace have focused (Morrison, White, and Velsor 1992; Davidson and Cooper 1992). Though the basic concept behind the term *glass ceiling* is the blockage of upward mobility of women, it has generally been analyzed based upon distributional data. Thus, the issue is "the representation of women" (Morrison et al. 1992, p. xii), and a conventional approach is to search for any women in the distributional data. While, as a metaphor, the glass ceiling conveys a strong connotation, as a means to measure women's career opportunities, it often lacks analytical leverage. In contrast, when the glass ceiling is actually measured by the mobility of individuals between different hierarchical levels, one recognizes that it has different levels of severity, or closedness, and thus the analyst can investigate the phenomenon as a matter of degree rather than as a dichotomy. In this study, we analyze glass ceilings using both measures.<sup>7</sup>

The concept of flows also enables one to link occupational segregation, specifically occupational captivity, and the glass ceiling, as well as to see the multidimensionality of the glass ceiling. At the organization level, with multiple occupations, the glass ceiling has two dimensions, that is, glass ceilings *inside* and *outside* the original occupation. Thus, the glass ceiling has a dimension of occupation and of organization. If women in a particular occupation are able to climb hierarchical ladders in the organization when they move out of the original occupation, while such career ladders do not exist for those who remain in the occupation, then changing occupations is the only way to enhance their careers. And here the issue of occupational captivity plays a critical role in determining such possibilities. Figure 2 provides a schematic view of the linkage between the two concepts. For women who face a glass ceiling, their prospects depend on the extent of captivity there. If they are in less captive occupations, they could reach higher positions by moving to other occupations that do not have a glass ceiling, whereas if they are in occupations with high captivity, such outside opportunities are virtually nil.

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opportunities are more numerous, as in occupations with greater ranks at the top, as is more often the case for men. We would also expect for there to be differences in the extent of internal entry and exit for such jobs—less entry, more exit and more entry, less exit. In short, asymmetry in flows into and out of one occupation would often be the case. In this article, our focus is primarily on outflows, where such restrictions or captivity result in disadvantages for women.

<sup>7</sup> That is, "0" or "1" and, if not "0," the percentage crossing the barrier




FIG. 2.—Occupational captivity-glass ceiling linkage

### Organizations and ILMs

The emphasis of our analyses is in the context of organizations and ILMs. The issues of gender inequity in the workplace, from glass ceiling to sexual harassment, are organizational phenomena, though it may be possible to generalize the problems over a particular occupation or industry. For example, Blau (1977) demonstrated that even where occupational distributions aggregated across firms were not extremely skewed by gender, if one examines the same data at the organizational level, many such occupations were relatively all male or female. Bielby and Baron (1984) found similar results for the entire state of California. Furthermore, Petersen and Morgan (1995) reported that for blue-collar and clerical jobs as much as 89% of the gender wage gap was accounted for by occupation-establishment segregation, compared to 40% by occupational segregation only, underscoring the importance of organization in examining the problem.

Institutional economists and organizational sociologists have further pointed to the significance of ILMs as an organizational phenomenon underlying job segregation. That is, while Petersen and Morgan (1995), Bielby and Baron (1984), and Blau (1977) pointed out the importance of the external boundaries of organizations for job segregation, ILM theorists go further and postulate multiple ILMs within such organizations (e.g., Doeringer and Piore 1971; Althauser and Kalleberg 1990) with a major premise that such ILMs are basically self-contained or segregated. For instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971) postulated that organizations consist of a set of largely independent or isolated mobility clusters (the set of jobs

within which an individual is usually promoted, demoted, or transferred, once he/she has entered one of its ports from the outside). Thus, internal flows, as well as external entry flows, are conceptualized, but there are boundaries segregating the internal flows. In short, there are external boundaries where entrants come into distinct ILMs and internal boundaries for these ILMs within the organization, keeping workers segregated.<sup>8</sup> Here we depart from the most prevalent version of ILM theory with an analogy to the discussion on occupational sex segregation. Just as discussions of sex segregation based on gender composition (distribution) implicitly assume no movement between occupations, ILM theorists have generally assumed little or no movement between ILMs within a firm. We hold no such assumption, allowing both independent and interdependent mobility clusters. Thus, one may examine the degree of independence or isolation of an ILM. In this article, we will show that weights based on relative frequency of flows (e.g., the "main paths" of ILMs) are not as important as outside routes to other ILMs for women's access to the top tier.

Several areas of import to extant ILM theory remain to be empirically investigated, some of which have been carefully articulated by Althauser (1989a) and Althauser and Kalleberg (1990). For instance, one such area includes the empirical or operational identification of mobility clusters. One of the criteria used by Althauser and Kalleberg (1990) to operationalize ILM mobility clusters was that of main paths to link a set of jobs (e.g., occupation  $x$ , grade  $y$ , to occupation  $w$ , grade  $z$ ). In many cases, of course, the main path will show promotions within occupation and thus  $x = w$ . In others, however, the main path may link different occupations. Althauser and Kalleberg (1990) defined *main paths* between a pair of jobs as having a minimum 20% of flows, as measured in terms of the percentage of all internal outflows from the source job or all internal inflows into the sink job.<sup>9</sup> Both Spilerman (1986) and Althauser (1989a) also noted the importance of empirically examining the degree to which an organization's official or formal definitions of such mobility clusters differ from the main paths of actual careers. We will address this issue for our organization in the analysis section—at least as far as examining the pathways for women through the glass ceiling. We also concur that there needs to be such explicit rigorous criteria and a structural requirement of a high proportion of flows within an ILM. However, given the diversity of world-

<sup>8</sup> There are also important variations for job dynamics and job opportunities within each ILM. It was to such organizational labor markets that organizational demography was brought to bear (Stewman and Konda 1983). Also, for a complementary approach linking organizational ILMs and vacancy chains, see Pinfield (1995).

<sup>9</sup> Both *source* and *sink* terms are used as in graph theory, where *source* refers to the origin of a flow and *sink* to the destination.

wide ILMs, there remain wide arenas for specifying the range of ILM behavior, and we differ from Althauser and Kalleberg (1990) when they add criteria such as job duration and growth of skill/knowledge. Here we prefer the more general conceptualization initially developed by Kerr (1954) and Doeringer and Piore (1971). The latter not only specified independent mobility clusters as the primary form of ILM but also allowed rules for job bidding across the entire range of jobs in a firm, as well as rules for seniority as a mechanism to prompt job movement. In short, we argue that the more open view of ILMs, allowing considerable heterogeneity in forms, is preferable since it confronts neoclassical labor economics at the organizational boundary—where internal jobs are shielded from external competition. This distinction is paramount and provides a basis for new theoretical development whereby organization theory confronts economic theory such as that developed by Simon (1991) and prior to that by Carnegie School theorists in general (e.g., Allison 1971; March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963; Simon 1979). It is also consistent with theorizing by Stinchcomb (1965), where new ILM forms may occur over time, with the founding of new cohorts or generations of organizations or technology (e.g., Kanter 1982). Equally important, it permits a substantial range of dynamics and variation in ILM forms to be specified. For example, while Doeringer and Piore (1971) utilized custom-based rules as a cornerstone for the metaphorical explanation of how ILMs evolved and persisted, they also underscored the rigidity of such rules. A quite recent thesis out of the Netherlands (Veen 1997), however, demonstrates considerable flexibility and dynamics in ILM rule structures. In short, in our view, as we will show, there is ample room for new theoretical and empirical specifications in ILM theory and such specifications have major implications for gender inequality.

The phenomenon of gender inequality in the workplace appears to be worldwide. However, theorists in Europe (Davidson and Cooper 1992) point to the United States as leading the way toward equality. Moreover, we postulate that one organization that should lead the effort of equalizing career opportunities of men and women is the federal government itself.<sup>10</sup> While Congress left the federal workers out of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there were executive orders by President Johnson in 1965 and 1967 regarding implementing equal employment opportunity in the federal workforce and by President Nixon in 1969 requiring each federal agency to develop affirmative action programs. In addition, in the 1972 amendments to the

<sup>10</sup> However, as far as occupational segregation is concerned, when measured by the index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955), the level of occupational segregation found among federal civil service employees in General Schedule (GS) jobs parallels that for the U.S. economy as a whole (Lewis and Emmert 1986).

1964 act, government employees, including those in the federal workforce, were brought under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Further, during the Carter administration, affirmative action was strengthened through the introduction of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which required federal agencies to take affirmative action in recruiting, hiring, and promoting women and minorities. While we are not testing the proposition that the public sector should be more sensitive to gender equality than the private sector, we believe that in the present normative structure of the United States, this will be the case and thus start our examination of the dynamics of opportunity structure and gender by looking at the federal white-collar workforce over a quarter century. The time period is 1962–89, covering six U.S. presidents and multiple civil rights acts, including the most comprehensive one in U.S. history (the 1964 act).

In sum, within the above analytical framework, we examine how women's opportunity structures have changed over a quarter century, from 1962 to 1989, for an organizational labor market—the U.S. federal workforce in professional, managerial, and technical fields. The comparative statics model we propose allows us to compare the distributions of men and women *and* their flows between occupations. We examine the effects of (1) occupational gender composition, (2) occupational captivity, (3) hierarchical structures of occupations, and (4) glass ceilings on the careers of men and women. The model is discussed in detail in the following section.

### CPS MODEL

This section discusses the CPS model (Stewman and Yeh 1991) but here applied in a setting allowing its comparative statics power to be elicited. We also describe the data that will be used for the current analysis and provide a couple of examples to demonstrate how the CPSs are derived.

#### Model

As noted above, the model allows one to construct an average individual's entire CPS within an organization. In obtaining this career trajectory, we first obtain pooled job shifts by concatenating the job-to-job movements of the entire occupation's population of external entrants for a given time period. We then focus on career entries in this occupation at a specific grade and utilize the pooled job shifts to derive the full-career trajectories, including the ending distribution that would occur if this opportunity structure remained constant. Thus, a major assumption of the model is that the conditions of the labor market remain constant for a given time period. When comparing two populations or a population in two time periods, the model yields both distributional and processual differences

in the complete careers that would unfold within this labor market in the two respective time periods.

We shift the analytical focus both from labor market distributions of men and women and their career segments to their full-career trajectories under the operative labor market conditions of that time zone. The model uses the career as a vehicle for bringing labor market opportunities into a sequential and integrated whole and allows us to obtain the *full* implications for a career of a specific set of actual labor market conditions. To provide more clarity, we briefly compare our strategy to three other approaches. The first comparison is with a direct analysis of change by viewing age cohorts. One problem may be highlighted by considering a comparative analysis using real-time data to compare opportunities for the same age cohorts between the two periods. Thus, if one of the historical regimes is the current decade, no matter what data we use, the careers of the current younger cohort are incomplete. And, while a sequence of intergenerational researchers could wait until these careers are finished, the problem is created anew for the younger cohorts of the most recent generation of researchers. When the process is not in equilibrium, one strategy to deal with truncated data is to use comparative statics to analyze future implications of two or more current processes. It is this tactic that we use in this article.

Second, from a theoretical statics point of view, our approach somewhat resembles the life expectancy concept in demography or the human capital concept in economics. Each uses the current schedules to derive the future implications for the population as if one might live out that schedule. Using the most recent data provides better estimates than tracing a generation backward in time. It is by assuming the operation of "current conditions" that both of these theories in demography and economics concatenate adjacent age cohorts to construct life expectancy or expected incomes over the working lifetime. Our approach is similar in method—assuming "current conditions" or schedules are operative (in our case, opportunity structure), concatenation, and derivation of a synthetic construct. However, we use a different unit of concatenation for constructing career trajectories. Sequential job moves from the pooled job shifts are used to obtain the full-career trajectories, or *synthetic* careers, of a group of individuals. Specifically, we concatenate the two-point flows from job  $x$  to job  $y$  into a chaining sequence of flows from the initial entry port to the organizational labor market through the sequences of jobs until an exit is made from the organization. In this process, nonmoves are disregarded and hence the sequential opportunities are embedded in time.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Since movement and nonmovement are binary, by obtaining all moves from a given location, lack of movement is also known. Thus, e.g., if more women than men never

That is, real time behavior such as moving and not moving is not treated, but sequential ordering of all movements is incorporated. The data are from the current labor market, and the strategy, in effect, constructs the career that would unfold under these labor market opportunities. Thus, one obtains the flows and outcomes (distributions) implied by the current labor market from the beginning to the end of one's career. Through the use of this comparative statics metaphor, we freeze time and labor market opportunities but elicit the full-career stream that would unfold under this opportunity regime.

Third, we compare our approach to the existing models in career analyses. One type, already noted in demography and economics but here applied to career movement, is that of synthetic cohorts (see, esp., Spilerman 1977; Spenner, Otto, and Call 1982). A major distinctive feature of the CPS model includes its exclusive attention to the connectivities of jobs versus concatenation of cohorts. The approach also makes a radical departure from the majority of conventional career models that focus either on the duration of one's staying at a job (e.g., Felmlee 1982) or on individual heterogeneity (e.g., Halaby 1982; Skvoretz 1984; Sørensen 1977; Rosenbaum 1979, 1984), dealing with career segments. In our approach, full-career trajectories are *constructed* based on the population of existing job connectivities. Thus, these trajectories are synthetic under the existing labor market conditions. In contrast, career lines in other studies *are* actually observed career segments; however, because the construction of career lines requires vast amounts of longitudinal data, the obtained results are generally about incomplete careers. Our approach, however, does somewhat resemble that of Gaertner (1980), Althauser (1989b), and Althauser and Kalleberg (1990), who examined career lines based on job connectivities. Nevertheless, it differs from the latter set of analysts in several key aspects. First, in our approach, timing in the form of duration and stays (nonmoves) is omitted, while sequential ordering is retained, embedding the processes in real time.<sup>12</sup> This differs from Gaertner (1980), who retained stays, and Althauser and Kalleberg (1990), who omitted moves off the main career line and incorporated duration once main career

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make a job shift, this is still captured by the model since it will show up in exits from that location. The relative odds of moving, initially and sequentially, are specified in the model. In effect, it is the time or timing that is omitted by attending only to moves. However, we generally think of mobility in terms of moves and nonmoves (stays), recording both, in time series data, and it is in this sense that nonmoves are disregarded. Conventional thinking of mobility mixes both mobility and timing. Here, instead, by attending solely to all moves, including the end move, we also know the lack of movement, or nonmoves.

<sup>12</sup> By *embedded in real time*, we mean that the actual timing of moves is omitted, while retaining the sequential order. For another such example, see White (1970a).

lines were identified. Second, we take into account *all* existing linkages across jobs and grades and do not use a threshold criterion, such as a threshold of traffic volume (e.g., Althauser 1989b; Althauser and Kalleberg 1990) or statistical significance of such volume (e.g., Gaertner 1980), to focus on "major" career lines. Third, since we include all the existing job linkages, the relative odds of movement along the pathway at *each* link, as well as the career-ending distribution, can be calculated. In contrast, in the approaches in Gaertner (1980), Althauser (1989b), and Althauser and Kalleberg (1990), because they disregard all nonmajor job links, neither the odds of getting to any internal location nor the specification of the locational distribution at which the career ends is available.

By collapsing the timing of career moves and retaining the connectivities of jobs, the CPS model preserves important relevant structural factors that influence individuals' career movements. While it does not differentiate between mechanisms prompting movements—vacancy based or seniority based—within an occupation, it does capture this joint impact since it utilizes all moves between jobs and grades, thus yielding not only the direction of flows but also the odds at each branch of the career path. Moreover, when concatenated into sequences, these directional odds yield the aggregate career trajectory of the present labor market. If we continue this concatenation process for all moves from the initial port of entry until one exits, we generate the CPS from beginning to end under the current labor market conditions. It is as if we are freezing the current opportunity structure in time and looking at its long-term consequences, using the theoretical concept of career as a metaphorical razor by which we may obtain a fully representative labor market slice, revealing its full implications in terms of opportunities for individuals. By constructing an average individual's entire CPS within an organization, the model also reveals the existing bridges connecting different ILMs, an important macro structure in examining organizational career mobility. When applied to gender, we are thus able to compare and contrast the career trajectories of men and women. When we further construct these career trajectories for different time periods, the resulting pathways reveal the manner and degree to which such opportunity structures have changed over time.

In the CPS model, we focus on an individual's movement from one position to another, represented by nonzero cells in the mobility matrix that captures all the job-to-job movements, rather than his or her staying at a particular position. In fact in the CPS model, all stays have been omitted—there are no stays.<sup>13</sup> The diagonal cells in the mobility matrix

<sup>13</sup> Our omission of job stays, or the duration of one's staying at a particular grade in an occupation, is not because we consider the duration trivial but because, as yet, no model is capable of simultaneously capturing both duration and connectivities of job

refer to moves within occupations only, and stays are not there. In this respect, the processes are embedded in time with the sequential order preserved. Thus, the model parallels that of the vacancy chain model of Harrison White (1970a) in which only moves by vacancies are recorded and one's interest is in the chain reaction. Here, correspondingly, only moves by persons are recorded, and our interest is the sequential nature of these moves from origin to exit, that is, the full sequential  $n$ -point process, which has been so difficult for career theorists to capture. These movements include moves to other jobs of the same type (e.g., transfers, reassignments), moves to different types of jobs (e.g., different occupation), moves to different hierarchical levels, and moves out of the organizational labor market. We will illustrate the equations of the model step by step:

1. Let  $n$  be the number of job classes for an organization. In the analysis to follow, a job class includes both hierarchical grade (e.g., GS13) and occupation (e.g., financial analyst job).
2. Let  $M$  be the internal  $n$  by  $n$  mobility matrix (e.g., a movement from a financial analyst, GS13, to a management analyst, GS14). This matrix  $M$  captures the direction and odds of movement. That is, the elements of  $M$ ,  $m_{xy}$ , denote the probability that an individual who is in job type  $x$  and grade  $i$  moves to job type  $y$  and grade  $j$  in one move.
3. Denote  $M_0$  an  $n$ -element column vector for the exit movements (e.g., financial analyst, GS13, to the outside of the organization). Similar to the mobility matrix  $M$ , the exit mobility vector  $M_0$  captures the directionality of movement and the relative odds of such moves to the outside. The relationship between  $M$  and  $M_0$  are such that  $ML + M_0 = L$  where  $L$  is a column vector of ones.
4. If  $M$  is multiplied by itself, a distribution of expected internal moves is generated for the loci of the individual on the second move. The elements of this self-multiplied matrix,  $M^2$ ,  $m_{ij}^{(2)}$  represent the expected probability of a move from  $i$  (the entry port) to  $k$  on the first move, then from  $k$  to  $j$  on the second move (i.e.,  $i \rightarrow k \rightarrow j$ ). Here,  $k$  could be any job class, including  $i$  and  $j$ , but not an exit.
5. If we multiply  $M$   $t$  times,  $M^t$  represents the individual's expected location after the  $t$ th move, with the sequential interconnections between jobs reflecting the underlying current labor market structure.<sup>14</sup>
6. Combining such a series results in the fundamental matrix  $(I - M)^{-1}$

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for the full career (a sequential  $n$ -point problem). In the present study, we have thus focused on job connectivities.

<sup>14</sup>  $M^t$  is not a representation of the individual's location after  $t$  time periods, as is generally the case with Markov models.

where  $(I - M)^{-1} = I + M + M^2 + M^3 + \dots + M^t + \dots$ . The fundamental matrix  $(I - M)^{-1}$  loses much of the cellular structure identifying the pathways, that is, it loses the destination of the specific link. However, it provides an estimate of the range of job nodes traversed and of the magnitude of occupancy per node due to the sequential property of career moves.

7. To obtain the pathway structure, or the origin *and* destination of the specific link, retaining the origin of the career, we now take, for example, the  $l$ th row of  $(I - M)^{-1}$ , denoted by  $O_l$ . The elements of the vector  $O_l$ ,  $o_{lk}$ , represent the expected number of career moves from job type  $x$ , grade  $i$ , given that one's career started in row  $l$  (job type  $m$ , grade  $n$ ).
8. Diagonalizing the row vector  $O_l$ , we obtain a matrix,  $O_{lD}$ . If we post-multiply  $O_{lD}$  by the mobility matrix,  $M$ , we obtain the internal destinations, yielding the link missing from the fundamental matrix. The outcome is a square matrix, denoted by  $C_l$ . Thus,  $C_l$  represents (1) the linkage between job nodes, as indicated by a nonzero cell, (2) the relative magnitude of such linkages, given by the value of the cell, and (3) the career origin,  $l$ , for example:

finance, GS9 → finance, GS11 → finance, GS13 → . . . ;

finance, GS9 → finance, GS11 → finance, GS14 → . . . ,

given a career origin at finance, GS9.

9. To obtain the career ending distribution vector denoted by  $C_{10}$  we postmultiply  $O_{lD}$  by the exit vector  $M_0$ . This generates a fourth element—the location of career exits from the labor market by career origin, for example:

finance, GS9 → finance, GS11 → finance,

GS13 → . . . → finance, GS17 → exit;

finance, GS9 → finance, GS11 → finance,

GS14 → . . . → personnel management, GS15 → exit,

given a career origin at finance, GS9.

These equations are shown below:

$$C_l = O_{lD} * M \quad (1)$$

$$C_{10} = O_{lD} * M_0 \quad (2)$$

where

- $C_l = \{c_{o_x G_x o_y G_y} | \text{career began in } l = O_x G_x\}$  where  $c_{o_x G_x o_y G_y}$  is the mean number of moves that an individual whose career began in job  $l$  (occupation  $m$ , grade  $n$ ) will make from occupation  $x$ , grade  $i$ , to occupation  $y$ , grade  $j$ , during his or her career.
- $C_0 = \{c_{o_x G_x 0} | \text{career began in } l = O_x G_x\}$  where  $c_{o_x G_x 0}$  is the relative odds that an individual whose career began in job  $l$  (occupation  $m$ , grade  $n$ ) will end his or her organizational career with an exit at occupation  $x$ , grade  $i$ ; that is,  $C_0$  is the expected career end distribution for an individual whose career begins in  $l$ ;
- $M = \{m_{o_x G_x o_y G_y}\}$  where  $m_{o_x G_x o_y G_y}$  is the probability that an individual will move to occupation  $y$ , grade  $j$ , in one move, given that he or she is in occupation  $x$  and grade  $i$ ;
- $(I - M)^{-1}$  = the fundamental matrix indicating the expected mean number of career moves from occupation  $x$ , grade  $i$ , given that the individual's career began in row  $l$  (occupation  $m$ , grade  $n$ );
- $O_{l_p} = \text{diagonalization of the } l\text{th row of } (I - M)^{-1}$ ;
- $M_0 = \{m_{o_x G_x 0}\}$  where  $m_{o_x G_x 0}$  is the probability that an individual will exit the organization on the next move, given that he or she is in occupation  $x$ , grade  $i$ .

## Data

The data used for the current analysis are a 10% random sample of all civilian white-collar employees of the U.S. federal government between 1962 and 1989. The original data, called the Federal Personnel Statistics Program for the years of 1962–72 and the Central Personnel Data File for subsequent years, are maintained by the U.S. Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) and contain the current personnel records for most agencies. Agencies update the files monthly, and the OPM annually draws a 10% sample based on the final digits of the workers' social security number (Lewis 1992). Thus, the sample is continuously updated to include 10% of all entrants as well as 10% of the initial total workforce in 1962. Because of its unique sampling method, the file allows one to track all of the individuals' career movements over time until their final exits from the federal government. It therefore covers an ongoing organizational labor market for over a quarter century.

In the government, the term *occupational series* refers to career lines and therefore corresponds formally to what Doeringer and Piore (1971)

defined as an ILM.<sup>15</sup> An occupational series consists of a group of similar jobs with different levels of skill and responsibility. The occupational series usually extend over a number of grade levels. While there are multiple pay systems, most of the white-collar workforce is employed in GS or GS-equivalent pay systems, which consist of 18 grades, from GS1 to GS18. Moreover, in 1979 an associated senior executive service (SES) system was created, having grades SES 1–6 to cover the jobs in top level positions, generally equivalent or higher than GS16–GS18. In our analysis, both GS and SES hierarchical levels are included.

In addition, the occupational series are classified by the federal government into five principal categories, called PATCO (professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and other). For classifying a detailed occupational series into one of the five major categories, the entry-level qualifications and job characteristics common to all positions within a series are utilized (DiPrete and Soule 1986). In general, upper-level career lines are classified as professional or administrative; we refer to these as *high stack*, based on the existence of higher GS grades (GS12 and above) within the occupation. The lower-level career lines are classified as clerical or technical and are referred to here as *low stack*.<sup>16</sup> Figure 3 presents a schematic view of these occupations. The present analysis includes 22 of the detailed occupational series, from both high-stack and low-stack career lines, to examine differential impacts on individuals' careers for occupations with different hierarchical structures.

#### Illustrative Cases: Female Psychologists

In the main analysis, we will estimate CPSs for each gender per detailed occupation in two different periods, period 1 (1962–76) and period 2 (1977–89). The 27-year time frame was broken into these two basic periods since a major change was observed from the Carter administration onward in each of the major occupational ILMs.<sup>17</sup> Thus, for each detailed occupation we examine, four different pathway structures were generated—two different pathway structures for each gender per period—by

<sup>15</sup> Note particularly the *Handbook of Occupational Groups and Series of Classes* (U.S. Office of Personnel Management 1979, p. 1) in which part of the definition of such a series provides the following: "A series may be thought of as composed of steps in the most natural line of promotion."

<sup>16</sup> A few occupational series are classified as mixed low stack and high stack because they include a number of administrative, technical, and clerical positions.

<sup>17</sup> Some degree of this change is observed in the Ford presidency, but the overall pattern for all four major ILMs across levels appears to break the overall time frame into two periods 1961–76 and 1977–89. The major occupational ILMs include professional, administrative, technical, and clerical labor markets.




FIG. 3.—High- and low-stack occupations

using equations (1) and (2) including both  $C_b$ , the pathway, and  $C_B$ , the end distribution (for career codes used in this analysis, see table 1). For illustrative purposes, we will now describe the derived CPSs for women who are psychologists in periods 1 and 2. These are provided in tables 2–4.<sup>14</sup> To enable greater facility in interpretation, each equation has been multiplied by 1,000. Thus, these data may be interpreted per 1,000 individuals who start at GS9. The actual external hires for the occupation at GS9 is 130 in period 1 and 220 in period 2. Thus, for example, to construct the model's expected values for the total population of female psychologists hired at GS9 for both periods, the values in tables 2–4 should be multiplied by 0.13 ( $0.13 \times 1,000 = 130$ ) for period 1 and by 0.22 ( $0.22 \times 1,000 = 220$ ) for period 2, respectively. Since this database is from a 10% sample, these numbers should then be multiplied by 10 for the organizational populations or 1,300 and 2,200 respectively.

As table 2 indicates, the career pathways for female psychologists who start at GS9 in period 1 are heavily concentrated in their occupation of origin. The table may be read from the left side rows (origin) to the right to

<sup>14</sup> The matrix for period 2 is too large to be published here as one table. A copy of the whole matrix as a single unit can be obtained from the authors upon request.

TABLE 1  
OCCUPATIONAL SERIES NUMBERS AND OCCUPATION TITLES

HIGH STACK		LOW STACK	
Series No	Title	Series No	Title
180	Psychology	332	Computer operation
185	Social work	404	Biological technician
212	Personnel staffing	621	Nursing assistant
403	Microbiology	644	Medical technologist*
510	Accounting	645	Medical technician
560	Budget analysis	802	Engineering technician
630	Dietitian and nutritionist	1152	Production control
861	Aerospace engineering	1311	Physical science technician
905	General attorney	1411	Library technician
1082	Writing and editing		
1320	Chemistry		
1410	Librarian		
1520	Mathematics		

NOTE.—All high-stack occupations are professional or administrative jobs. All but one of the low-stack occupations are technical jobs.

\* Medical technologist is a professional occupation.

a given column (destination). Thus, for example, of the 1,000 psychologists starting out at GS9 (row 1), 923 move laterally at GS9, 462 are promoted to GS11, and 77 are promoted to GS12. Out of the 462 who move to GS11 (row 2), 301 are promoted to GS12 and 20 to GS13, while 60 move laterally at GS11. From GS12, 245 move to GS13 (row 3, col. 4), 62 then move from GS13 to GS14 (row 4, col. 5), and the same number move from GS14 to GS15 (row 5, col. 6). As seen, no women in the occupation could move above GS15. Since men in the same occupation, though very few, do rise above GS15 and make it to GS16 (a separate CPS for male psychologists, not shown here), we identify the existence of a glass ceiling between GS15 and GS16. Regarding mobility outside of the original occupation, 97 of the original 1,000 move to other professional jobs (rows 1–6, cols. 7–8); however, none of these 97 return (rows 7–8, cols. 1–6) to their original occupation and in fact leave the organization for good (rows 7–8, col. 11). Similarly, 20 psychologists move to administration and 77 move to technical occupations. Though having been able to move out of the original occupation, all these women leave the organization from their second occupations at the grade at which they came in, without developing their careers there, indicating their extremely limited opportunities in these occupations of destination in period 1.

Tables 3 and 4 display the career pathways for female psychologists

TABLE 2  
CPS FOR FEMALE PSYCHOLOGISTS STARTING AT GS9, PERIOD 1

Psychologist	Psychologist								Professional	Administrative	Technical	Exit
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8				
1. GS9 .....	923	462	77	0	0	0	77	0	0	0	0	77
2. GS11 .....	0	60	301	20	0	0	0	20	20	0	0	100
3. GS12 .....	0	0	180	245	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	164
4. GS13 .....	0	0	31	218	62	0	0	0	0	0	0	172
5. GS14 .....	0	0	0	0	0	62	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. GS15 .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	62
Aggregation of moves .....	.....	2,641	97	20	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	806
Professional												
7. GS11 .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77
8. GS12 .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
Aggregation of moves .....	.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	97
Administrative:												
9. GS12 .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
Aggregation of moves .....	.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
Technical:												
10. GS11 .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77
Aggregation of moves .....	.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77

Note.—Total exits = 1,000.

TABLE 3

CPS FOR FEMALE PSYCHOLOGISTS STARTING AT GS9, PERIOD 2  
 (PSYCHOLOGIST MATRIX ONLY)

NOTE.—Total exits for the matrix as a whole (psychologist, professional, administrative, technical, and other, tables 3 and 4) = 997. The sum does not add up to 1,000 due to rounding off.

who start at GS9 in period 2. One clear difference from period 1 is the size of the matrix (spanning two tables), or the size of the overall pathway structure, indicating the increased numbers of bridges between the original and other occupations, as well as increased opportunities within the occupation. Among the 1,000 psychologists starting out at GS9 (row 2), 123 move laterally at GS9 (col. 2), 61 are promoted to GS10 (col. 3), 368 move to GS11 (col. 4), and 31 move further up to GS12 (col. 5) while 31 are demoted to GS7 (col. 1). Among those who reach GS11 (row 4), 359 are promoted to GS12 (row 4, col. 5). From GS12, 251 move to GS13 (row 5, col. 6), 68 move from GS13 to GS14 (row 6, col. 7), and 22 move from GS14 to GS15 (row 7, col. 8). Very few rise above GS15. Only seven make it to SES 1 (row 8, col. 9). Once there, all seven climb to SES 4 (row 11, col. 12) before they exit (table 4, row 12, col. 37). Thus, in period 2, women are able to reach the top tier of the occupation, breaking the glass ceiling that existed in period 1.

With regard to outward mobility (table 4), 101 psychologists move laterally to other professional occupations (rows 1–13, cols. 14–20), and 116 move to administrative occupations (rows 1–13, cols. 21–29). More specifically, out of these 116 who move to management, 29 move from psychologist at GS12 (row 5, cols. 21–29) with moves as follows: 17 move laterally to management at GS12 (row 5, col. 25), 6 are promoted to administrative jobs at GS13 (row 5, col. 26), and the remaining six move downward to managerial occupations at GS9 (row 5, col. 22). Among these 116 women who left psychology for management, 49 eventually came back to the original occupation (table 3, rows 21–29, cols. 1–13) while 63 of those who left for other professional occupations came back to psychology (table 3, rows 14–20, cols. 1–13). Similarly, while 37 of the entering psychologists move to technical occupations (table 4, rows 1–13, cols. 30–34), 14 of them come back to the original occupation (table 3, rows 30–34, cols. 1–13). None from psychology directly move to the “other” occupation group (table 4, cols. 35–36).

In terms of where their organizational career ultimately takes women psychologists, the last column of table 4 provides the expected end distribution,  $C_{10}$ . As column 11 in table 2 indicates, in *period 1*, 806 out of 1,000 female psychologists exit in their original occupation, 97 from other professional occupations, 20 from managerial occupations, and 77 from technical occupations. In *period 2*, 871 exit as a psychologist, while 14 exit from other professional occupations, 107 from other administrative occupations, and five from other technical occupations (table 4, col. 37).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> These exit counts do not exactly add up to 1,000 because the numbers were rounded off. In the original matrices, the sum of the exit probabilities add up to “1” since each odd is calculated by rounding at the fourth decimal point.

TABLE 4  
CPS FOR FEMALE PSYCHOLOGISTS STARTING AT GS9, PERIOD 2 (PROFESSIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL, AND OTHER MATRIX)

	PROFESSIONAL										ADMINISTRATIVE										TECHNICAL						OTHER			
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	EXIT						
Psychologist																														
1. GS7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2. GS9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	31	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	
3. GS10	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	460	
4. GS11	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5. GS12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	107	
6. GS13	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	87	
7. GS14	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	130	
8. GS15	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	
9. SES1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	
10. SES2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11. SES3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
12. SES4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
13. Non-GS	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	
<b>Aggregation of moves</b>	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	101																				37	0	871
Professional:																														
14. GS7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. GS9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	9	9	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
16. GS11	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	45	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
17. GS12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	21	54	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
18. GS13	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
19. GS14	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	93	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
20. Non-GS	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	27	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14		
<b>Aggregation of moves</b>	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	426			0																	32	0	0

	Administrative	Technical:	Aggregation of moves	Other
21 GS7 .....	0	0	0	0
22 GS9 .....	0	0	0	0
23. GS10 .....	0	0	0	0
24. GS11 .....	0	0	0	0
25. GS12 .....	0	0	0	0
26. GS13 .....	0	0	0	0
27. GS14 .....	0	0	0	0
28. GS15 .....	0	0	0	0
29 Non-GS .....	0	0	0	0
Aggregation of moves .....	19	471	18	59
30 GS7 .....	0	0	0	0
31 GS9 .....	0	0	0	0
32 GS11 .....	0	0	0	0
33 GS12 .....	0	0	0	0
34 Non-GS .....	0	0	0	0
Aggregation of moves .....	0	0	0	0
35 GS13 .....	0	0	0	0
36 GS14 .....	0	0	0	0
Aggregation of moves .....	0	50	0	5

**NOTE**—Total cents for the matrix as a whole (psychologists, professional, administrative, technical, and other, tables 3 and 4) = 997. The sum does not add up to 1,000 due to rounding off.

This end distribution is used later in the analysis of glass ceilings to estimate what percentage of individuals reached the top inside as well as outside the occupation. In period 1, no women in psychology reached the top tier either inside or outside the occupation. In period 2, 0.7% of women (seven in SES4 in psychology) reached the top tier within the occupation while none reached the top tier outside the occupation.<sup>20</sup> Thus, overall, less than 1% of women reached the top tier in period 2.

For the analysis of occupational segregation in terms of occupational captivity, the percentage of individuals moving out of the occupation is calculated by dividing the number of individuals leaving the occupation by 1,000 (base population) plus the number of individuals moving back to the initial occupation from outside. For instance, in period 1, the percentage of women in psychology moving out was  $194/(1,000 + 0) = 0.194$  or 19%. The 194 consists of 97 moving from psychology to other professional jobs, 20 to management, and 77 to technical occupations. Since no one who left for other occupations came back to psychology, the denominator remains 1,000. In period 2, the percentage moving out for women in psychology was  $254/(1,000 + 126) = 0.226$  or 23%. The 254 consists of 101 moving from psychology to other professional jobs, 116 to other managerial occupations, and 37 to technical occupations. The 126, which are added to the original 1,000 in the denominator, are from those returning back to psychology from other occupations: 63 from professional occupations, 49 from management, and 14 from technical occupations. In the same way, for each of the remaining 21 detailed occupations, CPSs are generated for each gender in two different periods in the analysis to follow.

## ANALYSIS

We selected 22 occupations for the current analysis based primarily on three criteria: occupational gender composition, hierarchical structure, and the number of women in the occupation (see table 1 for a list of the occupations). First, occupations were selected to cover a wide range of gender composition, from extremely male-dominated (female composition 10% or less) to female-dominated (female composition 90% or more), as well as gender-neutral occupations. A change in an occupation's gender composition between the two periods was also considered. Thus, we examined whether a given occupations' change in gender composition was sufficiently large enough to move the occupation from one level to another

<sup>20</sup> For the total population of female psychologists, the expected number would be  $7 \times .22 \times 10$  or 15.4.

## Sex Segregation

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONS BY HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE, GENDER COMPOSITION, AND CHANGE IN  
GENDER COMPOSITION ACROSS PERIODS

LEVEL OF GENDER COMPOSITION (% Female)	HIGH-STACK		LOW-STACK	
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2
1 0-19	180 510 861  905 1320 1520	180 510 861  905 1320 1520	802 1152  1311	802 1152  1311
2. 20-39	403  560	403  560	404  332	404  332
3. 40-59	185  212 1082	185  212 1082	645  621	645  621
4. 60+	212 1082  630 1410	212 1082  630 1410	644  1411	644  1411

NOTE.—All high-stack occupations are professional or administrative. All but one of the low-stack occupations are technical. See table 1 for a mapping of occupational series numbers to occupational title.

\* Medical technologist is a professional occupation.

among the four levels of gender composition (%female) in table 5. In each level in the table, we selected at least one occupation with no change and one with sufficient compositional change to place it in a higher level. In other words, we are assured of having both those experiencing relatively smaller increases in female composition and those with relatively large increases at each 20% threshold. Second, we varied hierarchical opportunities in terms of the highest grades within the occupation. Using the highest tenth percentile of an occupation's grade distribution as a cut-off point for GS level, we obtained what we refer to as *high-stack* and *low-stack* occupations. Among high-stack occupations, the 10-percentile grade is located between GS11 and GS15, while among low-stack occupations, it

ranges between GS5 and GS9. Third, we selected occupations that had at least 900 women in the workforce (90 in the 10% sample) in any given year.<sup>21</sup> A supplementary criterion, used in conjunction with either gender composition or hierarchical structure, was functionally related occupations—that is, a functionally related area such as microbiology and biological technician, both of which are working in the biological area but at different (hierarchical) levels.

Variations in the first two criteria, gender composition and hierarchical structure, are shown in table 5. The information in the first and third columns (period 1) include two dimensions: four levels of gender composition and two types of hierarchical opportunities. For period 2, there are still two hierarchical dimensions (cols. 2 and 4), but for each hierarchical stack, there are occupations with a change in the level of gender composition between the two periods and occupations with no gender composition change. These combinations create 14 different groups (indicated by the blank space between rows in table 5), for each of which one occupation was selected. Three additional occupations were selected, matching a high-stack occupation to a low-stack occupation within a broad functional area (new additions indicated in parentheses). These were aerospace engineering (new) and engineering technician, chemistry (new) and physical science technician, and librarian and library technician (new). These additions include two professional high-stack occupations (aerospace engineering and chemistry) and one technical low-stack occupation (library technician). Another match-based addition, keyed to functional area, paired high-stack occupations while varying gender composition.<sup>22</sup> This was psychology (new) and social worker. In short, four additional occupations were selected based on functional relations, while also varying either the hierarchical dimension or gender composition. The last four occupations were selected primarily to help balance specific conditions.<sup>23</sup> They are dietitian and nutritionist in high-stack occupations at level 4, mathematics in high-stack occupations that move from level 1 to level 2, writing and editing in high-stack occupations that move from level 3 to level 4,

<sup>21</sup> There were 100 professional, administrative, or technical occupations meeting this criterion. From these 20 were selected. The two exceptions included in our data were psychology and aerospace engineering with 760 and 570 female workers, respectively, in 1988.

<sup>22</sup> In the original 14 occupations selected, one pair of functionally related low-stack occupations, medical technician (level 3) and medical technologist (level 4) already existed, as well as one pair of functionally related high-stack occupations, accounting (level 1) and budget analysis (changing from level 2 to level 3). Additionally, one pair of functionally related occupations matching low- and high-stacks existed—microbiology and biological technician on level 2.

<sup>23</sup> In three of the cases the selections also extend the functional range of occupations.

and production control in low-stack occupations at level 1. Mathematics was added to balance high-stack occupations at level 1 that did not change, yielding comparable numbers of occupations experiencing gender changes with those having no change. The dietitian and nutritionist occupation was added to help balance the numbers between high-stack occupations at level 1 that do not change as well as low-stack occupations at level 4. Writing and editing provides a greater balance between high-stack occupations that change from level 1 to level 2 and high-stack occupations that change from level 3 to level 4, depicting gender composition change at both the low and high ends of the composition dimension within high-stack occupations. Finally, production control was added to provide balance with the high-stack occupations at level 1, varying hierarchical level.<sup>24</sup> For most of the table, there are either one or two occupational ILMs. For high-stack occupations at level 1 that do not change and for high-stack occupations that move from level 1 to level 2, there are three occupations, two of which were added for matching purposes. In brief, the sampling was strategic—to select a wide variation of occupations while strategically varying gender composition and its change as well as hierarchical distribution.

In addition to the high-stack, low-stack hierarchical dimension, the selections also resulted in a further hierarchical spread within each of these two ranks—occupations with grades at the top and those with no grades at the top, thus, having a hierarchical ceiling within both the high and low stacks. This variation was not planned but is fortuitous nevertheless, yielding yet further hierarchical variation. The strategic sampling scheme adopted here is consistent with that suggested in Stewman and Konda (1983)—sampling on structures. Due to the sizes, it is not for statistical purposes, in the normal sense of significance testing, that each condition was given at least one occupant. Rather, by varying structural dimensions that have been theoretically postulated to affect women's opportunities, we enlarge the theoretical scope of the model (see White [1970b] for a view on development of new models on theory vs. statistical testing). Overall, there are 13 professional/administrative occupations in the high-stack group and nine occupations in the low-stack group—eight are technical and one professional.

For simplification purposes in reporting results, the existing 18 or more GS/SES grades were collapsed into four hierarchical levels including top (GS16–GS18 and SES 1–6), upper middle (GS12–GS15), lower middle (GS9–GS11), and bottom (GS1–GS8). For analyzing the low-stack occupations, we converted upper middle into "top" and lower middle into

<sup>24</sup> These occupations were also at the low end of gender composition where tokenism has been postulated to operate.

"middle" because the occupations lack grades in the organization's top levels (see fig. 3). In the estimates of the model and to construct the CPSs, all 24 grades (GS1-GS18, SES 1-6) were used.

The objectives of the analysis are to identify gender differences in opportunity structures as represented by sex segregation and glass ceilings, to assess the size of such differences and their changes over time, and to identify structural factors that may account for the observed gender gap and therefore might be used in planning and policy formulation to improve the situation. More specifically, we examine gender composition and also analyze the degree of occupational captivity, measured by the amount of flows of individuals leaving the occupation. The height of the grade levels within the occupation represents its hierarchical structure. We also investigate the glass ceiling in three different ways: first under the ordinary distributional dichotomy within the occupation; second, by turning the analytical perspective outside the occupation to consider the possible ceiling outside the occupation but within the organization, thus examining the phenomenon in conjunction with occupational captivity; and third, by incorporating the flows of individuals going beyond the glass ceiling to more accurately measure the degree of change in opportunity structures. Both occupational captivity and glass ceiling are analyzed across a range of gender compositions and hierarchical structures. The analysis includes the following three components: a brief examination of gender composition and the hierarchical ceiling of the occupation for the two periods; an examination of a glass ceiling in terms of flows of individuals to the top tier within and outside the occupation for the two periods and changes in the flows between the two periods; and an examination of occupational captivity by gender in terms of the outflows per occupation, hence attending to overall magnitude of outside opportunities. We conduct these analyses on high- and low-stack occupations, separately, taking into account the impacts of occupational stack height and gender composition. In addition, we provide a brief analysis of the outside pathways that enabled women to break the glass ceiling when they left their initial entry occupational ILM.

### High-Stack Occupations

By using the CPS model, we first categorize 13 high-stack occupations presented in table 6 into two groups, grade at the top (GAT) and no grade at the top (no-GAT) groups, in terms of flows into the top GS grades. The seven GAT occupations, which have opportunities to reach the top within one's initial entry occupation, include aerospace engineering, accounting, general attorney, psychology, chemistry, mathematics, and budget analysis. The remaining six no-GAT occupations, which lack such inside oppor-

## Sex Segregation

TABLE 6  
GENDER COMPOSITION, HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	% FEMALE		% DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERIODS 1 AND 2
	Period 1	Period 2	
<b>GAT:<sup>*</sup></b>			
Aerospace engineering .....	.99	3.41	2.41
Accounting .....	7.29	16.01	8.73
General attorney .....	7.94	23.52	15.58
Psychology .....	13.41	19.29	5.88
Chemistry .....	15.08	20.88	5.80
Mathematics† .....	..	22.90	3.88
Budget analysis .....	36.58	53.21	16.63
<b>No GAT</b>			
Mathematics† .....	19.02	..	..‡
Microbiology .....	28.45	35.83	7.38
Social work .....	45.29	46.09	80
Personnel staffing .....	51.82	65.80	13.98
Writing and editing .....	56.93	62.76	5.83
Librarian .....	74.35	76.22	1.88
Dietitian and nutritionist .....	96.51	96.17	-34
<b>Average:</b>			
Overall .....	34.90	41.70	6.80
GAT .....	13.55	22.75	9.20§
No GAT .....	53.20	63.81	10.62§

\* GAT means the occupation has jobs in grades GS16 and above.

† The occupation has top only in period 2, i.e., new jobs were created at the top within this occupational ILM in period 2.

‡ See mathematics under GAT section.

§ These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2.

tunities, consist of microbiology, social work, personnel staffing, writing and editing, librarian, and dietitian and nutritionist.<sup>25</sup>

*Female composition.*—Table 6 also presents the female composition of each high-stack occupation. In period 1, the female composition among the high-stack occupations is on average 35%, ranging from 1% to 97%. Most GAT occupations have significantly lower (less than 20%) female composition, with an average of 14%; in contrast, no-GAT occupations

<sup>25</sup> In period 1, mathematics had no opportunities to the top, but new jobs were created at the top in period 2. Thus this occupation has an evolving hierarchical structure. Hence, to be precise, there were six GAT occupations in period 1 and seven in period 2, and seven no-GAT occupations in period 1 and six in period 2. In the discussion above, we are referring to an occupation having opportunities to the top (GAT) in either period.

have a substantially high female percentage, averaging 53%. Between the two periods, women's representation increased in all occupations but one. As a result, in period 2 the average female composition among the GAT, no-GAT, and the overall high-stack occupations increased to 23%, 64%, and 42%, respectively. The average increase in female representation among GAT occupations (9%) is nearly as large as that among no-GAT occupations (11%), and significant increases (14%–16%) in the female composition are observed in some occupations in both the GAT and no-GAT groups. Thus, increased female representation is occupation specific, and occurs at both GAT and no-GAT levels.

*Glass ceiling by end distribution and percentage ending in the top.*—One of the properties of the CPS model is that it yields the expected end distribution of a career for a person starting in a given occupation at a specific grade under the specific labor market conditions in a given period. Therefore, the number of individuals who end their careers at a certain level, say the top, indicates the magnitude of moves to and subsequent exits at that level. In turn, no flows to the top by either gender indicate the existence of a *hierarchical ceiling* (no GAT), whereas flows by one gender and not the other indicates the existence of a *glass ceiling*. Further, when the glass ceiling is analyzed in terms of inside and outside the occupation, the former indicates the existence of an *occupational ILM* glass ceiling while the latter indicates an occupational-organizational glass ceiling—that is no outside routes to the top throughout the organization for individuals starting careers in that specific occupational origin. Table 7 summarizes the existing hierarchical and glass ceilings within and outside of the occupations for individuals starting at GS9 in each high-stack occupation by period. In the table, yes indicates flows of individuals into the top while no indicates that no such flows exist.

In period 1, all seven no-GAT occupations, by definition, have no opportunities to the top for either gender within the initial occupation. In addition, they also lack outside opportunities. Thus, individuals in these occupations are stuck and neither staying within nor leaving the original occupation provides a chance for moving to the top. Even in period 2, none of the six no-GAT occupations has either inside or outside opportunities that are available to both genders, indicating the prevailing influence of occupational origins on career opportunities of individuals.<sup>26</sup> However, in three of the six cases, an outside route to the top did open for one gender.

In contrast to the no-GAT occupations in which *hierarchical* ceilings

<sup>26</sup> The reason for the change in the number of no-GAT occupations is that in period 2, jobs were created at GS16 and above for mathematics. Thus, this series moved into the GAT group, leaving six no-GAT occupational ILMs in period 2.

TABLE 7

END DISTRIBUTION OF CAREERS: GLASS CEILING AT THE TOP  
AMONG HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	INSIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO TOP				OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO TOP			
	Period 1		Period 2		Period 1		Period 2	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>GAT with glass ceiling</b>								
1520	.	.	..	no	yes	.	yes	yes
510	no	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	yes
861	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
1320	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
560	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
180	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes
<b>GAT with no glass ceiling</b>								
905	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
<b>No GAT:</b>								
1520	no	no	.	.	no	no	.	.
403	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
630	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
1082	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
185	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes
212	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no
1410	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no

are ubiquitous, the GAT occupations present a prevalence of a glass ceiling in both periods, indicating women's limited opportunity structure. For inside opportunities, women face a glass ceiling in five out of six GAT occupations in period 1 and five out of seven in period 2, while such ceilings do not exist for men in any such occupation in either period. Even in the occupation having newly created inside opportunities in period 2 (mathematics), women did not benefit from them, instead facing a glass ceiling. Women also face limited outside opportunities in period 1; in only one out of six GAT occupations (vs. five out of six for men) could women reach the top via the outside routes. In period 2, outside opportunities are created for women in three additional occupations, but those in the remaining three still lack outside opportunities. When both of the inside and outside routes are examined for the GAT occupations, women could reach the top in only two out of 12 available routes in period 1 (vs. 11 out of 12 for men) and six out of 14 in period 2 (vs. all 14 for men). Though improved in terms of available routes, women's opportunities are still less than half of those of men. When combining the results of the no-GAT

and GAT occupations, for their outside opportunities, women could reach the top in one out of 13 occupations in period 1 and six out of 13 in period 2, whereas for men, it was in five in period 1 and eight in period 2. Thus, the gender gap for outside opportunities narrowed considerably. The same could not be said for inside opportunities. Women could reach the top in one out of 13 occupations (vs. six for men) in period 1 and two out of 13 (vs. seven for men) in period 2. Clearly, the greatest chances for women, particularly those in occupations with a glass ceiling, are in outside routes, escaping blocked inside opportunities.

While gender-specific career end distributions indicate the existence of a glass ceiling above which no women could go, they do not provide information regarding magnitudes of flows of individuals or degree of closure of the ceiling. In this section, we examine the odds of reaching the top for men when there is a glass ceiling and the relative odds between women and men when there is no such ceiling for women. The numbers are again calculated using the CPS model, with the assumption that individuals start their careers at GS9.

For the high-stack occupations for each period, tables 8 and 9 provide the percentage of individuals that would reach and exit at the top within the initial occupation (table 9) and overall (inside and outside combined; table 8) for women, men, and total women and men. In period 1, on average a mere 2% of individuals among the high-stack occupations could reach the top. Zero flows in the columns among all the no-GAT occupations in period 1 again indicate the lack of both inside and outside opportunities to the top. While 4.6% of individuals in the GAT occupations on average could reach the top, the occupation-specific odds to the top varies widely from 1% to 12%. A relatively higher chance of careers ending at the top exists for general attorney and chemistry. In terms of the gender difference, 5% of men in the GAT occupations, compared to 2% of women, on average could reach the top. In five out of the six occupations that have opportunities to the top, men have a higher odds of reaching that level than women. Gender difference is particularly large (6% or more) in chemistry and budget analysis. An exception is general attorney; not only is this the only occupation in which women could reach the top, but it also provides women better opportunities (15%) than men (11%).

In period 2, overall opportunities to the top among the high-stack occupations increased slightly with the percentage reaching the top still less than 3%. Among the seven GAT occupations, about 4.5% of individuals still reach the top, a slight decrease from the level in period 1. While opportunities to the top substantially increased in aerospace engineering and mathematics, those in general attorney and chemistry significantly declined. Between the two periods, the percentage reaching the top for women increased by almost 2% compared to a decline of 0.6% for men,

TABLE 8

## GLASS CUTTING BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS: OVERALL (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE)

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2			
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2				
							Women	Men	Women	Men	Total	
<b>GAT:</b>												
861 . . . . .	.00	.00	2.60	6.10	2.57	5.92	-2.60	-6.10	.00	.00	3.50	3.34
510 . . . . .	.00	10.30	2.70	2.50	2.51	3.75	-2.70	7.80	10.30	-.20	1.24	
905 . . . . .	14.60	3.80	11.30	6.30	11.56	5.70	3.30	-2.50	-10.80	-5.00	-5.86	
180 . . . . .	.00	70	1.60	1.20	1.39	1.11	-1.60	-.50	.70	-.40	-.29	
1320 . . . . .	.00	.00	6.80	1.80	5.78	1.42	-6.80	-1.80	.00	-5.00	-4.36	
1520 . . . . .	..	12.30	8.00	.	8.99	..	4.30	12.30	8.00	8.99	8.99	
560 . . . . .	.00	3.30	5.70	5.70	3.59	4.43	-5.70	-2.40	3.30	.00	.84	
No GAT.												
1520 . . . . .	.00	..	00	00	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
403 . . . . .	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	00	00	.00	.00	00	
185 . . . . .	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.32	.00	-.60	.00	.00	.32	
212 . . . . .	.00	1.40	.00	.00	.00	.92	.00	1.40	1.40	00	.92	
1082 . . . . .	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	
1410 . . . . .	.00	2.20	.00	.00	.00	1.67	.00	2.20	2.20	00	1.67	
630 . . . . .	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	
Average												
Overall . . . . .	1.12	2.62	2.36	2.48	2.11	2.63	-1.24	-.14	1.49	-.12	.52	
GAT . . . . .	2.43	4.34	5.12	4.51	4.57	4.47	-2.68	-.17	1.91†	-60†	-10†	
No GAT . . . . .	.00	.00	.00	10	.00	.49	.00	50	60†	.10†	.49†	

\* Women - men.

† See 1520 under GAT section.

‡ These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2.

TABLE 9  
GLASS CEILING BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS: INSIDE

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2	
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1		Period 2		Period 1	Period 2	Women	Men
			Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2				
<b>GAT:</b>										
861	...	...	.00	.80	2.60	.79	2.52	-.80	-2.60	.00
510	...	...	.00	2.70	.50	2.51	.42	-2.70	-.50	.00
905	...	...	6.10	2.30	6.40	6.38	4.05	-.30	-2.30	-3.80
180	...	...	.00	.70	.80	.70	.94	-.80	-.30	-.80
1320	...	...	.00	5.80	.30	4.93	.24	-5.80	-.30	.70
1520	...	...	.00	...	.20	...	.15	...	-.20	.00
560	...	...	.00	.00	1.10	.80	.69	.38	-1.10	-.80
Average:										
GAT	1.02	.43	2.93	1.43	2.67	1.24	-1.92	-1.00	-.59†	-1.50†
										-1.42†

\* Women - men

† These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2

resulting in a significant reduction in gender difference in period 2; 4.3% of women and 4.5% of men could reach the top among the GAT occupations. In fact, when GAT and no-GAT occupations are combined, women have a slightly higher odds of reaching the top. Improvement in women's opportunity structure is certainly not a uniform phenomenon and the occupation-specific gender gap widely varies from -6% to +8%. Needless to say, in aerospace engineering and chemistry, women still do not have opportunities to move up to the top, facing a glass ceiling. Overall, however, there is near equity. A closer look at the routes involved, however, suggests a critical feature of this phenomenon.

In table 9, we observe that, over a quarter century, inside opportunities for women in the GAT occupations changed in two ways: first, an additional route opened in psychology; second, overall odds of getting to the top shrank. We also note that the impact of decreases in overall inside opportunities occurred equally for men and women. For both genders, the odds to the top were cut by half from the level of period 1; hence the relative gender difference favoring men remained constant—at 3 to 1. It matters greatly whether one analyzes overall (inside and outside) or inside occupational ILM opportunities. It clearly is of substantial consequence for the individuals involved since, for women, lack of movement out of the entry point occupation generally means hitting a glass ceiling, in contrast to the opportunities for men. When one takes into account those who left their initial occupation (table 8), overall chances of getting to the top were 1 to 1, though considerable variation existed across occupations.<sup>27</sup> These findings have major implications for career structures and behavior, as well as for human resource policies. In sum, in period 2 women's opportunity structures substantially improved to the level comparable to those for men, primarily due to exceptionally high increases in outside opportunities in selected occupations, while inside opportunities for women are still severely limited. A substantially large increase in outside opportunities in accounting and mathematics suggests that when outside opportunities became available in these occupations, women were able to take better advantage of the opportunities than were men. As was argued elsewhere (Stewman and Konda 1983), job creation is one of the major factors for individuals' career advancement. Thus, when individuals of special skills, for example financial management and mathematics in the current case, become needed in other types of occupations, this, in fact, creates new internal opportunities for these individuals to move into. And it seems that the greater the creation of such internal outside opportuni-

<sup>27</sup> Tables A1 and A2 provide specific data for the outside chances for high- and low-stack occupations. One may obtain these results from tables 8–9 and tables 13–14 by subtracting table 9 from table 8 and table 14 from table 13.

ties, the easier it is for individuals of minority groups who are in the "right place" to move into them, advancing their careers.<sup>22</sup>

The discovery of the route to the top from accounting, however, revealed two facets—(1) the magnitude in table 9 was short-lived and involved a structural change and (2) the gateway to the top closed after the structural change. In 1982, the accounting series (510) was split into two occupational series: accounting (510) and auditing (511). During the brief period in which this evolution occurred, women moved from accounting to auditing at multiple grades. The model indicates that many of these moves will result in careers at the top in the new occupational series, auditing. An important question then remained as to whether this entrée was a one-shot affair or whether women could reach the top via 511 once the job series split was complete. The model was used to examine complete career trajectories during the evolution period versus those without the opportunity set during the evolution time zone. The results indicate that the window of opportunities via this pathway opened only briefly, during the short period of job evolution. For those women who took advantage of these opportunities, there is no longer a glass ceiling. For those women coming later, however, after the evolution was complete, this gateway has closed and there is no longer an outside access route to the top.

*Occupational captivity.*—We have identified that, among the high-stack occupations, a substantial breakthrough in women's careers took place when they moved outside the initial occupation. Therefore a significant question is the degree to which they are able to move to other occupations. Table 10 provides the percentage of careers having such moves. We refer to these intraorganizational moves across occupations as internal exits and will focus on internal exit (captivity) rates. The rates are calculated using the CPS model with the same assumption that individuals would start their careers at GS9.

First, we examine occupational captivity for all individuals. For both genders combined, in period 1, the internal exit rates among the high-stack occupations range from 5% to a massive 64%, averaging 33%. The rates for most occupations range from 15% to 50%. In eight of the 13 high-stack occupations, the internal exit rates are greater than 25%, and in five of these occupational ILMs, nearly 50% or more of the individuals leave their initial occupation. When arranged in ascending order, these occupations are categorized into two groups: the high-captivity group with an average internal exit rate of 18% (dietitian and nutritionist, psychology, librarian, general attorney, social work, microbiology, and chem-

<sup>22</sup> In short, by *right place* we mean differential growth on the demand side in specific skills "demanded" and differential selection on the supply side of minorities who have such high-demand skills.

## Sex Segregation

TABLE 10  
INTERNAL EXITS BY PERIOD AND GENDER HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	PERIOD 1			PERIOD 2		
	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men	Total
<b>GAT:</b>						
861 . . . . .	50.00	53.21	53.17	48.03	49.34	49.30
510 . . . . .	29.56	39.94	39.21	67.75	66.99	67.11
905 . . . . .	31.42	14.89	16.21	14.87	11.41	12.24
180 . . . . .	19.40	12.08	13.03	22.22	23.23	23.04
1320 . . . . .	24.22	30.23	29.33	33.78	28.18	29.35
1520 . . . . .				65.39	56.23	58.34
560 . . . . .	28.68	57.76	47.00	44.00	56.05	49.67
<b>No GAT:</b>						
1520 . . . . .	40.84	51.24	49.26	-	-	-
403 . . . . .	25.57	27.33	26.84	32.07	36.00	34.59
185 . . . . .	2.80	34.98	20.50	15.85	23.97	20.24
212 . . . . .	57.17	71.79	64.19	55.77	64.33	58.68
1082 . . . . .	56.90	52.75	55.11	36.72	63.93	46.78
1410 . . . . .	10.97	24.79	14.56	21.00	25.09	21.98
630 . . . . .	4.64	00	4.50	14.76	19.10	14.93
<b>Average.</b>						
Overall . . . . .	29.40	36.23	33.30	36.32	40.30	37.40
GAT . . . . .	30.55	34.69	32.99	42.29	41.63	41.29
No GAT . . . . .	28.41	37.55	33.57	29.36	38.74	32.87

istry) and the low-captivity group with an average internal exit rate of 51% (accounting, budget analysis, mathematics, aerospace engineering, writing and editing, and personnel staffing). In period 2, this dichotomy is still observed with an average internal exit rate of 22% for the first group and 55% for the second group. Using the following measure, captivity rate = [1 - (internal exit rate)], the high-captivity group's captivity rate is about 80% whereas that of the low-captivity group is about 50%. In short, in the first group, the odds are four out of five of remaining versus fifty-fifty in the second group.

These generally high rates of intraorganizational mobility and a rather wide variation across occupations indicate that the notion of an independent ILM, originally proposed by Doeringer and Piore (1971), is not an accurate description of many organizational labor markets at least on three accounts. First, white-collar occupation-based ILMs are more interdependent, as Osterman (1984), DiPrete (1989), and Stewman (1995) have shown, rather than rigid independent structures in which most individuals' careers start and end. Second, the captivity rates vary greatly from one occupation to another, suggesting the diversity of occupational ILMs,

even in a single organizational or in a major occupational labor market (i.e., professional). Third, the vast exodus of individuals to other occupations within an organization indicates the existence of other *internal* entry ports that receive these individuals. Moreover, these internal entry ports are not located at the bottom but instead are in the middle or even near the top of the "new" occupations.<sup>29</sup> Thus, the original notion of limited numbers of ports of entry from outside, mainly at lower grades of the occupation, needs major revision for white-collar ILMs, also taking into account such internal entry ports. We also note that most of the movement of individuals in these occupations is either from a professional ILM to another professional ILM, or from a professional ILM to an administrative ILM, or from one administrative ILM to another administrative ILM, corresponding with previous findings on movements of individuals across occupational ILMs (Stewman 1995). In brief, while the shielding of job opportunities from the outside is certainly operative as Doeringer and Piore (1971) postulated, ILM theory needs revision for the internal structures, at least for white-collar occupational ILMs.

From the point of view of the sources, or origin, of these moves, we now look at these captivity rates by gender. In period 1, the percentage of women moving out ranges from 3% to 57%, averaging 29%; hence a captivity rate of 71%. When listed in rank order in terms of captivity rates, the occupations are divided into five categories: (1) traditional female occupations (social work, dietitian and nutritionist, and librarian); (2) occupations in science (psychology, chemistry, and microbiology); (3) non-scientific/engineering professional occupations (budget analysis, accounting, and general attorney); (4) math and engineering occupations (mathematics and aerospace engineering); and (5) administrative-professional occupations (personnel staffing and writing and editing). For men, the internal exit rates range from 0% to 72%, averaging 36%, yielding a captivity rate of 64%.<sup>30</sup> Among men, a clear-cut categorization is not observable in terms of occupational ILMs, as observed among women. On average men's captivity rates are 7% less than those of women, but no consistent patterns exist in the gender differentials across occupations. Among the seven occupations in which substantial gender differences are observed, general attorney is the only occupation with a captivity rate for women (69%) less than that for men (85%), underscoring the captivity-glass ceiling linkage since women had a significantly higher—nearly twice

<sup>29</sup> These career moves generally involve lateral movements and promotions.

<sup>30</sup> Due to the small number of males in dietitian and nutritionist, the obtained figure may not accurately represent this gender.

as large—percentage reaching the top via the outside route than did men.<sup>11</sup>

In period 2, women's internal exit rates range from 15% to 68%, averaging 36%, or a captivity rate of 64%.<sup>12</sup> Thus, on average, the rates for women in period 2 are equivalent to those for men in period 1. For men, the percentage moving out of their original occupation ranges from 11% to 67% with an average rate of 40% (captivity rate of 60%). In all occupations, gender difference in the captivity rates is reduced to about 4%. In the previous subsection, in period 2, we found women could reach the top via outside routes from the following occupations: accounting, mathematics, budget analysis, personnel staffing, general attorney, and librarian. Table 10 shows that four of these six occupations have lower captivity rates among the occupations examined.<sup>13</sup> Noteworthy is that women in the occupations with the lowest captivity rates (32% in accounting and 35% in mathematics) also yield the highest odds of ending their careers at the top (10% and 12%, respectively; see table 8). Furthermore, if we compare shifts in captivity and in outside opportunities to the top for women, additional evidence of a linkage between the two is shown. That is, women in all three occupations (accounting, mathematics, budget analysis) with a large decrease in captivity rates and a moderate captivity rate (60%–70%) to start with, were able to break the glass ceiling.<sup>14</sup> In general, women did not get to the top in occupations in which the captivity rates had virtually no change, small to moderate decreases, or relatively large decreases from a captivity rate at 95% or higher. In only two of eight occupational ILMs did women find routes to the top in these circumstances. Also, the two occupations in which the captivity rates increased substantially, either experienced a decrease in opportunities to the top (general attorney) or still face a glass ceiling (writing and editing). In sum, in general, outside routes were necessary but not sufficient for breaking the glass ceiling. However, when the full set of these outside routes experienced large increases in the volume of traffic from the origin ILM, given

<sup>11</sup> This may be seen by subtracting the values in table 9 from those in table 8. It is  $(14.60 - 6.10) = 8.50$  for women and  $(11.30 - 6.40) = 4.90$  for men.

<sup>12</sup> Note that the internal exit rate in period 2 for psychology is 22.2 vs. that given in the psychologist examples in the "Illustrative Cases" section, where it is 22.6. This difference is due to a higher precision in digits for all tables; it is thus due to rounding differences and for this example there is a difference of 4 per 1,000, due to rounding.

<sup>13</sup> An exception is aerospace engineering, which also has low captivity rates but no outside route to the top for women.

<sup>14</sup> For accounting, the drop in captivity rate was also related to the job evolution discussed in the prior subsection. Thus, it may have been short-lived. Nevertheless, the window in which it occurred was sufficient to enable women at that place, at that time, to break the glass ceiling.

a moderate captivity rate to start with, then it appears that these conditions were sufficient.

In this analysis, we have identified an important occupational segregation-glass ceiling linkage and an especially important organizational policy for leveling the playing field by gender. Without these internal outside opportunities, glass ceilings remain overwhelmingly intact. These findings are consistent with prior findings on gender inequality—namely, that one of the paramount factors underlying the wage gap by gender is sex segregation. Here, we probed further and have identified conditions under which decreases in occupational captivity led to breaking the glass ceiling.

### Low-Stack Occupations

In this section, we conduct a similar analysis on the nine low-stack occupations in which one's career movement within the occupational ILM would end no higher than the upper middle (GS12-GS15). The occupations include engineering technician, production control, physical science technician, biological technician, computer operation, nursing assistant, medical technician, medical technologist, and library technician (see table 5 for the mapping of the occupations). All but one are technical occupations while medical technologist is professional. Because these occupations lack the original top (GS16 and above), the previously specified four hierarchical levels for analyzing opportunity structures are redefined among the low-stack occupations: the original upper middle (GS12-GS15) is defined as the *top*; the original lower middle (GS9-GS11) as *middle*; and the original bottom (GS1-GS8) remains the *bottom*.<sup>15</sup> This conceptualization remains congruent with that of the original glass ceiling theorists (Morrison, White, and Velsor 1992) who stressed possible glass ceilings at different relative levels.

The low-stack occupations, displayed in table 11, are categorized into two groups in terms of the existence of flows to the top by using the CPS model: There are five GAT occupations with a top tier within the occupation (engineering technician, production control, physical science technician, computer operation, and medical technologist), and four no-GAT occupations without such opportunities (biological technician, nursing assistant, medical technician, and library technician).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that the top in the low-stack analysis is different from the top in the high-stack analysis of the preceding sections.

<sup>16</sup> In period 1, computer operation had no opportunities to the top, but new jobs were created at the top in period 2. Thus, this occupation has an evolving hierarchical structure, in the manner of that of mathematics in the high-stack group analyzed above.

## Sex Segregation

TABLE 11  
GENDER COMPOSITION: LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	% FEMALE		% DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERIODS 1 AND 2
	Period 1	Period 2	
<b>GAT:*</b>			
Engineering technician	.03	08	.05
Production control	.06	20	.14
Physical science technician	.18	.21	.03
Computer operation†	.	.44	-.10
Medical technologist	66	66	.00
<b>No GAT.</b>			
Biological technician	.26	.36	.10
Computer operation†	.34	..	..‡
Nursing assistant	.46	.62	.16
Medical technician	.49	.55	.06
Library technician	.81	.88	.07
<b>Average:</b>			
Overall	.37	.44	.08
GAT	.23	.32	.09
No GAT	.47	.60	.13

\* Top for these low-stack occupations means the occupation has jobs in grade GS12-GS15.

† The occupation has a top only in period 2, i.e., new jobs were created at the top within this occupational ILM in period 2.

‡ See computer operation in GAT section

**Female composition.**—Table 11 also presents the female composition among the low-stack occupations. In period 1, the gender composition of these occupations varies from 3% to 81% with an average of 37%. In period 2, the overall average female composition in these ILMs increased by 7% to 44%. While female representation increased in all but medical technologist, the rate of increase varies somewhat (2%-16%) from one occupation to another. As observed among the high-stack occupations, substantial increases in female composition (10% or more) are observed in both GAT and no-GAT occupations. On average, however, the female composition among the no-GAT occupations increased by 12% from 47% to 60%, whereas in the GAT occupations, the increase was 8% from 23% in period 1 to 32% in period 2.

**Glass ceiling by end distribution and percentage ending in the top.**—Table 12 summarizes for each period the existing ceiling between the top and middle tiers for individuals starting in each low-stack occupation at GS5. The no-GAT occupations by definition have hierarchical ceilings and therefore lack inside opportunities to the top. In contrast to no-GAT

TABLE 12

END DISTRIBUTION OF CAREERS: GLASS CEILING AT THE TOP  
AMONG LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	INSIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO TOP				OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO TOP			
	Period 1		Period 2		Period 1		Period 2	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>GAT with glass ceiling</b>								
332 .. - - - - . . . . .	.	..	no	yes	..	..	yes	yes
1311 . - - - - . . . . .	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
1152 . - - - - . . . . .	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
<b>GAT with no glass ceiling</b>								
644 . . - - - - . . . . .	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
802 . - - - - . . . . .	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
<b>No GAT:</b>								
332 . . - - - - . . . . .	no	no	..	..	yes	yes	..	..
1411 . - - - - . . . . .	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes
621 . - - - - . . . . .	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
645 . . - - - - . . . . .	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
404 .. - - - - . . . . .	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes

occupations in the high-stack group, here, four out of five of the no-GAT occupations have outside opportunities to the top even in period 1. While women's opportunities to reach the top are limited in period 1 (two out of five occupations for women, compared to four out of five for men), substantial change occurred in period 2—both genders could now reach the top in all no-GAT occupations.<sup>17</sup> Thus, in terms of the existence of outside opportunities, women and men are equal for these no-GAT occupations in period 2.

For the GAT occupations, in period 1, men in all four occupations have inside opportunities, but women could only reach the top in two; thus those in the remaining two face a glass ceiling. Similarly while men in all four occupations could reach the top via outside routes, women again lack such outside opportunities in two of them. Among the paths to the top, either outside or inside, women could take only four, compared to all eight for men in period 1. Perhaps more important, even in period 2, inside opportunities for women in the GAT occupations remain limited; in only two of five occupations could women reach the top, compared to all five

<sup>17</sup> In period 2, new jobs were created at the top in computer operation and thus the no-GAT group is reduced from five to four ILMs.

for men. While the glass ceiling is broken in production control, it remains intact in physical science technician, is reinstalled in engineering technician, and is newly created in computer operator. Thus, for women in these GAT low-stack occupations, inside opportunity structures did not improve between the two periods. In contrast, outside opportunities are now open for both women and men in all five occupations.

In sum, when we combine the findings from both GAT and no-GAT occupations in period 2, women can now reach the top in all nine outside paths, comparable to men. In contrast, in period 1, in only four out of nine occupations did women have such outside opportunities, compared to eight out of nine for men. However, if women stay within the initial occupation, in only two out of nine occupations (vs. five for men) could women reach the same level even in period 2. In sum, as with the case among high-stack occupations above, glass ceilings within the entry occupations have remained largely intact; it is outside opportunities that have substantially changed for women in the low-stack occupations. Being able to move to other occupations is therefore critical for the women in occupations in which comparable career advancement from within is blocked due to a glass ceiling.

We now go beyond the existence of glass ceilings to address the degree of closure of the ceiling by examining the odds of individuals reaching the top in the low-stack occupations. The derivations are obtained using the CPS model with the assumption that individuals start their careers at GS5. Table 13, provides the percentage of individuals that would exit at the top, overall (inside and outside) by gender. Significantly large opportunities (10%–12%) exist in these occupations, compared to those (2%–2.5%) in high-stack occupations. Further, in general, the GAT occupations have much higher opportunities to the top than the no-GAT occupations, as might be expected; the average percentage reaching the top among GAT and no-GAT occupations are 15% and 9% in period 1 and 15% and 4% in period 2, respectively.

*In period 1*, gender differentials are substantial in both GAT and no-GAT occupations. The gender-specific percentage ending in the top is 5% for women and 16% for men in the GAT occupations, and 3% for women and 13% for men in no-GAT occupations. In seven out the eight occupations that have opportunities to top, men have a higher percentage reaching the top. The gender gap is particularly large in occupations with large opportunities (production control, physical science technician, computer operation, and biological technician), in which opportunities for women do not exist at all or are less than one-third of those of men. An exception is engineering technician in which both men and women have relatively high and comparable opportunities. The gender difference is also near zero in medical technologist.

TABLE 13  
GLASS CRIMING BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS: OVERALL (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE)

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2	
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Women		Men	
							Women	Men	Total	Total
GAT										
802	13.00	11.50	17.50	10.70	17.37	10.76	-4.50	.80	-1.50	-6.80
1152	.00	16.60	17.90	14.40	16.83	14.84	-17.90	2.20	16.60	-3.50
1311	.00	18.00	22.80	18.30	18.70	18.24	-22.80	-.30	18.00	-4.50
332	..	19.20	..	22.90	..	21.27	..	-3.70	7.70	-17.90
644	6.90	6.40	5.90	10.30	6.56	7.73	1.00	-3.90	-.50	4.40
No GAT										1.17
332	11.50	..	40.80	..	30.84	..	-29.30	..	..	..†
404	5.40	13.00	4.50	10.63	4.82	9.10	.90	1.50	-8.50	-5.81
621	.60	3.40	1.30	1.84	.87	-3.40	-.70	.60	-2.10	-.97
645	4.50	6.20	4.50	3.16	4.50	-6.20	0.00	4.50	-1.70	1.34
1411	.00	8.30	.00	3.00	.00	7.66	.00	5.30	8.30	3.00
Average										7.66
Overall	3.92	10.06	14.17	9.99	11.77	10.08	-10.24	.07	6.13	-4.18
GAT	4.98	14.34	16.03	15.32	14.86	14.57	-11.05	-.98	9.37†	-7.11†
No GAT	3.08	4.70	12.68	3.33	9.29	4.46	-9.60	1.38	1.62†	-9.36†
										-4.83†

\* Women = men

† See 332 under GAT section

‡ These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2

*In period 2*, the substantial gender differentials observed among the GAT occupations in period 1 are virtually eliminated. On average, women's opportunities *increased* by 9% while those for men *decreased* by 1%. Particularly in production control and physical science technician, women's opportunities were created from zero to a level equivalent to those for men (17%–18%). In computer operation, men's odds in reaching the top was reduced by 18%, while those of women's increased by 8%, to 19%. In engineering technician in which both women and men experienced a reduction in the opportunities to the top, the amount of decrease for women is less than one-quarter of that for men.<sup>18</sup> As a result, a large gender gap that existed in period 1 in most occupations is eliminated: except for computer operation and medical technologist, the gender gap (women—men) is either within a range of 1% or women now have a higher percentage reaching the top. The percentage reaching the top in GAT, no-GAT, and the entire set of low-stack occupations for women is 14%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, compared to 15%, 3%, and 10% for men. Thus, as far as the average percentage ending in the top is concerned, women's opportunity structures in the low-stack occupations have become equal to those for men.

A great difference in outcome is observed when we look only at inside occupational ILM opportunities. Table 14 provides the percentage of careers ending at the top within the low-stack occupations. Since no-GAT occupations do not have inside opportunities, we focus only on the GAT occupations. We first note that compared to the relatively large overall opportunities to the top among the low-stack occupations (see table 13), their inside opportunities are substantially small, comparable for those among the high-stack occupations. In period 1, occupation-specific opportunities to the top among the four GAT occupations for both genders combined vary from 1% to 4%, with an average of 2.8%. Women's opportunity structures are further limited: compared to 3% of men, only 1% of women, on average, could reach the top. The gender difference is particularly large (5%) in physical science technician in which men monopolize the entire set of opportunities to the top. Also in engineering technician, women's odds are about one-third of those of men. In medical technologist, the only other occupation in which women could reach the top, their inside opportunities are slightly (0.6%) higher than those for men. In period 2, again in only two occupations could women reach the top from inside—in medical technologist, where the odds have reversed and now favor men, and production control, in which women's opportunities in-

<sup>18</sup> The only exception to this trend is medical technologist in which the gender differential has increased by almost doubling the percentage of reaching the top for men from 6% to 10% while keeping that for women constant.

TABLE 14  
GLASS CEILING BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS: INSIDE

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2				
	Period 1	Period 2			Period 1	Period 2	Period 1		Period 1	Period 2	Women	Men	Total
			Period 1	Period 2			Period 1	Period 2					
GAT:													
802	1.40	.00	3.80	3.40	3.73	3.13	-2.40	-3.40	-1.40	-40	-.60		
1152	.00	8.60	1.10	4.40	1.03	5.24	-1.10	4.20	8.60	3.30	4.21		
1311	.00	.00	4.90	1.40	4.02	1.11	-4.90	-1.40	.00	-3.50	-2.91		
332	.00	..	90	..	..	.50	.00	-.90	.00	.90	.50		
644	2.60	1.20	2.00	2.20	2.40	1.54	.60	-1.00	-1.40	.20	-.86		
Average:													
GAT	1.00	1.96	2.95	2.46	2.79	2.30	-1.56	-.50	96†	-.49†	-.49†		

\* Women - men.

† These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2.

TABLE 15  
INTERNAL EXIT RATES BY PERIOD AND GENDER LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	PERIOD 1			PERIOD 2		
	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men	Total
<b>GAT.</b>						
802 . . . . .	46.22	38.62	38.84	39.24	28.58	29.44
1152 . . . . .	81.45	63.08	64.19	41.36	56.60	53.55
1311 . . . . .	18.00	45.93	40.90	38.80	42.60	41.81
332 . . . . .	-	-	-	53.98	50.81	52.21
644 . . . . .	10.00	24.00	14.76	12.00	18.00	14.04
<b>No GAT.</b>						
332 . . . . .	60.73	64.61	63.29	-	-	-
404 . . . . .	30.48	32.18	31.74	18.95	19.96	19.60
621 . . . . .	18.65	30.75	25.18	44.06	23.12	36.10
645 . . . . .	21.69	37.48	29.74	29.65	32.95	31.14
1411 . . . . .	27.15	48.41	31.19	31.13	42.61	32.51
<b>Average:</b>						
Overall . . . . .	34.93	42.78	37.76	34.35	35.03	34.49
GAT . . . . .	38.92	42.91	39.67	37.08	39.32	38.21
No GAT . . . . .	31.74	42.68	36.23	30.95	29.66	29.84

creased from 0% to 9%. While women's opportunities have on average nearly doubled to 2%, compared to 2.5% for men in period 2, thus significantly reducing the average gender difference, the actual increase was observed only in production control. Among the remaining three occupations, women still face a glass ceiling.

In sum, we have confirmed that the major changes in opportunity structures observed in table 13 took place outside the original occupations. Given the different gender composition and hierarchical structures within these low-stack occupations, this uniform increase in women's outside opportunity structures suggests the impact of organizationwide affirmative action policies for gender. These programs seem particularly effective when women leave their original occupations. For outside routes, the changes are consistently in favor of women, regardless of the overall direction of shift in outside opportunities. In contrast, when women remain in the original occupations, the impact of such policies seems small.

*Occupational captivity.*—Given the above findings, once again it is clear that for women it is crucial to have opportunity structures with gateways or bridges that lead to other occupations with a higher ceiling. Table 15 displays the gender-specific internal exit rates among the low-stack occupations in the two periods.

In period 1, the overall (total) internal exit rates for the low-stack occu-

pations range from 15% to 64% with an average of 38%, or a captivity rate of 62%. On average, the GAT occupations have slightly lower (3%) captivity rates than the no-GAT occupations, reflecting the difference between the two groups in terms of the size of outside opportunities. For women, the percentage moving out from their original occupation ranges from 10% to 81%, averaging 35%, compared to those for men, where the range is from 24% to 65%, averaging 43%. The captivity rates were thus 65% and 57%. Men have a substantially lower captivity rates (10% or more) in about half of the occupations (five out of nine). In only production control are women's captivity rates significantly lower than that of men.

In period 2, the overall internal exit rates range from 14% to 54%, averaging 35% (captivity rate: 65%). While these rates for the no-GAT occupations on average decreased by 4% to 30%, those for the GAT occupations only slightly decreased by 1% to 38% in period 2. Despite the overall wide variation across occupations, the captivity rates for men in this period increased in all occupations, whereas those for women were split with decreases in five ILMs and increases in only four. Overall, these resulted in virtual equality in occupational captivity rates by gender for both the GAT and no-GAT occupations—women's captivity rates for the GAT and no-GAT occupations are 63% and 69% respectively, compared to 61% and 70% for men.

Once again we have confirmed the important captivity-glass ceiling linkage that we observed among the high-stack occupations. Without the internal outside opportunities, women's opportunities are severely limited with glass ceilings remaining overwhelmingly intact. When outside opportunities are taken into consideration, women's opportunities to the top are as great as those for men in period 2.<sup>19</sup> We also identified the importance of internal outside opportunities for those whose careers are limited because of the existing hierarchical ceilings within the occupation. Thus, in the case of no-GAT occupations, outside opportunities are critical for *both women and men* to develop their careers beyond the limited opportunity structures available from within. These findings clearly suggest the importance of creating new bridges linking occupations, in addition to maintaining the existing ones, as a means to effectively and probably more expediently enhance individual career opportunities.

#### Nature of Outside Opportunities

Given the current theorizing of career opportunities as largely embedded within the occupational ILMs of organizations, the findings above clearly

<sup>19</sup> Though speculative, it appears that an internal exit rate threshold of 30% is generally necessary in low-stack ILMs and an internal exit rate threshold of 40% in high-stack ILMs.

point to the significance of "roads less traveled," or "roads not readily perceived" by most organizational and occupational theorists, nor perhaps even by many of the managers within these organizations. Clearly, what we have been analyzing is an organizational labor market with shielding of job opportunities from the outside, a fundamental postulate of ILM theory. On the other hand, most of extant ILM theory would not have predicted the current findings. Thus, we now briefly propose to answer the following two questions: (1) If the predominant paths for breaking the glass ceilings are outside the original ILM, do they involve a relatively narrow band of occupations, a much wider band, or are they random? and (2) What is the institutional nature of these internal outside pathways to the top? That is, to what extent are they on the main paths or "major" career lines of operative ILMs, given that they are not on the organization's formally defined ILMs or job ladders? Since the predominance of breakthroughs occurred in period 2, we examine all 15 successful outside routes to the top in the period, including six in the high-stack occupations (accounting, general attorney, mathematics, budget analysis, personnel staffing, and librarian) and all nine in the low-stack occupations.

To address the first question, table 16 presents a list of destination occupations for each of the high- and low-stack occupations, using two dimensions: (1) direct versus indirect linkages of the career-origin occupation with the outside occupation at which the glass ceiling was broken, and (2) whether the outside occupation was functionally related (F), other administrative (A), or other professional (P). The numbers in brackets to the right of the career-origin occupation denote the total number of outside pathways from the occupation, with the values after the colon representing the number of direct and indirect routes, respectively. In three cases there were more than one indirect route taken (indicated by an asterisk on the linkages); in all three, the number of such indirect paths was two. An example of an origin occupation utilizing both direct and indirect routes is biological technician, having 11 direct and four indirect routes. The 11 direct paths include six routes to functionally related occupations within the occupational group of biological science (occupational series numbers in the 400s), three administrative occupations (334, 1412, and 2152) and two other professional occupations—psychology and chemistry.<sup>40</sup> The four indirect paths involve one in biological science (forestry), two administrative occupations, and one other professional occupation

<sup>40</sup> The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (1979) defines an occupational group as a set of functionally related occupational series and denotes these groups by the numerical digits at the level of 100 or higher, e.g., 201-299 refers to the 200 group (personnel), 301-399, to the 300 group (administrative), and 401-499 to the biological science group. These are referred to in table 16 by F<sub>xx</sub>.

TABLE 16  
WOMEN'S UPWARD CAREER ENDING VECTORS ACROSS THE GLASS CEILING

ORIGIN OCCUPATIONS	CATEGORIES	DESTRUCTIVE OCCUPATIONS	
		DIRECT	INDIRECT
<b>High stack:</b>			
Accounting (P 510 [1:1,0])	F <sub>so</sub>	Auditing (P 511)	
General attorney (P 905 [1:1,0])	A	Program management (340)	
Mathematics (P 1520 [1:0,1])	P	General engineering (801)	
Budget analysis (A 560 [1:1,0])	-	Program analysis (345)	
Personnel staffing (A 212 [1:0,1])	A	Personnel management (201)	
Librarian (P 1410 [1:1,0])	F <sub>so</sub>	Miscellaneous administration and programs (301)	
<b>Low stack:</b>			
Computer operator (T 332 [3 1,2*D])	F <sub>so</sub>	Computer specialist (A 334)*	
Biological technician (T 404 [15.11,4])	F <sub>so</sub>	General biological science (P 401)	
A	A	Microbiology (P 403)	
		Entomology (P 414)	
		Botany (P 430)	
		Genetics (P 440)	
		Wildlife biology (P 486)	
		Computer specialist (334)	
		Technical information service (1412)	
		(28)	
P	P	Air traffic control (2152)	Contract and procurement (1102)
		Psychology (180)	General physical science (P 1301)
		Chemistry (1320)	

Medical technologist (P 644 [12:7,5]) .....	F <sub>so</sub>	Consumer safety (P 696)	General health science (P 601)
	F <sub>r</sub>	General biological science (P 401)	Health system specialist (P 671)
		Microbiology (P 403)	General biological science (P 401)
	A	Chemistry (P 1320)	
		Administrative officer (341)	Intelligence (132)
		Management analysis (343)	Computer specialist (334)*
		Air traffic control (2152)	
		Civil engineering (P 810)	
		Mechanical engineering (P 830)	
		Electronics engineering (P 855)	
		Biomedical engineering (P 858)	
		Aerospace engineering (P 861)	
		Air traffic control (2152)	
		Soil conservation (457)	Industrial hygiene (690)
	A		Computer science (1550)
	P	Industrial specialist (A 1150)	Operations research (P 1515)
		Inventory management (A 2010)	
		Miscellaneous administration and programs (301)	Communications management (391)
Production control (T 1152 [5:3,2]) .....	F <sub>so</sub>		General physical science (P 1301)*
	F <sub>r</sub>		Health physics (P 1306)
	A		Health physics (P 1306)
		General physical science (P 1301)	
		Health physics (P 1306)	
		Geophysics (P 1313)	
		Chemistry (P 1320)	
		Geology (P 1350)	
		Oceanography (P 1360)	
	A		Computer specialist (334)
			Administrative officer (341)*
	P	Industrial hygiene (690)	General arts and information (1001)
		Electronics engineering (855)	Industrial hygiene (690)
			General engineering (801)
			Mechanical engineering (830)

TABLE 16 (*Continued*)

Origin Occupation	Categories	Distribution Occupations	
		Direct	Indirect
Library technician (T 1411 [7:4,3])	F <sub>100</sub>	Librarian (P 1410)	Technical information services (A 1412)
	A	Technical information services (A 1412) Computer specialist (334)	Miscellaneous administration and programs (301)
	P	Education and vocational training (1710)	Logistics management (346)
Nursing assistant (T 621 [3:1,2])	F <sub>100</sub>	Nurse (P 610)	Security administration (80)
	A		Logistics management (346)
Medical technician (T 645 [3:1,2])	F <sub>100</sub>		Health system specialist (P 671)
	A		Visual information (1084)
	P/T	General physical science (P 1301)	

Note.—P = professional; A = administrative; T = technical; F<sub>100</sub> = functionally related to the same occupational series group, grouped by hundreds; P<sub>7</sub> = functionally related even though it is not within the same group of a hundred. The no. in brackets after "origin occupations" denote outside pathways from the occupation. The no. before the colon indicates the total no. of pathways; the first no. after the colon indicates direct routes, and the second no. after the colon indicates indirect routes. The total of outside pathways = 81, the total of direct routes = 47; the total of indirect routes = 34.

\* These occupations had multiple indirect paths. In all cases the no. of such paths was 2.

(general physical science). A direct route indicates that the women moved directly from the origin occupation to the occupation listed (e.g., P 403 microbiology). In this case, the move through the glass ceiling is either on the move into microbiology or more generally within microbiology, after a shift from biological technician at a yet lower grade level. An indirect path indicates that an incumbent starting in a biological technical job moves to one or more other occupations prior to the occupation listed, in which they moved to the top. For example, a functionally related indirect route involved the following moves: 404 → 486 → 460 into the top. Another case that does not involve functionally related occupations has the following moves: 404 → 18 → 28, or from biological technician to safety management, and finally to environmental protection specialist into the top. Overall there are 47 direct and 34 indirect routes, for a total of 81 outside pathways to the top. Thus, about 60% of the routes are direct and the remaining 40% are indirect. The consequences for the type of linkage seems to depend upon whether it is a high-stack or low-stack occupation. In the former case, three of four of the direct routes are to other administrative jobs (outside the functional area), whereas none of the high-level indirect routes were to other administrative jobs. In contrast, for the low-stack jobs, the direct routes to the top are 3 to 1 in favor of functionally related jobs versus administrative jobs; when the route is indirect, however, the odds are even between functionally related and administrative jobs.

Among the high-stack occupations, two of the six or 33% of the occupations of destination are functionally related to the original occupation. These two cases involve both a direct and an indirect route; the direct route includes women in accounting moving to auditing within the 500 group, while the indirect route involves women in personnel staffing moving to general management and then back into personnel management. Additionally, three of the six or 50% of the high-stack outside opportunities are to other administrative jobs, while only one in six or 17% are to other professional jobs. Thus, the destination band seems very narrow, with over 83% of the opportunities either in a functionally related occupational ILM or in an administrative ILM, indicative of opportunities in managing the organizational ILM. The band of outside routes is also quite narrow in terms of the number of total possible outside paths. In this organization, there are a total of 273 professional and administrative occupational ILMs. The total number of outside paths taken per origin occupation is but one, less than 1% of the total possible paths—a very narrow corridor.

The lower part of the table presents the vectors of destination occupations for the low-stack occupations. Overall, the dominant paths are functionally related to the original ones—about one-half of women moved to

such occupations. A general pattern of occupational change is a movement from a technical occupation to either an administrative occupation or a professional occupation in a particular field in which more specific knowledge/skills to perform the tasks are required. That is, the destination occupations are either in the same functional group or functionally related though in a different functional group. A typical example includes women in engineering technician moving to a series of specified fields of engineering including civil engineering, mechanical engineering, and so forth, and women in production control moving to industrial specialist or inventory management.<sup>41</sup> An additional 29% of the gateways are into other administrative ILMs. Thus, once again, over 80% of the outside pathways are either to functionally related or administrative jobs. If we also ask what number of outside routes provide access to the top relative to all possible outside routes, the number for low-stack occupations ranges from three to 18, or from 1% to 7%, again a narrow band.<sup>42</sup> In short, the findings on women's outside upward career vectors from both high- and low-stack occupations indicate that their career movements are far from random. In terms of the functional linkage, they either move to a very limited number of occupations within the occupational group (grouped by numbers in the same hundreds, i.e., 400s) or to new occupations in which their acquired skills and knowledge are useful in performing tasks. The major difference between the high- and low-stack occupations is the nature of career change. While women in the high-stack group take a value-added approach—they change their occupation in a way so that they directly apply their acquired skills/knowledge to a new occupation—those in the low-stack occupations take an approach of ramification—they develop their careers by focusing or narrowing their fields of expertise. Where neither approach is used, women move into administrative ILMs.

To address the second question, regarding the extent to which the pathways to the top for women are on the major paths or main career lines of operative ILMs, we utilize both the inflow and outflow criteria or thresholds suggested by Althauser and Kalleberg (1990) for establishing a job-to-job ILM pathway link for all 15 occupations in table 16. That is, does the flow represent 20% of all the total internal inflows or outflows?

<sup>41</sup> In this case, we have included a production-related job as functionally related even though it is not within the 1100 group. Similarly for medical technologist, we have also included chemistry, microbiology, and general biology, denoted by F<sub>p</sub> rather than F<sub>100</sub>.

<sup>42</sup> Here we have included multiple routes—direct and indirect (single and multiple) per occupation—for the numerator but only a single route per occupation for the denominator and hence the percentage given is conservative. If we simply doubled the denominator by allowing direct and indirect routes, the percentages would halve.

Since we have thus far utilized the organization's formal delineation of ILMs as our ILM system boundaries, we wish to empirically examine how many of the routes to the top which we had identified as ILM boundary crossings using formal rules would hold up under an operative behavioral ILM criterion. We examine both the inflows and outflows. Of the 81 occupation-grade specific linkages that yielded outside access to the top, only one meets the ILM outflow threshold, while eight meet the inflow criteria, thus yielding nine possible main path links to the top. For the remaining 72 occupational links, none were main ILM paths. Hence, overall, 72 out of 81 of the interoccupational pathways to the top, or 89% of these routes were *not* on main ILM paths. Moreover, one specific occupational ILM (biological technician) accounted for six of the nine main paths. Thus, for the remaining 14 occupations there were only three main paths out of the 66 possible ones;<sup>43</sup> hence, generally around 95% of the outside routes to the top for women were *not* on main ILM paths. Even taking into account the most prevalent linking occupational ILM (biological technician), the outside gateways to the top for women generally involve moves between occupational ILMs. More specifically, using this particular criterion for operative ILMs, which is quite rigorous, an ILM theorist focusing only on the main paths would miss almost 90% of the gateways to the top for women. Hence, ILM theory is not only pertinent for structuring intra-ILM movement, which has been a main feature from its onset, but now we must also permit revisions to the theory, whereby important moves take place between occupational ILMs, off the main paths, weighting not only the relative frequency of travel *on* main paths but also the potential payoffs *off* these main paths. For women in this study, it is these roads less heavily traveled that lead through the glass ceiling.

## CONCLUSION

In sum, we find distinctive patterns of opportunity structures for women inside and outside their entry occupations: there are large differentials by gender within the occupational ILM of origin and near equality by gender when both inside *and* outside opportunities are considered. The key is therefore outside career routes within the organization. To date, the significance of these alternative outside pathways has been generally unrecognized (an exception is DiPrete [1989]). Perhaps this is due to attention on distributional data versus attention on the processes underlying careers and labor markets. It may also stem from sampling on limited occupations

<sup>43</sup> Eighty-one total paths less the 15 possible paths from biological technician leaves 66 pathways to the top from the remaining 14 career trajectories.

thereby losing data on the outside routes. These results have major implications for sex segregation theorists. To the extent that occupational captivity is high (opportunities outside one's occupation are nil), we face a much more severe problem as evidenced by the inside data. However, in this analysis the massive amount of movement outside the initial occupational ILM but within the organization suggests the possibility of much less job segregation in terms of captivity. It also indicates a wider framework to address gender inequality—one having an ILM network structure.

If we believe that the existing labor market conditions observed in period 2 will persist, women in many, if not all, occupations will have greater odds for reaching the top by leaving the initial entry occupation. And if so, the recent tremendous efforts by the federal government to establish and widen women's pipelines within occupations may not bring the expected outcome, at least in the short run. To increase women's representation at the top, an equally important area is to focus on setting up new feeder lines and maintaining, extending, and widening the existing number of bridges between occupations.<sup>4</sup> Also important may be to strategically bring in more qualified women in the fields that are in greater demand in other areas (occupations), as observed in the case of accounting, mathematics, and computer operation. Finally and important, we should not overlook the importance of the existing equal employment opportunity and affirmative action programs, particularly those implemented in the late 1970s, primarily because it appears that these programs did bring large increases in outside opportunities for women in period 2, thus substantially reducing the gap in opportunity structure. On the other hand, there are still occupations, particularly those in professional/administrative categories, in which women's inside opportunities are blocked almost as severely as they were about a quarter century ago. In this respect, such a micro-level analysis as the current one, based upon data with detailed occupations, may help responsible agencies to identify and target specific occupations for improving women's opportunities instead of indiscriminately applying remedial measures across occupations of different situations.

Are the results on outside routes historically specific? As to the specific occupation or the magnitude of change, the answer is, possibly. However, as to the continuity, we expect the importance of outside routes to remain a primary force in decreasing gender inequality. It may, in fact, with time

<sup>4</sup> Such bridge building also requires a substantial infrastructure of support—in the form of peer support, mentoring, training, and obtaining experience along the pathway.

also impact women's careers within their original occupation, opening doors there as well in order for managers to retain high performers. The pendulum may also swing back, in some cases, again closing outside routes. This, however, seems less likely than closure from within, when odds are low, as in the case of engineering technicians in this study (see table 14). Once the gate is open and safe passage has been made, it is far more difficult to close it. Moreover, there is not a single gate in many instances but several gates, again lowering the odds of multiple closures. In brief, as with global competition, there are more players and more opportunities. In this case, the player pool of those given consideration has expanded to include women, and the opportunities have not simply grown, but the opportunity set has expanded considerably—to those outside, the full set of which may include several orders of magnitude and, as noted, by multiple gateways. The model, when used across periods, as in this study, enables an analyst to capture the dynamics of opportunities and of the restructuring of organizations and their ILM structures. We think that it is important to visualize and to operationalize such dynamics in theories on organizations, ILMs, and gender inequality. In this respect, the present study offers a new avenue for this pursuit.

A case in which the gateway opening is more likely to be historically specific is where an occupational ILM subdivides into two ILMs. For example, accounting split into accounting and auditing. For the brief subperiod in which this evolution was occurring, women moved from accounting to auditing at multiple grades. Once the evolution stabilized, the gateways to the top closed.

To what extent were the gains by women at the expense of men? The results indicate that it depends on the nature of restructuring of job opportunities. In the high-stack jobs, for instance, overall opportunities to the top for the set of GAT occupations declined slightly ( $-.10$ ), and thus women's gains of almost 2% were at the expense of men (a decline of .5%). Note, however, that given the demographic proportions at this time, larger gains by women were not reflected in equally large declines by men. As these proportions shift, if opportunities are relatively constant, as in this case, such gains by women would mean larger losses by men. A different case, however, is shown in the lower tier (no-GAT) occupations of the high-stack jobs. Here opportunities were increasing by almost .5% overall. Thus, both women and men gain. The .6% gain by women is much higher than that by men (.1%), but both gain in the case of an expanding opportunity set. Overall, therefore for the high-stack jobs, the gains by women (14.9%) did not result in declines by men (0.12%) due to an overall increase (.52%) in opportunities to the top.

In the low-stack jobs, the GAT occupations also experience an overall shift decline ( $-.29\%$ ). Here, the magnitude of gain by women is much

higher than that of the high-stack jobs. It is 9.4%. The decline for men is less than 1% (-.71%), again reflecting the differential in the demographic base. Large gains, in this case by women, were offset by small losses by men. In the lower tier (no-GAT) jobs, however, the overall opportunity set declined much more, by almost 5%, and thus women's gains (2%) were offset by much larger losses by men (9%). Overall in the case of low-stack jobs, a net decline in the opportunity set is played out with a gain by women and a decline by men. The general story is, thus, that the outcomes for women and men depend on the nature of job restructuring and on the overall opportunity set. The relative gains and losses also depend on the relative size of the job-holding populations by gender. In the case of relatively higher losses by men, reactions of at least two kinds might be expected: (1) attempts to thwart new female incumbents and thus restore the imbalance, once again reducing future female selections and possibly increasing exits by women at the top as postulated by Jacobs (1989); or (2) increased exits by men, as hypothesized in Kanter's (1982) theory of opportunity-exit linkages. In fact, in a companion article, we find the support for the latter; losses in promotion rates by men are matched with higher exit rates, whereas increases in promotion rates by women coincide with decreased exit rates. Apparently, the revolving doors by gender have changed in their rate of revolution.

Two implications from the present study seem particularly important for future research: (1) the potential importance of roads not so widely traveled in the form of ILM networks and (2) the nature and form of occupational captivity and glass ceilings linkage. With respect to the former, at least three foci need to be investigated. First, to what degree do organizations permit mobility between these ILMs? Additionally, are such gateways equally open for women and men or for other minorities? Second, how does organizational restructuring and ILM restructuring affect the main and minor paths, as well as their linkage? Such research needs to look not only at organizational-external environment interactions but also at the dynamics of jobs (e.g., Pinfield 1995), of internal "rules" (e.g., Veen 1997) and of mobility routes or pathways. The restructuring of major corporations, and of organizations more generally, may involve the building of new roads and bridges or at a minimum the opening or closing of certain gateways for specific populations of workers, by skill or by demographic attribute. Third, given the recognition as to the magnitude of firm foundings and failures highlighted by organizational ecology, examination of mobility between firms (e.g., Haveman and Cohen 1994) in terms of main, minor, new, and "payoff" paths, seems especially promising. The routes may involve interorganizational occupational ILMs (e.g., Smith 1983) or possibly interorganizational interoccupational moves, with the

latter again revealing new networks of ILMs.<sup>45</sup> Given the amount of restructuring of organizations that has taken place over the past several decades (if not most of this century), movement between firms as well as movement within firms is important to examine.

There are also important implications for future research from the second area noted above, glass ceilings and occupational captivity. First, given the recent debates on reexamination of affirmative action policies, which may result in possible changes in the policies, the 1990s and early years of the next century could be a critically important period for women in the federal workforce as well as for working women more generally. The results found here, in terms of shifts to gender equality, are based on a continuation of such policies. Moreover, given the proposals on "restructuring the government" by the Republican Congress as well as by the Clinton/Gore administration, we may expect substantial occupational redistributions as we move into the 21st century and beyond. In this domain, internal outside career routes would also take on increasing importance. Existing, as well as new, alternative outside routes, whether outside the initial occupations but within the organization, or outside the focal organization (e.g., Haveman and Cohen 1994), may become more traveled and more central.<sup>46</sup> The nature of restructuring and its effect on opportunities generally, and for women in particular, are extremely important topics for analysis—both theoretically and for policy. Moreover, the CPS model used in this analysis offers one strategy for viewing such effects—far earlier than most prior types of analyses, which require that we wait until larger segments of the careers unfold in real time. In cases such as AT&T in the 1970s, in which new bridges were created for college-educated women in clerical jobs to move into professional or managerial jobs, the present model could be used by the organization and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to assess alternative futures and evaluate "progress" toward stated "goals" or targets. The 1996–97 example of Texaco regarding its equal employment opportunity policies and race could also be evaluated from the 1996 baseline, and in terms of the implications of operative personnel policy changes implemented in 1997 and thereafter.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> In the former case, the moves would be from one organization  $x$ , occupational ILM  $A$  to organization  $y$ , occupational ILM  $A$ . In the latter case, the moves would be from one organization  $x$ , occupational ILM  $A$  to organization  $y$ , occupational ILM  $B$ .

<sup>46</sup> In which case, some of these new routes might restructure ILMs, thus providing additional insight into the dynamics and evolution of ILMs, as well as into the dynamics of interorganizational moves.

<sup>47</sup> In 1994, a class action suit on behalf of 1,500 current and former black employees was brought against Texaco for racial discrimination in promotions and pay in-

Second, more general organizational restructuring may be evaluated in terms of implications for a firm's workers. For instance, one might examine the degree of change across an entire organization versus that in functional areas 1, 2, or 3, or in separate departments. What effect, if any, did the restructuring of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services have on the career chances of women? Or is it merely a function of the occupational distributions? Another example is that of organizations creating a slimmer but parallel upper hierarchy of jobs in professional research for their top research and development personnel. Instead of either hitting a hierarchical ceiling on the research track or continued promotion by moving into management, the person's career could now advance in either management or continued research. This type of restructuring has been fairly common for engineers, software personnel, and research and development scientists in general. In this instance, the restructuring would involve occupational captivity and hierarchical ceilings and a new route permitting access to the top within the occupation (i.e., taking the lid off). The research could also evaluate the extent to which there was equal access through the new gateway or whether such branching affected the odds of women moving into management, the wider road.

Third, other types of job linkages might also be examined. For example, if job bidding is organizationwide and/or seniority based given sufficient skills or experience, then to what extent is occupational captivity a factor? How do policies regarding job rotation affect career chances? Where are the hierarchical venturis (e.g., Stewman and Konda 1983), hierarchical ceilings, or glass ceilings? International comparative research, especially involving Japan, would be productive here.

Fourth, linkage of the present model to the more commonly used career approaches could yield complementary insights. For instance, current career research generally is limited to truncated career segments. Where key segmented chances have been identified by career researchers, the present model could be used to study the implications of linking the new segments to the implied end points in terms of tier or level. Alternatively, use of the present model to identify critical bridges could then be extended by career segment analysis via deeper probes to examine the gateway in terms of (1) who moves, probing the heterogeneity, (2) rates of movement, to pinpoint duration effects, and (3) qualitative probes into the nature of the

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creases. In 1997, after substantial pressure, arising from public news coverage of a newly released tape of a 1994 meeting of Texaco executives involving alleged racial remarks, the firm settled for \$176 million. As part of the settlement, Texaco reached a five-year agreement with the EEOC for it to intervene and monitor the company's promotion of minorities and contracted a plan to increase hiring and career development of minorities (See *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 1996a, 1996b.)

job and the staffing decisions by the employer and the employee selected (e.g., Pinfield 1995).

Finally, we note that in the form used here the model has implications for studying gender inequality in other organizations by simultaneously incorporating multiple mechanisms: gender distribution (skew), gender segregation (composition), occupational captivity, hierarchical ceilings, glass ceilings, and ILM structure/network linkages in terms of main paths and roads less traveled. Methodologically, the present study demonstrates how a researcher can extract the equilibrium career implications of organizational structure and personnel flows that are measured over much shorter periods of time.

TABLE A1

## GLASS CERAMIC BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR HIGH-STACK OCCUPATIONS OUTSIDE

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2	
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2	Difference*		Women	Men
							Period 1	Period 2		
GAT										
861	.00	.00	1.80	3.50	1.78	3.40	-1.80	-3.50	.00	1.70
510	.00	10.30	.00	2.00	.00	3.33	.00	8.30	10.30	2.00
905	8.50	1.50	4.90	1.70	5.19	1.65	3.60	-.20	-7.00	-3.20
180	.00	.00	.80	.20	.70	.16	-.80	-.20	.00	-.60
1320	.00	.00	1.00	1.50	.85	1.19	-1.00	-1.50	.00	.50
1520	.00	12.30	..	7.80	..	8.84	..	4.50	12.30	7.80
560	.00	3.30	4.60	4.90	2.90	4.05	-4.60	-1.60	3.30	3.0
No GAT:										
403	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
185	.00	.00	.00	.60	.00	.32	.00	-.32	.00	.00
212	.00	1.40	.00	.00	.00	.92	.00	1.40	1.40	.00
1082	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.92
1410	.00	2.20	.00	.00	.00	1.67	.00	2.20	2.20	.00
630	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.67
Average										
Overall	65	2.38	1.01	1.71	.88	1.96	-.35	.68	1.73	.70
GAT	1.42	3.91	2.18	3.09	1.90	3.23	-.66	.83	2.50†	1.09
No GAT	.00	.60	.00	.10	.00	.49	.00	.50	.60†	1.33†

\* Women - men  
† These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2

TABLE A2  
GLASS CEILING BY END DISTRIBUTION FOR LOW-STACK OCCUPATIONS' OUTSIDE

Occupation	Women		Men		Total		Gender Difference*		Change Between Periods 1 and 2		
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 1		Period 2		Period 1	Period 2	Women	Men	Total
			Period 1	Period 2	Period 1	Period 2					
GAT:											
802 .....	11.60	11.50	13.70	7.30	13.64	7.64	-2.10	4.20	-10	-6.40	-6.00
1152 .....	..	00	8.00	16.80	10.00	15.79	9.60	-16.80	-2.00	8.00	-6.19
1311 .....	..	00	18.00	17.90	16.90	14.68	17.13	-17.90	1.10	18.00	-1.00
332 .....	..	..	19.20	..	22.00	..	20.77	..	-2.80	7.70	-10.07
644 .....	..	..	4.30	5.20	3.90	8.10	4.16	6.19	.40	-2.90	90
No GAT:											
332 .....	..	11.50	40.80	..	30.84	..	-29.30	..	..	..	..
404 .....	..	3.90	5.40	13.00	4.50	10.63	4.82	-9.10	.90	1.50	-8.50
621 .....	..	..	..	.60	3.40	1.30	1.84	.87	-3.40	-.70	60
645 .....	..	..	..	00	4.50	6.20	4.50	3.16	4.50	-6.20	00
1411 .....	..	..	..	..	00	8.30	3.00	00	7.66	00	5.30
Average:											
Overall .....	3.48	8.97	12.86	8.62	10.53	8.80	-9.38	.34	5.49	-4.23	-1.73
GAT .....	3.98	12.38	13.08	12.86	12.07	12.26	-9.10	-.48	8.41†	-.22†	20†
No GAT .....	3.08	4.70	12.68	3.33	9.29	4.46	-9.60	1.38	1.38	-9.36†	-4.83†

\* Women - men

† These values are the difference of the averages for periods 1 and 2.

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# Political Culture Wars 1960s Style: Equal Employment Opportunity—Affirmative Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan<sup>1</sup>

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This article empirically examines contextually conditioned construction of symbolic resources during political debate over the 1969 revised Philadelphia Plan—a crucial moment in the shaping of federal equal employment law. Tying together political sociology's concept of policy feedback with legal and cultural sociology's concept of culture as a resource, the article explains how actors who were hampered by the explicit language used to embed equal opportunity values into law turned apparent constraint into an opportunity to transform law. The article simultaneously illuminates an underdeveloped aspect of equal employment law's unfolding and builds more general theory to help explain how law's language, general cultural values expressed in law, and alternative methods used to interpret law mediate the effects of past law on future law. Defining concepts of value centrality and explicitness of legal language, the article uses its case study to suggest hypotheses about how variation in centrality of cultural values and explicitness of language used to incorporate these values into law affect variation in mobilization of different types of cultural strategies by actors struggling over law interpretation and enforcement.

Today, amid what a *Newsweek* columnist referred to as “growing national torment over affirmative action” (Klein 1995, p. 23), affirmative action policies are on the defensive. On June 12, 1995, about two weeks after

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California governor Pete Wilson issued an executive order suspending affirmative action for California state employees, the Supreme Court ruled that federal affirmative action programs aimed at increasing the number of minority contractors must receive searching and severe constitutional scrutiny (*Adarand Constructors v. Pena* [63 Law Week 4523 (1995)]; Zachary 1995). This followed a similar 1989 Court ruling on state-level minority set aside programs (*Richmond [City of] v. J. A. Croson* [488 US 469 (1989)]). In the wake of these actions, as both the Clinton White House and Justice Department were reviewing all 160 provisions in federal statutes, executive orders, or regulations that provided any kind of affirmative action for minorities and women, conservative groups and Republican lawmakers were crafting federal legislation to curtail or eliminate affirmative action (Greenhouse 1995; Lewin 1995; Holmes 1995; Frisby 1995). Congressional action on the legislation was delayed until after the 1996 presidential election, but sponsors intended to resurrect a federal anti-affirmative action bill in 1997 (Seib 1996). In 1996, presidential candidate Robert Dole supported Proposition 209, California's voter referendum proposing a ban on all state race and gender preferences, and an appeals court barred the University of Texas Law School from using racial preferences to achieve student body diversity (ACLU 1996a; Jaschik and Lederman 1996).

Recent public opinion polls show that a majority of the electorate has misgivings about affirmative action's fairness (Lipset 1992; Ayres 1995), but support for race-targeted programs remains higher among blacks than among whites (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Lipset 1992; Rosenstone, Miller, and Kinder 1994). Proposition 209 passed by 54%–46% but is in legal limbo. At the end of April 1997, a federal district court's preliminary injunction barring Proposition 209's enforcement until a full trial could be held on its constitutionality is still in effect, pending the resolution of civil rights groups' appeal of the decision made by a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit Court, which, without benefit of such a trial, said that Proposition 209 is constitutional (Seib 1996; ACLU 1997). Meanwhile, President Clinton (quoted in Seib 1996) endorsed affirmative action but pledged to "mend" programs he carefully avoided describing as preferential treatment based on group membership. Instead, Clinton described affirmative action as a "systematic approach to open the doors of education, employment, and business development opportunities to qualified individuals who happen to be members of groups that have experienced long-standing and persistent discrimination" (Clinton 1995, p. 6).

In short, like abortion, immigration, multiculturalism, and sexual orient-

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tation, affirmative action has become a litmus test for where people stand in today's "culture wars" (Hunter 1991). Conservative groups and politicians clamor for ending what they see as race- and gender-based preferences. Liberal groups respond by demonstrating and litigating in support of affirmative action, insisting that erasing legacies of discrimination against African-Americans and other minorities requires some form of affirmative action policy (Lewin 1995; Frisby 1995; Ayres 1995; ACLU 1996b).

How did we get to the point where, in the words of the popular press (Thomas, Cohn, and Smith 1995, p. 20), a "policy that was supposed to get 'beyond racism' risks creating more racists"? How did a policy rooted in civil rights legislation that was supposed to promote equality of opportunity and advance us toward a color-blind society come to be associated by many with precisely the opposite result? (See, e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Graham 1990.) A major part of the answer lies in the rhetoric and enforcement of federal civil rights policies in the 1960s.

This article examines political debate over the 1969 Philadelphia Plan, described by Jill Quadagno (1992, p. 629) as "the first effective use of affirmative action to implement civil rights legislation directing employers to guarantee equal employment opportunity." As the first highly visible federal government affirmative action initiative in the wake of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Philadelphia Plan crystallized arguments of both affirmative action's early opponents and its early supporters. Just as past policies shaped how both sides crafted their arguments about the Philadelphia Plan, these arguments and their resolution *fed forward* to help shape later government employment policy. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) examine how the mass media provided various changing meanings for affirmative action from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, and Skrentny (1996) shows that discourses of pragmatism, crisis management, and tradition contributed to equal employment law's enforcement. But sociologists have not specified precisely how legally expressed cultural values and language in codified law of a given policy arena help shape that arena's subsequent conflicts and law.

Historical sociologists use the term *path dependency* to capture contingent, yet cumulative and constraining, effects of past actions and events on future possibilities (Aminzade 1992; Griffin 1993). Some policy events are especially important to understanding how a policy unfolds because these events are ones on which later politics are especially path dependent. Historians and legal scholars agree that, in conjunction with the development and Supreme Court ratification of the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination, the Philadelphia Plan debate and its resolution set a course for employment policy and politics for years to come (Graham 1990; Blumrosen 1972, 1984; Belz 1991; Jones 1985). Today's

equal employment law and politics grow out of and react to that course (see, e.g., Graham 1990; Quadagno 1992, 1994; Skrentny 1996).

In this article, we briefly analyze policies and events leading up to the 1969 revised Philadelphia Plan. Then we do a content analysis of debate over the plan as this debate was expressed in public hearings. Our historical and content analyses together serve two purposes. First, they illuminate one key aspect of a crucial moment in the shaping of contemporary equal employment law. They show how social and political actors, who were apparently constrained by explicit language that codified into law a "core" American value—"equality of opportunity" (Yankelovich 1994, p. 23)—turned this apparent constraint into an opportunity to transform law. Indeed, these actors contributed to transforming equal employment law by recasting the major value it promoted—equal employment opportunity. Since law is a key resource constructing social relationships (McIntyre 1994; Stryker 1994), and since interpretation and reinterpretation of legal values and language are important means of producing legal order and change (see, e.g., Lempert and Sanders 1986; Altschuler and Sgroi 1996), political and legal rhetoric helping to shape law's unfolding deserves social science inquiry (Fineman 1991; Brigham 1987; Harrington and Merry 1988; Skrentny 1996).

Second, our analyses contribute to more general sociological theory by tying together two previously separate concepts, one in political sociology, the other in the sociologies of law and culture. These are the concept of policy feedbacks (e.g., Weir and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1992) and the concept of culture, including political and legal culture, as a resource (e.g., Swidler 1986; Schudson 1989; Williams 1995). Tying these constructs together, we use them both to help illuminate our historical case and to begin building a more general explanation of how the cultural aspects of policy feedback work. We suggest that the language and values incorporated in past policies provide symbolic resources that shape political and legal conflict over these policies' implementation and future. Actors' construction of cultural strategies that exploit and shape these symbolic resources is a key part of the causal mechanisms through which policy feedbacks operate.

Analyzing cultural symbols and strategies adopted within a particular socioeconomic and political context is *not* intended to supplant political and socioeconomic analyses of conditions under which developed cultural symbols succeed or fail in transforming state policy. Advancing from explaining how and why particular actors recast equal employment symbols as they did to a complete explanation of how and why equal employment policies were transformed as they were requires coupling our contextualized cultural analyses with thorough appreciation of the political and so-

cioeconomic conjuncture in which successful transformation took place. The latter task is beyond this article's scope. Nonetheless, our cultural analyses illuminate a seriously underdeveloped aspect of policy feedback processes—one which plays a pivotal, if partial, role in explaining how and why affirmative action policies developed historically as they did, and one which has general theoretical implications far beyond equal employment policy.

In the rest of this article, we first provide theoretical background suggesting how construction of cultural resources provides *one* general mechanism through which policy feedbacks occur. Second, we establish raw materials for, and constraints on, Philadelphia Plan supporters' and opponents' cultural resource construction. Third, we provide methods and results of our content analysis of arguments for and against the Philadelphia Plan. We identify diverse symbolic packages that opponents and supporters used to frame the plan, its meaning, and the desirability of its enforcement. We also identify cultural strategies actors used to try to stabilize or transform law by drawing on equal opportunity values and language that law already incorporated. We show which symbolic package courts adopted, setting the course for the next two decades of equal employment law. Fourth, we discuss implications of the contextually conditioned package and strategy construction in our specific case for more general ways in which cultural resources mediate effects of past law on future law. We propose empirically grounded hypotheses to explain and predict how variation in the centrality of cultural values and the explicitness of language used to incorporate these values into prior codified law affect variation in the mobilization of different types of cultural strategies by actors struggling over law interpretation and enforcement. In turn, actors' interpretive strategies, in conjunction with the language and centrality of legally expressed values, help shape implementation and transformation of law over time.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

### Policy Feedbacks

One of many important sensitizing concepts emphasized by political sociology's political-institutionalist school is the policy legacy or feedback (e.g., Weir and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). This is the idea that "policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes" (Skocpol 1992, p. 58). Skocpol (1992) suggests restructuring occurs because, first, enacted policies transform state administrative capacities and, second, enacted policies reconstruct capacities, goals, and social identities of actors outside the state. For both reasons, past policies shape current

policy agendas and conflicts, such that those studying policy-making must “make social policies the starting points as well as the end points of analysis” (Skocpol 1992, p. 58).

Policy feedbacks focus on the mutual conditioning of politics and policy and how this unfolds through time. Focus on feedbacks now is widespread in both quantitative and qualitative research across diverse theoretical perspectives and types of policy-making (see, e.g., Quadagno 1992, 1994; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Moe 1987). But since past policies structure current policies and current policies structure future policies, policies are actually *feeding forward* rather than backward in time. We use the latter, more apt, phrase in the rest of this article.

No matter what phrase is used to capture the endogenous aspect of policy-making, Skocpol’s appeal to consider policies as starting points is, itself, only a start.<sup>2</sup> To advance theoretically beyond the insight that policies structure subsequent political identities, capacities, interests, and action, we turn to the concept of culture as a resource.

### Culture as a Resource

Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 89) defined culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols . . . by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” Culture includes ideas, values, and beliefs, as well as principles, norms, rules, or schema for behavior. Culture also includes the symbols—material objects as well as spoken and written language—that represent, evoke, and activate social rules, beliefs, and values (Peterson 1979; Sewell 1992; Griswold 1994). There are as many perspectives on culture as there are definitions or aspects of culture (e.g., Wuthnow and Witten 1988). But one useful approach for understanding how culture shapes politics is to treat it as a resource for action (Swidler 1986; Schudson 1989; Williams 1995).

<sup>2</sup> Scholars have just begun exploring what specific aspects of policies may feed forward. For example, quantitative studies cannot yet show if or how the content of past welfare policies affects the content of current or future welfare policies (see Huber et al. 1993, p. 719). Though these studies have done better specifying how pre-20th-century institutional forms of bureaucratic paternalism might feed forward to affect welfare policies, the findings on whether these earlier state forms have contemporary effects have been mixed (Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993). Qualitative studies show how, for particular policies, specific state institutional forms and specific policy contents have fed forward through mobilization of specific political identities, interests, and actions (e.g., Heclo 1974; Weir and Skocpol 1985; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Moe 1987; Stryker 1996a; Esping-Andersen 1985; Quadagno 1992, 1994; Cates 1983). What is missing from the panoply of qualitative studies is a unifying general theme beyond the idea that policy feeds forward by shaping political and administrative capacities and action.

Treating culture as a resource means that political and legal culture provides “a tool kit of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986, p. 273). Out of “the limited but nonetheless varied cultural menus a given society provides” (Schudson 1989, p. 155), people select particular ideas, symbols, and meanings that serve their purposes. Scholars of politics long have understood that at least one aspect of culture—political language—provides actors with an important resource because we “use political words . . . as tools. . . . Out of them we fashion arguments, we persuade, [and we] maneuver for space and advantage” (Rodgers 1987, p. 10; see also, e.g., Edelman 1977; Scheingold 1974; Zollars and Skocpol 1994).

Implicitly or explicitly, many studies of social problems and social movements adopt the perspective of culture as a resource to explore how groups and organizations draw from contextually available “cultural menus” (e.g., Schudson 1989, p. 155) or “cultural repertoires” (e.g., Williams 1995, p. 126) to strategically construct political rhetoric and action in contested situations (Williams 1995; Snow et al. 1986; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Harrington and Merry 1988; Stryker 1994). Actors do not create political arguments out of whole cloth but rather use existing political symbols to construct arguments that suit their purposes (Williams 1995; Fineman 1991; Zollars and Skocpol 1994). In Tarrow’s (1992, p. 198) words, political actors are “both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings.”

Swidler (1986, p. 273) proposed to replace the idea that general values direct action with the view that people use symbols to construct “strategies of action.” But these need not be opposing approaches. According to Gamson and Modigliani (1987), political issues are *symbolically packaged* as sets of ideas, words, and arguments that cluster internally but are externally distinct. “At the core of a [symbolic] package is its frame . . . a central organizing idea . . . providing meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p. 143). Symbolic packages and their frames help define social problems, mobilize social movements and appropriate responses, and legitimate problems, movements, and public responses (e.g., Gusfield 1981; Edelman 1977; Williams 1995; Harrington and Merry 1988; Zald 1996). Specific contents of diverse symbolic packages and the “catchphrases” or “signature elements” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p. 143) that promote one symbolic package and its frame over another are hotly contested. Because symbolic packaging of issues has policy consequences (Edelman 1977; Harrington and Merry 1988; Quadagno 1992, 1994; Zollars and Skocpol 1994), an important “part of every public political struggle is a battle over whose symbolic ‘framing’ of an issue is authoritative” (Williams 1995, p. 127).

Yet entire sets of diverse contested symbolic packages can be built around abstract general values that are widely shared (see, e.g., Williams 1995; Harrington and Merry 1988; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Skrentny 1996). Although diverse meanings are attributed at various times and by various persons to all candidates for such general values (e.g., Rodgers 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Wildavsky 1993), there are values eliciting such widespread agreement at the abstract general level that "virtually all Americans share them" (Yankelovich 1994, p. 24). It stands to reason that actors would draw on these values to create more specific rhetorical packages to wage political battle. "Cultural resonance" of specific packages and their frames with shared general values is itself an important resource (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p. 169).

Yankelovich (1994, p. 23) lists equality of opportunity as a core (i.e., enduring and widespread) American value (Yankelovich's list also includes fairness, democracy, equality before the law, achievement, patriotism, and freedom). McClosky and Zaller (1984, p. 94) say that, notwithstanding the diverse, more specific meanings with which the value has historically been associated, "American opinion, has, from the early days of the Republic, regarded equality of opportunity as a fundamental principle of the civic culture." Thus, we should expect to see equality of opportunity invoked often in American political discourse and policy.

In short, general cultural values, including equal opportunity, probably do not directly cause much political action (Swidler 1986; Zollars and Skocpol 1994). But people and organizations in the United States do package and market their political goals with words and rhetoric resonating with core American values, including equal opportunity (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Zollars and Skocpol 1994; Quadagno 1992). They do so in part because such values are culturally available but also because relying on such values is strategic given widespread and enduring public agreement on these values in their most abstract and general form (see, e.g., Harrington and Merry 1998; Fineman 1991; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Williams 1995). In chicken-and-egg fashion, if widespread enduring values are seen as "American tradition," adherence to them becomes part of what it means to be American. This increases these values' staying power and strategic worth because, whether or not a given actor internalizes the values, the actor will take for granted that others support them (see, e.g., Stryker 1994; Skrentny 1996).<sup>3</sup> However, as both general values

<sup>3</sup> There is another reason general values help frame political issues. Symbolic packages are constructed in public political debate and conflict between policymakers and diverse social movements (Quadagno 1992, Zollars and Skocpol 1994). Relatedly, symbolic packages acquire resource power in part by accommodating value ambiguities and tensions, such as those arising between polity insiders and outsiders (e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Harrington and Merry 1988; Williams 1995). Elites usually have

and more diverse specific symbols built around them are incorporated into policy-making, they are transformed through political interaction. This can lead to policies and later political conflicts that no actor or set of actors in or outside government wanted or intended (see Williams 1995; Fineman 1991).

Cultural resources likewise have become prominent themes in the sociology of law (see, e.g., Brigham et al. 1988; Fineman 1991; Merry 1995; McIntyre 1994, pp. 134–35). Here, scholars note that the ideas, values, discourse, rhetoric, and language that legal rules and institutions embody, “define and confine” (Fineman 1991, p. 2) the terrain on which actors who want to maintain or reform law must stand. Like political issues, legal issues are symbolically packaged, complete with central organizing ideas, that is, frames, and the catchphrases that function as signature elements to evoke these frames (see, e.g., Harrington and Merry 1988; Fineman 1991). Thus, on the one hand, law, like politics and policy-making, expresses abstract general values that endure and are widely shared. On the other hand, law’s abstract general values, and the degree to which two or more such values are in harmony or conflict, are debated and reinterpreted over time just as general political values are. As politics takes place through actors fashioning diverse symbolic packages, legal discourse takes place through actors crafting varied symbolic packages that resonate with more general legal values and thus help legitimate and advance actors’ interests (Stryker 1994; Harrington and Merry 1988; Williams 1995; Fineman 1991; Skrentny 1996). In this dynamic, language used to express legal rules is constitutive of the current legal world but also is a resource to reproduce or alter that world, albeit in ways that may be unintended (see, e.g., Harrington and Merry 1988; Forbath 1991; Voss 1993; Fineman 1991; Edelman 1992; McIntyre 1994; Merry 1995; Williams 1995).

In sum, at any historical moment, extant legal language and rules provide both the basis for promoting and for criticizing current law (Stryker 1994). Legal language may be even more “contested terrain” (Rodgers 1987, p. 11) than is the rest of policy-making because reasoning about and from words—whether of the U.S. Constitution, of federal or state statutes, of prior court opinions, or of executive branch orders—is the essence of American legal logic (e.g., Carter 1994; Altschuler and Sgroi 1996; Eisenberg 1988; Skrentny 1996). Standard procedures for enforcing statutes in the American system emphasize statutory language and legislative de-

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greater power to define cultural values and specific language through which institutions incorporate them (Fineman 1991); outsiders assume institutionalized values will be legitimating symbols (Williams 1995). Elites and social movements alike thus are likely to rely both on general American values and more specific words shaping these values toward the actors’ specific political goals.

bate over it as key indicators of what the law is or means (e.g., Altschuler and Sgroi 1996). As well, like politics, law is both “symbol and substance” (Edelman and Petterson 1994, p. 1). Actors use legal words and rules currently operationalizing more enduring, abstract, and general legal values as resources to achieve concrete and specific legal goals.

#### Feeding Forward through Activation of Cultural Resources Embedded in Past Policy

Hechter (1993) suggests bringing values into social science research by examining how they are embodied and transformed in social institutions, including law (see also Wildavsky 1993). Indeed, once we appreciate that law incorporates core American values through the legal language used to express them, and once we appreciate that values and language provide cultural resources for political and legal action, we can easily see that action relying on such resources is a central mechanism through which policies feed forward in time. Recent work in political and legal sociology, including that by Quadagno (1992), Fineman (1991), Zollars and Skocpol (1994), Harrington and Merry (1988), and Skrentny (1996), comes close to making this argument without ever stating it explicitly. Since Fineman (1991, pp. 9–10) views legal outcomes as in part the result of “fundamental concepts, values, and assumptions embedded in legal thought” and Skrentny (1996) emphasizes reliance on traditional values to help establish law’s legitimacy, they come closest to making our point that law incorporates general cultural values both through statutory and court language and through the language of political and legal debates over law enactment and enforcement.<sup>4</sup> Once this occurs, both general legal values and the specific language in which they are expressed become resources for later political and legal action. By studying construction and use of cultural resources embedded in law, we gain insight into how policies are reproduced or altered.

In short, values and language of prior law combine symbolic politics with state coercive power to create opportunities and constraints on later interpretation and mobilization of law by both state and societal actors. The next two sections develop our case study of equal opportunity sym-

<sup>4</sup> Quadagno (1992) shows how specific meanings of economic justice evolved through conflict among 1960s social groups and the state. Zollars and Skocpol (1994) show how enduring American values of individualism and self-reliance provided early Social Security administrators with alternative, but not unlimited, symbolic packages to help them market the program (see also Cates 1983). Harrington and Merry (1988, p. 710) show how three different “ideological projects” within the broader community mediation movement promoted diverse reforms by adapting community and consensual justice symbols.

bols as resources for political conflict over the Philadelphia Plan. We show that past law feeds forward to shape current and future law in part because actors with interests at stake consciously use legally expressed values and language in conjunction with alternative institutionalized methods of interpreting law to craft arguments about what law means, how it should be enforced, and whether and how it should be changed.

Gamson and Modigliani (1987) document media careers of various symbolic packagings of affirmative action, and Burstein, Bricher, and Einwohner (1995) adapt their content-analytic methods to show change over time in the frequency of diverse symbolic packages in post-1945 proposed bills regulating the intersection of work, family, and gender. We build on these authors' concepts but with a different goal and different use of content analysis. We take *one* event judged key to equal employment law's unfolding, and we use it to explain how and why, in a context with particular sets of cultural constraints and opportunities, affirmative action supporters and opponents crafted packages as they did. In so doing, we define *cultural strategies*. These are means that (1) are used to construct symbolic packages or to portray actors' past, current, or future actions or desirable actions with respect to those packages; and (2) involve manipulating words, ideas, and values, according to, or building on, preexisting rhetorical techniques. This concept goes beyond Gamson and Modigliani's (1987) arsenal and helps us build hypotheses about cultural conditions favoring or inhibiting the use of particular techniques. Similarly, where Skrentny (1996) provides a broad brush description of changed meanings in equal employment policy, our case study of the Philadelphia Plan hearings is narrower historically. But it reaches farther theoretically because it connects cultural analysis to policy feedbacks, defines the concepts of value centrality and explicitness of legal language, and builds more general testable hypotheses about cultural mechanisms through which the process of feeding a policy forward works.

## CONSTRUCTING CULTURAL RESOURCES

### Raw Materials, Constraints, and Opportunities from Prior Law and Politics

To show the raw materials from which plan opponents and supporters constructed cultural resources and to help explain how and why they constructed resources as they did at the plan hearings, we must first briefly analyze prior equal employment law and politics. To do this, we draw from secondary and primary documents, using several strategies to minimize the effects of possible biases in secondary works. First, we relied most on the most careful historical scholarship and counterbalanced sources written by known political or legal conservatives with those writ-

ten by known political or legal liberals.<sup>5</sup> In conjunction with using primary data, our cautious approach to secondary works and the many cross-checks we performed on their evidence and interpretations mean we can be fairly confident about the validity of our conclusions. For inevitable aspects of historical accounting when exactly what happened or how it should be interpreted is not clear, we can at least be confident of the range of viable alternate readings of law and history. Second, since some who commented retrospectively on the events we discuss also participated in these events, we take advantage of their insiders' knowledge while also cross-checking and validating their accounts.<sup>6</sup> Third, we use primary data not just to fill gaps left by secondary accounts but also to check these and enhance our empirical accuracy. Whenever we could, we used secondary accounts to lead us to primary data, which then helped us reach our interpretive-analytic conclusions.

Since executive orders cannot require behavior that violates federal legislation (e.g., Graham 1990), executive branch capacity to enforce the Philadelphia Plan, created in 1967–69 by the Labor Department under, first, Lyndon Johnson and then Richard Nixon, hinged on the plan's legal consistency with both Executive Order 11246 enacted by President Johnson in 1965 and the controlling federal statute—Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Thus, any political debate over the plan would likely involve discussion of plan legality vis-à-vis Title VII. This in turn would require legal interpretation of the meanings of Title VII, of E.O. 11246, and of the Philadelphia Plan itself. The standard legal method for such interpretation is constructing what is referred to as "legislative intent" (BNA 1964, p. 323). That is, what did Congress (or other government body) *intend* the statute (order or plan) to do? This involves both interpreting what general values are written into or guide the law as a whole and interpreting what its various more specific provisions prohibit, command, or allow (see, e.g., Altschuler and Sgroi 1996). One major taken-for-granted technique for constructing intent of a statute like Title VII is reasoning narrowly from the exact language of the statute and its legislative history. This often is referred to as strict or literal construction (e.g., Altschuler and Sgroi 1996). Legislative history includes all public interpretations and action made or taken on a statute by collective or individual executive branch or congressional actors prior to the statute's passage. (Interpreting

<sup>5</sup> Graham (1990) is the single best source on Johnson's and Nixon's civil rights policies. It is balanced and meticulous, describing and citing a vast range of primary historical material.

<sup>6</sup> From 1965 to 1967, Alfred Blumrosen was chief of conciliations for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As a Labor Department associate solicitor, James Jones helped craft the Philadelphia Plan.

executive orders rests primarily on their *text*; there may be relevant public speeches or memorandums, but there is no complete legislative history.)

Consistent with our perspective on legal culture as a resource, there has been much controversy over the intent of Title VII (cf., e.g., Blumrosen 1972, 1993, with Epstein 1992 and Belz 1991). Title VII is explicitly called the “*equal* employment opportunity” title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (BNA 1964, p. 116; emphases added). But while right, left, and center scholars and activists all acknowledged that, on an abstract general level, Title VII embodied equal opportunity values (see Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996), they disagreed about what the values *meant* in more concrete specific terms. This was especially so since Title VII failed to define its central term—discrimination (e.g., Edelman 1992)—and E.O. 11246 did not define affirmative action (e.g., Jones 1985; Price 1965; Graham 1990). One major dispute involved whether equal employment opportunity would be operationalized procedurally or could accommodate action to produce equality of results. Related to this were controversies over whether consistency with Title VII and E.O. 11246 required color-blind employment decisions, or could or had to accommodate action that was color conscious; and whether discrimination included only acts motivated by evil intent (racial animus), which treated minority individuals differently from majority individuals because of their race or some other legally protected characteristic, or included acts that, while apparently race or gender neutral, had disproportionately negative *effects* on minorities as a *group*.<sup>7</sup> Much prior scholarship—including an earlier version of this article—provided detailed analyses of these controversies and diverse conclusions about what the 1964 Congress intended (e.g., Pedriana and Stryker 1996; Skrentny 1996; Graham 1990; Blumrosen 1972, 1993; Belz 1991; Epstein 1992; Sovern 1966; BNA 1964; Berg 1964; Price 1965; Jones 1985; Edelman 1992). Here, we need only show that, given the anticipated accepted legal technique of narrowly constructing legislative intent from exact language in legal codes and legislative history, Title VII and E.O. 11246 together placed major constraints on actors who wanted to promote race-conscious, group, and effects-oriented interpretations. They provided easy rhetorical opportunities for those who wanted to promote color-blind, individual, and intent-oriented interpretations. Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence to show this.

<sup>7</sup> Although Title VII prohibited employers, unions, and employment agencies from discriminating on the basis of religion, *sex*, and national origin, as well as race, early enforcement focused almost exclusively on race. See Graham (1990) for ironies surrounding the amendment that added *sex* discrimination. For example, some Title VII opponents supported adding *sex* discrimination because they thought it might derail the bill.

TABLE 1  
KEY LANGUAGE OF TITLE VII AND OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246

	Key Language
Title VII	
Section 703(a) .. . . .	[It is an unlawful practice to] (1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any <i>individual</i> , or to otherwise discriminate against any <i>individual</i> with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any <i>individual</i> of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Emphasis added)
Section 706(g) .. . . .	If the court finds that the respondent has <i>intentionally</i> engaged in or is <i>intentionally</i> engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such <i>affirmative action</i> as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (Emphasis added; the word "intentionally" was added by the Senate compromise bill; the phrase about affirmative action/reinstatement was included in the original bill and copied from remedies for employer unfair labor practices specified by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.)
Section 703(k) .. . . .	It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms of employment . . pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test . . is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race (Emphasis added, the final phrase was added by the Senate compromise bill)
Section 703(j) .. . . .	Nothing contained in this Title shall be interpreted to require any employer . . to grant <i>preferential treatment</i> to any individual or to any group because of the race . . of such individual or group <i>on account of an imbalance</i> which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race . . employed by any employer . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race . . in any community. (Emphasis added; provision added by the Senate compromise bill.)

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

	Key Language
Executive Order 11246 . . . .	The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take <i>affirmative action</i> to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment <i>without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin</i> . (3 Code of Federal Regulation 1964-65 compilation; emphasis added)

**Note.**—Complete text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-352, is available in BNA (1964), app. A. President Johnson signed the act into law with bipartisan support (73-27 in the Senate to pass the Senate compromise bill, 289-126 to pass the same version of the bill in the House). Opposition to the bill came from a mix of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans.

Table 1 reproduces all key provisions of Title VII and E.O. 11246. Table 2 provides illustrative passages from our detailed examination of Title VII's entire legislative history. Reproduced in table 1 are passages lawyers generally would presume to be the most authoritative sources for narrowly construing the legislative intent of Title VII. Especially authoritative passages come either from an official interpretive memorandum and attendant explanations prepared by Title VII's bipartisan Senate floor sponsors or from statements made by architects of the substantially modified bipartisan Senate compromise bill that ultimately became Title VII. Because modification was great and accomplished through informal conferences among bipartisan Senate leaders and the attorney general, there is no Senate committee report on the final bill. The House Judiciary Committee report is less useful than it otherwise would be for narrow construction because the House bill did *not* contain clarifying language reported in sections 706(g), 706(h), and 706(j) (reprinted in table 1). These provisions were enacted to eliminate opponents' and some supporters' concern that the original bill could be extended to require racial proportional representation in the workplace and to prohibit use of race-neutral employment tests that could unintentionally restrict minority hiring if, due to past educational discrimination, minorities performed more poorly than whites (see, e.g., BNA 1964; Berg 1964; Graham 1990; Pedriana and Stryker 1996).

Overall, tables 1 and 2 show potent raw materials for arguments confining Title VII race discrimination to *intentional, racially motivated unequal treatment of individuals*. They also show authoritative words as powerful resources for interpreting Title VII-enacted equal opportunity as color-blind qualification or merit-based employment procedures. The

TABLE 2

## ILLUSTRATIVE KEY LANGUAGE FROM CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES OVER TITLE VII

Original Source	Statement
Interpretive Memorandum of senators Clark (D-Pa.) and Case (R-N.J.), bipartisan floor managers of the debate in the Senate	<p>It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meaning. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment . . . based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race [etc.] (7213)</p>
	<p>There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance . . . would involve a violation of Title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual. (7213)</p>
	<p>There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualification tests, where because of differences in background and education, members of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance. (7213)</p>
Sen. Humphrey (D-Minn.), coauthor of the Dirksen-Mansfield-Kuchel-Humphrey compromise bill*	<p>The meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear . . . [It] means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their different race, religion, or national origins. (5423)</p> <p>[Title VII] seeks to prevent discriminatory hiring practices [and] to give people an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit . . . rather than to keep their talents buried under prejudice or discrimination. (6549)</p> <p>Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial balance. (6549)</p> <p>Section 706(g) is amended to require showing of intentional violation of the title in order to obtain relief. This is a clarifying change. Since the title bars only discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it would seem already to require intent, and thus, the proposed change does not involve any substantive change in the title. . . . It means simply that the respondent must have intended to discriminate. (12723-24)</p> <p>For example, if an employer has two plants in different locations, and one of the plants employs substantially more Negroes than the other, it is not unlawful if the pay conditions or facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is shown that the employer was intending to discriminate for or against one of the racial groups. (12297)</p> <p>Subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial balance among employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully</p>

TABLE 2 (*Continued*)

Original Source	Statement
Legal memorandum incorporated into remarks by Sen. Case to explain the goals of Title VII	stated on numerous occasions that Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this point expressly. This subsection does not represent any change in the substance of the title. It does state clearly and accurately what we have maintained all along about the bill's intent and meaning. (12297)
Justice Department memorandum on Title VII, prepared for Sen. Clark (D-Pa.), to rebut fear that Title VII would require racial quotas	[In crafting the substitute package, we made] technical changes which sought to clarify ambiguities and uncertainties in the House passed version of H.R. 7152 (12999)
Rep. Minish (D-N.J.), Title VII supporter	Indeed the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color. (7247)
Rep. Godell (R-N.Y.), Title VII supporter	There is no provision, either in title VII or in any other part of this bill, that requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any individual or any group for the purpose of achieving racial balance. No employer is required to hire an individual because that individual is a Negro. No employer is required to maintain any ratio of Negroes to whites, Jews to gentiles, Italians to English or women to men. The same is true of labor organizations. On the contrary any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly run afoul of Title VII because it would involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin. What title VII seeks to accomplish . . . is equal treatment for all. (6986)
	No quota system will be set up. . . . The title is designed to . . . permit every worker to hold the best job for which he is qualified. (7213)
	Under title VII, employment will be on the basis of merit, not of race. (1600)
	There is nothing here as a matter of legislative history that would require racial balancing. . . . We are not talking about . . . an employer having to balance the number of employees. . . . There is no quota involved. It is a matter of an individual's right having been violated. (2558)

Source — U.S. Congress (1964). Explicit page numbers are given in parentheses at the end of each quote.

Note — Readers can verify the typicality of these statements and the expressed concerns to which they responded by consulting BNA (1964), which organizes and compiles the most important parts of Title VII's legislative history, including all official reports and memoranda, explanatory statements by House and Senate sponsors, floor leaders, and architects of the final compromise legislation, questions and answers by opponents and sponsors, analyses of changes from the original to final bill, etc. Additional statements made by representatives and senators on the floor of Congress, beyond what the BNA volume reproduces, can be found in U.S. Congress (1964).

\*This bill was hammered out in consultation with Attorney General Kennedy, substituted for the original House bill, and enacted.

words *affirmative action* in E.O. 11246 were readily interpreted at the time as requiring something *beyond* passive nondiscrimination (see, e.g., Price 1965; Graham 1990). But E.O. 11246 required affirmative action "to ensure . . . treat[ment] *without regard to race*" (emphasis added). No matter what its text, the order could not be extended to action deemed legally inconsistent with Title VII, sections 706(h) and 706(j), which, as noted above, responded to fears that minority underrepresentation would be equated with unlawful discrimination, especially if, as a result of either testing or seniority rules, there continued to be significant racial disparities in the workforce. Both congressmen for and against Title VII rejected equating discrimination with minority underrepresentation. As table 2 shows, supporters stated unequivocally that the act would not and could not require racial preferences or quotas. Though the affirmative action phrase also became part of Title VII's section 706(g), there, it simply copied a 30-year-old remedial provision using these words in federal labor-management relations law (Gorman 1977, p. 811). In contrast to modifications of section 706(g) emphasizing *intent*, absence of focus on or debate over 706(g)'s *affirmative action* phrase suggests it was seen as an unproblematic boilerplate phrase expressing the courts' ordinary equitable/remedial powers (see also Graham 1990).

More evidence for our conclusion about major constraints stemming from exact language embedding equal opportunity values in Title VII is that those who later crafted race-conscious, group, and effects-oriented interpretations of Title VII affirmed the serious hurdles that codified language coupled with the technique of narrow construction required them to overcome (e.g., Blumrosen 1972; 1993, p. 75; Graham 1990, pp. 249, 251, quoting the EEOC). In the immediate wake of Title VII, its interpretations, including nonpartisan Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) analyses providing technical help for lawyers, just assumed Title VII would be given an intent and individual-oriented construction (BNA 1964; Berg 1964; Sovern 1966). Consistent with focus on individuals, Congress structured the EEOC on an individual complaint-processing model. The EEOC was to investigate, and if it found that "reasonable cause" existed to believe discrimination charges were true, it was to try to conciliate claims on a case-by-case basis (Player 1988, p. 477). If conciliation failed, the individual complainant (but not the EEOC) could bring suit in federal court.<sup>8</sup>

As much as the language in tables 1 and 2 would provide easy rhetorical opportunities for Philadelphia Plan opponents while erecting major road-

<sup>8</sup> Congress authorized the attorney general to bring suit in federal court if he or she had reasonable cause to believe that an employer or union had engaged in a "pattern or practice" of intentional discrimination (*U.S. Code*, vol. 42, sec. 2000e-61a [1964]).

blocks for plan supporters, Title VII and the EEOC no sooner existed than those promoting aggressive enforcement began to craft a race-conscious, group, and effects-oriented interpretation unforeseen by the legal analyses of 1964 (see also Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996; Blumrosen 1972, p. 69). They relied on a preexisting legitimate alternative to narrow statutory construction: reasoning from statutory language and legislative history to construct *the statute's broad policy purposes*, and then reasoning about what were needed, appropriate, or effective means to achieve these. This often is referred to as *broad* (vs. *narrow*) statutory construction (Altschuler and Sgroi 1996).

The early EEOC drew harsh criticism from civil rights groups, including the National Association of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) (Graham 1990, pp. 189–90). Liberals in and outside civil rights organizations complained about dealing with a widespread, systemic problem on a case-by-case basis. Instead, they argued that the EEOC should take the initiative to “attack broad ‘whole-sale’ patterns of discrimination in large firms, unions, and entire industries” (Graham 1990, pp. 189–90). Short on staff and resources, and with individual complaints beginning to pile up, the EEOC agreed. Pragmatically searching for ways to maintain legitimacy by becoming effective (Skrentny 1996), the EEOC realized it would be more efficient and effective to target widespread industrial practices that affected large numbers of minorities (see Blumrosen 1993, pp. 79–80).

Early EEOC practical imperatives were complemented by an evolving *sociological* understanding of discrimination. Scholars and policymakers increasingly saw discrimination as a group, as well as an individual, phenomenon (e.g., Myrdal 1944; “An American Legal Dilemma” 1949; Blumrosen 1971). Employment discrimination did not necessarily require prejudice or harmful motive. Institutionalized industrial-relations systems and employment practices often resulted in systematic patterns of discrimination against large numbers of minorities. Consistent with the technique of broadly construing their authorizing statute—and cognizant of court precedent mandating deference to expert agencies’ judgments about how best to implement law addressing congressionally perceived social problems (in this case discrimination)—the EEOC sought a principle to address widespread employment practices that had negative effects on minorities *as a group* (Blumrosen 1971, 1993; Graham 1990, p. 191). The principle articulated by EEOC staff, in conjunction with civil rights groups lawyers, became known as the *disparate impact theory of discrimination*.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Although EEOC and civil rights lawyers crafted the theory later known as disparate impact, *disparate impact* did not become an official legal term until the 1971 *Griggs*

Disparate impact's development is detailed elsewhere (e.g., Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996; Stryker 1996b). What is important here is that the theory did not require proving intent to find unlawful discrimination. Ostensibly neutral selection or employment practices that had an adverse effect on minority employment would be illegal, regardless of employer motive or state of mind (Blumrosen 1972; Player 1988). Also, since "discrimination claims became group claims" (Blumrosen 1993, p. 83), the EEOC developed legal strategy in which statistics showing race disparities in the workforce would provide *prima facie* evidence of discrimination. The burden would then shift to the employer to justify the practice that resulted in the disparate impact (Blumrosen 1972; Belz 1991, p. 28; Graham 1990, p. 250). Using disparate impact theory, the EEOC and minority plaintiffs' lawyers hoped to build case law in federal courts to legally establish an effects test of discrimination under Title VII.

Notwithstanding hurdles posed by Title VII language narrowly construed, EEOC strategists crafted disparate impact theory by broadly construing Title VII purposes and then designing aggressive means to achieve them. They drew on legislative history remarks showing Title VII supporters' intense concern about African-Americans' poor economic situation, presumption that past discrimination was a major cause of this, and assumption that eliminating discrimination would greatly improve African-Americans' economic well-being (see, e.g., the statements of senators Humphrey, Case, Muskie, and Clark in the *Congressional Record* [U.S. Congress 1964] at, respectively, pp. 6547–48, 7240–42, 12614–15, and 13080). EEOC commissioner Samuel Jackson stated the rationale for disparate impact theory: "Congress, with its elaborate exploration of the economic plight of the minority worker, sought to establish a comprehensive instrument with which to adjust the needless hardships resulting from the arbitrary operation of personnel practices, as well as purposeful discrimination" (quoted in Graham 1990, p. 249; see also Blumrosen 1972).

Disparate impact theory provided raw materials that later Philadelphia Plan promoters could use to construct symbolic resources *not* because disparate impact was the same legal theory or program as E.O. 11246 but because disparate impact theory relates to E.O. 11246 affirmative action through broader cultural understandings that buttress them both (e.g., Stryker 1996b). By making workforce statistics central to establishing employment discrimination, disparate impact theory "rested on an implicit

v. Duke Power Co. Supreme Court decision (401 US 424 [1971]) endorsing the theory. Other terms conveying the same idea and often used interchangeably with disparate impact were *adverse impact*, *adverse* or *disproportionate effects*, and the *effects test of discrimination*. Since disparate impact theory did not exist at the time of Congress's debates leading to the passage of Title VII, these debates could not directly address the theory (e.g., Epstein 1992).

normative" concept of "proportional representation" (Graham 1990, p. 120). This hinted at a numbers game equating equal employment opportunity, not with process or good motives, but with minority employment results. Both the EEOC's grappling with what equal opportunity values meant and the agency's drift toward results are shown in a 1966 memo prepared for the EEOC general counsel by staff lawyer Sonia Pressman. Pressman argued that EEOC law required "active pursuit of an *equal opportunity* policy" so that "Negroes are recruited, hired, transferred, and promoted in line with their *ability and numbers*" (quoted in Graham 1990, p. 247; emphasis added).

Disparate impact theory's architects also conceived that *under Title VII*, race-conscious affirmative action would be an appropriate remedy to correct for adverse effects of past and present discriminatory employment practices (Stryker 1996b). The EEOC hoped that allowing statistical evidence of discrimination would encourage employers to develop race-conscious affirmative action hiring policies. This could be done through EEOC-sponsored conciliation agreements (Blumrosen 1971). The EEOC also envisioned court-ordered affirmative action hiring as a remedy after a court finding of illegal disparate impact discrimination. The EEOC's executive director argued that the remedy for legally established discrimination *patterns* should "require specific *results*, immediate hiring and promotion of Negroes . . . *rather than procedures* that offer them equal opportunity in the future" (quoted in Belz 1991, p. 28; emphasis added).

Thus, in the late 1960s, the EEOC emphasized disparate impact and remedial minority hiring and awaited court progress of disparate impact cases. Because arguments promoting disparate impact were readily adaptable to promoting race-conscious affirmative action, they provided raw materials for cultural resource building during the Philadelphia Plan debates.

### Context and Analysis of Philadelphia Plan Hearings

#### *The Federal Contract Program and the Philadelphia Plan*

As contested as were meanings of equal opportunity and discrimination under Title VII, the federal contract program produced the most immediate, intense conflicts over federal employment policy. Focusing directly on the meaning and reach of affirmative action, the conflicts climaxed with the revised Philadelphia Plan. Before presenting content analysis of the plan hearings, we briefly describe the plan and outline the broader legal, political, and socioeconomic context in which it developed.

Unlike remedial affirmative action under Title VII, the federal government did not need court findings of discrimination to make affirmative action a condition for receiving federal contracts. Through presidential

order, the contract program had extensive authority to mandate employers' affirmative action duties (Belz 1991, pp. 28–30; Player 1988, pp. 623–25). In September 1965, President Johnson strengthened equal employment in government contracting by issuing E.O. 11246 (table 1, above), to be enforced by the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCC). Initial OFCC efforts targeted construction, where, despite a history of executive orders banning race discrimination in federal contracts, skilled unions maintained racial exclusiveness (see Graham 1990, pp. 278–90).<sup>10</sup> In 1960, less than 1% of the building trades' membership was black (Quadagno 1992, p. 622). The building crafts restricted entry into unions by guarding access to feeder apprenticeships. This maintained high wages and tight labor supply but also allowed the unions to almost completely exclude blacks, either through overt discrimination or through nepotistic referrals (Leiken 1970; Quadagno 1992). In the 1960s, civil rights groups attacked these practices, with protests and sporadic violence occurring at federal construction sites between civil rights activists demanding more minority employment and union members trying to control labor supply and wages (Graham 1990, p. 278; Quadagno 1992). Although E.O. 11246 could not directly reach racial exclusiveness in construction *unions*, it did apply to construction *contractors*. Major contracts, and the threat to withhold them, provided the federal government with considerable leverage (see Graham 1990, p. 284).

The Johnson administration walked a tightrope. Since Democratic Party fortunes rested on electoral support from unions *and* African-Americans, the administration tried to satisfy minority demands for jobs without angering organized labor (Quadagno 1992; Belz 1991, p. 32). Initially, this led the OFCC to pursue an ambiguous affirmative action policy for construction contractors. In 1966, the OFCC began preaward compliance reviews in which the lowest bidder had to show capacity to meet E.O. 11246 affirmative action duties before being awarded a contract (Jones 1970). But the OFCC did not make clear exactly what these duties entailed, insisting on results but remaining vague on *what* results would suffice and *how* to get them (see, e.g., the statement by OFCC director Edward C. Sylvester, quoted in Belz 1991, p. 31).

Emphasis on results reflected increasing OFCC concern with underrepresentation of minorities, especially in the "lily white" (Graham 1990, p.

<sup>10</sup> Executive orders banning discrimination in government contracts began with Franklin Roosevelt's 1941 order against race discrimination in defense contracts. Later orders by presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy also prohibited discrimination by contractors and in federal employment, but there is consensus that these orders had little impact on minority employment (see, e.g., Gelber 1974; Harvey 1971).

288) building trades. To the OFCC, affirmative action under E.O. 11246 demanded active race-conscious hiring. In 1967, against a background of widespread racial turmoil, and after trying various ineffective or judicially short-circuited models of preaward affirmative action in other cities, the OFCC was ready to try in Philadelphia what it expected to be an effective model of preaward, race-conscious affirmative action (see Graham 1990, pp. 285–89).

Under an institutional setup in which a local interagency board—the Philadelphia Federal Executive Board (FEB)—coordinated field activities of the federal contracting and civil rights enforcement agencies, the OFCC ordered Philadelphia contractors to submit “manning tables,” specifying a certain number of minorities to be hired for each trade category (Leiken 1970, p. 90; Jones 1970, pp. 348–50; Graham 1990, p. 288). The OFCC expected its order to remedy what a 1967 FEB survey showed were patterns of severe minority underrepresentation in key visible and high-paying Philadelphia construction unions (Graham 1990, pp. 288–89). But in November 1968, Comptroller General Elmer Staats ruled that the plan violated government procurement rules and was illegal.<sup>11</sup> Staats indicated all contractor duties had to be explicit *prior* to the opening of competitive bids. But under the plan preaward system, which failed to say how contractors should determine manning tables, acceptable affirmative action plans were negotiated *after* bidding began. The Johnson Labor Department withdrew the plan, but Nixon officials resurrected it (Graham 1990, pp. 291–97).

Debates about plan vagueness partially obscured the more explosive issue of race-conscious hiring. If the OFCC were too specific about the duty to hire minorities, this could signal precisely the racial preferences that Title VII, section 703(j) could be construed to prohibit, as discussed above. Also, any possibility of race quotas threatened to open deep fault lines in the political coalition supporting equal employment opportunity.

Publicly, organized labor strongly endorsed nondiscrimination and generally supported Title VII. During Congress’s debates, the AFL-CIO dismissed some members’ fears that Title VII would destroy seniority systems by requiring race preferences (Graham 1990, pp. 139–40). Among employers, there was little active support for Title VII but almost no organized opposition to its passage (Gelber 1974, pp. 143–44). In the 1960s, in spite of frustrations with the EEOC (Blumrosen 1971, pp. 379–94), the business press talked extensively about ways for employers to open their

<sup>11</sup> The president, with Senate advice and consent, appoints the comptroller general, who is positioned in the executive branch. But often the comptroller is seen as Congress’s ally since the comptroller determines if executive spending is consistent with Congress’s appropriations.

workforces to minorities (see, e.g., Perry 1963; Silberman 1963). But realities of federal construction contracting showed the fragility of the loose consensus among employers, organized labor, civil rights groups, and the federal government on the abstract general value of equal employment opportunity.

Responding to civil rights pressure for minority jobs in government contracts, the state mandated race-conscious hiring that increasingly looked like quotas. Organized labor and contractors both vehemently opposed quotas, creating a new cross-class coalition linking the AFL-CIO to the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a; Graham 1990, p. 291). Contractors felt caught between their collective bargaining agreements with unions and state demands for black employment, arguing that contractors were being held liable for discrimination originating with unions, with whom they had exclusive hiring hall agreements (Leiken 1970, p. 95; Schuwerk 1972, p. 741; Graham 1990, pp. 290–91). In 1967–68, contractors' associations protested to the OFCC, unsuccessfully demanding public hearings, and they lobbied friendly congresspersons, who, in turn, wrote multiple letters to Comptroller General Staats, pushing him to rule against the Philadelphia Plan (Graham 1990, pp. 290–96).

Race quotas threatened construction unions' monopoly over labor supply (Quadagno 1992). The unions worried that OFCC affirmative action would force contractors to go outside the hiring hall for labor and would thwart union control of entry into construction through apprenticeships. By the time the Johnson Labor Department rescinded the initial Philadelphia Plan, in November 1968, federal affirmative action policy already threatened to shatter the traditional but tenuous coalition of civil rights organizations such as the NAACP, CORE, the Urban League, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) with organized labor. Appreciating this, the new Republican administration brought the conflict over affirmative action to a head by reinstating a revised Philadelphia Plan in June 1969.

By 1969, many American cities were experiencing racial turmoil focused on job discrimination in federal construction contracts, and Nixon administration officials worried about threats of more disorder (Leiken 1970; Jones 1985; Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996). They saw reviving the plan as a way to satisfy civil rights protesters and curb urban violence, while splitting apart two major Democratic Party constituencies—civil rights and organized labor—so that it would be impossible for Democrats to satisfy both constituencies at once (see evidence in Graham [1990, pp. 325–35] and Skrentny [1996, pp. 181–82, 203–4]).

The revised Philadelphia Plan required that federal construction contractors in the Philadelphia area commit to numerical hiring ranges, or

"goals," for minority workers in iron, sheet metal, and electrical work, plumbing, steam fitting, roofing, and elevator construction. Prior to the opening of bids, contractors had to submit acceptable affirmative action plans based on these goals. They then had to make a "good faith effort" to meet the goals (U.S. Department of Labor 1969). The Labor Department determined goal ranges, based on analyses of local construction, including minorities employed and available for employment, training needs, and impact on the existing labor market (Jones 1970; Schuwerk 1972).

Since the revised plan made the contractors' affirmative action duties explicit prior to the opening of bids, the comptroller general agreed it met the specificity requirement of federal contracting policy. But now it was illegal because its race-conscious goals violated Title VII, section 703(j)'s ban on preferential treatment (see Staats's letter to Secretary of Labor Shultz, August 5, 1969, reprinted in U.S. Senate [1969, pp. 155–62]). Siding with the Labor Department and echoing arguments made by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (a coordinating group for major civil rights organizations), Nixon attorney general John Mitchell countered that the plan was legal because it did not conflict with Title VII and because specific OFCC findings on race discrimination in employment in Philadelphia justified aggressive action under E.O. 11246 (Graham 1990, pp. 333–34). When the Labor Department said it would implement the plan, congressional opponents mobilized. In early 1969, Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen, one of the architects of section 703(j), attacked OFCC reliance on quotas and appealed to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers to examine the issue. About the same time, Senator Paul Fannin (R-Ariz.) introduced a bill (S 931) to suspend E.O. 11246, retain Title VII, and move all equal employment opportunity enforcement to the EEOC (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a, p. 418; Graham 1990, p. 329). In August 1969, about a month before he died, Everett Dirksen wrote George Shultz that he intended that no congressional funds be appropriated for the Philadelphia Plan (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a, p. 417; Graham 1990, pp. 335–36).

The comptroller's legislative branch allies included not just Republicans like Dirksen and Fannin but also some key members of the majority party, including southern senators Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) and John McClellan (D-Ark.). When Dirksen died, and his replacement, Pennsylvanian Hugh Scott, allied himself with civil rights groups supporting the plan, Senator Ervin, chair of the Senate's Separation of Powers Subcommittee, began directing plan opponents (Graham 1990, p. 336). Meanwhile, encouraged by the Labor Department and fearing more rigid government-imposed plans, cities around the country began to implement "hometown plans" for minority employment in construction contracts (Schuwerk 1972). Racial violence between blacks and construction union workers

was occurring in Chicago and Pittsburgh, and employment-related protests were planned for other major cities (Graham 1990, pp. 334–45; Leiken 1970, p. 84).

In this context, in fall 1969, Senator Ervin called for his subcommittee to hold hearings on the Philadelphia Plan. The formal reason was to discuss Fannin's bill for suspension of E.O. 11246, but this was a smoke screen for determining whether, in issuing the plan, the Nixon Labor Department had spent appropriated monies in violation of separation of powers principles and in contravention of Title VII. Ervin also designed the hearings to be a public political debate over quotas and race preferences in government contracts (Graham 1990, p. 336). Although plan supporters in Congress and the executive branch were invited to defend the plan, the subcommittee hoped to show plan illegality (e.g., Jones 1970, p. 396).

In sum, national debate over federal equal employment policy reached a defining moment with hearings on the revised Philadelphia Plan. These hearings were a visible public event providing an institutionalized chance to influence both a government audience and a national public audience (see *Congressional Quarterly* 1969a). Table 3 lists actors who spoke at the hearings.

Led by Senator Ervin, plan opponents on the subcommittee orchestrated the hearings, which took place October 27–29, 1969.<sup>12</sup> Ervin, joined by subcommittee member and southern Democrat McClellan, by the subcommittee's chief and minority counsels, and by a legal academic consultant, interjected comments and posed questions—often leading or provocative—to other plan opponents and to supporters. Among those testifying against the plan were Senator Fannin and Comptroller General Staats, as well as leaders of contractors' associations, a representative of the Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC; a regional association of businesses) and a representative for AFL-CIO affiliated construction unions. Those testifying for the plan included plan architect Secretary of Labor Shultz, the U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights (a subordinate of Attorney General Mitchell), and two liberal Republican senators, one black and one white, who spoke for a larger bipartisan Senate group (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a, p. 418). Civil rights leaders did not testify, but they did write letters supporting the plan. These letters, presented as supplementary materials to the hearing record, include notes from NAACP national director Herbert Hill, the Urban Coalition Action Coun-

<sup>12</sup> Two subcommittee members did not attend. One—Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.) might have been friendly to the plan. The other—Roman Hruska (R-Nebr)—opposed the plan (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a, p. 624; Graham 1990, p. 336).

TABLE 3  
PARTICIPANTS IN PHILADELPHIA PLAN HEARINGS

Subcommittee Questioners (Opponents)		Testifiers (Opponents)		Testifiers (Supporters)	
Name	Title/Affiliation	Name	Title/Affiliation	Name	Title/Affiliation
Sam Ervin	Senator (D-N.C.); subcommittee chairman	Thurman Sensing	Executive vice president, Southern States Industrial Council	Jacob Javits	Senator (R-N.Y.)
John McClellan	Senator (D-Ark.)	Harry Taylor	Executive director, General Building Contractors Association, Philadelphia	Edward Brooke	Senator (R-Mass.)
Rufus Edmiston	Subcommittee chief counsel	William Neumann	National representative, Associated General Contractors of America	Jerris Leonard	U.S. assistant attorney general, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice
Lawrence Brady	Subcommittee minority counsel	Roman Pudlak	U.S. Representative (D-Ill.)	George Shultz	Secretary of Labor
Philip Kurland	University of Chicago Law School professor; subcommittee chief consultant	Elmer Staats	U.S. comptroller general, General Accounting Office	Louis Sherman	General counsel, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO
				Paul Fannin	Senator (R-Ariz.)

Note.—Javits and Brooke testified on behalf of themselves and on behalf of Democratic senators Birch Bayh (Indiana), Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts), Philip Hart (Michigan), and Fred Harris (Oklahoma) and on behalf of Republican senators Charles Goodell (New York), Robert Griffin (Michigan), and Clifford Case (New Jersey). (*Constitutional Quarterly* 1969, p. 419). This presented the irony of plain opponents using Case's prior words from the bipartisan Clark-Case Interpretive memo on Title VII against his current support for the Philadelphia Plan. Republican Congressmen were among both those who testified in favor of and in opposition to the Philadelphia Plan. When the subcommittee minority counsel interviewed to ask questions of those who testified, he did so infrequently, and to interrogate plan supporters.

SOURCE.—U.S. Senate (1969).

cil, and the executive director of the Philadelphia Urban Coalition (U.S. Senate 1969). Just as Attorney General Mitchell had earlier drawn on arguments made by civil rights organizations, state actors testifying in support of the plan drew on legal arguments that civil rights groups had helped construct for aggressive Title VII enforcement. No participating actor could have predicted future events. But all would have appreciated the hearings' symbolism and likely import. The Labor Department had announced it would implement Philadelphia-style plans in nine other cities (*Congressional Quarterly* 1969a, p. 418), so stakes were high.

As had the Staats and Mitchell memorandums, the hearing centered on plan legality with respect to separation of powers doctrine. But participants also used raw materials provided by past law and politics to construct cultural resources that would help define the future reach of federal equal employment law. We now turn to our content analysis to show the clear competing symbolic packages that crystallized at the plan hearings.

Analyzing formal public political activity has disadvantages for many purposes. Here it provides advantages. First, since actors testified for public consumption, they tried to articulate coherent official policy positions to influence Congress, the courts, public opinion, and state policy. They did so by drawing on general political cultural values as well as on technical-legal strategies. Second, the hearing's written record allows us to analyze actors' statements verbatim. Third, though plan opponents orchestrated the questioning, providing easy openings for other opponents and challenging supporters, the hearing's rules enabled actors on both sides of the debate to articulate and to justify their positions clearly and completely.

#### *Packages and Strategies at the Philadelphia Plan Hearings*

Our introductory theoretical discussion followed Gamson and Modigliani (1987) in defining the concept of *symbolic package*, and it also defined our added concept of *cultural strategy*. Identifying packages and strategies required us to conduct content analysis of the written record of the Philadelphia Plan hearings. We began with a preliminary list of words and phrases that we thought would appear in political talk about equal employment opportunity, based on earlier research (Stryker 1996a). The list was developed based on equal employment writings, using terms that signaled both results- and process-oriented concepts (see, e.g., Lipset 1992; Fallon 1980; Fineman 1991; Donahoe 1994; Burstein 1993; Gamson and Modigliani 1987). Original terms were *equal opportunity*, *equal results*, *quotas*, *equal rewards*, *equal outcomes*, *process*, *outcome*, *universalism*, *particularism*, *individualism*, *individual rights*, *individual competition*,

*group rights, group competition, ascription, achievement, merit, skill, and productivity.*

We then read the hearings many times, highlighting these terms as they appeared. Since our list purposefully was preliminary and open to expansion, careful readings allowed us to identify words and phrases signaling equal employment opportunity values and language that our original list had missed (app. A contains our completed list). For each actor's testimony, one of us made a word count and location for each of our words and phrases. We both then (separately) examined the text in which these terms appeared to identify broader ideas and arguments associated with them. For this, we relied heavily on the contexts in which terms appeared.

By using the content and count of terms to locate relevant text passages, we tried to produce a systematic, representative evidentiary basis for our conclusions. But we recognized we would have to do interpretive work to avoid nonsensical conclusions based solely on mechanical locations and counts. For our content analysis to make *sense* out of diverse language employed by various actors—as well as of the diverse arguments they could create around the *same general values* and *some of the same or similar specific terms*—we had to interpret the meaning of words and phrases in the overall context of each testimony and to interpret that testimony's place and role in the totality of the hearings. Without this, we could not have identified key symbolic packages and cultural strategies used to characterize equal employment law in general, the revised Philadelphia Plan in particular, and the relationship between the two, nor could we have completed our list of words and phrases. Finally, we wanted primarily to *identify* symbolic packages that appeared in the hearings, *not* to assess the relative frequency with which the packages appeared. We located and counted all terms in our completed list of words and phrases to help ensure that our interpretive-analytic work identifying packages would be systematically based on the entire hearing record. Since this record is public, and we provide our list of words and phrases in appendix A, others can replicate our procedures and check our interpretations.

Philadelphia Plan opponents developed three interrelated packages that we label (1) *no racial considerations or preferential treatment*, (2) *qualifications and merit*, and (3) *affirmative action and equal employment opportunity for the individual through education and training*. Supporters converged on one all-encompassing package we call *systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action*. For each package, we draw on direct quotes representative of the overall package to articulate the package's frame, that is, its central summarizing and organizing idea. Quotes also contain package "signature elements," that is, the catchwords and phrases evoking the entire package. Since catchwords and phrases

help both to differentiate and to interconnect packages, we used many of them in our package labels. Finally, we discuss cultural strategies used to develop the packages. Table 4 lists symbolic packages and their associated frames, signature elements, and cultural strategies. Table 5 provides illustrative quotes as evidence for each package.

*Opponents' packages and strategies.*—In his opening statement, Subcommittee Chair Ervin set terms for the ensuing debate by posing key questions about the revised Philadelphia Plan and by characterizing the plan as a likely violation of Title VII.

We will [also] ask the Department of Labor to make clear what is meant by the "good faith effort" which is required . . . under the Philadelphia Plan. Does that "good faith effort" compel contractors to discriminate against workers who are not members of any minority group? . . . My observation is that it does. . . . The Subcommittee wants to be shown that the Philadelphia Plan, by forcing contractors to raise the percentage of minority group employment, does not violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That act certainly does not authorize any racial quota systems whatever names they may be called (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 2)

Ervin's statement introduced the opponents' no racial considerations or preferential treatment package, summarized in table 4. As shown by table 5, opponents interpreted Title VII and E.O. 11246 to require employers to act *without* regard to race. They then argued that Philadelphia Plan hiring goals required contractors to take race into account in hiring, to give preferences to blacks, to set up quotas, and to discriminate against qualified whites. To opponents, all these features made the plan illegal because they contradicted the values of color-blind equal opportunity, which opponents interpreted equal employment opportunity law to incorporate.

Opponents constructed their no racial considerations package using previously discussed narrow construction strategies. First, they relied heavily on the exact language of Title VII, section 703(j), and of E.O. 11246 (see table 1 above). For example, the general counsel and spokesperson for the Building and Construction Trades Department (AFL-CIO) stated that "a quota system such as that provided in the revised Philadelphia Plan cannot stand consistently with the *plain meaning* of the words (in sec. 703[j]). Verbal gymnastics, no matter how detailed and imaginative, cannot vary the language of the statute" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 166; emphasis added). Ervin argued: "The language of executive order 11246 places an ironclad ban on racial considerations in employment by federal contractors, [thus, the Philadelphia Plan] is in conflict not only with Title VII . . . it also is in conflict with the very executive order under which it was created" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 4).

Second, opponents relied on authoritative explanatory words from Title VII's legislative history. Addressing race-conscious hiring to correct for racial imbalances, Ervin quoted from the previously discussed formal interpretive memorandum for Title VII (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 3; quoted statement appears in table 2). Comptroller General Staats referred to the same memo and quoted Senator Hubert Humphrey's legislative history statement that Title VII could not require quotas (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 159; see table 2 above). Representative Roman Pucinski explicitly linked legislative history to the words of section 703(j): "During debate on the Civil Rights Act, Congress considered the worth of preferential treatment . . . but Congress decided that . . . such requirements would be as invidious in their discrimination as past practices of racial discrimination. Consequently, in section 703(j), Congress specifically forbade the use of any preferential hiring in areas where there was an imbalance of employees of one race" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 55).

In sum, actors developing the no racial considerations or preferential treatment package constructed it from language in Title VII and in E.O. 11246 and from how members of Congress, especially Title VII supporters, characterized Title VII's meaning during debates over its passage. As earlier sections of this article prefigured, these strategies were both easy and instrumental for plan opponents to mobilize. Since the *form* of these cultural strategies already existed, plan opponents had only to mobilize exact equal employment codes and legislative history language to fill in their *content*.

We call a second, closely related package developed by opponents "qualifications and merit." As summarized in table 4 and evidenced by illustrative quotes in table 5, this package emphasized criteria that plan opponents presumed equal employment opportunity law expected employers to use. Neither Title VII nor E.O. 11246 explicitly required hiring solely based on qualifications (see, e.g., statements of senators Humphrey and Clark, respectively [U.S. Congress 1964, pp. 5423, 6548–59, 7218, 13080]). But plan opponents argued this was their implication—that under color-blind nondiscrimination, qualifications and merit would be the sole factors guiding employer hiring.

Advancing the qualifications and merit package required building on the cultural backdrop against which Congress's debates over Title VII occurred. Consistent with Title VII *supporters'* statements during congressional debate (see table 2 above), plan *opponents* suggested Title VII equal opportunity *assumed* universalism. Contractors and unions proclaimed enthusiasm about hiring minorities, so long as they met the same standards expected of nonminority employees. Since the point of not considering race was to highlight job competence, opponents found it damning

TABLE 4  
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY—AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SYMBOLIC PACKAGES AND CULTURAL STRATEGIES  
AT PHILADELPHIA PLAN HEARINGS

Symbolic Package	Frame	Signature Elements	Cultural Strategies
Opponents: No racial considerations or preferential treatment	Race is not to be a factor in employment decisions.	Color-blindness; (no) racial considerations, (hiring) without regard to race, (no) racial quotas; (no) preferential treatment; (no) deliberate attempt to achieve racial balance; (no) compulsory hiring of qualified black over qualified white; unlawful employment practice to use race, equal employment opportunities regardless of race	Draw on exact language of codified federal equal employment law to narrowly construe Title VII; use legislative history to narrowly construe Title VII by drawing on exact explanatory language used by Title VII supporters during debate over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Qualifications and merit	All employment decisions should be made on the basis of each individual's skills, qualifications, and abilities	Merit, qualifications, abilities, skills; best person for the job based on qualifications	Draw out cultural backdrop for federal equal employment opportunity law and its legislative history by framing that backdrop as the expectation that equal opportunity means universality
Affirmative action and equal employment opportunity for the individual through education and training	Affirmative action necessary to provide equal employment opportunity by increasing the skills and qualifications of minority individuals; affirmative action in education and training automatically leads to employment results	Voluntary affirmative action in education and training; voluntary affirmative action in recruitment into unions; universalistic equal employment opportunity	Express dedication to equal employment opportunity as hiring based on universalistic criteria, tout their own part affirmative action efforts to increase skills and qualifications of minority individuals through education and training

**Supporters:**  
Systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action

Race-conscious hiring necessary to remedy historic patterns of discrimination against members of minority groups; equal employment opportunity defined as corrective action; goals are not illegal preferences, but rather remedies to correct for past denial of equal employment opportunity to minority groups.

Systematic discrimination, patterns of discrimination; corrective action; positive action; effective action, deliberate action; affirmative action in employment, remedial; equal employment opportunity, vigorous federal action to ensure equal employment opportunity; overcoming effects of past discrimination requires special measures

Recast meaning of equal employment opportunity to emphasize active race-conscious hiring to correct for historic patterns of discrimination, recast meaning of equal employment opportunity by placing both value and laws incorporating it into socio-economic context, attain recasting using statutory and legislative history language to construct Title VII's broad policy purposes, then show what policies will achieve these purposes; make semantic distinctions between hiring goals, including good faith efforts to achieve goals, and quotas.

TABLE 5  
ILLUSTRATIVE EVIDENCE FOR SYMBOLIC PACKAGES CONSTRUCTED AT PHILADELPHIA  
PLAN HEARINGS

Original Source	Statement
	Opponents
No racial considerations or preferential treatment.	
Comptroller General Elmer Staats	The basic philosophy of the equal employment opportunity portion of the Civil Rights Act is that it shall be an <i>unlawful employment practice to use race . . . as a basis of hiring or refusing to hire</i> , a qualified applicant . . . The plan will place contractors in a situation where they will undoubtedly grant preferential treatment to minority group employees. (142)
Rep. Roman Pucinski (D-Ill.)	By requiring the contractors to consider applicants on the basis of race this plan manifestly violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964. <i>That act forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of race. . . Title VII . . . guarantees equal employment opportunities to all citizens . . . regardless of race. It requires employers to be color-blind to their hiring practices . . . Since [in the Philadelphia Plan] a contractor must hire certain numbers of minority workers, he would have to choose a black man if a qualified white man and a qualified black man both presented themselves for employment. This discrimination would clearly violate the Civil Rights Act.</i> (55)  [The Philadelphia Plan] forces preferences rather than equality of opportunity . . . the plan violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . There is no warrant in American law or history for setting up a quota system in any area of employment (60-61)
Thurman Sensing, SSIC vice president	
Qualifications and merit:	
William Naumann, General Contractors of America	[Affirmative action under E.O. 11246 means] your hiring procedures, your promoting procedures, your treatment of all employees [would be] on the basis of merit and merit alone, and that race . . . would not be a part of anything that happened to any of your employees. (84)
Subcommittee Chair Sam Ervin (drawing out another plan opponent)	To your mind, "without regard to race" means that he should ignore race as a consideration for employment. The executive order leaves an employer free to resort to the only thing that makes the free enterprise system work, to get the best man who is qualified for the job, irrespective of race. (77)
Education and Training Rep. Roman Pucinski	<i>Full use of the cooperative study programs, on-the-job training programs for immediate help to the disadvantaged is part of the answer . . . In my judgment there should be a higher emphasis on vocational education, and on opening up these apprenticeship programs</i> (56-57)

TABLE 5 (*Continued*)

Original Source	Statement
Louis Sherman, AFL-CIO	If the whole operation gets diverted into this numbers game, then the attention and energy will be taken away from the difficult areas of training and education . . . where the work will produce a result as it has done in the apprenticeship outreach program. (189)
Harry Taylor, General Building Contractors Association	The solution . . . is that more minority workers in Philadelphia . . . must be trained, and they must be trained to reach a point where they will be accepted in a union. . . The minority work force should be given an education to qualify them for those unions (76)
	Supporters
Systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action:	
Sen Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.)	Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, equal employment opportunity remains far from a reality in America today . . . <i>Historic patterns of discrimination persist among employers and among unions. . . A vigorous program of action by the Federal Government is, therefore, still essential to assure the members of minority groups the full participation in our economic system . . . That Federal program must include, if it is to be effective, a firm policy requiring all Federal contractors to insure that equality of employment opportunity exists for their employees.</i> (39)
Assistant Attorney General Jerry Leonard	This Nation's commitment to equal employment opportunity is nowhere further from realization than in the construction industry. . . We all recognized the pressing need for effective, positive, and immediate action by the Federal Government to enforce the nondiscrimination guarantees of Federal law (92)
Secretary of Labor George Shultz	In the construction industry, <i>special measures are required</i> to implement the "affirmative action" requirements of Executive Order 11246 and to overcome the effects of past discrimination in the designated trades. In order to achieve equal employment opportunity in the construction trades it is necessary, therefore, to require that bidders on federally involved construction projects commit themselves to "goals" of minority manpower utilization. . . Under certain circumstances, . . . if there is a situation where there is not equality of opportunity, and you are trying to correct that, then it seems to me you have got to go about it in a deliberate way. . . We think that the requirement of employment is a centerpiece here in achieving the goals we are seeking. . . so I think the holding out of the employment point is critical to making these processes of recruitment and training and so on work. . . If you simply said let us have affirmative action as recruiting, training, outreach, and things like that but not employment, then I do not think we would get very much real recruiting, training, and so on. I think there has to be that employment possibility there (125, 137-38)

SOURCE.—U.S. Congress (1969). Explicit page numbers are given in parentheses at the end of each quote.  
 NOTE.—Emphasis has been added to highlight significant language in the illustrative quotes

that, under the Philadelphia Plan, employers were, as Senator Ervin said, "*not to . . . be guided solely by the ability of the prospective employee*" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 83; emphases added).

What makes the opponents' third package, which we call "affirmative action for the individual through education and training" so interesting is that it, and the cultural strategy used to construct it, need not have been developed at all. Opponents could have confined themselves to drawing on equal employment opportunity law's words and legislative history and interpreting the general values equal employment opportunity law incorporated to show that the plan was inconsistent with Title VII and E.O. 11246 and thus illegal. Judged by technical-legal standards, this was a compelling, though not irrefutable, argument. But opponents went beyond it, repeatedly emphasizing how they dedicated themselves to the equal opportunity ideals they presumed the law incorporated. For example, the SSIC representative asserted that "the declared policy of the Council [is] to protect in every way the rights of the individual. . . . The SSIC is dedicated to equality of employment opportunity for all Americans without regard to race, color or creed" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 60). The General Building Contractors' representative said he was "proud and happy . . . that the ratio of Negro building trade unionists has steadily increased. . . . All this recruitment, training, and hiring throughout the past eight years was performed voluntarily by the construction industry in Philadelphia. . . . We have made these extensive efforts, first, because we believe in equal opportunity for all Americans" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 67; see also p. 163, for the statement by AFL-CIO affiliated construction unions).

In short, opponents supplemented their institutionalized legal-interpretive strategies with a broader political cultural strategy aimed at showing uncompromising dedication to equal employment opportunity by highlighting their behavioral commitment to a properly defined affirmative action. As summarized in table 4 and evidenced by quotes in table 5, opponents built a symbolic package showing what affirmative action could and should mean, consistent with equal employment opportunity values and law. Since opponents believed in merit-based hiring, affirmative action should enhance the skills and abilities of minority applicants. By increasing skills and abilities so minority individuals could compete for jobs on an equal basis with whites, affirmative action in the form of education and training would provide equal employment opportunity. Racial hiring goals and quotas were *not* just impermissible, they were unnecessary.

*Supporters' packages and strategies.*—Defending against a hostile subcommittee, members of Congress and Nixon administration officials supporting the plan faced an uphill legal-interpretive battle to show it was legal. How could supporters justify a plan they knew took race into ac-

count and whose essence was hiring a representative number of minorities in construction, when relevant codified words and legislative history, narrowly construed, would prohibit this?

One option was to sidestep or deemphasize equal employment opportunity. Supporters could have drawn on alternate cultural values to justify the plan, emphasizing, for example, integration or increased racial diversity in employment. Public opinion polls from about the time of plan debates showed racial integration was gaining acceptance (e.g., a 1971 Harris poll found that 56% of Americans said they believed interracial contacts did more good than harm [Harris 1975]). Integrating public accommodations was an avowed purpose of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. From a technical-legal viewpoint, supporters would have been foolhardy to completely ignore the equal opportunity language and values embedded in Title VII itself. But they could have tackled interpreting equal employment opportunity language and values in conjunction with a strategy of emphasizing other general political-cultural values promoted by the plan.

Supporters did *not* do this. Instead, they highlighted equal employment opportunity values and maintained their unequivocal dedication to them. They agreed that equal employment opportunity law forbade quotas but said the plan was not about quotas or race preferences. It sought only to ensure equal employment opportunity for minorities, as the law required. Where opponents argued that "the Philadelphia Plan requires a racial quota or balance, whether that quota is disguised as a 'target,' a 'goal,' a 'range,' or a 'standard'" (Senator Ervin, quoted in U.S. Senate [1969, p. 3]), supporters' first cultural strategy relied on the art of making technical-legal distinctions—in this case between goals and quotas. For example, Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) said he thought "the difference between a goal and a quota is . . . that the contractor does not lose his contract nor is he in breach of contract if he fails to attain the goal. Therefore, it is not a quota because he can still demonstrate that he did his best and he could not meet it" (U.S. Senate 1969, p. 43; see also p. 109, for the Justice Department civil rights representative's statement). Through semantic sparring akin to what attorneys do to distinguish two similar fact sets to achieve two different legal outcomes, supporters steadfastly maintained that plan hiring goals were not unlawful quotas.

Even if goals and quotas technically were different, however, goals still involved taking note of race, when E.O. 11248 ordered affirmative action "without regard to race." Showing plan consistency with equal opportunity values required supporters to adopt a strategy *other* than one relying solely on semantic arguments about codified language. Supporters' major strategy was to *recast* the meaning of equal employment opportunity by placing both the value and laws incorporating it into their socioeconomic

context. As a corollary, supporters avoided constructing resources from exact statutory or executive order words. Like EEOC and civil rights group crafters of disparate impact theory, supporters emphasized equal employment opportunity law's broad policy purposes. Their redefinition, which built on disparate impact theory, crystallized into a package we call "systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action."

As tables 4 and 5 show, the supporters' package indicated that providing equal employment opportunity in construction required immediate active federal government involvement to correct for past discrimination. To supporters, providing equal employment opportunity required that minorities be hired for construction jobs; the Philadelphia Plan was an innovation to do just this. As Secretary of Labor Shultz's statement in table 5 shows, supporters carefully linked past discrimination and current affirmative action to equal opportunity ideals. Good faith efforts to achieve plan goals were not illegal preferences but legal corrections for past denials of equal opportunity. To buttress their recasting of equal employment opportunity, plan supporters used statistics showing that despite federal efforts, blacks still were grossly underrepresented in the building trades; they argued that blacks' past exclusion came from entrenched union and contractor selection procedures (e.g., the statement of the assistant attorney general, quoted in U.S. Senate [1969, pp. 92-93]).

#### Epilogue: Winning Package and Strategies

Events following the hearings show that, though initially things did not look good for plan supporters, the supporters' package and the policies it promoted increasingly gained acceptance in Congress and the courts. Shortly after the hearings, the Senate Appropriations Committee attached a rider to an appropriations bill that would have nullified the revised Philadelphia Plan (see *Congressional Quarterly* 1969b; Graham 1990, pp. 338-40). Emphasizing the civil rights aspect of the clash, the Nixon White House mobilized against the rider, and the rider failed (see Jones 1985, p. 914; Graham 1990, pp. 339-40). Some legal scholars and participants in debates over the plan interpreted the rider's defeat as congressional approval of the Philadelphia Plan and of race-conscious hiring goals in government contracting (e.g., Jones 1970; Schuwerk 1972). Now the federal courts would have to rule.

In 1970, in *Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz* (311 F. Suppl. 1002 [E.D. Pa. 1970]; aff'd 442 F.2d 159 [1971]; cert. den. 404 US 54 [1971]), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the plan did *not* violate either Title VII or E.O. 11246. Addressing whether or not the Labor Department had the power to issue the plan and what, if any, were areas of conflict or overlap between Title

VII and E.O. 11246, the court found that Philadelphia area employment data showed “compelling need” for implementing the plan pursuant to executive order affirmative action duties (*Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania*, 311 F suppl. 1009). The court repeatedly referred to Title VII’s contemplation of historical discrimination and the need to remedy it and explicitly rejected opponents’ arguments equating the plan’s required good faith efforts to meet minority hiring goals with racial quotas. The court opinion’s final paragraph offered a general view of the relationship between the plan and equal employment opportunity values incorporated into federal law that embraced plan supporters’ recast concept of equal employment opportunity (see *Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania*, 311 F suppl. 1002, p. 1012).<sup>13</sup> The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court ruling, indicating that “color-conscious” remedies for historical discrimination were both necessary and permitted under executive order affirmative action (*Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania*, 442 F2d 173). Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the circuit court’s ruling became the legal standard; plan supporters’ symbolic package and the cultural strategies used to build it became judicial precedent-setting justifications. *Race-conscious hiring goals to correct for present and past systematic patterns of discrimination* now were a court-endorsed means to provide equal employment opportunity in government contracting.

Even before this judicial resolution, the Labor Department consolidated its antirider victory in Congress by targeting 19 cities for quick implementation of OFCC-endorsed affirmative action plans for construction, and it issued Labor Department Order no. 4, applying Philadelphia Plan–style affirmative action beyond construction to virtually all federal contracting (Graham 1990, pp. 343–44). Consistent with plan supporters’ policy preferences, legal doctrine and programs were institutionalizing “fundamental shifts” in their equal opportunity language and values (Graham 1990, p. 343). When debate over the 1972 amendments to Title VII allowed Congress another chance to review executive order affirmative action, Senator Ervin offered four amendments prohibiting race-conscious hiring goals in federal government contracts. All were soundly defeated (Schuwerk 1972, pp. 753–57; Jones 1985, p. 914).

<sup>13</sup> The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said: “It is the Court’s belief that the denial of equal employment opportunity must be eliminated from our society. It is beyond question, that present employment practices have fostered and perpetuated a system that has effectively maintained a segregated class. That concept . . . is repugnant, unworthy and contrary to present national policy. The Philadelphia Plan will provide an unpolluted breath of fresh air to ventilate this unpalatable situation . . . The destiny of minority group employment is the primary issue and the Philadelphia Plan will provide an equitable solution to this troublesome problem” (311 F suppl. 1002, p. 1012).

In sum, by the early 1970s, court, congressional, and executive branch action had made systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action the full-blown winner among the packages characterizing the meaning of affirmative action in government contracts. Systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action also won in Title VII enforcement, when the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed disparate impact theory, and Congress did not use the 1972 amendments to Title VII to invalidate the Supreme Court's endorsement.<sup>14</sup> Later action by courts and Congress further institutionalized the shift in the legal meaning of equal employment opportunity. For nearly 20 years—until the Supreme Court in 1989 used the constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny to invalidate Richmond, Virginia's, minority set-aside program—dominant legal-cultural interpretations of equal employment opportunity included race-conscious affirmative action to correct for systemic patterns of discrimination.<sup>15</sup> Until 1989, aggressive affirmative action was the norm for federal, state, and local equal employment policies.

#### DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Analyses of the context and content of the Philadelphia Plan hearings highlight *one* key way prior state policies feed forward to affect future state policies: through actors' use of prior policies to construct cultural resources for political and legal conflicts over how the policies should be interpreted and enforced. We have shown four symbolic packages—three from plan opponents and one from supporters—constructed based on specific words and general values embedded in codified law, as well as on words, values, and rhetoric expressing prior debates over law enactment and enforcement. Constructing these packages, in turn, required cultural strategies shaped by the *content* of policies at issue but also by generally

<sup>14</sup> The Supreme Court is the final judge of US *constitutional* issues. When the Court interprets a federal statute, Congress—which enacts statutes—is final arbiter. As did the 1991 Civil Rights Act with respect to the 1989 *Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio* (490 US 462) decision violating disparate impact, Congress can change Court statutory interpretation by amending the statute (Stryker 1996b).

<sup>15</sup> Prior to *Richmond (City of) v. J. A. Croson*, 1989, a Supreme Court *majority* never had applied a strict scrutiny test for affirmative action programs. Strict scrutiny developed under the Constitution's equal protection clause to deal with state actions involving racial classifications discriminating *against* blacks. For race-conscious state action to survive strict scrutiny, the state must show a tight connection between the race-conscious action and a "compelling" state interest. Once strict scrutiny is deemed the correct legal standard, it is very hard for race-conscious state action to be judged valid. Until the *Richmond* case, the only major Supreme Court inroad against aggressive affirmative action in employment came from cases in which the Court said seniority principles should circumscribe affirmative action's scope (Stryker 1996b).

accepted *forms* of argument. The hearings were political theater, aimed at state officials and a mass national public alike, and also a quasi legal event about law enforcement. Strategies for package building reflected the event's dual political/legal identity and its dual national state elite/national mass public audience. Strategies included using vivid rhetoric applied to evocative situations, where both rhetoric and situations resonated with equal opportunity values interpreted as color-blindness, and also included preexisting legitimate legal techniques of broad and narrow statutory construction. No matter to what degree the support of diverse promoters of the Philadelphia Plan (and/or disparate impact theory) may have been motivated by socioeconomic interests and/or political ideology and/or pragmatic political interests in addition to, or instead of, any particular legal criterion, no matter whether, or to what degree, supporters pushed the meaning of equal employment law beyond what nonpartisan legal analysts of 1964 would have expected to be the law's limits, supporters *still* had to establish legal legitimacy for their symbolic package's content by grounding it in one or more preexisting legitimate legal-interpretive technique.

Crystallization of packages and strategies at the plan hearings and the resounding victories of the plan supporters' package in the hearings' aftermath helped channel later state policy and conflict over it. Fully explaining how and why supporters' cultural recasting met with political and legal success is beyond the scope of this article, which focused on how opponents and supporters mobilized the combination of cultural strategies and symbolic packages that they did. But our sketch of the plan hearings' context and epilogue suggests that a *conjunction* of supporter-constructed cultural resources with various *other* factors may have been responsible for supporters' success. Such important *other* factors were the historical reality of prior institutionalized race discrimination, including documented discrimination in Philadelphia, blacks' poor economic situation, substantial economic inequality between blacks and whites, the racial turmoil and violence of the 1960s, and the Nixon administration and fellow Republicans' perceived interests in promoting a split between the core Democratic Party constituencies of labor and civil rights. Whereas the final factor listed clearly played into supporters' political success, other listed factors—known to judges and politicians alike—probably contributed to supporters' legal, as well as political, success.

Whatever the motive for key political and legal decisions, court and executive branch orders must be rationalized and justified through legitimate legal-interpretive techniques. The symbolic packages and cultural strategies mobilized by plan supporters helped provide such justification. Without the credible technical-legal and political cultural arguments supporters made, state actors would not have had the legitimate cultural re-

sources they needed to make decisions they might have been predisposed to make on other grounds. In any case, the Third Circuit Court's endorsement of the Philadelphia Plan combined with later Supreme Court endorsement of the disparate impact principle, meant that for 20 years, equal employment law enforcement revolved around further elaborating conditions under which systematic patterns of discrimination allowed for or required various kinds of "corrective action" (see Player 1988).

After legal resolution of the Philadelphia Plan debates, newly defensive affirmative action opponents would be forced to make their case on the legally accepted turf of systematic discriminatory patterns requiring corrective action. They would do so in part by combining and molding their qualifications and merit and no racial considerations packages into the potentially punchier no reverse discrimination package (see Gamson and Modigliani 1987, pp. 149, 163).<sup>16</sup> As affirmative action programs became institutionalized, some opponents also would transform concerns that these programs would compel hiring qualified minorities over equally qualified whites into a package centered on how affirmative action provided "undeserved advantages" for minorities who were less well qualified than whites (see Gamson and Modigliani 1987, pp. 149, 164, and n.12). As for affirmative action supporters, as President Clinton's statement quoted in this article's introduction shows, they further refined their systematic patterns of discrimination requiring corrective action package, while responding to refocusing opponents by stressing the persistence of discrimination against minorities and the opportunities affirmative action presented to qualified minorities (see also Lewin 1995; Frisby 1995).

Clearly, we must be wary about generalizing based on one case, no matter how carefully analyzed and no matter in how abstract and general a fashion the case is conceptualized (see, e.g., Stryker 1996a). But based on our case analysis, table 6 offers some empirically grounded tentative hypotheses about *which* cultural strategies under *which* conditions are more or less likely to be available to—and chosen by—actors struggling over policy interpretation and enforcement.

<sup>16</sup> Reverse discrimination appears more times (11) in the testimony of Philadelphia Plan supporters—arguing that the plan is *not* reverse discrimination—than in the testimony of plan opponents criticizing the plan (5). Contrast between opponents' few mentions of reverse discrimination and the many more times they explained their position using the words *preferential treatment* (34), *racial considerations* (34), and *quotas* (126) shows their relative lack of emphasis on reverse discrimination to mobilize plan opposition, even though their no racial considerations package argued that the plan required discriminating against qualified whites in favor of qualified minorities. The comptroller general's opinion that the revised plan was illegal contains one reference to the plan's style of affirmative action as "reverse discrimination" (U.S. Comptroller General 1969, 49:59–71).

The hypotheses are not exhaustive, and to operationalize and test them requires work well beyond our empirically grounded theoretical contribution itself. But our hypotheses can orient and guide future empirical work. This is especially so since we provide precise definitions for our hypotheses' key concepts. Providing detailed instructions for every measurement issue arising in future theory-testing research is beyond our article's scope. But appendix B does provide an overall strategy for operationalizing our theory's key concepts; it is intended both to guide researchers wishing to empirically examine our theory and to show readers that such empirical examination is feasible.

Hypotheses in table 6 revolve around concepts of (1) value centrality and (2) explicitness of legal language. Our definition of values as "modes of conduct or states of existence . . . worthy of protection and promotion" follows Snow et al. (1986, p. 469) and is particularly conducive to formulating hypotheses such as ours, which consider how values incorporated in law shape later political and legal behavior. Hypotheses using the term "general" prior to the term "value" do so to signal the value's expression in relatively abstract and general form, *not* the degree to which the value is widespread in the population.<sup>17</sup> By *centrality*, we mean the degree to which *values are essential to, or dominate, citizens' characterizations of American political cultural ideals and identity. Central American values are ones that Americans identify as fundamental to American political cultural ideals and that they presume are widely supported by others in the population, whether or not they themselves support the value.* Thus, values like liberty, equality before the law, democracy, and equal opportunity, which public opinion polls since the 1940s show Americans widely endorse on the abstract general level (see, e.g., Westie 1965; Yankelovich 1994, p. 23; McClosky and Zaller 1984, pp. 65–66, 83–86; Huntington 1981, p. 18), become central to the degree that Americans identify them as essential to that for which their country stands.

By *explicitness*, we mean *the degree to which, for legal professionals*

<sup>17</sup> In practice, the degree to which a value is widespread often correlates with the degree to which it is expressed in abstract and general fashion. For example, Westie (1965) found 98% of his sample of white Americans in Indianapolis agreed "everyone in America should have equal opportunities to get ahead" and "children should have equal educational opportunities"; 97% agreed that "each person should be judged according to his own individual worth." Support dropped to 60%, 79%, and 67%, respectively, when the values were given concrete applications of being willing to "have a Negro as my supervisor in my place of work," "[have] Negro children attend the same school my children go to," and "[have] my children . . . taught by a Negro school teacher." But generality of values and the degree to which they are widespread are conceptually distinct, with the correlation between the two an empirical question. We would not, e.g., expect the general value of communism to receive such widespread support among Americans as do freedom, democracy, and equal opportunity.

TABLE 6  
GENERAL HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis	Value Centrality
1	The more central the general cultural value incorporated into law, the higher the <i>absolute value</i> of its worth as a symbolic resource, and the less likely actors engaged in debate over law interpretation and enforcement will be to engage in cultural strategies that sidestep the value.
1A	The more central the general cultural value incorporated into law, the more likely are actors whose policy and legal positions are <i>consistent</i> with dominant meanings attributed to the value in prior law enactment and enforcement to mobilize the value in subsequent debates over law interpretation and enforcement.
1B	The more central the general cultural value incorporated into law, the more likely are actors whose policy and legal positions are <i>inconsistent</i> with dominant meanings attributed to the value in prior law enactment and enforcement to <i>recast the value</i> so that they can mobilize it on behalf of their position.
1C	The more central the general cultural value incorporated into law, the <i>less</i> likely are actors whose policy and legal positions are <i>inconsistent</i> with dominant meanings attributed to the value in prior law enactment and enforcement to substitute for the "inconvenient" value another cultural value incorporated into law that they can claim their policy position promotes.
1D	The more central the general cultural value incorporated into law, the more likely that actors in strong rhetorical positions based on technical-legal forms of argument will go beyond technical-legal strategies to demonstrate attitudinal support and behavioral adherence to the value.
Explicitness of Codified Legal Language	
2	The greater the explicitness of legal language used to express the codified prohibitions, duties, rights or empowerments that enact a general cultural value into law, the higher the <i>absolute value</i> of its worth as a symbolic resource, and the more likely actors disputing law interpretation and enforcement will engage in semantic debates.
2A	The greater the explicitness of codified legal language, the more likely are actors whose position is <i>consistent</i> with the exact legal words to mobilize those legal words on behalf of their position.
2B	The greater the explicitness of codified legal language, the more likely are actors whose position is <i>inconsistent</i> with the exact legal words to substitute a legal-interpretive strategy requiring argument from broad policy purposes of codified law for a

TABLE 6 (*Continued*)

Hypothesis	Explicitness of Codified Legal Language
2C	strategy that mobilizes exact legal words for narrow statutory construction
2D	The greater the explicitness of codified legal language, the more likely are actors whose position is inconsistent with the exact legal words to engage in defensive semantic debates about meaning.
	The less the explicitness (alternatively, the greater the ambiguity) of codified legal language, the more likely are actors on both sides of the policy debate to rely on the technical-legal strategy of constructing broad policy purposes and of eschewing semantic debates

NOTE.—Definitions of value centrality and explicitness of codified legal language are provided in the text. App. B suggests how these key concepts might be operationalized in future work empirically examining the theory. App. B also discusses establishing consistency/inconsistency with dominant meanings attributed to values and with exact legal words, as contemplated by these hypotheses.

reading codified law, the words establishing codified prohibitions, duties, rights and/or empowerments are clear, precise, and specific, as opposed to vague, imprecise, and ambiguous. Our concept of explicitness incorporates the audience of legal experts because formal legal training and socialization in a national legal culture provide knowledge of legitimate legal-interpretive techniques and meanings of basic legal terms (e.g., contract, tort) against which judgments about statutory explicitness reasonably can be made. Since meaning always is interpreted, we assume that code meanings never are perfectly clear or fixed. But we also assume that some codes provide room for a greater range of later interpretations than do others.

We may be first to try to define value centrality and explicitness of codified legal language for systematic sociocultural analyses, but the assumption of variation along these lines exists in prior scholarship. Regarding explicitness, scholars indicate that, if political compromise and coalition building often lead to ambiguities in codified legal language (e.g., Easterbrook 1984), still, some laws are more ambiguous than others (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1992; Edelman 1992). Edelman (1992) has argued that Title VII is ambiguous because it fails to define what it prohibits—discrimination. But, Title VII does contain several clarifying provisions enumerating behaviors that do not constitute discrimination (see above). Thus, Title VII arguably is less ambiguous than is, for example, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sullivan 1977, pp. 808–9), which failed to define what it prohibited—contracts or combinations in restraint of trade—and also contained no clarifying provisions enumerating acts that did not constitute restraint of trade. Conversely, Title VII arguably is more

ambiguous than a statute like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which more specifically defines both what is, and what is not, a prohibited unfair labor practice (Gorman 1977, pp. 798–808).

Regarding centrality, many scholars purport to identify a fundamental American creed, including liberty, equality, rule of law, individualism, and laissez-faire (e.g., Myrdal 1944; Hartz 1955; Rossiter 1962; Huntington 1981; Skrentny 1996). These values often are not consistent among themselves but hold together loosely to define that for which America stands. Some scholars incorporate these “liberal democratic” values into a broader ethos of sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting values associated with capitalism, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other (e.g., Lipset 1963, 1993; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Hofstader 1951). Here, property rights, universalism, achievement, and competition are as central as liberty, equality, and so forth, but values not as closely associated with either capitalism or democracy, for example, “beliefs about progress and the perfectibility of man . . . faith in rationalism, compassion for the needy, and religion” (McClosky and Zaller 1984, p. 17), are seen as less central. Still other scholars stress how core are the ideals, as well as practices, of white supremacy (e.g., Smith 1993). But even these scholars, who strongly dispute the existence of any *single* creed, stress centrality of a finite number of multiple strongly conflicting sets of ideals, including ascriptive race and gender hierarchy, but also republicanism and liberal-democratic ideals (Smith 1993). In short, diverse prior views suggest some values are more central than others and also see equality values—explicitly including equality of opportunity—as historically and contemporaneously central (e.g., Yankelovich 1994; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Lipset 1993).<sup>18</sup>

Having defined key concepts around which our hypotheses are built, and referred readers interested in future operationalization strategies to appendix B, we now discuss the underlying theoretical logic of our hypotheses. As shown in table 6, hypotheses about centrality reflect our case study findings about strategies and packages mobilized by Philadelphia Plan opponents and supporters, including objectively possible alternative strategies supporters failed to take, and arguably unnecessary strategies taken by opponents. They also assume that symbols that have broad and deep cultural resonance take on higher positive resource value. If actors construct cultural strategies bounded by legally embedded general values that are *central* to political cultural discourse, then those whose position is consistent with dominant meanings previously attributed to

<sup>18</sup> That prior scholarship does not agree on which values beyond, e.g., liberty and equality, are core or fundamental and which are not, does not preclude valid and reliable measures of our precisely defined concept of value centrality. For operationalization issues, see app. B.

those values in law enactment and enforcement have an easy opportunity to construct symbols with broad and deep cultural resonance.<sup>19</sup> This is what happened in our case since, in the immediate wake of Title VII's passage, color-blind equal treatment of individuals was the dominant legal meaning attributed to Title VII equal opportunity. Actors whose position is inconsistent with dominant meanings previously attributed to central values embedded in law have strong incentives to turn constraint into opportunity. These actors are constrained by value centrality to remain on terrain constituted by these values, rather than to substitute *other* values that they could more easily mobilize to support their position. Yet the dominant extant meaning of the central value—a value defined in our theory as one most Americans identify as fundamental to American political culture and one they presume others support—provides high negative resources for these actors. Thus, once these actors adopt the value in their arguments, they also must recast the value. If they do not, they are very likely to lose the debate. If, because of some *conjuncture* of their cultural arguments with political, economic, and social context, value recasting is a winning strategy, actors who recast a central legal value will have fundamentally reconstituted the policy terrain. In the case we examined revolving around equal opportunity values, this is what happened.

Where Skrentny (1996) stressed how powerful were discourses of "tradition" for crafting equal employment policy, our hypotheses suggest more precisely—both for equal employment policy and more generally—how "traditional" values embedded in law are mobilized, and by whom, and under what conditions these values are likely to be recast to *reinvent* tradition. In turn, this begins to address the key issue of the "genesis of new packages of ideas and their entry" into policy-making processes (Burstein et al. 1995, p. 81). Finally, given dual legal/political and state/mass public audiences, no matter how strong a rhetorical position actors can achieve by relying on technical-legal strategies alone, they will likely mobilize complementary political cultural strategies that play to politicians and a mass political audience. Again, in plan hearings, this is what happened.

As shown in table 6, where value centrality affects especially how—and how likely—political actors are to mobilize value *meaning* for debates over law enforcement, explicitness affects especially the *form* of cultural strategy actors will choose when constructing symbolic packages. Since arguing narrowly from codified and legislative history words and arguing from a code's broad policy purposes are both institutionalized technical-

<sup>19</sup> See app. B, final paragraph, for suggestions on how researchers might operationalize both the dominant legal meanings previously attributed to general values incorporated into law, and for how researchers might begin operationalizing consistency/inconsistency with these dominant meanings.

legal strategies, actors will choose the strategy maximally enhancing their policy position. Actors whose positions are most consistent with exact words expressing codified prohibitions, requirements, and so forth are most likely to rely on those exact words by using a strategy highlighting what *they* will call law's "plain language." This is what Philadelphia Plan opponents did. Actors whose positions are least consistent with exact language will be pushed to engage in semantic debates to defend against the technical-legal strategy of narrow statutory construction. At the same time, these actors likely will mount a rhetorical *offense* relying on the alternative technical-legal strategy of arguing from broad policy purposes. To the degree that a value explicitly operationalized by words of a legal prohibition is central, actors whose position is most inconsistent with these words have most incentive to engage in semantic debate over the meaning of specific codified terms, even as they are *recasting* the more general value acknowledged to be embedded in law. This is what plan supporters did.

Skrentny (1996) shows that in internal discussion, the staff of agencies charged with implementing equal employment law mobilized a "pragmatic discourse," emphasizing that minority employment results were needed to show effective law enforcement. Administrative pragmatism, *by itself*, will not persuade courts (or, for different reasons, a mass audience expecting evocative political rhetoric). However, given interventionist laws like Title VII, aimed to produce effects on the social world, an administrative strategy of effective enforcement readily translates into the pre-existing *legal* strategy of broad statutory construction. So translated, it is a strategy appropriate to, and legitimated for, a judicial audience. In turn, broad statutory construction, which mobilizes policy purposes to interpret interventionist law, often becomes *sociological* in emphasizing (1) real world situations the law is intended to affect and (2) policies most likely to effectively produce the intended effects. It is no accident that both promoters and detractors of results-oriented policies like disparate impact theory and Philadelphia Plan-style affirmative action think these innovations were grounded in highly sociological jurisprudence (see, e.g., Blumrosen 1971, 1984; Belz 1991). And it is no accident that equal employment law enforcers testifying at plan hearings emphasized broad statutory construction.

Finally, we intend our hypotheses to apply to situations which, like the Philadelphia Plan hearings, are formally institutionalized, public debates occurring in electoral democratic contexts in which legislative and executive branch policies receive interpretive judicial review. Situations within our theoretical scope thus are part political events staged for politicians and a national voting public and part law interpretation events staged for legal elites. Since hypotheses presume crafting symbols that appeal across these audiences, if one or more audience is lacking, hypotheses may

not hold. Similarly, our hypotheses represent reasoning about strategic alternatives for those cases in which U.S. codified law—in our case Title VII—expresses one general value. Thus they highlight American techniques of code construction and ways these *create* precedent, rather than suggesting what happens when there is *only* prior case law precedent, rather than a legal code (and any later case law interpreting that code) to interpret. They also highlight the choice between emphasizing, sidestepping, or reinterpreting *one* general value in law, rather than, for example, choices among emphasizing, reinterpreting, or downplaying one or more of a set of multiple general values of varying degrees of centrality—and more or less interval value consistency—that law may incorporate. In addition, current hypotheses do not consider how techniques of code construction and thus the available alternative technical-legal strategies may differ depending on whether the legal code is part of a Continental or an Anglo-American legal system (see, e.g., Stryker 1994). Finally, current hypotheses do not consider whether U.S. political culture is so highly legalized as compared to other political cultures (see, e.g., Lempert and Sanders 1986; Kelman 1981) that (independent of actors' expectations that laws they interpret are subject to judicial review and that their interpretive debates will reach a judicial audience) technical-legal strategies will permeate all political action and debate.

As future empirical work examines our current hypotheses within an American context, future theoretical work can extend their scope and substance. Such work should consider how variations in such factors as whether values are embodied in a legal code (vs. case law only), whether that code is part of an Anglo-American (vs. Continental) legal system, and whether the broader cultural environment in which law exists is more or less "legalized," affect the availability of, and choice among, diverse cultural strategies. Future theoretical work also should consider how the number, relative centrality, and degree of conflict among multiple general values embodied in law, and the number and nature of audiences for the debates over law enforcement, will affect the number and nature of cultural strategies that are (or are not) available and that are more or less likely to be chosen for constructing symbolic packages.

Clearly, much work remains to be done. But by using our analyses of the Philadelphia Plan hearings to develop hypotheses based on defined concepts of value centrality and explicitness, we go a long way toward specifying (1) how and why actors in our case constructed cultural resources as they did and (2) more general *conditions under which and ways in which* general values incorporated into code law and the codified legal words that incorporate them, mediate effects of past policy on future policy. Starting with concepts of policy feedback and cultural resource, we merged aspects of the sociologies of politics, law, and culture to begin

building theory about cultural mechanisms through which policies and laws feed forward in time. Though built around content-analyzing symbolic packages mobilized at one key moment in time, rather than on analyzing political careers of such packages over time, our theoretical discussion explains why actors in a defensive position due to value centrality and explicitness of legal language are pushed to promote legal transformation. Our case study and resulting theory also show how these actors promote such transformation—by recasting law's general values. This in turn provides insight into legal and policy dynamics.

We also increased knowledge about the equal employment arena. Today's affirmative action political and policy debates are at least proximately shaped by the Supreme Court's 1989 *Richmond (City of) v. J. A. Croson* ruling, which showed political opponents of affirmative action that their judicial star was rising. Yet if the 1989 Supreme Court term and later intense politicization of equal employment opportunity—affirmative action represents another crucial moment and historical turning point in the equal employment arena (e.g., Stryker 1996b), it is not possible to examine how or why the transition occurred when or as it did without firmly grasping prior equal employment opportunity policy and politics. In short, no matter what side of today's affirmative action policy debates we find ourselves on, this article helps us better understand how, based on cultural strategies including alternative institutionalized methods of law interpretation, major contours of today's debates were constructed from words and values incorporated into prior equal employment law.

## APPENDIX A

TABLE A1

## WORDS AND PHRASES SIGNALING EQUAL EMPLOYMENT VALUES AND LANGUAGE

Ability	Group rights	Preferential treatment
Achievement	Historic(al) discrimination	Procedure
Affirmative action	Individual(ism)	Process
Ascription	Individual competition	Productivity
Because of race	Individual rights	Qualifications
Color-blind(ness)	Majority group membership	Qualified
Corrective action	Majority group rights	Quotas
Discrimination	Merit	Racial balance
Discriminatory employment practices	Minority group employment	Racial considerations
Education	Minority group exclusion(s)	Racial imbalance
Employment practices	Minority group availability	Ranges
Equal employment opportunity(ies)	Minority group membership	Recruitment
Equal opportunity(ies)	Minority group participation	Remedial action
Equal competition	Minority group representation	Remedies
Equal outcomes	Minority group (under-) utilization	Representative numbers
Equal protection	Nondiscrimination	Results
Equal results	On account of race	Reverse discrimination
Equal rewards	On (the) basis of race	Skill(s)
Equality of opportunity(ies)	Outcome(s)	Skilled
Equality of results	Particularism	Systematic discrimination
Goals	Past discrimination	Systematic patterns of discrimination
Group competition	Patterns of discrimination	Training
Group interests	Percentages	Universism
	Positive action	Without regard to race

Note.—List is designed to be overinclusive. Close examination of all passages containing any of these words and phrases allowed us to eliminate instances in which the words and phrases were used in ways other than to evoke equal opportunity values. For example, when Comptroller General Staus states "We appreciate this *opportunity* to appear before the subcommittee to discuss our position with respect to the Revised Philadelphia Plan," the word "opportunity" is not used to evoke any meaning of equal opportunity values. Note that words and phrases listed here encompass the widest possible range of meanings attributed to equal employment opportunity from, e.g., race-blind equal treatment to, e.g., race-conscious equal results, and are intended to capture controversy over what is, and what is not, equal employment opportunity.

## APPENDIX B

## Operationalizing Key Theoretical Concepts in Future Empirical Research

*Explicitness.*—Future hypothesis testing requires researchers to measure the *relative explicitness* or conversely the ambiguity of statutes and executive orders against each other. Compilations of statutes and executive orders are available as sampling frames in law libraries. Like early measures of corporatism relying on experts' judgment about features of state institutional context (see, e.g., Pampel, Williamson, and Stryker 1990), we suggest that first attempts to measure explicitness as we have defined it ask legal experts to rank various legal codes according to the

degree to which they are clear and precise about what behavior they prohibit, require, and so forth and then to explain why they ranked as they did. Experts would be encouraged to articulate specific criteria they used in ranking, and consistency between raters on ranking and rationales would be examined. To help generate the initial set of codes to be ranked, legal experts in one or more areas of federal law—not the same experts used in the study itself—could be asked to identify statutes and executive orders with which they are familiar and to indicate which of these are relatively clear, relatively unclear, and somewhere in the middle. This would help ensure that codes ranked in the study would, in fact, vary on explicitness. The information gained from the study then could be used to generate measurement criteria that are more precise and are applicable beyond the initial group of ranked statutes and executive orders to more representative samples of legal codes. If reliable, even a crude categorization of relative explicitness of a small number of strategically selected American legal codes would enable qualitative comparative analyses examining our hypotheses' empirical plausibility (see Stryker 1996a). In turn, this would help pave the way for quantitative hypothesis testing using large numbers of cases.

*Value centrality.*—Beyond a small set of values (including equal opportunity) that virtually all prior scholarship agrees are fundamental to American political culture, prior scholarship does not agree on which values are central and which are not. Testing our hypotheses requires that future empirical work measure *relative centrality* of abstract general values. Following our definition, one way to begin measuring value centrality would be to conduct a public opinion poll asking a representative sample of respondents, first in open-ended fashion, then with the aid of a list of abstract general values culled from prior scholarship and from the advice of historians and social scientists from diverse perspectives, what general values they think express the ideals America stands for. Researchers would make clear they are interested in ideals, *not* practices. Respondents then could be asked to rank values they identified as expressing American ideals in order of importance. Poll respondents also could be asked which of the entire list of values they thought most other Americans supported and to rank those values in order of how important they presumed the values were to others as a group. The initial list of values given to respondents should include all those thought central by *any* of the diverse scholarly schools mentioned in the text as well as values *any* or *all* the schools argue are not central (including values they assume Americans might identify as antithetical, irrelevant, or relevant but not important to American ideals). To ensure that values expressed in a wide range of legal codes are included in lists of values ranked in polls, legal experts across diverse substantive areas could be asked to indicate, based on codified laws and

accompanying legislative histories with which they are familiar, what general values—desirable states of existence or modes of conduct—these laws promote. Statutes often contain statements of background and purpose that are especially useful for interpreting the general values they enact. Ideally, value centrality would be measured a short time prior to the symbolic packaging being studied. But replicating at routine intervals the type of questions suggested would enable an assessment of the future stability of value centrality. For past periods for which no data of the type outlined are available, researchers still could get a more indirect handle on value centrality. For policy debates since the 1940s, they could use public opinion polls suggestive of the relative numbers of people holding diverse abstract values. If they were willing to assume that the likelihood that people identify a value as supported by others positively covaries with the relative number of people who themselves support the value, existing poll data could be used to create at least crude measures of value centrality. For policy debates for which no relevant poll data exists, researchers could identify experts from diverse perspectives on American culture of the relevant time period. Then, using questions similar to those suggested above to tap public opinion, researchers could ask these experts to identify and rank the relative importance of diverse general values to American ideals.

Writing questions from which to construct valid and reliable measures of value centrality may not be easy but given our precise definitions and our hypotheses, constructing these measures is both possible and worth doing. We assume future efforts to operationalize value centrality will consult public opinion, survey, and measurement experts. As with all efforts to measure newly defined abstract concepts, we assume much small-scale pretesting of questions before an initial survey. If pretesting showed, for example, that an open-ended lead-in question failed, a substitute lead-in question might give freedom as an example of a general value sometimes said to be an ideal for which America stands. This should create minimal bias since almost all scholars suggest freedom is a core American value, and polls show “overwhelming” support for it on an abstract, general level (e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984, pp. 36–38). Multiple item indicators for some values may be needed since, for example, in response to an open-ended question, some respondents might list *freedom* and others the synonym *liberty* as an ideal for which America stands. As with measuring explicitness, first attempts to measure relative centrality of a diverse list of values may be rather crude. But they can be improved upon based on information they elicit. As with research on explicitness, even qualitative comparative analysis of laws incorporating values of varying degrees of centrality, for example, laws embodying arguably more central equal opportunity values versus laws embodying arguably less

central (to American political culture) safety values, could provide useful evidence bearing on empirical plausibility, while paving the way for later quantitative hypothesis testing. When researchers conduct polls to tap value centrality, they also can follow past strategies for surveying enough members of various political elites so that mass and elite opinions can be compared (see, e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984). This would yield data on similarities and differences in mass and elite perceptions of the relative centrality of various abstract values (similar to data available from past research on similarities and differences in values personally held by elites and masses). Such knowledge would be useful in operationalizing our hypotheses about value centrality because our theory presumes that actors want, and need, to mobilize those general values that their audiences think are fundamental to political-cultural ideals for which America stands.

So far, we have addressed operationalizing value centrality itself. Since our theory hinges on the relative centrality of general values incorporated in law, it also must be possible to measure the general values that law incorporates. Again, we suggest small  $N$  comparative work prior to large  $N$  quantitative hypothesis testing. Researchers could begin small  $N$  empirical examination by giving multiple coders with legal knowledge the previously discussed initial list of general values. Coders could be asked to consider each of a list of relevant statutes and executive orders and identify which one or more of the general values are promoted as desirable states of existence and/or modes of conduct by which of the statutes and executive orders. Coders also could be asked to enumerate any values not on the list that they think the statutes and orders promote. Consistency between coders could be assessed. As we did for Title VII, researchers can survey legal scholarship from the relevant time, in our case, right after Title VII passed, to establish the *dominant meaning* of values incorporated into law. (If—unlike our case—it is not possible to establish the dominant meaning for the relevant time period, then the case is not within our theory's current scope.) Once a research team has coded the dominant meaning of values incorporated into law, they also can code policy positions expressed in the debates they study. Multiple coders could use a ranking scale (from highly inconsistent to highly consistent) to rate diverse policy positions' consistency with these dominant meanings (to test hypotheses 1a–1d) and with exact legal words (to test 2a–2d). Coders should have legal training for the latter task.

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# **Whose Expectations Matter? The Relative Power of First- and Second-Order Expectations in Determining Social Influence<sup>1</sup>**

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Two types of expectations are proposed to guide social interaction: those one holds for herself (first-order expectations) and those one believes others hold for her (second-order expectations). Also, interaction is assumed to be guided by three motives: contributing to group performance, preserving status, and facilitating interaction. These points are developed by formally incorporating ideas regarding reflected self-appraisals, dramaturgical accounts of the interaction order, and expectancy-value theory into status characteristics theory. When first- and second-order expectations conflict and an actor's motives are equally weighted, it is suggested that second-order expectations guide interaction. An initial experiment provides empirical support and insight for discussion.

Social scientists have long recognized that an important dimension of social interaction involves acquiring information about the people with whom we are interacting (e.g., Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Gergen 1991; Giddens 1984; Goffman 1959; Simmel [1908] 1950; Turner 1987; Turner 1962). This acquisition occurs through the exchange and negotiation of signs regarding who we are and who we believe others are. It may involve such mundane acts as wearing a uniform, displaying a diploma, or exchanging business cards. Through such symbolic exchange, though,

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we establish a social order that details who we are in relation to others—our social standing. Moreover, this negotiated exchange establishes the rights and obligations of actors, including who should defer to whom and who is expected to exercise influence over others. The negotiated social order is a fundamental source of action in a social setting: a determinant of how people behave toward one another and how social action is allocated.

Like others, we conceptualize the negotiation of the social order as an exchange of actors' expectations for themselves and others and recognize two types of expectations: (1) the expectations an actor holds for herself and (2) the expectations an actor believes others hold for her. Following Moore (1985), we refer to these expectations as *first-order* and *second-order* expectations, respectively. If we acknowledge the negotiated nature of interaction and recognize the two sources of expectations, another question becomes apparent: Whose expectations matter—the expectations an actor holds for herself or the expectations an actor believes others hold for her? This question probes the basis of social interaction and is at the heart of the theory and research we present. In this article, we develop a theoretical framework describing interaction both when one's own expectations are consistent with those others hold and when one's own expectations conflict with those held by others. We build our framework on the foundation of status characteristics theory (e.g., Berger et al. 1972), utilizing the strategy, concepts, and method of this research program, while explicitly incorporating insights from symbolic interactionism and expectancy-value theory. This framework yields claims on action, cognition, and affect under consistent and conflicting expectations. We will describe results from an initial experimental test of these claims and conclude with a discussion of the framework's implications for social interaction and further research.

## SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF EXPECTATIONS

As we have indicated, expectations are a key factor in social interaction. As such, most social psychological theories either implicitly or explicitly accord expectations a conceptual role. Variants of status characteristics theory and symbolic interactionism each acknowledge that expectations have a distinctly dual character, involving both an actor's own expectations and the expectations the actor believes others hold. We begin with an overview of these conceptualizations, which we later synthesize into a systematic theory of expectations in social interaction.

### Status Characteristics Theory

Status characteristics theory (SCT), an expectation states theory, describes how social characteristics (such as age, gender, race) relate to different

levels of influence by actors in social groups. Berger et al. (1972) argue that observable characteristics that differentiate group members are invested with social value. This social value, in turn, generates a status hierarchy in the group and, consequently, expectations about the relative competence of different members. Higher-status actors are expected to be more competent than lower-status actors. For example, in a group of engineers, seniority might differentiate group members. Those who have been engineers longer are likely to be evaluated more highly than newer engineers. In this example, seniority, a basis on which members of the group can be differentiated, becomes a source of differential status for group members and hence differential competency expectations. Compared to members expected to be less competent, members expected to be more competent will (1) be asked to contribute to the group more often, (2) accept invitations to contribute more often, (3) receive more positive evaluations, and (4) exercise greater influence over other members. The important point of this line of work for us is that competency expectations and differences in the interaction rates and styles of actors arise from *perceived* social differences among members of a group.

Since the initial articulation of SCT, a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work has refined our understanding of how status, expectations, and influence operate in groups. In an extension of SCT, Cohen and Silver (1989) point out that individual participation in groups is guided by two motives: (1) contributing to group performance and (2) avoiding status loss. According to Cohen and Silver, concern over status loss guides individual choices regarding when and how to participate. Consequently, the two motives can imply a paradox for members: Individuals are compelled to contribute through participation yet this places them at risk of losing status because their participation is subject to evaluation by others. Drawing on early work in SCT and by Bales et al. (1951), Cohen and Silver (1989) also note that lower-status actors are more likely to receive negative evaluations for their contributions than higher-status actors as a result of status organizing and maintenance processes. The key points in this line of work are that (1) member participation is guided by both a motive to contribute to group performance and a motive to protect one's status and (2) an actor's status, and hence her expectations about her competence relative to others, determines the likelihood that she will be negatively evaluated and lose status in the group.

In early articulations of SCT and in most developments like those of Cohen and Silver (1989), the expectations that are the determinants of action are those an actor holds for self in relation to others, or the actor's first-order expectations. Drawing on Cooley's (1902) articulation of reflected self-appraisal, however, Webster and Sobieszek (1974) developed formal arguments suggesting that expectations may also arise from an

evaluator, or source, who is not a member of the task group. This line of SCT research (referred to as "source theory") asserts that if an actor accepts an evaluator as a source, then she will hold expectations for self and other that are consistent with the source's evaluations of self and other. Additionally, source theory proposes that when conflicting evaluations are generated by two equally valued sources, then the actor will combine the evaluations in a manner leading to intermediate expectations (i.e., expectations that reflect both the high and the low evaluations). Fishek, Berger, and Norman (1995) integrate source theory into the mathematical framework of SCT, making it possible to generate more precise predictions on how sources outside the self affect expectations and actions.

Source theory represents the first explicit attempt within SCT to describe how others' expectations for self affect one's own expectations for self. However, it does not directly address how beliefs about another *interactant's* expectations for an actor will affect the actor, nor does it address how conflict between one's own and another interactant's expectations for self affect interaction. Moore (1985) addresses the former issue (though not the latter). Like Webster and Sobieszek (1974), Moore's arguments are influenced by Cooley (1902). Moore (1985) proposes that expectations involve not only first-order expectations but also a second component: the expectations that self believes other holds for self. Moore refers to this latter component as an actor's *second-order expectations*. In developing the concept of second-order expectations, Moore notes, as Cooley did, that an actor's self-conception is based not only on how she perceives herself but also on the appraisals she perceives that others make of her. This conceptualization is also consistent with Mead's (1934) insight that the self is composed of two parts, an "I" (self-as-subject) and a "me" (self-as-object), and that humans can view themselves both as subjects and as objects. In viewing one's self as an object, an actor assumes the perspective of others. That is, an actor views herself as others view her. As a result, the actor perceives others' expectations for her behavior, and she can adjust her behavior to conform to those expectations. First-order expectations (one's own expectations for self) correspond to Mead's "I" (self-as-subject), while second-order expectations (one's beliefs about others' expectations for self) correspond to Mead's "me" (self-as-object). The important point is that both first- and second-order expectations are key determinants of social interaction.

Moore (1985) also empirically demonstrated the role of second-order expectations in determining interaction. In Moore's experiment, subjects believed they were interacting with a partner (the "partner" was simulated through videotape equipment). Initially, the subjects were not given information about their hypothetical partners that would lead them to develop expectations regarding their own and their partner's competence. Then,

some of the subjects were provided with a contrived evaluation, purportedly from their partner. The evaluation revealed that the partner thought the subject was the most competent of the two. Thus, the subject still lacked first-order expectations but now had differentiating second-order expectations. Next, the subjects worked on a task in which they were given opportunities to either accept or reject the suggestions of their partners. Moore found that subjects with information that their partner had positively evaluated them (i.e., second-order expectations) rejected the partners' suggestions more frequently than subjects lacking an evaluation from their partner. Furthermore, in a poststudy questionnaire, subjects given second-order expectation information also rated themselves as more competent than their partner. Subjects who did not have second-order expectation information did not rate themselves as more or less competent than their partner. Thus, not only did subjects act on second-order expectations; they also developed first-order expectations on the basis of the second-order expectations.

Moore's study (1985) demonstrates that expectations involve two components: one's own expectations regarding self and other (first-order expectations) and one's beliefs about the expectations other holds for self and other (second-order expectations). Furthermore, Moore showed that second-order expectations affect (1) behavior in the absence of first-order expectations and (2) subsequent first-order expectations. To date, though, little is known about the *relative* power of first- and second-order expectations. We argue that first- and second-order expectations may not always be in agreement. For instance, an actor may have information about herself that other group members lack (e.g., skill, experience, and education), which she believes should garner her higher status and higher expectations of competence. In the absence of that information, others may allocate less status to her and hold lower expectations for her. Moreover, there may be barriers to transferring the information that result in sustained conflict between first- and second-order expectations. Such barriers may arise from sources including communication differences (e.g., a group characterized by cultural diversity) and normative constraints (e.g., a norm against self-aggrandizement). Irrespective of the source, incomplete information regarding self and other may generate conflict between first- and second-order expectations. That is, although both first- and second-order expectations may be present, they may not always be consonant.

### Symbolic Interactionism

*Reflected self-appraisal.*—As noted in Moore's work (1985), traditions in symbolic interactionism assert that the beliefs an actor has regarding the expectations others hold are important. In particular, an actor's sense

of self is partly based on the actor's beliefs about what others think of her. This derivation of the self is referred to as a *reflected self-appraisal*. In an early study of this phenomenon, Miyamoto and Dornbusch (1956) asked subjects to report their own self-evaluations, the evaluations they believed specific others would make of them, and the evaluations they believed that others in general would make of them. In addition, Miyamoto and Dornbusch collected actual evaluations others made of the subjects. Analyses indicated that a subject's self-evaluation most closely approximated the subject's beliefs about generalized others' evaluations. Also, the subjects' self-evaluations were closer to those they believed that specific others would make of them than to the ones that specific others actually made of them. In an extension of this work, Quarantelli and Cooper (1966) found that other-based self-evaluations were important predictors of future-oriented self-expectations. A longitudinal study of reflected self-appraisal (Felson 1989) advanced this work further by demonstrating a causal link between others' evaluations of self and subsequent self-evaluations. Finally, research by Matsueda (1992) links reflected self-appraisal to action. In a longitudinal study of delinquent behavior, Matsueda found that parents' appraisals of their children as delinquent were related to the youths' subsequent appraisals of themselves as delinquent. These self-appraisals were also associated with delinquent behaviors.

Together, these findings suggest that second-order expectations affect subsequent first-order expectations and action. However, they do not address our question regarding how conflict between salient first- and second-order expectations will affect action. Before returning to this issue, though, we explore the insights of the dramaturgical approach with respect to second-order expectations.

*Dramaturgy.*—Dramaturgy (e.g., Goffman 1959) also emphasizes the role of second-order expectations in determining action. In dramaturgical analysis, actors have both individual and collective goals, and the achievement of both requires a predictable pattern of actions and reactions from others. The pattern is negotiated through the exchange of symbols, which define both the meaning of the situation and an actor's role in relation to others in that situation. Roles are not merely labels but rather sets of expectations defining the rights and obligations of persons occupying particular positions in the group. In a provocative interpretation from this perspective, Goffman (1959) referred to the collectively agreed upon situation and roles as the group's "working consensus." The working consensus is critical. Without it, actors may enact roles that contradict the roles other group members are enacting, which would undermine both individual and collective goals. To avoid such social accidents, Goffman notes that actors engage in symbolic exchanges to ensure that their own definitions of who they and others are receive consideration in the development of

the working consensus. Symbols can be exchanged through verbal channels (such as accents or explicit statements of identity), appearances (such as wearing a badge or uniform), or actions (such as the offering business cards or rising to greet another). Through such exchanges, actors proclaim their preferences regarding how the situation and their position within it should be defined.

According to Goffman, these preferences are subject to negotiation; an actor's definition of the situation may or may not be accepted by others. As such, the working consensus arrived at within a group may be more or less consistent with any single actor's preferred definition. Another important characteristic of Goffman's concept of a working consensus is that individuals need not privately concur with the working consensus. However, if the working consensus is not publicly enacted, both individual and collective goals will be threatened. That is, the working consensus is based on an actor's understanding of how the *collective* defines the situation and thus what *others* expect in the situation.

In a subsequent elaboration, Goffman (1967) suggested that actors sometimes accept the definition of the situation set forth by others when it conflicts with their own. This may occur because the definition offered by others is more favorable to the actor (e.g., generating greater social rewards such as respect or affection). Alternatively, an actor may accept a less favorable definition of the situation because the conditions surrounding the interaction do not justify attempting to change it. As such, if an actor anticipates only a limited interaction with another, she may endure an unfavorable definition of the situation offered by the other. For example, in a customer's interaction with a rude sales clerk, the clerk's behavior, and hence her definition of the situation, suggests that the customer is a loathsome individual. If the customer does not require ongoing interaction with the clerk, she may accept the definition. The customer might even be rude toward the clerk, which would allow her to punish the clerk's rudeness but would also signal acceptance of the definition of the situation (i.e., loathsome behavior). Although this situation is not harmonious, it would allow the transaction between the clerk and customer to proceed. In fact, attempts to redefine the situation might slow the transaction. Thus, insights from dramaturgy suggest that following the expectations others hold for self can facilitate interaction (even if they contradict one's own expectations) and, consequently, expedite the realization of individual and collective goals.

### Combining the Perspectives

The recognition that social settings entail both first- and second-order expectations suggests five configurations:

## Expectations

1. known first- and second-order expectations that are consistent with one another;
2. unknown first- and second-order expectations;
3. unknown first-order expectations and known second-order expectations;
4. known first-order expectations and unknown second-order expectations;
5. known first- and second-order expectations that conflict with one another.

Goffman (1967, 1959) provides descriptions of how social interaction might unfold in each of these scenarios, while Moore's work (1985) represents an empirical test of the third situation. In configuration 1, when first- and second-order expectations are known, interaction is not problematic. Goffman asserts that actors in these cases are immediately oriented toward maintenance of the social order, which is accomplished by enacting second-order expectations (which correspond to the first-order expectations). Configuration 2, which Goffman considers an initial interaction situation, occurs when both sets of expectations are unknown. Goffman suggests that actors in this situation first exchange definitions of the situation, through which first- and second-order expectations are found to be either consistent (as in configuration 1) or inconsistent (as in configuration 5). In the latter case, which corresponds to configuration 5, ongoing interaction requires maintenance of the social order. This, in turn, implies either resolution of the conflict or giving priority to the second-order expectations. As noted previously, Goffman suggests that actors will comply to the second-order expectations if they engender an advantageous social position (relative to the first-order expectations) or if the actor anticipates limited interaction. However, Goffman does not comment on how *ongoing* interaction is handled when first- and second-order expectations conflict and when second-order expectations do not confer an advantage. Configuration 3, unknown first-order expectations but known second-order expectations, involves a negotiation. In this case, Goffman indicates that the actor can elect to accept or reject the second-order expectations. Goffman, however, comments only on the acceptance or rejection of the second-order expectations with no explicit statement on if and/or how first-order expectations might be affected by the outcome. Moore (1985), however, demonstrated that when the second-order expectation is advantageous to the actor, she not only enacts the second-order expectation but also uses it to infer a first-order expectation. We note that Matsueda's work (1992) also suggests that second-order expectations are enacted even when they do not confer an advantage. When first-order expectations are known but second-order expectations are unknown (configuration 4), Goffman sug-

gests that actors exchange symbols to convey a definition of the situation. The other's response indicates her acceptance or rejection of the definition. Acceptance corresponds to configuration 1 (expectation consensus), while rejection corresponds to configuration 5 (expectation conflict).

These accounts offer insights on the role of expectations in social interaction; however, they fall short of providing a complete account. First, we note that Goffman's (1959, 1969) work is largely descriptive. To date, we are unaware of empirical tests of the outcomes he describes for the five configurations. Also, Goffman's description does not account for the effect of enacted second-order expectations on first-order expectations. Research on reflected self-appraisals clearly indicates that second-order expectations have an effect on first-order expectations and action. Additionally, Moore (1985) describes the effect of second-order expectations on first-order expectations and action through an integration of SCT and symbolic interactionism. Yet, there is no complete explicit account of the effects of conflicting first- and second-order expectations.

While Goffman (1959) acknowledges such a situation, we find his resolution incomplete. He offers only that effective interaction requires that conflict must be resolved. However, the dramaturgical metaphor that he skillfully employs offers an important insight on the nature of social interaction that is not explicitly addressed in SCT. Goffman suggests that an important motivation of actors is the facilitation of interaction, which allows individual and collective goals to be realized. Furthermore, Goffman shows that adherence to second-order expectations is critical to the facilitation of social interaction. Violation of second-order expectations will disrupt a social setting, threatening both individual and collective goals. The theory and research within SCT that we have described suggest that individuals are also motivated to contribute to the group and to avoid losing social status. These three motives in social interaction—contributing to the group, avoiding status loss, and facilitating social interaction—will be critical to our development of a theoretical framework for the analysis of first- and second-order expectations in groups. In the next section, we propose a formal elaboration of SCT that incorporates the strains of symbolic interactionism that we have discussed. From this theoretical elaboration, we derive predictions regarding the resolution of conflict between first- and second-order expectations in social interaction.

#### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF EXPECTATIONS**

Our strategy for developing a theory for the analysis of first- and second-order expectations is to build on Berger et al.'s (1972) SCT, generating what Wagner and Berger (1985) refer to as a "theoretical elaboration" of SCT. Also, we employ the graph-theoretic approach of SCT to model the

combined effects of first- and second-order expectations. Comprehensive discussions of SCT's theoretical components are available elsewhere (e.g., Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al. 1977; Webster and Foschi 1988). In the appendix, we provide a brief discussion of the components of the theory relevant to our framework. Below, we elaborate on these components and suggest additions to SCT that incorporate the effects of second-order expectations on social interaction.

### SCT Elaboration

The formulation of SCT provided in the appendix incorporates only first-order expectations (i.e., the expectations one holds regarding one's own and another's relative competencies). However, as we have noted, actors may also hold second-order expectations (i.e., the beliefs one has about another interactant's expectations regarding one's own and the other's relative competencies). These beliefs may arise from sources including the behavioral cues actors emit or information introduced by a third party.<sup>2</sup> We assert that second-order expectations affect a group's power and prestige order when they conflict with first-order expectations. By elaborating SCT to incorporate second-order expectations and addressing how an actor's motives in social interaction correspond to both first- and second-order expectations, we provide a more complete understanding of social interaction. We turn now to such an elaboration.

As we noted earlier, actors in task-oriented and collectively oriented groups have three motives. We articulate these motives as additional assumptions to the five SCT assumptions outlined in the appendix:

*ASSUMPTION 1.—Individuals seek to contribute to the group's performance.*

*ASSUMPTION 2.—Individuals seek to avoid losing status in the group.*

*ASSUMPTION 3.—Individuals seek to facilitate group interaction.*

In addition, we make the following assumption.

*ASSUMPTION 4.—Individuals maximize (or attempt to maximize) their outcomes across their motives for interaction.*

Also, we assume a burden of proof process with respect to first- and second-order expectations.

*ASSUMPTION 5.—Individuals assume that first- and second-order ex-*

<sup>2</sup> Fishek, Berger, and Norman (1995) offer a theoretical model detailing how external evaluations (from a noninteractant) affect the power and prestige order described by SCT. The model fits Webster and Sobieszek's (1974) data on conflicting evaluations from two external sources. However, as Fishek et al. note, additional evidence on conflicting evaluations from another interactant (i.e., second-order expectations) are needed to address the generality of their theoretical model.




FIG. 1.—Higher status  $p$  in an expectation-conflict setting (a dashed line between an actor [ $p$  or  $o$ ] and a component of the expectation structure generates a path for the actor associated with second-order expectations; a solid line between an actor and a component of the expectation structure generates a path associated with first-order expectations).

*pectations are consistent unless they receive information that explicitly indicates otherwise.*

We also add a limiting condition for the present test of our elaboration of SCT.<sup>4</sup> Individuals equally weight their motives for interaction (assumptions 2–4).

Since second-order expectations are only relevant when they are explicitly demonstrated to conflict with first-order expectations, we propose the two graph-theoretic representations in figures 1 and 2. Each figure depicts an alternative case of conflicting first- and second-order expectations. We refer to the two paths depicted in those figures (the progression  $p$  diagonally to  $D$ ,  $\Gamma$ ,  $C^*$ ,  $T$  in figs. 1 and 2 vs. the progression  $o$  diagonally to  $D$ ,  $\Gamma$ ,  $C^*$ ,  $T$  in figs. 1 and 2) as “second-order expectation structures.” The dashed line indicating the second-order expectation is consistent with Fişek et al.’s (1995) graph-theoretic representation of an imputed expectation from an external evaluator. We note that Moore’s work on the impact of second-order expectations in the absence of first-order expectations would be represented by only these two second-order expectation structures.

As we previously noted, we consider five possible configurations of first- and second-order expectations. Because second-order expectations are not activated unless conflict is explicit (assumption 5), configuration 1 (known

<sup>4</sup> We refer to this as a “limiting condition” because our theoretical elaboration accommodates situations in which motives are differentially weighted, though we do not examine such situations in the present work.




FIG. 2.—Lower status  $p$  in an expectation-conflict setting (a dashed line between an actor [ $p$  or  $o$ ] and a component of the expectation structure generates a path for the actor associated with second-order expectations, a solid line between an actor and a component of the expectation structure generates a path associated with first-order expectations).

and consistent first- and second-order expectations) and configuration 4 (known first-order but unknown second-order expectations) should engender the same nonproblematic unfolding of social interaction. Configuration 2 (unknown first- and second-order expectations) is detailed in Goffman's (1959) work describing the negotiation of the definition of the situation. Configuration 3 (unknown first-order expectations but known second-order expectations) is the situation that Moore (1985) tested. Configuration 5 (conflicting first- and second-order expectations) has not yet been explicitly addressed in empirical studies. Based on the articulation of second-order expectations that we have proposed and our elaboration of SCT to incorporate this construct, we can generate testable claims describing how conflict between first- and second-order expectations will affect social interaction under SCT's scope conditions. We turn now to the derivation of these claims.

#### Effects on Social Influence

As detailed in the appendix, the power and prestige order within a social group, and hence the relative influence of actors in the group, is determined within SCT by the calculation of an actor's expectation advantage. The expectation advantage is derived from a calculation of paths and path lengths connecting actors, status characteristics, and competency expectations to task outcomes. In our elaboration of SCT, we follow the strategy articulated in Berger et al. (1977) and begin with a simple status situation involving first- and second-order expectations. This simple situation involves only one diffuse status characteristic and (where relevant) one sec-

ond-order expectation structure. We use SCT's graph-theoretic calculus to determine  $p$ 's expectation advantage in each setting. For the higher-status  $p$  in an expectation-consistent setting,  $p$  has one positive path of length 4, one positive path of length 5, and no negative paths, while the other actor,  $o$ , has no positive paths, one negative path of length 4, and one negative path of length 5 (see appendix). Thus,

$$e_p = \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} = 0;$$

$$e_o = 0 - \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\}.$$

Consequently,  $p$ 's expectation advantage in this first situation is

$$\begin{aligned} e_1 &= e_p - e_o \\ &= \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} - [-\{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\}] \\ &= 2[f(4) + f(5) - f(4)f(5)]. \end{aligned}$$

Using the functional form for  $f(i)$  offered by Fisek, Norman, and Nelson-Kilger (1992; see appendix below),  $f(4) = .1358$  and  $f(5) = .0542$ . Substituting these values yields an expectation advantage for  $p$  in this situation of .3653.

For the lower-status  $p$  in the expectation-consistent setting,  $p$  has no positive paths, one negative path of length 4, and one negative path of length 5, while  $o$  has one positive path of length 4, one positive path of length 5, and no negative paths (see appendix). Using the same calculus and substitution of the Fisek et al. (1992)  $f(i)$  values,  $p$ 's expectation advantage in this second situation is

$$\begin{aligned} e_p &= 0 - \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} \\ e_o &= \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} = 0 \\ e_2 &= e_p - e_o \\ &= -\{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} - \{1 - [1 - f(4)]\} \{1 - f(5)\} \\ &= -2[f(4) + f(5) - f(4)f(5)] \\ &= -.3653 \text{ (by substitution).} \end{aligned}$$

Here,  $p$ 's expectation advantage,  $e_2$ , is negative, meaning that  $p$  is disadvantaged relative to  $o$ .

For each expectation-conflict setting, there are two additional paths for each actor. The higher-status  $p$  in the expectation-conflict setting has two positive paths, one of length 4 and one of length 5 (see fig. 1). Also, as a result of  $p$ 's second-order expectation structure, there are two negative paths, one of length 4 and one of length 5. The lower-status  $o$  in this

expectation-conflict setting has two negative paths (one of length 4, one of length 5), and from the second-order expectation structure, two positive paths (one of length 4, one of length 5). The first- and second-order expectation structures effectively cancel one another out, and the expectation advantage calculated for  $p$ ,  $e_1$ , is zero:

$$\begin{aligned}e_p &= \{1 - [1 - f(4)]1 - f(5)\} - \{1 - [1 - f(4)]1 - f(5)\} = 0; \\e_o &= \{1 - [1 - f(4)]1 - f(5)\} - \{1 - [1 - f(4)]1 - f(5)\} = 0; \\e_3 &= e_p - e_o = 0.\end{aligned}$$

For the lower-status  $p$  in the expectation-conflict setting, there are two negative paths, one of length 4 and one of length 5 (see fig. 2). Also, the second-order expectation structure generates two positive paths, one of length 4 and one of length 5. The higher-status  $o$  has two positive paths of length 4 and 5 and two negative paths of length 4 and 5 (resulting from the second-order expectation structure). As in the case of the higher-status  $p$  in an expectation-conflict setting, the first- and second-order expectation structures in this expectation-conflict setting cancel one another out, yielding an expectation advantage for  $p$  in this setting,  $e_4$ , of zero. Comparing these expectation advantage calculations for  $p$  across the four settings, yields

$$e_1 > e_3 = e_4 > e_2. \quad (1)$$

Since the likelihood of exercising influence in a group is a function of an actor's expectation advantage, the expectation advantage predictions suggest that the higher-status  $p$  in the expectation-consistent setting is likely to be most influential, and the lower-status  $p$  in the expectation-consistent setting is likely to be least influential.<sup>4</sup> The higher-status  $p$  in the expectation-conflict setting will be as likely to be influential as the lower-status  $p$  in the expectation-conflict setting. Both will be less likely to be influential than the higher-status  $p$  in the expectation-consistent setting but more likely to be influential than the lower-status  $p$  in the expectation-consistent setting. We can represent this influence order for each setting as

$$I_1 > I_3 = I_4 > I_2. \quad (2)$$

<sup>4</sup> Balkwell (1991) discusses the precise estimation of particular power and prestige behaviors. Here, we are interested in the relational outcomes across different configurations of first- and second-order expectation correspondence. Thus, we limit the present discussion to these relational outcomes.

This result is itself interesting, suggesting that expectation conflict generates a *decrement* in the relative likelihood of influence for the higher-status actor but an *increment* in the relative likelihood of influence for the lower-status actor, relative to each actor's position in an expectation-consistent setting. In addition, it is consistent with the Fišek et al. (1995) formalization of source theory and corresponds to the outcomes Webster and Sobieszek (1974) obtained for influence behavior from an actor confronted with two conflicting evaluations from a noninteracting source. However, it does not yet incorporate our assumptions on the three motives of actors in a social setting.

Our assumptions on an actor's motives suggest that the propensity to exercise influence is not solely a function of the expectation advantage but is also affected by the extent to which the action maximizes the three motives (assumption 9). That actors will choose to act in ways that are expected to lead to goal attainment is not an unfamiliar assumption in social psychology. In assessing preferences in social choice situations, several researchers have argued that the choice from among possible alternatives in a set is determined jointly by an actor's goals, the relative importance of each goal, and how each alternative will affect the realization of each goal (e.g., Arrow 1963; Edwards 1954; Homans 1974). Known in social psychology as "expectancy-value theory," this position holds that actors make decisions on alternatives by assessing the value of the outcomes each alternative will generate and the likelihood of an alternative generating that outcome. Actors then choose the alternative for which the product of the value and likelihood is highest (i.e., they elect the alternative for which the subjective expected utility is highest). Drawing on this idea, we propose that the choice among action alternatives in a social situation is a function of (1) the effect of each alternative on the actor's motives in the situation and (2) the relative importance of each motive in the situation (i.e., its value). We operationalize the effects of action on motives in terms of facilitation of the motive (+1), interference with the motive (-1), or irrelevancy to the motive (0) and offer a preference function for action that captures these ideas and follows the functional form that Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) propose for allocation preferences:

$$P_A = \sum_{i=1}^n [W_i(E_{A-M_i})], \quad (3)$$

where

- $P_A$  = the actor's preference for an action,  $A$ ;
- $n$  = the total number of motives held by the actor in the situation;
- $M_i$  = motive  $i$ ;

$E_{I \rightarrow M_i}$  = the actor's assessment of whether  $A$  will facilitate (+1), interfere with (-1), or be irrelevant to (0) the realization of  $M_i$ ;

$$\sum_{i=1}^3 W_i = 1.$$

For our purposes, the action at stake is influence behavior and the motives at stake are captured in assumptions 1-3. Since we assume that actors seek to maximize their outcomes across these motives (assumption 9), the greater the preference value, the more likely it is that an individual will evidence influence behavior. That is, in task-oriented and collectively oriented groups, the propensity of an actor to exert influence is not simply a function of the actor's relative expectation advantage but also a function of the extent to which exercising influence realizes the actor's motives in interaction. Furthermore, as indicated by our limiting condition, we are constraining the present articulation to situations in which actors equally weight the three motives. Thus,  $W_i$  is always 0.33. The preference for exercising influence,  $P_I$ , then, is

$$P_I = \sum_{i=1}^3 (0.33)E_{I \rightarrow M_i}. \quad (4)$$

Thus in our elaboration of SCT, we propose that actual influence behavior in a task-oriented and collectively oriented group is determined by the actor's expectation advantage (which reflects whether others expect the actor to exercise influence) weighted by the preference value,  $P_i$ , for exercising influence (which reflects the extent to which influence behavior meets the actor's motives in the setting). The critical point here is that  $E_{I \rightarrow M_i}$  depends on both an actor's first- and second-order expectations.

We note that influence behavior for self-perceived higher-status actors ensures the realization of the first motive (assumption 1), contributing to the group task. This is because these actors are likely to see their own judgments as correct. As such, exercising influence in the task will contribute more to the group than will deferring to another (whose judgment is viewed as incorrect). For self-perceived lower-status actors, though, influence behavior may not be viewed as furthering this motive. These actors are unlikely to see their judgments as accurate (but are likely to see their higher-status partner's judgments as correct). Exercising influence (when one's judgment is thought to be incorrect) will not contribute to the group task and, as such, does not further the motive of contributing to the group task.

Avoiding status loss (assumption 2) depends partly on whether a person's behavior corresponds to expectations others hold for her. Behavior

that deviates from the expectations of others will lead to status loss for both higher- and lower-status actors (e.g., Homans 1974; Ridgeway and Berger 1988; Wagner 1988). Likewise, whether group interaction is facilitated (assumption 3) turns on whether the expectations of others are met. As we noted earlier, smooth interaction depends on adhering to the expectations of others. Thus, influence behavior by an actor meets the second and third motives we have described only when others expect such influence, that is, when the second-order expectations support such influence actions.

For the higher-status actor in the expectation-consistent setting, the exercise of influence contributes to the group task, maintains that actor's status (since others expect the actor to be influential), and facilitates group interaction (since the working consensus in the group generates an expectation of input from the higher-status actor). Using our preference function for exercising influence given above,  $P_I = 1.00$  for the higher-status actor in the expectation-consistent setting. For the lower-status actor in the expectation-consistent setting, influence behavior does not contribute to the group task, will generate status loss, and will not facilitate interaction in the group since she will not be expected to be influential. Thus,  $P_I = -1.00$  for the lower-status actor in the expectation-consistent setting. In the expectation-conflict setting, if the higher-status actor exercises influence she will contribute to the group task but will also face status loss and will not facilitate group interaction since she would be violating the expectations of others by doing so. Consequently,  $P_I = -0.33$  for the higher-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting. In contrast, the lower-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting who enacts influence behavior will not contribute to the group task but does avoid status loss and facilitates interaction in the group since such action is consistent with the expectations of others for the actor. That is,  $P_I = 0.33$  for this actor.

Weighting the influence order SCT generated (given in eq. [2]) by the  $P_I$  value for  $p$  in each setting yields a revised prediction on the influence order. This influence order for the four status-expectation settings is the first claim derived from our theory,  $I'_1 > I'_4 > I'_3 > I'_2$ , which we label as claim 1a.

Thus, the equality between the higher- and lower-status actors in expectation-conflict settings predicted by SCT's expectation-advantage calculus disappears when the model incorporates a motive-weighting factor. In fact, a lower-status actor in an expectation-conflict setting will have a *higher* likelihood of exercising influence than a higher-status actor in an expectation-conflict setting. We can now propose a claim that addresses the research question driving this article, Whose expectations matter?

**CLAIM 1b.**—*When first- and second-order expectations conflict in a task-oriented, collectively oriented group in which all three motives are equally weighted, the behavior of both higher- and lower-status actors will be determined more by the second- than the first-order expectations.*

We emphasize that our conceptualization is not a replacement for the arguments proposed in SCT. Instead, it offers further insight on the social meaning of expectations and the power and prestige order described by SCT. Our conceptualization advances notions of the power and prestige order as a hierarchy that orders interaction by portraying it as a potential script for action. This script is formed from expectations but is also assessed in terms of how it corresponds to an actor's motives in an interaction situation. That is, the script dictated by the power and prestige order is provisional insofar as it fits actors' motives in interaction. To the extent that the script supports these motives, it is enacted.

Enactment of the power and prestige order has consequences beyond influence; it also results in cognitive and affective outcomes. Exhibiting influence in a group is empowering and increases one's self-confidence and sense of personal efficacy (e.g., Cohen 1988). Our predictions suggest that all actors except the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting will exhibit an elevated degree of influence behavior. As such, we expect that the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting will experience significantly lower levels of self-efficacy than actors in any other setting.

Affective outcomes are also predicted because status is rewarding (Berger et al. 1972). When an actor perceives that she has wrongfully been denied rewards, she will feel angry, and when she feels that she has been wrongfully rewarded, she will feel guilty (Homans 1974). We have predicted that the higher-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting will exhibit less influence behavior and will defer more frequently than the higher-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting. Insofar as influence behavior represents affirmation of higher-status in a group, we would expect that because the higher-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting is forgoing some opportunities to assert influence (because of the conflict), she may feel unjustly denied the social reward of status. As a result, this actor should experience higher levels of anger than the higher-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting or the lower-status actor in either the expectation-consensus or expectation-conflict setting. In contrast, the lower-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting will enjoy the rewards of status to a greater extent than she realizes is just. Realizing the injustice of this reward, we expect this actor to experience higher levels of guilt than the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting or

the higher-status actor in either the expectation-consensus or expectation-conflict setting. These arguments provide the basis for the following claims:

*CLAIM 2.—Lower-status actors in an expectation-consensus setting will experience lower levels of self-efficacy than lower-status actors in an expectation-conflict setting, or higher-status actors in either an expectation-consensus or expectation-conflict setting.*

*CLAIM 3.—Higher-status actors in an expectation-conflict setting will experience higher levels of anger than higher-status actors in an expectation-consensus setting or actors in either an expectation-consensus or expectation-conflict setting.*

*CLAIM 4.—Lower-status actors in an expectation-conflict setting will experience higher levels of guilt than lower-status actors in an expectation-consensus setting or higher-status actors in an expectation-consensus or expectation-conflict setting.*

#### INITIAL EMPIRICAL TEST OF RELATIVE EFFECTS OF FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER EXPECTATIONS

Returning to the question that motivated this inquiry, we ask, Whose expectations matter? According to the arguments we have proposed, an individual's action, cognition, and affective reactions in a social situation are determined by how actions correspond to motives in interaction and self-perceived status. Our discussion of insights from SCT and symbolic interactionism suggest that two of three motives for interaction, avoiding status loss and facilitating interaction, directly implicate second-order expectations. We emphasize, though, that the effects of second-order expectations are tempered by self-perceived status and the first-order expectations those perceptions generate. Consequently, when first- and second-order expectations conflict, we predict that the two jointly guide action, as well as subsequent cognitions and affective reactions. The action that maximizes the most motives will be most likely in a setting. When expectations conflict, our framework predicts that second-order expectations will guide action since these expectations correspond to a greater preponderance of the motives we have posited in social interaction. As a result, when higher-status actors confront conflicting second-order expectations, they will be less influential and more deferential. In contrast, when lower-status actors confront conflicting second-order expectations, they will be more influential and less deferential. However, because first-order expectations for actors in these conflict settings dictate alternative behaviors, we anticipate cognitive and affective outcomes. Lower-status actors in an expectation-consensus setting will experience lower levels of self-efficacy than actors

in any other setting. Higher-status actors facing conflicting second-order expectations will feel anger, and lower-status actors facing conflicting second-order expectations will feel guilt. We turn now to an initial empirical study of the claims our theoretical framework has generated.

To test these claims, we employed a modification of the experimental procedures used by Moore (1985). These standardized procedures have been used to test aspects of SCT in several studies (for a review of this experimental protocol, see Meeker [1990]). Our experiment involved a two-factor design: self-perceived status (higher vs. lower)  $\times$  expectation correspondence (consensus in first- and second-order expectations vs. conflict between first- and second-order expectations).

The subjects in our study were 87 female first- and second-year undergraduates. They were told they could earn up to \$12, depending on their performance in the study, and that they would work with a partner over a computer network to solve a group task. In reality, all subjects were paid \$12, and each dyad included only one subject. As described below, the input on the task by the subject's "partner" was emulated by a computer program. At the conclusion of each session, the subject was debriefed and paid.

### Independent Variables

*Status.*—As indicated above, two of the experimental conditions required that the subject perceive herself to be higher status than her partner and two experimental conditions required that the subject perceive herself to be lower status than her partner. To manipulate status differences between subject and partner, we provided each subject with an information sheet detailing her own and her partner's year in school, favorite course, and hobby. All subjects were first- or second-year undergraduates, and at the time we scheduled them to participate in the study, we asked them to provide their year in school, favorite academic course, and hobby. We advised subjects that they would exchange this information with their partner to help them get to know one another. When the information was presented to the subject in the self-perceived higher-status conditions, her partner was portrayed as a high school senior, with a favorite academic course and hobby similar to the subject's. In the self-perceived lower-status situations, the subject's partner was portrayed as a college senior with a favorite academic course and hobby similar to the subject's. Thus, only year in school explicitly differentiated the subject from her partner.

To assess the effectiveness of the status manipulation for first-order expectations, we administered a brief questionnaire to subjects before they began working on the study task (described below). The questionnaire

included an item that we used to assess whether subjects' first-order expectations corresponded to those the status manipulation was intended to produce. Subjects responded to the statement, "I think I should be the leader in today's decision-making task" on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Subjects in the self-perceived higher-status conditions should agree more strongly with this statements than subjects in the self-perceived lower-status conditions.

*Expectation correspondence.*—Our design also required that we manipulate expectation correspondence. In the two expectation-consensus conditions, subjects must believe that their own expectations for self and partner's relative performance are shared by their partner. In the two remaining expectation-conflict conditions, subjects must believe that their own expectations for self and partner's relative performance are opposite those they believe their partner holds. To generate expectation conflict, we pointed out that an "error" had been made on the information sheets (described above) and that the subject's year in school had been inaccurately recorded. We also told subjects in these conditions that the information was already being conveyed to their partner and that it was too late to correct the error. In the case of the self-perceived higher-status subject in the expectation-conflict condition (claim 3), the information sheet incorrectly listed the subject as a high school freshman and her partner (allegedly correctly) as a high school senior. The information sheet for the self-perceived lower-status subject in the expectation-conflict condition (EC 4) incorrectly listed the subject as a first-year graduate student and the partner (allegedly correctly) as senior undergraduate. These manipulations were intended to lead the subject (1) to hold particular expectations for herself in relation to her partner and (2) to infer that her partner held opposite expectations for each. In the expectation-consensus conditions, when we provided the subject with the information sheet, we pointed out that an "error" had been made—the date of the experiment had been misrecorded—but that the same sheet was already being conveyed to the subject's partner and it was too late to correct it.

### Task

The task in this study was an adaptation of one commonly used in SCT research, "contrast sensitivity" (e.g., Berger et al. 1972; Moore 1965, 1968). Our adaptation involved using a computerized version of the task developed by Foschi et al. (1990). In this task, subjects are advised that they will view a series of 25 computer screens, each containing two rectangles composed of red and white squares. Their task is to determine which of the two patterns contains the most white area. In reality, both patterns contain nearly equal areas of red and white. Subjects, however, are led

to believe that there is a correct answer for each pair of patterns. Moreover, they are advised that the ability to answer correctly is demonstrative of a known skill called "contrast sensitivity." In the instructions subjects receive prior to the task, they are also informed that researchers have developed performance standards for the contrast sensitivity task that correlate correct answers on the present task with levels of the skill. Additionally, subjects are advised that groups tend to do better at the task than individuals. These two latter pieces of information are included so that subjects will be inclined to view the task as both evaluative (i.e., one with right and wrong answers) and collective (i.e., one in which it is desirable to consider input from others). As discussed earlier, these are two of the scope conditions of SCT. In the poststudy debriefing session, subjects were asked if it was important for them to do well on the task and if they paid attention to their partner's input. These two questions were used to determine which cases met the theory's scope conditions and thus whether they could be included in subsequent analyses.

In our use of the Foschi et al. (1990) adaptation of the contrast sensitivity task, subjects were advised that the task is fully automated and that they would communicate with their partner during the task through a computer terminal. The subject was advised that for each of 25 contrast sensitivity problems (1) she and her partner would be asked to indicate their own choices independently regarding which pattern was composed of the most white area for each pair; (2) for each pair, her initial choice would be revealed to her partner, and she would see her partner's initial choice; and (3) she would then have an opportunity to make a final choice—to stay with her initial choice or to change it.

In our elaboration of SCT, we have asserted that our claims will hold when actors equally weight the three motives (contributing to the group task, avoiding status loss, and facilitating group interaction). To facilitate this equal weighting of the motives, we advised subjects that they would be paid according to (1) how many correct answers they generate for their group (16¢ for each correct answer), (2) whether they or their partner is deemed to be most important to the group (16¢ for each trial on which they are most valuable), and (3) whether they and their partner agree (16¢ for each trial on which they and their partner agree). Thus, subjects are led to believe that over the 25 study trials, they can earn as much as \$12 if, for every trial (1) they are correct, (2) they are viewed as most valuable, and (3) they and their partner have the same answers. Consequently, by basing the pay scale equally on correctness, value, and consensus we increase the likelihood that subjects equally weight the three motives (contribute to the group task, avoid status loss, and facilitate group interaction, respectively). As a manipulation check on our limiting condition, in post-experiment debriefing, we asked subjects to report the extent to which it

was important for them to do well on the task, influence their partner, and agree with their partner. Only subjects who reported that all three factors were important were included in subsequent analyses.

### Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for our experiment included subjects' influence behavior as well as their cognitive and affective reactions. As described below, we assessed influence through both a behavioral and self-report measure. We examined cognitive and affective reactions through a questionnaire.

*Influence.*—For five of the 25 trials of the contrast sensitivity task, the Foschi et al. program provides feedback on the subject's and partner's initial choices that indicates the same initial choices by each. On 20 trials, the subject receives information indicating that her partner initially selected the pattern opposite the one the subject initially selected as the one containing the most white. These 20 trials represent the critical trials of the study through which influence is operationalized. As described by Meeker (1990), when the subject and partner appear to initially disagree regarding the correct answer on the task, the disagreement forces the subject to assess the relative likelihood that self or partner is correct. SCT posits that actors will rely on expectations about others' competence relative to self to resolve the disagreement and arrive at an assessment of whether self or other is most likely to be offering the correct answer. This assessment is then used to determine whether one should stay with her initial choice or defer to her partner's choice. Staying with one's own initial choice is an indication that the subject has resolved the disagreement in her own favor based on salient status information and the collective- and task-orientations of the actors. That is, it is as though the subject determines that she is expected to be more competent and therefore is most likely to be correct in the face of a disagreement with her partner. Conversely, the subject who changes her initial response in the face of disagreement to go along with that of her partner is exhibiting deferential behavior; she is being influenced by her partner. Thus, the proportion of "stay" responses,  $p(S)$ , for the 20 critical trials constitutes the resolution of disagreement in one's own favor or a "failure to defer." This is, in essence, an assertion of influence and provides an operationalization of influence behavior.

In addition to this behavioral measure of influence, we obtained a self-report measure of influence. We administered a questionnaire to subjects after all contrast sensitivity trials were completed but before they were debriefed. We asked subjects to respond to the following statement on a seven-point Likert-type scale: "I often changed my answers to go along

with those of my partner." Anchors on the scale ranged from "1" (strongly disagree) to "7" (strongly agree). Thus, the higher the value, the greater the subject's perceptions of her partner's influence in the setting.

*Cognitive and affective outcomes.*—We predicted that expectation correspondence would generate differential feelings of self-efficacy, guilt, and anger for subjects. To assess these predictions, a postexperiment questionnaire administered to subjects included questions designed to tap subjects' perceptions of self-efficacy, anger, and guilt. To operationalize efficacy, we asked subjects to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement, "I did better than I expected to on today's task." Responses were made on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Also, we included items using the same response method (i.e., extent of agreement) to obtain subject's perceptions of anger (i.e., "Working at this task made me feel angry") and guilt (i.e., "Working at this task made me feel guilty").

## RESULTS

Of the 87 subjects participating in our study, 66 were included in the analyses. Ten were dropped because they did not believe that they were actually interacting with another partner. Eight subjects were dropped because in the poststudy debrief they reported that they were not task and/or collectively oriented (i.e., these cases constituted scope violations). Three were dropped because they reported generating a status hierarchy from the wrong characteristic (i.e., hobby, rather than year in school).

### First-Order Expectations

Prior to starting work on the task, subjects in the self-perceived higher-status conditions indicated that they felt they should assume the leadership role in the task to a greater extent than self-perceived lower-status subjects. The mean level of agreement with the statement, "I think I should be the leader in today's decision-making task" was 3.7 for self-perceived higher-status subjects and 3.0 for self-perceived lower-status subjects (one-tailed  $t = 1.77$ ;  $P < .05$ ). While not large differences, this result nonetheless indicates different initial first-order expectations among subjects that correspond with our status manipulation.

### Influence

We hypothesized that second-order expectations would have the greatest effect on influence-related behavior (claim 1b). ANOVA results indicate that only the status-by-expectation interaction is significant ( $F[1, 62] =$

TABLE 1

MEANS AND TUKEY-KRAMER Q STATISTIC FOR PROPORTION OF STAY RESPONSES ( $\pm SD$ )

STUDY CONDITION	N	MEAN ( $\pm S$ )	CONTRAST CONDITION		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Higher status, consensus	15	.6033			
(2) Lower status, consensus	15	.4800	4.026 (.016)		
(3) Higher status, conflict	18	.5389	2.197 (.210)	-2.025 (.250)	
(4) Lower status, conflict	18	.5889	4.81 (.493)	-3.740 (.028)	-1.793 (.298)

NOTE.—Nos in parentheses in the body of the table reflect the level of significance for the contrast with the condition indicated by the column number and are based on one-tailed Q-tests.

8.592;  $P < .005$ ).<sup>4</sup> Since we are interested in the effect of expectation conflict on social action (i.e., influence), we examined the simple effects of the expectation factor (i.e., consensus vs. conflict) independently for each level of status (i.e., self-perceived higher and lower status). The results indicate a disordinal interaction: expectation conflict decreases the deferral of the self-perceived lower-status subject to a higher-status partner while it increases deferral of the self-perceived higher-status subject to a lower-status partner. Self-perceived lower-status subjects in expectation-conflict settings changed their responses less often to the responses of their partner than did higher-status subjects in expectation-conflict settings.

We also hypothesized that self-perceived higher-status actors in an expectation-consensus setting (claim 1a) would be less likely to defer to their computerized partners, followed by self-perceived lower-status actors in an expectation-conflict setting (claim 4), and self-perceived higher-status actors in an expectation-conflict condition (claim 3). Self-perceived lower-status actors in an expectation-consensus condition (claim 2) would be most likely to change their responses to their partners. To test claim 1a, we conducted a Tukey-Kramer test for pairwise differences between conditions (Kramer 1956). As shown in table 1, although the means for this behavioral measure of influence are in the predicted order, the differences between some pairs are not significant.

Overall, these results provide support for our framework. The key claim

<sup>4</sup> Following Balkwell (1991), we also conducted logistic regression analysis. In this analysis, each decision to stay with one's own initial choice or switch to the choice consistent with one's partner's initial choice represents an observation. Results were consistent with the ANOVA. Only the interaction of status-by-expectation was significant ( $b = .1729$ ;  $P < .001$  [Wald test];  $\chi^2 = 1.320$ ;  $df = 1,316$ ;  $P = .4638$ ).

## Expectations

TABLE 2

MEANS AND TUKEY-KRAMER Q STATISTIC FOR SUBJECTS' REPORTS OF DEFERRING TO PARTNER'S RESPONSE

STUDY CONDITION	N	MEAN	CONTRAST CONDITION		
			(1)	(2)*	(3)
(1) Higher status, consensus . . . . .	15	4.13			
(2) Lower status, consensus . . . . .	14	5.21	-3.63 (.033)		
(3) Higher status, conflict . . . . .	18	4.44	-1.096 (.434)	2.71 (.125)	
(4) Lower status, conflict . . . . .	18	4.83	-2.47 (.157)	1.34 (.395)	-1.43 (.372)

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses in the body of the table reflect the level of significance for the contrast with the condition indicated by the column number and are based on one-tailed *Q*-tests. Responses to the statement, "I often changed my response to go along with that of my partner" were made on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

\* Lower status expectation-consensus includes only 14 respondents because of an error generated by the computer program for one case in the postexperiment questionnaire.

on the relative importance of second-order expectations is supported. When first- and second-order expectations conflict, subjects behaved in a manner that most approximated the second-order expectations. This result is particularly evident in the contrast between experimental conditions 2 and 4. Here, we see that when self-perceived lower-status actors believed their computerized partners expected them to be more competent than they themselves expected (i.e., claim 4), then the mean proportion of staying with their own response (and thus, failing to accept the influence of another) was significantly *higher* than for self-perceived lower-status actors who believed their computerized partner expected them to be less competent.

We also assessed self-report measures of influence through an *F*-test of the status-by-expectation interaction. In this case, the results were not significant ( $F[1, 61] = 1.447; P = .234$ ). However, we did find a main effect of status ( $F[1, 61] = 6.526; P < .05$ ), though we found no significant main effect of the expectation factor ( $F[1, 61] = 0.015; P = .904$ ). These analyses indicate that only the self-perceived status of the subject affects the level of influence that a subject reports. As we will elaborate in the discussion of these results, the inconsistencies between behavioral and self-report measures of influence may reflect the dilemma that subjects experience in an unresolvable expectation-conflict condition.

To further explore the differences between experimental conditions in the self-report measure of influence, we conducted a Tukey-Kramer test of the pairwise differences. These results, presented in table 2, indicate

support only for the differences between the self-perceived higher- and lower-status actors in the expectation-consensus setting, with self-perceived lower-status actors reporting greater deferral to their partners than self-perceived higher-status actors. Additionally, the self-perceived lower-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting reported less deferral to their partners' response than did the self-perceived lower-status actors in the expectation-consensus setting, although this difference was not significant. Also, the self-perceived higher-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting did report greater perceptions of deferral to her partner compared to the self-perceived higher-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting. Again, though, the differences fail to reach significance. Although not consistent with our predictions, the self-perceived lower-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting reported more deferral to their partners than did the self-perceived higher-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting (though the difference is not significant). These results do not conform to behavioral results. The inconsistency between the behavioral and self-report indicators of influence points to the quandary that conflict between first- and second-order expectations poses for actors. We will address this point in the discussion.

### Cognitive and Affective Outcomes

We also hypothesized that status and expectation conflict would affect subjects' feelings of self-efficacy, anger, and guilt. We argued that self-perceived lower-status subjects in the expectation-consensus setting would experience lower self-efficacy than subjects in the other conditions (claim 2). Also, we claimed that self-perceived higher-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting would experience greater anger than subjects in the other conditions (claim 3) and that self-perceived lower-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting would experience greater guilt than subjects in the other conditions (claim 4). We tested these claims through planned contrasts of the condition means. Table 3 summarizes these results and shows some support for our claims. Self-perceived lower-status actors in the expectation-consensus setting did report the lowest self-efficacy, though the mean efficacy for this group was only marginally significantly different from the pooled mean of subjects in the other conditions ( $P = .06$ ).

Results for the analysis of anger did not conform to our predictions. We expected that anger would be highest among self-perceived higher-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting. The mean for subjects in this condition was not significantly higher than the pooled mean for subjects in the other conditions. In fact, the mean for self-perceived lower-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting was higher than for self-

## Expectations

TABLE 3  
MEANS AND PLANNED CONTRASTS OF EFFICACY, ANGER, AND GUILT

Affective Dimension	Higher Status, Consensus	Lower Status, Consensus	Higher Status, Conflict	Lower Status, Conflict	t-statistic
Self-efficacy . . .	3.73	2.86*	3.44	3.56	-1.58**
Anger . . . . .	2.67	2.64	3.44*	3.61	.98
Guilt . . . . .	2.73	2.64	2.61	3.39*	2.15*

\* Condition predicted to show significant differences from other conditions on the dimension

\* P < .10

\*\* P < .05

perceived higher-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting. A post hoc test of the contrast between anger reported by subjects in expectation-conflict settings and anger reported by subjects in expectation-consensus settings (i.e., the pooled mean of condition 3 and condition 4 vs. the pooled mean of condition 1 and condition 2) indicated a significant difference ( $t = 2.03$ ;  $P < .05$ ). However, we note that the ratings of anger for both expectation-conflict conditions were not high from an absolute standpoint. The mean levels of anger for both self-perceived lower- and higher-status subjects in the expectation-conflict conditions were below the scale midpoint of "4." This may reflect our manipulation. The status "error" was introduced as an "accident" by the experimenter (who may have been perceived as a higher-status actor). It may be that actors are more forgiving of an accident, especially one by a higher-status actor (i.e., experimenter). Had the mistake appeared more careless or purposive, subjects may have felt greater injustice, which might have exacerbated anger for the higher-status actor who forgoes social rewards.

Results for the analysis of guilt do support our contentions. Self-perceived actors in the expectation-conflict setting reported significantly higher levels of guilt than actors in the other conditions. It seems that receiving social rewards (i.e., status) when one is aware that the reward is based on "false pretenses" does indeed lead actors to feel some guilt. However, we note that the mean is below the scale midpoint of "4." That is, actors in experimental condition 4 (self-perceived lower-status expectation conflict) report higher levels of guilt than actors in any other condition, but from an absolute standpoint, guilt is still low.

## DISCUSSION

We return to the question motivating our research, Whose expectations matter? Our results suggest that, in fact, it is the expectations of others

that represent key definers of social interaction in at least one type of generalizable interaction setting. In part, this reflects an insight of Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) made decades ago: social interaction is guided by our ability to read the interpretations others make of us and our actions (in or out of their presence) and adjust our behavior to correspond in a meaningful way to those expectations. This important claim on social life has been picked up by Goffman (1959), who argued that interaction depends on conforming to a shared definition of a situation. Likewise, Webster and Sobieszek (1974) along with Moore (1985) have noted that both the expectations one holds for herself and those she believes others hold for her affect social action. The question that these traditions beg and we address is whether an actor's own expectations (i.e., first-order expectations) or those she believes that other interactants hold for her (i.e., second-order expectations) carry the most weight in determining one's social action. Following the tradition of SCT, we demonstrate that in a generalizable setting in which actors are task-oriented and collectively oriented *and* equally guided by three motives (contributing to group performance, avoiding status loss, and facilitating group interaction), second-order expectations appear to be key determinants of social action. Empirical results generally support this contention.

However, the results of our experimental test did not generate the clear distinctions across experimental conditions that we had anticipated. For instance, lower-status subjects in an expectation-conflict setting did not defer to their computerized partner's response significantly more than higher-status subjects in an expectation-consensus setting. This does not contradict our basic contention that second-order expectations are fundamental in this setting. Rather, it may indicate an even stronger claim on the importance of second-order expectations relative to first-order expectations. We theorized that actors assume that second-order expectations are consistent with first-order expectations unless explicitly proven otherwise. That is, the burden of proof is on demonstrating inconsistency between first- and second-order expectations. It may be that, when conflict between first- and second-order expectations becomes salient, the power of second-order expectations is exacerbated. Under such conflict, actors may become explicitly conscious of the other's expectations, and deploy those expectations as key determinants of action. Both the higher-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting and the lower-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting believe their partner expects them to be most competent. This expectation may become particularly salient for the lower-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting, leading not only to a significant difference in influence-related behavior, relative to the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting, but also to an approximation of the higher-status actor's behavior in the expectation-consensus

setting. Likewise, the higher-status actor in the expectation-conflict setting and the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting both believe that their partner expects less competence of them. For this pair, this expectation may be most salient to the higher-status actor, who defers significantly more to her computerized partner than the higher-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting. In fact, these rates of deferral begin to approximate those of the lower-status actor in the expectation-consensus setting. These results clearly demonstrate the power of second-order expectations in determining social action.

Although our experimental results are consistent with our theoretical arguments, we note that these  $p(S)$  values are uniformly lower than those generally obtained in other experimental tests of SCT. Based on the parameterizations offered by Fiske et al. (1992) as well as reviews of research and metanalyses of different studies (e.g., Balkwell 1991; Berger et al. 1977; Fox and Moore 1979), we would expect to obtain  $p(S)$  values around .68 for a higher-status actor whose status advantage results from a single agreed upon diffuse status characteristic. For the lower-status actor (whose status disadvantage results from a single agreed upon diffuse characteristic), the expected  $p(S)$  would be around .59.<sup>6</sup> The mean  $p(S)$  values we observed for the higher- and lower-status actors (.6033 and .4800, respectively) are substantially lower than these predicted values. The reduced  $p(S)$  values may be attributable to either of two features of the experimental setting. First, the fact that misinformation is introduced in all experimental conditions may have affected the results we obtained. The observations analyzed conformed to the theory's scope conditions (i.e., task and collective orientation), however we did not assess the *degree* to which these scope conditions were realized among subjects. The misinformation manipulation may have led subjects to be less task-oriented and collectively oriented than in other studies, though it is unclear why this might occur. As such, we find this explanation dissatisfying because it fails to provide an adequate conceptual rationale for the findings.

The characteristics of the standardized experimental setting we used may provide an alternative explanation for the depressed  $p(S)$  values we obtained. The studies around which predictions for  $p(S)$  have been generated and investigated have all involved a video-based setting. In this version of the standardized experimental setting, subjects view themselves

<sup>6</sup> Berger and Fiske (1974) proposed a linear function for generating  $p(S)$  predictions from  $p$ 's expectation advantage,  $p(S) = m + q(e_p - e_s)$  (for an alternative form, see Balkwell 1991). This function provides a good fit for data from several experimental studies involving the contrast sensitivity task. The parameter  $m$  represents the stay-response probability that would be characteristic of status-equal interaction (i.e., the intercept), while  $q$  captures characteristics of specific operationalizations of a study.

and receive instructions from the experimenter through a video-based system. In addition, a videotape manipulation is used to convey images of the subject's alleged partner. For our experiment, we used a computer-based system. That is, subjects received study instructions and information regarding their partner through a computer system in text-based form. We believe that this manipulation may have reduced the degree to which the subjects were collectively oriented. In other words, the  $m$  and  $q$  parameters described in note 6 may be different in the computerized setting. To the extent that experiments continue to employ the computerized setting, we believe that it will be important to systematically address these discrepancies.

We also note that subjects' reports of the extent to which they deferred to their partner's response did not conform to our predictions. We believe that this outcome may suggest the dilemma that an expectation-conflict condition poses. In the self-report data, we did not find the ordering between the higher- and lower-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting that we had predicted. Rather, though not a significant difference, higher-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting reported that they changed their own responses to go along with their partner less often than lower-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting. We emphasize that this occurs despite behavioral evidence to the contrary. It may be that for some actors, it is difficult to acknowledge that they are compromising the "truth" of the situation in their behavior. That is, we propose that it would be difficult for actors to explicitly acknowledge that their actions stand in stark denial of what they perceive to be their actual competence, relative to their partner. Such a revelation might generate feelings tantamount to having a lie exposed. The lack of consistency, then, between behavioral and self-report measures of influence-related behavior may be taken as evidence of the stress that inconsistency between first- and second-order expectations imparts to actors. We offer this post hoc explanation as a tentative interpretation and propose that our knowledge of the dual nature of expectations would benefit from subsequent theory and research exploring the paradox that conflict between first- and second-order expectations can engender.

Our analyses of the cognitive and affective consequences of the interplay between first- and second-order expectations provide some additional support for the logic of our theoretical argument. We asserted that influence behavior can be empowering, generating a heightened sense of self-efficacy. We argued that subjects in three of the experimental conditions (higher status, expectation consensus; higher status, expectation conflict; and lower status, expectation conflict) would exhibit more influence-related behavior than the subject in the lower-status, expectation-consensus condition. As such, we hypothesized that subjects in these three

conditions would experience higher self-efficacy than subjects in the lower-status, expectation-consensus condition. Our results support this claim. Subjects in the higher-status, expectation-consensus condition reported the highest mean level of self-efficacy, followed by subjects in the lower-status, expectation-conflict condition. Subjects in the higher-status, expectation-conflict condition reported the third highest self-efficacy level; and the lowest mean level of self-efficacy was reported by subjects in the lower-status, expectation-consensus condition. This paralleled the results for influence behavior, suggesting that the relation between influence behavior and self-efficacy (from which we drew this claim) may be operating. In fact, the correlation between influence and self-efficacy was moderate ( $r = .2430$ ; one-tailed  $P < .05$ ).

With respect to subjects' perceptions of anger, we obtained interesting results. Anger was significantly higher for both higher- and lower-status subjects in the expectation-conflict settings than for higher- and lower-status subjects in the expectation-consensus settings. We had posited that only the higher-status subjects in the expectation-conflict condition would experience significantly greater anger. This claim followed from our assertion that unjust denial of the social reward of status would anger higher-status actors in the expectation-conflict condition. As pointed out previously, though, mean anger in all conditions was below the scale midpoint of "4". This may reflect the fact that we manipulated expectation conflict by introducing it as an "accident" by the experimenter. As such, actors may be only mildly angered by the error and ensuing injustice. This reasoning is consistent with the work of Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson (1983) who demonstrated that actors feel less injustice in situations where justification is available for a mishap or change in procedure (such as an accident by the experiment).

That the lower-status subjects in the expectation-conflict setting would have the highest mean level of anger was not anticipated by our theoretical argument. Our reasoning linked anger solely to unjust reward denial. The fact that lower-status actors in the expectation-conflict setting manifested the highest levels of anger, though, points to the complexity of affect generated by conflicting expectations. It may be that lower-status actors felt unjustly compromised because they felt compelled by the expectations of their partner to remain more steadfast in their decisions than they felt they should. Moreover, subjects were advised that they would meet their partner following the completion of the contrast sensitivity task. Anticipation of this meeting and anxiety over the possibility that they might be unfairly perceived by their partner as a phony or impostor (who had unjustly asserted influence over the task) may have generated heightened anger for these subjects. That is, these subjects may have felt that the experimenter's "mistake" would compromise their partner's impression

of them. However, given the small differences, we pose this as only a tentative interpretation of the results. In retrospect, our survey instrument did not allow us to track the source of subjects' feelings. We asked only to what extent they felt angry; we did not ask them *why* they felt any anger. Subsequent research investigating the role of affect in the processes we have described would benefit from more precise theoretical articulation and empirical assessment of anger.

Outcomes for guilt did conform to our predictions. We had reasoned that only lower-status subjects in an expectation-conflict setting would feel that they were unjustly reaping social rewards by conforming to second-order expectations, and this would generate higher levels of guilt among these subjects than subjects in any other experimental condition. These subjects did indeed report higher mean levels of guilt than subjects in any other condition. However, we note that as in the case of self-efficacy and anger, guilt assessments were low in absolute terms, falling below the scale midpoint of "4". It may be that subjects felt that they had a legitimate account for their behavior—the experimenter's "mistake." Awareness that the situation was really not their fault may have tempered subjects' feelings of guilt.

As this discussion suggests, we believe that conflict between first- and second-order expectations generates complex cognitive and affective responses from actors. The actual cognitive and affective experiences of actors may depend on the source of the conflict (which, in this case, was due to a third-party, i.e., experimenter, "error"), and anticipation of whether and how the conflict would be publicly revealed. There is substantial empirical evidence elsewhere that links cognition and affect to social action (for discussions of cognition-action links, see Mead [1934] and Fiske and Taylor [1984]; for discussions of affect-action links, see Kemper [1978], Lawler [1992], Lovaglia and Houser [1996], and Thoits [1989]). We maintain, then, that cognitive and affective processes may be critical mediators of both influence as it unfolds in the expectation-conflict setting we examined and in subsequent interactions. Our understanding of the sources and consequences of social influence requires additional research directed at disentangling and testing the theoretical role that cognition and affect play in relation to second-order expectations.

### Further Implications

We emphasize that our theoretical framework integrates fundamental sociological thinking about self-other interaction. Sociological social psychology is unique in its emphasis on integrating perceptions of self, perceptions of others, and social structure. We have drawn on these traditions to develop a theoretically rigorous statement of how one's own action is

derived from beliefs about how one is perceived by others and how this behavior is tempered by one's motivations in social interaction and one's position in a status structure. However, this only hints at further issues. We constrained our articulation to task-oriented collectively oriented groups with three balanced motives. What additional conditions, motives, and social structures affect the interplay between first- and second-order expectations?

The issue of additional motives and conditions brings to mind a host of circumstances in which the actor might be inclined to manipulate second-order expectations to her advantage. These circumstances may be captured by the prototypical scenario of the hustler.<sup>7</sup> Hustling can be conceptualized as a situation in which the hustler is motivated to exploit another. We propose that the hustler manipulates second-order expectations and enacts them until the unsuspecting other is lulled into complacency and is primed for exploitation. In such a situation, (which may involve competitive rather than collective orientations), the hustler purposively fosters second-order expectations that are disadvantageous to her. This way, she can entice her opponent into a situation in which the stakes are highest, then switch to enactment of her first-order expectations to the bewilderment of her opponent. Note that not all hustling is illegitimate. For instance, in law enforcement some "good cop/bad cop" routines, which can be described as hustles, are recognized as effective and legitimate means for extracting confessions from suspects. An interrogator can enact both the "good" cop and "bad" cop roles through the manipulation of second-order expectations. When second-order expectations are successfully manipulated, the suspect believes that the interrogator views the suspect as innocent and is trying to help the suspect. Note that these second-order expectations conflict all along with the interrogator's first-order expectations that the suspect is guilty. Such an interrogation assumes the tone of a friendly discussion trying to uncover a viable account for the crime. When sufficient detail is exposed implicating the suspect, the interrogator can switch to enactment of her first-order expectations to effectively extract a full confession. The distinction between first- and second-order expectations provides a useful conceptual tool for the analysis of such situations.

It may also be the case that different social structures affect (1) the content of first- and second-order expectations and (2) how conflict between first- and second-order expectations is played out. In this initial examination, we explored status structures, asserting that competence expectations are derived from the status structure of a collective. Sociology

<sup>7</sup> We are grateful to Kevin Leicht and Nader Sohrabi for suggesting this colorful situation to us.

is rich in its conceptualization of different social structures that are employed in describing social relations. We offer a brief discussion of an alternative structure, exchange structure, to illustrate the versatility of the notion of first- and second-order expectations.

Sociologists describe resource expectations in terms of exchange structures (e.g., Cook and Emerson 1978; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988). In this line of work, an actor's position in a network of exchange relations determines the level of resources she can expect to garner. Although not explicitly addressed in this research, we offer that actors also hold second-order resource expectations (i.e., the resource levels the actor believes others expect her to acquire). In particular, we propose that the correspondence between first- and second-order expectations represents a cognitive mechanism that foreshadows the impending state of trust and, thus, contributes to commitment in an exchange relation. Lawler and Yoon (1996) show that stable networks foster "relational cohesion," positive emotions arising from stable exchange, which engender commitment. In related research, Kollock (1994) and Coleman (1990) have found that trust is an important determinant of commitment in exchange structures. When actors are presented with more advantageous options, they may continue to pursue disadvantageous but established alternatives having developed a trust in the relations generating those alternatives.

We propose that trust in an exchange structure can be conceptualized in terms of consensus between first- and second-order resource expectations. That is, an exchange structure is characterized by trust to the extent that an actor's expectations for resources acquired from the impending exchange are consistent with those she believes that the other expects her to acquire. Conflict between first- and second-order resource expectations may arise as a result of entries into or exits from the network (and hence new exchange alternatives), the infusion of additional resources into the system, or extraction of existing resources from the system. Whatever the source, when conflict between first- and second-order resource expectations becomes evident, it may generate a cognitive signal to the actor that the ongoing state of trust is jeopardized unless the actor takes steps to resolve the conflict *before* the exchange proceeds. If trust is jeopardized, commitment is threatened, and ongoing exchange may be in peril, generating instability in the exchange structure. It may be that Lawler and Yoon's (1996) concept of relational cohesion is derived, in part, from a cognitive state of consensus between first- and second-order expectations. Conflicting first- and second-order resource expectations may also generate negative affect (similar to those in the empirical research we presented), which jeopardizes commitment. Hence, ongoing exchange requires resolution of the conflicting expectations. Resolution may occur by altering either the first- or the second-order expectations or both. Altering

expectations, in turn, may occur through negotiation, explanation, and/or forfeiture of resources or opportunities in the exchange structure. Irrespective of the means whereby consensus is achieved, our point here is that the dynamics of the exchange structure as they pertain to trust and commitment may be mediated through perceptions of the correspondence between first- and second-order expectations, which actors use as a tool for diagnosing trust.

In summary, a wide array of sociological social psychologies either explicitly or implicitly accord expectations an important role in social dynamics. Our explication of the concept of expectations within a few perspectives reveals that these perspectives recognize the dual (i.e., first- and second-order) nature of expectations. Based on this explication, we have proposed a formal theory that offers predictions on the relative strength of second-order expectations as a factor driving influence behavior in status structures. Whether and/or how second-order expectations relate to social behavior in other settings and social structures remains to be explored. However, we suggest that such an exploration may be a worthwhile journey. This is based on our finding that even when an actor is aware of the inaccuracy of others' expectations about her, action may be largely determined by those expectations. In answer to the question we opened with—Whose expectations matter?—we find that under certain generalizable conditions, the answer is “the expectations of others.”

## APPENDIX

### Elements of SCT

SCT explains how observable social characteristics that differentiate group members (e.g., age, gender, race) are differentially valued, generate differential competency expectations for members, and consequently lead to a hierarchical distribution of influence across members of the group (referred to as the “observable power and prestige order”).<sup>4</sup> Differentiating social attributes may affect the power and prestige order even when they are unrelated to the group's task. Such attributes, called “diffuse status characteristics,” have three properties: (1) an actor believes it is better to possess one state of the characteristic rather than another (e.g., it is better to be older than younger), (2) the actor associates with the states of the characteristic one or more specific expectations (e.g., that older actors are better widget designers than younger actors), and (3) the actor associates with states of the characteristic a general expectation state (e.g., that older actors are wiser than younger actors). SCT provides five assumptions link-

<sup>4</sup> The discussion in this appendix is drawn from Berger et al (1972) and Webster and Foschi (1988)


ing a differentiating diffuse status characteristic to the observable power and prestige order. The first three describe how a diffuse status characteristic becomes linked to performance expectations on a task.

ASSUMPTION A1.—*If an attribute is a social basis of discrimination between actors in a setting, then it is activated.*

ASSUMPTION A2.—*If a diffuse status characteristic, D, is activated and has not been previously dissociated from a specific performance competency, C\*, believed by group members to be relevant to task outcomes, then it will be linked to a similar state of C\*.*

ASSUMPTION A3.—*A structure of status characteristics and expectation states will become fully connected through the processes described in assumptions A1 and A2. If actors leave or enter the situation after it has been completed, new connections appear according to the same processes, and all parts of the structure previously completed will remain in subsequent interactions.*

Berger et al. (1977) represent the link between actors, diffuse status characteristics, expectations, and task outcomes in a graph-theoretical model as exemplified below:



where

- $p, o$  = actors;
- $D$  = a diffuse status characteristic;
- $\Gamma$  = an expectation regarding  $p$ 's general competence;
- $C^*$  = an expectation regarding  $p$ 's competence at a task;
- $T$  = task outcome;
- $+, -$  = the state of the characteristic, expectation, or task outcome, such that positively valenced states are more valued (desirable) than negatively valenced states;

and the negatively valenced line connecting  $D+$  and  $D-$  indicates the dimensionality in the relation between two oppositely valued states possessed by the actors.

The length of a path in the graph is determined by counting the links between an actor and the task outcome. The valence of a path is determined by multiplying the signs of the path and the sign of the task outcome to which the path leads. In the above representation,  $p$  has two positive paths: one of length 4 ( $p \xrightarrow{\quad} D+ \xrightarrow{\quad} \Gamma+ \xrightarrow{\quad} C_+^* \xrightarrow{\quad} T+$ ) and one of length 5 ( $p \xrightarrow{\quad} D+ \xrightarrow{\quad} D- \xrightarrow{\quad} \Gamma- \xrightarrow{\quad} C_-^* \xrightarrow{\quad} T-$ ). If more than one characteristic is activated, SCT asserts that status information is combined via a princi-

ple of organized subsets. According to this principle, actors first combine all positive paths for self,  $p$ , and other,  $o$ , into positive subsets ( $e^+$ ) for each, and all negative paths into negative subsets ( $e^-$ ) for each. Also, each subset is first aggregated separately according to an attenuation principle, which states that each additional bit of consistent status information has less weight than it would by itself. For each actor, the two subsets are combined to generate aggregate expectations, as represented in the fourth assumption:

*ASSUMPTION A4.—If an actor  $p$  is connected to task outcome states that are positive and negative in a completed structure, then  $p$ 's aggregated expectations,  $e_p$ , are represented by*

$$\begin{aligned} e_p^+ &= \{1 - [1 - f(i)] \dots [1 - f(n)]\}; \\ e_p^- &= -\{1 - [1 - f(i)] \dots [1 - f(n)]\}; \\ e_p &= e_p^+ - e_p^-, \end{aligned}$$

where

- $e_p^+$  = a positive subset;
- $e_p^-$  = a negative subset;
- $i, n$  = path lengths;
- $f(i), f(n)$  = monotonically decreasing functions of  $i$  and  $n$ ;
- $e_p$  =  $p$ 's aggregate expectation.

The aggregate expectation for  $o$ ,  $e_o$ , is similarly calculated, and  $p$ 's expectation advantage is the difference between the two ( $e_p - e_o$ ). Fishek et al. (1992) derive a functional form for  $f(i)$ , which fits existing data well:

$$f(i) = 1 - e^{-2.6102^{-i}}.$$

The fifth assumption of SCT asserts that  $p$ 's position in the group's power and prestige order (and hence relative influence in the group) will be a function of  $p$ 's expectation advantage:

*ASSUMPTION A5.—Once  $p$  has formed aggregated expectation states for self and other,  $p$ 's power and prestige position relative to  $o$  will be a direct function of  $p$ 's expectation advantage over  $o$  in this situation.*

Berger et al. (1972) are careful to note the conditions under which they believe these processes operate (i.e., scope conditions [SC] of the theory). They assert that SCT applies to groups in which individuals are task oriented (scope condition 1) and individuals are collectively oriented (scope condition 2).

Task orientation refers to the case in which individuals are motivated to solve a problem, which they perceive has defined (i.e., correct and incorrect) outcomes. Collective orientation refers to situations in which individ-

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uals consider it necessary and legitimate to consider other group members' contributions.

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# **Runaway Train? The Diffusion of State-Level Reform in ADC/AFDC Eligibility Requirements, 1950–1967<sup>1</sup>**

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Displeased with the increasing expenditures on ADC/AFDC and the changing demographic composition of the recipient population, state managers between 1950 and 1967 attempted to restrict the program. One way this was accomplished was through enacting work requirements as a condition of eligibility. Temporal variation in the enactment may be explained through a synthesis of two theoretical traditions on policy development: the *intrastate* and *interstate* approaches. The authors use diffusion models to examine how both sets of processes affected the rate of enactment of work requirements. States reformed AFDC programs in response to their own internal problem pressures. But this did not happen in a vacuum; work requirements diffused among states that were culturally and/or institutionally linked.

## **INTRODUCTION**

When it was first enacted as part of the Social Security Act of 1935, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) barely merited a passing glance by Congress, the president, or the public. By 1960, however, the same program had become the symbol of all that could go wrong with American social provision (Steiner 1966). By 1996, the fully discredited Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was struck from the federal system of entitlements.<sup>2</sup> This move represented a dramatic departure from the national commitment to the New Deal principles of social provision.

<sup>1</sup> The authors would like to thank Paula England, John Meyer, Marc Schneiberg, and David Strang for valuable comments on this research. Additionally, we would like to thank David Strang for sharing his diffusion routines in the Interactive Matrix Language of SAS. Direct all correspondence to Sarah A. Soule, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721. E-mail: soule@u.arizona.edu

<sup>2</sup> The program was initially called Aid to Dependent Children when it was passed as part of the Social Security Act of 1935. The name was changed by the 1962 amendments to Aid to Families with Dependent Children to reflect a broader social service orientation. Since this project covers the period 1950–67, we use the rather inelegant term ADC/AFDC for inclusiveness.

While the public often imagines that the drive to "end welfare" is a phenomenon of very recent origin, elements of the political transformation and undoing of the ADC program were evident as early as the 1940s, taking the form of new eligibility requirements enacted at the state level. These new requirements indicated a growing suspicion on the part of policymakers and the public about the nature of public assistance and the character of those who received it. Though the passage of the Social Security Act nationalized and broadened the scope of public assistance programs for poor children and their (largely female) caregivers, the institution of new eligibility requirements in state programs beginning in the 1940s and carrying through the postwar period sought to restrict coverage and make the process of applying for and receiving assistance considerably more unpleasant.

How can we explain the emergence and rapid embrace of this punitive turn in welfare policy making in the middle part of this century? While the literature on welfare states is quite diverse, there are at least two distinct general approaches to the analysis of policy adoption and development: those that treat policies as evolving out of some set of *intrastate processes* and those that focus on *interstate processes*. The first of these two general approaches includes analyses of how economic development, class conflict, interest group politics, and institutional dynamics *within* a given state or nation-state affect the evolution of social welfare policies.<sup>1</sup> The second approach focuses on the relations *between* states and on the generation of pressures toward conformity to policy norms. This second tradition has focused on a number of different types of linkages or connections between modern states and how these connections lead to greater degrees of homogeneity with regard to social welfare, educational, and environmental policies.

Unfortunately, dialogue between these two traditions has been scarce, which has left a noticeable void in the study of social welfare policy adoption (but see Collier and Messick 1975). Our approach fills this void by uniting these two traditions, each of which speaks to particular deficiencies in the other. We begin with the general observation that there is no theoretically informed reason why *interstate* and *intrastate* processes should not be considered together. In short, we argue that, as state actors attempt to puzzle out solutions to problems that arise within their institu-

<sup>1</sup> The term "state" here refers simultaneously to a set of institutions and a geopolitical entity. Some research falling in this category examines processes internal to a state as an organization (state-centered research), other work focuses on economic or political pressures that are brought to bear on that organization. In this latter type of research, a "state" is a geographically and/or politically bounded space. The point, however, is that, in both cases, states are considered to be independent of other states.

tional domains (as a result of socioeconomic or political pressures), they may look outward to other states considering the same problems—particularly to states that are institutionally and/or culturally linked to their own.

While most studies of social policy development focus on the expansion or enactment of policy and build theories explaining the tendency of states to act in socially progressive ways (i.e., expanding the rights of marginal social groups, or redistributing material resources across lines of economic and/or social stratification), we address here a form of policy *retrenchment*: the adoption of a punitive eligibility requirement in the ADC/AFDC program. We use Strang and Tuma's (1993) recent advances in the modeling of diffusion in an event history framework to answer two empirical questions: First, what economic, political, or institutional characteristics of states led them to adopt punitive reforms in their ADC/AFDC programs more quickly or more slowly than other states? And second, did ADC/AFDC reforms diffuse across states? Thus, we are first interested in the structural characteristics of states that increase or decrease their rate of adoption of a major reform in the eligibility requirements of ADC/AFDC programs: rules that required applicant mothers to accept available employment or be denied benefits. For brevity, we call these eligibility rules "work requirements."

Our second interest regards the spread of these reforms. We argue that internal political and institutional dynamics triggered by rising ADC/AFDC enrollment led many state administrators and legislators to look for new ways to exclude potential recipients. Work requirements rapidly became one of the most popular methods of exclusion, and we claim that diffusion processes are partly responsible for the quick adoption of these rules throughout the United States.

#### REFORMING ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE ADC/AFDC PROGRAM

The Social Security Act of 1935 established the first national commitment to economic provision for children in the United States through the ADC program. This program, which was incorporated in the omnibus act as Title IV, provided for a federal-state matching grant system of support for poor children who were left without the economic security of a family breadwinner—generally a father. Although modeled after existing mother's pensions programs (which were in operation in 23 states at the time of ADC's enactment), ADC was more broadly inclusive than its Progressive Era predecessor (Skocpol 1992; Goodwin 1992). While mothers' pensions were often limited (by statute or by de facto practice) to "gilded widows" (white, Anglo-Saxon mothers of "legitimate" children), ADC was

at least technically available to a wider cross-section of the poor: eligibility rules were so loosely worded that African-American, divorced, deserted, and unmarried mothers were not formally excluded from coverage. In practice, state policy administrators often attempted to exclude these mothers and their children, and some tested the limits of the federal Social Security Administration's resolve to ensure good faith implementation of the program. Nonetheless, as widowhood declined as the preeminent cause of female indigence, and the number and proportion of female-headed households increased nationally, these trends were ultimately reflected in the composition of the ADC recipient population.<sup>4</sup>

The rapid and sizable increases in program expenditures during the 1940s and 1950s drew the attention of state legislators, who observed that ADC was increasingly being drawn upon by unmarried mothers rather than widows and that the recipient population was increasingly made up of black women and their children rather than white women and their children. For example, in 1938, 48% of all children receiving ADC were living with widowed mothers (U.S. Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance 1943, p. 30). But a survey in 1961 demonstrated the rapid decline of paternal death as a reason for welfare receipt over the postwar period: only about 8% of recipient children were receiving ADC because their fathers were dead. Sixty-five percent of fathers were absent from the home—most by virtue of desertion, divorce, or separation (Mugge 1963, p. 9). As for the racial composition of the recipient population, in 1938, 13.8% of all children receiving ADC were black; two years later, the rate had climbed to 16.2% (Sterner 1943, p. 283). By 1961, approximately 44% of cases consisted of black families (Mugge 1963, p. 4).

ADC as a program was also consuming a larger and larger share of state expenditures, and in some cases, increases in ADC spending far outstripped increases in a given state's revenue collection. At the aggregate level, states' revenues increased 138% between 1945 and 1955 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1947, p. 376; 1957, p. 414), while their ADC expenditures rose 270% (U.S. Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency 1946, p. 532; U.S. Social Security Administration 1955, p. 50). State-level variation meant that some states endured much more extreme imbalances. One example is California, where ADC payments jumped

<sup>4</sup> According to census data, the number of female-headed households increased from 3.7 million in 1930 to 6.4 million in 1950 (the beginning of the welfare reform wave)—an increase of 73%, while the total number of households increased only 43% during this period. Among female-headed households, those headed by widows declined from 68% in 1930 to 59% in 1950, while those headed by women who had been divorced or whose husbands were absent due to separation, desertion, incarceration, institutionalization, or service in the armed forces increased from 17% to 29% over the same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1930, 1950.)

more than 1,000% between 1945 and 1955 (U.S. Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency 1946, p. 532; U.S. Social Security Administration 1955, p. 50), while total revenues to the state increased only about 100% over that same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1947, p. 376; 1957, p. 414). Driven by racial, fiscal, and what might be termed patriarchal motivations (Zylan 1994), state legislators sought to reform the program's eligibility requirements to limit expenditures and reduce the representation of black, unmarried, divorced, and deserted women among the recipient population.<sup>5</sup>

Beginning in the early 1950s, ADC came under systematic attack. Well before Daniel P. Moynihan (1967, p. 29) decried the undue familial power of the "black matriarch," state officials were complaining about black women receiving welfare in lieu of working in the fields or in homes as domestic laborers. Many connected the receipt of welfare with sexual license, as evidenced by the assertions of a grand jury in Georgia that "the program is so constituted and administered as actually to encourage immorality" and of a grand jury in New York that "immorality, promiscuity, and unwed motherhood seem to be rewarded and encouraged by the easy allowance made upon a simple application of need" (quoted in Bell 1965, p. 68).

These arguments underwrote legislative and institutional innovations in the ADC program as eligibility regulations were revised and/or initiated to weed out unmarried mothers, who were disproportionately African-American. By 1957, 18 states had attempted to pass legislation expressly excluding the children of unmarried mothers from ADC coverage (Bell 1965, p. 72). So-called substitute parent rules were implemented in many states so that male partners could not supplement the income of recipient mothers. By 1962, eight states and 18 large cities had established special investigating units to detect the presence of a "man in the house" (Bell 1965, p. 87). Requirements that aid be granted only to mothers maintaining a "suitable home" had been on the books in many states since mother's pensions programs first defined them in Protestant terms of religious upbringing. By 1962, they had been redefined to refer to sexual morality. Mothers engaged in nonmarital sexual relations could be denied assistance based on their failure to maintain a "suitable home" for their children.

While federal law prohibited the attachment of explicit racial criteria to these eligibility rules, in practice they were often exercised selectively and fell heaviest on black women and their children (see Lieberman [1995]

<sup>5</sup> Briefly put, some states may have attempted to reform ADC to help shore up patriarchal nuclear families, to better substitute state provision for that of husbands and fathers, or to enforce patriarchal norms of female sexuality.

on racial discrimination in ADC benefits and coverage). Legislative innovations that appeared to discriminate on the basis of race tempted retaliation from the Bureau of Public Assistance, which was charged with protecting the spirit of the Social Security Act. But the bureau was hamstrung from the start by the fact that its only weapon against renegade programs was to cut them off. It was not until 1960 that the bureau seriously threatened such intervention—in response to an irrefutably racist effort by the state of Louisiana to throw thousands of black women and children off the rolls (Abramovitz 1988, pp. 326–27).<sup>6</sup> Prior to this confrontation—which became known as the “Louisiana Crisis”—state legislators regularly pushed the limits of the federal guidelines.

One of the most popular reforms designed to push these limits was the institution of work requirements. These rules required potential recipient mothers (and often disabled fathers as well) to accept employment if any was available at the time of application. Most states stipulated that mothers be required to work only if “suitable arrangements” could be made for the care of dependent children, but these arrangements were not specified, leaving considerable latitude for caseworkers to interpret suitability in light of racial, religious, psychological, or other criteria. While most work requirements were broadly worded, long-standing beliefs about race, gender, and maternal employment meant that they were often selectively enforced against black women, particularly in rural economies with seasonal labor demands (Bell 1965, pp. 61–63).<sup>7</sup> Mothers who refused employment could be excluded from ADC coverage. Twenty-eight states adopted some kind of work requirement as a condition of eligibility between 1950 and 1967 (table 1).

Work requirements were an important state-level development in ADC for at least two reasons. First, they symbolized a sea change in the fundamental philosophy of gender, motherhood, and work embodied by the ADC program. When ADC was first included in the Economic Security Bill, its purpose was to provide stipends for mothers so that they could remain at home to care for their dependent children. Maternal care, policy makers and the public believed, was irreplaceable to a child, and mere poverty should not deprive him or her of such an essential resource. Mothers of young children were—by definition of the Economic Security Coun-

<sup>6</sup> According to Mimi Abramovitz (1988, p. 326), at the time that Louisiana instituted its new suitable home policy, black recipients made up 66% of the Louisiana ADC recipient population. Of those dropped from the rolls because of the new rule, 95% were black.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Winifred Bell (1965) documents attitudes expressed by caseworkers and public officials that black women were more likely to be able to rely upon extended family members for care of their dependent children and that, for black women, motherhood had never been expected to preclude work in paid employment.

## AFDC Eligibility

TABLE 1

STATES PASSING WORK REQUIREMENTS AS CONDITION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR  
ADC/AFDC, 1950-67

State	Year	State	Year
Arizona	1950	Tennessee	1956
Illinois	1950	Texas	1956
Nebraska	1950	Missouri	1957
Alabama	1953	West Virginia	1957
Arkansas	1953	North Carolina	1962
California	1953	Pennsylvania	1962
Georgia	1953	Washington	1962
Mississippi	1953	Kansas	1964
Rhode Island	1953	Massachusetts	1964
Florida	1956	North Dakota	1964
Michigan	1956	New York	1964
New Hampshire	1956	Oregon	1964
New Mexico	1956	Louisiana	1967
South Carolina	1956	Vermont	1967

NOTE.—The date of enactment is measured by the year the work requirement first appeared under eligibility criteria in *Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans* (U.S. Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance 1940, 1950, 1953, 1956-57, 1959, 1962, 1964, 1967).

cil—members of the category of “unemployables” (Cauthen and Amenta 1996). As long as the mothers drawing on the program were predominantly white and widowed, this fundamental tenet of state maternalism was left unchallenged.<sup>8</sup> But by the late 1940s, there were significant fissures in opinion about subsidizing this arrangement for poor families. As the women associated with the ADC program were presumed to be quite different from those associated with mothers’ pensions, the ideals associated with their performance of gender and motherhood changed as well. Work requirements gave material shape to the shift in policy discourse that now asserted that maternal employment was to be encouraged over maternal child care where ADC recipient families were concerned.

The second reason the institution of state-level work requirements was an important development is that this reform was soon taken up by the federal government and incorporated in national AFDC policy. Work requirements were first merely facilitated by the 1962 public welfare amendments, but during the mid-1960s something called “workfare” emerged, taking legislative shape in the 1967 amendments to Social Security. The

<sup>8</sup> State maternalism, as we use it here, simply refers to state support of women in their roles as mothers.

1962 amendments allowed states to require work in exchange for benefits, while the 1967 amendments required work for welfare (Abramovitz 1988, chap. 10).

The institution of new eligibility regulations—including work requirements—did not succeed in reversing the growth of the ADC program, although it politicized the benefit-setting process and made coverage of the target population more variable across the states (Zylan 1994).<sup>9</sup> However, these reforms concretized the first signs that ADC's image was being radically transformed; what was once an unobtrusive section of a complex system of social provision was becoming the most contested and controversial program in the U.S. welfare state. In short, work requirements signaled the beginning of the first wave of welfare "backlash" in the United States.

How did this reform wave begin, and what was responsible for its rapid spread across so many of the states providing ADC in the 1950s? Did reform efforts emerge simply where fiscal strains on the ADC system were severe? Did states create eligibility innovations as a result of political dynamics or race- or gender-based social conflict? Were some states institutionally predisposed to adopt restrictive social policies in response to these socioeconomic and/or political pressures? Finally, did some states follow the example of others passing the rule change, thereby creating a "runaway train" of welfare reform? Two broad approaches have emerged in the policy literature to help explain the enactment of policy reforms. We address each of these in turn, paying attention to the ways in which standard approaches may need to be recast to address the adoption of punitive, rather than progressive, policies. We then provide a quantitative analysis that demonstrates that a synthesis of the two is necessary to understand the evolution of ADC and later AFDC during the postwar period.

#### INTRASTATE CHARACTERISTICS OF STATES AND POLICY REFORM

Research on social policy development has mushroomed, offering explanations of spending levels, policy enactment, and policy reform for a wide range of policy instruments across a broad range of geographical and political contexts (for a review, see Skocpol and Amenta [1986]). Much of this research has examined the internal characteristics of states that play a role in social policy development—particularly economic, political, and institutional dynamics. For example, some research has indicated that ad-

<sup>9</sup>In fact, the sense of a welfare "crisis" only escalated during the 1960s, resulting in even more extensive, national reforms.

vancing capitalism creates both the need for state intervention (to solve problems of social dislocation, unrest, and/or threats to state legitimacy) and the resources to enact or administer it (Cutright 1965). Transformation to an industrial, wage-based economy increases the vulnerability of certain segments of the population by weakening traditional family-based supports (Wilensky 1975). Processes of capital accumulation may spur geographic mobility among wage laborers and can lead to dramatic spells of unemployment and social unrest (Piven and Cloward 1971). In general, socioeconomic accounts of welfare state development have stressed the increased ability of industrialized states to meet these new social demands, but some research indicates that states can intervene by expanding *or contracting* programs of social provision (Piven and Cloward 1971). In some cases, states may face severe fiscal imbalances that force them to make choices about specific forms of public expenditure (Offe 1984; O'Connor 1973).

Other research indicates that these socioeconomic pressures are mediated by political structures, actors, and institutions; variations in political characteristics help determine the timing and form of specific policy reforms. Most such research has emphasized the ways in which workers, interest groups, electoral constituencies and other social groupings may mobilize "power resources" and coerce states into producing policy interventions on their behalf (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Dahl 1961; Korpi 1980; Tufte 1978). At a minimum, for socially marginal groups (such as African-Americans and women) to press claims for new programs or protect their interests as embodied in existing ones, the polities within which they mobilize must be permeable: both democratic and representative political institutions must prevail (Key 1949; Shefter 1983; Mayhew 1986). In states where democratic structures are lacking, political and administrative actors may be expected to act in ways reflecting elite interests. In the American case, political exclusion of African-Americans was systematic into the late 20th century. During the period under study here, legal and *extralegal* mechanisms of exclusion were still prevalent, particularly in the states of the former Confederacy.

Finally, research emanating from the organizational sociology of the "new institutionalism" (March and Olsen 1984) suggests the need to consider the way that state institutions and actors can have an independent effect on social policy development and are either empowered or constrained to respond to social pressures or mobilized political interests. This "state-centered" research stresses organizational resources, the autonomy of state agencies, policy environments, and processes of political learning (Skocpol 1985; Orloff 1993; Zylan 1995; Hecllo 1974). These institutional characteristics and dynamics may be important in at least two ways: first, they may indicate the relative likelihood of proactive autonomous (or

semiautonomous) policy making on the part of state actors; second, they suggest that states may be differentially responsive to socioeconomic or political demands.

In sum, a variety of economic, political, and institutional dynamics may be important in shaping states' policy-making activities. While researchers addressing these *intrastate* characteristics have debated the relative importance of each category of variables, it is likely that all three operate—either interactively or in succession—to produce specific policy outcomes. In the case of postwar ADC/AFDC policy making, there is *prima facie* evidence that socioeconomic pressures on the program were mounting, race and gender politics were significant, and institutional dynamics made some state programs more likely than others to enact punitive policy reforms. In the next section, we address the theoretical and empirical literature that indicates that reforms may also spread as a result of *interstate* processes.

#### INTERSTATE PRESSURES AND THE DIFFUSION OF POLICY REFORM

While research on the internal characteristics of states has shown that certain aforementioned structural characteristics of states lead to the adoption of policy reform, this research has not paid ample attention to the *interaction* between states and how this affects states' decisions to adopt policies. One unifying characteristic of the intrastate approach is that researchers operating within this framework have largely assumed that states are discrete entities that are statistically independent. Certainly in a world increasingly characterized by a variety of different types of relations between states, it makes sense that these actors affect one another in very real ways (Meyer and Hannan 1979). This does not mean, however, that intrastate characteristics are unimportant. Rather, we argue that *both* intra- and interstate characteristics are important to states' activity on ADC and AFDC reforms.

Theoretical work in what some call the "cultural school" of world system analysis (and what others call the "institutionalist" perspective) argues that similar forms of social policies (such as education, social welfare, environment) diffuse among nation-states due to the increasingly complex set of both indirect and direct relationships between nation-states (Skocpol and Amenta 1986). This theoretical perspective asks why it is that, in the modern world system, so many radically different nation-states have such similar types or forms of policies. The cultural school argues that these similarities may be best explained by the "relations of complex interdependence among social units" that lead to the homogeneity in form of each component social unit (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, p. 146).

Research in the cultural school has centered around the connections between nation-states which lead to the necessity of both universal criteria for communication and the tendency for nation-states to emulate one another (Meyer and Hannan 1979). We argue that similar sorts of processes exist at the *state level* within the United States and that states, like nation-states, are connected in a variety of different ways. Interdependencies between states, we argue, led to the spread of work requirements as a condition for eligibility for ADC and AFDC.

Meyer's associates, David Strang and Nancy Tuma, have developed methods that are appropriate to test some of the ideas inherent in the cultural school or institutionalist perspective. In particular, Strang and Tuma (1993) have developed a series of *diffusion* models that allow us to test for the existence of diffusion of innovations among state actors. In the subsequent section of this article, we discuss these models in greater depth.

According to Rogers (1983, p. 14), diffusion occurs when some "innovation is communicated through certain channels over time and among members of a social system." Theories of diffusion maintain that there are two types of channels along which innovations flow: *direct (relational)* and *indirect (nonrelational)*. The aspect of diffusion most utilized by social scientists is the direct connection or channel between actors in a social system (Strang and Meyer 1993). Relational models of diffusion maintain that information flows between actors through their direct network relations. The rate at which an item diffuses varies with the level of interaction between actors so that, at high levels of interaction between a prior and potential adopter, there should be higher rates of diffusion of innovations.

Despite the promise of the analysis of the relational diffusion, the question remains why there is often a striking degree of uniformity in form, structure, ideology, and practice between *unconnected* actors. Scholars have noted that actors are sometimes indirectly connected through common membership in a social category, a phenomenon Strang and Meyer (1993) call "cultural linkage." Building on Strang and Meyer's (1993) work, McAdam and Rucht (1993) call cultural linkages, "nonrelational channels of diffusion." These authors argue that diffusion should be rapid among a set of potential adopters who define themselves as similar to the transmitters (McAdam and Rucht 1993). The higher the level of identification with the shared social or cultural category, the more extensive the transmission of an innovation.<sup>10</sup> This type of relation is similar to *struc-*

<sup>10</sup> A concrete example might be illustrative. Previous research (Soule 1995, 1997) found that student activists all over the United States adopted the same innovative protest tactic in the 1980s. Using diffusion analysis, it shows that the tactic spread among

*tural equivalence*, the situation in which two actors or groups of actors occupy the same network position with respect to a third actor. There is a striking degree of homogeneity between structurally equivalent actors, leading to the hypothesis that structural equivalence facilitates diffusion (Burt 1987).

The primary focus of this article is these nonrelational channels of diffusion. In the case of the spread of ADC/AFDC reforms, examples of nonrelational channels of diffusion might include states that are policy innovators or states in common Social Security Administration regions. In both of these examples, state actors are not directly connected to one another. The following section describes methods to test hypotheses about diffusion using event history data and diffusion models proposed by Strang and Tuma (1993). One of the advantages of the models described below is their ability to incorporate both inter- and intrastate measures in the same model.

#### THE MODELING OF DIFFUSION IN AN EVENT HISTORY FRAMEWORK

Strang and Tuma (1993) and Strang (1991) have proposed a new set of diffusion models that shift the level of analysis to the *individual actor* rather than the *population*, a marked improvement over the conventional diffusion models described by Strang (1991, 1992). By doing this, it is possible to model the "probability of each individual's adoption, at each point in time, as a function of the individual's proximity to the sources of diffusion" (Strang 1992, p. 16). In other words, the rate of adoption of an innovation by an actor is a function of the adoption rate of other, related actors.<sup>11</sup> Event history analysis is the proper method to estimate these models, as it allows for the analysis of data on both the timing and sequence of events.

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institutionally similar campuses that were not directly linked. The collective identity of activists served as an indirect channel of diffusion. Student activists defined themselves as similar to activists on similar campuses and imitated their protest tactics.

<sup>11</sup> There is some discussion in the literature on why certain innovations diffuse while others fall by the proverbial wayside. For example, the case that protest tactics perceived to be effective are likely to diffuse was presented in earlier work (Soule 1995, 1997). Similarly, Tarrow (1994) argues that modern protest tactics such as boycotts and petitions diffuse because they are "modular." In other words, they may be employed by many different activists, in many different situations. Strang and Meyer (1993) discuss how highly "theorized" innovations diffuse rapidly. It is beyond the scope of this article to compare a case of an innovation that failed to diffuse with the diffusion of work requirements; however it should be noted that not all innovations diffuse and that there are theoretical reasons why we might expect certain innovations to diffuse.

The *multiplicative model of diffusion* discussed by Strang and Tuma (1993) allows for the measurement of *both* the relationships of independent variables on the dependent variable (as in a traditional event history model) *and* the measurement of diffusion. The first of these are referred to as the *propensity* effects, and the coefficients in this vector are interpreted as one would those in a traditional event history regression model. *Proximity* effects are those that are the effects of diffusion (incorporating both temporal and spatial heterogeneity). The multiplicative model is

$$r_s(t) = \exp(\alpha' x_s + \sum_{m \in S} \theta' z_m),$$

where  $s$  is the potential adopter and  $s$  is the transmitter.<sup>12</sup> The propensity vector,  $X_s$ , includes the effects of structural covariates on the outcome (timing of adoption). The proximity vector,  $Z_m$ , includes the effects of pairs of transmitters and potential adopters. The vectors of parameter estimates for each of these are denoted by  $\alpha$  and  $\theta$ . As should be clear, we are interested in the direct effects of a set of structural covariates on the rate of states' adoption of work requirements (intrastate effects) and in the diffusion effects (interstate effects).<sup>13</sup> Maximum-likelihood techniques are the best way to estimate these event history models (Strang and Tuma 1993).

#### MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The dependent variable in this analysis is the rate of enactment of work requirements as a condition of eligibility for ADC/AFDC. The years in which the state-level provision was enacted were obtained from the U.S. Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance, *Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans*, and is presented in table 1.

<sup>12</sup> The full model is represented as

$$r_s(t) = \exp(\alpha' x_s + \sum_{m \in S} \beta' v_m + \sum_{m \in S} \gamma' w_m + \sum_{m \in S} \theta' z_m)$$

Note that this includes vectors to measure both *infectiousness* and *susceptibility*. In the current usage, however, we are only interested in the propensity and proximity vectors. For a discussion of infectiousness and susceptibility, see Strang and Tuma (1993), Soule (1995), and Greve (1995).

<sup>13</sup> Note that table 1 shows that several states adopted work requirements in the same year (e.g., Arizona, Illinois, and Nebraska all adopted in 1950). There are two distinct ways of treating simultaneous adoption events in the Strang and Tuma (1993) models: they may either be treated as influencing each other or not. In the analysis presented in this article, we do *not* allow simultaneous influence. We did, however, run all of the models presented below allowing for simultaneous influence and found no differences between these results and those presented in this article.

The independent variables used in the analysis are divided into two different types corresponding to the two different vectors discussed in the previous section: *propensity or intrastate effects* and *proximity or interstate effects*.

#### Intrastate Factors and the Enactment of Work Requirements: The Propensity Vector

The first set of independent variables that we are interested in reflect characteristics of each of the states. As discussed earlier, previous research has found that the economic and political climate of the state should be important to ADC/AFDC policy, as should be certain state-centered factors. One prominent economic theory of policy development—often referred to as the “logic of industrialism” theory—asserts that programs of social provision should be more extensive in industrially advanced states than in agriculturally driven economies (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). While, overall, the United States was fairly advanced industrially, significant variation occurred across states in terms of the mix of agricultural and manufacturing economies (see appendix table A1 for descriptive statistics on and sources for all continuous independent variables).

The value added by manufacture is considered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to be the best measure available of the importance of manufacturing to a state relative to other states. Specifically, it is the value of products manufactured (plus receipts for services rendered) minus the cost of materials, supplies, containers, fuel, purchased electricity, and contract work. We use a per capita transformation to standardize for differences in population size, thus to ensure comparability across states. If industrial states are more likely to extend social provision than rural states, we would expect an inverse relationship between this measure and the enactment of restrictive eligibility requirements. A more empirically grounded hypothesis about the effect of an industrial economy would also predict this inverse relationship: to the extent that the historical data are correct that eligibility rules may have been manipulated to respond to seasonal labor demands, we would expect rural states to have adopted them more quickly than industrial states.<sup>14</sup>

Even as broad socioeconomic processes may lead to pressures to expand or contract programs of social provision, states may be driven to respond in particular ways by fiscal considerations. States engaged in a wide variety of public expenditure programs may face fiscal imbalances or even

<sup>14</sup> Since much of our data come from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States Census* and is not available yearly, we use linear interpolation to obtain yearly values for our independent variables.

crises. We hypothesize that states facing revenue shortfalls (O'Connor 1973) should be looking for ways to cut back on expenditures; adding eligibility rules to an expensive social program would be one method of achieving this. We have created a proxy for the fiscal health of the state by subtracting total state expenditures from total state revenues and dividing by the state revenues.<sup>15</sup>

We also examine the extent to which the political dynamics within a state affect the rate of adoption of work requirement provisions to states' ADC/AFDC policies. First, if the state is to respond to the needs or demands of social constituencies with programs of social provision, these constituencies must (at a minimum) have access to channels of political influence—particularly the franchise. Since the constituents of ADC/AFDC included poor mothers, and given the racial distribution of American poverty, we are interested in the potential mobilization of women and African-Americans. While women and African-Americans were formally enfranchised during this time, African-American men and women were systematically excluded from political participation in many political jurisdictions—at least until after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Thus there was considerable variation in political structures across the states between 1950 and 1967.

To test the importance of democratic access, we construct a measure of the presence or absence of voting rights in the state. We divide the number voting in the last presidential election by the number of eligible voters to get a measure of electoral participation.<sup>16</sup> However, as we are interested in electoral *access* (rather than enthusiasm, e.g.) we take the natural log of this number to arrive at a measure of voting rights. The logarithmic transformation allows us to distinguish between states with low voter turnout and states with medium or high turnout. We claim that states with exceptionally low turnout are characterized by restricted

<sup>15</sup> Note that this is different from a measure of the fiscal capacity of the state, which in some research is measured by per capita revenues (and is usually associated with the "state-centered" literature). We believe that the *balance* of revenues and expenditures is a better indicator of the "fiscal crisis" argument than revenues alone, although use of per capita revenues or per capita income does not significantly alter the outcome of our results.

<sup>16</sup> "The number of eligible voters" is defined as the population ages 21 and over in the state. Following Amenta and colleagues (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Cauthen and Amenta 1996), we expect that a variety of legal and extralegal methods of exclusion were at work in a number of (mostly Southern) states during this period. Since these methods would have thwarted registration and voting among African-Americans, we use the population of constitutionally eligible voters as the potential voting population and create a ratio using the subgroup who actually voted in the most recent national election to produce a measure of participation.

electoral access (see Amenta et al. [1992] and Cauthen and Amenta [1996] on the construction of this measure).

Given open access, what other political factors might favor or obstruct the passage of policy reforms? Much research on welfare state provision has focused on male wage earners and has argued that the balance of political forces favoring capital or labor can tip the balance in favor of strong or weak redistributive policies (Korpi 1980; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Borg and Castles 1981; Castles 1982). Partisanship has thus been deemed an important aspect of this balance of forces and construed in terms of class cleavages: polities dominated by labor or leftist parties have been found to be more likely to produce redistributive policies than polities dominated by parties of the right. In the absence of a true labor or leftist party, the best case scenario for progressive programmatic commitments in an American political party would be found in the Democratic Party. However several factors complicate this assumption.

First, this has clearly not been the case among Democrats in the American South (Key 1949). Southern Democrats have historically demonstrated hostility to federal initiatives that might encroach upon parochial practices of racial control. Second, research has indicated that patronage-oriented parties are unlikely to endorse programmatic spending policies, instead favoring discretionary initiatives (Mayhew 1986). Finally, given the historic indifference (if not antipathy) of the American labor movement toward ADC/AFDC, we are skeptical that partisanship would operate in terms resonant with the traditional class allegiances demonstrated by the Democratic and Republican parties.

To test for the possibility that partisanship operates in this case according to broadly "redistributive" criteria, we have—following Amenta and colleagues (Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Cauthen and Amenta 1996)—created a measure of progressive Democratic control of the state legislature in open, representative political systems. A code of "1" on this binary variable indicates that (in a given year) the state is non-Southern, that the political system of the state is nonpatronage, and that the state legislature is composed of over 50% Democrats. If partisanship operates according to class-based models of party influence, we would expect states with open Democrat-controlled polities to be least likely to enact restrictive and punitive social policies like work requirements.<sup>17</sup>

If we consider the case from a slightly different angle, however, we

<sup>17</sup> Alternatively, we might expect Republican-controlled legislatures in nonpatronage states to be most proactive in passing work requirements. We examined this possibility in a separate analysis (not shown). As the results section demonstrates, the partisanship measure works in a direction opposite to that predicted by the literature; this holds true for the Republican measure as well.

might expect a different effect of partisanship. Historical data on the partisanship of ADC/AFDC reform is quite spotty; while Bell (1965, pp. 61–62) implies that Republican politicians may have had a particular interest in using the welfare crisis to attack the long reign of Democrats in the White House, at the state level it was Democrats (outside the South) who were busily unseating Republican legislators. Partisanship in this sense may only have been significant as it related to incumbency; policy departures may be more likely to emerge from newly constituted legislative leadership. If this is the case, we might expect open, Democrat-controlled legislatures to be more likely to enact work requirements during this period.

The data for the composition of the state legislature come from *The Book of the States* (Council of State Governments 1948–67). The data on patronage come from Mayhew's (1986) *Placing Parties in American Politics*. Mayhew's qualitative research on the American states led to his construction of a five-level categorical variable, giving each state a "traditional party organization score," where a score of "1" indicates the lowest level of patronage organization in the state, while "5" indicates the highest level of patronage organization (Mayhew 1986, p. 196).<sup>18</sup> The South is defined to include the 11 states of the former Confederacy (Key 1949).

Finally, we examine the characteristics of state institutions. According to Heclo (1974) and Zylan (1995), the preexisting policy environment may condition the ability and willingness of state actors to create innovations in social policy.<sup>19</sup> Heclo (1974) argues that bureaucrats engage in a process of political learning, analogizing from one policy to another based on perceived similarities between the problems each is designed to address. Conversely, state actors may seek to solve problems they see emerging from preexisting policies. Zylan (1995) finds similar dynamics to be especially important to the development of policies for women.

In this article, we use the average monthly benefit paid to recipients of Old Age Assistance (OAA), the per capita number of ADC/AFDC recipient families, and the presence or absence of a children's bureau in a state's department of labor as indicators of the policy environment. Much like

<sup>18</sup> The value for a state on this variable can change biannually as a result of shifts in partisan control of the legislature. The measures indicating patronage and location in the South remain constant for each state over this time period.

<sup>19</sup> Note that there are varying definitions of the term "policy environment." Heclo uses a definition that includes economic growth and social change, political development, and what he terms "policy inheritance." Amenta et al. (1992) prefer the term "policy framework." Where Heclo's "policy inheritance" describes a mostly critical approach toward previous policy inadequacies, and "policy framework" describes a position of state actors' commitment to a given policy instrument or approach, we prefer the term "policy environment" (Zylan 1995), which includes both stances.

ADC, OAA was a means-tested program that provided income assistance to the indigent aged, many of whom were not eligible for retirement income under the social insurance titles of the Social Security Act.<sup>20</sup> During the earliest years of the Social Security Act, OAA was considered the flagship program of the public assistance title and was often administered jointly with ADC/AFDC (Bucklin and Lynch 1938). We anticipate that policy decisions on ADC/AFDC might be made to cohere with OAA policy characteristics; where OAA programs were generous, ADC/AFDC programs may have been similarly generous (and thus unlikely to entail punitive eligibility restrictions).

At the same time, state actors may have developed concerns about the trajectory of ADC/AFDC coverage. We anticipate that the enactment of work requirements would be more likely in states where caseloads were heavy relative to the population. Similarly, we might expect a particular institutional interest in selectively trimming coverage where the recipient population is especially socially demeaned—that is, where there are high rates of unmarried childbearing, or where the recipient population is disproportionately black. Unfortunately, state-level data on recipient characteristics are unavailable for this time period. However, we use an indicator of the percentage of blacks in the population to provide a broad measure of the racial dimensions of ADC/AFDC policy making.<sup>21</sup> We expect that where the percentage of blacks in the population is high two mechanisms are likely to increase the rate at which work requirements are adopted: first, racial conflict in society and polity are likely to be exacerbated, inflecting social policy making with a discourse of racial interventionism; second, the recipient population is likely to have a greater representation of African-Americans—even with informal racial discrimination in ADC/AFDC administration, the number of black recipients is likely to be higher in states with a higher proportion of African-Americans as a result of simple demographics and the structuring of poverty by race.

Additionally, we expect that state-supported maternalism—as indi-

<sup>20</sup> Recall that Old Age Insurance was still a relatively young program during the 1950s and 1960s; many elderly Americans had never paid into the system or had paid for only a few years before reaching retirement age.

<sup>21</sup> Ideally, we would also like to measure the effects of “illegitimacy” rates. However, states were not required to report this data to federal agencies documenting vital statistics, and not all of them did. For our time period, we were unable to obtain rates of birth to unmarried mothers for the following 12 states: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and Vermont. We ran the models presented below on the subset of states for which these data were available and found that both the overall rate of illegitimacy and the rate of black illegitimacy increase the rate of adoption of work requirements. We do not present these results in table 2 below, however, because states for which data were not available were excluded in a nonrandom fashion.

cated by the presence of a children's bureau in the state's department of labor—should create an institutional environment unfriendly to efforts to exclude children from ADC/AFDC coverage. State-level children's bureaus were established during the Progressive Era in response to demands by organized women espousing a maternalist agenda of child labor regulations, child and maternal health provision, and assistance to mothers with dependent children (Muncy 1991). Not every state established such an office on behalf of children, and child labor laws were in fact quite controversial. We anticipate that those states that did create and maintain such offices demonstrated a significant and continuing support of maternalist ideals of government. These states, we hypothesize, would be reluctant to address the growing burdens associated with the ADC/AFDC program with punitive eligibility requirements. Data on the presence/absence of children's bureaus come from *Labor Offices in the United States* (U.S. Department of Labor, various years).

Finally, we hypothesize that states with a history of innovativeness might be likely to enact new eligibility requirements more quickly than states that tend to lag in policy adoption. To measure innovativeness, we use Walker's (1969) policy innovation score. Walker analyzed 88 programs passed by states between the late 1800s and 1965 to create a measure of the general level of innovativeness of each state. The measure is continuous, with a score of "0" indicating least innovative and "1" indicating most innovative. Walker chose these 88 programs to represent a variety of different issue areas such as health, welfare, education, conservation, planning, administrative organization, highways, civil rights, corrections and police, labor, taxes, and professional regulations. While innovativeness has generally been theorized in terms of the expansion of state commitments, we hypothesize that states might also conceive of enacting new eligibility requirements as a form of program innovation and predict a positive effect of the Walker policy innovation score on the rate of enactment.

#### Interstate Factors and the Diffusion of Work Requirements: The Proximity Vector

Although the intrastate factors discussed above are clearly important to each individual state's decision to adopt work requirement provisions, interstate diffusion effects are important as well. As indicated earlier, the event history models employed in this article incorporate a vector of variables to measure linkages between states.

In this article, we are primarily interested in the *indirect* linkages between state actors. We do not deny that certain direct linkages may have existed as well, but we are most interested in two culturally constructed

categories of similarity: the level of policy innovation and the Social Security Administration (SSA) region. We argue that innovative states will look to other innovative states and base their policy decisions on those of their peers. In a similar vein, the policy decisions of less innovative states will be more important to other less innovative states than will be the policy decisions of more innovative states. We have created a four-category variable of policy innovativeness based on Walker's policy innovation score to examine the hypothesis that work requirements diffuse across states with similarly innovative institutional structures.

In addition to the level of innovativeness, we also test for the diffusion of work requirement provisions among states in each of the 12 SSA regions. In these models, we also control for diffusion within region as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, a different definition than the SSA's regional categories (see appendix table A2). We argue that although *both* of these definitions of region include states that are geographically proximate, the SSA region may have meaning beyond that of the census region. One of the functions of the regional SSA offices was to review new state legislation (Burns 1949, pp. 384–85), and we expect that states within the same SSA region will be most cognizant of the actions of other states in the same region due to communications from the regional SSA offices. Stated differently, the principle of structural equivalence leads us to hypothesize that actors that are not directly connected (e.g., states in the same SSA region) will be similar because of their common network connection to the third actor (e.g., the regional office of the SSA).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 2 presents models comparing measures representing both the intra-state and interstate perspectives. These models include both the propensity and the proximity vectors of the multiplicative diffusion model. The models presented in table 2 include two socioeconomic measures: the value added by manufacture and our measure of the fiscal health of the state.<sup>22</sup> Across models, neither of these variables is significant, although the industrialism measure operates in the expected direction (rural states displayed higher rates of enactment of work requirements). Fiscal health, however, operates in a direction opposite to that predicted by the theory.

The models in table 2 also include two measures of the political climate of the state. As expected, states with lower voting rights had higher rates of adoption of work requirements. This finding is consistent across the

<sup>22</sup> Model 1 is known as the baseline diffusion model and will be used as a comparison model for models 2, 3, and 4, which incorporate the diffusion effects

## AFDC Eligibility

TABLE 2  
DIFFUSION OF WORK REQUIREMENTS AS A CONDITION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR  
ADC/AFDC, 1950-67

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept . . . . .	40.04*** (4.20)	37.88*** (4.21)	35.33*** (4.20)	35.8*** (4.16)
Value added per capita . . . . .	-.13 (.22)	-.23 (.22)	-.38 (.23)	-.33 (.23)
Fiscal health . . . . .	.09 (.24)	.15 (.23)	.18 (.24)	.14 (.24)
Voting rights . . . . .	-.72*** (.23)	-.59** (.24)	-.49* (.24)	-.49* (.23)
Open Democratic party . . . . .	73*** (.16)	75*** (.16)	68*** (.16)	72*** (.16)
Children's bureau . . . . .	-.02*** (.002)	-.02*** (.002)	-.02*** (.002)	-.02*** (.002)
Walker's policy innovation score . . . . .	3.21*** (.81)	3.41*** (.80)	3.52*** (.80)	4.40*** (.89)
ADC/AFDC families per capita . . .	20.23*** (3.60)	21.50*** (3.60)	22.04*** (3.62)	22.40*** (3.63)
Average monthly OAA benefit . . .	-.006 (.004)	-.008* (.003)	-.008* (.003)	-.009* (.003)
%black . . . . .	.002* (.0008)	.002* (.0008)	.002* (.0009)	.002* (.0009)
Diffusion intercept . . . . .	.005*** (.0003)	.007*** (.0005)	.006*** (.0006)	.005*** (.0008)
U.S. Census Bureau region . . . .		-.007*** (.001)	-.009*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)
SSA region . . . . .			.02*** (.004)	.02*** (.004)
Walker level . . . . .				.007** (.002)
Likelihood ratio $\chi^2$ vs constant rate model . . . . .	347.56***	364.18***	384.69***	390.44***
df . . . . .	10	11	12	13

Note.—SEs are in parentheses.

\* P = .10.

\*\* P = .05.

\*\*\* P = .01.

four models presented in table 2, and across models, the magnitude is rather large. For example, the coefficient on the voting rights covariate in model 1 is -.72. The corresponding multiplier on the rate of adoption for states with the *lowest* level of voting rights is 4.5, while for the states with the *highest* level of voting rights it is 1.2. In other words, the rate of adoption of these punitive eligibility requirements is nearly four times

greater in states that have limited voting rights than it is in states that promote voting rights. This supports our expectation that states in which African-Americans had limited access to the franchise had higher rates of enactment of this restriction to ADC/AFDC.

Interestingly, table 2 shows that our measure of the progressiveness of the dominant political party of the state does not yield the expected coefficient: states with more progressive Democratic legislatures have higher rates of enactment of work requirements. One possible explanation for this unexpected effect is that during this period, most states were dominated by less progressive legislatures—many of them controlled by the Republican Party. If Democrats were political “challengers” during this period, they may have proffered welfare reform (however punitive) as a way of attracting new voters (Steiner 1966).

The models presented in table 2 also include measures of the policy environment, and the results are consistent with our expectations. As predicted, the presence of a children’s bureau in the state’s department of labor decreases the rate of adoption of work requirements, as does the average monthly benefit paid to OAA recipients. Taken together these findings indicate that states committed to a general model of social welfare and state-level maternalism have lower rates of adoption of ADC/AFDC restrictions such as work requirements.

Across the models in table 2, the number of ADC/AFDC families increases the rate of adoption of work requirements, as we expected, and the magnitude of this effect is quite large. In model 1, the coefficient for this measure is 20.23 and the corresponding multiplier for states with the highest number of ADC/AFDC families per capita is 13, while the multiplier for the states with the lowest is only 1.1. Stated differently, the rate of adoption of work requirements is about 13 times faster in states with the highest caseloads than in states with the lowest caseload.

States that were generally innovative in policy enactment were also likely to be innovative in adopting work requirements. This is indicated in table 2, as the coefficient on Walker’s policy innovation score is positive and significant. For example, in model 1 the coefficient on the Walker score is 3.21. The corresponding multiplier when the Walker score is .298 (the *lowest* score) is about 2.60. When the Walker score is .66 (the *highest* score), the multiplier is about 8.3. In other words, for the most highly innovative states, the rate of adoption of work requirements is over three times that of the least innovative states.

Finally, as we expected, there is an independent effect of the percentage of the population that is black on the rate of adoption. The coefficient is positive and significant, although the magnitude of the effect is not great. In model 1, for example, the multiplier on the rate of passage is only

slightly higher for states with the highest black population than for those with the lowest.<sup>23</sup>

In short, the intrastate dynamics of interest in this case combine political, demographic, and institutional factors. States were responding punitively to increases and changes in the ADC/AFDC recipient population; where caseloads were heavy, where the racial composition of the population may have increased the likelihood of a racialized discourse of welfare receipt, and where there were few institutional protections for public assistance recipients and poor women, efforts requiring ADC/AFDC recipients to work were politically appealing, deemed a form of innovation, and likely to be rapidly enacted.

Intrastate characteristics were not alone in determining a state's rate of adoption of work requirements, however. Models 2, 3, and 4 of table 2 add each of the measures of interstate effects. Note that when we add the interstate measures, the intrastate effects do not change dramatically. Model 2 includes a measure of diffusion among states in the same geographical region, as it is defined by the U.S. Census. Note that the coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that the rate of diffusion was actually *slower* among states within the same census region. But did work requirements diffuse among states within the same SSA region, a categorization that we have argued has more meaning than simple geographic regions? Model 3 tests for the presence of diffusion among states within the same SSA region; our hypothesis is supported. Model 3 shows that, within each of these 12 regions, the policy reform spread.<sup>24</sup> This finding makes sense when we consider the role of the staff of these regional offices, which was to review any new state legislation and to inform states of any nonconformities to federal law (Burns 1949).

One explanation for this result is that states within a particular SSA region are structurally equivalent. States within the same SSA region share the same network position with respect to the regional office of the SSA, thus the principle of structural equivalence may help explain diffusion within SSA regions.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> One might argue that the independent variables in our analysis would operate only with *lagged* effects. Using the lagged values of our independent variables does not alter the effects presented in table 2.

<sup>24</sup> This finding is robust when we only include the SSA region variable (without the census region measure).

<sup>25</sup> Perhaps an alternative explanation for the finding that diffusion occurs among states in the same SSA region is that racism was driving the implementation of work requirements and that diffusion among *Southern* states artificially produces the SSA regional diffusion finding. We tested for this possibility by including a binary variable in the proximity vector for South/non-South. The effect of SSA region remains, while we found no evidence for diffusion among Southern states.

It is important to note that the SSA region differs from most standard definitions of geographic region. For example, the SSA defines Louisiana and New Mexico as belonging to the same region and Washington and Nevada as belonging to the same region (see app. A). However, states in the SSA region *are* contiguous. Another interpretation of this finding is that states imitate the policies of *contiguous* states in an effort to reduce the incentives for ADC/AFDC recipients to flee one state for a neighboring state with a less restrictive ADC/AFDC policy.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, model 4 of table 2 includes a term for the measurement of the general level of policy innovation of the state, or the "Walker level." The coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that these reforms diffuse among states that are similar in their general history of innovativeness. Even though policy innovation has traditionally been conceived as innovation in economically redistributive and/or socially progressive directions, our findings suggest that the quick adoption of restrictive reforms may also be conceived by state actors as an innovative policy action. The diffusion results indicate that more innovative states imitate the actions of states similar to themselves on this dimension. Less innovative states look to other less innovative states for cues on the appropriate actions to take with regard to ADC/AFDC work requirements. For example, Michigan, Rhode Island, and California are all in the same category of innovation (relatively high innovators), and all enacted work requirements between 1953 and 1956 (see table 1).

In conclusion, our results show that both intra- and interstate processes are important in predicting reform in welfare policy. Our analysis of the intrastate characteristics is revealing. It is clear from these analyses that certain state characteristics increase the rate of adoption of such punitive measures as work requirements. Race and gender politics tell us why ADC/AFDC as a program was vulnerable: the decline of state maternalism, the unwillingness of states to fund programs that were increasingly seen to be redistributing resources from whites to blacks and from taxpaying families to unwed mothers, and the systematic disfranchisement of blacks were all factors determining the rate of adoption of these rules.

This is only one half of our story, however. We also find that, net of the characteristics of states that led them to adopt work requirements, a state's decision was also affected by the decisions of states to which it was connected. Work requirements diffused among states that were indirectly

<sup>25</sup> Research by Peterson and Rom (1990) supports the assertion that program characteristics may encourage in- or out-migration of recipients and taxpayers. Other, more recent research suggests that ADC/AFDC recipients do not move to other states in response to variations in benefits and eligibility requirements (Hartmann and Hanson 1996). Whether or not recipients *actually* migrate in search of high benefits or easy program access may not matter, however, if state managers believe this to be the case.

connected through the SSA regional offices. Additionally, this policy also diffused among states that were of the same level of innovativeness. Innovative states' decisions were impacted by other innovative states, while less innovative states' decisions were impacted by other less innovative states.

The finding that intra- and interstate mechanisms of policy development are *both* important does not, in our opinion, represent a theoretical conflict between cultural and intrastate schools of thought, but rather an opportunity for synthesis. If we examine the theoretical contributions of John Meyer and Theda Skocpol—seminal figures in research examining, respectively, interstate and intrastate determinants of policy development—we find the lack of discourse between the two schools unnecessarily limiting and somewhat perplexing. For one thing, both Meyer and Skocpol have been referred to as “institutional” theorists, and both have stressed the image of states as rationalizing organizations operating according to institutional logics of varying kinds.

Skocpol and Meyer do clearly diverge in their conception of the state as an “actor,” however, and it is here that we believe some connective work is in order. Meyer has claimed that states are better seen as “enacting” than “acting”: “If we take institutional thinking seriously, we are encouraged to conceive of modern actors (be they persons or organizations or polities) as deeply embedded in a wider rationalized culture and social structure. If so, their ‘action’ is often better theorized as an enactment of one sort or another—of roles, of identities, of models. If the modern individual, organization, or nation-state is in large part a local display of material constructed elsewhere, actors are really playing a role, or enacting an identity, as ‘actor’” (Meyer and Jepperson 1997, p. 3). Skocpol (1985), on the other hand—in her efforts to distinguish between “society-centered” and “state-centered” approaches—has vigorously articulated the image of states as semiautonomous actors, pursuing independent goals, interests, and/or agendas. Yet Skocpol (1985, p. 8) herself has noted that “the modern state as we know it, and as Weber and Hintze conceptualized it, has always been, since its birth in European history, part of a system of competing and mutually involved states.”

We agree that states can operate independently of each other and yet be “mutually involved” and that both kinds of mechanisms can influence policy development. Our analysis of the efforts of states to reform welfare policy during the immediate postwar period suggests that states may both act *and* enact. States reformed ADC/AFDC programs in response to internal problem pressures, puzzling out solutions that were coherent with their own policy environments within their own political structures. But these reforms were not adopted in a vacuum; work requirements diffused more rapidly among states that were culturally similar (in terms of innova-

tiveness) and/or institutionally linked. In short, states *acted* to address internal policy dynamics while also *enacting* their roles as policy innovators or policy laggards. Researchers' efforts to uncover the determinants of America's precocious episode of welfare state retrenchment would, we believe, be fundamentally incomplete without attending to both sets of processes.

## APPENDIX

TABLE A1  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SOURCES OF CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
FROM TABLE 2

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Value added per capita	.72	.38	.05	1.59
Fiscal health	11	.37	-1.08	.82
Voting rights	-.51	.32	-2.07	-20
Walker policy innovation score	.45	.085	.298	.656
Voting rights	-.51	.32	-2.07	-20
ADC/AFDC families per capita (%)	.5	1.0	.03	12.7
Average monthly OAA benefit (in dollars)	62.99	18.47	1.20	166.50
%black	8.8	10.3	.05	44.9

SOURCES—Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1947, 1957) except for the Walker policy innovation score (Walker 1969).

## AFDC Eligibility

TABLE A2  
CENSUS AND SSA REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Region	SSA	U.S. Census
1 . . . . .	Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont	Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
2 . . . . .	New York	Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
3 . . . . .	Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania	Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
4 . . . . .	Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia	Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
5 . . . . .	Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio	Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia
6 . . . . .	Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin	Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia
7 . . . . .	Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee	Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
8 . . . . .	Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota	California, Oregon, Washington
9 . . . . .	Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma	
10 . . . . .	Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas	
11 . . . . .	Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming	
12 . . . . .	California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington	

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## Book Reviews

*Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age.* By Alberto Melucci. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii+441. \$64.95 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

*The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society.* By Alberto Melucci. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. vii+177. \$49.95 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

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*Challenging Codes* is certainly the best introduction to the study of social movements. The book is based on a wide variety of information from both North American and European sources. Melucci rightly defines three types of social movements.

The first definition considers social movements as crises or dysfunctions that arise in the institutional order either because institutions are not able to give a satisfactory answer to social demands or because these demands cannot or will not find an institutionalized solution. This approach is certainly the least useful because it denies any autonomy to collective actions that are only reactions to a social or, even more, to a political crisis.

Melucci opposes two different approaches to this functionalist conception of social movements. The first approach defines social movements as a collective pursuit of rationally defined personal interests. It concentrates its efforts on analyzing strategies, forms of resource mobilization, leadership, and alliances that are means of action because goals are defined in terms of rational choice from the beginning on. Melucci rightly observes that economic liberalism and Marxism often converge to inspire this type of study, but he is not satisfied with it. He follows Pizzorno in his critique of rational choice theory, which reminds us that the formation of actors and conflicts determines the definition of interests instead of being determined by them. Melucci also criticizes this idea of rational choice theory—as well as the “functionalist” one—because they tend to reduce social movements to political action, as if collective actors were no more than interest groups that try to influence political decisions.

Melucci’s double critique leads him to defend a more radical definition of social movements that corresponds to the title of the book, *Challenging Codes*. Social movements are the type of collective behavior that challenge the ends, values, and power structure of a given society. However, Melucci thinks that this definition is ambiguous, and he rejects a Marxist

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approach that identifies social movements with the idea of history or with the battles of reason against irrational forms of profit or power. He criticizes this Marxist approach, especially because he subordinates social movements, which can only make structural contradictions manifest, to political action, while positive goals can be defined only by revolutionary intellectuals and parties.

In the search for an approach that gives a solid ground to the autonomy and creativity of social movements, Melucci defines a social movement as the "individual and collective reappropriation of the meaning of action that is at stake in the forms of collective involvement, which make the experience of change in the present a condition for creating a different future" (p. 9). This action has three main components: group solidarity, definition of a conflict, and "a breach of compatibility of the system within which the action takes place" (p. 30); this definition corresponds to the analysis of social movements I have offered since 1965. Melucci's analysis is original, however, because it constantly rejects any "essentialist" definition of social movements and any attempt to identify one central social movement in each societal type. Social movements as processes of building collective identities—what Melucci calls "identization"—do not serve any principle of order or change. They are the final end of their own action, especially in contemporary societies where life experience is penetrated and shaped by classification and manipulations. This central idea leads him to define democracy as the creation of conditions that "allow social actors to recognize themselves and be recognized for what they are or want to be" (p. 219). Social movements defend and create the existence and freedom of social actors and have the capacity to give unity and meaning to life worlds that are segmented and invaded by mass society.

This general view of social movements has two categories of consequences. First, it allows Melucci to overcome the opposition between the so-called European and American traditions—between a sociology of structural conflicts and resource mobilization theories—which both contribute to the analysis of social movements. He is nearer to the second tradition of resource mobilization theories when he devotes a large part of his book to the processes of the formation of collective action. However, he shares the idea that our societies are dominated by general conflicts that oppose the freedom of actors to a power structure and to the imposition of codes on individuals and groups with the European tradition. Second, Melucci helps us, in a very innovative way, to understand what I have defined as new social movements since 1975: youth protest, the women's movement, the ecological campaign, the peace movement, and the defense of ethnic-national or religious identity. He does not believe in a deep-seated unity of these movements because his main preoccupation is to avoid an essentialist view of them.

*The Playing Self*, a companion book to *Challenging Codes*, examines the unity of the protest movement. It offers a "weak" image of the self similar to what Elster has called the multiple self. "The inner planet is

no longer an essence, but an articulation of levels and systems which alter the way we perceive ourselves" (p. 62). This mobile, "playing" self is defined by its effort to create its own identity—which is not conceived in macrosociological terms—as the effort to create or maintain a meaningful life experience—which is not what I call subjectivity. The formation of an actor, according to Melucci, consists mainly in reconstructing the totality of life experience and its internal diversity by linking together body and mind, identization and participation, diversity and unity. This definition of new social movements corresponds to the concrete analyses that are offered in the second part of *Challenging Codes*, but it is carefully titled "contemporary collective action." We can use here Melucci's own remarks that all collective actions have various dimensions to suggest that a "weak" definition corresponds better to the broad category of collective action, while social movements express more directly a central conflict between identity and deregulated, market-oriented processes of change that threaten, destroy, or manipulate self-identity.

Melucci seems to waver between a soft and a hard definition of self-identity and, consequently, between two definitions of collective actions: one aims at enriching and reconstructing personal experience, and another more conflict-loaded definition emphasizes resistance to all forms of domination and manipulation.

I would like to emphasize the deep originality and importance of these books, which not only provide us with a large amount of information, but also lead us to the central problems of the sociology of collective action and social movements. *Challenging Codes* and *The Playing Self* will be very useful for graduate courses not only in sociology but in psychology and philosophy as well.

*Organizing Dissent: Unions, the State, and the Democratic Teachers' Movement in Mexico.* By Maria Lorena Cook. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi+359. \$55.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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In this thoughtful examination of the emergence and survival of the democratic teachers' movement in Mexico, Maria Lorena Cook offers a rich case study central to several important debates in the fields of social movements, democratization, and Mexican studies. Cook asks how an oppositional and democratic movement could emerge under conditions of authoritarianism, and more important, how it could endure for more than a decade given that the repression of popular opposition is generally the norm in such contexts. For answers, Cook turns away from the new social movement paradigm and its concerns with identity and autonomy, which now dominate the social movement literature on authoritarian countries, and instead employs a "political process" approach. Like Sid-

ney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, she examines strategy and organization as well as political opportunities, arguing that "the timing of the emergence of the teachers' movement can best be understood by the presence of conflict between major actors in the movement's immediate environment—namely the state and union leadership—which in turn provided the movement with some protection from repression and opportunity for mobilization" (p. 4); its survival owed to internal organization and movement strategy and especially its democratic character.

To substantiate both claims, Cook examines six regions in Mexico where the independent teachers' movement emerged—contrasting the enduring successes of the movement in Oaxaca and Chiapas, where internal organization was much more democratic but movement strategy less confrontational, with the fleeting successes of independently organized teachers in other states who employed more conflictual, extralegal tactics. Her findings are noteworthy. One might expect that in authoritarian contexts, and in Mexico in particular, conciliatory movements that use the state's own formal legal channels to make claims, as happened in Chiapas and Oaxaca, would fall prey more easily to co-optation and, thus, lose popular support and their capacity to survive. But Cook's evidence suggests otherwise: a "self-limiting" strategy, as Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen (*Civil Society* [MIT Press, 1992]) might call it, produced better results. In combination with internal democratic organization, those movements that employed a less oppositional and more conciliatory strategy were more likely to survive than those that preserved their ideological purity and rejected state structures in their entirety.

Cook's study also sheds light on the process of political change in Mexico, not just its much-touted democratic transition but also the slow but veritable institutional transformation of the party-state. Because teachers have historically been one of the largest and best-organized sectors of a national union movement that for decades sustained the power of the party-state, the mere emergence of an independent, democratically organized teachers' movement "reflected a crack in the system itself" (p. 9). As such, this case study lends considerable insight into the crumbling edifice of one-party rule in Mexico. Given that far too many studies of democratization speak in abstract generalities about the Mexican political system—how it works and why it may be failing—Cook's approach is a breath of fresh air. Most worthy of commendation is her empirically grounded, nuanced analysis of the institutional conflicts and alliances within and between state agencies, the ruling party, the loyal progovernment teachers' union, and the independent teachers' movement, as well as her efforts to situate them historically and regionally.

Despite its numerous merits and impressive scope, some questions remain, mainly regarding the use of a study of independently organized teachers in Mexico to sustain general arguments about social movements under conditions of authoritarianism. Mexico is hardly prototypically authoritarian, and its government has long faced repeated social mobilizations, often bringing mobilized populations into the state. Moreover, as

Cook acknowledges, teachers in Mexico have their own unique history and organization, much of which owes to past mobilizations and state responses, that together make teachers rather exceptional on several accounts. They are considered a mainstay of the union movement but are grouped in a middle-class sector of the party separate from other key trade union organizations. They are public employees who, because of restrictions on workplace mobilization, have long relied on their organizational involvement in legitimate structures of the party-state to express grievances. Last, unlike most other organized occupations, they hold legitimacy and influence in almost all states and municipalities, not merely the capital city or other high-profile localities. In short, teachers hold a unique place in the institutional, class, and regional structures of Mexico. One cannot help but think that movement dynamics in general, and teachers' successes in Chiapas and Oaxaca (states far from the center with long histories of regional opposition), owe to more than political opportunities and organizational strategies per se, as Cook seems to be suggesting.

If more attention had been paid to regional politics and to the literature on trade unions and public employees, we might have been pushed to think more about the ways that ambiguities or overlaps in teachers' class versus social versus regional identities affected member allegiances, movement strategies, and state responses. Theoretically, we would have been in a better position to determine to what extent identity matters even in a political process approach, as well as to consider the fact that the emergence and success of social opposition among teachers may merely reflect the peculiar institutional structure and historically specific character of teachers or the Mexican state—but no matter. Even if this book says more about Mexico and teachers than it does about social movement dynamics under authoritarianism, that is surely no criticism. It is a solid achievement worthy of high praise.

*Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge.* By Steven Epstein. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996. Pp. xiii+367. \$29.95.

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Is the gulf between scientists and nonscientists widening, as C. P. Snow lamented in 1962 and as many natural and physical scientists now contend? Or is it narrowing, as postmodernist critics of science would have it? Steven Epstein's smart and illuminating book provides evidence for the latter view. Through a careful chronology of the struggle to identify the causes of and treatments for AIDS between 1981 and 1995, Epstein convincingly argues that the distinctions between scientists and lay people are blurring. Using an "archeological and genealogical" approach, *Im-*

*pure Science* shows how AIDS activists ironically contributed to analyses of the etiology and treatments of AIDS.

The first half of the book tracks debates among scientists who sought to explain the source of a mysterious illness that first appeared in 1981 and was seemingly restricted to gay men. This part of Epstein's story is a solid chronicle of the victory of proponents of HIV as a cause of AIDS. The second, more theoretical, part of the book traces the struggle *between* scientists and AIDS activists to find treatments for AIDS. Far from hindering the search for answers, these struggles among and between AIDS activists and scientists were essential to understanding the etiology of and treatment of AIDS. Epstein identifies a paradoxical relationship: The critics of scientific researchers became highly important in producing scientific knowledge.

If AIDS activists played a bit part in analyzing the causes of AIDS, they played a major role in developing the treatments of AIDS. Activists have much to be proud of. They wrested drug trials from the seemingly fastidious but ultimately narrowly scientific criteria of medical researchers and pushed the medical establishment to use pragmatic *and* scientific criteria. They also gained the inclusion of more diverse subject populations and achieved widespread use of drug trials that included concomitant and surrogate measures of treatment effectiveness. These trials were symbolically and pragmatically important for AIDS activists. Scientists usually relied on "pure" subjects and single treatments in order to maximize their knowledge about the effects of a particular drug. Many activists and their constituents, however, saw scientists' preferences for single-drug trials as unrealistic and self-serving. Since people with AIDS usually suffer from multiple health problems, they need simultaneous treatment if they are to survive.

Activists not only achieved specific victories for AIDS treatment, they also found "a seat at the table" (p. 284) of science: Scientific researchers came to respect, admire, and even envy, the scientific sophistication of some AIDS activists, who had designed and carried out their own drug trials, researched and understood the science behind various AIDS therapies, and participated in scientific conferences. As active contributors to the scientific knowledge about AIDS, activists earned the right to participate as members of the powerful AIDS Clinical Trials Group of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases. In doing so, Epstein argues, AIDS activists successfully challenged scientists' ideological justifications of science as clean and pure, and, therefore, sacred.

These outcomes were all the more remarkable because they took place during the Reagan-Bush years when homosexuality was under strong attack from the Christian Right. To explain activists' success, Epstein unpacks the concept of scientific *credibility*, the ability to speak with authority and garner trust from fellow researchers. We can see from Epstein's chronology that activists gained credibility in four key ways: (1) by educating themselves so that they knew as much as, and sometimes more than, other AIDS researchers thereby making themselves into

"obligatory scientific passage points"; (2) by discrediting scientific claimants with whom they disagreed; (3) by giving credit where credit was due and thereby gaining status as fair-minded and rigorous rather than extremist and sloppy participants in the debate; and most important, (4) by yoking together moral and scientific arguments by arguing that one standard goal of scientific research—the acquisition of generalizable claims from "pure" subjects—was in conflict with a second important goal—to assist patients. By implication, Epstein suggests that these professionals were also highly dependent upon AIDS activists to legitimize their claims to service to those who are ill.

Just how far the democratization of science can proceed however, is not clear. Epstein dutifully reports that the white, gay, male AIDS activists who are his subjects had unusual amounts of cultural and economic capital, a strong tradition of activism, geographic proximity, and access to alternative media. It is not apparent whether these features explain most of why other AIDS activists, such as hemophiliacs, people of color, and women, gained neither scientific credibility nor even a fraction of the political successes of Epstein's main subjects. It is also possible that the great overlap between the social characteristics of researchers and activists, AIDS activists' direct actions, and/or the common goals of activists and researchers all played a part as well.

What remains clear from Epstein's superb book, however, is that the active, contentious participation of those with AIDS and their supporters—the "politics" of science that so many scientists lament—had the consequence of advancing the understanding of the origins, spread, and treatment of AIDS. Activists' efforts benefited all Americans as well, by advancing genuine progress in the democratization of health care and biomedical research.

*The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.* By Diane Vaughan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. xv+575. \$24.95.

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Sociology, as Kenneth Burke (*Grammar of Motives* [Meridian, 1966]) might observe, reveres "strategic ambiguities" that reveal the duality of human conduct. Concern for these ambiguities directs attention to dramatic oxymorons such as "normal accidents," "routine failures," "technical culture," and even "normal deviance." Sociology is puzzled yet attracted to oppositional, often even binary, everyday life distinctions because these are flags for action, for deciding and accounting for practical resolutions in uncertain situations. These signifying terms should illuminate the dialectic between uncertain events and organizational roles, routines, cultures, and practices.

Vaughan, in 10 chapters, 19 figures, two tables, three appendixes, 62 pages of single-spaced footnotes, an 18-page bibliography, and a 25-page index, succinctly presents an organizational case analysis of the failed Challenger launch of January 1986. (She mentions in passing that the explosion was widely seen on television and is widely affecting; perhaps that alone might secure it a place as a critical incident and a role in high politics.) Her argument is built "incrementally" (p. 73) between two versions of the eve of the launch (chaps. 1 and 8). She initially asked, why launch a design that was known to be flawed against engineers' advice? She came to see that the launch decision was not a product of "mismanagement" and "production pressures," explanations initially mooted, but the result of decision processes (normalizing deviance) shaped by the culture of the engineering work groups, the culture of production with its pressures to produce in an accountable fashion, and structural secrecy, bureaucratically induced by hierarchies, roles, and compliance.

She intended to link micro-macro processes within organizations and institutions, fashion a "historical ethnography," and assemble a case of theorizing (pp. xiv–xv). In due course, she accepts the role of scarce resources, competition, and production pressures but dismisses them as definitively causal. These were present since 1981 and had been signaled by early cuts to the space program by President Nixon. Stating her problem definition, Vaughan raises doubts about typologies of calculative or non-calculative violators of regulations, and individualistic rational theories of decision making. In so doing, she unfolds her case like a matador.

The decision (not a decision but a series of decisions beginning years previously and located in a decision stream) was taken in the context of fairly well known but acceptable negative risks guided by tacit and written conventionalized rules and procedures and in light of the agency's (and its agents') scientific, technical, political, and bureaucratic responsibilities. She gestures toward these forces early when she writes, "The invisible and unacknowledged tend to remain undiagnosed and therefore elude remedy" (p. xv)—that is, they continue to drive policy decisions.

Vaughan's analysis is based on a reading of massive archival records (some 9,000 pages), a presidential commission and the House investigation of the disaster, relevant literature, and interviews with some of the key actors. Interviews and testimony are quoted throughout. She includes some figures and copies of memos in the text and appendixes.

Chapters 1 and 2 set the original problem, chapter 3 discusses work group culture, while chapters 4 and 5 interpret the process of normalizing known risks (from 1981–86). Chapter 6 outlines the culture of production (the technical, engineering-based standards, rules of thumb, and practices of well-resourced engineers). Chapter 7, on structural secrecy, fleshes out the narrative of organization, field, and practice (my borrowed terms). Chapter 8 is a painfully detailed explication of how and why experts at Morton Thiokol recommended a delay of the launch and then reversed themselves. (This was based on divided opinions about the functioning of the O-rings, which caused the disaster.) Here, she provides an elaborate,

polished analysis of the critical teleconference between the Marshall Space Center and Morton Thiokol's engineers on the eve of the launch. This, the centerpiece of the analysis, haunts the pages of the book.

This is a work of over 10 years, well crafted by a fine sociologist and well positioned to touch off debate on rational decision making, organizational culture (and "reliability"), and social aspects of risk and risk analysis. It extends the seminal works of Charles Perrow, James Short, Lee Clarke, and Steve Sagan and the elegantly stylized writings of Karl Weick. Her densely argued text obviates the "individual" decider, makes "deviance" highly context dependent, slides around legal questions of accountability and blame as embedded in bureaucratic and professional practice, and asserts the socially constructed nature of risk. More precisely, engineering culture, like many others, is premised on modulating the dialectic between risk and responsibility. Risk is assumed. The existence of statistically rare events, inferences based on small or limited samples, prohibitions upon risky and costly experiments that might compromise the integrity of the final product, and practical expectations to create, to build, to make manifest the imagination, must be understood and managed. They cannot be obviated or eradicated. In this precise sense, "deviance" is a misleading sponge concept because it disappears into the context of deciding. On the other hand, in a brief section, Vaughan pointedly chides Perrow (p. 415), arguing that his reified, technologically driven, actor-absent model of "normal accidents" omits the interpretive work that confers meaning to such axial terms as "loose coupling," "risky technology," "complex," and "linear" and conditions collective action that affirm their presumptive reality. She urges naturalistic studies of decision-making processes, forms, and content.

After absorbing the detail of this impressive book, one ponders its genius. The central unexplicated concept is risk: it appears in her text as a negative, scientifically conceptualized matter, to be assessed if not measured, with the likelihood of negative consequences. Institutions deal with risk, reducing and mollifying its consequences, making visible its character and quality. But subjective and objective assessments adhere tenuously. While we are subjected almost daily to critical incidents worldwide, it is scientifically produced risk that preoccupies our times (e.g., air bags, mammograms, IUDs, secondhand smoke, and our hidden gene ensemble). Invisible, perhaps irreversible, vexing, common, and more subtle than death (which we deny facilely) and taxes, (which we postpone, avoid, shift, and manipulate), these products of new technologies are ambiguous. Risk, like the unity of mistakes, exists.

Vaughan richly categorizes "signals" (information) and how they were socially embedded in key decision situations but does not comment on the irony that, like a tree that falls in a forest, a signal may not be seen, heard, attended to, intended, or interpreted as read. This is the central paradox of an information-based analysis—the relationships between the coders, the code, and the unit (the signal) may remain creatures of the observer's horizon. As Vaughan writes, quoting Becker, culture is only

apparently shared. Vaughan's analysis of deciding, especially in chapter 8, is plausible and makes the dominant culture apparent. The process of deciding is inferred therefrom. The question one might ask, as did Karl Weick in his analysis of the Mann Gulch Fire (*Administrative Science Quarterly* [38 (1993): 628–52]) is, Under what conditions do organizational decision processes change?

*Reconfiguring Truth: Postmodernism, Science Studies, and the Search for a New Model of Knowledge.* By Steven C. Ward. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. Pp. xx+163. \$52.50 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

Nico Stehr

*University of British Columbia*

That science is increasingly seen as an essentially contested enterprise (adopting William Connolly's apt phrase) is not merely the result of recent work done by students of scientific activity and its economic, social, and cultural consequences in modern society. Even without or despite efforts to demystify ruling self-conceptions of the ways in which science gets done and becomes practical knowledge, the increasing penetration of the modern life-world by scientific knowledge and technical artifacts alone insures that modern science is, and increasingly will be, the object not only of skeptical and critical scrutiny but of more and more attempts to plan, police, and constrain scientific developments.

Steven C. Ward's examination of these broad issues is largely restricted to the more familiar grounds of the philosophical and sociological aspects of disputes surrounding the status of knowledge claims within the scientific community; thus, he surveys four contemporary and contending approaches to knowledge: scientific realism (the modern episteme), postmodern textualism, social realism, and actor-network theory (or the new sociology of knowledge). He asks how the latter might assist in transcending (perhaps solving) the contest between modernists and postmodernists. Scientific realists argue that knowledge claims can be privileged and useful as long as they speak the language of their objects; postmodernists stress the choices of the subjects of knowing, while the critique of realism—with the help of some of the cognitive tools of postmodernism—has given rise to social realism or as the author calls it, the rhetorical turn in the critical analysis of science as text and practice.

The book also includes two brief chapters devoted to an examination of the role of knowledge in the classical sociology of knowledge as well as some of its more recent derivatives. These chapters tread well-known territory, except that some of the more insightful exegesis of the classics is not incorporated. The examination of the writings by Mannheim and Durkheim is somewhat arbitrary and thrives on catchy but inappropriate phrases. For example, Mannheim surely did not mean to treat natural scientists, logicians, mathematicians, and sociologists as exemplars of his

notorious notion of "free-floating intellectuals." Although Mannheim accepts Max Weber's conception of a distinctive nonpartisan scientific vocation, he assigns to that vocation an indispensable political mission with regard to the apparent crisis of mutual total distrust in the ideological field. Ward's verdict is that all these strategies and their reciprocal criticism leaves a serious void: for example, "sociology still lacks an adequate account of knowledge or a successful strategy for dealing with the issue of reflexivity" (p. 91).

Naturally, and from the point of view of the proponents of scientific certainty, the critique that questions the ways that seem to assure objectivity and that even suggests that the only certainty is uncertainty or that scientific truth is just another ideology trying to universalize specific practices (i.e., the positions of feminist criticism or postmodernism) is quite troubling. This critique perhaps amounts to evidence of a nascent "antiscience" movement. However, why do we consider—as the author does—such a response to be an alarmist need to "reconfigure" the positions found in scientific realism, postmodern textual relativism, and the social realism (of the sociology of knowledge) or why do we need to transcend the alleged impasse of the modern/postmodern dichotomy? Is it necessary to reinvent Mannheim's project to rationalize the irrational?

Despite the apparent sympathy Ward has for perspectives that insist that knowledge is a social construct, he wants to transcend their logical, moral, and political dilemmas in order to reconfigure truth with a view toward finding more solid ground. But he does not indicate on what grounds and why such a heroic Münchhausen act is necessary, let alone how such a project is capable of gaining credibility in the context of an essentially contested domain of discourse. The contributions Ward considers next offer a clue, at least in the case of the question of gaining legitimacy.

It is the actor-network theory's unique approach to knowledge, truth, and reality discussed in the last and best parts of the book, that is adduced to heal the "spell of representation." This theory offers a "new vocabulary for reconfiguring" these notions and ways of overcoming the impasse that has developed on the way toward a postrealist model of truth building.

Actor-network theory (i.e., the work of Bruno Latour) suggests that the weight of knowledge, its reproducibility and practicality, is a function of the power of its claimants. What is new about this approach to knowledge claims is (1) that it struggles to transcend entrenched conceptual dichotomies such as nature and society, (2) that it considers knowledge to be neither the cause of nature or society although knowledge is always social, and (3) that truth is contingent. Knowledge is weak or strong depending on the strength or weakness of its social networks.

The arena to which the philosophical and sociological debates Ward chronicles will likely shift and in which these issues will be debated and contested vigorously in the next decades, however, will no longer be the

scientific community alone nor will disputes be driven by epistemological goals. The contest will shift, if it has not done so already, to the political, economic, and legal stage in efforts designed to exploit and police knowledge.

*Contingency Theory: Rethinking the Boundaries of Social Thought.* By Gary Itzkowitz. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996. Pp. 268. \$54.00 (cloth); \$34.00 (paper).

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*Contingency Theory* is an infuriating book. I was continually tempted to return it unreviewed. What held me back was that some of its arguments (summarized in 14 numbered paragraphs at the end of the book) are important. "Contingency" is the key word. Itzkowitz is convinced of the importance of chance and unpredictability in social life and, thus, that social science has long been on the wrong track in its search for causal and lawlike regularities. Open-ended becoming (my phrase) is the case at both micro and macro levels and in micro-macro interactions. Social theorists are thus, again, on the wrong track in their attempts to see the macro as necessarily made up of the micro or to see the micro as structured by the macro, or to see the micro and the macro as somehow one thing. Further, if everything *becomes*, the best that we can do is to study empirical phenomena; social theorists thus stand condemned for their predilection for hermetically sealed theoretical debates with one other. These are all points worth making and discussing; and if Itzkowitz is not terribly clear on them and does not go very far with them or deeply into them, it is not entirely his fault. In trying to emphasize contingency, he is swimming against a powerful tide.

On the other hand, the sheer pain of reading *Contingency Theory* will put off many people. This is a book that has never seen a copy editor. I have never encountered a published work so replete with spelling mistakes, typos, missing words, nonexistent words, grammatical errors, and contorted phrases. More substantively, the entire book exemplifies the kind of self-referential theoretical discourse that Itzkowitz condemns. Far from reporting on empirical research into the contingencies of the social, Itzkowitz expounds his position in the usual social theory style. In a typically forced and repetitive fashion, he takes on an almost endless list of other social theorists—from Hume, Kant, and Hegel, through Marx, Durkheim, and Weber up to the postmodernists, feminists, and ecologists, taking periodic detours through the history and philosophy of physics. In one or two paragraphs, he wheels some major or minor social thinker on stage, praises them for whatever he likes (an acknowledgement of the autonomy of the micro, say), criticizes them for whatever he does not like (failure to recognize contingency), and then wheels them off again. I was

left longing for Itzkowitz to make some interesting and constructive point in his own voice.

The one body of literature that Itzkowitz could have invoked for powerful support and elaboration of his position goes completely unremarked in *Contingency Theory*. Recent work in science and technology studies is the place to look if you want to find empirically grounded discussions of contingency and the open-endedness of the social world, nuanced thinking about levels of analysis that goes beyond the crude dichotomy of micro and macro, and even thinking about the relation between the material and social worlds (which, remarkably, this book does touch upon). But Itzkowitz, of course, travels in the standard theoretical orbit that leaves science studies in outer space.

*International Orders*. By John A. Hall. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. Pp. xiv + 210. \$54.95 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

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A well-known historical sociologist, John Hall, has written an extremely ambitious book, aiming to provide guidance on how the international system can and should be run in the next 10 years. Like his predecessor, Hedley Bull, he examines a number of mechanisms of international order, including the balance of power, the concert of great powers, liberal regimes, interdependence, and the exercise of hegemony. He also seeks to assess how well (or badly) the system was held together during the emergence of the European state system, the period from Westphalia to Nazi Germany, and finally the Cold War and after. Basically, he concludes that a durable peace depends upon a degree of ideological homogeneity among rationally calculating states. Ideological division must be transcended as it largely has been. In addition, the world can no longer afford the irrational excesses of Napoleon or Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany. The obtuseness of Stalin and Brezhnev was bad enough, but it did not lead to nuclear war and thus heeded an underlying rationality. The world is now in a multipolar state that cannot longer be held together by either American hegemony or a concert of great powers—the latter would be an imperial imposition directed at the Third World. What we face is the return to the balance of power in hopefully more favorable circumstances. This is true for two reasons. First, the existence of economic interdependence is now accompanied by a well-understood recognition of its restraints among policymakers. This was not true in 1914 or indeed, at any previous time. Second, the temptations of territorial population render it far less successful. Over time in addition, economic liberalization eventually opens the political system. This is good because authoritarian regimes are prone to start wars. "Every time pressure for liberalization is successful, the chances of war are reduced" (p. 174).

This optimism is more than balanced by developments in three continents. In Europe and America, all is quiet on the Western front. In Eastern Europe, democracy has yet to take hold and economic conditions are unsatisfactory. In the South, we face the potential of catastrophe. But liberal interventionism is not the solution nor is a return to a concert or to U.S. hegemony. Rather the world must find a new structure to give institutional "voice" to repressed Southern peoples. In its absence, nationalist separatism will flourish. This means allowing territorial change and secession. The more the right to leave is respected, the less it needs to be exercised. This does not mean that the world will come to consist of 8,000 states (currently the number of separate dialect-languages now in use). The more open and democratic the domestic system, the more easily minorities can co-exist within the political state. This will in any event be necessary for economic reasons, despite the decline in the territorial size of the nation. Finally, Hall contends that the capitalist and democratic North should assist the South by allowing the latter to sell in its market. It should share its capitalist wealth with Southern nations. The West should not lose its nerve; it should prescribe Adam Smith for the rest of the world.

Much of this book constitutes a laudable and necessary recipe for reducing violence worldwide. Hall does not understand, however, how useful a concert mechanism could be in inculcating the norms of Adam Smith internationally. His view of the current "encompassing coalition" of Great Powers is too akin to that of the 19th-century concert, which intervened for legitimist reasons in other nations' affairs. The role of a concert today is to bring great powers together, preventing the outbreak of a new dispute and a new cold war between them. Through the establishment of relatively exclusive international "clubs" (WTO, G-7, NATO, EMU, EU, NAFTA, TAFTA, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community, etc.), nations can raise the standard of acceptable political and economic performance internationally. Today the high standards set for joining Europe's European Monetary Union make it the most exclusive international club.

Another factor that Hall incompletely recognizes is that the balance of power has been reversed in economics. We know that political-military forces abhor a vacuum and act to offset a concentration of power. Economically, the reverse is true. A conurbation of successful economic power draws others in as the European Union is doing today, with Eastern European countries slavering at the mouth to join. In time the success of centralizing economics in North America, Japan and East Asia, and Europe will hold out attractive forces to both Russia and China. In order to join, however, they will have to meet much higher standards of openness, impartial enforcement of contracts, low inflation, an end to subsidies, and the establishment of fully convertible currencies.

Hall has written an outstanding book. Supplementary analysis, however, can relieve his bout of pessimism in the final pages. The South needs

political and economic reform before it can fully join the developed North.

*An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next Century.* By Yasusuke Murakami. Translated with an introduction by Kozo Yamamura. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxix+476. \$60.00.

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*An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis* constitutes the final work of Yasusuke Murakami, a prominent Japanese economist and polymath. It is fitting that the book is extremely ambitious. Indeed, it seeks both to reconceptualize economics as we know it and to offer a new way of understanding and structuring the international order. Not surprisingly, the book is a challenging, often rewarding, bit of reading.

The book unfolds in three separate but related themes, which Murakami ultimately brings together in a vast synthesis. The first theme is a philosophical discussion that concentrates on the possibility of a "true liberalism" that is not based on some form of progressivism. In this regard, he calls for greater pluralism of thought—a possibility that he identifies more closely with the "hermeneutic" Eastern style of thought than with "transcendent" Western-style thinking.

The book then moves to an extended discussion of the history of the nation-state system and of how the concept of unjust war (which justified balance of power) metamorphosed into a reassertion of just war (which justified total war) in the 20th century. The balance of power that resulted was fundamentally unstable, leading to hegemonic stability theory, which attempted to encompass political power and economic outcomes. Murakami characterizes hegemonic stability theory as being essentially a way of thinking about the problem of maintaining public goods in the international system. However, he concludes that hegemonic stability too is unstable in real life, as a result of his third theme, what Murakami calls "developmentalism." This is perhaps the most concrete section of the book, and it provides the meat of the discussion that most readers will be looking for in "an anticlassical political-economic analysis." It is based on his analysis of the economics of decreasing cost, which he believes is pervasive. Murakami argues that, over time, it is decreasing costs rather than increasing costs that best characterize economies. This has profound effects on economic analysis, as he demonstrates in three closely reasoned chapters. If costs in an industry decrease over time and with greater quantity of production, then long-term success will be tied to maximization of market. In other words without intervention, an industry with decreasing costs will be characterized by fratricidal com-

petition and natural monopolies, thus leading in the long run to stagnation.

If economies are really driven by a dynamic of decreasing costs, then some of the ways in which Japanese industrial policymakers have justified their actions—including “excess competition” and developmentalism—are more justifiable than most American economists have been willing to admit. Murakami defines developmentalism as an economic system based on capitalism but that “makes its main objective the achievement of industrialization . . . and . . . approves government intervention in the market from a long-term perspective” (p. 145). He argues that developmentalism is bound to beat laissez-faire liberalism whenever they compete.

A discussion of the competition among national economic systems is where the second theme, the instability of hegemonic stability, reemerges. The post-war global political economy, which has depended fundamentally on the provision of the public goods of free trade and stable money by a hegemonic United States, is inherently unstable if national governments are using neomercantilist means to advance their own interests. Accordingly, Murakami offers a two-part solution. The first step is to redefine international public goods so as to encourage developmentalism while limiting the volatility it causes in the global economy. In place of free trade, he calls for the leading economies to freely provide investment capital and technology to the developing countries, even calling for the effective abolition of patents for developing countries. Murakami’s second proposal is for the introduction of “polymorphic liberalism.” This notion harks back to his initial philosophical discussion on the possibility of a “true liberalism.” Concretely, its several components include acceptance of a variety of different national systems (particularly developmentalism), a patchwork of overlapping regional security alliances, and nonexclusive regional economic integration. Murakami is especially adamant that regimes be rule based; one of the more important rules is that leading countries, including Japan, must abstain from developmentalism.

In the breadth and novelty of its conception, *An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis* parallels Adam Smith’s magnum opus. Like Smith, Murakami offers an original way of thinking about the creation of wealth. As in *The Wealth of Nations*, this understanding calls for fundamental changes in the ways in which nations organize themselves and interact with each other. Nonetheless, it is probably not destined for Smithian prominence. For one thing, it is not obvious that Murakami’s version of long-term decreasing costs is an accurate one (no numbers are offered) or that developmentalism is the best solution. Second, the developmentalism that Murakami advocates requires considerable political discipline and is likely beyond the abilities of many developing countries. Third, turning to his vision of North-South relations, not all developing countries are likely to feel comfortable with the vast investment from the North he prescribes nor are many technologically advanced countries likely to be willing to waive patents for the nations of the South.

Finally, despite the excellent translation by Kozo Yamamura, such a broad-ranging work makes for inherently difficult reading. Nevertheless, it is a valuable addition to an important debate.

*Democracy, Capitalism and Empire in Late Victorian Britain, 1885–1910.* By E. Spencer Wellhofer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. xii+264. \$59.95.

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Given the recent turn toward empire in Victorian history, a book that promises to analyze the tripartite impact of popular democracy, capitalist interests, and imperial policies on late-19th-century British politics is tantalizing indeed. E. Spencer Wellhofer proposes to give a comprehensive survey not just of electoral patterns but, more particularly, of the ways in which party machinery adapted to the monumental constitutional challenges posed by a variety of political reforms and shifting socioeconomic allegiances in this period. The year 1885 is an appropriate starting point marking, as it does, the immediate aftermath of the century's Third Reform Act (1884) and the beginning of concerted parliamentary agitation for a legislative solution to home rule for Ireland (1886). Perhaps a less self-evident point of closure is the year 1910, especially because the four years leading up to World War I were arguably crucial to both the arc of "Victorian" politics and the shape of the postwar British electorate. If such periodization is intended as a challenge to traditional surveys of the period, it represents one of the few innovations offered by *Democracy, Capitalism and Empire*—which tends to replicate the Whig model of linear progression without complicating it much, if at all, with evidence of how the British political system was influenced by imperial commitments. What emerges is a synthetic and largely familiar picture of how elites responded to the exigencies of "arithmetic democracy" and how arduously they worked to contain what they viewed as its disastrously un-English effects.

Wellhofer frames his study around the question of what happened to English constitutional assumptions and practices once class interests (laborers and agricultural workers) and regional ethnic questions (Scots, Welsh, and Irish nationalisms) made their way from the margins to the center of Victorian politics. To do so is to imagine that these subjects were not already implicated in the political settlements that preceded the late 1880s or, indeed, that the presumptions of "English" supremacy that underwrote them had not been a source of contest and conflict from Peterloo (1819) onward. One effect of this approach is to view demands articulated by Celtic nationalists as mere corollaries of liberal dissent at the center rather than as legitimate (if naturalized) claims upon a "British" state, which masqueraded as the cultural representative of all Britons

but, in practice, stood for a deeply anglocentric tradition. To be sure, *Democracy, Capitalism and Empire* does rematerialize the constitutive role that the Celtic fringe played in the shaping of English politics in the late Victorian period without privileging Ireland as the primary nationalist site, as is often the case in overviews of this kind. And yet, even this emphasis goes in and out of focus leaving readers with the impression that Welsh, Scots, and Irish agitators were little more than gadflies on the central state and party apparatus. In fact, based on the evidence presented, those players may be viewed as an array of "internal others"—both actual and symbolic—against whom late Victorian definitions of civil society and democratic community were imagined, measured, and admired.

Wellhofer is not, admittedly, as interested in political culture as he is in the more mechanical—and, it must be said, quantifiable—functions of political machinery. Readers interested in models that track the statistical results of electoral returns and the path coefficients of the party system at critical moments across this period will not be disappointed—except if they are looking for diagrams that take us beyond the rather predictable axes of class affiliation and, more rarely, regional specificity. What is gained by the kind of attention Wellhofer focuses on the non-English dimension of this story is mitigated, unfortunately, by his almost complete neglect of the imperial context. In part because he uses the same outdated core-periphery model for empire as he does for Celtic political movements, colonial policies scarcely impinge on his narrative, and when they do, it is so fleetingly that the claim for empire as a constitutive influence on metropolitan politics implied by the title simply cannot be sustained. Given the rise of the Indian National Congress in 1885, not to mention the kind of coalitional politics undertaken by colonial nationalist leaders and Irish radicals during the crucial decades of the 1880s, this failure is more than benign neglect or even an opportunity lost. It represents an unself-conscious, but nonetheless politically significant, misunderstanding of how intimately related imperial policies and "domestic" concerns were in fin de siècle Britain. It signals an equally telling failure to appreciate how inadequate the category of "British" is for understanding the complexities of the metropolitan political landscape then and now. The quest to rewrite the narrative of Victorian high politics so it accounts for the expansion of democracy in dialectic tension with empire and other capitalist interests is an admirable one, but it requires a rigorous critique of the frameworks of Whig, if not national history, in which this study is invested.

*French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere*. By Kenneth H. Tucker, Jr. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. x+284. \$54.95.

Alberto Spektorowski  
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*French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere* is an original and highly documented book that explores the evolution of French syndicalist organization, Confédération Générale du Travail, from left revolutionary discourse and support of federalist control of industry to a rightwing productionist approach, emphasizing instrumental rationality and national and increased material output through expert and central direction of the economy. Kenneth Tucker's accomplishment is not limited to pure historical reconstruction and interpretation. Through analysis of the ideological evolution of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and its interaction with the French public sphere during La Belle Epoque (1900–20), the author uses history as a cultural resource to make a point about present-day social thought and social movements.

French syndicalism, similar to new social movements today, emphasized direct democracy and small-scale organization and was suspicious of massive bureaucratic attempts to transform society. Although this early proletariat discourse owed its moral sensibility to religious republicanism and utopian socialist sources, Tucker correctly emphasizes the direct impact of modern theories of social science on its development. Durkheim's vision of social solidarity and communitarian republicanism along with theories of industrial productionism, moral progress, and solidarity provided the syndicalist model with a base for a humanitarian and responsible socialism. However, this Durkheimian model of social solidarity, uniting the liberal and proletarian public spheres in France, soon vanished. Tucker, though, directs his efforts through a historico-cultural analysis to explain this shift from social republicanist discourse to a *méchaniste* and productionist approach in the CGT. He also attempts to convince the reader of the importance of preserving the syndicalist legacy, which, according to him, preceded the development of social movements in present times and faced one of the dilemmas that new social movements confront today—namely, that of integrating democratic practices with the requirements of more systematic international forms of integration (p. 131).

One of Tucker's conclusions is that despite the integrating trend of modernization, the social republican discourse of French syndicalism created its own cultural field. This contributes to a more pluralistic and democratic idea of modernity based on the diversity of cultural traditions and on the existence of new networks of structured social relations concretized in different autonomous yet interdependent fields, each with its own logic. Following this line of thought, Tucker is determined to challenge some of the most important critical perspectives of syndicalism in general and

of French syndicalism in particular. A general Habermasian, for whom the evolution of syndicalism could be understood as part of the refeudalization of the public sphere, critique is employed. Accordingly, an overburdened public sphere could not maintain its democratic structure and increasingly gave way to neocorporatist politics. This Habermasian approach intersects with C. Maier's view that the decline of parliamentary power is attributable to the emergence of a corporatist society and a new language of technological labor in post-World War I Europe. Tucker agrees with this general productivist and bureaucratic trend; however, his study emphasizes the spaces of cultural resistance to instrumental rationality remaining in the French proletarian public sphere. In addition, most of his study attempts to elaborate another nonstructural explanation of the noted shift from a revolutionary syndicalist to a productionist discourse at the CGT.

A different type of argument to which Tucker pays somewhat lesser attention is also elaborated on by some students of fascist ideology. The students have made a case based on the fact that fascist ideology has, in great part, originated from the revolutionary ideas of French syndicalism, especially from Sorel's "antimaterialist revision of Marxist thought," to which Mussolini himself owed his intellectual evolution (e.g., Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asherri, *Naissance de l'idéologie fasciste* [Fayard, 1990]). These latter theses explained the shift from the discourse of revolutionary syndicalism to national syndicalism, by focusing precisely on the revolutionary potential embodied in the discourse of revolutionary syndicalism. The worker union served as a productionist unit on the one hand and as a revolutionary school on the other, where a new man (a synthesis between a heroic worker and a warrior) and a new culture were created. However, the myth of the combative syndicate representing an "association of free workers" is substituted with the organic "free nation," which encompasses the "productivist" forces of the country. The new national-syndicalist state represents, at a higher level, the spirit of a heroic community embodied in the syndicate. This productivist society contrasted with the idea of a liberal or a social democratic bureaucratic state; it also rejected Durkheim's attempt to reunite the liberal and proletariat public sphere on the basis of moral solidarity on the one hand and social science on the other.

As mentioned, Tucker makes a great effort to respond to these lines of thought, especially to Habermas. Tucker traces the CGT's move toward a seemingly quasi-corporatist perspective in 1914 as the result of two fundamental causes. As new elites came to power, the dynamics of the proletarian and liberal public spheres changed: a new type of proletariat, tied to expertise rather than radical oratory, emerged. Both Merrheim's and Jouhaux's theories of technocratic positivism developed as a result of their conviction that the future of French syndicalism should be unity and centralization. However, differing slightly from Habermas, Tucker argues that the version of corporatism advocated by Merrheim and Jouhaux was much more of an ideological achievement than a result

of structural constraint (p. 185). Despite the fact that during the prewar years France's political and economic concentration was only in its infancy, Mertheim and comrades developed a vision of an inevitable future of French economy and syndicalist organization based on the consequences provoked by large-scale economy and informed by values of competence and increased production. The war experience and its aftermath confirmed both syndicalist leaders' convictions. In fact, after the war a new public sphere was delineated as a result of these new trends in the national economy. Many capitalist and syndicalist elites called for a more productive and technocratic society on the one hand and the establishment of new social rights on the other. The central aims were to integrate the workers into the polity and to create a more socially responsible welfare capitalism. The CGT program of 1918 expressed this trend: No more *ouvrieriste* ethics or general strikes; there was a new focus on concrete reforms benefiting labor and national productionism. In other words, the new language of technical efficiency tied increased productivity to a strongly social democratic program. Tucker is correct in admitting that this productivist labor was not totally integrated into a new refeudalized public sphere, in Habermasian terms (p. 205). Indeed, earlier themes of moral transformation, direct democracy, and decentralized organization remained an integral part of the workers' union legacy in France and saw a revival in the postwar years, especially with the emergence of social movements in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, one might wonder what was wrong with a democratic corporatism based upon a technocratic efficiency approach and the introduction of the workers into the democratic public sphere. Despite Tucker's efforts to criticize this key piece in the syndicalist ideological development, it seems that French democracy benefited strongly and precisely from democratic welfare and technocratic evolution. One could wonder as well what was so impressive about the Sorelian tradition, which is rooted in the idea that the workplace is a new school of solidarity and revolutionary struggle. Although this revolutionary spirit fascinated left-wing and radical democratic intellectuals, who searched for alternative ways of nonbureaucratic and direct democratic paths of action, it has also fascinated many protofascist intellectuals and integral nationalist groups that identify with this spirit. In other words, while it is correct to say that Durkheim's critique of instrumental rationality and his belief that socialism had to forge a new solidaristic culture informed one side of revolutionary syndicalism, the other side, based on direct action and the myth of violence, was informed by Sorel. As Tucker also confirms, Sorel saw the future of society as grounded in the ethics of producers. He did not believe that *méchanisme*, or technological development, contrasted with the revolutionary solidarity emerging in the working place. However, this does not make Sorel a supporter of a more democratic and aesthetically pleasing workshop as Tucker suggests (p. 147). In contrast to the democratic syntheses between technocratic advancement and social welfare inspired by Durkheim, who actually strove to save the demo-

cratic republic, Sorel's concept of technology and the idea of a working place communitarian spirit were associated with the idea of a heroic non-democratic society. Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* did not present unusual ideas to the syndicalists. He reflected on the crisis of bourgeois civilization and all its moral and political values. He praised the myth of violence and direct action, and he reflected on one of the most important themes raised by revolutionary syndicalists, such as Victor Greffuelhes and Émile Pouget: Syndicalism and democracy are irreconcilable, because the latter, by means of universal suffrage, gives control to the "ignorant . . . and stifles the minorities who are the flag bearers of the future" (Émile Pouget, *La Confédération général du travail*, 1909).

For some analysts of the development of fascist ideology, the organic conception of the syndicate and the total rejection of democratic society and bourgeois civilization became the common ground associating radical revolutionary syndicalists with right-wing nationalists. Tucker is attentive to the ideological encounters between French syndicalism and integral nationalists like L'Action Française. His explanation accounts for L'Action Française and Charles Maurras's support of worker strikes, as well as for the positive response by some syndicalists to this *ouvrieriste* turn (p. 163). Gustave Hervé, the editor of *La Guerre Sociale*, Pautaud, the president of the electrician's union, and Sorel during a brief time had been seduced by Maurras's integral nationalism. Both sides believed in direct action and both sides despised the republic and everything it symbolized. In sum, although it is possible to agree with Tucker that the legacy of revolutionary syndicalism informed the theory of the Russian soviets or R. Luxemburg's belief in the self-managing capacities of the workers and that its antibureaucratic spirit was perceived in later democratic and social movements of the 1960s and 1980s, the revolutionary syndicalist legacy seems to be much more complex. The fascist political tradition also embodied a distinct concept of democracy, one that did not rely upon the individualist, materialist, and rationalist bases of liberal democracy but on a distinct type of mobilized, heroic, and combative society. Tucker is attentive to some of these problematic developments. As he admits, contemporary identity politics' reproduction of the syndicalist fetish of class purity—though often pointing to race, ethnicity, and/or gender as focal points—also build upon some of the syndicalist cultural legacy (p. 215). Building upon these conclusions, several students of fascism would agree that Sorel's legacy has been important but not essential for contemporary socialist thought. Fascism, at least the "fascism of the first hour," owed its theoretical basis to the legacy of revolutionary syndicalism.

*National Interests in International Society.* By Martha Finnemore. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xi+154. \$35.00 (cloth); \$13.95 (paper).

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Martha Finnemore draws on sociology and sociological organization theory to demonstrate the influence of norms on state behavior in world politics. Her central argument is that states are taught to accept new norms, values, and interests by international organizations. Finnemore's target is mainstream international relations theory in political science. Such theory either ignores the processes through which states define their interests (as in "rationalist" theory that simply posits state interests in order to explain state behavior), or if the theory problematizes state interests, it neglects the role of international normative structures in explaining them (as in liberalism, which accounts for state interests by looking at preference aggregation within states). Additionally, international relations theory presumes that state decisions are driven everywhere by an instrumentalist or consequentialist logic. Finnemore's constructivist approach challenges international relations theory on all three of these points by explaining state interests and actions as the product of socialization to norms, rules, understandings, and relationships at the international level.

Finnemore develops her argument through three case studies. The first case considers the creation of science bureaucracies during the 1950s and 1960s within a number of small, poor, and technologically unsophisticated states. These states did not need science bureaucracies and were not reacting to domestic demand for them. Finnemore explains their actions in terms of a general redefinition of the norms and expectations regarding the state's role in science during this period. The activities of UNESCO figure prominently in this account. For internal reasons, UNESCO popularized the new bureaucratic innovation pioneered by Great Britain, the United States, and France, and it assumed responsibility for "teaching" states how to fulfill their new role in science. UNESCO aggressively advised states on the best way to structure their science bureaucracies, heavily lobbying key domestic actors in some countries to secure adherence to the new science norm.

The book's second case concerns the development of humanitarian norms in warfare, specifically, the establishment of standards of treatment and neutrality status for noncombatants, particularly the wounded and medical personnel. In this chapter, Finnemore focuses on the origins of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions. She notes that, because humanitarian norms require states to restrain their use of violence during war—a time when the vital interests and even the survival of states are at stake—theories that ascribe only power-based interests to states offer no explanatory hold. Her case study

reveals that the impetus for the development and adoption of these norms came not from states but from the actions of private citizens.

Finnemore's final case study examines the shift in international development goals from a nearly exclusive focus on raising GNP and per capita GNP to an emphasis on poverty alleviation in the late 1960s and 1970s. This shift, the author argues, cannot be explained by domestic political changes within states nor can it be attributed to the initiative of states. While development experts in universities and multilateral lending organizations did play a role in preparing the intellectual groundwork for this normative change, Finnemore argues that the impetus for the shift came from one individual, Robert McNamara, and that its precise form was determined by the structure of the organization that he headed after 1968, the World Bank. In Finnemore's account, the bank "sold" poverty alleviation as an essential component of development policy to its member states through a mixture of persuasion and coercion. The author suggests that the institutionalization of the global antipoverty norm mirrors the normative change in the late 18th and 19th centuries at the domestic level that led to the rise of the welfare state.

Finnemore's book is beautifully written and carefully argued. She is the first scholar of international relations to offer a sustained, systematic empirical argument in support of the constructivist claim that international normative structures matter in world politics. Her book will be of interest not only to students of international relations but to all social theorists concerned with the relation between interest-based and norm-based explanations of human behavior. True, Finnemore does not consider cases of "high politics" (involving war, revolution, and catastrophic economic dislocation) in her empirical analysis, and mainstream international relations theorists will be tempted to argue that a rationalist, utility-maximizing theory remains the most appropriate framework for understanding behavior there. These scholars may suggest that the sociological or constructivist approach that Finnemore champions is appropriate only for the analysis of marginal issues and problems in world politics, but such an argument will be hard to sustain in light of Finnemore's pioneering study. Her work questions the value of any explanatory framework that ignores or suppresses questions about the origins of state interests in international relations. World politics, after all, is as much a struggle to define these interests as it is a competition to defend them.

*The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National Identity and the Post-Communist Transformation of Society.* By Ladislav Holy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. x+226. \$59.95 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

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This book analyzes the Czech perception of themselves as a nation: a shared identity that has survived three centuries of life in states run by "alien" rulers. The author, Ladislav Holy, left Czechoslovakia in 1968 and made his career in Britain as an anthropologist of African cultures. The main focus of the book is on the strong shared perception of an unbroken tradition of Czech history in which the Czechs, an advanced, cultured nation, repeatedly fall foul of their more powerful neighbors but nevertheless manage to preserve their common identity and emerge unscathed. The core of the book is a succinct summary of this invented tradition scattered with many interesting details.

Westerners who are not familiar with the Czechs but who have heard of Vaclav Havel and the "Velvet Revolution" probably think that Czechs are less "nationalist" than their Polish or Hungarian neighbors. Holy demolishes this illusion, noting that the opposition in 1989 defined themselves primarily as Czechs standing up for national freedom from an occupying power rather than as citizens demanding individual rights (p. 49). Czech nationalism tends to be tacit rather than explicit—but it is a powerful presence to anyone who looks closely. The author stresses the paradoxical features of the Czech national mythology. Czech nationalism has resurfaced as a political phenomenon at precisely the same time that Czechs are striving to "return to Europe" and, concretely, to enter the European Union. This reflects the fact that they see their nation as an embodiment of universal values of tolerance and culture—the presence of which, they believe, distinguishes them from their European neighbors. While they have mostly defined themselves vis-à-vis the Germans, more recently the Slovaks, seen as rural, backward, and "Eastern" (p. 6), have become the dominant "other" against which they identify themselves.

Complicating the picture is the fact that most Czechs have a negative image of the typical characteristics of Czechs—even while at the same time they have a proud and positive evaluation of the qualities of the nation as a whole. Holy explains this paradox by arguing that, despite its apparent commitment to universal European values, Czech nationalism is, in fact, inimical to individualism and includes a strong dose of egalitarianism (chap. 2). This stems from the fact that for much of Czech history the landed and merchant classes belonged to different ethnic groups (Germans and Jews). Holy implies that, despite the fact that the Czechs enthusiastically embraced market reform after 1989, theirs is not an example of liberal nationalism based on civic values.

Holy's account rings true as a general characterization of the Czech

perceptions of their nation's history. However, the book appears to be heavily based upon published debates among the Czech intelligentsia and does not draw upon popular culture, such as movies or television. The book does not offer an analysis of social rituals and the salience of national identity in daily life; one wonders how far the perceptions of historical identity really penetrate into Czech society. In the public opinion surveys on national stereotypes that Holy quotes, for example (p. 75), one-third of the respondents refused to identify any feature as particularly Czech, and in 1992 the most commonly cited feature (envy) was only picked by 28% of respondents (only 12% in the 1990 survey). There is no discussion of the different understandings of nationalism among different social groups or variations in the way different politicians use nationalist rhetoric, except in the context of the breakup of the federation in 1992. There is no mention of the radical nationalist Republican Party, which regularly gathers 8% support in elections, and barely any discussion of Czech attitudes toward the Romany minority—the main target of the Republican skinheads.

The subtitle of the book, *Post-Communist Transformation of Society*, is a bit misleading. In general, the book ends in 1992, a mere three years after the revolution. Given that continuity in shared historical mythology is a major theme in Holy's work, it would have been interesting to read his analysis of the changes in Czech society since 1989 and whether this process has altered their views on historical identity. Who will the Czechs, having separated themselves from the Germans and now the Slovaks, choose as the "other" against which to define themselves? There is now a lively debate, for example, over the possible threat to Czech identity from the post-1989 American cultural invasion.

Holy does not directly address the question of whether the Czechs really are different in their construction of historical identity from, say, Poles or Hungarians. For example, his brief discussion of the Velvet Revolution overlooks the fact that it came immediately in the wake of massive public protests in East Germany, which spilled over into the streets of Prague as German refugees besieged the West German embassy. In other words, Czech demonstrators were not so much expressing a unique historical yearning for national freedom as joining an East European protest. Also, looking at social developments since 1989, one suspects that the dominant social value is consumerism rather than nationalism.

*The Clash of Rights: Liberty, Equality, and Legitimacy in Pluralist Democracy.* By Paul M. Sniderman, Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, and Philip E. Tetlock. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xi+291. \$35.00 (cloth); \$18.00 (paper).

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*The Clash of Rights* is a masterful and disquieting analysis of the politics of rights in a democratic state. For their inquiry, these three political scientists (Sniderman, Fletcher, and Russell) and one psychologist (Tetlock) chose Canada primarily because of the 1982 addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedom to its constitution. While containing provisions of special importance in Canada, such as language rights, the charter also articulates values at the heart of liberal pluralism, such as liberty and equality. In 1987 the authors conducted extensive interviews with ordinary citizens and elites on many issues pertaining to the politics of rights. They employed sophisticated survey devices, such as the counterargument technique and quota-beneficiary experiment, and separated political elites by partisan affiliation. Sniderman and his fellow researchers then use the abundant information about the value commitments of citizens and elites "to pursue more fundamental questions about the politics of liberal democratic rights" (p. 3).

The authors' findings are gripping and provocative; I note three major ones. First, not surprisingly, liberty often conflicts with other values, such as order and tolerance. However, elites will forgo liberty as willingly as ordinary citizens if presented with competing arguments. This discovery shakes the conventional faith in elites as the custodian of democratic values against popular hostility. While the New Democratic Party and the Parti Québécois consistently adhere to progressive positions even when confronted with electoral rejection, other partisan elites do not. The authors conclude that "the fallacy of democratic elitism consists exactly in its indifference to which partisan elites prevail" (p. 51). Second, equality produces passionate debate not only because it may conflict with other values but because it admits to competing conceptions, which also "lie ideologically at opposing poles" (p. 12) and work to the advantage of the political right as well as the left. Moreover, citizens and elites may hold different conceptions of equality simultaneously in their belief repertoire, with the specific context of importance in their consideration of issues such as affirmative action programs.

Third, citizens' views about governance and legitimacy—who should have the final say in policy decisions, the courts or legislatures—have considerable uniformity across Canada. The charter, with judicial review of entrenched rights, has acquired widespread support among both English and French Canadians except with respect to its language rights. In opposition to the now standard depiction of the charter as unwelcome to Quebec citizens, the data shows that "the Charter, considered as a

political symbol in the general public at the time of its adoption, was consensual, not divisive" (p. 253). However, in sharp contrast to this consensus is a deep division among elites about the instrumental uses and consequences of the charter. Furthermore, the commitment to language rights (one variant of group rights) is volatile and fragile for ordinary citizens and elites alike. Again, the research disproves the thesis of democratic elitism: "Legitimacy must thus be time-subscripted: a readiness to respect claims to rights—and perhaps particularly to group rights—is a variable, not a constant" (p. 233). Moreover, group rights are inherently susceptible to manipulation by political elites for their own partisan purposes. "Without minimizing the risks begot by the public's ignorance, we take as a theme of equal importance the dangers begot by elites' pursuit of both power and ideology" (p. 13).

Already I await with anticipation a follow-up study. Much has happened in Canada since 1987, including the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The avowedly separatist Bloc Québécois is the official opposition at the time of this writing, and the right-wing Reform Party has significant parliamentary power. More notably, in 1995 Quebec citizens voted in another referendum, deciding by a razor-thin margin to remain in the existing federal structure. While the authors discuss many postsurvey developments, such as Meech's demise, their data predates the political turmoil of the past decade. Nevertheless, these recent events illustrate further the book's conclusion about the "inherent and inescapable volatility" (p. 257) of liberal democracy and the dynamic quality of democratic values. Some outcomes, such as the decisive rejection of the Charlottetown Accord by ordinary citizens in the face of overwhelming endorsement by elites, would not have surprised Sniderman and his colleagues. While their analysis signals problems with future constitutional negotiations conducted by elites, it also provides optimism about the capacity of citizens to deliberate about democratic values. In a complete twist of conventional democratic theory, which exalts elites as the guardian of core values, one may infer from this study that ordinary citizens may need to save the liberal pluralistic project of Canada from elites, especially partisan elites engaged in the contest for governmental power.

*Multi-Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities.* By Leo Driedger. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii+352. \$39.95.

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Driedger begins his survey of Canada by declaring his book "unabashedly multi-ethnic and pluralist" in orientation (p. xiii). His book ends with the declaration that "Canada is a pluralist multi-ethnic society" in which ever more people are "willing to accept and work for equality, justice, and opportunity for all" (p. 309). Sandwiched between the beginning declara-

tion and the ending declaration, where he lets his hopes hang out, Driedger's substantive text provides a well-informed, dispassionate, and factual survey of race and ethnic relations in Canada. Although the book is clearly aimed at Canadian undergraduates who want to learn about their own country, other readers will also find it a painless way to learn something about Canadian race and ethnic relations. They will also find this book a useful shelf reference to the Canadian research literature of the last 20 years.

To ground his empirical survey in the appropriate literature, Driedger opens with 50 pages (two chapters) of the history of race and ethnic relations in social theory. He devotes 17 obligatory pages to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, who had little to say about race and ethnic relations, then moves on to the Chicago school, Milton Gordon, Pierre van den Berghe, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Edna Bonacich, and others. We learn that Canada's ethnic groups have assimilated more slowly than those of the United States, possibly because of the greater stress the United States has placed upon assimilation (p. 29). Despite Jeffrey Reitz and Raymond Breton who have convincingly dissented from it (*The Illusion of Difference* [C. D. Howe Institute, 1994]), this opinion still prevails in Canada. Indeed, the claim, if true, offers a solid theoretical reason for studying Canada.

Part 2 of the book continues with a demographic and geographical survey of Canada's population from the 19th century to the present. Canada is a vast country whose regions have more distinct ethnoracial profiles than do the regions of the United States. Obviously Quebec is preponderantly French, but it is not just the charter groups, English and French, that cause Canada's regionalism. Aboriginals are relatively more numerous in the northern territories and visible minorities in the West, and other Europeans are in the Great Plains provinces. Here, as elsewhere, Driedger's text contains numerous detailed and current maps.

The third part of the book deals with ethnic identity in Canada. This is not a boring subject. Quebec nationalism, Meech Lake, Bill 101, and the 1995 referendum open the discussion. However, Driedger gives fair and reasonable attention to the excellent and extensive Canadian literature on ethnicity outside Quebec. This literature lacks the drama of Quebec nationalism, but it provides rich detail about the other ethnic groups that make up the Canadian mosaic. The exception is the British Canadians, who are amply featured in Driedger's stratification section but do not appear in the ethnic identity section of Driedger's book. I fear that this exclusion reflects the dubious but pervasive assumption that ethnic and non-British are synonymous in Canada.

Ever since John Porter (*The Vertical Mosaic* [University of Toronto Press, 1965]), Canadians have been fascinated with their country's distinct stratification. This is the topic of part 4. The empirical detail is quite high. One table shows how many ministries were held by British, French, Scots, and Irish politicians between 1867 and 1966. Another table (table 8.4) allows interested readers to look up and compare the relative prestige

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of ethnic groups in French and British Canada. Chapters on residential segregation include maps of major Canadian cities with ethnic neighborhoods indicated. A chapter on race and racism revisits the Hooten phenotypical criteria of the Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid races, then moves on to immigration and racism today. The purpose of this visit escapes me as Canadians do not need reminding that races have different colored skins.

Part 5 examines the provisions made for human rights in Canada. Some of the discussion juxtaposes Canadian, U.S., and UN declarations and legislation bearing on human rights. One learns that Canada guarantees human rights to her citizens—not a surprising fact. Of course, legal guarantees do not confer equality of treatment in daily life. Reviewing existing studies, Driedger's most interesting sections contain scales that enable readers to ascertain in considerable detail just what fellow Canadians think of their ethno-racial group. There are a few amusing surprises. For example, 75% of Canadian high school students would be willing to marry an American, and only 65% would marry a Brit. On the other hand, some empirical results are unsurprising, if obnoxiously graphic. Ethnic jokes are equally directed at Jews and Poles, the most favored ethnicities, but Jews receive by far the most hate literature, physical attacks, and vandalism.

Driedger has assembled current human relations literature from the existing archive. His survey is up-to-date, detailed, and convincingly illustrated with graphic aids. The level of theorizing is low and its quality pedestrian. But the point of this book is not to reinterpret Canada to the Canadians; it is simply to assemble useful documents that synthesize the existing literature on ethnic and race relations in Canada in a package Canadian students will read and instructors will assign. The book makes interesting reading and succeeds in its modest ambition.

*The Theming of America: Dreams, Visions, and Commercial Spaces.* By Mark Gottdiener. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997. Pp. vi+170. \$69.00 (cloth); \$18.00 (paper).

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As the title suggests, Mark Gottdiener's book is an account of cultural change in contemporary America: in the second half of the 20th century the appearance of public spaces in a variety of settings is increasingly no longer the result of chance accumulations of particular activities but has been designed to conform to a thematic vision. Going beyond the role of architects in designing buildings, a new class of designers (should I call them imagineers?) uses a symbolic vocabulary to create total environments. The examples he cites of these types of public spaces are shopping malls, airport terminals, casinos, theme parks (both Disneyland and Dis-

ney World and other leisure settings such as sports stadia), and, rather puzzlingly, memorial settings such as the Vietnam Veteran's memorial site in Washington, D.C., and museums of cultural themes such as slavery.

Charting this trend is not really an innovation; it has become a staple theme of those who detect, in the conjunction of trends in leisure and consumer culture, a new postmodern era. Gottdiener does not survey this literature, for example, he does not cite Umberto Eco's provocative analysis of some of the same environments (*Travels in Hyperreality* [Picador, 1987]) but is instead concerned with presenting his own analysis in a way that avoids much of the jargon of cultural theory. It seems to me that there are two distinct strands to Gottdiener's analysis: a historical account and an analytic account. The latter is considerably more successful than the former, which builds on a necessarily absurdly generalized survey of features of world history and cultures to culminate in a tendentious account of the built environment in the 20th century. The essence of the argument is that modernism, in alliance with developmental trends in capitalism in the first half of the century, stripped the public environment of symbolic adornment. In the second half of the century mass suburbanization, again allied with capitalist necessity to constantly stimulate consumer demand, has generated the flowering of thematic design I have summarized. In such a short book these arguments are inevitably compressed to the point of caricature, and one's dissatisfaction is compounded by avoidable howlers. For example, "during the eighteenth century, the life of the dandy, involved dressing flamboyantly, pursuing women, especially the wives of wealthy capitalists, sleeping late, and never, never working for a living" (p. 53). On the same page there is an amusing (what I assume to be a copyediting) slip when "aesthete" is used for "ascetic": "Members of the early Protestant sects that Weber recognised as possessing the strongest affinity to capitalist functional requirements were aesthetes."

I have hinted at an important strand in Gottdiener's analytic account by suggesting that for him there is a materialist logic to cultural change. In effect this picks up themes that Gottdiener develops from the French social theorist Jean Baudrillard, that in late capitalism goods are no longer marketed or sought for their intrinsic utility but instead for their symbolic connotations. These symbolic associations are promoted through a combination of mass advertising and highly stylized commercial venues offering a generalized corporate benevolence as well as the (partial) satisfaction of desire: "now businesses are increasingly building environments as themed spaces . . . People increasingly enjoy these symbol-filled milieus . . . for their own sake as entertaining spaces" (p. 76). The logic of theming is therefore ideological; it works to promote the interests of commercial elites. But Gottdiener describes the mode of ideology as hegemonic because the pleasures of themed environments cannot be completely controlled by their designers. They offer spaces for the realizations of fantasy otherwise denied by the conformity of suburban estates: "We are compelled to visit the mall for shopping or the theme

park and casino for a vacation, because it is within these environments, after many years of media conditioning, that we feel most like 'ourselves'" (p. 128). Themed spaces offer security from what have become the uninhabitable centers of major cities, but the price is that we give everyday life over to "the plethora of popular culture symbols that now pervade our environment. . . . Our everyday lives currently occur in thoroughly commodified spaces, whether we are alone or in a place of public communion" (p. 144).

It is difficult to avoid giving the impression that this is a dystopian vision, although the full flavor of the book is more ambivalent—an ambivalence that underlies the more central weakness of the enterprise. The use of imagery in creating simulated social environments is an important theme in contemporary culture, but we need both a more sophisticated historiography and a more detailed sense of the dynamics of what I have called elsewhere an aesthetics of representation to avoid the superficial confusions of this account.

*Handwriting in America: A Cultural History.* By Tamara Plakins Thornton. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+248. \$30.00.

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A cultural historian at the State University at New York, Buffalo, Tamara Plakins Thornton has penned in elegant style a volume that both enriches the intellect and satisfies the aesthetic palate. Her subject is handwriting, her period the past three centuries, and her study a wide-ranging investigation of handwriting's cultural roles and meanings. She knowingly explores such topics as the evolution of European scripts, the history of the printing press in Colonial America, the rise of graphology, and trends in handwriting instruction methods. At every step she reveals the importance of each topic for understanding both handwriting forms as such and the social significance of the cultural elements implicated in handwriting. She also does the reader the very useful service of ending each chapter with a concise summary that fixes her detailed material in the larger frames she constructs as interpretive windows on the handwriting world.

This book brims with insightful analysis. For example, in the colonial period, handwriting was formalized status. A limited number of "hands" were available, suiting the merchant, the lawyer, the clerk; male hands differed from female, gentle hands from coarse. As in most places, writing was dissociated from reading and mostly a male preserve, a measure of a man's integrity and reliability but, for writing women, a decorative art. Writing was "self-presentation but not self-expression" (p. 41), for it allowed for no subjectivity in its practice. Yet writing was more personal

than print, whose rigid, anonymous forms masked the character and intentions of authors. Publications therefore often appeared in sizable numbers as handwritten copies.

In the 19th century the subjective dimension of handwriting flourished. Victorians concerned about self-discipline and bodily control made of handwriting an exacting physical endeavor (the Spencer method) that would keep the subjective firmly in hand. Individuality grounded in the newly popular concept of the unconscious emerged as a presumed determinant of handwriting style but largely to the detriment of the individual, for early rationalized forms of graphology sought above all to unmask forgers and other criminals. In counterpoint to this scientized movement, romantic notions of glamorous unconventionality in a world of industrial regimentation yielded autograph collectors and a cottage industry of handwriting analysts divining clues about the suitability of prospective mates.

The 20th century opened with a scientific attack on graphology as character analysis but with considerable effort (by Thorndike, among others) to add handwriting tests to the array of assessments of intelligence. In schools, the Palmerian method from the 1880s, a simple, rapid style emphasizing the physiological components of writing, marched triumphantly across the land. Intending to help "reform the dangerous, assimilate the foreigner" (p. 174), educators used penmanship to foster discipline and conformity. Yet the tension between uniformity and individuality continued, with expanded interest in graphology and autographs, rising gender equality as men's and women's hands became more similar, and psychological analyses that depicted handwriting individuality as categorical and genetic.

As I have indicated, Thornton's prose pleases greatly; the book is a reader's joy. Mellifluous, precise, a ready mot juste at every turn, her writing tells her tale with strong images and effortless clarity. A sample, summarizing the reaction to 19th-century women's acquisition of the ability to write: "The only solution seemed to be to dip the female pen in invisible ink, to define women out of the world of writing altogether" (p. 71). Another sample, describing popularized graphology enterprises of the late 19th century that celebrated rather than condemned handwriting individuality: "These are mere whispers heard amid the cries of duplicity and danger, but they suggest that even at the end of the nineteenth century, men and women were drawn to the fact of individual difference for purposes other than surveillance and exposure" (p. 107). Thornton's gifts as scribe and word painter are exceptional.

Against such praise, minor exceptions can be raised. One, more illustrations would improve the exposition, particularly with regard to the styles and methods discussed. Two, although the book avoids the common pitfall of telescoping events (ever thickening detail as the focus shifts closer) by concentrating its lens on the middle period, recent decades receive too little attention. Surely Thornton's epilogue on the "symbolic functions of obsolescence" could say a good deal more.

A final, weightier issue must be mentioned: themes and arguments are rather period specific in this telling. Readers would benefit from a more systematic effort to develop the theoretical import consistently throughout the book. Control, self-control; conformity, individuality; self-display, self-development; objective institutions, subjective expression: Thornton would do well to allow her penetrating mind to elaborate more explicitly on the general processes reflected in her materials. Though this would alienate some of her disciplinary colleagues, I suspect that theory-minded sociologists will benefit more from—and better appreciate—her sparkling efforts in any case.

*Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering.* By Marita Sturken. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. x+358. \$45.00 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

George Lipsitz  
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In this imaginative, insightful, and thoroughly original study, Marita Sturken asks and answers important questions about collective memory, popular culture, and politics. Through semiotic, social, and ideological investigations of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the AIDS Memorial Quilt, and a variety of other images and objects that people use to address, understand, and interpret traumatic events and experiences, Sturken shows how images and material objects sometimes serve as mechanisms for confronting events and experiences that might be too horrifying to engage in any other way. She reminds us that remembering and forgetting are not just things that we do as individuals, rather, that our collective civic life often revolves around complex collective negotiations about what will be remembered and what will be forgotten.

Sturken's objects of study encompass a broad range of visual representations, and she offers especially interesting readings of photographs, films, and televised images of the Kennedy assassination, the Challenger explosion, and the Rodney King beating. Her most unusual and most profound contributions, however, come from her investigation into the ways in which political culture in the United States has been shaped in recent years by the production, circulation, and reception of complex and conflicting images of both the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic. Many of us might initially think of these two tragic and horrifying historical events as belonging to separate spheres of existence and representation—the war as political and public, the epidemic as private and personal. Sturken shows us, however, the inadequacy of these kinds of divisions. She describes how elected officials, media marketers, and social activists have all struggled (albeit for different reasons) to emphasize the private and personal consequences of the war in Vietnam, while at the

same time stressing the public and political dimensions of the epidemic. Ironically enough, the processes set in motion to memorialize the war through the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, with its dearth of political symbolism and its emphasis on the names of individual members of the U.S. armed forces, allows the war to occupy public space largely as a repository of private and personal grief and remembrance. Conversely, the success of the AIDS quilt in deploying the private and personal grief of individuals to claim public attention and resources from a society previously unsympathetic to the epidemic's victims because of their presumed sexual orientations led to changes in scientific procedures and government funding in response to coordinated political pressure.

Among many impressive achievements in *Tangled Memories*, perhaps the most lasting will come from Sturken's demonstration of the possibility, indeed of the necessity, of studying political culture as the product of the interaction of diverse realms, including commercial culture, the state, and social movements. It has become commonplace even among interdisciplinary scholars in recent years to study the cultural politics of the state, of social movements, and of commercial culture as if they existed in separate spheres. Yet, in actual social experience, cultural productions in these spheres function as nodes in a network, mutually constituting one another even as they sometimes compete for the same constituencies. Memories of the Vietnam War generated by the state cannot be detached from memories that emanate from commercial culture or from the social activism that accompanied the war. Similarly, cultural struggles over collective memory and the AIDS epidemic initiated by grassroots activists always exist in dialogic relation with commercial culture's representations of sexuality, disease, and social identities as well as with the words, images, and actions deployed by politicians on these same issues.

Sturken's sophisticated research framework and her impressive skills as an interpreter of political, social, and cultural issues all make this a breakthrough study—the kind that forces future researchers to take on tasks of greater ambition and, consequently, greater achievement. She shows that historical remembrance cannot be taken literally; the monument erected to "remember" deceased U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War can also erase acknowledgement of the 3 million Southeast Asians killed in the same conflict. At the same time, the traumas inflicted by the Vietnam War and by the AIDS epidemic have also been remembered because they serve to arbitrate broader fears and anxieties about changes in gender roles and about the authority of science. In addressing these issues—and many others—Sturken shows how acts of remembering and forgetting are neither innately emancipatory nor innately constraining.

Projecting our anxieties back to the past may enable us to view things in the present more clearly, but we can also use the past as a way of hiding from our own problems and concerns. Sturken shows us that the tangled nature of our memories has as much to do with what we have not addressed in the present as with what we are still trying to process

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from the past. Her eloquent, carefully argued, and well-reasoned book augments our understanding of the past and its horrifying traumas to be sure, but its greatest contribution comes from its simultaneous ability to arm us with insight about and to understand the complicated challenges we face in the present.

*My Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul Schreber's Secret History of Modernity.* Eric L. Santner. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+200. \$22.95.

Michael P. Steinberg  
*Cornell University*

If you are a social theorist interested in the cultural construction of subjectivity and in the personality of Max Weber as paradigm of the fin de siècle crisis of modern subjectivity and its relation to the founding of disciplines (such as sociology), then you must give an invested reading to Eric Santner's groundbreaking and intensely challenging new book. Santner's portrait of Daniel Paul Schreber (1842–1911) is presented within an intricate collage that incorporates briefer treatments of Freud, Kafka, Richard Wagner, and Walter Benjamin, elaborated in a theoretical frame derived from arguments about the social interpellation of the modern subject as developed by Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, and Žižek. It is an extraordinarily elegant argument about the crisis of fin de siècle European subjectivity with a broader claim about the structure and burdens of modern subjectivity in general.

Santner understands "the central paradox of modernity" to be "that the subject is solicited by a will to autonomy in the name of the very community that is thereby undermined, whose very substance passes over into the subject" (p. 145). Max Weber had a similar take on modernity, which he attributed to secularization or disenchantment. The profoundly welcome and analytically promising variation at work here is the depiction of modernization and modernity as scenes of *reenchantment*: that tendency of the subject to claim autonomy while modeling itself on displaced sacred authority, such as the state. The authority of the state has a central presence in the Schreber story, but what is especially interesting is the emergence of undisguised religious identifications and phantasms. Thus, whereas the dislocations of modern subjectivity produce mass psychoses such as anti-Semitism, such psychoses also carry powerful self-identifications with the objects of culturally and ideologically produced abjection. In this light, it makes little sense to talk about the "self-hating Jew"; it makes much more sense to talk about the ideologically available stereotype of the Jew for the purposes of abject identification, on the part of Jews as well as non-Jews. The problem is the self-hating modern subject, who, in the case of Schreber, comes from the Protestant patriciate.

Daniel Paul Schreber was the son of Daniel Moritz Schreber, who re-

mains notorious even in today's Germany as an originator of the cult of the correct body, which made physical respectability into a form of literal self-imprisonment. Daniel Paul grew up a prime object of his father's experiments, including straps and bars to induce upright sitting and immovable supine position in bed. One could scarcely conjure a more perfect scenario for the Wilhelmine superego. In 1893, following his investiture as presiding judge of the Saxon Supreme Court, the "young" Schreber fell into a psychotic illness that would plague him for virtually the rest of his life. That illness produced a text, his 1903 *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*. Original and crucial to Santner's analysis is the focus on Schreber's descent into mental illness at the moment of his investiture.

Illness—in this case, paranoia—and its narrative become, in Santner's analysis, a secret passage out of the iron cage created by the enforced repetition of the system of power's rules. In paranoia and its symptoms, the son finds a way not to become the father, the judge not to become the voice of the state that has empowered him. Where previous readers of Schreber (such as Elias Canetti) understood his paranoia as a prehistory of fascism, Santner finds in it a potential for the "avoidance" of the "totalitarian temptation" (p. xi).

Schreber's symptoms included patterns of identifications with stereotypes of cultural abjection, chiefly women and Jews. The book's final chapter, called "Schreber's Jewish Question," decodes Schreber's Jewish identification in the contexts of other discourses of symbolic Jewishness, from Freud's *Moses and Monotheism* to Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, in an extraordinarily rich display of the conundrums of symbolic meanings of Jewishness in the central European fin de siècle.

The book makes two broad claims about modern subjectivity, and on each of them I find myself going halfway in agreement with the author. The first claim is that the Schreber case offers a paradigm for the modern interpellated subject. Here I would ask for more historicization and argue that the overwhelming assault on subjectivity characteristic of the European fin de siècle, particularly of its demand that subjects understand themselves in the image of national power, legitimacy, and respectability, generated a degree of psychic crisis not necessarily applicable to earlier modern contexts. The second claim is that the Kafkaesque erasure of functional subjectivity can be inverted by a personality that functions through symptoms alone—indeed that ethical and political integrity, even heroism, can emerge from a delusional personality. (Santner reads Schreber's own text in a highly refracted manner—as a commentary on Freud's reading—and thus forecloses on a less mediated interpretation of Schreber's own narrative voice as a referendum on a reemergent subjectivity.) Here I would want to hold back—to suggest that after Weber, Freud, and Foucault, we can understand subjectivity as unfreeable from the pressures of interpellation and its resulting symptomatologies, but that the survival or remaking of an extrasymptomatic subjectivity is necessary for ethical and political functioning. Thus my first caveat with this

powerful paradigm is a historical one, my second, an ethical and political one.

To the historian, the Schreber story reads fascinatingly as it tracks the problems generated, for a Protestant cosmos, by the compulsion to switch the cultural “other” from Catholicism (which in 1870 could still be projected as the source of traditional social and cultural power in central Europe) to the Jews (in which case the projection of otherness was clearly a pretext for persecution). There is the following method in Schreber’s madness: to play out his Protestant anxiety, Schreber fantasized, in a vintage Prussian and Saxon manner, about being persecuted by Catholics, but for the sake of emotional authenticity, he had to identify with the abject position of the Jew. Santner elaborates powerfully the elements of Schreber’s self-delusion as an inversion of Martin Luther, who also appealed to the Luciferian rhetoric of the refusal to serve. The resulting Luciferian “fall” into abjection is prescribed culturally as the fall into the fin de siècle conundrum of degeneration, femininity, and Jewishness. There is a brilliant political gesture in this picture: the unmasking of the bogus trope of the “self-hating Jew” as the self-hating fin de siècle subject.

Santner’s analysis of Protestantism as a cultural system is multiply deflected into a brief account of Schreber’s own references to the *Kultkampf* of the 1870s (p. 103). Much more thought is needed in order to come up with an analysis of a crisis of Protestant subjectivity (the crisis of Schreber and, more significantly, the Max Weber of the 1890s), which is a crisis of the word-identified ego. Weber, unlike Schreber, emerges from this crisis with a renewed ability to *name*—in his case, to name a new discipline: sociology. Freud responded to fin de siècle crisis with a similar volition, by naming the new discipline of psychoanalysis. But the cultural and ideological contexts of these disciplinary foundations are profoundly different. The Protestant, word-based culture of Weber and Schreber counters the image- and representation-oriented context of Freud’s Catholic Austria. In the technique of dream interpretation, Freud explicitly transforms images into words, thus enacting a kind of Protestantization and Judaization of an image-based symbolic order of reality. (In the Austrian context, the prime analogue to Schreber—and to the discourse limited to the symptomatic—is Otto Weininger, whose treatise, *Sex and Character*, was published in 1903, the same year as Schreber’s *Memoirs*.)

Santner’s important and incisive purpose is to chart the prehistory of the paranoia that became the mass-psychological predisposition to fascism. But in the world of paranoia and the purely symptomatic, the rejection of totalitarianism is difficult—perhaps impossible—to differentiate from its ratification. Santner’s sympathetic take on Schreber as a critic and victim is not enough to make him into a hero. The paranoid personality, as it is presented here, offers no integrity, that dimension of subjectivity that remains capable of reasoning and acting. A functioning subjectivity must be produced both by the self and by the surrounding culture.

A context, such as fascism, that denies subjectivity in principle makes the slightest glimmer of its survival a heroic act.

Paranoia describes both the fascist mentality and its resistance. Just as the same paranoia produces at once National Socialism and its critique, the same "descent" into phantasmatic identification with women and Jews produces at once a sympathetic, empowering engagement with femininity and Jewishness and a reenactment of misogyny and anti-Semitism. Where is the space for political differentiation and political action—for the ability to *think* ethically and politically? Schreber may survive, as Santner asserts, "by momentarily refusing to make sense of it all and by himself becoming a player in the ruination of meaning" (p. 93). But how can he be understood to function, and how can a model of subjectivity conceived in his image be said to be one that functions?

Santner signals one way out of this trap, which is both deeply humane and incomplete. It is the suggestion that the knowledge of abjection—as admitted and, literally, published, by Schreber—can serve as a critique of that denial of abjection through which power confers legitimacy and demands obedience. Thus the knowledge of abjection is ethically required by a reality principle that refuses to repress the very existence of abjection. But that knowledge must exist as a function of the distance of the thinking ego to the perceived and even self-identified dimension of abjection. Santner's reading of Kafka's Gregor Samsa in *The Metamorphosis* serves as a summary of Santner's Schreber: "[his] fall into abjection can be approached as a *symptom* whose fascinating presence serves as a displaced condensation of larger and more diffuse disturbances within the social field marked out by the text" (p. 129). But can Schreber be always both Gregor Samsa and Kafka? Or do we read Kafka both because Kafka is Gregor Samsa and, more fundamentally, because he is not?

*Disciplining Old Age: The Formation of Gerontological Knowledge.* By Stephen Katz. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996. Pp. x+209. \$45.00 (cloth); \$18.50 (paper).

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University of Toronto

Katz offers us an analysis of "how gerontology has made the problems of aging amenable to the strategies of contemporary knowledge-production" (p. 117). The book can thus be read as a study in the sociology of knowledge or of science. The major intellectual payoff is the attention drawn to the interplay between the social constitution of disciplines and fields and the ways in which that constitution creates the object (or as Foucault and Katz would say, the "subject") of their knowledge-constituting practices.

A lengthy introductory chapter provides a clear, balanced introduction

to Foucault's and Bourdieu's theories. Katz also draws on other contemporary critical and feminist theorists to construct an analytical apparatus that he puts to good use in the rest of the book, which is fashioned as a contribution to critical gerontology.

The first substantive chapter examines the ways in which old age has been disciplined in relation to the body. It does so by an examination of medical thought from the ancients to the early stages in the development of geriatric medicine. The second substantive chapter examines the elderly population through administrative apparatus and the social survey, and the third examines gerontology and geriatrics texts. All of these subjects are related, because all reflect different social processes that constitute "the aged" as well as those who administer, service, or study them.

In chapter 4 Katz, through the lenses of Foucault and Bourdieu, seeks to understand how gerontology can be a field outside of traditional disciplinary criteria. He argues that multi- (trans-, inter-, cross-) disciplinary efforts act against the thrust of disciplinarity and are potentially counter-disciplinary (p. 109). Disciplinarity and multidisciplinarity co-constitute each other dialectically in setting and shifting boundaries. Katz notes that few fields are as committed to multidisciplinarity as gerontology but examines the "disciplinary construction of multidisciplinarity" (p. 4) in this book, including the fact that there is more mutual tolerance and respect for other disciplines than genuine interdisciplinary collaboration. For all his emphasis on social processes that are somewhat abstractly formulated in Foucauldian or Bourdieuan language, when he seeks to explain how multidisciplinarity came to be so ideologically central to gerontology, Katz perhaps gives undue credit to the leadership of one individual, E. V. Cowdry, who edited an important multidisciplinary collection (*Problems of Ageing: Biological and Medical Aspects*, 2d ed. [Williams and Wilkins, 1942]). A greater emphasis on the organizational imperatives of the Social Science Research Council (which could hardly foster a unidisciplinary development but had much to gain from fostering a multidisciplinary one) might have been more in line with Bourdieu, as would an analysis of the mutual gains each of the cognate disciplines sought in collaborating.

Methodologically, the case is made in successive chapters by focusing on selected scholars, texts, research institutes, focal research topics, and publications. This requires readers to make judgments about "representativeness"—not in any statistical sense but in assessing fairness and the symbolic representation of a field. I find remarkably little to quibble about in his selectiveness. The very logic of the book denies that there could or should be one faithful account, and Katz makes a strong case for his approach in contrast to the "progress of science" study of the growth of a discipline.

The comprehensive and theoretically grounded research leads to an impressive work of scholarship that both answers and raises questions. Well into this scholarly book, Katz discusses some of the major multidisciplinary research studies that have been important landmarks in the

growth of gerontology as a field and asks, Did they "actually discover the processes of aging, or did they organize such processes in ways that were scientifically recognizable and functional within the specific confines of the gerontological web?" (p. 116). Katz's perspective permits only one answer to this question: Knowledge is not "out there" to be discovered; knowledge is socially constituted through a process that coproduces that which is known and the knowing discipline or administrative apparatus.

Katz does not want old age to be disciplined and seems to be happy that it resists it: "Old age undisciplines gerontological knowledge in two ways: first, the realities, experiences, times, and spaces of old age defy conventional attempts to understand it; second, the indefinite, imaginary, and impossible character of old age itself destabilizes attempts to fix it" (p. 139). Yet he states that "gerontologists have bettered life in old age" (p. 135). Does he then want gerontology, but not old age, to be disciplined? Can gerontology be disciplined without disciplining old age?

This book is for serious scholars in several areas, including advanced graduate students. The 21 pages of notes add to its seriousness but are informative and should not be missed. Because it both explicates and tests through usage a Foucauldian analysis, this book's appeal extends well beyond gerontologists and life course theorists to anyone seriously interested in questions of theory and its usefulness.

*Life without Father: Compelling New Evidence that Fatherhood and Marriage Are Indispensable for the Good of Children and Society.* By David Popenoe. New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996. Pp. viii+275.  
\$25.00.

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A steady stream of books has appeared on the disintegration of the nuclear family, the decline of marriage, and the deterioration of children's well-being. No doubt *Life without Father*, David Popenoe's latest salvo on the consequences of men's retreat from family life, will take its place alongside the rest. The book is at once a compendium of social science research on the paternal role, a passionate appeal for resurrecting men's authority as parents, and a list of prescriptions for rebuilding marital commitments and restoring the paternal role.

Sociologists of the family (historians as well) may find fault with the uneven quality of Popenoe's portrayal of scholarly findings and dispute the bold claim on the jacket cover that the book offers "compelling new evidence that fatherhood and marriage are indispensable for the good of children." In fact, the evidence is neither original nor especially compelling. Nonetheless, the book makes for interesting reading, for Popenoe writes well and has the great virtue of telling it as he believes it should be—even if he does not always do such a good job of telling it as it is.

Popenoe's interpretation of family change here is much closer to main-line interpretations than in some of his earlier writings. There is far less ranting about family decline than in *Disturbing the Nest* (Aldine de Gruyter, 1988) and a more sober and balanced historical account of the social, economic, and cultural changes that have destabilized the conjugal bond and limited parental authority over children. Yet, when he comes to say what these changes have meant for children, the link between the changes and the presumed consequences is suspect to say the least. Popenoe tells us in his chapter on "The Human Carnage of Fatherlessness" that "evidence indicating damage to children has accumulated in near tidal-wave proportions" (p. 77). But how is Popenoe to explain that the tidal wave of damage to children was being first felt in the very era, 1950–1964, when children were raised in nuclear families? Moreover, during the following decade, when according to Popenoe all hell broke loose, this cohort of children from stable families were marching on the streets, experimenting with drugs, and openly admitting that they were sexual creatures. And as they got older, they were among the first to drive the age at first marriage up to new heights.

In the Victorian era, which he singles out as the apogee of family stability and social civility, a significant minority of children lost a parent while they were growing up. This was also a time when a goodly fraction of American children were placed in fosterage or sent out of the home to work. Popenoe needs to make sense of the seemingly improbable link—at least at a macrosocial level—between growing up in two-parent households and the behavior of children. One suspects that the stability of the family and the welfare of children may be linked to a common set of cultural, social, and economic conditions.

To bolster his argument, Popenoe assembles what slim evidence exists on the benefits of the biological father in the home. This is not to say that he is wrong to presume that the presence of a biological father benefits children. However, he consistently ignores the enormous variability that exists within family types that swamps the variability between family types. All the literature points to moderate, albeit important differences. To convert those relative differences into the proposition that fathers are indispensable for the welfare of children is at best a gross exaggeration of what the social science literature tells us.

We know that children thrive under conditions of nurturing, support, constancy, high expectations, and reasonable standards. How much these conditions are correlated, much less created, by the presence of a father is a matter of urgent research interest, but it has hardly been settled by the data as Popenoe claims.

Popenoe also confuses the advantages provided by fathers who provide quality care and the mere presence of biological fathers in the home. To the extent that biological fathers are more likely to offer this care than alternative parent figures (single mothers, stepfathers, grandparents, lovers), biological fathers may be superior to other coparents. However, researchers really have not yet convincingly established this proposition.

When committed fathers are present, are they superior to the benefits provided by an equally involved grandparent, lover, or stepparent? It is necessary to compare, not just all stepfathers, but the subgroup of skilled and committed stepfathers with their counterparts in nuclear households. Also, in making this comparison, we need to net out the negative effects of divorce on children that occur prior to the establishment of stepfamily households. If the damage were already done, it would be incorrect to attribute the child's problems later in life to the presence of a stepfamily.

Popenoe is correct to remind us, as he does in a chapter devoted to "What Fathers Do," that we dare not neglect biological evidence. However, evidence from biology must include behavioral genetics and comparative studies of primates as well as evolutionary biology, a strand of scholarship to which Popenoe seems unduly attracted, no doubt because he believes it shores up his argument. Variation in father-related roles, Popenoe observes, is enormous both across culture and historically in Western society. If there is a lesson to be drawn from anthropology, history, or biology, it would certainly not suggest that the Victorian family represented the pinnacle of evolutionary and cultural development though it might indeed tell us that, for social systems to survive, they must do a good job in providing for children and equipping them to make contributions as adults.

I share Popenoe's assessment that American society is not doing an adequate job of caring for its children. We have managed to create the worst of all worlds by assigning tremendous importance to the role of biological parents but granting them little social and economic support to assume the responsibility of child care. We have been unwilling to support alternative family forms with cash and institutional assistance for fear that they will further weaken marriage. This perverse policy has emiserated children by both failing to support marriage and failing to support its alternatives. Instead, we publicly bemoan the fate of the family and blame parents for their lack of commitment to children.

Is there any evidence that parents are less committed to children than they were at mid-century? Do parents spend more time and resources on themselves and less on their children? Do those without dependent children spend less on other people's children than we did a half century ago?

Readers of *Life without Father* are told that restoring fathers to the family requires nothing less than the "cultural revitalization of marriage." Popenoe's prescriptions range from rebuilding local communities to promoting promarriage values and everything in between, including postponing premarital sex, delaying marriage further, granting parental leave, reinstating stricter divorce statutes for couples with children, reforming welfare by creating jobs, and so on. Oddly enough, little of it is aimed at reshaping the political and economic culture that creates many of the problems that ail us. Despite acknowledging that the radical form of consumer capitalism in this country lies at the heart of the issue of strength-

ening the family, Popenoe clings to the belief that marriage could be restored with a heavy dose of values and a light touch of economic reform.

*Ambition and Accommodation: How Women View Gender Relations.* By Roberta S. Sigel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. x+240. \$48.00 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

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Are contemporary women postfeminists, for whom discrimination is an infrequent and minor event, heralded in popular media (Laura Shapiro, "Sisterhood Was Powerful" [*Newsweek* (June 20, 1994): 68–70])? In an era of backlash to feminism (Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War against Women* [Crown, 1991]), do women reject feminism? Or are they closeted feminists who avoid the label while privately endorsing the women's movement? Or have contemporary women crafted a new configuration of perceptions about gender relations and feminism?

To answer these questions, Sigel conducted an original research project involving 650 New Jersey residents. Her findings suggest that contemporary perceptions about gender relations are more complex than either the postfeminism or the backlash images suggest. Women are "ambitious" because they seek equality in their everyday lives while recognizing that discrimination is pervasive; they are "accommodating" because they reject collective, policy-based strategies in favor of nonconfrontational individual coping mechanisms.

Initially Sigel's findings may appear to be common sense, but readers who delve into Sigel's book will soon realize that these general findings are only the tip of the iceberg. What Sigel offers readers is a well-written, highly textured account of the nuanced crosscurrents and contradictions of contemporary views of gender relations that is both conceptually anchored and methodologically sophisticated.

Sigel deftly provides an appropriate theoretical framework focusing on three primary concepts for this study of attitudes about gender relations. First, Sigel uses an institutionally defined "gender perspective" that locates power dynamics at the center of social construction of gender. Second, according to the concept of "relative deprivation," comparing one's group to other groups who are receiving rewards to which you feel entitled can lead to a sense of anger that, in turn, promotes participation in struggles to reduce the extent of deprivation. Third, current models of group consciousness (A. Miller, P. Gurin, G. Gurin, and O. Malanchuk, "Group Consciousness and Political Participation" [*American Journal of Political Science* (1981):494–511]) assume that people who are aware of and upset by systematic injustice are committed to and participate in struggles to eliminate inequality. Because these models do not fit the women in this research, Sigel creates the concept of "minority conscious-

ness" to describe the substantial portion of women who see themselves as part of a disadvantaged group; they are angry over pervasive discrimination and want equality but do not endorse political, collective solutions.

A chapter on methods effectively discusses the advantages and disadvantages of combining telephone interviews of 400 women and 200 men with single-sex focus groups of 50 women and men in a single research project. Two advantages seem particularly noteworthy. First, themes emerging from the focus groups were used to construct the questionnaire, approximately 80 questions. Second, combining quantitative and qualitative methods not only permits cross-verification of attitudes, but it also elucidates the nuanced eddies, backwaters, and whirlpools of contemporary attitudes in a transition period.

The discussion of men's perceptions, for example, reveals the effectiveness of this design. While less supportive than women, between 23% and 57% of men in the telephone survey acknowledged that gender discrimination exists (p. 145). The survey results, however, exaggerate the men's support of gender equality compared to their comments in the focus groups: Men seldom raised the topic of discrimination, limited the possibility of discrimination to encounters in work settings, justified the continuation of existing gender relations, did not consider women working the second shift a problem, and tended to endorse traditional family structures. Thus, men were ambivalent about recent changes and had made few substantive attitudinal, much less behavioral, changes supportive of egalitarian gender relations.

In contrast to men, the majority of women acknowledged in the survey that pervasive discrimination exists. In focus groups, women openly discussed their personal encounters with discrimination and their anger over their experiences, particularly regarding the second shift and the disrespect of having their opinions and contributions ignored. Yet, in the survey women were almost equally divided over whether the government is doing enough to improve the position of women, and they ignored a number of feminist issues, such as abortion and sexual harassment, in focus groups. Sigel explains this apolitical response in terms of the adoption of two protective coping mechanisms—a "not-me syndrome," in which women consider themselves exempt from pervasive discrimination, and a "refuse-to-be-bothered strategy," in which women accept discrimination as a "fact of life" while individually struggling against it. Rather than coping by compliance, confrontation, or collective action, the women in Sigel's study preferred an accommodation-for-a-purpose strategy of avoiding confrontations with men while individually struggling to "make it" in a sexist society.

*Doctors of Conscience: The Struggle to Provide Abortion Before and After "Roe v. Wade."* By Carole Joffe. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. Pp. xvi+250. \$24.00.

Mathieu Deflem  
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Debated time and time again as one of the most divisive issues in American society, abortion in its many sociologically relevant dimensions remains poorly understood. The state of abortion research is a rather sad instance of our discipline's occasional lack of attention for issues that passionately move broad segments of society. With *Doctors of Conscience*, sociologist Carole Joffe has added to the sparse scholarly informed abortion literature. We should be grateful for the author's effort. But, unfortunately, there remains much to be desired about the results.

Based on interviews with 45 abortion providers, *Doctors of Conscience* presents an analysis of abortion services in the years before and after the Supreme Court decision of *Roe v. Wade* in 1973. The central argument of the book is that abortion was an inevitably risky enterprise before *Roe* and that it stayed an activity at the margins of mainstream medical practice in the period thereafter. The author presents various case studies as illustrations to indicate how abortion providers worked before and after 1973 and how they sought to legalize abortion in the days before *Roe*. Most striking is that the medical treatment of abortion after legalization of the practice did not gain much attention in professional health training and never received much support from within the medical profession. Thus, the freestanding abortion clinics represent the failure as much as the success of legalized abortion because they are as specialized in their work as they are marginalized from mainstream health care. The author concludes that, in order to secure women's rights to abortion, the medical community should be more actively involved in supporting abortion services.

This book has its merits. It supports the argument that the history of abortion in the United States is surely not alone a history of *Roe v. Wade*. However relevant, the Supreme Court's decision cannot be assumed to have had the impact on abortion access a legalistic outlook would naively imply. An analysis of the profession of abortion, indeed, adds to the value of the notion that rights are never secured through court activity and legislation only. The relative continuity in the medical profession's ambivalence towards abortion, furthermore, suggests how misleading the histories are that portray a one-sided picture of greedy abortion butchers before 1973 and of respected professionals thereafter.

Regrettably, the weaknesses of this book are many. Most clearly demonstrating the tremendous bias and methodological flaws of this work, the bold conclusions and predictions follow an analysis that is based on interviews with only abortion providers who were doing their work for reason of a self-proclaimed compassion for women seeking abortion.

The story told is inevitably one very sympathetic to the providers. The author acknowledges the limitations of her sampling methodology (p. 156) but totally fails to address the consequences. Instead, the perceptions of a select group of providers are relied upon to draw conclusions on the state of abortion services. The author overlooks that, while self-reports are perfectly acceptable for research on motivations and experiences, they are insufficient when trying to account for the conditions and implications thereof.

This book is theoretically not grounded, not in the sociology of health nor in the sociology of social movements, not in the sociology of law nor in political sociology. It for the better part presents a fragment of a history of abortion, one that, moreover, conveniently fits the author's personal agenda. Explicitly mentioning her personal beliefs, the author occasionally touches upon sociologically significant themes but fails to address these to any satisfactory degree of sophistication (see, e.g., p. vii; chap. 7). Most notably, the discrepancy between legality and accessibility is often hinted at throughout this book but never sufficiently explored. We learn, for instance, that the availability of abortion services is uneven across the United States, but we do not learn of the factors that condition this state of affairs. Some of the providers interviewed are said to have played an active role in the repeal and reform movement in the 1960s, but there is almost no analysis of how the medical profession actually influenced changes in legislation. Some statements in this book remain without argument or proof, for instance, when the author claims that there is "no question" that the violence surrounding abortion has a chilling effect on its availability (p. 5). In her conclusions, Joffe is swayed to argue that the impact of abortion's marginalization in mainstream health care can be overcome by educating and reforming the medical profession. But, while suggesting this empowerment through professionalization, she makes no mention of the created dependencies on reproductive technologies and does not mention the alienating effects of professionalism and medicalization.

Lacking a theoretically substantiated research agenda and a useful methodology, this book is unlikely to appeal to sociologists. However, participants in the popular abortion debate—regardless of what side they are on—may fare much better. Those who seek to secure women's reproductive freedoms will find in this book further support for their conviction. Those who struggle for the dignity of fetal life will once again find an easy prey against which to position their viewpoint. For anyone interested in the sociology of selected aspects on abortion, Joffe's book presents one more item in an ever-increasing mass of primary materials. Perhaps that was the author's intention.

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*States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity.* By Wendy Brown. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. Pp. xiii+202. \$39.50 (cloth); \$12.95 (paper).

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On one level, each of the main essays in *States of Injury* makes its own discrete, cutting point. In one essay, for example, Wendy Brown criticizes feminists who blame postmodernist theory for the practical fragmentation of identity, diffusion of power, and instability of place in the contemporary period. In another, she exposes the toxicity of demands by subordinate groups for social recognition and restitution. She chides Catharine MacKinnon for treating sexuality as if it were rigidly dualistic, sadomasochistic, and the basis of gender power everywhere. She explores the paradox that, for groups trying to achieve the full status of personhood, winning individual rights ensures the erasure of their collective situation and winning group rights ensures the reentrenchment of their marginal identity.

Brown also probes the tension between liberalism's explicit valorization of public equality, liberty, autonomy, rights, the individual, self-interest, and contract and its implicit dependence on private difference, encumbrance, duties, selflessness, the family unit, and passive consent. What happens when women, who sustain liberalism's implicit goods, reject them for liberalism's explicit ones? In her final chapter, Brown looks askance at demands that the state act to equalize social relations, underlining the state's masculinism and the way state interventions in society entail state normalizations of society.

On another level, *States of Injury* etches out a provocative overarching position on power, resistance, and freedom in the late-20th-century United States. Brown's greatest methodological feat is to dive for pearls in Karl Marx, whom almost everyone these days has forsaken but whose ideas, as Brown reveals, provide a strong antidote for the rancor of identity politics, the self-satisfaction of liberalism, and the blind spots of a Foucauldianism she otherwise upholds. Brown makes an especially brilliant move when she returns to Marx's essay, "On the Jewish Question," drawing on this still unsurpassed critique of liberalism to capture the conundrums confronting identities that strive for emancipation in a liberal frame.

Brown's bravest substantive feats are forecast in her fine introductory chapter, which is nicely haunted by shades of Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault. Brown reveals ressentiment to be a motivating impulse of contemporary radical politics, manifesting itself in the call for the victimizer's guilty conscience and, thus, oddly enough, in the desire for the continued relation of victimization that gives the victim his or her moral edge. She shows how the politics of ressentiment contributes to the disciplinary and regulatory power of the state. Brown emphasizes the need

for a radical reclamation of freedom but acknowledges its difficulty too, given liberalism's appropriation of freedom as its own idea, conservatism's lambast against all freedom "other than free enterprise" as "selfish" and "infantile" (p. 9), and postmodernism's portrait of the free subject as nothing but an effect of subjection. Brown assails identity politicians for capitulating to liberalism's fetishization of the individual by equating subjective feelings of empowerment with real freedom and power. She assails critical theorists for replicating liberalism's idealism by looking for freedom in a civil society supposedly autonomous of economy and state. She holds that the current inattention of democrats to economic domination and their preoccupation with sexual, racial, and ethnic identities at once obscure and express class power. Finally, Brown presses us to see that while the idea of a dialectic of history is no longer persuasive, the idea had the virtue of fostering optimism about social change and a positive, not merely resistant political will. It is up to us, she hints, to find a better way to accomplish the same trick.

There are, inevitably, flaws in this admirable book. Brown displays the postmodern habits of ridiculing the moralism of others while insisting on the rightness and goodness of her own ideas and of highlighting the topic of style but disregarding it in her own uninviting prose. Despite her assimilation of Marx, she often reduces everything to discourse. For example, while she skillfully details multiple modalities of the state, she ignores its modality as alienated social power that might be retrieved and used for the common good. That the state is irrevocably masculinist in all its aspects is, coming from Brown, an oddly "totalistic" and paranoid view.

These irritations aside, Brown's formidable book, *States of Injury*, will give theorists and activists a vigorous intellectual workout. Politically, alas, they might well be confused about where Brown thinks the space for radical democratic politics really lies now that she has nixed the struggle for rights, identity politics, civic association, and popular pressure on the state as well as revolutionary action, the alternative that no one proposes anymore.

*Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*. Edited by Deniz Kandiyoti. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+177. \$39.95 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

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For a change, the subtitle of this book, "Emerging Perspectives," is legitimate. The main title points to a recalcitrance in our sociological, Middle Eastern, and gender/women's studies scholarship to remark that an area, a topic, a group, is "gendered." This collection is only one among a burgeoning field that claims to subvert sexism, racism, classicism, and Western ethnocentrism. What fresh perspectives can we expect?

In scanning the backgrounds of the eight contributors to this collection of seven essays and an introduction, one realizes that a majority of the contributors are writing from within or from the rift, and sometimes from exile. These seven authors, in addition to Deniz Kandiyoti, represent varied fields (history, sociology, anthropology, international relations [politics], and English) and positionalities (Turkish, British, Iranian, Dutch, North American, Israeli, and Egyptian descent and residence). This is, however, still a European-derived set of essays in the sense that the work emerged from the Middle East Study Group in London.

Yet, for all of its diversity, this is not an equal representation collection nor one that engages in artificial tokenism. There was a more important set of goals. Contributors were asked to interrogate the canons of their disciplines, to use "gender analysis as a tool for social criticism" (p. ix), and to engage in feminist analytic intervention. That the collection favors Iran (two essays), Palestine (including Palestinian diaspora studies), and Israel/Palestine, with only one essay on Egypt, does not matter here.

Kandiyoti informs us that the task of postcolonial scholarship, which analyzes the relationship between Western imperialist discourse and colonized subalterity, is to interrogate the points of intersection, dialogue, and confrontation among discourses emanating from distinct sociohistorical locations, especially when these are situated outside the West (pp. 1, 19). In the overview essay, "Contemporary Feminist Scholarship and Middle East Studies," Deniz Kandiyoti explores the "discursive limitations" (p. x) of existing scholarship, offering critiques of three phases: (1) combating androcentric bias, (2) accounting for the subordination of women, and (3) shifting from the concept "woman" to the concept "gender." The current phase may be described as both post-Orientalist and poststructuralist, and Kandiyoti leaves us with provocative questions about future directions.

Joanna de Groot's chapter, while critiquing "three moments" in gender studies, epitomizes some of the new directions she suggests. The "three moments" are recuperative (making women visible), redefinitional (new accounts of the institutions and conditions of women's lives), and transformative (a project "in which the actual frameworks of social, historical, and cultural analysis are being challenged and altered" [p. 30]).

In "Feminism and Islam in Iran," Parvin Paidar (who began her U.S. academic career writing under the pseudonym, Nahid Yehaneh) traverses early nationalist and statist feminism in an era of cultural nationalism, arguing that "Iranian feminism was essentially secular until the rise of Shi'i modernism in the 1970s" (p. 57). She ends with a discussion of contemporary Islamist feminism, that odd bird that perplexes so many Western feminists, concluding that the opportunities of women are limited.

Annelies Moors's essay "Gender Relations and Inheritance: Person, Power, and Property in Palestine" puts in practice a method to which most feminist scholars can only aspire: she demonstrates with ethnographic data how focusing on gender challenges materialist assumptions about the necessary connections between property and power in the Mid-

dle East, the heart of much of the historical and anthropological literature on the region. She shifts our focus from the nature of property to the position of the women involved, stressing women's elaborate inheritance strategies and the dynamic character of the process in Palestine. It is an exciting and important piece of work that appropriately centers gender and women.

Sheila Hannah Katz's chapter on early Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms is an historical *tour de force*. Using pre-1950s Palestinian and Jewish texts, she demonstrates how changing nationalist constructions of masculinities and femininities and the eroticization of "the land" have shaped contemporary power relations between Jews and Arabs. Another powerful explicator of contemporary Jewish/Arab relations in Israel/Palestine, Simona Sharoni effectively engages in feminist intervention strategies to elucidate the masculinist and militaristic underpinnings of the peace accord, but also to suggest strategies for unsettling the conventional conceptions of the "center" and "margins" of political life.

Hoda El Sadda, in "Women's Writing in Egypt: Reflections on Salwa Bakr," exemplifies the general strategy of the other essays: remaining close to one's primary data (or positionality), observing the subject for unexplored interpretations, and engaging in her own feminist interventions (simultaneously analyzing Salwa Bakr's). El Sadda explores Bakr's analysis of language embedded in her fiction and the gendered nature of all literature, arguing that Bakr subverted dualities.

Rosemary Sayigh, longtime resident of Lebanon and observer of Palestinian camps, offers a complicated analysis. Locating herself, a feminist anthropologist, amidst the sprawling Shateela camp of the 1980s, she tries to work out the varied agendas of researcher, camp residents, and the national resistance struggle. With great power Sayigh explores issues of positionality, accountability, and ethics and how these affected her research methods and priorities.

Kandiyoti sees these essays linked through their feminist agenda and through foregrounding gender "as a means of understanding, decoding, and ultimately challenging . . . social and cultural phenomena" (p. xii). This statement is too modest. However, as to "feminist intervention," I would caution that intervention is not a substitute for social action (and since most of the essayists are activists, I assume they would agree).

In many ways the essays are refreshing, for example, in not foregrounding Islam or the veil, now considered trite in the progressive literature on the Middle East. With the exception of one essay, Islam is just one of many social phenomena. Further, unlike other edited collections, these essays are unabashedly feminist, with no apologies offered. The authors do not feel compelled to classify their subjects' activism on behalf of themselves, as women, as either "feminist" or "not feminist."

Another important departure from other such collections within Middle Eastern women's studies is that the essays are epistemological, evidence of a growing sophistication. The grand narratives have been at least partially abandoned and the need for analyses of "power relations

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and political processes through which gender hierarchies are both created and contested" is understood (p. 17), yet there is still a paucity of studies that actually accomplish that task.

The authors of these essays can certainly be said to have contextualized and historicized their subject matter. This is a collection that still falls within the modernist framework but in which the researchers use post-modernist strategies to subvert the old questions. However, of the modernist questions that might have lingered, my personal wish is that class had been among them.

*The Social Construction of Virtue: The Moral Life of Schools.* By George W. Noblit and Van O. Dempsey with Belmira Bueno, Peter Hessling, Doris Kendrick, and Reeda Toppin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. x+225. \$18.95 (paper).

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Columbia University

As historians of education have observed, school reform basically recycles two agendas: excellence and equity. Over the course of the last century reforms to promote excellence, typically achieved through increased centralization and standardization, have alternated with reforms to promote equity, typically achieved through decentralization and other changes intended to make schools more responsive to student needs. In *The Social Construction of Virtue*, Noblit and Dempsey critique both sides of the equity versus excellence debate and argue that the best hope for meaningful reform is to realize that "people in everyday life offer new possibilities for understanding the moral nature of education" (p. 12). When the authors speak of the "moral nature of education," they are referring not to the idea that schools should teach values but to the argument that the "essential nature" of schools as institutions is to "express our [society's] values."

The book begins with an overview of the debate between advocates of excellence and standards (here represented by Mortimer Adler, Allan Bloom, and E. D. Hirsch) and advocates of equity (represented by Dewey). The recycling of reform, Noblit and Dempsey argue, reflects a long-standing conflict in Western society. Contemporary ideas about excellence come out of an oratorical tradition emphasizing the mastery of standards and the importance of received wisdom. Current notions of equity have developed out of a philosophical tradition emphasizing the search for truth and knowledge by means of individual experience. The major problem, as Noblit and Dempsey see it, is less the content of this debate than the way in which it dominates our thinking, crowding out other ideas about education. Unfortunately, the authors' discussion of this claim is much too brief. If the ideas of the oratorical and philosophical traditions are guilty as charged of "silencing" other perspectives it

would be helpful to understand how and why these ideas have come to play such an important role in the arenas of educational theory and policy.

According to Noblit and Dempsey, one crucial idea that Adler, Bloom, Hirsch, and Dewey fail to grasp is that the "moral construction" of virtue, rather than the transmission of knowledge, is the most important function of schools. The everyday moral narratives that people construct about the purpose of their communities' schools contain the blueprint for reform. To demonstrate this point the authors turn to an "ethnohistory" (part ethnography, part oral history) of elementary schools in two inner-city communities. The first school, located in a largely white neighborhood, is highly ranked and has a student body that is 70% African-American. The second school, located in a neighboring African-American community, was closed in 1975, and many of its students were redistricted to the school in the white community. The research for the book grew out of an invitation from the recently hired principal to write a school history intended to unify staff, parents, and students.

The ethnographic chapters whet the reader's appetite for more information. The labored theoretical discussions interspersed throughout make for an arid picture of life at these schools and of the ways communities come to their decisions about what constitutes virtue vis-à-vis their local schools. Moreover, the ethnographic portraits of these two communities are hardly alternative examples of moral narratives about education. The data presented indicates that both communities tend to define virtue in terms of excellence, although the African-American community also valued collective responsibility and expressed a faith in redemption. The most engaging examples of the "construction of virtue" comes at those points in the book that deal with the racial politics of the decision to close the school in the African-American community, the effect this decision continues to have on the current attitudes of the community and the school staff, and the interaction between the staff and the field-workers.

The authors' emphasis on the moral dimension of schooling leads, not surprisingly, to prescriptions that do not address many of the problems that most "excellence" or "equity" critics are worried about. It leads instead to a renewed concern for the problem of constructing values: "Law and regulation should be geared so that schools are encouraged to examine their own narratives, traditions, beliefs, and what they want for the future" (p. 205). Readers worried about school achievement or the gap between the rich and poor are not likely to find this satisfying. But readers who share the premise about the function of schools as an expression of community morals may find this refreshing.

*Human Capital or Cultural Capital? Ethnicity and Poverty Groups in an Urban School District.* By George Farkas. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996. Pp. xiv+216. \$42.95 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

Annette Lareau  
Temple University

A sensitive and complex research issue in sociology is the substantial gap in school performance across racial and ethnic groups. There are many indications, for example, that differences remain in the school performance of Asians, whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, even after one controls for family background. George Farkas has waded into the heart of this debate with a pragmatic and empirically focused work. He adopted a "holistic" strategy: the book describes his empirical results and the implementation of his Reading One-One tutoring program, which is aimed at correcting the academic difficulties he uncovered in his quantitative research. This combination of intensive data analysis and intervention is unusual. Farkas acknowledges the structural components of stratification. Still his work is marked by a determination to break the elements of the stratification process into component parts and to create effective interventions.

The book focuses on cognitive skill, particularly in the area of reading, as well as the "habits" and "styles" children bring to school. For example, he begins by using Woodcock-John Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised data (a national data set where children are tested individually) to argue that family linguist backgrounds influence cognitive development. He makes the interesting point that, in his results, young black children's processing speed (a dimension which he suggests might be "hard wired") is not different from that of whites. There are, however, differences in important cognitive skills (i.e., auditory processing), which he links to cultural exposure. He insists these differences in cognitive skills are extremely influential. Using the National Longitudinal Survey, he presents evidence that differences in cognitive skill help explain wage gaps by race.

A key part of the thesis, however, is that individuals use their agency to create school careers. Using a Dallas School District Study of 486 middle school students, he convincingly demonstrates that teachers' judgments of students' school habits (i.e., homework, effort, organization, and class participation) influence course mastery and, especially, course grades. Levels of unexcused absenteeism and teachers' assessments of students' appearance and dress also play a role, as do cognitive skills. Thus, knowledge of "skills, habits, and styles," dramatically narrows the substantial gap in educational outcomes between Asians, whites, Hispanics, and African-Americans. For example, after taking into consideration teachers' judgments of students' school habits, the difference in course mastery (of a social studies curriculum) between Asians and whites is cut in half. He asserts that there are real differences in skill by race and

ethnic group; indeed he sees variations in reading skill as the "smoking gun" that impedes school performance. Although presented in a labored fashion, there are numerous interesting tidbits: black students who have black teachers are absent less often. He shows boys doing less homework, being more disorganized, and showing less effort than girls but still talking more in class.

Having sought to understand the sources of school difficulty, Farkas designed an intensive tutoring program for the early grades. Similar to that of Robert Slavin, the program stresses the critical importance of reading skills in fostering school development. The program, Reading One-One, uses (paid) college students to meet regularly with children in a "pull-out" program to tutor them in reading skills. Farkas shows positive changes in participants' reading scores as a result of the amount of exposure students had to the program, but the program encountered resistance from district officials. The demise of Reading One-One is described in the last chapter of the book.

The flaws in the book are, in many respects, linked to its ambitious character. The manuscript discusses detailed analyses from four different data sets (two national, one districtwide, and one program based). The breadth and scope of the book is a unique strength; still, the various components of the book are not woven together in a tight fashion. The theoretical issues (notwithstanding the title) are also underdeveloped. The author, impressed by the educational benefits of the program, scarcely conceals his tone of disbelief and dismay in his description of "sabotage" by district administrators. Yet, the literature on organizations as well as on the politics of education amply demonstrates other cases of difficulty in the implementation of educational reform. The integration of this literature into the end of the book would have been helpful. In addition, while asserting that he uses "qualitative methods" to provide this portrait of bureaucratic resistance, this section lacks a pattern of reflexivity or a presentation of the taken-for-granted perspective of the educators in the program. Still, the author builds a credible tale.

Overall, this book is an important and unusual contribution to the literature. The seriousness of the data analysis makes the book more appropriate for graduate rather than undergraduate courses, but the discussion of the tutoring program and its demise would be useful for a discussion of school reform at any level. In sum, Farkas moves to the center of a complex issue in a thorough, illuminating, and interesting fashion. *Human Capital or Cultural Capital* is an important contribution to the debate about the role of racial and ethnic membership on school experience and one effort to improve the performance of urban, poor children.

*Work-Place: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets.* By Jamie Peck.  
New York: Guilford, 1996. Pp. xvi+320. \$42.50 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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Most sociologists would agree that the study of labor markets cannot be safely left to economists, with their disregard of institutional embeddedness and their treatment of labor as a straightforward commodity bought and sold in self-regulating markets. In *Work-Place*, Jamie Peck develops an analysis of the social regulation and spatial embeddedness of labor markets as integral to their functioning. He argues that while institutionalist and radical analysis of segmented labor market theories are vastly superior to the neoclassical model, they need a much greater historical and geographical sensitivity. Most people are restricted to *local* labor markets; unlike national labor markets, these are not mere statistical artifacts but represent the space of operative constraints and feasible opportunities in which people live, hence, the space at which labor is mobilized and reproduced.

As "institutionalized, codetermined, conjunctural phenomena that vary over time and space" (p. 77), labor markets are a particularly challenging problem for explanation. Chapter 2 analyzes how social regulation influences the very constitution of a "supply" of labor. Chapter 3 provides an excellent review and critique of three generations of segmentation theory: dualist approaches, emphasizing the needs of different production processes (P. Doeringer and M. Piore); radical approaches, emphasizing labor control (Reich, Edwards); and multicausal approaches (I. Michon, Rubery, Wilkinson), emphasizing regulation and institutional variability. Peck draws upon regulation theory to develop a "fourth-generation segmentation approach" (p. 86) challenging the implicit assumption of its predecessors that regulation operates at a purely national level and exploring how labor markets are regulated in geographically distinctive ways. Regulation—understood in the manner of the French regulation school to include regularization—operates at other levels too, including the local level. At the local level, it covers not only locally based policies and programs but local enterprise agreements, work cultures, and household structures.

Another chapter provides a critical review of the much hyped literature on "flexibility," distinguishing the many different phenomena included under that banner and arguing that deregulated, flexible labor markets are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term without eroding skills. There then follow two more empirical chapters relating to the author's research on homeworkers in Australia and on local training enterprise councils in Britain. Influenced strongly by the United States's private industry councils, the TECs have, in fact, contributed little to the development of either technical skills or enterprise and have primarily functioned to keep down unemployment statistics. Drawing critically on Rich-

ard Jessop's theory of the transition from a "Keynesian welfare state" to a "Schumpeterian workfare state," Peck provides an illuminating analysis of the changing nature of regulatory regimes from state-run skill-training bodies financed by levies on firms to privately run but centrally regulated bodies funded according to performance data. The implications of this form of regulation go far beyond the limited case of industrial training to a wider critique of neoliberal governance and the inconsistencies between its rhetoric and its practice. Further, Peck attacks the assumption that we are entering a post-Fordist order, arguing that a successful new mode of regulation has yet to emerge from the decline of Fordism and that disorder is the dominant tendency. The book concludes with a discussion of competition among regulatory regimes for mobile investment at intranational and international levels and warns that a "race-to-the-bottom" threatens both economic viability and social stability. In these ways, Peck not only brings out the spatial embeddedness of labor markets but counteracts the neglect of the influence of the state in much labor market theory.

*Work-Place* does not quite escape the twin occupational hazards of radical writing on labor markets—exaggerating the importance to firms of labor costs and labor control and paying insufficient attention to the top-to-middle end of labor markets. It therefore repeatedly emphasizes the risk of capital flight to places with cheaper labor and, hence, the near inevitability of a "race-to-the-bottom," which lowers the pay and security of workers' jobs. However, the fact that rich countries continue to be the main recipients of foreign direct investment reminds us that access to product markets is usually capital's priority and that labor quality is often more important than labor cost. Peck does note in the preface his belief that "labor inclusive" approaches "based on social protection and negotiated worker involvement" are a feasible alternative to neoliberal weakening of labor, but unfortunately, this more hopeful scenario is not followed up or illustrated in the book.

Notwithstanding this reservation, as a contribution to developing theoretical approaches to labor markets, especially with regard to space and regulatory regimes, *Work-Place* is an important book for researchers in this area.

*Black Corporate Executives: The Making and Breaking of a Black Middle Class.* By Sharon M. Collins. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997. Pp. xiii+196. \$49.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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*University of Maryland*

*Black Corporate Executives*, by Sharon Collins, is a very welcome addition to the small but growing amount of scholarly literature on the new black middle class. In the study, based on in-depth interviews in 1986

and 1992 with 76 high ranking black executives from the 52 largest white-owned corporations in Chicago, Collins perceptively explores a number of important issues surrounding the emergence of the new black middle class. They include questions of upward mobility, the significance of race, the role of affirmative action, the position of black executives in these major U.S. corporations, and the future of the black middle class.

The focus on black executives in major corporations makes this a study of those at the apex of the new black middle class. To select prospective interviewees, Collins first identified 52 of the largest white-owned corporations in Chicago, then went to informants familiar with these corporations to locate black executives in these corporations. Other black executives were reached through information from interviewees themselves. Of the 87 black executives located in this process, 76 were interviewed. Only 13 of the 76 executives were women, leading Collins to remark that the assumption of black females reaping greater benefits from affirmative action than black males was not supported by her survey.

The first three chapters provide background for the analysis of Collins's own data. These chapters offer a useful and perceptive review of pre-civil rights racial conditions in the United States as well as progress made following passage of the Civil Rights Act in the mid-1960s. They also include a review of major scholarly interpretations of the gains by blacks that were achieved during the late 1960s and 1970s. While the information found in these chapters is not new, it should be especially valuable to the general reader and for students in college courses.

What is new in these chapters is the presentation of Collins's own position and the concepts she will later effectively use in the analysis of her own data. Perhaps the two major concepts underlying Collins's thesis are "racialized" positions and a "politically mediated opportunity structure." These two concepts are at the heart of her analysis of black mobility into the boardrooms of corporate America.

Through her analysis of interviews and the careful use of direct quotes, Collins presents data to support her contention that the opportunity for blacks to move into executive positions in the major corporations of Chicago resulted from federal government mandates and black community pressures to desegregate. While the results were encouraging, in that corporations responded by hiring blacks for managerial positions in the 1960s and 1970s, she documents a bifurcation of these positions. Some black executives held positions whose functions were tied to the general population, "mainstream" positions. Others occupied positions tied to black constituencies either as customers or as groups that needed to be appeased in a period of urban unrest and protest, "racialized" positions. Analysis of her data reveals that the majority of black executives in her sample either held racialized jobs throughout their corporate careers or held one or more racialized jobs before eventually moving into the mainstream.

Collins's finding that racialized jobs typically proved to be "traps" from which many were not able to escape is equally significant. In these posi-

tions, which typically included affirmative action functions or community relations, there was little opportunity to acquire the management experiences that would qualify these executives for mainstream positions. Furthermore, Collins found that most black executives in mainstream positions held support jobs rather than jobs in planning and operations, the latter being the jobs with real power. Both racialized jobs and mainstream support jobs proved to be the most vulnerable to corporate downsizing in the 1980s and 1990s.

The consequences of what Collins calls "politically mediated" upward mobility has been a "structure of achievement that preserved inequality while it carried out its role in reinstating social order" (p. 161) in the 1960s and 1970s. Because these developments left corporate structures intact, Collins argues, the cessation of government pressure during the Reagan years and after and the absence of black community pressures similar to the 1960s and 1970s make the future of black mobility into corporations uncertain.

*Black Corporate Executives* is very well written in a style that makes it easily accessible to the educated public. Because it is grounded in carefully collected data that is skillfully analyzed, the study is also important to the sociological community. It makes a solid contribution to the literature and should be a welcome addition to a wide variety of academic courses in business and in the social sciences.

*Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race.* By K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. 191. \$21.95.

Les Back  
*University of London*

K. Anthony Appiah's and Amy Gutmann's new book, *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race*, asks searching questions about the meaning of race as we approach the millennium. It seems fitting that the introduction to the book, written by David B. Wilkins, returns us to W. E. B. Du Bois's famous pronouncement that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line." *Color Conscious* asks its readers to think critically and with equanimity about the politics of race as we move into the next century.

These are big questions that resonate with no less importance than those posed by Du Bois himself close to a hundred years ago. Indeed the figure of Du Bois seems to linger at the side of these writers. It seems fitting in this context to also mention that Du Bois was, among many other things, a sociologist and a personal friend of Max Weber. He published the first substantial study of African-American community (*The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* [University of Pennsylvania Press, 1899]). While the scope of *Color Conscious* covers philosophy, cultural

theory, social policy, and politics, this is an important book for sociologists to read and engage with critically. It attempts to ask searching questions about the integrity of race as a social category within America.

The book takes the form of two long essays. First, Appiah provides an exhaustive and impressive treatise on the connections and disjunctures between race, culture, and identity within American and European thought. The scope of this piece ranges from the detailed deconstruction of the racial underpinning of the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, Matthew Arnold, and Johann Gottfried Herder to a discussion of African-American formations of racial identity. Appiah argues persuasively that race is no more than an effect of racial discourse and that social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the concept of race. His argument is nuanced, and he understands that it has been strategically necessary for black Americans to recode the meaning of race in a positive and self-affirming way in order to assert for themselves a dignity that racism has historically denied. But here he cautions the reader that the profusion of racial essentialisms within African-American communities and elsewhere may lead to replacing one kind of tyranny with another.

Appiah is arguing for identities that are, in his phrase "not too tightly scripted" by the expectations of others and by racial authenticity. This is something close to what Stuart Hall has referred to as "identity though difference." He invites us to live with fractured identities, to find solidarity and yet to recognize the contingency within all categories of personhood. More critically Appiah and Gutmann are very much bound within a dyadic model of black-white relations, and references to other minority groupings are made only in passing. One might question the viability of their approach to the political morality of race given the complex mosaic of cultural groupings found within the United States. The reader is left to wonder, as David B. Wilkins mentions in his introduction, how their analysis would be complicated by a serious discussion of the position of Hispanics or Asians within the landscape of racial ideas.

Amy Gutmann's essay shifts the focus to the practical imperatives of responding to racial injustice. It is one of the great strengths of this book that it attempts to combine both a philosophical discussion of race and cultural theory with a commitment to trying to demonstrate the relevance of these ideas to issues of public policy and institutional politics. Here she deconstructs many of the contemporary arguments against affirmative action, from the color-blind perspective to the pursuit of "class, not race" policies, and offers a moral justification for the use of color conscious (which she distinguishes from racial essentialism) initiatives that are morally justified through a notion of fairness. Black and white citizens have different obligations to counter racial discrimination, but Gutmann appeals to a shared responsibility for achieving a just society.

This is a very important and much-needed book. Appiah and Gutmann argue rightly that much of American "race talk" is dishonest, confused, ill-informed, and unhelpful. They end with a call for common ground, which involves a return to some of the tenets of modern liberalism, such

as the sovereignty of the individual and the importance of reasoned debate. However, the lesson of the 20th century is that the appeal to liberty and opportunity alone will not dismantle the color line. The great contribution of this book is that Appiah and Gutmann challenge us to rethink how racial disadvantage and inequality might be tackled in way that is morally defensible.

*The Ownership of Enterprise.* By Henry Hansmann. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 1996. Pp. xi+372. \$39.95.

Neil Fligstein  
*University of California*

*The Ownership of Enterprise* is a difficult book to review for someone who shares none of its assumptions. However, I feel strongly that sociologists need to confront books like this one because they do tell us something about what people who are inventing theory that is being applied to the corporate world are thinking. The current conception of the firm that dominates discussion in law schools, some business schools, and departments of financial economics is based on "agency" theory. This view argues that the firm is a fiction and the best way to understand it is to see it as a "nexus of contracts." The purpose of the firm is to produce residual cash flow, what Marxists call "surplus value," or profit. Ownership is a claim to this cash flow. The problem is to produce contracts that bind various actors, whether they be managers, workers, or suppliers, who act as agents for the owners (the principals) in ways that help maximize the production of residual cashflow.

The ideological development of this theory in universities has gone hand in hand with the way financial analysts, lawyers, judges, and executives have come to manage and understand the corporation in the past 20 years. The job of many people working in the corporate world is to frame what corporations do in these terms (i.e., maximizing shareholder value) and then make decisions, be they investments, writing contracts, or deciding case law, on this basis. A trip through a book like Hansmann's shows how those who are concerned with making firms more efficient by altering the organization of property rights are thinking about the problem.

Hansmann wants to transcend the normative debate about who should have claims on residual cash flow (stockholders or stakeholders—i.e., workers, suppliers, customers, and communities) by asking a provocative empirical question: What determines the most efficient form of ownership in a given context? To put it another way, Why would anyone want to control residual cash flow, which is uncertain, when they could have a contract that specifies remuneration? Hansmann's answer, which is an original and interesting twist on agency theory, is that ownership relations maximize efficiency when there exists no arrangement by which one

class of patrons (Hansmann's term for suppliers, managers, workers, and customers) can gain without another losing.

Hansmann argues that the owners of firms in a given situation will be those for whom the cost of market imperfections might have the greatest negative outcome (i.e., those who could suffer the highest transaction costs in the case of market failure). For instance, if a firm is a natural monopoly vis-à-vis its customers but its capital, labor, and other factors of production come from competitive markets, then it makes sense for the customers to own the firm so they will not be exploited by managers (a potential case is rural electric utilities). The way Hansmann understands which group bears the highest cost of market imperfections is to study who owns firms in an industry. If customer-, worker-, or investor-owned firms dominate in a given industry, then the game is to figure out why that group has the highest potential transaction costs.

The rest of *The Ownership of Enterprise* is an attempt to consider some industries where different ownership forms appear successful and then to reason why those forms are particularly advantaged in that situation. For instance, Hansmann argues that worker-controlled firms make the most sense where workers have similar skill levels and share similar interests, like professional partnerships. When workers are more heterogeneous, their interests diverge and firms have more politics and, thus, higher costs than investor-owned firms. These transaction costs have a huge effect on competitive advantage and explain why one form of ownership dominates.

What can we learn by this exercise? *The Ownership of Enterprise* provides a nontechnical approach to agency theory and discusses much of that literature in lucid language. It also proposes an elaborate set of novel mechanisms to understand ownership from the perspective of agency theory. The book might provide hypotheses for scholars interested in using a very broad view of agency theory to account for diverse patterns of ownership.

There are many downsides to the book. The industry cases are selected mostly by availability, and, in most cases, Hansmann does not even have the crucial data to tell if one ownership type predominates. Moreover, he assumes that the market processes he theorizes exist and actually are determinative for what ownership types survive. This assumption works for lawyers and agency theorists but is much more problematic for social scientists. Hansmann also has such an ad hoc view of the many different ways in which agency or transaction costs can come into play that it would be difficult to systematically test his hypotheses. Finally, he dismisses challengers to his perspective. Theories that emphasize the role of history, accident, or preexisting political and legal institutions are never given adequate consideration either as theories or in the evidence in any systematic way.

*Investor Capitalism: How Money Managers Are Changing the Face of Corporate America.* By Michael Useem. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Pp. xiii+332. \$30.00.

Vicki Smith  
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Anyone desiring to understand the profound changes reshaping U.S. corporate practices and employment relations in recent years should read this book. Adding to a long-standing debate about the historical transformation of and complex interconnections between corporate ownership and corporate control, Michael Useem looks at the rise of large, powerful institutional investors—public and private pension fund managers, investment and insurance companies, and nonprofit organizations—who have become agents of corporate control in the 1980s and the 1990s. He takes the reader on two journeys. The first journey is a grand survey of the entire terrain of the American economy; the second is an up close tour of specific corporate headquarters and boardrooms to observe institutions' effects behind the scenes.

*Investor Capitalism* draws on multiple sources to build a case for the formidable power of institutional investors. Useem uses data from interviews with chief executive officers, chief operating officers, chief financial officers, pension fund managers, and directors of investor relations from 20 large corporations as well as from interviews with 58 senior officers for large institutional investors. To interview data he adds survey research data, participant observation data from meetings and conferences, archival data, and numerous additional quantitative research findings. Together they yield a rich and often disturbing picture of the ways institutional investors are transforming corporate strategies and structures. By looking at this new form of financial power from both sides of the divide—from the point of view of both private corporations and investors—Useem is able to document the varied ways in which investors have extended their reach into top management decision making as well as the obstacles facing investors in their quest for power. He furthermore makes a persuasive argument for a qualitative change in the course of investor-management relations over the last decade from a period of acrimonious investor activism to the current period of comparatively stabilized and closely-managed network relations between corporate top management and investors.

As Useem points out, the rule of Wall Street has changed. Historically, investors who are unhappy with the performance of any given company would walk away, selling their stocks and moving on to invest in the next firm. Shareholders with significant holdings can no longer register their dissatisfaction so simply. Instead, major investors, anchored to companies by huge blocks of shares, more routinely challenge corporate managers. Investors have become activists for improved company performance, exerting pressure on top level company management directly and

energetically to improve their bottom lines. They have lobbied, often successfully, for new forms of company governance, for executive dismissal, for changes in product strategies, and for changes in boards of directors.

Useem argues that top level managers have not passively accepted investor intervention and, to demonstrate the pitched battle between the two groups, meticulously tracks several cases in which thousands of managerial hours and millions of company dollars were devoted to thwarting institutional investors' buyout and reorganization attempts. His recreations of these investor-management skirmishes are gripping. Corporate top managers have developed a "cultural resistance to shareholder insistence," as well as organizational and legal mechanisms for circumventing institutional power. Top managers criticize investors for stubbornly and often counterproductively holding to a short-term horizon for judging company performance, for lacking the qualifications for effective decision making about what companies should do, and for not legitimately representing the interests of those whose money they are investing.

With 57% of shares of the 1,000 largest companies held by large institutional investors, however, corporate management has had no choice but to change some of its practices. So, while Useem found that corporate managers have resisted some forms of investor intervention, they have yielded on others, a response culminating in a general pattern of corporate restructuring. Some of the indexes of restructuring are familiar—widespread layoffs, redesigned and reengineered business organizations, homogenization, the forced resignations of CEOs—while others—institutionalizing investor voice, developing routines for communicating with and registering the demands of investors—are less familiar. All combined, however, these innovations add up to a new institutional framework in our largest companies in which investors have taken a key role in directing the performance of the economy, the management of investors has become critical to effective business leadership, and far-flung networks have emerged for transmitting information in two directions, from company management to investors about business performance and from investors to company management about investors' concerns.

These networks, the "optical fibers of investor capitalism" (p. 206), represent the institutionalization of investor power. Although one may wonder how thoroughly investors have supplanted the power of professional managers, there is no minimizing how deeply institutional investors have reconfigured American corporations and, in turn, American society itself. *Investor Capitalism* makes very plain that the equation of corporate power has shifted considerably, with institutional investors emerging as an implacable factor in that equation.

*The Reportage of Urban Culture: Robert Park and the Chicago School*  
By Rolf Lindner. Translated by Adrian Morris with Jeremy Gaines  
and Martin Chalmers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
Pp. xiii+237. \$54.95.

Lyn H. Lofland  
*University of California, Davis*

This is a book aimed at "advanced students." Readers who have a more than passing familiarity with the history of American sociology, who are aficionados of the Chicago school, and/or who cut their sociological baby teeth reading and gossiping about the likes of Albion Small, W. I. Thomas, Ernest Burgess, and, of course, Robert Park, will find it richly satisfying. Less knowledgeable readers, on the other hand, are more likely to be mystified than satisfied and would be well advised to acquaint themselves with one or more of the basic primers (e.g., Martin Bulmer, *The Chicago School of Sociology* [University of Chicago Press, 1984]; Robert E. L. Faris, *Chicago Sociology 1920-1932* [University of Chicago Press, 1967]; Fred H. Matthews, *Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School* [McGill-Queens University Press, 1977]) before tackling a graduate level text like this one. My advice here is based on the fact that Rolf Lindner's goal is not to describe a particular time and place and cast of characters, but to advance a thesis about that time and place and those characters; the information that is proffered is determined by its relevance to the thesis.

The bare bones version of the thesis Lindner advances can be stated simply and briefly: "the orientation of urban research represented by Park ultimately owes its origins to the reporting tradition" (p. 3). This is *not*, let me hasten to add, simply one more rendition of the old (and tiresome) "ethnography is mere journalism" critique—very much to the contrary. The author is a professor of European ethnology at the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, coeditor of the journal, *Historische Anthropologie*, a supporter and defender of fieldwork, and (judging from the content of this book) a strong admirer of Robert Park. Rather than functioning as critique, Lindner's thesis is intended to deepen his readers' appreciation for what Park brought to the Chicago school and what the Chicago school bequeathed to American sociology. In its more elaborated version, the argument goes something like this. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the occupational subculture of American reporters stood in opposition to—was in rebellion against—the "narrowness and sterility, the nice pretence and vain self-satisfaction of what George Santayana . . . termed the 'genteel tradition'" (p. 198). Central *mind-set* components of that rebellious subculture included both a strong preference for learning about the social world via direct experience (as distinct from a reliance on "book learning") and an attitude of disinterested appreciation for the variation of human types and territories to be found in the social world (as distinct from "do-gooderism," which aimed to bring the variants in

line with conventional morality). Critical *organizational* components of the subculture included both the role of city editor, who assigned reporters to "beats," and the practice of training and testing cubs reporters by sending them out to do observational exercises. Park's personal characteristics that attracted him to the rebellious world of journalism in the first place, combined with his years of employment as a reporter (1887-98), meant that, by 1913 when he joined the University of Chicago faculty at the age of 50, he possessed both the mind-set (a skeptical streetwise interest in what people actually do) and the organizational know-how (an ability to get students to explore the city's diverse areas and peoples) necessary to transform sociology from "social gospel reformism" to empirical science.

There is much more to Lindner's thesis than this necessarily capsule summary can convey. There is also much more to the book than the simple development of a thesis. That task probably could have been accomplished in a longish article. The bulk of the volumes' 250 pages is actually taken up with intellectual by-ways or "miniessays"—developed trains of thought touched off by his argument but not really essential to it. Inessential or not, for aficionados of the Chicago school, these miniessays are not to be missed, as a small sampling of topics will show: the concepts "stranger" (both Simmel's and Schütz's) and "marginal man" and their relationship to the practice of fieldwork, Park as theorist, Simmel's contributions to sociology and his similarities to and differences from Park, the origins and development of ecological thought among members of the Chicago school, and the work of W. L. Thomas. I have one minor quibble: the book contains a few (not very serious) confusions and errors, which aficionados are likely to find jarring (the systematic and unfailing transformation of Herbert Blumer into Herbert Bulmer is the most bothersome of these). This quibbling aside, if you have ever advised your students to begin their research by "nosing around," if you have ever suggested that a paper was not interesting because it did not contain any "sociological news," if you have ever been inclined to "damn the moralists" because the sociological "stories" they tell are so conventional and predictable, this is definitely the book for you.

*Community, Culture, and Economic Development: The Social Roots of Local Action.* By Meredith Ramsay. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xx+163.

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Meredith Ramsay's first book—*Community, Culture, and Economic Development: The Social Roots of Local Action*—is a welcome addition to the literature that deals with the three subjects featured in its title. In 1990, Princess Anne and Crisfield, Maryland, had populations of 1,666

and 2,880, respectively. The former had an agricultural economy, while the latter's economy was based on fishing. Both had experienced population losses, and both had residents who were anxious to promote economic development activities that might lead to a resurgence in their community's well-being. In neither case, however, did substantial economic development take place. Ramsay tells the story of how groups operating through established institutions and civic cultural routines successfully fought back attempts to mount aggressive development programs.

The white, land-based elite of Princess Anne pushed through the construction of a prison but literally and figuratively ran afoul of poor black and newer white, middle-class residents when they opened a processing plant in the town. The ruling white elite began to lose control of the reigns of the five-person town commission with the successful election of a woman, a black, a retired chemist from New Jersey, and a music teacher from New York City.

Crisfield's story is a little different. The loss of seven businesses to fire in October, 1987, prompted the state of Maryland to allocate \$5 million in community development block grant funds to rebuild the core of the old business district. The expected increase in tourism that would come with a refurbished downtown area did not materialize. In large part this was because the \$5 million had produced little more than a parking lot and a public toilet, known locally as the "park and pee." A populist mayor, sensitive to the needs of his poor white and black constituents, did not support the introduction of new businesses that would bring in new jobs and stricter housing codes. Largely content with their way of life, these persons were not at all sure that the new jobs would go to them. They were quite certain that new housing and zoning codes would leave their dilapidated homes in jeopardy. Even the Chamber of Commerce was ambivalent about the big economic development plans promoted by Maryland's governor. Crisfield's residents controlled growth in order to protect their fragile seafood industry.

In both cases the citizens of these communities were more concerned about the quality of their social lives and cultural routines than they were about the prospects for new and better jobs. Elite members of both towns could not push big economic development schemes down the throats of their neighbors. Life went on pretty much as the citizens had come to know it.

Ramsay's finely textured and literate study provides fresh evidence that human beings, working together on matters of importance, can make sense of the changes going on around them and sustain their preferred view of the world. They are driven by something more than greed and will, on occasion, choose to maintain a way of life that is far from prosperous because it is important to them. Something is going on here, and it has nothing to do with the fact that the places in question can be dismissed as backward or maybe even racist. After all, we have seen before that city residents are not always keen to have new economic ventures take place

in their neighborhoods, and sometimes they succeed in curtailing these efforts. We also have seen, though much less often, that economic development activities can serve a broad array of persons living in cities (see my own book, *Race, Redevelopment and the New Company Town* [State University of New York Press, 1990]).

No, what Ramsay is writing about goes well beyond these points. She shows how human beings embedded in a place with a viable local culture, a place they care for, are able to articulate their interests, no matter how little hard economic sense their decisions make to the rest of us. The persons and communities that Ramsay writes about struggle to reach a common understanding of the right course of action. Then they proceed to follow it. They not only act like competent persons, they are competent persons who are immersed in a viable culture.

She shows us how making a community function well is hard and sometimes thankless work. It requires the collaboration, if not outright cooperation, of the several races, generations, and classes represented among area residents. The prospect of imminent change, however alluring, has an impact on everyone who lives and works in these places. Ramsay describes how the residents of these communities come to reject new, shiny opportunities in large part because these changes would be too disruptive to the way of life that they had come to accept. She has told their story with sensitivity and intelligence. It can be read profitably by students and serious observers of economic development alike. It is a good book.

*On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology.*  
By Michael Rosen. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.  
Pp. xi+289. \$35.00.

Don Herzog  
*University of Michigan*

Michael Rosen brings intoxicating erudition and an elegant if elusive prose style to crack—or pulverize—one of the most venerable chestnuts of social theory, the theory of ideology. For Rosen, the two central elements of that theory are (1) that societies are self-maintaining systems and (2) that they produce false consciousness in their members precisely because it helps to maintain society. And for Rosen, the theory is, well, a spectacular mess. Despite the efforts of such analytical Marxists as G. A. Cohen, he urges, no such view can be reconstructed in ways that begin to comport with our ordinary standards for reasonable scientific explanation.

Much of the book is a sort of prehistory of ideology. I say *prehistory* advisedly: Rosen writes as though Whig history never got a bad name or at least never deserved one. Just as Leszek Kolakowski decided to return to Plotinus to unearth the seeds that sprouted in Marxist error, so

Rosen begins a dazzling tour through intellectual history with Plato and Augustine. No teleologist, Rosen does not credit Rousseau or Hume or Smith with a covert intention of laying the ground for Marx's views. But every time he examines an author, he is ruthlessly forward looking. He wants to know how he helped lay those grounds. A prissier historian might groan at the future-directed perspective, but my view is that for Rosen's purposes this is just fine. What is more, and better, he is a perceptive, even gifted, reader of canonical (and less canonical) texts. Instead of rounding up the usual suspects and producing peremptory citations from them, he digs in and does great work.

Less historically minded social theorists will want to skip straight to chapter 6, where Rosen credits Marx with five (largely incompatible) models of ideology. Rosen speaks of *models*, not theories, because he thinks in every case Marx has evocative but only sketchy gestures that omit crucial explanatory mechanisms; Marx fails to offer fully realized arguments. Along the way, Rosen urges that Cohen's account of functionalist explanation is too lax: the genius of evolutionary biology is to supply efficient causation to underlie functionalist stories, but social theory has no parallel account. (More generally one might note that facile gestures toward evolution in the social sciences—consider, e.g., the “evolution of norms”—remain irritating in the absence of any compelling account of selection and transmission mechanisms.) An ensuing chapter on the quasi-Kantian apparatus of critical theory, with its efforts to cast society as an agent imposing fundamental categories of perception on its members, is just as assiduously and appropriately skeptical.

Rosen is so desperately well read that sometimes the thread of his argument gets lost. (Call this the Berlin effect, after Sir Isaiah.) Or, put differently, sometimes he writes promissory notes himself instead of cashing them out with cogent arguments. Given his considerable analytic skills, this is a shame. I wonder, for instance, precisely what he has against what he calls the “rationalist tradition” of the West, with its emphasis on putting reason in charge of the self. Not that that view is unobjectionable: just that so put it is so invidiously abstract that it is hard to know what to say about it one way or the other. I wonder, too, precisely what he finds attractive in Walter Benjamin's exceedingly obscure account of the aura. Rosen begins to work up an explication, turning partly to prior continental aesthetics, but I cannot report that I had a clear grasp of the matter when he let it drop.

Finally, alas, the book ends with a whimper instead of a bang. Rosen notices some straightforward possibilities that retain some of the core insights people have wanted from the theory of ideology while jettisoning the two premises he finds faulty. He canvasses coordination dilemmas and prisoners' dilemmas (I think he jumbles these two together a bit), wishful thinking, and more, so reminding us that there are plenty of other ways to see how people might come to accept forms of domination that are bad for them—quite so. But then one wonders just how many Marxists and others really do resolutely insist on society as a self-maintaining sys-

tem and on odd functionalist explanations. Rosen obviously believes there are lots of them out there. I do tend to think of social science as a living museum of curiosities better preserved in amber, but his target is a specimen I do not often encounter. Those who stumble across his specimen more often and those who wish to enjoy the company of a thoughtful and literate mind will enjoy this volume.

*Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions.* By Stephen E. Hanson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. xv+258. \$45.00 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

Philip G. Roeder  
*University of California, San Diego*

Stephen Hanson traces the conception of time in Marxist thought with an intellectual history that sweeps from precursors (Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel) to Mikhail Gorbachev. Hanson rejects Marxist and modernist approaches to this question and instead introduces his own typology that draws on Max Weber's distinction among traditional, rational, and charismatic authority and on Ken Jowitt's characterization of the Leninist synthesis as charismatic-rational. Hanson touches on several issues in which conceptions of time were important in the Marxist tradition, such as work discipline in the factory, but the most important recurring issue in Hanson's analysis is the question whether the transition to communism is thoroughly constrained by the unfolding of history or individuals might transcend these constraints of history and leap forward in time. In Hanson's view, the Marxist synthesis embraces both, so that the rational time of linear history can be punctuated by charismatic interventions.

Hanson traces Marxist thought through four cycles (the last truncated by the collapse of the Soviet Union); theoretical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural cycles correspond to the periods in which Karl Marx wrote, Vladimir Lenin built the Soviet state, Joseph Stalin constructed social and economic institutions, and Gorbachev sought to create a mass political culture supporting Soviet institutions. In each cycle the initial conceptual resolution of the tension between rational and charismatic strands in Marxist thought (by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Gorbachev, respectively) was followed by divisions among a rightist or rational tendency (Eduard Bernstein, Nikolay Bukharin, and Georgii Malenkov), a centrist or neo-traditional tendency (Karl Kautsky, Grigory Zinovyev, and Mikhail Gorbachev), and a leftist or charismatic tendency (Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, and Nikita Khrushchev), setting the stage for a new synthesis.

Hanson's broader purpose is to demonstrate the causal force of ideas. He asserts that these conceptions of time shaped Soviet practice: political elites enforced institutional rules about time that they felt were rooted in legitimate ideological principles. The strong claim of this book is that

"both the design of Leninism's core institutions and the patterns of political struggle among Communists from 1848 to 1991 were rooted in the conception of time set out in the work of Karl Marx" (p. 19).

This thesis leads Hanson to some interesting revisions of common wisdom and to some original stands on one side or the other of recurring debates in sovietology. For example, Hanson joins those who see continuity in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, but he argues that this continuity is rooted in their common conceptions of time. In this vein, Hanson disputes the traditional view of Stalin as an intellectual mediocrity and, instead, argues that Stalin alone among the heirs to Lenin understood the charismatic-rational conception of time and how to apply this to the task of building economic institutions. Gorbachev emerges as the heir to this Marxist tradition, trying to move to the next stage by creating a culture based on mass internalization of the Marxist norms of revolutionary time transcendence.

Hanson does leave some pieces missing in his case for the centrality of conceptions of time in Marxist thought and practice. First, Hanson owes us a more careful explanation of how the introduction of the concept of time to our reading of Marxist texts improves on conventional interpretations. Much of Hanson's discussion of the writings of Marx and Lenin and the debates among their respective disciples is a familiar recounting. For example, it is part of the conventional wisdom that Bernstein, Kautsky, and Luxemburg disagreed over the timing of the socialist revolution. What did we fail to understand that required the introduction of the Weberian typology? Second, Hanson needs to demonstrate that these conceptions of time actually affected Soviet practice. Although the author's strong claim is the causal force of ideas, there is little discussion of Soviet practice and no careful analysis to show that conceptions of time better explain these practices than do more conventional, and far simpler, explanations.

*Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. By J. Scott Long. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997. Pp. xxx+297. \$45.00.

Alan Agresti  
University of Florida

This is a useful addition to the rapidly expanding literature on statistical models for categorical, discrete, and limited dependent variables. What distinguishes *Regression Models* is its emphasis on models that other books on these topics treat lightly, if at all, such as models for nominal and ordinal outcomes, models for count data, and models for dependent variables that are continuous except for a set of "censored" observations known only to fall in a certain range and often set equal to some constant such as zero.

A strength of the book is the emphasis on model interpretation. J. Scott Long motivates most models by an underlying latent variable model and then provides various ways of interpreting parameter estimates so that one does not need to rely on effects on unfamiliar scales such as the logit. The emphasis is on application rather than theory, but the technical level would be difficult for many social scientists. The style resembles the way models are presented in the econometric literature, and readers will benefit from having a somewhat better background than the typical statistical methods courses for social scientists provide. The reader ideally should have some familiarity with calculus, matrix algebra, and probability density and distribution functions. Nonetheless, the social scientist who truly wants to understand these models will benefit from the sophistication of the presentation.

After two introductory chapters reviewing linear regression and maximum likelihood estimation, chapter 3 discusses models for binary outcomes such as logit and probit models. An appealing aspect of Long's style in this chapter and later ones is his beginning each chapter by mentioning several published articles that have used the methodology. Chapter 4 introduces basic ideas of hypothesis testing and goodness of fit based on the likelihood function. Chapter 5 presents models for ordinal outcomes, and chapter 6 presents models for nominal outcomes. This is standard material, but social scientists who are familiar only with binary logistic regression may be surprised at the variety of extensions that exist for multicategory responses including models for which values of predictors may change according to the response category. All these chapters have a strong emphasis on interpretations, which is often novel.

The book makes its most important contribution in the following two chapters introducing two types of models that are not commonly discussed in the social statistics literature. Chapter 8 presents the tobit model that describes censored observations in which, for instance, all observations below a particular level receive the value zero. Long shows connections with event history (survival) models where censoring normally occurs for high rather than low values of the response. Chapter 9 presents models for outcomes that are counts of the number of times something has happened, such as the number of times a subject has been arrested. Simple models of this type assume a Poisson distribution for the dependent variable. In practice, this distribution usually does not permit sufficient variability (the variance is constrained to equal the mean), and Long shows ways of generalizing this model to account for extra heterogeneity. Again, the emphasis on interpretation is very good, and this chapter is perhaps the best in the text.

*Regression Models* is missing two major topics. First, the log-linear model for contingency tables has only a brief introduction in the final chapter. This is not a major problem since other books cover this model in detail and since it is more natural for describing relationships among a set of dependent variables than effects of predictors on a single dependent variable. For completeness and comparative purposes, though, a full

## Book Reviews

chapter on log-linear and association models would have been nice. In particular, it will surprise many social scientists that this book contains no mention of Leo Goodman's work.

Second, there is no discussion of models for longitudinal or other forms of repeated measurement data. New developments have been occurring at a rapid pace in this area, and an introduction would have been useful. The choice of topics for a text like this is a difficult one, however, and I commend the author for choosing some that are poorly represented in the existing literature.

How does this book compare to existing books on these topics? It has a higher technical level than, for instance, the books by Stephen Fienberg (*The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data* [2d ed., MIT Press, 1980]), Thomas Wickens (*Multiway Contingency Table Analysis for the Social Sciences* [Erlbaum, 1989]), and myself (*An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis* [Wiley, 1996]). There is little overlap with Wickens or Fienberg, however, as those books concentrate on log-linear models. There is overlap with mine on topics such as logistic regression and its extensions for multicategory responses. My book also includes some traditional topics for contingency table analysis whereas Long's has greater emphasis on models for discrete and censored responses. Unlike the other books, Long's does not provide problems at the ends of chapters; throughout, however, Long suggests many of the unproven results as exercises, and he provides solutions at the end of the text.

In summary, this is a fine book for any social scientist who wants to develop a solid understanding of the models discussed. It is an important resource for those who use the models and want to see useful ways of interpreting them, and I commend the author for a clear exposition of some models that have received insufficient attention in other books of this type.

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